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Other Housing Strategies

Editorial

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In spite of all the technological and economic progress that the world has experienced over the last 50 years, the number of homeless and precariously housed has increased worldwide. A major reason is, of course, the generalisation of neoliberal policies spread through globalisation. But in spite of this general trend, which is bound to continue for years if not decades to come, a large variety of formal, informal or semi-formal housing strategies have been, and can be, developed that offer better and more easily accessible housing solutions than those current political systems tend to come up with. The problem of formal state housing solutions seems to be more a lack of imagination than fundamental opposition to new approaches. After all, decent housing conditions have always been considered a stability factor against political turnover and should therefore be supported by open-minded state representatives (who are still a minority, though).

The very first number of TRIALOG, published in 1983[1], attempted a fair assessment of conventional housing policies for the poor in the Global South. Most of the critical statements expressed in the papers of that issue still hold true today, although contemporary ecological and climate change concerns were obviously not a topic at that time. Since then, positive mass-housing policies have certainly declined rather than increased. On the road, alternative solutions in form of self-built housing solutions have periodically been rediscovered as options, and were discussed in TRIALOG 18 (1988)[2], but they seem simply to be too time-consuming in a fully "tailored" working environment. In this current issue of TRIALOG, we focus on the individual appropriation of state-built housing, on the effects of the penetration of the private sector into low-income housing solutions, and on user-driven adaptation of state housing or other neglected structures.

The first paper, written by ***Janice Perlman***, the author of the legendary Book "The Myth of Marginality", tracks back the failures of public sector interventions (which she characterises as "*the helping hand strikes again*") and their effect in the same informal neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro in **Brazil** that she studied 50 years ago. Considering that very soon one in three people on the planet will live in informal areas, we should better decide to make positive use of the knowledge and talent of the billions of people living on it than relying on the state to take the lead.

Monika Grubbauer analyses the recent Mexican experience in which the state apparently restricts itself to the role of a facilitator, while it relies less on the individual settler than it does promote corporate market intrusion in both the field of informal settlement upgrading as well as the provision of large-scale workers' housing supply. Interestingly enough, the disregard of popular demand and preferences has simultaneously produced the phenomenon of large-scale vacancy rates, neatly demonstrating an incompatibility between housing need and market supply in the low-income sector. The distinction between "formal" and "informal" has been commonly linked to a legal interpretation. The stricter the legislation, the more impractical is the enforcement of formal constructions. Vietnam, as demonstrated by ***Hoai Anh Tran*** and ***Yip Ngai Ming***, is a highly interesting example of a complex but functional practice of resolving the discrepancy between legal norms and widespread illegal practice by means of political negotiation and community consensus.

Whereas the Vietnam paper refers to the impact of legalisation on informal constructions, ***Elettra Griesi*** reports on informal adaptation of formally produced mass housing in **Cuba**. Her empirical study refers to a well-intended provision of standard walk-up apartment blocks to be occupied by a rural population traditionally housed in one-storey detached cottages. The paper highlights the cultural incompatibility between both models and focuses on human and cultural values about which the local professional wisdom appears to be completely ignorant.

A partly similar process of architectural appropriation can be observed in two – once avant-gardist – social housing estates in **Peru** from the 1950s and 1960s, commonly known as UVs and PREVI. The author, ***Patricia Caldas Torres***, argues that the original high architectural quality, whether anticipating later modifications by the users or not, facilitated spatial adaptation and appropriation – a very positive experience in comparison with the preceding Cuban case study. Apart from the original architectural quality, apparently the limited control exerted by a weaker state also facilitated the extent of user appropriation in Peru.

No form of state control seems to limit the appropriation of space in informal settlements around Maputo, **Mozambique**, as revealed by ***Joana da Cunha Forte***. However, though less abrupt than in the Cuban case above, we observe a gradual transformation from rural to urban housing patterns. In this case, an increasing scarcity of space dictates a continuous change from outdoor to indoor living patterns. Similar to in a chicken farm, overpopulation nurtures social conflict. So far, multi-level living has not yet arrived – a potential alleviation, in respect of living space, but probably an additional cultural factor of stress.

A very special case of informal settlements, occasionally even with a rare variety of multi-storey housing, are the historical cemeteries in Cairo, **Egypt**, described by ***Zeina Elcheikh***. Opportunities for adaptation of the living environment are limited; more realistic would be to refer to adapting lifestyle to the setting. The costs of living in the "City of the Dead" are mostly social which the individual residents must weight against material benefits like free lodging and a central and quiet location that provide a certain compensation.

Kosta Mathéy

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Other Housing Strategies

Volume editor: Kosta Mathéy

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Cities without Slums are Cities without Soul
Re-thinking Concepts and Consequences of Marginality in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro

Janice Perlman

„Städte ohne Slums" heißt „Städte ohne Seele" – Reflektion über Begrifflichkeiten und Auswirkungen von Marginalisierung anhand der Favelas von Rio de Janeiro

*Dieser Aufsatz von Janice Perlman – Autorin der legendären 40 Jahre alten anthropologischen Untersuchung ‚The Myth of Marginality' in den Favelas von Rio de Janeiro – entstand im Rahmen einer der zahlreichen Tagungen im Vorfeld von HABITAT III. Der Anlass lädt zu einem Rückblick ein über die wohnungspolitischen Wandlungen seit HABITAT I (1976), als die Diskussion wesentlich von Experten wie John Turner und seinen Mitstreitern angeführt wurde. Sie interpretierten das noch junge Phänomen der informellen Siedlungen in Lateinamerika als einen Lösungsansatz von Seiten der Betroffenen und nicht als „Schandflecken" der damals beginnenden (und im Übrigen bis heute anhaltenden) Urbanisierungswelle. In diesen vierzig Jahren erkannten progressive Politiker*innen insbesondere die sozialen wie politischen Vorteile einer Sanierung der selbst gebauten Siedlungen anstelle von Abriss und Vertreibung und setzten dies als Mittel der städtischen Wohnungspolitik ein. Janice Perlman hat die Gültigkeit der erwarteten Erfolge auch empirisch im Rahmen einer kürzlich veröffentlichten Langzeitstudie für Rio de Janeiro nachgewiesen. Sie stellt dies mit einem lachenden und einem weinenden Auge fest, denn seit den jüngsten Wohnungsprogrammen in Brasilien im Rahmen des Stadtumbaus für die Fußball-WM 2014 und die Olympischen Spiele 2016 stehen die Zerstörung von Favelas und die Zwangsumsiedlung der dort Lebenden in monotone Massenwohnbauten an der städtischen Peripherie wieder auf der Tagesordnung.*

What's a precarious neighbourhood?

In the urban poverty and policy lexicon there is an unfortunate fusion between **precarious neighbourhoods and precarious people**. Once a neighbourhood is perceived as precarious, the people living there are imbued with a series of negative stereotypes as unworthy, unruly and unclean. This is where the literature on marginality comes into alignment with current concepts of peripheries and precariousness. Marginality has a similar but not identical set of associations – on the margins spatially and socially; deviant from mainstream beliefs and behaviours; and threatening to the city of the elite. Referring to *"precarious neighbourhoods"* implies that we share a common understanding of the meaning of "precarious". Yet the concept is not specific. It embodies several different kinds of insecurity and vulnerability.

One type would be **insecurity of occupancy of the territory**. Urban communities built on land the residents neither own nor rent are unsanctioned and therefore under constant threat of removal. These are either unrecognised at all or negatively designated as "subnormal agglomerations", "invasions" or "occupations" regardless of age, size, location, or urban characteristics. The constant uncertainty of permanence runs the gamut from homeless people living on the streets, in parks, or under bridges (as seen in New York City); to occupation of patches of grass in the middle of traffic circles (as seen in Paris); to living on construction sites (as seen in Bombay); in abandoned buildings (as seen in Johannesburg) to informal communities developed on unused land. Whether called squatter settlements, shantytowns, slums or *favelas*, these self-built neighbourhoods represent the most prolific form of urban precariousness. They are located in undesirable areas such as steep hillsides; swamplands; riverbeds; flood plains; or downwind from fowl smelling industries, left unused by the owners – public or private. As the cities grow into the surrounding areas, these lands become more central and valuable, increasing the threat of removal.

This category also includes government built **social housing projects** in Latin America where people are forced to re-settle when their homes and communities have been demolished. They are frequently separated from family, neighbours and social support networks, making them more vulnerable. They are also removed from proximity to their sources of livelihood, and even education and health care. Residents of these public housing complexes may be expelled for any number of reasons ranging from late payment of monthly rents and fees to getting on the wrong side of the drug lord or militia controlling the territory.

A second aspect of precariousness is the **instability and impermanence of the dwellings**. Construction materials are often taken from the garbage: scrap metal that becomes burning hot in the sun; plastic sheeting that becomes torn in wind and rain; packed mud, lean-tos and tents or even, as in the case of pavement dwellers in India, cloth saris strung on poles on the sidewalk (using the wall behind them as the back of the house). What these have in common is danger to the inhabitants.

A third dimension of precariousness is the **fluidity of the**

Figure 1: Rio de Janeiro. Bairro Rocinho, 2010. Sightseeing the Favela (Photo: Klaus Teschner)

population. In some communities the members of the group may change radically – some disappearing, others moving to other locations, some arrested or killed – and others arriving.

Neighbourhoods may be precarious because they have: **1) deteriorated** due to neglected maintenance, lack of urban services, natural disaster, or population succession; **2) been partially or totally demolished**; or **3) been abandoned** due to economic and social transformations. One scenario would be –as in the case of Detroit– neighbourhoods depleted by de-industrialisation and the loss of the major industrial base; another like Havana which was left to decay for decades after the Cuban revolution, until the late 1980s when integrated urban development became a political priority. In port cities, such as London, Los Angeles, Cape Town, or Rio de Janeiro, the changing nature of the shipping industry and shift to containerisation left piers, warehouses, docking facilities and the surrounding neighbourhoods vulnerable to illicit and illegal occupation and activities.

In the case of major job and population loss in formerly thriving industrial cities, the challenge is to attract new types of businesses and residents. In the case of the changes in needs and use of **port cities**, the trend is restoration and revitalisation of the tangible and intangible cultural patrimony. Rio's *Porto Maravilha* is a prime example of massive public and private investment. The futuristic Museum of Tomorrow sits on a formerly abandoned pier and not far away is the excavation of the buried history – the *Cais do Valongo* – the wharf where African slaves were brought from arriving ships and put up for sale. What is precarious here is not the renewed areas themselves but the right of the long-time residents to remain and benefit from value-added – or be expelled by the state or the market (gentrified).

Finally, not to be forgotten are neighbourhoods which were rendered **precarious by acts of the state**, such as the urban renewal projects in American cities in the1960-'70s. They tore thriving neighbourhoods apart for various public works projects and built massive housing projects, taking "eyes off the streets" and opening the way to urban violence[1, 2, 3, 4].

In different ways, all of the categories in this typology demonstrate that precariousness erodes one's sense of self, safety and security. Families and individuals are put under constant stress and distress insofar as their lives and the meaning they imbue to the place they live, of their can be totally disrupted by political decisions made about them without including them.

In many periods and places, it has been part of the **amusement of the elite** to go "slumming" a phrase made famous by the incredible attraction that Harlem had for white New Yorkers who wanted to be cool, get in the groove and be part of the scene of good music, good dancing, good food and general good times. This is among the contradictions in Rios favelas. *Cariocas* do not treat *favela* residents with respect, do not protest unjustified police killings, do not pressure the city for equal services, yet go into the *favelas* at night to party at bailes funk, *passinho*, rap, hip hop and recreational drugs. And now we see a blossoming of favela tourism, *favela* chic design

01 Jacobs 1961
02 Caro 1974
03 Gans 1962
04 Fried 1963

Figure 2: Minha Casa Minha Vida Public Housing program (Source: http://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2016/10/03)

and all manner of profitable enterprises based on favela creativity, while preserving the separation and inequality.

Later in this paper I present findings from decades of study in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. What interests me today is learning how precariousness is manifested and addressed in other places, particularly now in European cities dealing with the massive influx of international refugees. How does that compare with the experience of other stigmatised groups such as rural-urban migrants within their own countries, or migratory groups like the Roma? And how have the policy responses and social movements differed in each case?

Why do precarious neighbourhoods exist?

The typology and questions above raise the issue of why these precarious neighbourhoods exist. Each category is the result of different historic, cultural and political economic factors. At the time of writing this paper, informal settlements in cities of the developing countries are the fastest growing segment of the global population. Unlike the case of international refugees who are **pushed out** of their countries by natural disasters or the violence of civil wars, the many city-ward migrants come by choice. They are **pulled by** the magnetism of urban opportunities – if not for themselves then for their children. Since they cannot afford to rent or buy any form of housing in the formal market, they build on their own.

Figure 3: Minha Casa Minha Vida in Rio (Source: http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14887)

Similarly, as with almost all types of precarious settlements, if there were political will, inexpensive housing options could be provided near sources of livelihoods, and would at least reduce the number of people living on the streets, in abandoned office buildings or on stilt houses over swamps. Of course, there are cases of mental and physical illness that require other solutions. And there are people who prefer to live informally for a variety of reasons, including greater freedom to live an alternative lifestyle. For them, being forced out of their settlements and into public housing is not the answer.

There are many examples of misguided urban policies focused on reducing "housing deficits" without taking into account the "housing assets" already existing in informal settlements. The numbers game of producing "housing units" rather than on producing a vibrant integrated city has distorted national urban programmes (such as *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* in Brazil). Instead of interventions with a vision of an integrated urban fabric, they are blinded by tunnel vision of units – without regard to location. This is leading to a replay of the disastrous removals to remote housing projects that were a huge failure in the 1970s.

Precariousness and marginality - a longitudinal perspective

The origins of this concept in sociology were not entirely negative. In the 1920s the sociologist Robert Park used

the trope "marginal man" to describe a person who has left one culture behind and not yet totally embraced or been embraced by the new one, thereby left in a kind of cultural limbo.

This territory between two different cultures implies the alienation of "not belonging" but also opens a window for seeing things with an outsiders' eye. Thus creativity and originality are born in the struggle to establish a new identity. In this process one is able to perceive patterns and create new connections that those living coherently within one thought system cannot. To quote directly:

> *"The marginal man… is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures…. his mind is the crucible in which two different and refractory cultures may be said to melt and, either wholly or in part, fuse"*[5].

Over the next hundred years the concept of marginality acquired different connotations with the shared stigmatisation of the urban poor as "other" – those "outside" the mainstream. The label has had material force in justifying the eradication of precarious neighbourhoods in different contexts and historic moments.

In the post-war period of rapid urbanisation in Latin America rural migrants were seen as rootless masses invading the citadel city of the elites. They were seen as dirty, degenerate and dangerous. The idea of marginal elements as criminals, prostitutes and ne'er do wells, was clearly expressed in the writing of the Fundação Leão XIII, the institution supposed to provide social services to them[6]. Even leftist writers such as Frantz Fanon[7] in the *Wretched of the Earth*, warned of the rootless hoards encircling the city, as likely to explode into violence at any time. One prominent political scientist compared *favelas* in Rio to "the syphilitic sores on the body of a beautiful woman", others simply saw them as cancerous growths to be exorcised.

My early research in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro was conducted at the height of the military dictatorship in Brazil –1968-'69– a time when everyone from leftist students to taxi drivers thought it too dangerous to enter a *favela*. I was interested in the impact of urban experience on newly arrived migrants from the countryside. I wanted to know how they managed in the city, given that most arrived with little or no money (having sold everything to afford the trip to the city); that few knew how to read or write; and that only a handful had gone beyond walking distance from their villages.

One favela was selected from each of the three areas of the city where migrants tended to go: 1) *Catacumba* from the upscale residential South Zone; 2) *Nova Brasília* from the industrial North Zone; and 3) *Vila Operária* and two small *favelas* from the municipality *Duque de Caxias* in the *Baixada Fluminense*. I lived for six months in each favela and interviewed 200 people chosen at random and 50 leaders from each community. I returned in 1973, after *Catacumba* was removed, to find out what had happened and learn about life in the housing projects. The book resulting from that study in 1976, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Politics and Poverty in Rio de Janeiro*, was part of the paradigm shift from seeing squatter settlements as the solution rather than the problem and seeing the residents as a valuable *resource rather than a parasitic drain*. This line of thinking had already been suggested in the work of John Turner[8], Lisa Peattie,[9] and Anthony Leeds[10] with whom I studied – and Charles Abrams[11] before them.

A decade before Charles Abrams, Oscar Lewis had argued against the anti-urban bias in his article "Urbanization without Breakdown"[12] which took on Robert Redfield's premise of a "folk-urban continuum" from an idyllic rural life to a depraved urban life[13]. Lewis later postulated a "Culture of Poverty", a set of beliefs and behaviours passed from generation to generation thereby perpetuating poverty[14,15]. William Ryan[16] called this, *Blaming the Victim*, claiming the poverty trap was structural and not a self-defeating sub-culture.

In Brazil at roughly the same time, a body of work on marginality and dependency theory was emerging in the discourse on poverty, inequality and development. At the height of the military dictatorship (1969) a group of university professors in Sao Paulo founded CEBRAP- The Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning. The group included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Paulo Singer, Francisco Weffort, Octavio Ianni and Jose Arthur Giannotti[17]. Not long afterwards Cardoso and Al Stephan, along with Juan J. Linz, Samuel Morley, Philippe C. Schmitter, Thomas E. Skidmore and other American Brazilianists came out with Authoritarian Brazil which built upon the work at CEBRAP[18].

My fieldwork in Rio's *favelas* was an attempt to test of the core concepts of marginality (as used in the literature, popular parlance and urban policy) against the reality on the ground. It was originally a set of questions about the "Impact of Urban Experience" based on the disputes in the literatures of the time. The research results contradicted assumptions that had never been empirically tested or contested. I found that the migrants were not the poorest or most desperate within their village, but the best and the brightest. They were the ones who had the courage and conditions to leave everything behind in search of a better life in the city. In other words, they were not the "bottom of the barrel" but the "cream of the crop". And, in political terms, they were not resentful and radical and did not compare their conditions to that of those in the luxury apartment houses around them. Their reference group remained the people back in their villages who were much worse off and without future opportunities open to them. My overall conclusions were:

1. Favela residents are not marginal to the city but inextricably integrated into it, albeit in an asymmetrical manner detrimental to their own interests;

2. They contribute their hard work, their high hopes, and their loyalties, but do not benefit from the goods and services of the system;

3. They are neither economically nor politically marginal, BUT exploited, manipulated, and repressed to maintain the status quo;

4. They are neither socially nor culturally marginal, BUT

05 Park 1928
06 Perlman 1976
07 Fanon 1962
08 Turner 1972
09 Peattie 1986
10 Leeds 1971, 1976, 1978
11 Abrams 1964
12 Lewis 1952
13 Redfield 1953
14 Lewis 1969
15 Bourgois 2001
16 Ryan 1971

17
For a history of this period and the individual and collective publications of CEBRAP, see Goertzel 1999 and Cardoso 2001.

18 Stephan 1976

Figure 4: Rio de Janeiro: Bairro Rocinho (Photos: Klaus Teschner)

stigmatised and excluded from a closed class system.

5. In short, favelas are not marginal but actively "marginalised" by a system that benefits from maintaining inequality, exclusion and repression.

Forty years and three generations later

In 1999, I returned to Rio to see whether it would be possible to find the any of the 750 people who had been interviewed thirty years earlier. The prospects were especially dismal given that we had used only first names (to protect people's identity); that there were few street names and no housing numbers at the time; and the communities had grown and changed so much between 1969 and 1999. *Catacumba* had been removed in 1970 and its 10,000 residents had been re-located to distant housing projects. *Nova Brasília* had grown up and over the hillsides, merging with other *favelas* into what the government called the Complexo do Alemao, one of the most violent areas of Rio. Yet due to the strong socialnetworks it was easier than expected to track down original interviewees, even those who had left the area.

The idea of the study was to follow the evolution of these precarious neighbourhoods and the life trajectories of those who had been part of the original study[19]. However, there was no way to determine whether the people were better or worse off, because they were in a different stage of their life cycle. To deal with this we interviewed a sample of their children, whose age range was comparable to their mothers or fathers 30 years earlier (the study included males and females from 16-65). When the analysis of those data showed disappointing results as compared with the hopes of the migrants, we thought that perhaps it took another generation for integration. With that in mind we sampled the grandchildren. The research results are presented in the more recent book, *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*[20].

The study demonstrated that precarious settlements are not necessarily *dead end traps*. A third of the original interviewees and over half of their grandchildren had left the *favelas* (or the housing projects) and moved into the formal sector. Only 1/3 of the grandchildren's generation was still living in *favelas* when the re-study was done. Furthermore, many people had remained in *favelas* by choice despite having sufficient income to move elsewhere. For a variety of reasons including lifestyle preference, family ties, proximity to work and community networks, these people preferred life in the *morro* (hill) over life on the *asfalto*.

Living conditions in the *favelas* had also improved in terms of basic urban services, housing materials and household consumption of electro-domestic appliances and education. In these "consolidated" *favelas* that had been in place since my first study virtually all homes were built of bricks or other permanent materials, had electricity, running water, indoor toilets, and, legal or not, cable television.

Household consumption of electro-domestic appliances went up with each generation but the biggest leap was from the 1960s to the 2000s by which time the level of consumption reached the median of the city as a whole. The younger generation owned plasma televisions, washing machines and air conditioners unthinkable in earlier times. The only two indicators that were higher in the formal city were personal computers and cars. Even so, 34% of the grandchildren's generation owned cars or other vehicles and 27% of them had personal computers. This high degree of consumerism has been equated with the rise of a "new middle class" yet *no degree of material acquisition can confer citizenship status, equal treatment under the law or the respect accorded to a middle class person*.

Without doubt there were striking gains in education. Among the grandchildren, illiteracy had been wiped out and –as of 2006—11% were studying or had completed university. In 2016 when this is being written, that percentage is much higher and some of those born and raised in *favelas* are now professors and professionals. But overall, those are still the exception. For most families at least as of 2009 gains in education did not translate into parallel gains in income. The graph below indicates in fact that for every additional year of schooling after 3rd grade, the income gap between *favela* residents and the rest of the city increased. The expected rise in incomes with additional years of schooling showed up for the city as a whole, but for *favela* residents, the rise was gradual and the outcome, after 18 years of school, discouraging if not to say pathetic. [Compare Figure 'Income returns to education..]

Among the explanations for this gap are the rising bar for entry into jobs which demands educational levels at higher rates than the gains made in the *favela* population; the changing labour market; the poor quality of schools in *favelas* and the stigma of living in a *favela* –which is sufficient in itself to cut off job interviews when address is required. Despite decades of change in informal communities and upward mobility of their residents the stigma of being "other" and "lesser" persists and continues to inform policy. Perhaps this is part of the legacy of slavery, which was only abolished in Brazil in 1888. Close to four million slaves came through the port of Rio, 40% of all **slaves** brought to the Americas. Could this be why the elite's sense of superiority and entitlement is so ingrained and unacknowledged?

19 Perlman 2007
20 Perlman 2010

The single change, however, which most affected already precarious lives, was *the rise of the drug and arms traffic and the consequent high levels of lethal violence*. Starting in the mid 1980s the drug trade, especially in cocaine grew rapidly and *favelas* provided a convenient local for dealing. By the time I began the re-study in 1999 many *favelas* were controlled by drug traffic and by the end of the study almost all had expelled the elected Presidents of the Residents' Associations. People were living in constant fear of being caught in the crossfire between competing drug gangs or between the police and the traffickers. One in every five interviewees reported having lost a family member in a homicide.

The sharp increase in violence decreased the most precious survival mechanisms of the *favelas*: social capital, mutual trust and sense of community unity. And the use identification of any *favela* resident with a potential reinforced the negative associations. In response to the questions about sources of prejudice they had experienced personally, residents reported more discrimination based on *favela* living than on skin colour, "appearance" (presentation of self), gender, being born outside the city or living in a "bad" neighbourhood. While all other experiences of discrimination declined in each generation, the negative consequences of living in a *favela* remained high – reported by 80% or more in all three generations.
Fear of losing one's home was replaced by fear of *losing one's life* in the crossfire --between police and gangs or

Among rival gangs at war over territorial control. Police tended to stay out of the *favelas* while the *narco* traffic expanded their area of control expelling or killing the elected Presidents of the Residents' Associations. By 2007 there were few independent *favelas* left; those not controlled by drug lords were controlled by self-appointed armed militias.

With the election of a governor whose campaign slogan was ending violence and the "taking back control of the territories" and the Rio's selection as host of the World Cup and Olympics, the UPP –Pacifying Police Unit programme– was launched in 2008. Its aim was to end the use of ostensive arms and exert control of *favelas* through a permanent police occupation. The original concept was to pair the military side with strong social programmes and community services provided by the sister programme, the Social UPP. A political party deal destroyed the prospects for the much-needed Social Programme just before it was to go into effect. Without the human and social side, and in push for rapid expansion, the UPP police antagonised the communities with arbitrary brutality and disregard for the rights of residents. Rather than bringing peace, they increased the atmosphere of violence and opened the door for the return of the drug gangs even before the 2016 Olympics.

Twenty-five year time lag between idea and implementation

When the ideology of marginality was the conventional wisdom, the obvious response was to 'cleanse the citadel of the elite, exorcising the filthy lower class elements.' In short, remove the growing favelas as you would remove cancers from a healthy body. It took almost a generation of research, knowledge creation, social mobilisation – and finally the threat of political and economic disaster before policy-makers begin shifting from removals toward on-site upgrading[22]. The dialectical interplay between research, mind-set and public policy change over the past 50 years is loosely diagrammed in Table 1.

In oversimplified form the parallel and converging boxes on two tracks, suggest the interaction between knowledge (along the top) and practice (along bottom) from the 1960s through 2016. In the 1960s the assumption that squatter settlements were an "unsanitary" urban blight –harbouring criminals, prostitutes and lazy bums– was contested by the work of Charles Abrams, John Turner,

Lisa Peattie, Anthony Leeds, William Mangin and others working on Latin America. They and a handful of graduate students, myself included, and Carlos Nelson, Antonio Carlos Machado and Lisa Valadares in Rio began creating a counter-narrative. Our field research had shown that self-built housing was the solution not the problem and that housing was not a static commodity but an on-going work with multiple functions beyond shelter. The titles of two of John Turner's works, *Freedom to Build and Housing as a Verb*, convey this paradigm shift, which implied *building rather than bulldozing*.

At the policy level, the negative stereotypes squatters and their settlements in the 1960s helped to justify massive eradication and re-settlement in the 1970s, which, by the 1980s had disastrous results for both squatters and the state. Not until the mid1980s, with the end of the military dictatorship and return to party politics in Brazil and with the failure of public housing to pay for itself and nearly bankrupting the government did public policy finally converge with knowledge creation in support of upgrading on the site. The *Favela-Bairro* Project was inaugurated in

21 Pero 2004 / Pero 2006
22 Perlman 1987



Figure 5: Income returns to education are lower for favelados (Source: Pero[21])



Table 1: Ideas and Implementation Timeline for Informal Settlement Policy (Source: Author)

1995 and by 2005 had become the most ambitious upgrading project in the world.

It built upon the accumulated experience from the early years of CODESCO in 1968 and was continued under PAC-Favelas[23], targeted to the largest *favelas* in Rio. As part of the euphoria of winning the World Cup and Olympic bids, the City inaugurated the *Morar Carioca* (living the Rio way) programme in 2010, promising to integrate every *favela* into the formal city by 2020. In his widely applauded TED Talk Mayor Eduardo Paes[24] articulated his vision of an inclusive and sustainable city, going beyond physical urban infrastructure.

Morar Carioca was truncated before it was implemented, eliminating 30 of the 40 winning proposals for upgrading projects and then cutting the scope of the ones that went forward. The strongest aspects of the programme – having IBASE, a well-regarded NGO, as the community liaison, and having the Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB) as the convener of the competition – were both discontinued. Instead, the City has reverted to removing favelas for the purpose of building the Olympic facilities, transportation network and developing the Port Area and the *Barra da Tijuca*[25].

Two major shifts in Urban Policy during the past 50 years have taken us full circle: from removal to upgrading; and then from upgrading to removal (this time by market forces as well as state interventions). [Box 1 and Box 2]

The other reprise of tunnel vision from decades earlier was to base housing projects on counting so-called "housing deficits", ignoring the existing housing stock of informal communities. That led to massive investment in "social" housing "units" – on the far peripheries of cities, at the expense of integrated urban planning. Housing units do not make a city work!!

I have used the case of Rio de Janeiro as a specific example of policy evolution regarding one type of precarious neighbourhood, but parallel processes were in play all over Latin America, Asia and Africa. The similarity can be

Box 1: Urban policy shift # 1

> **End removal and re-location into public housing** and allow the favelas to grow naturally into working class neighbourhoods serving and contributing to their surrounding neighbourhoods. By the first decade of the 2000s, it was apparent that favela removal was over for good. It would be too politically risky given that 20% of the population lives in favelas; and economically counterproductive given the massive state investment in upgrading and infrastructure. At the same time, the shacks of the first phase of settlement had been developed into solid housing stock of permanent materials, typically with four stories and a flat slab roof. This allowed extended families to live together or allowed for rental income. This settlement pattern prevented sprawl and allowed people to live within walking distance or short bus ride to their work. The favelas did not have legal title to their land but they had "de facto" tenure since it was unthinkable that they would ever be faced with removal. In fact, during the first decade of the 2000s, most residents were no longer interested in formal title as they saw it as unnecessary and adding to household expenses through property taxes.

23
The Brazilian Federal government´s Growth Acceleration Programme (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, or PAC) was launched in 2007, with the stated mission of aiding economic growth through a substantial investment in infrastructure. In Rio de Janeiro, among other things, the programme urbanises favelas by improving sanitation, housing, transportation, and access to utilities' (<www.rioonwatch.org/?p=1705>, visited 22.05.2017).

24
https://www.ted.com/talks/eduardo_paes_the_4_commandments_of_cities?language=en

25
Western, rich and quickly developing town extension of Rio de Janeiro.

explained in part by the implicit consensus among international development agencies who fund urban projects. For that reason, we see national ministries starting to use the same catch-phrases at the same time in seeking support from the same sources. In urban development "Cities without Slums' became the goalpost for national governments around the world and perverted into large scale eradication programmes of informal settlements.

Cities without slums are cities without soul

Over the last 17 years, one of the guiding slogans for urban upgrading –led by multi-lateral and bi-lateral development agencies– has been "Cities Without Slums." A programme by this name was developed by the Cities Alliance in 1999[26], and was adopted by the United Nations in 2000 as part of the Millennium Development Goals. Since 2015 it has been carried over into the Sustainable Development Goals. Recognising that the intent was and is to upgrade the physical infrastructure of squatter settlements on site, preserving the social networks and access to job and other opportunities, this is commendable. Yet words have weight – and have power. Ignoring for the moment the on-going controversy over the derogatory nature of the word "slum", the intention of formalising the informal sector is not necessarily desirable insofar as it implies removing spaces of freedom and alternative lifestyles; "cleaning up", or "controlling/ordering" communities, it encourages both homogenisation and gentrification. That is net loss. Cities need free spaces for counter-cultural expression in order to thrive, as any urban *flâneur* would attest.

The goal of Cities without Poverty, Inequality or Exclusion is incontestable. But the implication of "pacifying" or eliminating informal communities, which were self-upgraded through struggle and savings over many decades undermines the very essence of urbanity. Innovation blossoms in cities because of their diversity, density and proximity. Wiping out the sources of cultural creativity and community solidarity is of course an unintended consequence, but a consequence nonetheless. Urban conviviality dies without the chance of serendipitous encounters among people with different cultures and lifestyles. *In short, formalisation of informal communities is not the path to the desirable city.*

Box 2: Urban policy shift # 2

> **Return to removal and resettlement into public housing [or provision of a "social rent" or a one-time buy out],** using the Mega-Events (World Cup and Olympics) or environmental risk as justification. As of July 2015, 77,206 people had been removed from Rio's favelas, including those deemed in the way of the Olympics infrastructure and those deemed as environmental safety risks. Most went to apartment units in the Minha Casa Minha Vida programme; most were separated from family and community members and located far from their homes, not unlike what happened half a century ago. The design and layout of the new housing units is eerily similar to those of that 1970s as if architecture, design and urban planning had been frozen in time.

In defence of the informal sector

As argued above, informal settlements are essential spaces of insurgency and innovation that nurture non-conformism. Without an alternative places offering flexibility and freedom from the norm, cultural productivity, consumption, social capital and intellectual capital are diminished[27]. The five major losses of formalisation are:

1. **Loss of labour and productivity**: Informal communities have a thriving internal economy with commerce, services, real estate markets, restaurants, bars, and small-scale manufacturing.

2. **Loss of consumer power**: The urban poor spend a disproportionate portion of their income on consumer goods and services, paying double or triple the shelf price because they buy on instalments. *Favela* residents in Rio account for 1.3 -2 million consumers, with an annual income of 5-10 billion *Reais* per year[28] (approximately 1.4 to 2.9 billion US dollars) keeping entire segments of the urban economy afloat.

3. **Loss of cultural production and creativity**: New forms of music, art, dance, theatre, film and fashion are born and nurtured in these "alternative spaces" –influencing trends in the rest of the city and the rest of the world.

4. **Loss of social capital**: The internal and bridging networks of social capital are coping mechanisms for those within and around neighbourhoods, providing support, resources and enhanced quality of life.

5. **Loss of intellectual capital**: As intelligence is not distributed along economic, racial or territorial lines, depriving the residents of informal communities of the opportunity to realize their full potential, limits the intellectual capital of the entire city. I have learned more from community leaders in Rio than from many of my professors at MIT. The intractability and complexity of the urban problem, requires the best minds, closest to the ground for solutions.

Policy perspectives: from the Right to the City to the right to exist

The above discussion has centred upon only one approach to addressing urban poverty – *the place-based approach*. All of the focus has been on the territory within the boundaries of informal settlements. There are at least two other ways to address this issue: *poverty-based and universal*. As illustrated in the box below, all squatter upgrading projects fall under the first category.

The poverty-based approach focuses is on those living below a set poverty line regardless of where they live. To be fair, this needs to be adjusted for purchasing power parity as living costs in a city are not comparable to those in a subsistence economy in the rural Northeast.

This approach, generically known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) creates a monetary incentive for low income families to invest in the health and education of their children and the care of their elders. In Brazil the programme in currently called "*Bolsa Família*".

26
The "Cities Without Slums" action plan was developed by the Cities Alliance in July 1999 and launched at the inaugural meeting of the Cities Alliance in Berlin in December 1999. [www.citiesalliance.org/cws-action-plan]. For more on this theme, see Yusuf 2014 and Perlman 2014.

27 Perlman 2014

28
O Globo, August 24, 2008, *"Sem direitos econômicos, favelas movimentam bilhões"*.

Table 2: Policy approaches for the urban poor (Source: Author)

Policy Approaches for the Urban Poor		
Place Based	**Poverty Based**	**Universal**
Favela Bairro	Conditional Cash Transfers	Right to Housing
PAC		
Morar Carioca	Bolsa Familia	Right to the City
MCMV		Right to Dignity

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The Universal Approach is based on individual and collective rights, applicable to all people regardless of place of residence or socio-economic status. The argument for "The Right to the City" was articulated by the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre in his 1968 book of that name (Lefebvre 1968). He wrote: "*The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is (…) one of the most precious and yet most neglected of our human rights*".

This concept led to a worldwide discussion about the right to decent housing at the Habitat II Summit in Istanbul in 1996, and the more global Right to the City is now being debated along with the concept of "*The City for All*" in the zero draft for the UN Habitat congress in 2016 in Quito. Obviously these approaches are complementary not mutually exclusive.

government interventions in precarious neighbourhoods often do more harm than good. I refer to this as "*the helping hand strikes again*". The further removed from the on-the-ground reality, the more difficult it is to value the voice of the disenfranchised and to recognize the way society renders them invisible.

Ultimately, the lack of respect for the dignity and personhood of the urban poor means that right now, in 2016, the knowledge and talent of the billion people living in precarious circumstances are being wasted. By 2050, one of every three people on the planet will reside in these informal communities. Can we afford to ignore them?

NOTE:

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The Current State of Self-help Housing in Mexico

Shifting National Housing Policy Priorities, Commercialisation of Housing Microfinance and Marketisation in the Construction Sector

Monika Grubbauer

Die zunehmende Kommerzialisierung des Selbsthilfe-Wohungsbaus: *Mexico, einst bekannt durch seine Anstrengungen, die Wohnungsknappheit in den Städten durch massiven staatlichen Wohnungsbau zu mildern, schwenkte in den 1990er Jahren auf den international-neoliberalen Trend ein, den sozialen Wohnungsbau der konzerngebundenen Privatwirtschaft zu übertragen. Ein Mix aus Liberalisierung und indirekter Subventionen mündete in eine massiver Überproduktion an Wohnraum in der städtischen Peripherie – ohne damit jedoch die Wohnungsnot in den Griff zu bekommen: der neu entstandene Wohnraum befand sich am verkehrten Ort und orientierte sich an der verkehrten Zielgruppe - was an den hohen Leerstandsquoten abzulesen ist. Eine Revision der Politik besann sich auf das Potenzial der innstädtischen informellen Wohngebiete, deren mögliche Modernisierung eher den Bedürfnissen der Geringverdiener als Zielgruppe entsprach. Diese wurden in der Folge mit Kleinkrediten und technischer Beratung bei Umbau und Renovierung ihrer Selbstbauhäuser unterstützt. Was zunächst eine gute und sozial verträgliche Politik zu sein schien, erwies sich aber bald als Trojanisches Pferd: Die potentesten der nationalen und auch internationalen Baumaterial-Produzenten bzw. Handelsketten monopolisierten den Sektor binnen Kürze, banden ihre Kunden mittels Gratis-Kreditkarten an ihre Firma und kontrollieren das Baugeschehen mit Unterstützung der legal vorgeschriebenen Bauberater.*

This paper reports on state-led housing policies in Mexico which seek to expand access to credits for the improvement and remodelling of self-help housing to the lowest income groups in Mexico, facilitated by programmes of the National Housing Commission (CONAVI) in cooperation with the Federal Mortgage Company (SHF). These programmes have been introduced in Mexico over the past decade and combine micro-credits with technical assistance and capital subsidies in order to facilitate small-scale rehabilitation of informal settlements. The programmes constitute a response to the new housing law enacted in 2006 which, for the first time, recognised incremental building as a legitimate housing strategy. More recently, these schemes have further been expanded in reaction to the negative consequences of the building boom of the late 2000s and the evident failures of market-based social housing provision through the industrialised construction sector[1].

In many ways, these assisted self-help housing schemes fulfil long-standing demands of housing activists and practitioners to take the needs of the urban poor more seriously and adapt finance and assistance schemes to the needs of self-help builders[2]. In Mexico, recent policy documents such as the National Housing Strategy (*Programa Nacional de Vivienda 2014-2018*) and the National Urban Development Strategy (*Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano 2014-2018*) emphasise urban rehabilitation and re-densification, and explicitly seek to address sustainability issues. These documents show the increasing awareness of the need to improve the existing housing stock and to rehabilitate and densify consolidated self-help settlements occupied, by now, by the second, third and present living generations[3].

However, these state-led attempts to institutionalise housing microfinance as a key instrument of national housing policies which aim at the rehabilitation of the self-help housing stock have also to be assessed in the light of wider changes in the construction and retail sector in Mexico. The market for basic building materials used in self-help construction is both highly profitable and fairly stable in terms of demand and, thus, allows buffering the business cycles in the formal construction sector. For the past 15-20 years, the large producers and retailers of building materials in Mexico have aggressively expanded into the market for low-income customers in both urban as well as rural areas, taking over local owner-operated businesses and replacing vernacular building materials. They have also greatly expanded their offers of consumer credit to include housing improvement and remodelling. To attract clients and win their loyalty, technical assistance is often provided together with the consumer credit. A much-cited example of such a business model targeting self-help builders is the *Patrimonio Hoy* programme of Mexico's CEMEX[4], which is often quoted as best practise for "bottom of the pyramid" business strategies[5].

In this paper, I discuss the three broad changes in the housing, finance and construction sector which currently affect self-help housing practises of the urban poor in Mexico:

- first, the recent paradigmatic shift towards small-scale housing policies which provide increased acceptance and support for self-help construction practises;

01 Monkkonen 2011, Soederberg 2015

02 Ortiz 2007, Bredenoord and van Lindert 2010

03 Bredenoord and Cabrera 2014, Ward, Jiménez et al. 2015

04 CEMEX launched its *Patrimonio Hoy* programme in 2000. *Patrimonio Hoy* organises low-income families into small savings groups that facilitate incremental construction by jointly making saving payments. CEMEX, through its network, provides basic building materials and technical advice. So far, *Patrimonio Hoy* has served 500,000 families in five Latin American countries, the majority of them in Mexico.

05 Hartman and Werhane 2009

06 Datta and Jones 1999, Gilbert 2000
07 Ortiz 2007, Bredenoord and Verkoren 2010, Soederberg 2014

08
A mortgage-backed security is a tradable financial asset whose income payments derive from a pool of mortgage loans. The SHF purchases mortgage loans from banks, places them in a trust, and insures this pool of mortgages against default through a state-backed guarantee. Securities from the trust are then sold to institutional investors.

09 Soederberg 2015
10 PUEC-UNAM 2012, Fuentes and Hernandez 2014
11 Connolly 2006, Monkkonen 2012
12 Ziccardi and Gonzalez 2015
13 CONAVI 2013
14 Connolly 2009
15 Ward, Jiménez et al. 2011, Ward, Jiménez et al. 2015

- second, the expansion of housing micro-credits as a form of finance that is increasingly of commercial interest for the private financial sector; and

- third, the marketisation processes through which multinational retailers and large building-material suppliers are systematically targeting low-income customers.

National Housing Policies in Mexico (2006-2016)

Housing policies in developing countries in the 1990s were marked by a shift from state- to market-based solutions and the focus on the expansion of housing finance systems as part of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF[6]. Governments encouraged the development of private mortgage markets coupled with a strong bias on home-ownership. Similar to other Latin American countries, Mexico has adopted a market-based approach to housing for low-income households since the 1990s, when President Ernesto Zedillo initiated reforms of the housing finance system relying on provident funds. The two provident funds, the National Institute of Housing for Workers (INFONAVIT) and the Institute of Security and Social Services of State Workers (FOVISSSTE) were transformed from providers of subsidised housing into financial institutions and public mortgage banks[7].

The conservative government of the National Action Party (PAN) under President Vincente Fox (2000-2006) reinforced this approach with another reform at INFONAVIT. In 2001, the Federal Mortgage Company (SHF) was established as a second-tier housing development bank with the explicit mandate to promote the expansion of mortgage issuance and to foster the establishment of a mortgage-backed securities market[8]. In 2006, the National Housing Commission (CONAVI) was established to coordinate housing-sector reforms. Further reforms were initiated to make the financing available from INFONAVIT more flexible and to allow the combination of INFONAVIT loans with loans from private-sector lenders[9].

As a result of these reforms, in the late 2000s Mexico experienced massive over-supply of new housing at such a fast rate that the market could no longer absorb it. The mass-produced housing schemes of companies such as Geo, Homex and Urbi multiplied as a consequence of the high availability of cheap mortgages and cheap credits for the construction industry – mostly subsidised by the Federal Mortgage Company. These companies mostly built single-family housing estates in the outer urban peripheries, which proved problematic in many ways: they typically lack social infrastructure and public transport, which imply long commuting distances for households who rely on jobs in the more-central areas of the cities. In addition, construction quality tends to be poor and developers have been unwilling to compensate for damages and deficiencies. All of this brought about severe vacancy problems, deterioration and neglect in the newly built housing estates[10]. These large estates with small-scale housing targeted at middle- and lower-income populations became a main engine for socio-spatial segregation in Mexico in the 2000s, while still failing to reach the poorest segments of the population[11].

The disastrous environmental, social and economic consequences of this overbuilding became manifest at the end of the decade[12]. In 2013, incoming President Enrique Peña Nieto initiated a policy change which now prioritises housing construction in more-central urban settings. It relies on CONAVI subsidies, which vary according to location, infrastructure, public transport and other criteria[13]. As an effect, CONAVI subsidies for low-income house buyers became higher in more-central locations than in the urban periphery. In consequence, land in far-flung areas designated for development became unprofitable and many projects were left uncompleted. This brought debt troubles to Mexico's largest developers and finally brought construction to a halt. In 2014, the three largest Mexican housing constructions companies (Geo, Homex and Urbi) filed for bankruptcy.

In the light of these developments, there was an increasing awareness about the need to expand programmes to the renewal of existing informal urban areas, especially in the Mexico.

City Metropolitan Area. In Mexico City, as in most Latin American cities, the informal and squatter settlements, originally located in the urban periphery, have consolidated over 30 years after their formation and the self-built dwellings have been passed on to the second and third generations[14]. Even in the official debate, the improvement and regeneration of these unregulated housing stock is increasingly being declared as a priority issue for policy and practise, even though Peter M. Ward and colleagues argue that the consolidated low-income self-help settlements continue to pose a blind spot in contemporary housing-policy efforts and call for a more professional analysis in support of densification, rehabilitation and regeneration[15].

CONAVI and SHF are two organisations specifically supporting self-help housing. Since 2006, the SHF has been promoting the improvement of existing self-help houses – mejoramiento – through its housing micro-credit fund1 and, since 2011, it assists the more-comprehensive new construction of new homes and remodelling of existing ones – autoproducción – through its assisted self-help houses – mejoramiento – through its housing micro-credit

Figure 1: Number of residential houses with deficiencies according to type of necessary measure, numbers in millions of houses (Source: CONAVI/SHF)



Figure 2: San Buenaventura complex Ixtapaluca Mexico (Real photo – not an animation! Oscar Ruiz). https://www.pinterest.de/pin/440789882257688116/)

fund[16] and, since 2011, it assists the more-comprehensive new construction of new homes and remodelling of existing ones – autoproducción – through its assisted self-help housing fund[17]. The Federal Mortgage Company (SHF) does not issue credits on an individual basis, but works through intermediary lending institutions by acting as guarantor. Loans from the micro-credit fund are limited to the amount of 3,000 $US, loans from the assisted self-help housing fund may reach about 12,000 $US per unit. The latter scheme, within CONAVI's Esta esTu Casa programme, allows combining the loan with a capital subsidy for eligible households earning less than 5 times the minimum wage[18].

Borrowers within such an assisted self-help housing scheme are requested to work with an SHF-registered enterprise (*Agencia Productora de Vivienda/APV*), which supervises the construction or renovation project while the financial intermediary manages credit allocation and repayment. There are different types of APVs. A majority works through some form of prototyping: standard housing models assembled from prefabricated elements are – to different degrees and with varying success – adapted to the client's needs. These schemes, even when relying on the labour force of the households, replace existing structures or add new buildings. Only a few of the registered APVs provide technical assistance for detailed remodelling of existing homes. One such example is the non-profit enterprise Mejoremos, which operates in both rural and urban locations and supports individual case-by-case design[19].

In Mexico, non-governmental initiatives have been offering technical assistance to self-help builders for a long time. Much of this work has been unpaid work by activists or donor financed. Also, housing microfinance has been an issue since the late 1990s (Datta and Jones 1999). But a new element is its institutionalisation as part of state-led housing programmes and the incorporation of commercial banks in the provision of housing microfinance. This move cannot be separated from the general commercialisation and institutionalisation of housing finance in Mexico as discussed in the next section.

Commercial Engagement in Housing Microfinance

Many governments, development institutions and practitioners agree that the expansion of housing microfinance[20] is a crucial strategy to upscale adequate shelter[21], most importantly by "increas[ing] the speed and efficiency of the [self-building] process" (Ferguson and Smets 2010: 289). The institutions offering housing microfinance products have very different backgrounds and operate within a range of different legal structures. Housing microloans are offered by NGOs, non-profit organisations such as savings and loan cooperatives, as well as a variety of commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions (Ibid., Stickney 2011, Rosenberg, Gaul et al. 2013).

For more than 30 years, microfinance has been promoted as a key policy for poverty reduction and institutional capacity building in developing countries. However, scholars

Figure 3: Ecatepec, consolidated self-help settlement, Northern Mexico City Metropolitan Area (Photo: Author)

16 *Fondeo de Corto Plazo para Mejora o Ampliación de Vivienda*
17 *Fondeo de Mediano Plazo para Autoproducción Asistida*

18 The daily minimum wage as of 1 January 2016 for Mexico City (Geographical Area A) is 73.04 pesos (3.90 USD).

19 Grubbauer forthcoming

20 The term housing microfinance refers to small value, non-mortgage loans for purposes of home improvement, renovation and incremental building.

21 UN-Habitat 2005, Bredenoord, van Lindert et al. 2010, Merrill 2012

Figure 4: Self-constructed home remodelled under supervision of Mejoremos, second floor awaiting construction (Photo: Author)

have argued about the lack of sound quantitative evidence of the positive impact of microloans on poverty reduction[22]. Moreover, critics have also highlighted the adverse effects of microfinance, especially when meeting the requirements of full cost recovery imposed by World Bank and US government policies from the 1990s onward. Key points of critique are the ongoing commercialisation of microfinance coupled with excessive profit margins and high interest rates, the problem of multiple borrowing and client over-indebtedness, the use of loans for short-term consumption needs, and an increased share of wealthy clients[23].

Murdoch, in his seminal paper titled The *Microfinance Schism*, pointed out the fundamental conflict between rhetoric and action in the microfinance sector, between "financially-minded donors and socially-minded programmes"[24]. This schism results from a range of inherent problems: transactions costs are higher when lending at small scales, risk assessment is difficult when borrowers are poor and lack formal employment, and poor households typically lack assets for providing collateral[25]. These problems have made it difficult if not impossible to match demands for financial self-sustainability of microfinance institutions with the moral impetus to reduce risk and vulnerability among the poor. Castillo found that the Mexican profit-oriented microfinance institutions significantly differ from the altruist, socially-minded institutions in terms of higher operative costs and higher interest rates[26].

Over the past decade, housing microfinance has become increasingly attractive for commercial investors in Mexico. Compartamos, for instance, launched its housing microfinance product in 2006. The credit volume for the "Crédito Crece y Mejora" currently is between 8,000 and 30,000 pesos (400-1,600 USD) with interest rates between 70 and 90% per year, and the total costs of the credit including fees and 15 percent value-added taxes amounting up to 120% per year depending on loan volume and length of repayment.

The Mexican bank Compartamos is a particularly controversial example of the negative consequences of the commercialisation of microfinance: founded as an NGO in 1990 and transformed into a full-service bank in 2006, Compartamos is now the largest microfinance institution in Latin America. It has 2.8 million clients in Mexico and dominates the Mexican market with a share of 42%[27]. In 2007, it was the first such institution in Latin America to offer equity through an initial public offering (IPO). While the World Bank and the financial sector considered the commercial success of the IPO as a milestone for the industry[28], the huge profits the offering produced for Compartamos shareholders and the high interest rates that Compartamos charges for its services were subject to harsh critique by scholars and leading figures such Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank and winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize[29].

The rationale for the commercial engagement in housing microfinance is that two-thirds of the total housing stock in Mexico is self-built and a potential but largely underserved market. This valuation is supported by calculations of CONAVI, which put the number of residential properties in need of remodelling – extension and/or improvement – at 11.8 million[30]. Such estimates, however, do not necessarily reflect real demand but rather normative assumptions about what type of built structure can be regarded as completed. So far, housing micro-credits still account only for a small part of commercial microfinance. A market study based on data of nine major microfinance institutions in Mexico (including Compartamos) over the period of 2009-2014 found that 71% of the credits were obtained for micro-enterprises, 16% for consumption needs, and only 13% for housing improvement[31]. Yet, housing microfinance is clearly viewed as potential growth market, in Mexico and globally[32].

In Mexico, various new actors have expanded into this market. On the one hand, NGOs and social enterprises have expanded their portfolio to include housing microfinance products to complement the traditional types of microfinance for income-generating activities. On the other hand, commercial investors specialised in mortgage finance or related to the construction sector have also expanded into housing microfinance. Micro-loans for home improvement and remodelling are also available from INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE. These are, however, restricted to workers with formal employment and state employees.

The aim of the two SHF programmes mentioned above, the housing micro-credit fund and the assisted self-help housing fund, is to provide loans for the poorest segments of the population without formal employment, about 60% of Mexico's work force not eligible for INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE programmes. However, for the financial intermediaries the registration with these two programmes is attractive because of the possibility of refinancing their activities through low-cost credits from the SHF. The combination with technical assistance provided by the registered APVs makes these programmes even more attractive, because it allows reducing some of the risks associated with microfinance. In the model of assisted self-help housing projects combining technical assistance, state subsidies and commercial micro-loans as exemplified by the work of Mejoremos, project quality and client satisfaction can be improved significantly. This in turn is expected to reduce the risk of credit default[33].

In their attempts to tap into the market of low-income households, the large producers of construction materials and the material suppliers have adopted similar models of

22 Coleman 1999, 2006, Chowdhury 2009, Hammler 2011
23 Murdoch 2000, Bateman 2010, Roy 2010, Young 2010
24 Murdoch 2000: 618
25 Murdoch 2000: 619
26 Castillo 2011
27 Prodesarrollo 2015
28 Rosenberg 2007
29 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2009
30 PUEC-UNAM 2012: 78
31 Martínez 2015
32 Habitat for Humanity 2015
33 Grubbauer forthcoming

assisted self-help housing. In order to attract clients and win their loyalty, companies such as CEMEX and HOLCIM offer technical assistance together with micro-credits. How such business strategies effectively serve to link financial sector and construction sector interests is explored in the third section.

Construction Companies Targeting Self-builders

The large building-material suppliers and the multinational retailers on the Mexican market have systematically been targeting the markets of low-income customers since the early 2000s. The market of self-help building is regarded not only as a largely underserved market in terms of the provision of financial services, but also as an important and profitable market for construction materials and consumer goods. Because of limited financial resources, self-builders tend to largely rely on informal sources for finance and labour. They borrow money through informal networks and obtain help on the construction site from family and friends. Beyond contributions through solidarity and reciprocity, the contracting of additional labour, particularly professional masons, and the acquisition of building materials and household appliances all rely on formal markets and monetised exchanges [34].

Self-builders are highly dependent on suppliers of basic building materials. Concrete blocks as well as other materials such as cement, sand, reinforcing steel and iron sheets for roof cladding are obtained from local material shops. The market for these basic building materials is highly profitable and important for companies such as CEMEX, one of the world's largest producers of cement, which dominates the Mexican market with 52% of the sales. Holcim-Lafarge is the second-largest cement producer in Mexico, with a 20% market share; Cruz Azul ranks third, with 14%[35].
The main driver for cement consumption is the housing sector, particularly informal construction. Based on data from the Camara Nacional de Cemento, Fry calculates that between 40 and 50% of annual cement consumption comes from informal construction for the period 1994-2006. Of the total volume of cement sold by CEMEX on the national market, 60% is distributed through the company's chain of building supply shops, Construrama, which mainly target self-builders[36].

A benefit in engaging self-builders as clients is that the low-income housing market, with its steady demand for basic building materials, is not only profitable but also less affected by the business cycles in the construction sector and can act as a buffer when demand in formal construction is low. This is an experience which CEMEX made particularly during the economic crisis of 1994, when sales to low-income households dropped by 10-20% whereas the sales to the formal construction industry and middle- and upper-income households were cut by half[37]. This experience motivated CEMEX and other producers of basic building materials to seek business strategies which specifically target low-income customers. Such strategies include the expansion of distribution networks, the implementation of micro-credit schemes, and the introduction of packages which combine micro-credits with techni cal assistance under the condition that the material is sourced from the respective company. CEMEX has been most successful and effective in implementing all of these strategies and thereby increasing its market share. This has been discursively framed by a „necessity narrative" serving to normalise the use of cement and continuously rising levels of cement consumption while preventing the wider use of lower-carbon alternatives such as blocks and bricks made from adobe, clay and earth[38].

In 2001, CEMEX launched Construrama to extend its reach into low-income markets and strengthen the brand. Construrama operates through a franchising system with local distributors signing up for Construrama in exchange against training, equipment and refunds of the cost for new Construrama signage and store painting. The Construrama network currently comprises 3000 shops across the country which offer all the basic building materials needed in self-construction. Even though Construrama dealers are technically free to offer products of different companies, they typically sell only CEMEX cement. However, when buying at Construrama shops, households have to accept prices which are considerably higher than wholesale prices for the industry, which in turn increases the profit margin for CEMEX[39].

In 2004, CEMEX, in association with GE Capital Bank, launched the Construcard credit card in order to expand the pool of potential clients and allow low-income customers purchasing items sold through Construrama on credit[40]. The average credit line is 1,000 USD, and to obtain a Construcard applicants do not need to provide collateral. Similarly, other suppliers of building materials such as Holcim-Lafarge and Home Depot and all of the general retailers such as Walmart, Grupo Elektra and Coppel have also established and expanded consumer credit schemes over the past decade, clearly under the influence of and modelled on experiences in the US market and with annual interest rates which often exceed 100% due to the lack of legal regulation[41].

Wal-Mart has been a particularly influential role model: it entered the Mexican market in 1991, when it opened its first store outside the United States in Mexico City, and has since then expanded successfully; in 2006, it established Banco Wal-Mart in order to use its cash registers as virtual bank branches[42]. Wal-Mart is now the market leader in the retail sector, with a network of 2,400 stores. Another important company is the US-based Home Depot, which is the world's largest home improvement retailer. It currently operates more than 60 stores in Mexico and has become one of the largest retailers in Mexico since it ent-

34 Ribbeck 2002
35 Aguilar 2015
36 Fry 2013
37 Connolly 2007, Hartman and Werhane 2009
38 Fry 2013
39 Salas and Oteiza 2008
40 CEMEX 2004
41 Soederberg 2012
42 Soederberg 2012

Figure 5: CEMEX advertisement for its Tolteca cement brand, Construrama shop, Mexico City (Photo: Author)

Figure 6: Coppel, one of the largest department store chains in Mexico specialising in household appliances sold on credit

43 Soederberg 2014: 199
44 Salazar, Husted et al. 2011

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ered the market in 2001. Soederberg, in her book *Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry*, offers a critical analysis of this widespread extension and commercialisation of micro-lending to low-income workers in both the United States and Mexico. She argues that the extent to which the poor have come to rely on expensive consumer credits to augment and replace their wages in both countries demonstrates the „structural violence of neoliberal-led vcapitalism, including the role of the debtfare state, which regularises, individualises and depoliticises the microfinance industry“[43]. CEMEX's *Patrimonio Hoy* programme was launched in 2000 and is the most significant example of the Mexican construction sector incorporating microfinance and instrumentalising the principle of social collateral as a business strategy. The clients who subscribe to *Patrimonio Hoy* organise themselves into small savings groups based on established social ties and trust. The groups commit themselves to weekly saving payments and the members take turns in collecting and enforcing established payments. In exchange for their savings, the clients receive building materials sourced from local Construrama shops as well as technical advice. CEMEX relies on local promoters, who engage in face-to-face promotion of the programme within their communities. When the promoters sign up new clients, they receive points which they can exchange for cash or building materials. The main advantage of the programme for CEMEX is that clients are obliged to purchase all materials from the company, while losing the opportunity to capitalise on price differences between different suppliers. The advantages for the clients are less clear, however, as Salazar, Husted et al.[44] show in their study of the social effects of the *Patrimonio Hoy* programme for a group of households in Zinacantepec, State of Mexico. While most households in the programme achieved an improvement of their housing situation, social objectives such as the improvement of health, the increase of savings and the fostering of participation in community groups were not met.

Conclusions

This paper has shown how small loans and technical assistance can serve to overcome typical shortcomings in the production processes of self-built homes – especially from the point of view of finance capital. Problems of layout, structure and building equipment supply can be resolved more efficiently with the help of professionals. A minimum of "up-front" financial resources allows the efficient use of building materials and resolves problems of theft and deterioration of supplies stored on site over extended periods. CONAVI and SHF currently aim at broadening the practise of assisted self-help housing and to increase the number of registered APVs and investors. Particular attention is paid to APVs which operate on a project-by-project basis to support households in the remodelling of existing homes, even though only a few of the APVs currently registered have the expertise and commitment to work in such a way.
There can be no doubt that the state-supported credit schemes of the SHF for home upgrading and self-help construction also serve the interest of the finance sector to enter and expand into the immense low-income market. This in turn also serves the interests of the construction industry, as demand for basic building materials increases. I can, however, see the danger of the institutionalisation of microfinance within state-led assisted self-help housing policies and a further blurring of boundaries between the commercial and socially more responsible forms of housing microfinance. The extension of markets for commercial consumer credits over the past decade has generated huge revenues for retailers and producers of building materials, which has also fuelled the intrusion of new actors into the housing microfinance market. Companies such as CEMEX have realised that low-income customers can be won as clients by means of well-targeted business strategies. The commercial interests of the financial sector and construction trades will inevitably attempt the incorporation and scaling up of existing, localised experiences of assisted self-help housing such as Mejoremos. This, in turn, is likely to further increase the commercialisation of the housing microfinance sector and the exploitation of the poor through abusive interest rates. The key question is whether and how state regulations can control the expansion of markets for credits, building materials and professional services, which turn self-built homes into a hunting ground of capital accumulation, and foster rationalities of social and environmental justice instead.

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A Regime of Informality?
"Informal housing" and the state-society relationship in transitional Vietnam

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Vom Nutzen der Informalität im Baugeschehen:
Informell entstandene Häuser finden sich überall in Hanoi und überraschen nicht nur durch ihre Größe und hohe Anzahl, sondern auch durch gestalterischen Einfallsreichtum. Dabei sind die Grenzen zwischen formell und informell, bzw. zischen legal und illegal keineswegs immer klar, zumal die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen nicht präzise formuliert sind, sich häufig widersprechen und darüber hinaus oft ändern. Eine mögliche Verfolgung oder Beseitigung illegaler Bauten hängt von vielen sozialen und politischen Konstellationen ab. Dieser Beitrag untersucht dieses Phänomen am Beispiel von Fallstudien in Hanoi auf der Grundlage von Medienberichten, wissenschaftlichen Analysen der jüngeren Rechtsprechung und Interviews mit Politikern, Bauunternehmern sowie Bewohnern. Die generell unzuverlässige Gesetzeslage erweist sich in einem Umbruchstaat wie Vietnam nicht nur als nachteilig, da sie die Härte der Bürokratie moderiert, einen Milieuschutz in Gegensatz zu der Praxis von großmaßstäblichen Stadtumbau erlaubt und ein gewisses Maß an effektiver Partizipation in der lokalen Stadtentwicklung möglich macht, welche in der formellen Politik bestenfalls als Etikette existiert. Auch die politischen Entscheidungsträger selbst zeigen kein explizites Interesse an einer eindeutigen Rechtslage, da damit ihre Entscheidungshoheit geschmälert würde - ebenso wie der Spielraum für eigene kommerzielle Interessen.

Introduction

"Informal" constructions in Hanoi are commonplace, in terms of size and numbers, and are remarkable for their creativity. They cover a wide range of housing forms and scales: from the illegal addition of a balcony to penthouse apartments on top of unauthorised tourist hotels in the protected historic quarter, from single middle-class family houses to large-scale new urban areas in the outskirts of the city. What is "illegal" or "authorised" is often blurry or shifty, as regulations are ambiguous or conflicting and in constant change. The distinction between varying forms of resistance (by the residents and/or entrepreneurs) and complicity (by local government officials) is not always clear. The horizontal and vertical extensions to buildings, which dominate the streetscape, are certainly an eye-catching feature to any foreign visitor to Hanoi. Most of these extensions are "informal" in the sense that they neither comply with prevailing building regulations nor have they followed the required approval procedures. In fact, other types of informal constructions co-exist aside from such incremental, self-organised extensions of balconies and additions of extra floors – such shop houses transformed into tall mini-hotels or the unauthorised conversion of simple one-storey family houses into elaborated ‚multi-storey apartment blocks – even in the protected historic quarter. There are even large-scale commercial developments and new urban areas that completely ignore the approved master plan. However, within the context of a rapidly changing transitional regime like Vietnam, a dichotomous distinction of such activities between legal and illegal, or a criticism of a weak state failing to eradicate such anomalies, would fail to reflect the important processes of state-society interaction behind such a phenomenon. The literature on housing and urban development conceptualises such processes, which are quite common in the Global South, as expressions of informality. n Hanoi, however, such informal construction is remarkable, as it challenges the notion of the informal as primarily connected to poverty. We argue that it is, rather, an expression of interaction and negotiation between the civil society at the grassroots and a state in transition from rather orthodox socialism to a hybrid system in which state-led socialism is combined with a market-oriented economy.

Figure 1: Informal housing in Hanoi

This paper examines informal construction in Hanoi with data from various sources: policy documents, relevant regulations, field observations combined with interviews, project documents, as well as media coverage of cases in violation of construction orders. The field observations include observations of informal extensions built by individuals and households, as well as large projects built by

real-estate developers. These examples of informal activities are analysed through the lens of the informality perspective in critical planning theory.

Concepts of informality

Discussion on informality began with the observation of labour migration from rural areas to the city, where employment outside of the formal institutional economic sector was rampant. Informality was considered a representation of an inferior form of employment associated with marginality, poverty, and unprotected labour, and hence a "symptom" of the backwardness of less-developed countries. A similar discourse entered planning, urban development, and urban studies after the 1970s[1]. In fact, however, informality exists even in "developed" countries in the form of supplementary informality, which is complementary to the often bureaucratic and inflexible labour market in the formal sector[2]. In the less-developed economies, this type of complementary informality, in which either formal rules are not being observed or where such rules cannot catch up with dynamic changes of the country and its economy, exists extensively.

The dualist view of formality-informality has been increasingly criticised for obscuring a full understanding of urban informality. McFarlane[3] highlights the point that informal and formal practices are inter-dependent and mutually enabling or delimiting of their field of influence. Roy argues that the "informal" does not necessarily represent an unregulated sector in which state regulation is absent or urban planning has failed. Rather it is a form of "deregulation" in which "law itself is rendered open-ended and subject to multiple interpretation and interests"[4]. The state is not out of the scene but, instead, is a player as it has the power to determine what is legal and what is not. Informality is not necessarily connected to the poor, but is a specific feature of the state power structure. In fact, "calculated informality" is frequently practised by the state through its selective enforcement of laws and partial authorisation of that which has been classified as "unauthorised"[5]. In such cases, the state is an informalising entity from above and informality is "an integral part of the territorial practices of state power"[6]. In other words, it is the state itself that produces urban informality.

Roy uses the term "urban informality" to emphasise "an organising logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation"[7]. She proposes seeing urban informality as a "mode of urbanisation" involving "a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another"[8]. Informality has to be understood as "an idiom of urbanisation, a logic through which differential spatial value is produced and managed"[9].

Along the same line, Yiftachel provides the concept of "grey cities" to refer to urban phenomenon that lies between full state sanctioning and expulsion: a conceptualisation of "the stratification of informalities" that involves processes of whitening (condoning) or blackening (criminalising) where the informality of the powerful is often whitened while other forms of informality remain grey or blackened. Informal spaces produced by the powerful – grey space "from above" – tend to be lauded and formalised[10]. In transitional societies, informality (particularly in spatial entities) involves an array of overlapping and interlocking processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, modernisation, migration, etc.[11]. This inevitably increases the "observed" informalities embedded in the processes of migrating from the rural lifestyle to the urban way of living, from the economy of self-sufficiency to commodification, as well as the simple instinct of survival of rural migrants in cities or the adoption of "imported" practices in governance (e.g., neoliberalism, globalisation).

DoiMoi and urban housing development in Vietnam

Since the national economic reform programme, which started in 1986 and is generally referred to as "*Doi Moi*", Vietnam has experienced spectacular economic growth, which has fuelled a rapid expansion of cities. The Vietnamese government considers urbanisation a priority condition for socio-economic development – especially in terms of industrialisation and modernisation[12]. By 2009, about one-third of Vietnam's population lived in cities[13]; the urban population is expected to exceed the rural one by 2040[14]. Rapid urbanisation inevitably creates a huge demand for infrastructure, housing, and urban amenities. Alongside manufacturing, the construction industry is the economic sector that is expanding most rapidly[15]. It is also the sector experiencing the most radical transformation and commodification.

Before *Doi Moi*, housing construction in urban areas was a state monopoly. The housing areas were designed by state institutions and constructed by state companies. Private construction activities were not allowed. However, due to the lack of resources, the amount of housing produced was far from sufficient, and the housing shortage was acute. Housing allocation standards were very low, typically 4 to 6 m2 per person, and overcrowding was widespread[16]. As the apartments became too cramped, the residents extended their living space by adding space at the balconies and on the public ground in front and behind their apartments. These activities were in violation of the rules and thus "illegal", but they were usually tolerated. The extended structures could be kept after a fine was paid.

As part of the 1986 reforms and in order to help state employees solve their housing problem, the ban on self-help building was lifted and local governments began to allocate land-use rights to state employees for self-construction activities[17]. Furthermore, the unclear status of urban property invigorated many people to renovate and enlarge their property[18]. This opportunity triggered off a huge wave of private housing construction by individual households, termed "popular housing", which actually became the predominant form of housing production in the early 1990s[19]. In fact, many of the private "popular" housing units were constructed (also including renovation and enlargement) on land with unclear property rights[20, 21].

Even when a formal system for the transfer of property rights with proper legal papers was gradually established after Doi Moi, a parallel para-legal system of land and property rights still existed in which transactions took place without proper legal papers[22].

Apart from new construction, renovation activities, most commonly the addition of extra floors to existing buildings

01 McFarlane, 2012
02 Altrock, 2012
03 McFarlane, 2012: 90
04 Roy, 2011a: 80
05 Roy, 2005
06 Roy, 2011a: 84
07 Roy & AL Sayyad, 2004
08 Roy, 2005: 148
09 Roy, 2011b: 233
10 Yiftachel, 2009: 91-92
11 Altrock, 2012
12 The World Bank, 2011: 3
13 General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2010
14 United Nations, 2008
15 The World Bank, 2011; General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2010
16 Duc Nhuan & Mathéy, 1990: 282ff; Tran and Hornyanszky, 2005
17 Government of Vietnam, 1993
18 Gainsborough, 2002
19 Geertman, 2007
20 Gainsborough, 2002

21
People built on whatever land that was unclaimed. It was the unclear status of urban land and property that has made this appropriation of urban land possible.

22 Kim, 2004, p. 279; Payne, 2001, p. 418; in Kim, 2004

(from 2, 3 floors to 6, 7 floors or more) form a substantial part of floor-space production in the city[23]. In the first decade after Doi Moi, between 1999 and 2009, 66.6 percent of the total urban housing production could be considered informal, as it was conducted without construction permits[24].

Even today, it is a common situation that buildings do not comply with the building regulations. In Hanoi alone, during the first six months of 2014, the Department of Construction revealed 1,157 cases of violation out of 7,696 houses inspected[25]. Apart from a prevalence of informal construction activities, between 60% and 80% of land transactions also take place informally; the informal change from residential to retail use is the most common phenomenon[26].

In the late 2000s, control of housing activities became stricter and preference was given to large-scale developments, which were promoted by large developers, in new urban areas at the urban fringe[27]. As a result, small-scale housing construction by individual households has slowed down, though it still accounts for more than 50% of the annual housing production[28].

The double nature of urbanisation processes in transitional Vietnam has been described by McGee[29]. On the one hand, urbanisation is driven by state-led projects in which planning and implementation is carried out according to a central state vision and under centralised control.

On the other, urbanisation processes are driven by private individuals as well as entrepreneurial groups in their daily life outside state planning and control. Urbanisation thus involves processes of interaction between the state (and its representatives at different administrative levels) on the one side, and people in their everyday spatial practices – processes that involve negotiation, resistance and compromises – on the other.

The predominance of people-led urbanisation and of informality in Vietnam in the early years after *Doi Moi* was attributed to the scattered nature of state authority as well as to the extreme poverty of the prior years. People were driven to engage in unsanctioned economic activities – e.g., fence breaking – out of necessity[30].

Doi Moi and the opening of the economy created space for a resurgence of informal "small-scale capitalism"[31], a phenomenon that has been termed the "popular economy" in Vietnam[32].

Government control and regulatory framework

The high level of informality in Vietnam cannot be attributed to a lack of regulations. In fact, building activities are highly regulated. Between 1992 and 1999, for example, nearly 120 new laws and ordinances, and thousands of implementing regulations and guidelines[33], mark the apparent attempt to match the need for new regulatory framework necessitated by the economic reform. Many of such new regulations are relevant to land and housing.

Besides, even newly enacted laws and regulations are also subjected to rather frequent review and modification. For example, the land law, which was put in place in 1987, has been changed three times: in 1993, 2003 and, most recently, in 2015. The housing law, which was issued as recently as 2005, was amended in 2008[34] and updated again in 2009[35] before being replaced by the new housing law in 2015[36]. The side effects of such rapid but uncoordinated changes may create clashes with other relevant laws that have not been revised, and legal documents also emerge from multiple sources[37]. This leads to inconsistency, contradiction, and ambiguity in the legal bases, which results in confusion and opens the door for case-to-case interpretation by officials.

Furthermore, as new national laws and ministerial decrees only mean to offer a national legal framework, local governments are required to work out the implementation details[38]. Governmental circulars meant to clarify the implementation details tend to be issued several months later, thus resulting in a delay in the implementation and creating the space for local governments to interpret the laws and regulations to their advantage. Even if the implementation guidelines were unproblematic and the inconsistencies in the legislation were resolved, there would still be substantial room for interpretation at the local level. This legal ambiguity is not necessarily a sign of weak state power but is, on the contrary, an instrument of rule, argues Gainsborough, meaning that keeping people in a state of perpetual uncertainty is a key feature of indirect government[39].

In fact, the Vietnamese urban development control system is also characterised by over-regulation. The system is built on the legacy of a central planned economy, whereas many regulations and standards reflect the government's directive rather than social reality or what the market needs[40]. Examples in this regard include regulations on minimum plot sizes (of 50 m2 in some cities) and minimum requirements for green areas per person in some urban areas. Cumbersome procedures and over-regulation make it difficult for households and small businesses to comply with the regulations and pushes many into informality[41]. Study of the informal economy of Vietnam has found that informality is a product of government-business interactions in an overregulated business environment with very high compliance costs and discretionary behaviour by officials[42]. There is a clear gap between "de jure" legal measurements and their implementation (de facto measures)[43].

Widespread corruption also makes formalisation expensive and, in turn, encourages informality. The World Bank's enterprise surveys in 2009 found that of 22% of the businesses that had submitted applications for a land-use certification in the previous two years, an informal gift or payment was expected or requested (31 cases). Of the 28% of businesses that had applied for construction permits within the previous two years, 41% received requests for an informal payment or gift[44].

The widespread informality in thinking and practice can be attributed to a general attitude of mistrust and resistance to central laws and formal orders that is prevalent in Vietnam, probably due to a long history of foreign domination. A well-known Vietnamese proverb goes, "The laws of the emperor give way to the customs of the village"[45]. Confucian teaching places moral principles (such as virtue and sentiment) higher than legal rules, and this tradi tion

23 The World Bank, 2011: 120
24 UN Habitat, 2014
25 cafef.vn 18/7/2014
26 The World Bank, 2011: 169
27 Tran and Yip, 2008; Tran, 2015
28 The World Bank, 2015
29 McGee, 2009
30 Gainsborough. 2010: 161

31 The term "small-scale capitalism" has been introduced by McGee (2009).

32 McGee, 2009: 236
33 Quinn 2002 in Tenev et al. 2003:18
34 Decree 19/2008/QH12
35 Decree 34/2009/QH12
36 Decree 65/2014/QH13
37 Tenev et al., 2003: 18
38 Tenev et al., 2003: 19
39 Gainsborough, 2009:269
40 The World Bank, 2011
41 The World Bank, 2015
42 Tenev et al, 2003:14
43 The World Bank, 2011:161
44 The World Bank, 2011:166
45 "Phepvuaphaithua le lang"

of thought has a substantial influence in the people's way of thinking, and practices. A survey of businesses asking what methods they would use in cases of dispute revealed that few would contact the authorities, and even fewer would appeal to the court[46].

This may explain the government's pragmatic stand to informal housing. Demolition has been carefully avoided, except for road widening[47]. After *Doi Moi*, parallel to the introduction of a new legal framework for housing production was the legalisation /formalisation of informal construction[48]. The Land Law of 2003 acknowledged illegal houses built before July 1st, 2004[49], and allows households to register such illegal houses[50].

Regulations on construction activities

There are different purposes to impose development control on construction activities. For Hanoi city, different development-control regulations are applied to different areas in the city. They intend to limit population and construction density in the already dense city centre and to protect and preserve the architectural and historical values of the Ancient Quarter and the French Quarter, as well as to ensure that new development follows the general plan. While the first two goals relate to the management and protection of the existing urban structure and are more stable, the development guidelines set up by the city's general plan are subject to changes following changes in thev urban development strategies, socio-economic priorities, etc. With master planning being the instrument of control of the centralised state, the plan can be out of touch with local market and social realities. There is a lack of transparency in the planning and decision-making process, and the citizens are not consulted. Hence, many stakeholders are not informed nor convinced about the necessity of a certain plans or regulations.

The measures taken in cases of violations in construction activities may include a moratorium on all construction works, withdrawal of electricity and water supply, forced removal, fines for the damages incurred, and administrative sanctions. Serious breaches may be dealt with under criminal law. Certain by-laws may foresee "administrative sanctions"[51] – some of which allow for the measures of "fine and let live". Here, it is stipulated that this is a possible sanction when the violated buildings are "discovered" by the authorities after they have been completed and put into use, but built within the construction limits and fulfilling the functions specified by the master plan. On the other hand, forced demolition is the other possible extreme action.

The provisions for enforced removal of illegal constructions have received negative response from many parties, and are considered by many as a wasteful way to handle the citizens' and state's resources. Even officials have argued that „some buildings if let remain do not affect the urban landscape and the surrounding"[52]. Informalities, in this case, can be seen as a result of overregulation. Here, we have an example of the use of the language of informality by a legal official to explain an informal action.

Typologies of informalities

Illegal extensions: negotiated space?

Annexes protruding out of buildings and on roofs are common sights in the residential neighbourhoods of Hanoi. Although such sights are also commonplace in cities like Taipei and the inner city of Hong Kong, in Hanoi they are much more visible due to their size and numbers. For instance, a two-by-six-metre temporary wooden structure hanging on the fourth floor of a dilapidated building, without strong support, appears to be scary. Small and random samples of a Hanoi street section indicate that, in fact, most houses have various degrees of extension.

More intrusive extensions tend to be found on the ground-floor level, mostly used for business. Some extensions even reach to the second floor to allow for advertising for the shop or to accommodate a store over several floors. Opening a small family business promised a lucrative opportunity in the early years of the economic reform, after private businesses were no longer prohibited.

46 The World Bank, 2010
47 The World Bank, 2011: 121
48 Decision 4637/QB-NB issued in1987
49 Decision 39/2005/QD-TTg
50 The World Bank, 2015
51 Decree 121/2013 and Circular 2/2014; Decree 180/2007/ NĐ-CP
52 xaydung.gov.vn 2/3/2014



Figure 2: A section of Bui Thi Xuan Street in the Hai Ba Trung District of Hanoi. Most buildings have extensions or added floors (Photo collage: Nguyen Thao Trang)

Figure 3A & B: Self-built extensions protruding out of buildings and or piling up on their roofs are common sight in Hanoi residential neighbourhoods (Photos: Hoai Anh Tran)

Ostensibly, these undertakings in creating extra space allow ordinary people to bridge the gap between what they need and what they get, if at all, through the official procedures, which are either unclear, too costly, or too cumbersome to follow. Informal activities can thus be perceived as a "fence-breaking" act, ignoring impractical rules while meeting urgent needs[53]. Sometimes, such behaviour later on led to the issue of new laws or simplification of existing ones. At least, it widens the space of tolerance of the otherwise slow-moving state administration, and to a large extent explains the large volume of the urban informality phenomenon in Vietnam. Understandably, extension activities become "normality" when it is widespread:

> *"I think majority of houses are extended. Almost all the families I know make extensions. If they can't get to live on the first floor, they go to the second and third floors, if not move up higher to make extensions to enlarge their living environment"* [54].

The double role of the authorities at the ward level and the resident group calls for deeper analysis. One the one hand, they are agents of the state in day-to-day contact with the grassroots who are entrusted with the responsibility of governance. On the other hand, they share the daily life with people in the neighbourhood and are dependent on the people's support. When absolute state authority is brittle at the grassroots level, cooperation of the residents becomes essential to maintain a minimum level of respect for the state agents in the neighbourhoods.

Single house construction – a double informal process

For single house construction, the most common violation is the building of extra floors or construction without a building permit. According to news reports, many cases of violation have been sanctioned but many more were tolerated. The process from the discovery of violation to the final decision of enforced removal usually takes a long time, up to a couple of years. This raises several questions as to why some cases were sanctioned and others were not, and what the reasons were for slow action or inaction by the authorities.

53 Koh, 2006: 238
54 Hanoi resident, interview conducted 14-04-2013

Figure 4A & B: Extensions on the ground floor to accommodate shops. (Photos: Hoai Anh Tran)

Figure 5A & B: The completed building (middle) at No. 107 Bui Thi Xuan had 9 floors, 3 more than granted by the building permit (left). The white building in the middle, at 1b To Tich in the Ancient Quarter, was granted a construction permit for a 2-storey building, but 8 floors were actually constructed (right) (Photos: Hoai Anh Tran, 2007)

Box 1

The construction was started on 15-9-2010 and completed on 15-9-2011. The first violation report was registered on March 28th, 2011, half a year after the start of construction. The ward authorities subsequently issued several decisions, including a construction-stop order, a decision for withdrawal of electricity and water supply services, etc. On 23 April, the owner removed a part that was not in compliance with the building permit, and pledged to continue the construction according to the permit. Following this, electricity and water was again connected. However, when the building was completed in September 2011, the building had 9 floors and several other features not sanctioned by the building permit. More than a year later, on January 15th, 2013, the removal order was issued and on 21 January, the ward finally undertook forced removal of the extra floors.

Box 2

The first violation report was made on 3/½014 and the construction stop was issued on 6/½014 by the ward. One has an impression that the authority acted promptly. However, construction still continued and all 8 floors were built without further actions from the authority. Almost a whole year later, on 15/12/2014, a sanction decision was issued. Electricity and water supply to the building was to be disconnected and the family was requested to remove the extra floors within 3 days. The order also specified that forced removal would be carried out in case of non-compliance. However, the order has never been implemented. The building of 8 floors has since completed and has been put to use.

Boxes 1 and 2 show two examples of cases in which the owners built more floors than were allowed by the building permits.

Figure 6: A section of Hang Gai street at the border of the Ancient quarter. Many residential buildings were transformed into hotels and violated the regulations of max building height for the area (Photo collage: Nguyen Thao Trang

The extra floors were removed by the authorities in one case, but not in the other case. It is puzzling why stronger actions were not employed against the building in the Ancient Quarter, which is subjected to a stricter development control according to the regulations to preserve this historical area.

In both cases, the authorities kept documenting the violations but this did not necessarily lead to corrective action. Where it did, it took a long time – up to a couple of years after the building was put to use – for the authorities to finally issue and enforce a removal order. Does inaction imply a form of complicity? It has been suggested in the media that the ward authority assisted the violation by not taking action for almost a year[55]. Were some informal negotiations perhaps taking place "behind the scenes" during this time?

The next question is: What finally drove the authority to enforce sanction against the second case? Was this because, as indicated in the news, the owner "did not cooperate with the authority" and "created troubles in the process"[56]?

In both cases, there is the tendency for the owners show defiance to the sanctions and reluctance by the authorities to employ forced removal. Earlier studies have shown that ward officials are reluctant to employ forced removal[57]. One reason is that forced removal involves a clash with the people – something the local officials prefer to avoid. Another reason could be that ward authorities live closely with the residents in the ward and are dependent on the cooperation of the latter in their work and thus tend to avoid open conflicts. The daily newspapers frequently report many instances where ward officials turn a blind eye to, and indirectly assist, the violation of construction orders[58].

As discussed earlier, overregulation seems to play a role in the wide-spread non-compliance of both the residents and the officials. At the same time, the cases could also suggest an informal involvement by the officials. Many ward officials share the residents' sentiment that forced removal is a waste of resources, which eventually motivates them to turn a blind eye on more-or-less minor infringements. A ward official was quoted as saying,

> *"To tell the truth, people's needs are unlimited, everybody wants to build more [floors], especially in the Ancient Quarter, the houses are small. People have invested so much money to build a place here, of course, they want to extend. We try to prevent it from the start, because it is too troublesome to let them build in the first place and then come to remove…"*[59]

It is possible to say that in each case of informal construction, we can observe a double informal process: one in regard to the construction of a building that does not conform to the rule, the other in regard to the informality in the subsequent treatment of the violation by the officials.

Informality in high power layers

In the second case of the above (Image 4A), we see that both the ward authority and the district inspection authority issued several reports and sanctioning orders, but none of them seem to have had any effect. According to a district official, the family has a "connection" with a "higher authority", and therefore it is difficult for the local authorities to take action[60]. While this points to a case of corruption, it also calls attention to the power relationship between the local government and entrepreneurs, and between different government levels.

It can be observed that people or companies with substantive power are more likely to experience unenforced sanctions for illegal construction. A typical case would be the mixed-development residential and office building cum museum on a site of 316 m2 at No. 55A & 55B Ba Trieu Street in Hanoi. Apart from the violation of the building permit – 14 built floors instead of 9 – several other violations of construction law and regulations (regarding construction, set-back, and height limits) were also found in the construction permit granted by the Department of Construction[61]. It was also revealed that the construction limits had been issued twice and modified once between January 2011 and March 2012, each time allowing the building of more floor space[62]. Similar to the cases presented in the previous section, several documentations of violation were issued by the ward but no action was taken. When the district inspector finally took action, it only requested an administrative sanction in the form of a fine. This was an act of discretion, since it took place before the issuance of the Decree 12½013, which allows payment for certain categories of building. While under inspection, authorities at many levels – from the ward to the district People's Committee, the Department of Construction, the Department of Culture, Sport and Tourism, and even the inspection office at the Ministry of Construction – were involved in assisting the investor in the formalisation of the building[63]. Only upon further outcries from the public did the inspection office of the municipal party committee finally get involved and the owners ordered to pay a fine and to remove the extra floors. Both the ward and the district authority were held responsible for not taking proper action in time, but only got a warning. This case shows that big projects with more-severe violations get even milder treatment than many residential buildings. It illustrates the point highlighted in the media that the authorities tend to chase small-home builders while turning a blind eye to larger violations by big investors[64].

Figure 7: The completed building at No. 55 Ba Trieu now serves as a bank office, museum, and residential building

55 tinmoi.vn 22/01/2013
56 Hanoi moi.com 26/9/2015
57 Koh, 2006; tinmoi.vn 14/6/2012
58 vov.vn 20/7/2015, www.giadinhvietnam.com 17/5/2016
59 vov.vn 20/7/2015
60 giadinhvietnam.com 17/5/2016
61 vnexpress 26/6/2012
62 kinhtenongthon.com.vn 9/6/2012
63 vnexpress 26/6/2012
64 cafef.vn 7/7/2014



Figure 8: Situation plan of Trung Hoa Nhan Chinh. All the residential towers along the southern main street were changed from the approved 15 floors to 17 floors. The residential buildings in the second row from the same street were changed from the approved 9 floors to 17 floors (Drawing: Nguyen Trung Thanh Loi & team)

Zones of exception and corporate informality

Getting around legal frameworks is just as common in much larger projects, such as the new urban zones developed by large developers on the fringe of many Vietnamese cities. The new urban areas – large-scale real estate developments with residential housing and associated services – are examples of large-scale urban informality in the sense that the breaching of the law takes place already on the side of the public authorities who whitewash any infringements by officially authorising such developments that would normally involve all sorts of breaches of the master plan as well as the urban planning law. This practice of informal change in *de facto* land use is widespread in the new urban projects[65]. A common change is the increase of accepted gross floor area for housing, business, and shops. Another change is the omission of public facilities such as playgrounds, parks, public schools, and kindergartens. Our study of four new urban zones in Hanoi (Trung Hoa Nha Chinh 32ha, Linh Dam 260 ha, Viet Hung 210 ha, and Ciputra 395ha) revealed many changes to the initial approved plans. For example, in Trung Hoa Nhan Chinh the majority of residential buildings were changed into taller buildings (from 15 to 17 floors or 9 to 18 floors). Three areas did not provide a park, despite parks being indicated in the approved plan. In one area, the area intended for the park was turned into a parking lot.

Considering that the new urban zones were introduced with the argument of permitting better control of urban development and avoiding the situation of uncontrolled informality that is connected with self-built, small-scale housing construction by individuals and small business[66], it is ironic that the policy itself breeds informality in even larger scale. The prevalence of informal practice *de facto* formalised form of housing development in Hanoi opens a new perspective on informality that move beyond the

65 The World Bank, 2011: 169
66 Tran, 2014

thinking that informal and formal are separate entity. We can see this as an illustration of what is termed the "zone of exception" by Ong: a form of informality created and shaped by state[67].

Discussion and concluding remarks

The paper argues that the widespread existence of informal housing and associated construction activities in Vietnam cannot simply be interpreted as a lack of regulation or as merely a mirror of widespread poverty, as it is a common phenomenon in less-developed countries. Although Vietnam's governing capacity may be weak in some areas[68], hundreds of laws and decrees have been issued in attempt to catch up with the necessary formal framework of the economic reform that was launched in 1986, many of which relate to land, housing, and building construction.
Although many house extensions and new building activities were "illegal" within the social and political context in which they emerged, the generalisation of such practices and the impacts of their proliferation follow the self-propelled rule of need and practicality. They follow a social negotiation process which, elsewhere, created the established formal system over decades if not centuries – which does not protect them from becoming outdating little by little every day. which does not protect them from becoming outdating little by little every day.

While the cases presented here can be termed "informal" for not having gone through all the required approving procedures or regulations, not all of such buildings and structures are unauthorised since they are erected in consent with neighbours and tolerated by local officials. Informal construction in Hanoi can be interpreted as processes of deregulation rather than as a product of a legal vacuum. The process may even be interpreted as seeking a balance between contrasting values and interests rather than an interpretation using the usual black-and-white or right-and-wrong dichotomy.

The presented concept of informality does not only refer to the physical buildings, but also to the procedures and negotiations between the partners involved. The handling of the cases by state representatives is informal as it allows, in practice, a certain degree of discretion and interpretation and may be tuned according to and at the different levels of power and authority on both sides, which

67 Ong, 2006
68 Yip and Tran, 2008



Figure 9A & B: New urban areas. Clockwise from upper left Ciputra, Linh Dam, THNC, and Viet Hung (Illustrations from the project's websites)

Figure 9C & D: New urban areas. Clockwise from upper left Ciputra, Linh Dam, THNC, and Viet Hung (Illustrations from the project's websites)

may lead to disparate outcomes and spur further informality. The agents involved at the neighbourhood level, such as ward officials and resident groups, may go a long way to avoid forced removal and generally prefer to apply various forms of mediation involving persuasion and compromise. Through these mediation processes, the boundaries of state authority are constantly re-negotiated[69].

The paper also shows that over-regulation – regulations that are disconnected from socio-economic and market reality – provides the breeding ground for informality, at least in the Vietnamese context. This morally puts violators in the right position and the executor of the law in the wrong. It creates situations where the people reclaim the power of defining the boundary of what is acceptable and what is not.

Echoing Roy's propositions on informality[70], informal construction activities in Hanoi are not mainly a practice of the poor, as it is the case in most other countries. Informality is embedded in wealth and power when it comes to the production of space. Typical actors include the entrepreneurs, who need additional space for their business, and the middle class, who have the means for investing in extensions of their homes (which allows them to stay in the relatively privileged and expensive inner city of Hanoi). Individuals and businesses with sufficient wealth and power are more likely involved in projects that do not conform to the rules, and very often they do not face high-level sanctions. Those who have political connections or the economic power are in a more-advantaged position to negotiate for exemption and tolerance, or know how to sneak through the radar of surveillance. This constellation also offers opportunities for those who have the political or administrative authorities to gain "informal" financial reward.

Many documented cases illustrate the "stratification of informalities" as discussed by Yiftachel[71]. Adding floors in a single house can result in their enforced removal, while the grey spaces "from above" – such as adding several floors to residential towers and turning land officially reserved for public greens into a parking lot, which is common practice in the new urban zones – are not even discussed in terms of informality.
The selective enforcement of laws and regulations as well as the various compromises in Hanoi illustrate the kind of "calculated informality" discussed by Roy. The cases of Hanoi show how the formal and informal are not a separate sector; instead, they form a continuum of activities and transactions that "connect different economies and spaces"[72].

While the reliance on discretion undoubtedly involves corruption, an interpretation of "common" cases of informal construction as instances of corruption reduces the phenomenon to the behaviour of individuals and neglects the issue of how discretion and "soft" jurisdiction is inherent in Vietnam's system of urban development control.

This can be explained as a system in which informality is an integral part of the spatial practices of the state. Informality is a predominant feature in the city's urban development scene, and it is also a key element in urban development policy. Hanoi evidently provides a prime case for the argument made by Roy [73] that urban informality is a mode of urbanisation, a logic of development that is grounded in Vietnam's specific socio-political context, cultural values, and development trajectories.

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69 Koh 2004
70 Roy, 2011
71 Yiftachel, 2009
72 Roy, 2005:148
73 Roy 2005

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Massenwohnungsbau und Tradition auf Kuba
Dynamische Transformationen von sozialen Praktiken, Nachbarschaftsinteraktion und gebautem Raum

Elettra Griesi

Where culture clashes with social housing design
This case study deals with the experiences of both rural and urban residents relocated to a state-built prefabricated housing scheme in Pinar del Rio, Cuba, in the 1980s. It analyses the interdependence between the built environment on the one side, and user appropriation, social interaction, and cultural practice on the other. It is generally taken for granted that housing design predetermines, or at least influences, user behaviour. This paper tells the other side of the story, and illustrates typical strategies adopted by the residents to overcome the limitations of the inflexible and standardized mass-housing design while creating personalized space which better corresponds to their needs and customs. The author concludes that mass housing certainly can help to reduce a numeric housing crisis, but the design must be flexible enough to respond to the local cultural, social, and economic needs of the future residents. In the presented case study, these specific target-group requirements had not been sufficiently investigated in the first place – or they had simply been ignored in the design.

Einleitung

Dieser Beitrag thematisiert am Beispiel eines staatlichen Umsiedlungsprojektes in der Stadt von Pinar del Río (Kuba), wie gebauter Raum menschliches Handeln, soziale Interaktion und Praktiken beeinflusst. Er illustriert die Strategien der Akteure, um diesen Raum an eigene Bedürfnisse anzupassen und mit eigenen kulturellen Elementen zu bereichern. Dieser Prozess bewirkte Veränderungen der Raumnutzung wie auch eine Veränderung der Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen und in einem zweiten Schritt - als Antwort darauf - eine Raumveränderung durch die Bewohner. Die Untersuchung erfolgte in einem Plattenbaugebiet der 1980er Jahre, jedoch lassen sich die analysierten Prozesse verallgemeinern und auf andere Gebiete übertragen, da gleiche Dynamiken auch an anderen Orten in Kuba zu beobachten waren.

„…und vieles änderte sich durch meine Umsiedlung"

Was versteht man unter Umsiedlung und wie kann diese definiert werden? Der Anthropologe Palmer[1] definiert Umsiedlungen als geplantes und kontrolliertes Versetzen von Gemeinschaften von einem Gebiet zu einem anderen, während Tadros[2] Umsiedlungen als „*development of viable communities on new or unused land through the introduction of people*" ansieht und zwischen freiwilligen und paternalistischen Umsiedlungen unterscheidet. Das erste Modell lässt Freiraum für die Eigeninitiative von Gemeinschaften, die sich völlig selbstständig entwickeln; das zweite Modell sieht technischen Support wie Bildungs- oder Gesundheitssysteme vor, die den Umgesiedelten zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Marthur deutet Umsiedlungen als „Missgeschicke" (betrachtet aus der Perspektive der Umgesiedelten) und erkennt in dem Akt ein Trauma für die betroffene Familie[3], die entwurzelt wird aus dem Ort, wo sie für Generationen gelebt hat und sich an einem anderen und fremden wiederfindet. In seiner Langzeitfeldforschung über umgesiedelte Gemeinschaften im Zusammenhang mit dem Staudammbau *Kariba Dam* (zwischen Zambia und Zimbawe) hebt Scudder[4] psychologische, physiologische und soziokulturelle Stressfaktoren der Umgesiedelten hervor, welche die soziale Struktur stark beeinflusst und verändert haben. Eine ähnliche Situation konnte ich während meiner Feldforschung über die Folgen der Umsiedlung einer Beduinengruppe (*Bdoul*) in Petra (Jordanien) beobachten[5]. Die Umsiedlung in die Plattenbauten von Pinar del Río, hingegen, kann als nicht - in gleicher Weise - traumatisches Erlebnis betrachtet werden, da die Familien in den meisten Fällen aufgrund ihres Raumbedarfes der Umsiedlung einwilligten. Das neu zu Verfügung gestellte Gebiet befindet sich unweit des Herkunftsortes der Bewohner, die heute noch regelmäßigen Kontakt zu ihren Verwandten und Freunden dort pflegen. Somit kommen sie unvermeidlich mit sozialen Praktiken in Berührung, die sie vor Umzug in das Plattenbauviertel auch selbst ausübten. Obwohl die neue Umgebung ihre Raumwahrnehmung und -nutzung beeinflusst und verändert hat, prägen soziale Praktiken ihres Herkunftsorts heute noch ihre Raumnutzung im Plattenbauviertel.

Der folgende Abschnitt vermittelt einen Überblick über Werte, Programme und Umsetzungspolitik der kubanischen Revolution sowie eine kurze Einführung in das Untersuchungsgebiet. Danach wird illustriert, wie der staatlich geplante und gebaute Raum der Plattenbauten (als Resultat der kubanischen Ideologie) Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen, Raumnutzung der Bewohner und soziale Normen beeinflusst und geändert hat. Im Anschluss werden die Strategien der Betroffenen beschrieben, um den „fremden" Raum an ihre Bedürfnisse anzupassen. Des Weiteren wird die Frage analysiert, warum das angestrebte Ziel der kubanischen Revolution – die Aufhebung der sozialen Klassenunterschiede – durch gleiche Wohnverhältnisse im Alltag nicht notwendigerweise funktioniert. Den Abschluss bildet der Ausblick auf eine mögliche Alternativlösung zur vorgefundenen Situation[6].

„El Hombre Nuevo" - Werte, Programme und Umsetzungspolitik der kubanischen Revolution

Die kubanische Revolution wurde von verschiedenen Gruppierungen und Parteien getragen und befreite 1959 das Land von der Diktatur des Generals Fulgencio Batista[7]. Die Ideen der Kollektivität und des „Neuen Menschen" standen - gemeinsam mit Werten wie Humanismus, Patriotismus, Solidarität, Internationalismus,

01 Palmer 1979: 149
02 Tadros 1979: 122
03 Tadros 1979: 122; Mathur 1995: 17, vgl. auch Varma 1985
04 Scudder 1973
05 vgl. Griesi 2011

06
Dieser Text basiert auf meiner Masterarbeit in Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie an der Freien Universität Berlin (vgl. Griesi 2013).

07 Mansilla 1973: 288



Figure 1: Stadtplan von Pinar del Rio mit dem Untersuchungsgebiet (hell schattiert) (Quelle: Centro Provincial 2002)

Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit - im Mittelpunkt der neuen kubanischen Ideologie[8]. Nach Che Guevara[9] sollten zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen den Interessen des Kollektivs dienen, während kollektive freiwillige Arbeit die Aufgabe erfüllen sollte, diese Beziehungen zu konsolidieren und Klassenunterschiede aufzuheben (indem Handarbeiter, intellektuelle Arbeiter und Bauern an gemeinsamen Projekten zusammen wirkten).

Während die Propaganda aus der kubanischen Revolutionszeit (1959) Gleichheit für alle anstrebte, wurden der Wohnungsbau als Recht jedes Bürgers und die Erschaffung des Wohnraumes als Sozialleistung betrachtet[10]. Die Verbesserung der Wohnsituation stellte seit dem Triumph der Revolution unter Fidel Castro eine der zentralen Prioritäten dar, da die extreme Wohnungsnot in Kuba seit Beginn der 1950er Jahre grassierte und sichtbares Symbol der Menschen verachtenden Diktatur der Batista Regierung war[11].

Demzufolge wurden im Jahre 1960 in Santiago de Cuba die ersten 3.400 staatlichen Sozialwohnungen für Bewohner armer Viertel und Marginalviertel gebaut[12,13]. Das Wirtschafts-Embargo der USA gegen Kuba von 1962 führte dazu, dass ein Teil der Arbeiter der nunmehr generell staatlichen Betriebe unbeschäftigt blieb. Dieser Umstand legte die neue und schlüssige Strategie nahe, unterbeschäftigte Arbeiter dieser Betriebe für den Wohnungsbau im Rahmen der sog. *(Betriebs-) microbrigadas* einzusetzen[14]. Die Erbauer dieser Quartiere sowie andere besonders bedürftige Stadteinwohner bezogen diese Wohnungen und gründeten somit neue Gemeinschaften. Erst seit dem Ende der 1970er Jahre wurden industrialisierte Bauweisen nach Europäischem Muster in den Massenwohnungsbau eingeführt und durch professionelle *Baubrigaden des Bauministerium* (MICONS) erstellt, obschon das Verständnis und die Tradition für solch eine Bauweise fehlten[15]. Ende der 80er Jahre (1984) wurden die *microbrigadas* in veränderter Form wieder eingeführt. Freiwillige Arbeitseinsätze für den Bau dieser Viertel wurden aus der nachbarschaft rekrutiert und nicht mehr aus Betrieben.

Fallstudie in Pinar del Rio.

In Pinar del Río wurden die ersten drei Sozialwohnungsbauten im Jahre 1974 durch *microbrigadas* am Rande der Stadt errichtet[16] und mit dem Namen Hermanos Cruz getauft, ehemalig als Calero[17] bekannt. Neue Siedlungsformen und ein Netzwerk kommunaler Einrichtungen sollten entwickelt werden: Als neue Bautypologie wurde das *Kommunenhaus* mit Kollektivräumen als Modell entwickelt, welches die veränderten sozialen Prozesse widerspiegeln sollte[18]. Das Stadtviertel Hermanos Cruz[19] zählt heute 21.620 Einwohner[20], obwohl inoffizielle Quellen von 50.000 Einwohnern sprechen.

Charakterisierend für den Calero sind eine geringe Baudichte bedingt durch die Existenz großer Freiräume und Grünflächen, die als Erholungsräume dienen sollen. Die Baumasse besteht in der Hauptsache aus fünf-geschossigen Bauten in vorgefertigter Bauweise und zwei zwölf-geschossigen Riegeln.

Zu der Infrastruktur des Viertels wurden Parkanlagen, breit angelegte Fußgängerzonen, kleinere Parks[21] und ver



Figure 2: Concejo Hermanos Cruz, Pinar del Río (Quelle: Google Earth)

08 vgl. Lourdes-Fernandez und Lopez Bombino 1987: 42-43
09 zitiert nach Corujo Valejo 2001: 36, Mansilla 1973: 328
10 Mathéy 1993: 23
11 Brosenbauer 2009: 17

12
Im selben Jahr trat das „Gesetz der Startreform" (Ley de la Reforma Urbana) in Kraft, wodurch u.a. Mietbeiträge gesenkt werden und Leerstände der ehemaligen Revolutionsgegner an Kubaner vergeben werden sollten (vgl. Brosenbauer 2009: 17).

13 Mathey 1994a: 129
14 vgl. Mathéy 1993: 44
15 Mathéy 1993: 24, 46

16
In der Tat unterscheiden die pinareños zwischen Pinar del Rio als Zentrum (pueblo) und Calero, als wäre dieser Ort eine eigenständige Stadt.
17
Nach Auskunft von Segundo Páez Paredes, Spezialist der Kulturabteilung in Pinar del Rio, war das gesamte Gebiet vor der Revolution Castros mit Bauernhöfen bebaut. Einige davon sollen besonders bedeutend gewesen sein, unter diesen der besagte Calero (vgl. Azcuy 1995: 1-2 und Centro Provincial 2002: 2).

18 vgl. Bodenschatz 2003: 22-23

19
Der heutige Volksbeirat Hermanos Cruz (Consejo Popular Hermanos Cruz) setzt sich aus drei Vierteln zusammen: Reparto 26 de Julio, Reparto Orlando Jerez und Reparto Hermanos Cruz (Centro Provincial 2002: 2).

20 Bodenschatz: 2003: 3
21 vgl. mit Centro Provincial 2002: 2 und 3

schiedene Dienstleistungsbauten wie Apotheken, Retaurants, Bars, Arztpraxen, Lebensmittelgeschäfte, Kindergärten, Schulen und ein Krankenhaus geplant[22], die in den Erdgeschossen der Wohnbauten untergebracht werden sollten.

Das Gebäude für meine Feldstudie stammt aus den Jahren 1985-86. Entsprechend der kubanischen Ideologie wurden dort unterschiedliche Sozialschichten aus verschiedenen Herkunftsorten gemeinsam untergebracht. Unterschieden werden im Rahmen meiner Untersuchung drei Gruppen: Umgesiedelte aus Landgebieten, aus Marginalvierteln und aus dem Stadtzentrum. Diese Differenzierung erwies sich insofern als relevant als die Bewohner aus den verschiedenen Herkunftsorten auch unterschiedliche Gewohnheiten der Raumnutzung mitbrachten, die bis heute noch determinierend und prägend sind.

„Nachbarn sind wie eine Familie": Vernetzung und Reziprozitätsverhältnisse im Plattenbau

Während die kubanische Revolution Gleichheit für alle sowie die Abschaffung von Sozialklassenunterschieden bzw. -privilegien anstrebte[23], zeigt der Alltag, dass das Aufeinandertreffen von Familien und Einzelpersonen aus unterschiedlichen Orten und sozialen Gruppen oft zu Ungleichheiten und sozialen Konfliktpotentialen führt, die u.A. aus dem unterschiedlichen *Habitus* dieser Personen und Gruppen resultieren kann. Nach Bourdieu bezeichnet der *Habitus* das Auftreten einer Person in der Gesellschaft nach seinem Lebensstil, Sprache, Kleidung und Geschmack. Am *Habitus* einer Person lässt sich ihr Rang in der Gesellschaft ablesen, d.h. ihre soziale Verortung. Das Modell der sozialen Verortung bezeichnet demnach zunächst eine spezifische Zugehörigkeit, bzw. die individuelle Teilhabe an einer partikularen Gemeinschaft. In der untersuchten Gruppe korreliert der *Habitus* nicht mit einer bestimmten sozialen Schicht, sondern mit dem Herkunftsort, an dem sich bestimmte Lebensstile und soziale Praktiken etablierten - und zwar unabhängig von Sozialklassen. Ich habe die Bewohner dort direkt mit der Frage konfrontiert, ob die Durchmischung von Familien aus unterschiedlichen Herkunftsorten innerhalb eines Wohnkomplexes zu Spannungen oder Konflikten führte, so fiel die Antwort fast immer negativ aus: *„Alle hier verstehen sich gut, das Sozialniveau oder die Herkunft spielt keine Rolle*". Nur einige von ihnen, insbesondere im untersuchten Plattenbau, erkannten Spannungen auf Grund der sozialen Durchmischung (auf diesen Aspekt werde ich später zurück kommen). Die Beziehung innerhalb der Nachbarschaft im besagten Plattenbau ist eine gut funktionierende, wie sich aus häufigen Aussagen wie *„Ich verstehe mich mit allen*" oder „*Nachbarn sind wie eine Familie*" heraushören lässt. Zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen basieren in Kuba sehr stark auf Reziprozitätsverhältnisse und manifestieren große Offenheit, welche sich als wichtige soziale Norm und Wert im kubanischen Verständnis erweist: Der Alltag dieser Gemeinschaften im Calero funktioniert dadurch so gut, dass eine regelmäßige gegenseitige Unterstützung notwendig stattfindet. So erzählte z. B. Juana, dass ihre Nachbarin, die im Café arbeitet, ihr immer was zu trinken oder essen schenke, weil sie täglich für sie einkaufte aufgrund ihrer eingeschränkten Zeit. Oder dass Maria auf die Kinder ihrer Nachbarin auf-passe und dafür gelegentlich aufgrund ihrer schwachen finanziellen Lage etwas Warmes zu Essen erhalte.

Das Teilen von Mahlzeiten unter der Nachbarschaft gilt als Gewohnheit und findet regelmäßig statt.

Im Folgenden werden zunächst die Verhältnisse und Interaktion in Calero diskutiert, um danach auf Aspekte der Raumnutzung, -aneignung und -transformation sowie das darauf aufbauende persönliche Konfliktmanagement einzugehen.

Figure 3: Plattenbauviertel, Volksbeirat Hermanos Cruz. Großzügige Freiräume und Grünflächen sollen der Erholung dienen (Foto: Autorin)

Der Einfluss des Raumes auf die Nachbarschaftsinteraktion

Auch wenn die Bewohner des Plattenbaus aus unterschiedlichen Kontexten und Orten stammen, ist allen gemeinsam, dass das Leben sich früher in eingeschossigen Häusern abgespielt hat, die nicht nur eine andere Art der Raumwahrnehmung mit sich brachten, sondern völlig andere Lebensstile, soziale Praktiken und Interaktion der Nachbarschaft ermöglichten als die heutigen Mehrgeschosshäuser. Es standen ihnen früher großzügig angelegte (private) Freiräume zur Verfügung, wie beispielsweise Innenhöfe oder Portalbereiche bzw. die Gärten auf dem Land. Als ich Lisandra, eine der Bewohnerinnen, danach fragte, ob sie sich an die Wohnung im Calero gewöhnt habe oder ob ihr etwas fehle, antwortete sie nach kurzem Überlegen:

> *„[…] ich war daran gewöhnt… ich kam zum Beispiel vom Wohnzimmer direkt in den Portalbereich oder konnte durch die hintere Tür direkt in den Innenhof gelangen. Dort hatte ich meine Bäumchen und meinen Freiraum, was ich hier leider nicht mehr habe"* (Lisandra, 56 Jahre, ehemalige Landbewohnerin).

Hofbereiche galten u. a. als Orte der Entspannung, welche durch Pflanzen und Blumen verschönert und mit Obstbäumen wie Mango oder Avocado versehen wurden. Das Gefühl im Freien aber trotzdem bei sich zu Hause sein zu

22 vgl. mit Centro Provincial 2002: 4-6
23 vgl. Fuente 1995: 131-133

Figure 4: Städtisches Einfamilienhaus mit Hof und Portal in Pinar del Rio (Zeichnung: Autorin)

Figure 5: Beispiel eines Einfamilienhauses auf dem Lande mit Portal, Garten und Hofbereich (Foto: Autorin)

können, hatte eine wichtige Bedeutung, denn der Trennung zwischen öffentlich und privat wurde eine hohe Wichtigkeit zugewiesen. Die isolierte Lage der Einfamilienhäuser durch den physischen Abstand zum nächsten Haus oder durch die teilweise existierenden Zäune sowie Portale verlieh dem Haus seine eigene Privatheit. Ebenfalls wiesen Innenräume eines Hauses eine Unterteilung in öffentlich und privat auf, da dort Räume wie Schlafzimmer, Küche, Esszimmer und Innenhof[24] im hinteren Teil des Hauses untergebracht waren, während öffentliche Zonen wie das Wohnzimmer eher im vorderen Teil eines Hauses zu finden waren. Die Wohnungen in den Plattenbauten weisen in Gegensatz eine völlig andere Grundrissaufteilung auf: Küche sowie Ess- und Wohnzimmer befinden sich in der unmittelbaren Nähe der Eingangstür und werden mit einem vorderen und hinteren Balkon versehen. Die Schlafzimmer werden durch eine kleine Diele erschlossen und bleiben vom Rest der Wohnung etwas abgesondert, jedoch vom Wohnzimmer aus einsehbar. Nur im Falle der 5-Zimmer Wohnungen ist eins der Schlafzimmer direkt vom Wohnzimmer aus zu betreten, was von den Bewohnern häufig als unangenehm empfunden wird. Auch wird als sehr unangenehm empfunden, dass jeder Besucher direkt das Esszimmer betreten muss, einen Bereich, der in der Regel als privat gilt. Der Bau zeigt eine Vorder- und eine Rückseite. Der Vorderseite sind Gemeinschaftsgärten und ein öffentlicher Platz vorgelagert. Die Bauten sind immer paarweise angeordnet, so dass in diesem Zwischenraum ein Ort entsteht, der für die Kollektivität gedacht ist und für Haus-Wartungsarbeiten benutzt werden sollte. Im Allgemeinen sind öffentliche Bereiche, wie Plätze, Gemeinschaftsgärten, Durchgangsbereiche, im vorderen und hinteren Teil des Hauses, wie auch Zwischenbereiche zwischen den Bauten im Hinterhaus, durch die Hausbewohner zu pflegen. Doch stellt sich an dieser Stelle die Frage, ob der staatlich geplante und gebaute Raum die Bedürfnisse der Bewohner sowie soziale Normen hinreichend berücksichtigte. Laut Lefebvre[25] ist Raum das Produkt konkreter sozialer Praktiken (historischer Materialismus[26]). Raum, wiederum, beherrscht Körper und beeinflusst soziale Beziehungen und das Handeln der Akteure[27]. Die Art der Durchführung und Ausübung von sozialen Praktiken erfolgt im Zusammenspiel mit der Umgrenzung von Tätigkeitsorten und wird von den physischen Gegebenheiten eines Ortes (z.B. eines öffentlichen Platzes oder eines Hauses und den Räumen dieses Hauses) beeinflusst[28], Orte die im Fall des Calero durch eine staatliche Ideologie produziert wurden. Früher, das heißt in den städtischen Einfamilienhäusern genauso wie auf den ländlichen Dorfgrundstücken, folgte die Nachbarschaftsinteraktion anderen Regeln. Die Grundrissaufteilung ermöglichte bspw. eine „Hierarchisierung" der Besuche, wonach Passanten im Portal, Bekannte im Wohnzimmer und Freunde in der Küche oder Esszimmer empfangen wurden. Anders liegen die Bedingungen im Plattenbau, wo die „Hierarchisierung" sozialer Kontakte eingeschränkt ist: Hier gehen Wohnzimmer, Esszimmer und Küche ineinander über und sind vom Eingang aus

24
Mit dem Begriff Innenhof werden in Pinar del Río Freiräume in hinteren Teil eines Hauses bezeichnet, sei es in der Stadt oder auf dem Land.

25 Lefebvre 1991

26
In diesem Zusammenhang sei das sehr wichtige Konzept der räumlichen Dreiheit erwähnt, bestehend aus *räumlicher Praxis* (das Wahrgenommene), *Raumrepräsentation* (das Konzipierte) und *Repräsentation des Raumes* (der gelebte Raum).

27 Lefebvre 1991: 129 und 143

28 Dickhardt 2003: 38



Figure 6: Typengrundriss der Wohnheiten im Plattenbau Hermanos Cruz: Eingangstür öffnet direkt ins Wohnzimmer (Zeichnung: Autorin)

Figure 7: unveränderte Wohneinheit im Plattenbauviertel Hermanos Cruz: Küche sowie Ess- und Wohnzimmer befinden sich in der unmittelbaren Nähe der Eingangstür (Foto: Autorin)

Figure 8: Der öffentliche Raum zwischen den Häuserzeilen soll eine Zusammentreffen der Bewohner erleichtern. (Foto: Autorin)

einsehbar, wobei die traditionelle Zonierung und die ihr zugrunde liegenden sozialen Normen verloren gehen. Des Weiteren, verlagert sich im Plattenbau die Interaktion der Nachbarschaft in die „Vertikale". Zunächst seien die Balkone betrachtet, wo sich Menschen zur Unterhaltung auf Distanz „treffen". Während früher Gespräche (beispielsweise im Stadtzentrum oder in Marginalvierteln) über den Gartenzaun stattfanden und bzw. durch die physische Nähe um einen Hof herum untereinander begünstigt wurde, finden diese im Plattenbauviertel hauptsächlich auf Balkonen im hinteren Teil des fünf-geschossigen Hauses statt[28] und die hohe Lautstärke, in der unvermeidlich geredet werden muss, verwandelt solche Gespräche in öffentliche Gespräche: Viele meiner Informanten fühlen sich vom häufigen Treppensteigen im Gebäude belastet, was dazu führt, dass sie tendenziell auf persönliche Besuche verzichten. Die Unterhaltung von einem Balkon zum anderen bringt jedoch den Nachteil mit sich, dass persönliche und intime Gespräche nicht geführt werden können, so dass Freundschaftsbeziehungen nicht mit großer Intensität erlebt werden und diese – im Vergleich zum Stadtzentrum – eher oberflächlich bleiben.

Gegenstände werden mittels eines Korbes von einem Balkon zum anderen gereicht, so dass die Raumwahrnehmung im Vergleich zu der im Stadtzentrum eine ganz andere wird: Nicht nur geschieht dies in der „Vertikale", sondern es entfällt auch der körperliche Kontakt.

Ein traditioneller Ort für Nachbarschaftsinteraktionen ist das ‚Portal' (Überdachte Terrasse zur Strasse hin) von wo aus die Hausbewohner Unterhaltungen mit den Passanten führten, wie Lisandra erzählte:

> *„dort, wo ich früher lebte, traf ich immer meine Nachbarn, nicht alle aber die meisten, weil diejenigen, die ein Stück weiter nach unten wohnten, am meinem Haus vorbei gingen, wenn sie von der Arbeit kamen. Ich saß dann im Portal, sie grüßten mich und wir unterhielten uns eine Weile"* (Lisandra, 56 Jahre, ehemalige Landbewohnerin).

Das Portal wird im Plattenbau durch das Treppenhaus ersetzt. Dort kommt es immer wieder vor, dass Nachbarn sich im Vorbeigehen treffen, dort eine Weile verbringen und Gespräche führen. Unterhaltungen im Treppenhaus führen dazu, dass die Eingangstüren zu den Wohnungen oft zum Schutz der Privatsphäre verschlossen bleiben – anders als in den alten Stadtzentren oder Dörfern: dort ist es nichts Außergewöhnliches, wenn die Bewohner eines Hauses eine Nachbarwohnung betreten, ohne anzuklopfen, sich nehmen, was sie brauchen und dann wieder gehen. Die Beachtung von Privatsphäre, die in eingeschossigen Häusern als soziale Norm galt und durch die unabhängige Lage der Hauseinheiten begünstigt war, ändert sich aufgrund der hohen Dichte dieser Plattenbauten. Um diese soziale Norm dort wiederherzustellen, bleiben

Figure 9: Ein traditioneller Ort für Interaktionen der Nachbarschaft ist das ‚Porta' – hier in Pinar del Rio (Foto: Autorin)

28
Nach meiner Beobachtung und aus den Aussagen der Bewohner übernehmen die Balkone im hinteren Teil des Hauses (sie bezeichnen diese als *„hintere Höfe"*) die Funktion der Innenhöfe in den eingeschossigen Häusern des Stadtzentrums. Dort treffen sich die Nachbarn zur Unterhaltung, die von einem Hof zum anderen stattfindet, jedoch aufgrund der physischen Nähe ohne „Geschrei".

Figure 10: Haare Schneiden im Portal eines Einfamilienhauses im Stadtzentrum von Pinar del Río (Foto: Autorin)

29 Lefebvre 1991: 336
30 Lefebvre 1991: 331
31 Lefebvre 1991: 129

Türen verschlossen und dies führt zu einer konsequenten Veränderung der Raumsprache und Rückzug in die inneren Bereiche einer Wohnung, wie mir Graciela bestätigte:

> *„Und das ist, was in einer (Plattenbau-) Gemeinschaft passiert. Sobald du in deiner Wohnung bist, schließt du die Tür hinter dir und bekommst nichts mehr mit, aber in einem Einfamilienhaus, wenn du im Innenhof sitzt und etwas erledigst, gibt es immer irgendwelche Nachbarn, mit denen man sich unterhalten kann"* (Graciela, 35 Jahre, ehemalige Stadtbewohnerin).

Der neue Raum im Plattenbau: Einfluss auf soziale Praktiken und Raumverständnis

Doch muss sich das Nutzungsmuster notwendigerweise immer dem Raum anpassen? Gemäß Lefebvre[29] setzt eine räumliche Praxis (Natur-)Raum voraus, besetzt ihn, eignet ihn sich an und produziert ihn. Das heisst: Raum ist gleichzeitig als Voraussetzung und Resultat sozialer Praxis zu betrachten: In diesem doppelten Verständnis enthält der soziale Raum als Projektion der sozialen Praxis neben Werken und Produkten auch die sozialen Beziehungen, aus denen er hervorgeht. Raum entsteht jeweils in seiner eigenen Genese, Form und mit seinen spezifischen Zeiten[30], während soziale Beziehungen der Nutzer sich in den Raum projizieren, diesen mit ihrer eigenen Raumpraxis füllen und in diesem Prozess neuen Raum[31] produzieren.

Figure 11: Aneignung des öffentlichen Platzes durch Wäscheaufhängen vor dem Eingangsbereich des Plattenbaus (Foto: Autorin)

Beispielsweise hat die räumliche Umstellung im Plattenbauviertel Veränderungen in der privaten Raumnutzung mit sich gebracht, da Privatwohnungen eine andere Bedeutung bekommen und andere Funktionen erfüllen als nur die Familie und das familiäre Leben zu herbergen: Kurze Zeit nach der Umsiedlung wurden als privat intendierte Räume für das „geschäftliche Leben" benutzt. Die Bewohner begannen kurz nach ihrer Umsiedlung, die gewerblichen Tätigkeiten - die sie früher in Portalbereichen ausübten - in die eigenen Wohnungen zu verlegen. Sie hofften einerseits, den Bedarf der Nachbarn an fehlenden Dienstleistungen abzudecken und andererseits, dadurch eine Chance für den (ökonomischen) Aufbau ihrer Zukunft zu sichern. In dieser Hinsicht investierten sie quasi in der Gemeinschaft, in der sie lebten, um ihre Zukunft zu sichern. Zu den Gewerbe- und Interaktionstätigkeiten zählten z.B. die Hände- und Fußpflege, das Haare schneiden oder Reparaturdienste aller Art. Anders als in der Innenstadt, wo derlei Tätigkeiten in den Portalbereichen stattfinden und somit eine große Interaktion ebenfalls mit Passanten möglich wird, geschehen diese innerhalb der Plattenbauten in der eigenen Wohnung, was mit zwei Konsequenzen verbunden ist: um Einen verkleinert sich dadurch die Interaktionsgruppe und zum Anderen muss der „Fremde" somit den privaten Bereich der Wohnung betreten, so dass privat und öffentlich ineinander verschmelzen und keine klare Trennung der beiden Bereiche mehr vorhanden ist. Auch Balkone werden oft mit zusätz-



Figure 12: Wohneinheit im Plattenbauviertel Hermanos Cruz vor und nach dem Umbau zur Unterbringung eines Friseusalons (Zeichnung: Autorin)

lichen Funktionen gefüllt und in einigen Fällen für eine Schweinehaltung benutzt, die ursprünglich in den Innenhöfen der Einfamilienhäuser stattgefunden hat: Diese werden zu einer Art Stall umfunktioniert, indem Holzboxen gebaut werden, in denen die Tiere untergebracht sind. Auch werden kleine Taubenschläge gebaut und auf den Balkon platziert. Diese räumliche Praxis kann mit dem (sozialen und räumlichen) Herkunftsort im Zusammenhang gebracht werden, da diese hauptsächlich bei Marginalviertel- und bei Landbewohnern zu finden war (und heute noch ist). Weiterhin werden öffentliche Plätze und Durchgangsbereiche okkupiert, um Wäsche aufzuhängen oder Reis und Kaffee zum Trocknen auszubreiten. Letztere stellen Alltagstätigkeiten dar, die früher in den Innenhöfen der Landhäuser durchgeführt wurden und eine Interaktion unter Frauen förderten. Gemüseanbau findet heute häufig in den Vorgärten der Plattenbauten statt, während dafür früher auf dem Land ein Bereich des Hofes reserviert war.

Raumaneignungen und -transformationen

Zu den Strategien der Akteure für eine räumliche Umfunktionierung gehört die physische Transformation des Raumes. Es können zwei Typen der Raumtransformation unterschieden werden: Eine Veränderung des Innenraumes und die Aneignung von öffentlichen Kollektivräumen. Auch hier sind die Gründe für physische Eingriffe auf das Fehlen von Innenhof und Portalbereichen zurückzuführen. Eine erste Art der Veränderung wird vorgenommen, um in der Wohnung zusätzliche Räumlichkeiten zu gewinnen, die für gewerbliche Tätigkeiten benutzt werden. Ich konnte häufig beobachten, dass Wohnzimmer, die in ihrer physischen Lage näher am Eingang liegen, umgebaut werden (indem Trennwände in der Wohnung eingezogen werden) um daraus „gewerbliche Zonen" zu gewinnen. Dort werden oft Cafés oder Friseursalons untergebracht. Das Verkaufen von Gegenständen und Mahlzeiten in den Portalbereichen der Stadt – was ebenfalls Sozialisierung fördert – findet in dem Plattenbauviertel in Schwellenbereichen statt. Um dies zu ermöglichen, werden die sog. Gemeinschaftsvorgärten vor den jeweiligen Bauten durch die Bewohner eingenommen, durch Zäune abgetrennt und okkupiert. Ein weiteres Beispiel der Privatisierung öffentlicher Flächen sind die Rückseiten der Wohnblocks. Diese werden durch die Bewohner der Erdgeschosse durch private Terrassen, Garagen oder andere Anbauten belegt, was mitunter zu Spannungen führen kann. Beim Wachsen der Familie wächst der Bedarf der Wohnungs-

Figure 13: Private Inbesitznahme öffentlicher Flächen zur Nutzung als Wohnraum, Garage oder Werkstatt (Foto: Autorin)

Figure 14: Informelle Werkstatt im Hinterhof des Plattenbaus (Foto: Autorin)

Figure 15: Traditionelles Schweineschlachten im Innenhof eines Einfamilienhauses im Marginalviertel (Foto: Autorin)

Wohnungserweiterung weiter. Während man im Stadtzentrum über große Grundstücke verfügt, die bei Bedarf ausgebaut werden können, kann dies im Calero nicht erfolgen – mit Ausnahme der Erdgeschosse, die auf Kollektivboden erweitert werden.

Gelegentlich werden staatlich geplante Kollektivräume (Zwischenräume zwischen zwei Bauten) für die Errichtung von kleinen Werkstätten verwendet – wie sie übrigens schon im städtebaulichen Programm vorgesehen waren aber nie realisiert worden sind. Es handelt sich um Holzkleinbauten, die illegal gebaut und betrieben, jedoch vom Staat geduldet werden. Der Bau dieser kleinen Werkstätten wird von vielen der Bewohner nicht begrüßt, da ihr Betrieb Lärm, Gerüche und Staub mit sich bringt. Jedoch beschwert sich öffentlich keiner darüber, um in der Nachbarschaft *„gut zu leben*".

Hohe Dichte, Leben in der Gemeinschaft und Spannungen im Alltag

Wie in allen Gesellschaften gibt es auch in Kuba reichlich Gründe für Spannungen zwischen den Bewohnern. Ohne Zweifel spielt die hohe Wohndichte in den Plattenbauten eine zentrale Rolle. Dies wird noch verstärkt durch die hohe Lautstärke, mit der Musik und Fernseher abgespielt werden. Auch das Geschrei über die Balkone hinweg wird oft als Belastung genannt. Verursacher sind mehrheitlich Hausbewohner, die aus Landgebieten oder aus Marginalvierteln stammen. Auch die Tierhaltung (Schweine, Tauben, Hühner und Hunde) auf Balkonen ist Gegenstand von Klagen - insbesondere wegen Lärm, Gerüchen und hygienischen Bedenken. Auch die Treppenhausreinigung, das Grasmähen der Gemeinschaftsbereiche und die Müllsammlung auf öffentlichen Plätzen wird als Konflikt oft erwähnt und führt im schlimmsten Falle (jedoch selten) zum Streit. Dies sind Aufgaben, die theoretisch rotierend auf „freiwilliger" Basis von Allen erledigt werden sollen, jedoch halten sich nicht alle daran und oft fallen diese Tätigkeiten ganz aus. Im öffentlichen Strassenbereich sind die Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDR) als „Garant für das Wohl der Kollektivität" beauftragt, solche Aktivitäten zu organisieren und leisten dies mehr oder weniger erfolgreich.

Ein letzter Aspekt, auf den ich gerne eingehen möchte ist das Schlachten von Schweinen zum Jahresende. Traditionell findet diese Tätigkeit in den Höfen der eingeschossigen Häuser auf dem Lande oder in Marginalvierteln statt. Da bei den Plattenbauten solche Flächen nicht geplant sind, geschieht dies in den Kollektivräumen im hinteren Teil des Hauses. Nicht nur durch die daraus entstehende Blutverschmutzung fühlen sich manche Hausbewohner belästigt, sondern auch durch die Zubereitung des Fleisches über offenem Feuer, womit Rauch in die Wohnung kommt: "*Ich muss meine (aufgehängte) Wäsche wieder abwaschen, da der Rauch sie verschmutzte*". Meine Recherche ergab, dass solche Spannungen stark mit dem Herkunftsort zusammenhängen und nicht mit der sozialen Zugehörigkeit: die Tätigkeiten, über die berichtet wurde, werden in den meisten Fällen von denjenigen vorgenommen, die entweder aus Landgebieten stammen oder Marginalvierteln, wo sich auch ehemalige Migranten aus ländlichen Zonen konzentrieren.

Figure 16: Kochstelle im hinteren Bereich eines Plattenbaus für das Festtags-Essen (Foto: Autorin)

Ausblick

Die Fledforschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass die durch den Staat angestrebten Ideale, auch 26 Jahre nach Fertigstellung und Bezug des Calero nicht erreicht wurden, zumindest nicht wie ursprünglich in der kubanischen Ideologie prognostiziert. Ein fundamentaler „Mangel" findet sich bereits in der Grundrissaufteilung, bei der kulturell verankerte Raum-Hierarchien und Zonierungen verloren gehen und als ‚private' betrachtete Bereiche von Wohnungseingang her eingesehen werden können. Auch die Idee der Erschaffung von Kollektivräumen als Ersatz für die Portale auf den ersten Blick eine gute Lösung (weil Bewohner der Stadt von Pinar del Río und Umland ihre Freizeit gerne im Freien verbringen) hat sich in der Praxis nicht bewährt, da dort verankerten Funktionen privater Natur sind.
Ehemalige Stadtbewohner eignen sich dagegen Kollektivräume an, um gewerbliche Tätigkeiten auszuüben oder transformieren sie durch Anbauten in Privatraum. Grund ist der Planungsfehler, dass einerseits entsprechende Mischfunktionen im Plattenbauviertel nicht vorgesehen waren, und andererseits weil ehemalige Stadtbewohner gewohnt waren, solche Tätigkeiten im Portal in der unmittelbaren Nähe des eigenen Hauses, jedoch nie in Privaträumen, durchzuführen.
Andere räumlich relevante Praktiken ehemaliger Landbewohner, können aufgrund der Mehrgeschossigkeit und großen Nähe zum Nachbarn in den Plattenbauten schnell zu Spannungen führen. Die Übernahme kollektiver Aufgaben durch freiwilliger Arbeit, ein zentrales Element der kubanischen Revolution, ist über die Jahre erodiert – nicht zuletzt wegen der tendenziellen Anonymität großer Wohnblocks im Vergleich zu städtischen Wohnstrassen und Dörfern auf dem Land. Ich führe diese Problematiken persönlich darauf zurück, dass bei der Planung dieser Bauten – insbesondere die Unterbringung im Massenwohnungsbau und die Durchmischung von Familien aus unterschiedlichen Herkunftsorten im selben Gebäude – die kulturellen Komponenten und Lebensgewohnheiten entweder nicht bekannt waren oder schlicht ignoriert wurden. Dies brachte direkt „Fehl-" oder Umnutzungen der Bausubstanz durch die Nutzer hervor. Auch die Diskrepanz zwischen politischer Zielsetzung und sozialer Wirklichkeit trägt unweigerlich zu Spannungen, Unsicherheiten und Unzufriedenheit bei, die im Alltag der BewohnerInnen klugerweise auf kleiner Flamme garen gelassen werden im Sinne des höheren Wertes einer guten Nachbarschaft. Obgleich eine ironische Stellung gegenüber Programmen und Diskursen der kubanischen Revolution leicht über die Lippen geht (und sogar Teil einer tolerierten lokalen Folklore zu sein scheint), bin ich der Meinung, dass das Modell der Durchmischung von Familien aus verschiedenen Herkunftsorten durchaus funktionieren kann, da die BewohnerInnen des Calero (wie es sich zeigte) eine große Toleranz und Verständnis gegenüber unterschiedlichen sozialen Gewohnheiten und Bedürfnissen aufbringen. Massenwohnungsbau in der Form, wie er konzipiert wurde, kann dann gut funktionieren, wenn vorherige Wohnkulturen und räumliche Praktiken bei der Planung mitberücksichtigt werden und im selben Bau differenziert Ausdruck finden. Dies bedeutet selbstverständlich nicht, dass jeder Bau eine andere Planung und Konzeption vorweisen soll, sondern es würde reichen, ein universell einsetzbares Konzept und Lösungen zu entwickeln, die eine Differenzierung entsprechend der unterschiedlichen Herkunftsorte von Bewohnern zulassen.

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Towards a New Local Paradigm: PREVI and the Transformed UVs in Lima.

Incremental Neighbourhood Adaptation in Social Housing for Lower-Middle-Income Residents

Patricia Caldas Torres

Aneignung von Sozial-Wohnblocks durch die Nutzer in Lima, Peru
In den 1950er Jahren, als sich die Europäische Bauwirtschaft in einer durch Schlichtbauweise gekennzeichneten Aufbauphase befand, startete in Lima, Peru, ein anspruchsvolles Sozial-Wohungsprogramm unter dem Namen ‚Unidades Vecinales' (UVs) mit hohen qualitativen Ansprüchen wie z.B. in den CIAM Manifesten gefordert. Als städtebauliches Modell diente die Gartenstadt mit bezugsfähigen Wohnungen und einer autonomen Infrastrukur. Rund 2500 Wohnungen entstanden in diesem Programm.

Eine Dekade später startete ein weiteres wegweisendes Wohnungsbau-Programm in Lima unter dem Namen PREVI (Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda) als Produkt eines Architekturwettbewerbs, zu dem 13 berühmte zeitgenössische Architekten der Avantgarde aus der ganzen Welt eingeladen worden waren. Die demographische Dynamik lateinamerikanischer Metropolen verlangte damals schon flexible Modelle, bis hin zum Wachsenden Haus. Von den ursprünglich geplanten 1500 Wohnungen wurden nur 500 fertiggestellt, nachdem der gewählte Präsident und Förderer des Programms, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, durch einen Militärputsch abgesetzt worden war.

In Laufe der mehr als 5 Jahrzehnte Ihres Bestehens haben sich die Bewohner ihre Wohnungen angeeignet, umgebaut und erweitert. Die Studie von Patricia Caldas Torres vergleicht (z.T. auf der Grundlage von Sekundarquellen) die in beiden Programmen zwischenzeitlich vorgenommenen Veränderungen in Funktion der jeweiligen individuellen Raumbedürfnisse – welche sich in der Regel nicht mit den seitens der Architekten prognostizierten Modellen decken. Dabei erlauben die PREVI Entwürfe weitergehende Anpassungen als die UVs.

Introduction

All South American metropoles have been experiencing an ongoing, rapid urban growth that materialises in the spread of informal settlements. Lima was one of the first and well-documented cases of this phenomenon, and there were several attempts to offer a solution with the help of engaged and talented architects. Already in 1946, a national housing corporation (CNV) was founded and a large-scale, low-income housing programme of residential modules (UV = *Unidades Vecinales*) was started that achieved an impressive output of 25,000 dwellings by the early 1960s[1]. The UVs were based on "autonomous" neighbourhood units containing some elements of the garden suburb: five cellular units were built at the first urban periphery, equipped with a school, some community services, and green areas[2] The prevailing typology was the *Zeilenbau*, aligned rows of multi-storey apartment buildings[3] conceived as an end product. However, over the 60 years of their existence, residents have modified the architecture to respond to their daily needs, dreams, and preferences. Hardly any unit can be found with the unaltered design of the architect.

It was soon recognised that, in spite of best intentions, the UV programme would not be enough to solve the problems of Lima's *barriadas* (squatter settlements). John Turner, Hans Harms[4] and other architects who worked in Peru drew attention to the step-by-step, self-building practises of the home-seeking local people and migrants, which better suited the economic conditions and typical family cycle of the poor population. Progressive politicians became responsive to the arguments and, with the help of the United Nations, started an experimental core housing scheme that became known under the name PREVI[5]. Thirteen outstanding international architects (including James Stirling, Charles Correa, Georges Candilis, Aldo van Eyck, Christopher Alexander, Atelier 5 and others) were invited to plan and realise, together with a number of young Peruvian architects, a pioneer lab of a variety of incremental one-family houses inspired by the informal growth processes in *barriadas*.

Both programmes – UV and PREVI – although starting from opposite planning concepts, eventually demonstrated the outcomes of user self-help construction interventions in dwellings originally planned and built by architects at undoubtedly highest design standards. This phenomenon can also be observed in the state housing developments, for example, in the form of informal extensions of the standard apartments that can equally be found in working class Barrios Obreros, with closed street blocks and row housing; in middle class Agrupamientos, with several types of three-storey rows; and in Conjuntos Residenciales, planned as "park neighbourhoods" typical for upper-middle-class residents.

The hypothesis of this article is that both initially contradictory approaches represent examples of co-production of space. In a country with a neo-liberal economy like Peru, where the state has given up even at least trying to guarantee the basic right of housing, co-production is understood as partial self-construction, and has become a survival strategy and common practise in the city of Lima in times of economic crisis. This affects not only the low and middle classes, but sometimes also the upper middle

01 *Corporación Nacional de la Vivienda*. See: HABITAR 25.6.2012 (https://habitar-arq.blogspot.com/2012/06/unidad-vecinal-matute.html)

02
The UV was a model which, in Latin America, marked a phase of the social housing policies in the post-war period. The models built under their influence in Lima were: *Conjuntos Residenciales*, *Conjuntos Habitacionales*, *Unidades*, *Grupos and Agrupamientos*. The Ensemble of the Working Class Neighbourhoods Barrio Obreros N° 3 and N° 4 is a predecessor of the UV: it is a transition between the garden city and the Hispanic compact city. The transition between the models was documented in Caldas 2015.

03
With the model of the garden suburb, the typology of the *Zeilenbau* based on a serial structure was also imported.

04 Harms Hans 1972, p. 188.

05
PREVI = *Proyecto experimental de vivienda* ("Experimental Housing Project").



Figure 1A & B: *PREVI Stage Zero.* A fragment of the neighbourhood and small plaza with extended houses in 2017. Source: Site plan in Garcia-Huidobro; Torres; Tugas 2008, p. 52 (Photo: Author)

class. Projecting this fact into the future, the common contemporary practise of housing co-production might be beneficially incorporated in upcoming housing policies for Peru or even the entire region. With this perspective in mind, I propose to systemise past experiences on the basis of a comparative analysis of the UV and PREVI case studies. The PREVI case[6], which is relatively small in terms of units produced, has already been researched and documented by Fernando García-Huidobro, Diego Torres and Nicolás Tugas, and their valuation of the transformation of 14 extendable houses over three decades was adapted as part of the baseline for my own studies. As a representation of the UV approach, I selected UV3[7], UV Matute, and follow-up examples in the *Conjuntos Habitacionales* (CH) Palomino and Manzanilla and *Conjunto Residencial* (CR) San Felipe[8].





Co-production of city in the Peruvian society: another modernity

Carlos Franco's concept la otra *modernidad* ("another modernity") refers to the co-production of the Peruvian city carried out by poor and low-income urban groups that are mostly excluded from public sector programmes. An important driver was the mass migration from the countryside to Lima in the decade of the 1950s and thereafter. The concept helps to interpret the informally transformed UVs as an expression of the modernisation model of development in the Peruvian society – characterised by Hispanic and Andean tradition – between 1950 and 1970.

The first residents of the UVs were children of migrants who mostly came from the Andean regions and did not have access to social housing programmes[9]. Later on, more than half of their children were also not eligible for public housing because of their low incomes, and remained in the neighbourhood where they formed new families, which required extra space that they created by expanding apartments and houses, including communal facilities, and adapting public space according to their individual and collective needs. Thus, they collectively transformed the built and social environment of the UVs. The "another modernity" of Peru is therefore rather distinct from the Western modernisation concept[10], which is based upon economic growth and mass consumption. It expresses a differentiation of needs, the ability of the inhabitants to deal with the transformation of society,



Figure 2A & B: Ground floor of a basic four-house cluster built by government contractors and a minimum house transformed by the family (Source: Arnell; Bickford 1984: James Stirling. Bauten und Projekte 1950-1983, p. 142)

06 See: free access summary (19 pages): https://upcommons.upc.edu/bitstream/handle/2099/12264/03_02_NicolasTugas.pdf. For another, more technical account from 1988, see: http://informes-delaconstruccion.revistas.csic.es/index.php/informes-delaconstruccion/article/view/17119764/. For a third publication dated 1993, see: http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/28701/1/26472-92746-1-PB.pdf

07 For UV3, see also: http://infraestructuraperuana.blogspot.com/2010/01/unidad-vecinal-numero-3.html

08 In CR San Felipe, as well as in other state-housing groups that underwent fewer modifications, there are 12% to 15% of extended families. See: INEI Census 2007. In PREVI, of 14 case studies, only four showed growth due to this pattern, according to Garcia-Huidobro; Torres; Tugas 2008.

09 Delgado 1966, pp. 32-34.

10 See video: http://study.com/academy/lesson/modernization-theory-definition-development-claims.html





Figure 3A, B, C: *UV3 Morphology*. Unidad Vecinal, double row site layout, photo and first-floor plan (Source: Photo and typical floor plan in Arquitecto Peruano, Sept. 1949)

and their ability to make and adapt their own "city for the future" shaped by individual and collective survival strategies[11].

Characterisation of PREVI and of the transformed examples of the UVs

The PREVI case

While PREVI was conceived as a neighbourhood of houses owned by low-income families, the UVs were meant to offer rented accommodation to low-income sectors but were later privatised in line with the policies promoting home ownership from 1967 onwards. This explains the freedom of the UV residents to enlarge and modify their apartments and housing units. Although PREVI had been planned for 1,500 low-cost homes, only 500 were actually built on a site 9 km away from the traditional centre of Lima in a low-rise, high-density scheme (40 units/ha, 12.3 ha).

On the other hand, the first *Unidad Vecinal*, UV3, contained 1070 dwellings (50 units/ha, 30 ha) and was located between 3 and 4 km away from the traditional city centre. Like the other UVs, it remains a planned urban fragment surrounded by the former squatter settlements or *barriadas* of the city. But over time, the residents accommodated production spaces, shops, and stores in existing apartments and its self-built extensions, and achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency in services.

PREVI "stage zero" consists of a group of compact houses with a patio, grouped in clusters around small plazas. The units were designed with one or two floors, which could be extended to up to three floors. Over time, the compact house proved to be a typology capable of generating high density (Image 01A and 01B). After 40 years, PREVI inhabitants could obtain additional dwelling units through densification, thus extending the living space from the original 53 m² and 107 m² to up to 127 m² and 352 m² of one original house. As the extensions are up to four floors high, the appearance of the neighbourhood has changed considerably (Images 02A and 02B).

Unidad Vecinal No. 3

The UVs underwent a totally different transformation. The UV3 morphology[12] was based on a serial structure and contains four-storey double rows and aligned two-storey houses with two apartments on each floor. The first one,

11 Franco, Carlos 1990, pp 198-204

12 See also: http://divagarquitectura.blogspot.de/2012/04/unidad-vecinal-n-3.html

Figure 4A, B, C: Unidad Vecinal, transformations and extensions of the flats made by the residents (Photo: Author)



the most commonly built type of the modules, shapes a cul-de-sac between the rows to create calm enclosed open spaces (Images 03A, 03B and 03C).

The residents of the 1,115 units appropriated these spaces and transformed them into alleyways, which express the private character of these spaces in contrast to the public gardens between the double rows. At the beginning of the 1950s, the serial model of the UV marked a break with the local Hispanic urban tradition of the compact city. But over more than 60 years, the inhabitants recreated the local *quinta*[13] consisting of alleyways, small plazas in the modified cul-de-sacs, and corridors into which some new rooms or private extensions of apartments open (Images 04A, 04B and 04C).

Vertical extensions by the residents reached a maximum of four floors in the two-storey houses and, in parts, four floors in the double rows. The horizontal and vertical extensions altered the original image of practically all the double rows, especially towards the end of the cul-de-sac streets. Also, a few unplanned units were added to the front of the rows. Over time, the original 56-64 m² apartments of the double rows (ground floor and fourth floor) were extended to 80-180 m²; they were expanded by 50% to 200%. The apartment buildings allowed a total of 16% to 31% increase in size. The initially 100-124 m² apartments in the two-storey houses now reach up to 200-340 m², an expansion of 100% to 250%. Families were able to double the given original apartment's size, in some cases they even increased it more (Images 05A, 05B, 06A and 06B).

Unidad Vecinal Matute

This housing estate also belongs to the first generation of the UVs (1953), and its architecture is said to be influenced by Le Corbusier and Mies van der Rohe. It consists of two typologies: rows of apartment buildings and two-storey row houses (Images 07A, 07B and 07C). Over time, only a few of the apartment buildings of the first phase have been altered, but the two-storey row houses grew to three or four floors, sometimes even reaching five floors. The public gardens in front of the row houses were transformed into private enclosed spaces (garage, courtyard, or private garden), thus narrowing most of the inner streets. The second phase of UV Matute (1960s) was planned with rows of five-storey apartment buildings and contains blocks, plazas, and interior streets. Dwellers primarily made vertical extensions, thus parts of the blocks reach six floors. Without altering the structure of plazas, but by narrowing the inner streets, ground-floor extensions were realised on the former sides and gardens parallel to the actual path (Image 08A, 08B and 08C).

Figure 5A & **B**: *UV3*. Two-storey house with two apartments on each floor. Ground floor, first and second floor (Source: Arquitecto Peruano, Sept. 1949)

13
Local housing typology for lower- and middle-income inhabitants, which consists of an alleyway into which small rooms or two-room apartments open. There is an entry to access into the quinta from the public street.

The Conjunto Habitacional Manzanilla

CH Manzanilla was one of the last UV ventures (1971-80) and was located in an area of informal settlements and commerce. It consists of two housing typologies: rows of five-storey apartment buildings and a "U-shaped" module with a row of five-storey apartment buildings and another two three-storey residential buildings, designed as a pair of lateral wings. A plaza-like public space is integrated in each module (Images 09A, 09B and 09C). CH Manzanilla, nevertheless, has already reached the highest building density. Rows of apartment buildings were extended not only to six floors, but in a few cases up to even seven

Figure 6A & B: *UV3*. Transformed two-storey house with two apartments on each floor in UV3, 1949 – 2015 (Source: Caldas 2015: 318-324)





Figure 8A, B, C: Row, 1953. Original shape (left), Row, 2011. Additions in dark (middle), Plaza in UV Matute, 2011 (right) (Photo: Johny Cruz)

floors. Horizontal extensions have been added in front of the rows, reaching from one to three floors, and minimising the original space of the inner streets. In one case, a multi-storey housing building was added to an existing row (Image 10A, 10B and 10C).

Appropriation of architecture and flexibility

The co-production implies appropriation, social actors, and the structural flexibility of existing neighbourhoods. According to Gimenez[14], urban identities are produced

14 Gimenez, Gilberto, 2004. https://de.scribd.com/doc/112493897/1-Introduccion-Al-Estudio-de-Las-Identidades-Urbanas-Gilberto-Giménez. Viewed 19-10- 2016.





Figure 9A, B, C: Typical floor (above), site plan (left), Façade with few modifications, 2007 (right)



Figure 10A, B, C: CH Manzanilla 2009 (foto) and Transformed "U-shaped" module in CH Manzanilla (drawings)

precisely through appropriation, and residents are the main social actors who construct identity. On the other hand, the transformation of the neighbourhood's physical structure and its architecture arise as a response to insufficient living space[15]. Appropriation is manifested in the adaptation of the original housing design to the changing needs of the inhabitants.

Both in PREVI and the transformed UVs, CHs, and CRs, the dynamic of growth of the different types of expandable houses and apartment buildings can be read only in relationship to the life processes of the residents.

The expansion of living surface reflects the growth of the family (Images 11 and 12).

The arrangement of space displays a tendency to become more complex in line with changing needs, and have produced new collective housing types in the UVs, CHs, and CRs[16]. Different from the PREVI setting, in these cases collective agreements have become necessary, which enriched the social interaction in the neighbourhood. The dwellings in PREVI had been adapted and expanded within the possibilities of the project design established at "stage zero".

In PREVI and the UVs, the evolution of building characteristics stretched over four phases: occupation, densification, diversification, and consolidation. New house types emerged in this evolution in PREVI: the multifamily house for the "family clan", and the "hyperhouse", which repre-

15 Fröhlich (2008)

16
Another housing-building type that grew are the closed street blocks in the assembly of the Barrios Obreros N° 3 and N° 4, which increased their area as much as 32%; the *quintas* of the CR San Felipe grew 18% to 20%, and the high apartment building (15 floors) increased their area by 13%.





Figure 11: Growth in area and time of expandable house types in PREVI (Source: Garcia-Huidobro; Torres; Tugas [2008], pp. 130-131)

sents the final phase in the evolution of an extended house (Image 13). This type incorporates uses beyond the basic residential functions and may include rental units, spaces for work and businesses, or communal facilities. Within the PREVI neighbourhood, the "hyperhouse" increased the opportunities for their owners to gain an income by leasing apartments or operating small businesses and workshops[17].

In the transformed UVs, the residents developed, similar to the PREVI case, new incremental space within the *Zeilenbauten*: the "row of apartment building that grows" and the "hyper apartment building". This type, like the "hyperhouse" in PREVI, refers to the latest stage of the typological evolution, where the informal construction process came to standstill. Both forms allow complementary uses beyond only the residential[18]: We may find rental units like rooms for students or young couples, etc.; spaces for work including workshops, studios, etc.; businesses

17 About the hyperhouse in PREVI see García-Huidobro; Torres; Tugas 2008, p. 138
18 Ibd., p. 138



Figure 12: Growth of apartments in different collective housing types in some state housing developments in Lima.

(shops, pharmacies, garages, etc.); and communal facilities like a small primary school, nursery, popular kitchen, etc. In the UVs and CHs, there are a number of "hyper apartment buildings", as in CH Manzanilla, with shops and restaurant on the ground floor, a copy shop on the first floor, and new lodger's bedrooms on top of the row (Images 14A, 14B and 14C).

Both the "hyperhouse" in PREVI and the "hyper apartment building" in the UVs and CHs can also generate an income for the families and, in a way, highlight the advantages and opportunities for social investments in housing. Following influences of Hernando de Soto in public politics[19], informal extensions of some ground-floor apartments in the UVs have been legally recognised by the Lima's municipality over the last decade. Thus, the UV inhabitant's efforts have added value to state housing, creating neighbourhoods that are in many aspects perfectly integrated with the urban fabric.

Both in the transformed UVs and in PREVI, the typical residents belonged to the lower-middle income segment characterised by strong ties to the extended family. This culture explains the desire of subsequent generations to live close to their parents and the rest of the family. Given the general housing shortage in Lima – especially for the lower-income population – they decided to stay in the neighbourhood and appropriate their social and physical environment to their family needs.

Both in PREVI and the UVs, the appropriation processes of dwellings are contrary to the conventional concept of standardisation in the design of housing for nuclear families (parents and children), and corresponds with varied and changing family structures. The pattern of the extended family in PREVI and the UVs diversified the social tissue of the neighbourhood: apart from the nuclear family, different types of family structures appeared and found place in the existing neighbourhood.

Over time, the pattern created new bonds between families (and more bonds within a family), feeding into a cultural attachment to the place. In the UVs, the pattern of the extended family generated greater complexity than in PREVI because of the range of apartment modifications ranging from units of intermediate evolution (only the apartment was extended) to developments in which two very small adjacent apartments were spatially integrated.



Figure 13: Hyperhouse in PREVI. 1. Common areas 2. Owner's family house 3. Lodger's bedrooms, 4. Guest's apartment

19 See: De Soto Hernando inhttp://www.ild.org.pe/books/the-mystery-of-capital-versions-capitulo-1

Figure 14A, B, C: HOUSING TYPOLOGY OF CH Manzanilla





Figure 15A & B: Alleyway moulded by the residents in CH Manzanilla. 3-D graphic (Richard Barrios) and view, 2009 (Photo: Author)

The processes of informal interventions in row structures and other building types in the UVs and CHs under this pattern have generated a more-intense collective life than in PREVI, and a shared sense of belonging to a group.

Provision and appropriation of open and public space

In the case of PREVI, the public space of the neighbourhood was designed with the local practise of the Peruvian inhabitants in mind. Open space was meant to be used individually and in groups around small plazas, each designed to serve groups of 6 to 18 families – offering a variety of small plazas and narrow lanes which still exist today. The small plazas in PREVI facilitated the appropriation of the public space, as groups of neighbours organised themselves to maintain and care for the plazas and green areas[20].

In the UVs, state housing developments also contained plazas[21]. But, also, in the evolution of the UVs originating in informal construction, in some cases plazas popped up where none had existed before – like some almost circular plazas in the cul-de-sac street of UV3. Another local feature appeared in the UVs: the pedestrian alleyway or narrow lane. This seeks a greater enclosure of the outside space between the double rows. This type of transformation persists above all in CH Manzanilla, where the greatest transformation took place in the 1990s, when 60% of its population were migrants, and 30%, children of migrants (Images 14 and 15)[22].

Unlike PREVI, the UV models were planned with a large percentage of garden areas; we find them on the edges of the plots or between two or more multi-family buildings. In fact, the different socio-spatial appropriation of the public gardens is precisely one notable difference between PREVI and the transformed UVs. In PREVI, these are very small gardens, cared for and adapted to the individual or collective needs of the residents.

In the UVs, on the other hand, they are large public garden areas that have been subtly subdivided and delimited by the residents, using hedges or wooden fences to create collective and individual gardens, as well as private constructions in the middle of the public space (e.g., shop, workshop or garage). These informal interventions in the UVs and CHs have diversified the spectrum of land uses,

20 About the public space in PREVI, see Baumgarten 2012

21 CH Palomino, CH Manzanilla, and the second stage of UV Matute. The second phase of UV Matute was designed by the Peruvian architect Enrique Ciriani.

22 According to INEI Census 1993 (National Institute of Statistics)

Figure 16A & B: UV Santa Marina, 2011. Private garden in public space (Author's graphic and photo)





◄ ►
Figure 17A, B, C: "Stage zero", CH Palomino. In: Arquitecto Peruano. No 347-348, 1966 (above), Collective meeting point shaped by inhabitants, CH Palomino, 2011 (left) (Photo by the author), Site plan 1966 (right) (Author's graphic)

blurring the distinction between public and private uses. The appropriation practises reveal the idea of the public space as a kind of „shared space" (Images 16A, 16B, 17A, 17B and 17C).
In the original design of PREVI, street furniture was part of the design and the species of trees were carefully selected to correspond to the arid climate. In the UVs, the residents have collectively arranged for public space by improvising street furniture, often substituting brick walls and railings with hedges of local species such as cacti and palm trees. The informal interventions in the public space in the UVs can be understood as social constructions that reflect ways of "marking the territory" and of strengthening the inhabitants' sense of ownership of the collective living environment. Examples include the way in which the residents enriched internal streets or passageways, and the spontaneous uses of the public space for folkoric dancing, religious events, open-air cinema, etc. (Images 18A and 18B).

Appropriation to obtain community facilities in PREVI and the UVs

In PREVI, procedures to obtain community facilities in the neighbourhood (e.g., shops, workshops or schools) mostly came from individual initiatives, although some have been the result of group initiatives. On the other hand, in the transformed models of the UVs, community equipment was for the most part collectively provided: the deficiencies in the original plan turned out to be a challenge and promoter for neighbourhood organisation.

Thus, sporting areas, community meeting rooms, small facilities for clubs or associations, and workshops (UV3) have been added on the ground floors. Further interventions followed on top of the shops: owners built housing units for themselves (UVs), and in other areas (UV and CH) health posts and community kitchens have been installed.

◄
Figure 18A & B: Residents recreate an alleyway with cacti in CH Palomino, and dwellers celebrate the anniversary of their neighbourhood UV 3 (Author's photos, 2010)



Figure 19A & B: Original plan of UV3 in 1949, and addition of a nursery school in 2010 (Author's graphic and photo)

Vacant cinemas were recycled as informal markets, protestant chapels, etc. Unlike PREVI, where the community amenities had to fit into small existing areas, the layout of the UVs was more favourable since the larger distance between the multi-family blocks allowed the accommodation of reasonably-sized community facilities without sacrificing residential space. Nursery schools, shops, businesses, primary schools, community kitchens, and health posts – among other additions – have enriched the area (Images 19A and 19B).





Figure 20A & B: Morphological changes in UV Matute showing the flexible structure with plazas and inner ways, 2D graphic by author, 3D view of the changes in a block (Richard Barrios)

Organisation of self-managed practises in the PREVI and UV neighbourhoods

The organisation and self-managed amendment of space in PREVI relies on the group of families living around defined public spaces. The „low-rise high-density" plan gives the residents a certain amount of freedom to extend their housing when and how they wish to do, as the whole house within is used solely by this family. In the multi-family housing of the UV, groups of 4, 8 or 12 families tend to be organised around a common access staircase. Residents who cannot extend their rooms need to negotiate with their neighbours. Negotiations proved less successful where the original neighbourhood design does not differentiate well between public and private space, in the sense that individual residents are tempted to privatise the undefined "in-between spaces" between collective walkways and the front of the apartment. UV3 represents a successful example of self-managed practises which was supported by the government and by the municipality for over 15 years and goes back to the idealistic start-up enthusiasm in the 1950s. The authorities engaged in the maintenance of green areas, supported some collective gardens and an ecological garden in front of one school, paid for the material for painting the blocks and, most importantly, helped with the formalisation of the informal extensions.

Flexibility of expandable houses in PREVI and elasticity of collective housing forms in the UVs

Generally speaking, in both projects, PREVI and the UVs, the morphological structure of plazas, interior streets and clusters has not been altered by the residents' spatial appropriation, apart from some extensions occupying former public space. For example, in the case of the Zeilen that form patios in UV Matute (2nd stage), the original structure of block, street and patio remains unaltered. Since the morphological structure of "block-plaza-street" is flexible, it easily permitted adaptation and extensions options in the case of PREVI – and, also, in second stage of UV Matute (Images 20A and 20B). This is supported by a clear delimitation of the public space separating private from public. Only in the case of UV3 – the oldest project of all – the original serial-type morphology experienced a

Figure 21: Flexible row with multiple possibilities for extension in UV Matute, main and rear façade. (Photo: Author)

Figure 22: Ample possibilities for extensions in the double-floor house typology on the flat roof in UV3 (Photo: Author)

modification of the original layout (especially at the rear of the plots).

In UV Matute, the most frequent extensions concerned the loggias, which extended over two storeys and allowed the addition of an extra 20 m² to the two-level apartments. The top-floor apartments could also build an extra room on the roof, which increased the living space from the original 94 m² to 145 m² (Image 21). Similarly, the lower double-floor typology in UV3 easily allowed extension on the flat roof, where a small multi-purpose room was already provided in the original design, apart from additions into the gardens on the ground floor (Image 22).

Conclusions

Both PREVI and the transformed examples of the UVs demonstrate the potentials for a "growing-house" principle, even in the context of low-income mass housing. This opportunity, promoted elsewhere since the 1960s by John Habraken[23] and the Open House Journal[24], and even formalised in some other Latin American movements, could be transformed into practise in Peru thanks to a lack of control by local authorities and, only exceptionally, the intention of the original architects. A particularity of the UV experience in Lima was the location close to the old barriadas, where they demonstrate the possibility of mass housing on a human scale and closer to the needs of residents who grew up in informal settlements. Nowadays, there still are vacant lots near to these vulnerable, informal settlements in Lima. With adequate land-use control, this kind of incremental housing projects could act as catalysts for the upgrading of barriadas. In similar new developments, lower-middle income inhabitants could not only obtain flexible living space for their families, allowing them to remain in the neighbourhood, but the new development could equally offer community services, workshop spaces, shops and stores, a comedor popular, kindergarten, etc. close to a barriada. Such projects can take into account the residents' varied appropriation practises, their capacity to recognise the extendibility in the planned housing, and their neighbourhood organisation initiatives.

This paper has been edited and shortened by TRIALOG due to lack of space. The full original version can be obtained from the author. For German readers, we especially recommend the author's PhD thesis (2015) on the same topic, which can be downloaded as an open-access PDF at http://edoc.sub.uni-hamburg.de/hcu/volltexte/2015/199/or http://d-nb.info/1068278668/34.

23 Habraken 2002 (originally 1988). See: also http://www.habraken.com/

24 See: http://www.open-house-int.com/history.html

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Maputo's Neighbourhoods and Their Open Houses
Shapes and Dynamics

Joana da Cunha Forte[1]

Das Freiraum-Haus als Wohnungstyp in Mozambique
Die traditionelle Wohnform in Mozambique geht auf die Ansiedlungen der Buntu Stämme zurück, deren Wohnraum – zumindest tagsüber – sich auf gesamte Freifläche zwischen den Schlafhütten erstreckte. Auch heute, in den ländlichen Dörfern wie in den städtischen Marginalvierteln lebt diese Tradition, als ‚Open House' definiert, in kleineren Dimensionen weiter sofern die räumlichen Umstände dies erlauben. Die empirische Forschung der Autorin vergleicht die Abstufungen in der Konkretisierung und Nutzung des Open House zwischen ländlicher Wohntradition und den Zwängen städtischer Verdichtung im Großraum von Maputo. Trotz den unvermeidbaren Einschränkungen, die die Nähe zum Stadtzentrum mit sich bringt, kommt die Autorin zu dem Schluß, daß das Konzept des Open House für die Bewohner der informellen Siedlungen in Mozambique mit seinem spezifischen Klima auch weiterhin vergleichsweise optimale Wohnbedingungen erlaubt, jedoch durch behutsame Upgrading Maßnahmen – insbesondere im Bereich der Infrastruktur – aufgewertet werden sollte.

Introduction

This paper analyses the gradual transformation of the traditional "open-house" typology, which is characterised by a large central courtyard as the scene for most domestic daytime activities and which, in turn, is surrounded by several mono-functional huts. It represents a small and complex type of a homestead typical for the informal outskirts of Maputo. A gradual transformation of this housing typology from the countryside towards the centre of Maputo's capital has been demonstrated through case studies of three suburban neighbourhoods of different ages and distances from the urban core. The benefits and limitations of the open-house typology found in each setting are compared in the concluding section of the paper.

The setting

The first reports about what is now the city of Maputo go back to 1544, when the site developed into a strategic point for colonial trade. In 1826, foundations were laid for a new city designed on a regular grid pattern and inhabited by Portuguese colonizers; it is known as the "Cement City" today. Spatially segregated, the native population lived in an informal agglomeration of simple huts, still known today as the "City of Clay", where the buildings were supposed to be temporary. During the entire colonial era, the black population was only allowed to live in Maputo when they were needed as a workforce by the whites. The "Natives Law" allotted the black population a designated area to live in, the City of Clay. The growth of this area was restricted by the minimal infrastructure.

The City of Clay, especially, suffered from immigration: the neighbourhoods got denser, and the houses became more crowded. The process of rural-urban migration and subsequent settlement densification produced a morphological transformation and adaptation of housing typology in which the increasing lack of space and urban living patterns were the main drivers.

> Mozambique is one of the poorest countries of the world. It has a population of 25 million and a GDP per capita of US$1327. Around 50% of the population lives in absolute poverty (UNHABITAT 2008). The urban population is about 36%, of which 60% is concentrated in the 3 major cities: Maputo, Beira, and Nampula (Census 2007). The capital city, Maputo, covers 675 km2 with a total population of 1,770,000 inhabitants (2007). Around 75% to 80% of the inhabitants live in spontaneous settlements (UNHABITAT 2008), and 50% live in conditions of extreme poverty (Oppenheimer; Raposo 2002[a]: 11, 13[2]). The 1997 census (INE 1988) indicated 164,700 houses in Maputo.

Figure 1: Maputo: City of Cement

Figure 2: Maputo: City of Clay

01
The paper is based on the author's PhD dissertation submitted to TU Darmstadt under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Kosta Mathéy. The full thesis has been published as: Forte, Joana da Cunha (2011): *An Insight into an Outside Living: The Mozambican Open House as a Sustainable Answer for Informal Settlements – Case Study Maputo*. Munich: GRIN Verlag.

02 Oppenheimer, Jochen; Raposo, Isabel (2002[a]): *A pobreza em Maputo. Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade, Departamento de Cooperação*: Lisboa



Figure 3: The city of Maputo and location of study areas in the urban, suburban and periurban zones

The open house

Like in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, the population of Mozambique is Bantu. Among the many Bantu cultures, a major distinction can be observed between the housing of the groups south and north of the Zambeze River. The first group, in the south, is characterised by houses consisting of different cylindrical buildings positioned around a circular space, whereas the housing of the second group, in the north, is characterised by rectangular buildings built around a courtyard that is either quadrangular or aligned along a single axis.

The *kraal* house of today, in the area south of the Zambeze River, in the Mozambican territory, is an adaptation of the classical African *kraal* house native to several areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. This housing archetype was composed of settlements with circular houses assembled around a circular yard marked by a sacred tree (Bruschi; Carrilho; Lage, 2005: 4[3]). Different symbolic, social and physical spaces can be distinguished. The *kraal* house is the social and physical settlement model for an extended family. This traditional residential concept of a succession of open and closed spaces spread over the entire plot still prevails, above all, in rural Mozambique. The typology defined by its specific shape and dynamics can be identified as the "*open house*"[4].

It is important to emphasise that an open house is not a house with four walls and a roof, but a yard where the family can conduct its daily living activities (Carrilho 2004[5]). This set of isolated buildings or areas caters to all domestic functions, which are spread over the yard. These activities typically include: (1) lazing, (2) sleeping, (3) daily hygiene, (4) cooking, (5) eating, (6) dish washing, (7) washing clothes, (8) drying clothes, (9) animal husbandry, (10) vegetable cultivation, (11) tree cultivation, (12) garbage treatment, (13) storage, and (14) working. The open house is thus divided into both open areas and closed structures (compare diagram and image 5).



Figure 4: The areas/functions of the open house by order are: lazing, sleeping, daily hygiene, cooking, eating, dishwashing, washing and drying clothes, animal husbandry, vegetable gardening, trees, garbage disposal, goods storage, and working (self-designed)

03 Carrilho, Júlio; Bruschi, Sandro; Menezes, Carlos; Lage, Luís. (2005): *Traditional Informal Settlements in Mozambique.* UEM: Maputo

04 Forte, Joana da Cunha (2011): *An Insight into an Outside Living: The Mozambican Open House as a Sustainable Answer for Informal Settlements – Case Study Maputo*. Munich: GRIN Verlag

05 Carrilho, Júlio (2004): "Life in the Peripheral Districts of Lichinga in Carrilho". In: Júlio; Bruschi, Sandro; Menezes, Carlos; Lage, Luís (2004): *Traditional Informal Settlements in Mozambique*. UEM: Maputo



Figure 5 & 6: Traditional rural typology of the open house

Transformation of the open-house concept to the urban context

Scarcity of land, as well as different socio-economic and cultural factors, has influenced the adaptation of the open-house pattern to an urban context in the process of rural-urban migration. A recent research project analysed this transformation in three urban, suburban, and periurban areas of Maputo, which represent different stages of such development.

Albazine

Albazine is a neighbourhood that has been occupied and developing for only the last few decades. It belongs to the periurban area of Maputo and covers a surface of 8.4 km^2. The distance to the city centre is 15 km. There is still a high proportion of free space, and several families here live from subsistence agriculture. The settlement has a rural atmosphere. According to the 1997 census, there are 5,252 inhabitants, and the density is under 50 habitants per hectare. Since 1980, the population has increased around 250%.

The majority of the households don't have access to electricity, nor is there public street lighting. For cooking, the families use charcoal, paraffin or firewood gathered in the bushes. Since there is no piped water, the families – with the exception of the few residents who have dug a well – have to buy water from the few public fountains, which are normally far from their houses. Garbage is either buried or burned in holes on site, as there are no public containers. The roads of Albazine remain unpaved but are, nevertheless, well maintained and regularly cleaned by the inhabitants. Due to this, public transport is limited to the main road and expensive because the city centre can only be reached by changing the bus several times (short segments are more profitable for the bus drivers).

The level of community organisation is still a very low in Albazine but, nevertheless, the population actively maintains a stable social life between the different households. The families tend to be poorer than in other areas of the city, and many residents have fragile human and economic assets, a lack of skills, and shaky employment, and only 5% to 9% of the residents work in formal employment. For most of the inhabitants in Albazine, if any cash income is

Figure 7: City of Clay: Periurban area (Albazine) (Photo: Author)

Figure 8: City of Clay: suburban area (Hulene B) (Photo: Author)

generated, it is from agriculture and raising cattle. Other informal-sector activities include artisanal items produced at home, and small services offered directly from the doorstep.

Albazine has only one public primary school and no further educational facilities, not even a crèche. But neighbours normally take turns at looking after the neighbourhood children. A public medical station with only basic services is also available to the inhabitants. There are almost no other social amenities (e.g., social, civic or public spaces) except for the many small churches that the people attend.

The individual plots in Albazine vary between 260 m^2 and 475 m^2, and the average is 398 m^2. The plots are quite big and spacious, with an average of 86% open space, or 79.22 m^2/habitant. But due to the relative newness and precarious economical situation, the houses are all still quite simple. Compared to the older informal settlements areas, the families are quite small and normally consist of young parents and their children. The average household size is 4.69 inhabitants.

Most of the daily functions are performed in the open spaces of the house and are well spread all over the yard. The constructed elements, because of their simplicity, have only rudimentary equipment to facilitate the development of activities – including, among others, small businesses, accommodating own and other children, raising and breeding animals, or cultivating food.

Hulene B

Hulene B belongs to the suburban belt around Maputo. The neighbourhood developed in the final years of the colonial period (1960s and early 1970s) and the first years after independence (1975 onwards), and it has been growing and changing since then. The development of the neighbourhood is still recognisable in both the building materials used and in the variations of the open-house typology: first, a family builds a hut. When the family earns some more money, they build a brick house on the side of the hut. Initially, this brick house has just one room, but is extended later in line with the economic possibilities and family needs.

Figure 9: City of Clay: urban area (Maxaquene B) (Photo: Author)

Hulene B has a much stronger urban character than Albazine: the streets in Hulene B are more lively and lined with small stands that sell everything. The distance from downtown Maputo to Hulene B is 9 km. The neighbourhood has 3.65 km^2 and a population of 8,450 households, or 38,664 inhabitants, according to the 1997 census; the density is between 100-200 habitants per hectare.

The public water supply network only reaches a very few streets, and water is generally purchased from those with a bore hole or from some of the public standpipes. Although the area is supposed to have electricity, less than 20% of the households have an electrical connection

Figure 10: Settlement pattern in Albazine, with case-study locations





Figure 11 & 12: Albazine: Case-study house of Sidra (Photo: Author). All the open houses have outdoor spaces for: lazing, cooking, eating, dishwashing, clothes washing, clothes drying and, if possible, also a small vegetable garden, several planted trees for shade, and a place for garbage treatment. The constructed elements mainly serve for sleeping, daily personal hygiene, and storage. Of the surveyed houses, most also have provisions for animal husbandry and spaces for working

to their houses (Census 1997). The garbage is buried or burned. Public transport is limited to the main roads, which have asphalt, but buses run directly from the neighbourhood to Maputo's city centre. The roads inside the neighbourhood are unpaved.

The poverty levels in Hulene B are not as high as in Albazine. Many families obtain an income from some kind of business in their own houses, while others keep animals and, even if small, a vegetable garden, which allows a modest subsistence economy. A substantial minority of the residents works in the formal sector. Hulene B, like other neighbourhoods in Maputo, has a neighbourhood secretary who coordinates the activities and responsibilities of the different blocks' chiefs and a population which, when compared with other zones of the city, is quite engaged in social and communal activities. An example is the participative garbage collection system. Another project is the creation of a community watch aimed at keeping the bandits away that occasionally enter Hulene B at night.

A further and very remarkable community project, which has already been running for several years now, is a collective emergency fund supplied by all the population to assist widows without families to look after them after the death of the husband. These examples demonstrate the remarkable solidarity networks that exist between families and neighbours in Hulene B. The families are normally nuclear, and have only weak links with the extended family. The social infrastructure in Hulene B includes a small health post, three public primary schools, and eight kindergartens, which are normally capable of catering for all the children in the neighbourhood. Secondary schools are further away, in the City of Clay, and there is a deficit in



Figure 13: Street layout of Hulene B, with location of case-study houses

Figure 14 & 15: Hulene B (Photos: Author)

recreation facilities and public greens, except for the Association Building where meetings and other collective activities can be organised – for example, by the several community associations, clubs, and other groups operating in the neighbourhood. Also, some 20 churches provide some sort of social assistance in Hulene B. An important and interesting social platform is the local radio station, where people can come and broadcast. The housing situation in Hulene B is still relatively comfortable. With an average of 175 m², the plots have a medium dimension that still provides enough space to accommodate most of the necessary daily functions of the open house. The average open space of the plots is about 50%. The average family size is 6.22 inhabitants, and typically includes two generations of adults apart from any young children. This translates into a residential density between 39 m²/habitant and 19 m²/habitant, or an average of 28.3 m²/habitant. The open house in Hulene B is a typology where the majority of the daily functions are still performed outside in the open spaces. The constructed elements are several, have a relatively high level of complexity, and are normally located at the perimeters of the plot. The functions are well spread and divided inside the yards. Plot size can therefore be considered an example for sustainable livelihood in urban Mozambique: it allows, among other things, the development of an economic activity; a small vegetable garden that provides the family some food; the lodging of young adult children (before they form their own households); and the minimum ecological and necessary separation between the different activities.

Maxaquene B

Maxaquene B, founded in the 1940s in the urban area of the informal city, is one of the oldest neighbourhoods of Maputo. It is characterised by highly intensive land use.



Figure 16, 17, 18: Case study of the open house of Maria João family in Hulene B

Figure 19, 20, 21: Maxaquene B. Urban morphology and access paths

The built-up urban fabric is extremely dense, and cut into irregular parcels by a labyrinth of narrow paths. The houses are bigger and the plots are smaller than in the other two study areas. The distance from downtown City of Cement Maputo to Maxaquene B is 4 km. This proximity to the city centre promises better opportunities, but in fact daily life is more difficult due to the high population density.

The surface area of Maxaquene B is 1.04 km^2, which accommodates a population of 29,527 inhabitants (Census 1997) and results in a density of more than 200 habitants/hectare. The houses are made of cement and often reveal quite a differentiated layout, with several different rooms and spaces, but which are often badly maintained due to the high costs in relation the residents' income. Because of the high plot coverage, many of the traditional outdoor activities are difficult to develop. Nevertheless, the survey showed that the families still like to spend most of their days outside.

More than half of the population has access to water (Census 1997). The public standpipes are often broken, and the water expensive. Less than 50% of the population has access to electricity in their homes; there is also no public lighting. Because of lack of drainage in Maxaquene B, the neighbourhood is frequently flooded during the rainy season. The garbage is generally burned in a hole.

The proximity of houses to each other also causes sanitary problems and other disturbances. Public transport is limited to the main road, Avenida Vladimir Lenin, which is quite far from Maxaquene B. The other streets in the neighbourhood are just small paths where the vehicle circulation is impossible.

In Maxaquene B, there are two public primary schools, which are sufficient to accommodate all the children of the neighbourhood, but only one kindergarten. There are two secondary schools not far from Maxaquene B, and there is also a small clinic close by. For more demanding health treatment, people must go to the hospitals in the city centre. Recreation areas or public spaces are non-existent.

The poverty levels are quite high in Maxaquene B. One of the main reasons is that the families don't have enough space to develop an economic activity on their plots and are also not able to accommodate, even if small, a vegetable garden, or to breed some animals. Maxaquene B displays low levels of community organisation, resident collaboration, and engagement. Poverty may be an obstacle to mutual help and support, even within the extended family. The majority of the households adhere to one of a wide range of churches represented in the neighbourhood, which may offer consolidation but generally do not provide material assistance. It is important to mention that the neighbourhood of Maxaquene B is relatively unsafe. The neighbours voluntarily organise themselves to patrol the neighbourhood at night, but to date the system is still not working well.

In Maxaquene B, there is a higher share of "incomplete" families compared to Albazine or Hulene B, which suggests a more fragile family pattern. The reasons are varied: too many family members to fit into one single plot (many times there are 3 generations of adults in one household), others don't have a family and live alone, or the highly unstable social and economic situation places their future at constant risk.

The plots in Maxaquene B are of different sizes, with an average of 151 m^2 and 11.8 m^2 gross living space per habitant. The families in Maxaquene B have an average of 12.8 inhabitants. Due to the high number of inhabitants, there is a lack of space to perform all the customary daily functions of the open houses in Mozambique. The per-



Figure 22: Case study: House of Virginia in Mexakene B

centage of open spaces is low when compared with the other analysed neighbourhoods.

All surveyed open-house case studies in Maxaquene B showed the existence open spaces – even if limited – for the most essential functions: lazing, cooking, eating, dish-washing, clothes washing and drying. However, because there is a lack of space, all the functions have a lack of space and are quite piled up. Most of the open houses have some trees, but these are insufficient to make the use of the yards comfortable and agreeable. The constuc ted elements in the houses provide for sleeping, daily hygiene, and storage. Only very few houses also have space for working. Of the surveyed families, very few raise animals, grow vegetables, or have space to dispose of garbage. In conclusion, the private open spaces in Maxaquene B are not big enough and the constructed elements cannot accommodate all habitants and needed functions. The family members are restricted in the development and practise of their needs and potentials because there is absolutely no space to do so.

The open house in Maputo's neighbourhoods – a comparative evaluation and perspective

In principle, the open house can be considered to present a historically developed balance between the economical, ecological, social, and cultural needs of the target population – which is also sustainable for its reliance on local resources (Forte, 2011). However, the new shapes and dynamics of Maputo also bring new realities, and the open house in the periurban, suburban and urban areas is con-



Figure 23: An open house in Albazine, Hulene B and Maxaquene B – in scale (research by the Author)

Figure 24: In Fatima's house, some animals are raised between flowers and other decorations. There is ploughed land, which shows the self-sufficiency of the family. There is a living room with a table and chairs. The plot is a sunny one



Figure 25: The sleeping arrangements are very clearly explained: each member of the family seems to have their private social and physical spaces. There are separate compartments for the toilet and bathtub, as well as a kitchen with a stove. The television isn't forgotten and it is clearly an important item

stantly adapting its characteristics by a trial and error mechanism.

Albazine's strength is mainly due to its ecological situation. It is a neighbourhood where there are free spaces for the families to perform their daily activities in healthy and pleasant ways. The families can grow their gardens and obtain food from them. At the same time, this existing reserve of space also allows the families to grow and to develop their houses according to their daily needs and depending on their social and spatial spaces. Therefore, in terms of their social sustainability the inhabitants of Albazine enjoy a good position. On the other hand, the social relations among neighbours are still very weak. Another weakness of this neighbourhood concerns its low economic sustainability due to the limited income opportunities. The cultural level in the neighbourhood is also modest, mainly due to its recent formation – but this can change over time. A possible threat can be an increase in land values, gentrification, and living costs in relation to incomes.

Albazine would be a good candidate for an infrastructure improvement programme similar to the Brazilian *Mutirao* practise whereby residents receive assistance in form of materials, machinery and technical assistance while providing the labour force themselves. Albazine still has many free spaces and land available for development. Therefore, it is good moment to start long-term development planning including public transportation solutions, overspill housing or land banking for the new generations, sites for small-scale industries, water management and erosion control, etc. The *Pfuka Dzixile* programme in Maputo[6] provides examples of similar initiatives that have-been successful in Mozambique.

In the **Hulene B** / suburban-area context, the open-house setting nurtures strong social links. The neighbourhood has a very active and engaged population that helps and shares. The houses are culturally adequate and rely on traditional patterns while, at the same time, adapting to contemporary materials and environment. The open space is big enough to accommodate social and practical necessities. The economical sustainability is very high, as all the families manage to earn what is needed for their subsistence and even produce some surplus. On the negative side, we can conclude that the families are relatively small and the reduced space may not be suitable to sustain extended families with two adult generations. The increasing densities may also affect the ecological and social sustainability of the neighbourhood.

Future development plans should definitively take advantage of the existing and dynamic community initiatives operating through the extensive and cooperative household networks. Apart from controlling further densification, which would be a threat to social and ecological sustainability, improvement and especially maintenance efforts should address the public space and amenities whereby the individual housing situation can be safely managed by the residents themselves – but, as in Albazine, land banking would be a good precondition for controlling densification.

Xitique[7], a rotational, (by day, week or month) traditional financial system, is very well installed in Hulene B, and

06 Rosário, Maria dos Anjos (1999): "Participatory Development & Urban Management in Ferraz". In; Bernardo; Munslow, Barry (1999) *Sustainable Development in Mozambique*. Africa World Press: Oxford and Trenton

07
Xitique is a revolving micro-credit system particularly practised by low-income women in Mozambique – especially in Maputo. It is said to have its origin in the Bantu society. For more explanation, see http://www.dicionarioinformal.com.br/xitique/ or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3y4HC9NWXyQ.



Figure 26: Celia's family has a shop with many items. The soap opera "O Profeta" is on TV. The main house is built with traditional materials

can be used in the support of the participatory maintenance of services and infrastructures. Also, the condominal sanitation system in Brazil (Melo, 2005) is a successful example of the organisation of the maintenance of services and infrastructures in poorer neighbourhoods that involves local participation and know-how as the key issue for success.

Maxaquene B houses show the least advantageous balance, in spite of the benefit of being close to the city centre. The greatest problem is the high density. The neighbourhood is, in fact, reaching its limits of sustainability. The housing conditions, as well as the social and spatial spaces of the families, are declining rapidly. There is a constant fight for space, and the traditional typology of the open house can no longer be maintained. The most sensitive development strategy would be to start a long-term densification concept.

Since forced evictions must be avoided at all cost, the first step would be to develop attractive relocation opportunities (e.g., by linking housing and employment opportunities[8]). Municipal inter-departmental cooperation will certainly be a high challenge in Maputo, but it is a must. The municipality of Maputo should make available information about the new areas for housing, and the benefits that the inhabitants of dense areas will have when moving to other areas.

Maxaquene has always been a neighbourhood with relatively good services and infrastructures, but these are few and overused. Hence, a desirable next step would be participative upgrading.

Maxaquene B has a very good, strategic location and connectivity in relation with the City of Cement and, therefore, many neighbourhood services and infrastructures could be easily improved. At the same time, due to its compact urban development, a high number of residents would benefit. Additional assets are its historical significance, which is worth preservation, and a generation of migrants that settled in the city a long time ago and that is well organised.

Conclusions

Although the traditional open-house concept may appear as a step back in development, in fact it is considered that its perpetuation provides the basis for a sustainable life. The open house is the simple expression of the elements required in a house in Maputo in order to satisfy the daily needs of its inhabitants.

It is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the shape of a specific location, locally available materials, and occupation In all, it provides a simple answer to basic human as well as the local physical, local physical, economical, ecological, social, emotional and cultural needs and aspirations in regard to housing. The concept is not geared to fulfil the needs of capital accumulation as rampant in global cities, where it is nourished through over-exploitation of the cities' ecological footprint without redistributing the extracted gains to the local population.

The open-house concept, rather, represents an exemplary solution for the cities and regions excluded from – or rather escaping – the stressful hype of global urbanisation[9].

08
A very good example of a win-win situation is the resettlement with partnership in Mumbai, India. Here, the city of Mumbai was able to offer a good alternative for housing with security of tenure in other areas of the city, in order for the railway building project to be possible. The resettlement process was managed by the inhabitants themselves. (Patel, Sheela; d'Cruz, Celine; Burra, Sundar (2002): Beyond evictions in a global city- People managed resettlement in Mumbai. Environment&Urbanization).

09
People-driven upgrading in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, is a sample project that applied a participative upgrading approach. This means that the inhabitants planned and implemented the projects of their neighbourhoods. In the upgrading partnership project in Bangkok, Thailand, the inhabitants of very dense and problematic neighbourhoods joined their efforts and upgraded their communities. A network was created and plans were made taking into account the potentials of the places (Archer, Diane (2010): Empowering the urban poor through community-based slum upgrading: the case of Bangkok, Thailand. ISOCARP).

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When Life and Death Cohabit
Rapid Profiling in Al-Megawreen Cemetery of Cairo

Zeina Elcheikh

Mit den Ahnen unter einem Dach
Cairo's Totenstadt ist sicher der bekannteste, wenn auch nicht der einzige bewohnte Friedhof auf unserem Globus. Die Autorin hatte die Gelegenheit, dort eine Kurzrecherche mit 10 Bewohner-Interviews durchführen. Ein Großteil der Bewohnerfamilen sind bereits seit Generationen als Wächter der Grab-Schreine bestellt, oder sind zumindest Nachkommen früherer Wärter. Niemand der Bewohner würde das Angebot für einen Umzug in eine andere Wohngegend in Kairo ausschlagen, aber Alternativen sind weder individuell finanziell, noch in der Größenordnung des Phänomens seitens der öffentlichen Hand denkbar. Und schließlich bietet die Totenstadt ihren Siedlern auch Vorteile: eine zentrale und ruhige Lage, der Wegfall von Wohnkosten, gelegentliche Einkünfte durch den Friedhofsbetrieb und ein über Generationen gewachsenes soziales Netz.

Introduction

Religions and beliefs play a major role in death rituals, i.e., by influencing the burial customs and location. Cemeteries differ from humble spaces for mourning where graves are not even marked with tombstones, as in Saudi Arabia, to city landmarks and visitor destinations like Père Lachaise in Paris. Yet, graveyards sometimes transcend the conventional quiet and peaceful character to become a more vibrant area within cities. This animation is caused by the fact that cemeteries, in some parts of the world, are no longer just a location for people who have passed away but also one for those who are still alive and live there informally.

In Cairo, about 70% of the city is considered to be informal. This informal urbanisation comes in many forms and can be categorised into: (a) expansion on privately-owned agricultural land, (b) squatter settlements on state-owned land, and (c) cemeteries or cities of the dead[1]. This paper deals with the third category; in other words, with the spaces where life and death cohabit.

Based on a rapid profiling of a small sample of dwellers in the Al-Megawreen cemetery who responded to the questionnaires and interviews, and through a review of previous works dealing with the City of the Dead, this paper aims to answer some initial questions concerning the challenging characteristics encountered in this place in light of the Cairo 2050 vision[2] calling for the area to be transformed into an outdoor museum. Is it really a problem when the "City of the Dead" is also inhabited by living people? If yes, whose problem is it? And how could the problem be solved with all the existing constraints?

Rapid Profiling in Al-Megawreen Cemetery

This rapid profiling[3] focuses on an area located within the eastern part of the City of the Dead cemetery, called Al-Megawreen. The area, bordering the Al-Azhar Park towards the south-east, is surrounded by the main thoroughfares Salah Salem and Al-Nasr, Al-Afifi Street (branched from Al-Sultan Ahmad Street) and Al-Mamalik Street, and Abdelmagid Al-Labban Street. For this kind of survey, it is very important to understand the limits between easy accessibility and no-go areas. Although walking through the main streets around and within the cemetery is safe, going through the narrow alleyways and

Figure 1: View over Al-Megawreen Cemetery from Al-Afifi Street (Source: Author)

01 Khalifa, M.: *Redefining slums in Egypt: Unplanned versus unsafe areas*, in Habitat International, 2010: 43

02
Cairo 2050 is a development vision for the Greater Cairo Region promoted in 2008. It foresees a modernist reallocation of land into huge monofunctional districts separated by high-capacity transportation corridors. For further reading, see: Adham, K. (2014). Modes of Urban Diffusion: Culture, Politics, and the Impact of Recent Urban Development in the Arabian Gulf Cities on Cairo's Vision 2050. *Under Construction: Logics of Urbanism in the Gulf Region*, 233-64.

03
Interviews were conducted with 11 households at the end of October 2012.

burial structures could end up either in undesired encounters or getting lost.

The main objective of this study was to get a closer look at the socio-cultural and economic aspects in the life of the tomb dwellers, and not at the fascinating aspects and stories one comes across in literature or a spatial survey of the area. Although highly fascinating on its own, the architecture and historical context of the mausoleums as well as the celebrities buried there were skipped, apart from a very short and quick overview of the City of Dead.

The City of the Dead in Cairo: A Story to Tell

In ancient Egypt, there were large numbers of labourers, craftsmen and tomb keepers permanently living in the cemetery of Thebes; there was even a barrack for soldiers stationed there to protect the monuments from looting[4]. Archaeological evidence has shown that the tradition of building a structure that provides accommodation for visitors or for a caretaker of a family gravesite dates back to the Abbasid period[5]. The fact that workers were housed in the City of the Dead centuries ago suggests an accepted tradition of Cairo's cemeteries absorbing residential overflows and providing homes for the poor[6].

The numbers of slum populations are often deliberately and sometimes massively undercounted[7], and informal areas are rarely subject of precise statistics[8]. While the City of the Dead was allocated and planned to accommodate a slowly growing community of dead people, the population that settled on the surface has grown without control. Many references state that the City of the Dead hosts around 800,000 "living" inhabitants practicing their daily life amidst the graves, while other estimations reach 1,500,000. The most common burial structure in the City of the Dead is the family hosh (literarily: "yard"), which is a funerary space (open or roofed) with one or several rooms attached and used for staying and other services. The residents of the cemetery, mainly working men, are divided into toraby (tomb keepers or gravediggers) and their sabi (which literarily means "boy" in Arabic, but here infers "as sistant").

Figure 2: Location of Al-Megawreen within the Eastern Cemetery in Cairo (Source: Google Earth)

The fact that the toraby profession stays within a family for many generations makes the toraby a highly influential person: he is a leading figure in the cemetery[9]. Many of the residents are proud of the expensive marble gravestones in the tombs that they are guarding, and point out that they are living in the tombs of a certain pasha or prince. The notion of the English poet Philip James Bailey that "the sole equality on earth is death" seems to be questionable here, as the City of the Dead emphasises that even after death people are not equal. In more recent times, poverty and shortage of shelter has forced many people to seek a cheap, even free, accommodation within graveyards.

Although the City of the Dead in Cairo enjoys great fame worldwide for its inhabited graveyards, this phenomenon is not exclusively Egyptian. Several cases are found in Iraq (Wadi Al-Salaim historical cemetery), in Gaza Strip (Al-Mamadani Cemetery), and the Philippines (Manila North Cemetery).

Respondent Profiles

Households were selected randomly, and respondents were mainly women. Structured questionnaires and interviews started by asking whether the person lives in the cemetery, and whether she/he would mind answering a

04 El-Kadi,G., Bonnamy, A., *Architecture for the Dead: Cairo Medieval Necropolis*, 2007: 256

05 Al-Ibrashy, M.: *The History of the Southern Cemetery of Cairo from the 14th Century to the Present: An Urban Study of a Living Cemetery*, 2005: 32-33

06 El-Kadi,G., Bonnamy, A., *Architecture for the Dead: Cairo Medieval Necropolis*, 2007: 258

07 Davis, M.: *Planet of Slums*, 2006: 14

08 Merlin, P., Choay, F.: *Dictionnaire de l'Urbanisme et de l'Aménagement*, 2005: 126

09 Shehayeb, D.: Sense of Place. http://www.suyuti.net/index.php?controller=dina (Viewed 17.02.2017): 1-2

Figure 3: The study area in Al-Megawreen Cemetery (Source: Google Earth)



Figure 4: Profiles of the respondents

few questions and showing the place in which she/he lives. Although some people answered the questions, they did not extend invitations to enter their living space inside the burial structures. Therefore, information on building materials or additional construction work within the burial spaces was collected orally, and sometimes could not be verified. During the field visits, unexpected encounters occurred with visitors of the cemetery and with people working there.

The Cemetery as a Residential Built Environment

Residents get water either by direct connection to the public network (previously arranged by the owners), or in fewer cases they obtain it from a public tap in the street. As for electricity, some of the structures enjoy legal connections to the public network. Some respondents mentioned openly that they are connected illegally to save expenses. Since the cemetery was not intended to accommodate residential activities, there is no official sewerage pipeline network.

Many respondents believe that it might damage the dead bodies. Instead, residents depend on septic tanks located on the narrow streets and regularly emptied by an external service provider. For health, education and other services, residents depend on the facilities in the neighbouring informal areas of Manshiyat Nasser and Al-Hussein. Some of the informants mentioned that they altered parts of the *hosh* and made additions, mainly service facilities (toilets, kitchen, etc.) and not additional living rooms as expected.

The Cemetery and Tenure Concept

When respondents were asked about the status of inhabitancy, one answer was repeated in several forms:

> *"The owner knows that we are here,"* or *"The owner allows us to stay."*

The majority reside without pay in return for the basic services they provide. The conversations revealed both good and difficult relationships between dwellers and owners:

> *"I need to wake up very early in the morning with my wife and two kids, arrange the mattresses and blankets, and stay attentive. If the owner ever comes in the morning and finds any trace of daily life practice, he will throw us out…" (P.7)*

> *"The old man who was the head of the family owning this hosh was horrible. He used to come from time to time and threaten that he will throw us all out. Now he has passed away and is buried here. We can live in peace now, since his heirs are more tolerant than he was…" (P.3)*

When the respondents were asked whether they felt secure about their status in the cemetery, most of them answered positively.

Some respondents claimed a right to being compensated, either with money or another accommodation, if the owners ever decided to move them out. Only one respondent had a totally different story to tell than the others:

> *"When my husband passed away, I could not afford paying the rent of the flat in which we were living. So I had no other choice than to move here. Since this hosh is owned by my father, I do not have to pay any rent, and I am staying here for free. Here, I am staying with my family, since my parents are buried underneath the tiles of the living room…" (P.2)*

The Cemetery and Burial Features

During the field observations, it was very important to see whether residents are affected by burial practices in the living space or not. In some cases, living and funeral spaces were completely separated; in other cases they were clearly mixed.

> *"The owners were too kind with us. They made another entrance to the burial space of the hosh. Now, whenever they have a funeral they no longer have to go through our living space with the dead body…" (P.8)*

> *"When someone of my family passes away, the floor of the living space should be dug to bury the deceased. I need to leave the place for forty days, as a ritual…" (P.2)*

The Cemetery and Personal Safety

Some respondents mentioned that it is very safe for women and girls to walk around at any time, while many,

Figure 5: Mixture of funeral and daily life aspects (P.2) (Photo: Author)

especially women, said that they would never go out once the sun has set.

Some of them mentioned that some robberies had happened, and that they preferred to rely on natural leaders to solve any problems than the police. It was not easy to verify whether some stories had really happened or not: someone came to bury a newly born, others came to hide the body of a murdered person, etc…

The Cemetery and Social Networks

In the studied area, all the residents seem to know each other very well. In some cases, information provided by one respondent was confirmed (or not) by the others, especially those of common origin, length of stay, and income source. Many respondents said that they have good relationships with their neighbours. They tend to gather at weddings and funerals, while others mentioned troubled relationships with their neighbours. In one case (P.11), an unusual story was told:

> *"My 26-year-old grandson was fighting with our neighbours who live in the hosh next to us. The fight became more serious, and the neighbour who is his friend killed him with a knife…" (P.11)*

Figure 6: The burial chamber underneath the living room (P.1) (Photo: Author)



Table 1: The interpretation of informal housing in the City of the Dead (Source: Author)

"…He is now in prison, and he will stay there for 15 years. But once he is out, we will revenge and kill him…" (P.11's other grandson)

The Cemetery as an Income Provider

The majority of the dwellers are staying in the cemetery with the approval of the original owners, and some of them even "inherited" the place because their family has been living there since a long time ago. Although many respondents did not tell about it when they were first asked, all of them benefit from funerary-related activities due to the location.

Even those who are not already toraby or sabi engage in guarding the given burial structure, cleaning the space, welcoming visitors when they come for visit, and serving them water and tea. Some of the respondents run small businesses within the cemetery: small shop, tailor, scarf-maker, etc…

The Cemetery and other Prospects

When respondents were asked about how they see their lives in the future, they all expressed a strong desire to leave the place. Despite the fact that the cemetery provides free shelter and some additional humble benefits, the aspect of being alive but living in a tomb is not easy to accept emotionally.

"I was born here, got married here, and my children were born here as well. But they always insist on moving elsewhere. They would never invite any of their colleagues to come here, they feel ashamed." (P.8)

Conclusions

The interpretation of informal housing in the City of the Dead as a problem or a solution typically depends on the position of those answering the question. In the Cairo 2050 vision, and in order to green the city, it is suggested to transform the City of the Dead into a huge park. This proposal entails removing all graves other than those of important historical value. This will consequently result in the eviction of the people currently living there, and who need to be relocated elsewhere. Nevertheless, most relocation experiences in Egypt have resulted in a worsening of conditions for the poor and for the city, and have been considered as a failure in retrospect. The failure was not necessarily related to the physical aspect of relocation, but was mainly connected to socio-economic and cultural aspects. During the meetings and interviews with the people surveyed, it became clear that many of these families, especially the widowed women, depend on the support of the original owners of the burial structures: they count on donations (food, clothes,…) or money – and above all, free accommodation – in return for some simple services. These benefits will be lost if they are evicted and moved to another area. Moreover, the community in the study area is a conservative one. Girls and women have some, though limited, opportunities to go to school or work. After changing their place of living and losing their current access to school or work, it might take a long time to encounter opportunities of gaining an income alongside with having a shelter. Consequently, reducing urban poverty and informal housing is not a task that can be resolved mostly by architects, physical planners, or urban designers. It primarily calls for socio-economic solutions and participatory processes.

To conclude, informal housing in the City of the Dead is not an issue that can be solved by any conventional housing authority. Therefore, it does not require a top-down "experts" response like the Cairo 2050 plan. Any sensitive urban renewal strategy can come up with step-by-step improvements of the living conditions of this area and its occupants. Gradual interventions in which residents can improve services, education, and income may eventually enable them to find and afford better conditions elsewhere and in line with their own choices as part of a "problution". At the same time, such a step-by-step approach would prevent the realisation of the real-estate landsharks who are already lurking to swallow this "precious" and centrally located chunk of land to turn it into a speculators' profit machine.

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Book Review / Buchbesprechung

Belle, I. *From Economic Zone to Eco-City? Urban Governance and Urban Development Trends in Tianjin's Coastal Area.* Bornträger Science Publishers. Stuttgart 2015. €44.80

China ist bekannt für ein rapides Städtewachstum, speziell in der Küstenregion. Momentan entwicklen sich dort drei urbane Super-Regionen: (i) am Pearl River Delta mit den Großstädten Guangzhou (Canton), Shenzhen, HongKong, Zhuhai und Macao; (ii) Shanghai und Hinterland bis Nanjing am Yangtse Fluss; und (iii) Beijing, Tianjin, und verschiedene Städte in der Hebei Provinz ("Jing-Jin-Ji" genannt), die bis 2050 auf 130 Millionen anwachsen sein soll. In der Hafenstadt Tianjin gibt es umfangreiche Aktivitäten zur lokalen Wirtschaftsförderung, wie die *Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area* (TEDA) und das *Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City Project* (SSTEC). Am Beispiel dieser beiden Wirtschaftszonen untersucht diese Doktorarbeit die treibenden Kräfte der Entwicklung städtischer Zentren in der Metropole Tianjin. Da beide Stadtteile ein und der selben wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungslogik folgen, stellt die Studie die Frage, ob diese Logik der Profit-Maximierung eine nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung, oder wie im Falle der SSTEC eine ökologische, soziale und inklusive Nachhaltigkeit erzielen kann. Die beiden Gebieten zugrunde liegenden Antriebsfaktoren mögen vordergründig unterschiedlich erscheinen: im Fall von TEDA steht die Firmengründung und die Entwicklung einer Wirtschaftszone im Vordergrund während wir es im Falle von SSTEC mit einem eher ganzheitlicher Öko-Stadt Ansatz zu tun haben. Aber wie die Autorin in ihrem Vergleich der beiden Modelle hervor hebt, sind die wirtschaftlichen Faktoren immer am Ende dominant. SSTEC – wie auch andere Öko-Städte in China - ist vorwiegend eine Schlafstadt mit bisher wenig Jobchancen. Andere Gebiete waren erfolgreicher, neue Investoren anzulocken.

Die Autorin hebt hervor, dass beide Städte stark von Firmengründungen geprägt sind, und deren Interessen decken sich nur bregrent mit ökologischen und sozialen Dimensionen der Stadtentwicklung. Speziell hinsichtlich der Beteiligung von wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Akteure erläutert die Autorin, dass die Gruppe der Entscheidungsträger sehr überschaubar ist während den Bewohnern kaum Mitsprachemöglichkeiten eingeräumt werden. Bestenfalls als Langzeit-Perspektive ist eine soziale wie ökologische Integration zu erwarten. Ein interessante Arbeit, die nicht bei vordergründigen Propagierung zur Öko-Stadtentwicklung stehen bleibt.

Florian Steinberg

Forthcoming Conference / Tagung

1. Dezember 2017 TRIALOG-Jahrestagung ‚Mapping Space and Action'

Mappings sind seit nun mehr als einem Jahrzehnt ein anerkanntes Instrument der Forschung, Analyse und Diffusion von Experten- sowie Alltagswissen in den Planungs- und Sozialwissenschaften. Als interdisziplinäre und durchaus künstlerisch zu interpretierende Methode der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Paradigma des Raums — von breit gespannten Zusammenhängen im Globalen sowie kleingliedrigen Verhaltens- und Bewegungsmustern im Lokalen — haben sie Begriff und Praxis von Kartographie ausgedehnt und genießen zunehmende Popularität weit über den Wissenschaftsbetrieb hinaus.

Dabei wird „Mapping von unten" bzw. „Community Mapping" ein besonderer Stellenwert zugeschrieben, ob in formalen Prozessen der Nachbarschafts-, Stadt-, Landschafts- und gar Raumplanung (hier wird von Partizipation bzw. partizipatorischen Momenten gesprochen) oder in radikaleren Prozessen der Selbstorganisierung und -bestimmung von Bewohner_innen. Zugleich fordern Künstler_innen, die auf Kartierungsmethoden zurückgreifen, einseitige Lektüren und festgelegte Nutzungen heraus. Fragestellungen der Konferenz sind u.a.

- Wann sind (welche) Mappings sinnvolle Instrumente der Forschung?
- Was zeigen sie, und was zeigen sie nicht?
- Inwiefern helfen diese Visualisierungen dabei, Aufklärung und Mitbestimmung zu stärken?
- Sollte in einer visuellen, ja hyperrealen Welt der Simulacra (Jean Baudrillard) der Anspruch der Information, der an Karten und Mappings immer noch haftet, endgültig aufgegeben werden?
- Welche Vorteile bieten radikal subjektive, den noch informierte Darstellungsformen?

Die Konferenz findet in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Masterstudiengang „Raumstrategien" der weißensee kunsthochschule berlin in deren Räumlichkeiten statt. Anmeldungen und Vorschläge für Beiträge zur Tagung an nest.hfb@t-online.de

Am 2. Dezember, dem Tag nach der Tagung, findet eine **TRIALOG Mitgliederversammlung** statt. Termine, detailliertes Programm und weitere Informationen für beide Tage auf der Webseite http://www.trialog-journal.de/verein/tagungen-mitgliederversammlungen/

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