


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**Slum- and
Squatter Upgrading**



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Editorial

The upgrading of slums and squatter settlements has become an important aspect of housing policies in many Third World nations. In order to evaluate the effects of this relatively recent strategy TRIALOG has organized a symposium on the subject, which was held in Berlin from Nov. 27th to 30th, 1986. More than 30 papers were presented, and discussed by the 170 participants attending the event. In this issue we include a selection of 13 papers which we believe to be representative for the variety of experiences presented. A list of the remaining papers can be found on page 66, together with the addresses of the authors, from which any individual copies may be obtained. In addition to the list we have prepared an evaluation in matrix form of the cases presented (page 64 / 65). Although the sample is too small to give a representative indication of the frequency of typical project elements, involved agents, sources of finance, and observed effects - the kind of information gathered here -, the trends become visible. Also, the evaluation can assist those readers to identify those cases showing the characteristics, in which he may be particularly interested.

The volume starts with a shortened version of the opening address the symposium organizers **K. Mathéy and F. Steinberg**. Their paper attempts to highlight the main tools and problems of upgrading policies in the Developing World.

The remaining papers of this volume are grouped by geographical regions, starting with Latin America, and followed by Africa and Asia. Within the regions the more general, policy oriented papers precede the case studies, which represent the majority of the papers submitted.

In evaluating two upgrading experiences in Latin America (Sto. Domingo and Colombia) **Roland Ziss** argues that the possibility of the target group to satisfy its basic needs constitutes a precondition for the success of any upgrading programme. In countries where this insight is not yet shared by the ruling class, or by its bureaucrats, technical cooperation may be in the position to support the weaker political groups in their struggle for decent living conditions.

Celine Sachs reports from Brasil where 'reformist' upgrading policies have been in operation since the late 1970's, but rarely reached the target group with the greatest need. A different approach represents the 'Mutirao' movement, a traditional survival strategy of collective self-help existing among low income and rural neighbourhoods. Now that the state is taking up the 'Mutirao' concept in its housing policies, the danger of 'pacification' and double exploitation - often linked to selfhelp schemes - is becoming evident.

In her paper **Giulietta Fadda** refers to Castell's concept of the 'Urban Social Movements' and monitors the struggle of a shanty town neighbourhood against the authorities threatening the demolition of their settlement. Although all demands for resettling put forward by the community are met eventually - indicating a successful *political mobilization* on the surface, the community finds itself shifted into standardized high rise tenements and dispersed all over the city.

In comparing low-income housing schemes in Kenia and Tanzania, **Hartmut Schmetzer** is bound to touch upon highly political issues too. In a typical capitalist country like Kenia, where land is at a premium and subject to speculation, any low income housing policy should be linked with a long term land banking exercise to show a success. However, in a country with a socialist bias, a policy of nationalizing land and the existence of a formal framework for popular participation seem to help upgrading schemes in reaching their aims, as the example of *Manzeze* in Dar es Salaam suggests.

Also in Lusaka / Zambia, where one of the biggest upgrading operations has been implemented worldwide, the land is nationalized. As Ann Schlyter estimates, this is one of the reasons for the relative success of the scheme (improved housing conditions and

no displacement of the poorest population). Another beneficial circumstance is the almost city-wide coverage of the operation, together with the absence of any tradition of landlordism in the country. However, in her new paper on the settlement of George, which draws on her own survey monitoring the development and occupancy pattern of 36 houses over a period of 20 years, Dr. Schlyter is nevertheless observing indications of a commercialisation process in the form of increased subletting as a consequence of the upgrading process.

The benefit of being able to rely upon an old tradition of selfhelp, neighbourhood assistance, and popular participation is also stressed by **Jürgen Oestereich** in his report on *Kalingalinga*, a more recent Upgrading project in the same city, Lusaka. However, building up confidence among the local population, and establishing a local economy within the project to provide jobs and income takes a long time: this tends to be incompatible with the tight project and financing schedules of many aid agencies.

The danger of triggering off a gentrification process by upgrading a poor neighbourhood did not materialize in the Lusaka example nor in *Old Naledi*, the only scheme of that kind in Botswana, which is the subject of **Anita Larsson's** article. But again, an increase in subletting can be observed. In hand with the resulting increase in the overall density the neighbourhood runs the risk of turning into a slum area again, and to continue the conventional social segregation in line with residential demarcation.

Hudu Siita describes a typical US-AID sponsored upgrading project in Ghana, involving revenue collection by the authorities, institution building, job creation, road and infrastructure provision. However, this standard approach did not seem to offer sufficient opportunities for the target group to participate in the decision making process. The result was a lack of identification with the project among the users, and little enthusiasm for unpaid self-help construction work. Evaluating his experience in the *Tamale* scheme the author proposes ten rules of how to avoid the mistakes made in a future scheme.

The *Pacim Project* in the Cape Verde islands, described by **Per Rathman**, contrasts the previous example, as it seems to be capable to incorporate the population both in the planning process, and in the physical works by incorporating the local branches of existing mass organizations - a familiar feature in many socialist nations.

Referring to the Indian context, **Meera Bapat** examines the question, why a legislation designed to promote upgrading of slums and squatter settlements remained without much impact over a period of more than ten years. One of her conclusions suggests, that individual upgrading schemes tend to fractionize the class of the needy within the city, and that a less project-oriented approach in order to improve the living conditions of the poor might be more effective in the long run.

Ghousia Colony in Karachi is described as a successful upgrading project by **Jan van der Linden**. In a centrally located slum occupying land of potentially very high commercial value it was possible both: to improve the physical environment and to preserve the low income neighbourhood (apart from a minority group which had to clear a strip of land they occupied close to a neighbouring jail). However, in this case, community participation in planning was much less an influential factor for the success of the scheme than the protection granted by a local councillor.

Political conflicts and alternative strategic approaches like the ones revealed in the preceding case study are an element present in all housing schemes, and they must be taken into account at an early stage of planning. In the last paper **Reinhard Goethert and Nabil Hamdi** describe a training module for planners and Government administrators, which is proposes, among other features, the simulation of similar situations.

The last pages of this double-issue of TRIALOG contain, as usual, book reviews (in German) and a calendar of conferences and other events related to the theme of the journal.

Kosta Mathéy, Florian Steinberg and Rita Mrotzek-Sampat

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Florian Steinberg*
Kosta Mathéy*

Upgrading: The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating

"The fact is that the upgrading of existing squatter settlements can be a low-cost and practical approach to low-income shelter. Upgrading legalises the settlement, provides secure tenure, and supplies minimum infrastructure, water, roads, storm drainage, security lightning and rubbish collection" (The World Bank 1975).

The Strategy:

UPGRADING of slum and squatter settlements has become an important aspect of shelter policies of many Third World nations. The *intention* behind this strategy can be summarised as follows:

- * to reduce health hazards in the habitat by improving houses, and the technical / social infrastructure
- * to mobilize private resources for housing construction by granting certain rights and securities, in particular with regard to land ownership
- * to strengthen the community through social assistance, so that its members can integrate more easily into the rest of the society
- * to improve land use and development control in accordance with spatial planning provisions
- * to make housing of reasonably good standard accessible for both for the individual as well as for the community as a whole through the validation of existing investments, more imaginative use of building materials, and through self-help labour
- * to improve personal income opportunities for the participants through training schemes, loans for informal sector activities, and fostering small scale industries as part of the scheme

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- * to complement other elements of the national or municipal shelter policies and thus widen the choice of housing options particularly for the lower and lowest income groups.

The relatively cheaper upgrading policies represent a clear departure from the conventional confidence in the ability of Government agencies to solve the "housing problem" through ready-made "low cost" housing schemes. All over the world self-managed or self-built, informal housing is responding to the failure of "formal" housing supply schemes and gives evidence of the vitality and capabilities of popular housing action by the people. The newly evolving paradigm of "basic housing" and support policies institutionalizes the self-help effort of low-income families in developing their own housing solution within "sites and services projects", and upgrading schemes.

Although many politicians would like to see settlement upgrading policies only as a transitional, temporary stage in the course of modernization, the basic assumptions for the formulation of upgrading policies acknowledge that in

the foreseeable future gradual consolidation is the only realistic option for improved habitat of the urban poor living in slums and squatter-settlements today. The informal and unplanned settlement patterns and mechanisms - which require some form of upgrading sooner or later - will remain the dominant form of housing provision for the poor families - especially as long as governments feel unable to absorb the cost of infrastructure and servicing for the majority of them. Hence, upgrading will have to involve in the one form or another the concept of "self-help" and / or "self-management" as an incorporation of dwellers' own resources to match public expenditures.

Apart from more practical aspects the shift to UPGRADING policies opens a wider political debate about the extent of state intervention and its role in the redistribution of income, and about the sanctioning of the informal sector. From the point of view of the urban poor it must be asked, how far "Upgrading" schemes allow real grass roots participation and autonomous decision - making by the local community, and how strong is the danger of consequent "gentrification" of the neighbourhood and an expulsion of its former residents.



The squatter settlement of ALAGADOS in Salvador of Bahia (Brasil) is located in a shallow bay and was the location of one of the first upgrading projects in South America. (Lit: Mathéy, *The rehabilitation Program of Alagados...* in: *Ekistics* 270, 1978)

Disputes over Upgrading:

Departing from a more general, remote contextual understanding of urban strategies on policies, it is possible to identify two rather adverse approaches in the discourse about slum and squatter upgrading:

- the problem
- orientated technocratic approach, and
- the approach of political economy (Lea / Courtney).

The technocratic approach is not only characteristic for so many project approaches which find their fulfilments in project activism of whatsoever nature, but they also characterize the "learning by doing" approach (The World Bank) that introduced the departure from the "traditional paradigms" in urban planning and intervention.

The political economy approach at the other end departs from critical assessment of urban management policies as a promotion of modernization and incorporation of society at large and especially the urban poor into the market mechanisms. For example, the creation of a formal land market through legalization is seen as a policy favouring distinguished class interests and being far away from genuine attempts to raise the living standards of the urban poor.

Further expansions of market relationships are also being introduced as part of upgrading programs through the prescription of certain building materials and standards, through the encouragement of subletting arrangements, formal credit and loan schemes, and through the need to levy local taxes and service charges. So far very little research as be conducted to find out, where this commercialization process is beneficial for the local residents and where not.

The practitioners of urban projects mostly have different problems, as they lack time and a proper forum to discuss and evaluate the relevant political, economical and social implications of their project and approaches. Their "real world" is based on official requirements and objectives as well as on the permanent need for negotiation, accommodation and compromise. And especially this search for a viable consensus exposes slum and squatter upgrading processes being the scene for divergent, fierce interest conflicts between slum dwellers, community builders, municipal engineers, politicians, international funders (Angel 1983). In Reality there is rarely consensus and a real mutual interest in the goal of settlement upgrading; instead too often only temporary or occasional solutions and arrangements are achievable. "The whole structure in which slum-upgrading is ... executed, has more of the characteristics of a jungle ..." (Van der Linden 1980, p. 43). For moving diligently in this 'jungle' it is necessary to know the spatial growth patterns and indigenous forms of social behaviour, including a right

assessment of the roles of actors participating in slum and squatter upgrading. A positive contribution on behalf of the interest of slum and squatter settlers can only be based on such thorough knowledge necessary to localize gaps and loopholes of the system, and to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the bureaucracy.



Upgrading in a Rio de Janeiro Favela (Photo: Mathéy)

General outline of constraints and problems within upgrading policies:

Although representing a relatively young experience upgrading policies have now reached the stage where a sufficiently large number of cases can be evaluated. We know better, under which conditions initial expectations can be met, and which parameters defining the programs were less realistic and might be amended in future schemes.

In the following a few typical conflicts related to the formulation, implementation and management of upgrading projects have been collected from reports, visits and discussions:

* Too often the introduction and implementation of reform-orientated housing policies proposing the upgrading of informal settlements are withheld for political and economical interests, taking advantage of the insecure, just vaguely settled position in which the people are kept. In case a central government decision in favour of upgrading is reached, conflicts between (possibly international sponsors) central authorities and local government or their respective local bodies remain as an additional burden. Lack of coordination or even hostility between different government institutions - often too many of them are involved at one time - can severely delay project implementation, and hinder a positive co-operation with the community in the project.

* A serious constraint to successful project management and active institutional involvement by the local governments or authorities can be their resource

capacity, their dependancy on central budgets, their limited decision-making capacity as well as their lack of sufficient well-trained personnel.

However, if planning and implementation of upgrading schemes happen without the full involvement of local authorities, problems will most likely arise during the later phases of maintenance and management of these schemes. Therefore, early attention should be given to the aspect of **institution building** including the training aspect of the staff responsible for the future management of this and future schemes.

* In most upgrading projects the low-income households can be considered the prime target group, however, most informal settlements contain quite a variety of income and social status variations. This circumstance should be considered in assessing the stability and regularity of incomes and the households' paying capacity to contribute regularly to the recovery of project costs. Far too many upgrading schemes are do not strengthen the economic base of the target group through employment generation. The appearance of middle-income bidders within upgrading-projects (providing freshly serviced housing and land at relatively low prices), has sometimes led to a distortion of the population reached in a project. While this "pricing-out-process" may vary in degree from project to project it is already noticeable that such social gentrification tendencies are less frequent within upgrading than in the context of the sites and services projects which principally require a much bigger private investment.

* In maintaining the social goals of upgrading projects the definition and implementation of reasonable and



Upgraded street in a Madras squatter settlement (Photo: Mathéy)



affordable low-cost standards for infrastructure as well as for housing are critical project components. Relatively low basic standards for all users (with the possibility of evolutionary, gradual improvement of services and houses) would have a beneficial impact on affordability and reflect changing needs. But in conventional practice strict planning procedures and outdated building by-laws and standards tend to ignore the paying capacity of low income households, and contribute to the expulsion of this target group in the course of project implementation.

* **Cost recovery** - and especially full cost recovery as in many World Bank-funded projects - poses a number of severe political problems: It is a difficult task to create the "positive" repayment attitude in a social context where the provision of housing and services for the wealthier groups is (heavily) subsidized - not to speak about the mere incapability of the very poor to contribute any cash. And apart from the matter of social injustices cultural matters like not being familiar with the idea of paying for services (or even for houses) can be an obstacle repayment concepts.

Such dissatisfaction is even increased when settlers see no convincing linkage between collection of charges and the actual spending on services. Even the introduction of group responsibilities and collective sanctions for members' defaults may not solve the repayment problems in general, although decentralized management can nevertheless mean an advantage in other respects.

* Finally, most of the previous aspects heavily point at the need for more **popular participation**. Effective participation means involvement of residents throughout all stages of planning, implementation and management of their neighbourhood. Since upgrading is dealing with already existing social networks and is often a result from the people's demands and expectations brought forward by their own neighbourhood organizations or representatives previously, there are fair chances for the mobilization of user participation.

But in the area of participation the effective consultation and collaboration with local residents, the involvement in decision-making and control has mostly been rather limited. As we started - polemically - with the statement that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating" so we want to conclude that there is still a lot to be learnt from the present practice of upgrading projects.

But one general conclusion may be permitted beforehand: To overcome the technocratic approaches to upgrading the respective agencies and governments in future have to face the challenge of a politization of settlement upgrading processes through comprehensive community participation.

We follow the strong conviction that community participation will allow the most successful realization of basic housing policies in support of the low-income groups and in the upgrading of their residential circumstances.

For a critical evaluation of the case studies presented here we proposed the following questions as a guideline:

1. How representative is the project for the national housing policy?
2. Which were the original target groups for the scheme, and how many of them had the opportunity to remain in the area eventually?
3. Was full cost recovery achieved in the project, or which other funds were raised and redistributed as a lost subsidy?
4. Which were the main fields for public participation? Which additional problem areas were identified by the residents?
5. What was the organizational setup, and the division of labour between state, NGOs, cooperatives etc.
6. Which policy recommendations would you give for future developments considering your experience in this UPGRADING project?

Supply of Electricity and improved pedestrian access: an cheap and efficient Upgrading measure applied in Alagados, Salvador de Bahia, Brasil
(Photo: Kosta Mathéy)

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Settlement Upgrading in Latin America and the Leverage of Technical Cooperation The Process of Upgrading

Settlement upgrading is not a new concept in Latin American cities. The gradual improvement of physical infrastructure and urban services has always taken place. City growth has always gone along with incorporating unserved land and changing its use from agricultural into urban residential and commercial. Though upgrading processes are highly town- and even settlement-specific, depending on the individual conditions of tenure, topography, climate, income and other environmental and social factors, the outstanding general feature is that certain types of infrastructure and services like streets, water, electricity, transport and schools, ease this process and determine the speed of development and consolidation. When a settlement shares most of the common urban facilities and services, the upgrading process has achieved its end, namely to integrate the settlement into the urban networks and facilitate its inhabitants the participation in economic and social urban life.

THE POLITICAL DEBATE

New about settlement upgrading is that some Latin American governments are turning their attention to it as a strategy and part of the national housing and urban development policy. Until now there has been only little governmental support for upgrading, mostly at an experimental level and on a rather limited scale.

One reason for this is that upgrading means channelling public fund towards low-income households and thus is in conflict with the traditional housing programmes which are oriented toward middle or even high-income groups. Upgrading requires quite different skills and does not benefit the national construction industry in a way traditional programmes do. Therefore upgrading is a matter of debate, and in more than one Latin American country considered as of highest political priority. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that upgrading might be the only type of state intervention in urban development which really gives access to the poor, and is much cheaper per capita or household participating than any other public development programme, including so-called low-income housing and sites and services schemes (Keare / Parris 1982).

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Given that political framework characterized by an increasing awareness on the one hand and strong resistance on the other, we would like to focus on the question if technical cooperation, funded by an external development agency, is able to foster upgrading as a strategy and consider what the best contribution could be. First of all, there is no doubt that there are plenty of well prepared professionals in almost all Latin American countries so that technical cooperation does not have to transfer basic know how. Why do some governments still apply for technical cooperation in the field of upgrading? Foreigners are invited at an increasing scale, even if the fund transfer involved is quite minimal in comparison to the possibilities of financial cooperation through loan agreements. What is the expected function of technical cooperation if the immediate interest of getting foreign exchange and non-existing know how into the country are usually not satisfied?

COMPARING TWO PROJECTS

Some of the questions raised about the role of technical cooperation in upgrading will be discussed by comparing two projects, one with, the other without technical cooperation funded by an international development agency. Both projects were in the process of implementation up to the end of 1986, but are already advanced enough to enable a preliminary comparative evaluation. As the projects take place in different countries with different traditions and a different institutional framework, only some basic generalizations can be drawn from the comparative analysis that will concentrate on some structural similarities and differences examining whether these are due to the existence or absence of externally sponsored technical cooperation. As far as the information base is concerned, we mainly rely on two recently published detailed evaluations of the projects (Lewin 1986, Santana 1986).

EL CALICHE, SANTO DOMINGO

The first project area is called El Caliche after the limestone that formerly was exploited by a cement factory before the area was invaded in the early sixties and turned into one of about 100 squatter settlements of Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. El Caliche

grew by accretion. In 1981 when the national housing institution INVI applied for technical cooperation to the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation, El Caliche had about 1,350 families with approximately 8,000 inhabitants. It is quite important to note that El Caliche was selected after approval by a team of Dominican professionals and just one German expert as a typical squatter settlement in town. From the very beginning, the El Caliche project was conceived as a pilot project to develop the institutional capacity of coping with the increasing upgrading demand as just one corner-stone of a medium-term programme to promote upgrading as a strategy.

MORAVIA, MEDELLIN

The location of the other project is rather special, close to the bus terminal, highway, the botanical gardens and the centre of Medellin, the second largest city of Colombia. A huge garbage hill, by now covered with vegetation, forms the centre of the project area. It was started in 1977 when Empresas Varias de Medellin, a city owned company, was allowed to use that public land temporarily for refuse disposal. When the hill grew higher and higher and the environmental impact became unbearable, the City Council decided in 1983 to stop disposal there. The authorities realized that meanwhile more than 3,000 families, almost 15,000 persons, had settled around and on the slope of the dump hill. Some of them had lived there for ten or fifteen years, quite an important number living from the garbage recycling itself. Two solutions were discussed: removal of the people or upgrading this centrally located area. The latter was adopted and strongly supported by the Mayor of Medellin.

CHARACTERISTICS

Both projects are integrated upgrading projects in a sense that for implementation different components are realized simultaneously with the help of various institutions. The main components include legalization of tenure, introduction or improvement of physical infrastructure and urban services and house improvement funds.

Both projects were conceived as participatory projects, but with some decisive differences. In Moravia a tight organizational structure already existed and remained almost unchanged; about 8 different neighbourhood organizations participated mainly in the bargaining

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Main components of upgrading projects		
Component	El Caliche	Moravia
Legalization of tenure	Individual property titles for occupants of formerly public land. Problem: 40 % tenants	Individual property titles for occupants of formerly public land. Condition: Community work. Almost no tenants
Introduction or improvement of physical infrastructure	Streets with contractors, water and sewers with community work	Streets, water and sewers with contractors
Community facilities	Community and health centre, school	Health centre, training centre, school
House improvement funds	Rotating fund administered by community providing material loans until US \$ 500, low subsidy	Small material loans until US \$ 50, highly subsidized
Job creation	Concrete block factory, workshops for women and young unemployed, rotating fund for small working capital credits	Cooperative of garbage collectors, other community enterprises failed
Promotion of neighbourhood organization	Constitution of SODECA (Sociedad de Desarrollo de El Caliche) that will take over project responsibilities after official completion	About 8 different organizations existed already and participated in initial negotiations, but lack of coordination since then

process with the authorities at the beginning of the project, but later on they withdrew and thus the project passed through some serious conflicts during implementation. Community work was basically motivated by the individual perspective of obtaining a legal land title. In El Caliche the organizational texture was weak before the project started. One of the major objectives was precisely to help establish a representative neighbourhood organization. In the course of the project SODECA (Sociedad de Desarrollo de El Caliche) assumed more responsibilities like discussing and defining priorities, organizing community work and administering funds. By promoting different forms of participation the capacity to self-administer the project after official completion and take care of maintenance has been developed.

EVALUATION

Both projects needed strong institutional support. The El Caliche case shows that a national housing institution can provide the specific type of upgrading support only to a limited extent. Probably local authorities are in a better position to promote upgrading as they are closer to the needs. The Moravia case illustrates that even when the executing agency is the municipality, a strong political person (or fraction) is required to push upgrading adequately.

As far as affordability is concerned, both projects reach the lowest income groups. In El Caliche about 89% of the households fall into the strata between the 15th and 30th percentile of the income distribution. In Moravia almost 70% of the families earn less than US \$ 90 per month, and only 8% more than US \$ 200. Sustainability, the capacity to maintain the project results, seems to be more achieved in El Caliche through the explicit and systematic strengthening of the neighbourhood

organization. In Moravia, due to the central location, there is high probability that the target group is gradually displaced; higher income groups may buy out the original owner-occupants quite soon. Being the first participatory integrated upgrading projects in their countries and conceived as models and pilot experiences, both projects were not planned for immediate replicability. The project cost per household benefitted might be too high (about US \$ 1000 in El Caliche and about US \$ 2000 in Moravia) to reach a significant number of persons with upgrading needs. And what affects replicability even more, is the high subsidy content in both projects, much more than 50% of the costs.

Still, the spread effects of both projects are remarkable. In the Dominican Republic similar (e.g. La Zurza) and larger projects (e.g. Los Minas Norte) have been planned and are under implementation, widely using the experiences from El Caliche. Upgrading has become an important and heavily discussed type of urban project, not only for INVI, but also for local governments and non-governmental organizations. In Colombia, there are also some new upgrading projects following the lines of thought of Moravia, e.g. Agua Blanca in Cali, Rio Otun in Pereira and Iguana in Medellin. Whereas the projects heavily depend on municipal initiatives, the national mortgage bank BCH meanwhile has established a new line of action for financing upgrading and related activities, though not necessarily nourished by the Moravia project.

THE MAIN DIFFERENCE

The main difference between the two projects refers to the type of settlement selected for upgrading. El Caliche was selected as a typical barrio in order to strengthen the institutional capacity for upgrading and make experiences for

replicability. Moravia, with its unique situation around a garbage hill, became the area of an upgrading project because upgrading offered the cheapest solution to an environmental problem taking into account both economic and political costs. The spread effects in Colombia are not directly related to the Moravia project; they were much more of an incidental character than institutional and strategically based. Through the El Caliche project skills to replicate upgrading project have been systematically developed at more or less two levels:

- INVI has gained experiences with house improvement loan schemes for low-income households who had neither access to governmental programmes nor to formal sources of finance before.
- Many professionals from the City Council of Santo Domingo and some non-governmental organizations have been trained and now work with different communities.

The El Caliche project, though not directly replicable, helped prepare a set of conditions for replicability and thus favors the adaption of upgrading as a redistributive and equitable strategy of urban development policy.

CONCLUSIONS

Technical cooperation in upgrading is definitely not a substitute for a basic needs oriented housing and urban development policy. But where there is a general concern about redirecting public expenditure towards basic needs, technical cooperation can support the often weaker political fraction in favour of upgrading against other types of middle-income oriented housing programmes. Technical cooperation sponsored by an international development agency gives upgrading prestige and reduces the fear of many governments to be blamed for producing slums. There is another reason for the leverage effect that technical cooperation may have in the upgrading process: Through the bilateral (or multi-lateral) agreement technical cooperation provides a certain continuity that does not exist in many Latin American countries. Upgrading when based on community participation is a time-consuming learning process that requires continuous institutional support, without which participation collapses, the community loses control and private speculators appropriate the fruit of upgrading.

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Low-Income Housing in Brazil: Public Policies and Peoples' Responses, A Reflection on ,Mutirao'

I propose to draw some lessons from squatter upgrading and housing programmes such as Profavela (squatter settlements upgrading), Promorar (provision of serviced plots with a core unit) and Vila Nova Cachoeirinha (provision of serviced plots and collective State assisted mutual-aid construction of houses) launched in Sao Paulo in the late seventies. These programmes emerged as a response of the local authorities, backed by the National Housing Bank (BNH), to the flagrant insufficiency of the conventional housing schemes put in practice under the aegis of the BNH since 1964. They have many common features with similar endeavors attempted in other countries and draw their inspiration from the general evolution of housing policies in Third World countries towards the ,reformist options' (Durand-Lasserve, 1986). The domestic reasons for this shift in housing policies and the international context in which it took place will not be discussed here.¹

These programmes represent a welcome departure from the previous supply policies of turn-key housing schemes insofar as they recognize the existence of the ,illegal city' and constitute an attempt at designing support policies for the actual practices of the true builders. However, they will not pass the stage of more or less successful pilot experiments so long as they are not supported by comprehensive land-use policies and integrated into an overall development strategy aimed at improving the economic and social condition of the urban majority.

A specific Brazilian feature of the new housing and urban policy options is the reference to ,mutirao'. This word adapted from a native language denoted originally the traditional practice of mutual-aid in rural communities. It has been transplanted into the urban setting and is used at present in a somewhat loose way to denote all sorts of actions implying some measure of popular participation, unremunerated or partly paid. It plays an increasing role in the collaborative

schemes initiated by the State and implemented in partnership with the civil society and the market forces.

There are several types of government sponsored ,mutirao' programmes mainly dealing with the provision of infrastructure, sanitation and road pavement, social services, etc. - existing side by side with the self-help housing extensively resorted to in the ,illegal city'. Publicly sponsored programmes of assisted self-help housing are a recent addition.


Occasionally they get wide publicity like the Goiania project where, on a Sunday in October 1983, 80,000 people participated in a collective ,mutirao' building of one thousand prefabricated houses, apparently at a very high cost.²

The ,pure mutirao' without any involvement of the State and of the market economy seldom exists nowadays. The two main forms of ,mutirao' are:

- the collective self-help housing construction in the ,illegal city' using the market, both formal and informal, to procure at least some building materials and services of skilled craftsmen and
- assisted collective self-help housing schemes supported by the State and resorting also to the market for the procurement of building materials and specialized services.

In theory it is possible to visualize ,mutirao' schemes assisted by the public sector and

Fig. 1: Conceptual Framework to the ,Mutirao' Movement



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not resorting to the market, but this is unlikely to happen in an urban setting, at least within the existing mixed-economy model in Brazil.

Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework to compare the different forms of ,mutirao' with other means of housing production.³

Up to now, the reformist options in Brazil have been applied on a very limited scale, indeed, when compared with the housing needs of the urban poor. The deficit of dwellings has been estimated at over one million units in the city of Sao Paulo alone, while in its peak production year Cohab-SP - a public enterprise set up to produce on behalf of BNH housing for families with a monthly income of less than 5 minimum wages turned out 14,000 units, that is at best 25% of the new housing demand on account of the population increase and less than 10% of the total demand including the substitution of substandard dwellings. From 1966 to 1985, Cohab-SP produced less than 91,000 units, most of them for families with monthly income of about 5 minimum wages, i.e., non affordable for over half of the Sao Paulo population. Even so the waiting list for Cohab dwellings exceeds 300,000 families.

The situation is much worse for families earning less than 3 minimum wages - about one third of the total population. From 1979 to 1985, only 13,000 families benefited from Promorar and assisted mutual-aid housing schemes.

As for Profavela, a municipal programme for the upgrading *in situ* of squatter settlements, launched in 1979, it reached only 27 favelas out of the 900, all of them situated on municipal land and was discontinued after 1983. Sectoral programmes such as provision of electricity and water to favelas had however a larger impact.

At a national level, the alternative housing programmes did not go beyond pilot projects: 161,608 Promorar units were produced, that is 11% of all Cohabs⁴ housing, from 1964 to 1985, and 7% of their resources, i.e., less than one per cent of the total lent for housing from public sources. During its best years, from 1980 to 1984, Promorar represented over one quarter of Cohab's loans. *Joao de Barro*, the latest mutual-aid housing scheme promoted by the BNH, constitutes apparently a better response to the



„Mutirao“ (popular participation) providing the workforce for infrastructure provision in the neighbourhood.

housing needs of the poor and also to the financial crisis of the Housing Finance System - the target group are families that earn less than 1,5 minimum salaries but in 1984 it represented only 7% of Cohab's activities, that is 6,445 loans. Since 1985, popular housing programmes have practically come to a standstill due to the financial crisis of the BNH that was closed down in November 1986.

What are the chances then to step up the alternative programmes, so as to make a dent in the accumulated deficit of housing?

The obstacles are manifold, to start with the absence of political and institutional conditions. The first Development Plan of the Republica Nova emphasizes the need to reduce the 'social debt' of the country and postulates the construction of 1,7 million units from 1986 to 1989, but does not explain how this is to be financed. Up to now, no political party has identified itself seriously with the alternative approaches to housing and squatter upgrading. Significantly enough, on the eve of the general elections held on November 15th 1986, the Governor of Sao Paulo, Franco Montoro, declared that the housing programmes of the federal government had been directed towards the middle and upper classes; if elected, the candidate of his party would start in Sao Paulo a genuine popular housing programme financed out of the profits of the state lottery!

An institutional reform is necessary to reinforce the local authorities and to clarify the rules of the game between the different levels of decision-making, particularly important in a federative system. The Municipal Council of Sao Paulo consists of 33 elected counselors for a population of over ten million. How can one ensure under these circumstan-

ces a meaningful contact with the population and even with the citizen organizations and action groups?

A major drawback in the alternative programmes is that they remain unaffordable to the poorest strata of the population for which, in principle, they are designed for. In order to improve the situation one of the following three solutions (or a combination of all of them) is required:

- increasing peoples' incomes;
- reducing the cost of the programmes by means of an urban land reform aimed at facilitating access to constructible land at a lesser price a continuum of policy instruments is available to the State and a compromise must be reached between the degree of boldness, the efficiency and the political feasibility of the proposed solutions;
- subsidizing on a massive scale the programmes. Quite obviously, the first option is related to a general development strategy and cannot be dealt with as part of the urban and housing policies as such. In the absence of measures aimed at creating more employment, increasing the general level of wages and redistributing the income, sectoral actions in the field of housing are bound to remain ineffective.

In Sao Paulo, as in many other Third World cities, land speculation and inadequate land-use policies are the main bottleneck: 40% of the city consists of empty lots, enough to house eight million people. Yet public housing programmes have been pushed to the outskirts of the city and, even so, forced to pay for the constructible land exorbitant and continuously raising rates. Land accounts for over one third of the cost of Promorar projects.

The richest industrial center in Latin America has not succeeded, up to now, to mobilize resources for public housing and squatter upgrading on a scale commensurable with the needs. This is a problem of misallocation of resources much more than one of their absolute scarcity. Social housing has taken up to now only a very

minute share of the GNP. A projection of the costs of Vila Nova Cachoeirinha shows that the production of 350,000 housing units of this type in one year - more than twice the total of Promorar units built between 1979 and 1985 - would require less than one per cent of GNP, out of which 0,37% of GNP for land. This figure represents of course, only an order of magnitude.⁵

It is true that the centralization policies of the authoritarian regime had deprived the municipalities of autonomous sources of finance. It is, however, hard to imagine that ways of allocating additional resources to social housing could not be found if there were the political commitment to do so and also the understanding that under the conditions of widespread poverty prevailing in Brazil - over one half of the families remain under the poverty line as defined by Jaguaribe (1986)⁶ - massive subsidization of social housing is required.⁷

„Mutirao“ is not free from a certain ambiguity. It is being criticized in some quarters for imposing an additional effort on those who are already overworked and overexploited. This argument is not entirely convincing insofar as the assisted self-help schemes provide an opportunity of saving for housing through the family work.

By contrast, the criticism becomes valid when the State uses the „mutirao“ programmes to divest itself from the responsibility to redistribute national wealth by taking from the rich to fund the provision of minimum social services for the poor majority. This explains, i.a., the population's distrust of initiatives taken by the authorities, even if these are democratically elected local bodies.⁸ It is not easy to convince the inhabitants of shanties periphery that they should make up through their unpaid or underpaid work for the shortage of public funds for the provision of infrastructures while the richer sections of the town were not required to pay for the same amenities.

The Sao Paulo's experience with „mutirao“ does not warrant up to now too much optimism, which is not to say that it should not be fostered. On the contrary, given the shortcomings of the conventional solutions, the way out is to improve and broaden these alternative programmes. At





Massive state-directed, 'mutirão' housing project to be completed within a single day with the help of 80,000 volunteers.



least two conditions must be met in order to establish a genuine relationship of confidence between the State and the true builders of the city and to legitimise the 'mutirão'. The better-off inhabitants of the city and the enterprises should be required to pay more than the full costs of the services they get so as to create a fund for cross-subsidies, while priority in public spending should be given to social programmes directed to the needs of the low-income strata of the population.

At the same time, it is necessary to identify and to study in depth the many political, organizational, and managerial problems that marred the implementation of alternative housing programmes in Sao Paulo and greatly reduced their efficiency. Communication between decision-makers, project managers and citizen activists is notoriously deficient. To overcome this and other obstacles more reflection-in-action from practitioners and advocacy planners engaged in innovative urban programmes is called for.¹⁰

Finally, the scope of public policies supportive of innovative solutions should be broadened by overcoming narrow sectoral approaches to housing by means of a two level systems approach: housing policies must be designed as an integral part of an overall social and economic development strategy. Moreover, action is required on all the components of the housing production system: land, finance, institutional design, community participation, building industry and access to services. In the Brazilian context an urban land reform is long overdue.¹¹

Notes

1. deal with this subject in my doctoral dissertation about to be completed on "Evolution et limites de la promotion publique de logements populaires à Sao Paulo (1964-1985)" which contains an extensive Brazilian bibliography. For a review of Brazilian housing policies, see in particular Valladares (1987).
2. A description of 'mutirão' programmes in Sao Paulo is contained in Sachs (1985 & 1986).

3. This figure is predicated by the analysis of the relationship between the civil society, the State and the market proposed by "Alternatives for Survivors. Report from the 'Third System' Project" (1981); Marc Nerfin uses the metaphor "Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen".
4. All together 37 Cohabs operate in different states and cities of Brazil.
5. Quite obviously, many technical, managerial and organizational reasons prevent shifting overnight to a programme of assisted collective mutual-aid construction on such a scale.
6. Helio Jaguaribe (1986) draws the poverty line at the level of 2 minimum wages per month and family.
7. This has been recognized in the report submitted to the president of Brazil by the Committee appointed to reformulate the housing policies (MDU, 1986).
8. See i.a., Francisco de Oliveira (1972) et Bolaffi (1986) in the Brazilian context and at a more theoretical level, Ward (ed., 1982) as well as the recent polemic between Burgess (1985 & 1987) and Gilbert and Van der Linden (1987).
9. See on this point Cardoso (1985).
10. On the role of reflective practitioners see, i.a., Schön (1983).
11. A project to this effect was introduced to the Parliament in 1983 after a protracted preparation; it still awaits its turn to be discussed. For a review of the evolution of concepts of urban land tenure in developing countries see, i.a., Doebele (1986) and for the costs and benefits of illegality and irregularity in the supply of land for the urban poor Gilbert (1987).

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Giulietta Fadda*

Urban Social Movements in Caracas: Their Connection with Urban Policies

A Case Study of „El Barrio la Moran“



URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (USM) IN CARACAS METROPOLITAN AREA (CMA)

Over the last few years CMA has undergone an unrestrainable process of urban development and demographic, functional, economic and political crowding.

2% of Venezuela's population is concentrated in Caracas, which has attracted both local and foreign immigrants for decades. Caracas population's growth rate for 1971-1981 (4.30%) surpassed both regional (4.19%) and national (3.36%) growth rates. The capital population has almost twelve-folded over the last 45 years. Such demographic boom will have a great impact upon urban processes, out of which demographic segregation shows special significance.

According to estimates, Caracas slums registered an absolute demographic growth of 800,000 people from 1972 to 1980 (OMPU, 1980: 6, Diagnostico). Figures also show that a high percentage of CMA population is currently segregated in slums. This means that about two million people (FUNDACOMUN-Ornes, 1985:11) in Caracas live under most precarious conditions, and do not benefit from consumer goods and urban services.

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"Ranchos" (shanties) are built by squatters themselves on land overlooked by the urban market. Both, the possibility of a definite settlement on land, and access to utilities as well as social services escape any individual control. They depend upon State policies. Consequently, the communities seek forms of collective organization to force the State to meet its demands. Over the last ten years, urban popular movements have been encouraged by facts such as the eviction from "ranchos" (shanty towns) and permanent claims for housing, water supply, waste disposal, sewage, electricity supply, transportation, etc.

Table No. 1 is a synopsis of the main USM occurred in CMA from 1975 to 1983. It illustrates confrontation between low-income groups in Caracas and the State. This Table has been elaborated following Castells, Cherki, Godard and Mehl's model on relations for USM analysis (1977). Based upon this model and information collected about low-income groups' USM in Caracas¹, we organized an overview that - unlike the model - only takes into account a reduced number of parameters. It is intended to provide a general view of the movements rather than make a detailed analysis of all cases.

As observed from the analysis of Table 1, the different movements are characterized by a wide range of claims such as for obtaining land, basic services (water, electricity, sewers, etc.), and community

supplies and the population's opposition to eviction policies and relocation in barracks². The community's reaction to eviction policies is one of the most serious and recurrent problems in the period studied, and the beginning of many mobilizations arising in the said period. From the above statement, a hypothetical relation may be established between the occurrence of this type of movement and the application of urban policies -- particularly Decrees 332 and 333, referred to as "Slums Dangerousness and Planning", enacted under the administration of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-1979). Although these policies were issued for slum upgrading, results proved unfavorable in several occasions thus causing mobilization of communities involved.

In order to validate our hypothesis we have undertaken a study of the case of "El barrio La Moran", one of the slums these measures affected the most. A brief description of policies mentioned will be given before making reference to the case itself.

URBAN POLICIES (1974-1979). During the 1974-79 presidential period urban policies were implemented by means of decrees such as: Decree 168, which created a Committee to study housing problems; Decrees 332 and 333 on "Slums Dangerousness and Planning". Other regulations were enforced in Decree 346, which encouraged private investment through tax exemption, and Decrees 868

Table 1: Some parameters from Castells et al. model (1977) for the analysis of Urban Social Movements (USM) applied to low-income groups in the Caracas Metropolitan Area during 1975-1983

PARAMETERS	ORGANIZATION	SPECIFIC	URBAN	POLITICAL				
LOCATION	OBJECTIVE	OPPONENT	CHARACTERISTICS	CLAIM	ACTION	REPRESSION	IMPACT	IMPACT
LA VEGA	Avoid eviction (Decree 333)	Governor	Meeting with Parish First Auth.	Stop eviction	Resistance to eviction	Forced eviction	Project to construct 6 buildings for evicted population	Community responsibility
	Resodelling La Vega	Parish First Authority's Office	Neighbors Committee	Works, infrastructure	INAVI seizure	Indiscriminated demolition of "ranchos"		Fusion of two slums
		INAVI	Meeting	Housing repairs	School seizure			Community support
		Governor's Office	Committee against eviction	Better location	Hunger strike			Community awareness
		CSB	Striker Committee	Improvements reimbursement				Community organization
		Disasters and Aid Department						

PARAMETERS LOCATION	OBJECTIVE	OPPONENT	ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS	SPECIFIC CLAIM	ACTION	REPRESSION	URBAN IMPACT	POLITICAL IMPACT
LOS MANGOS Barrack	Fight barracks policy (fire in barracks)	Municipal Council F.D. INAVI	Defense Committee	Construction of buildings	Clothes & food for injured people	Control with no violence	Project to construct two buildings	Political parties support Community Infor. United Slums Committee Support
NUEVO HORIZONTE + VISTA HERMOSA + NINO JESUS	Fight against eviction Project	Governor BO ONPU MOP FUNDACOMUN	Incorporation of political-oriented and natural experienced boards Creation of paral- tel-to-board bodies	No eviction Improvements reimbursen. Infrastruct.	Notion of sustained, daily and continuous fight	Violent eviction Arrest Dismissal of FUNDACOMUN workers	Sewers installed Pavement Cont. wall	More awareness Efforts to unite local struggles (To cont...)
LA MORAN LA SELSA	Housing (relocation) for affected population (Decree 333)	INAVI	Meetings Creation of specific-to- problem committees	No eviction if no re- location Relocation	Seizure of apt. build- ings Seizure of INAVI headq. Press releases Town council meeting Appeal to Council, Congress, Dis- trict Attorney and President	Arrest Military action against seizure Scattered Relocation	1,250 dwell- ings granted	High level of organization Example to other com- munities
LA VEGA: El Milagro Margarita La Ladera Culebrilla	Make dwellers aware of the problem Move out cement plant	FUNDACOMUN INOS INAVI MIN FOR ED WASTE DESP DEP GOVERNOR'S OFF Council	Committee, leaflets, notices of meetings, Press Council	No eviction Service-up- grading Avoid pollution	Seizure of: INOS MOP INAVI and FUNDACOMUN headquarters	Roundups		Mov. acquires political character Popul. awareness Report and Press release Link/other mov.
EL NAZARENO (Casalta)	Solution to people af- fected in 8/16/80 land- slide Cont. Comm. Mov	Council, Governor	Civil Assoc. Self-building - Casalta Literacy cam- paign	Housing for affected people	School seizure Spreading of problem		Relocation Casalta self-build- ing	Cooperation UCV National and international forums/experience
FETANE: J.F. Rivas Esfuerzo 1° Noviembre Guacajipuro Progreso	Avoid eviction Low-income groups organization People training and awareness	Council (mediator/ private sector) ONPU	Committee against eviction People organized by areas Committees Neighbors Assoc. Local information systems	No eviction	Letters to Congress and President Councilors' support Town council meeting		No eviction	Awareness Fusion with other slums
CARICUAO PALD GRANDE Onoto García C. Terrazas de Caricuaio	Service-upgrading Neighborhood participation in problem solving	Council INOS FUNDACOMUN Governor	Youth leaders Neighborhood Ass. Meetings Press One rep/floor in apt. buildings Work groups in slums	Service-up- grading: drinking water sewage elevators School No increase in transport fares No eviction for Metro (under- ground) construc- tion	Letters to: Council and President Seizure of INOS headq.		Water and electricity supply, ramps and perrons were obtained	Transport fares reduced Example to other slums

FADDA 3

FADDA 4

and 869 that are related to the National Bank Savings and Loan System. In May 1975, the Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (INAVI = State Housing Authority) was created, and a Housing Act was enacted including aspects such as investment in infrastructure, land purchase, the construction of low-income house for the poor, urban renewal, etc. In September the same year, another bill was passed for the creation of the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (FONDUR - National Fund for Urban Development). It must be stressed at this point, that during this period the State acted as a promoter of low-income housing through INAVI and FONDUR. Actions in this sense are shown in Decree 1,540 which provides a guideline of incentives for the construction of dwellings for low-income families. On the other hand, the need for providing new land to wealthy groups encouraged eviction programs and put aside the legitimate purposes of State actions favoring instead capital cumulation. This also led to an increasing conflict with low-income group affected by the said policies. This case study intends to provide an example of a slum mobilization which originated in the application of these urban policies. Decrees 332 and 333 affected the slum population more directly. The first one created a program to order urban growth and provide basic services and infrastructure to those slum areas in the country that could eventually become "definite settlements". The program included the study, inventory and definition of intervention needs in urban slums. The construction of service units was also foreseen, as well as the expropriation and relocation of dwellers from highly unstable slums, or disaster areas. In addition, according to Decree 333 five areas in CMA were declared "unstable" and inhabitable, including La Moran slum. La Moran was to be demolished after relocation of its dwellers into barracks, and land should have been incorporated into the "Caracas Metropolitan Area Green Areas System" (Aguilera et al., 1979:67). Simultaneously, Decree 855 was issued which did not only declare La Moran, La Silsa and Las Piñas as slums to be affected by slum-upgrading programs and by housing construction through INAVI, but also ordered the expropriation of land and improvements in the area. All these circumstances finally motivated the La Moran-community to organize itself and start a series of actions.

A NEIGHBORHOOD MOVEMENT: EL BARRIO LA MORAN

Geographically, La Moran slum is located in northwest Caracas. In 1977 it had a population of 11,535 in an area of 17.69 hectares, 1955 dwellings, and a density of 652 inhabitants per hectare (FUNDA-COMUN, 1978). Regarding community services (education, medical care), the situation is qualified as highly precarious. (Fadda 1985).

For a better understanding of the mobilization of the La Moran-community we must distinguish two periods: the initial period (1959-1973) that ranges from the creation to the consolidation of the slum, and the final period (1974-1983), characterized by crisis and mobilization, which resulted from the community's reply to the State's urban policies, (especially Decrees 332, 333 and 855). We will focus our analysis on the second period, however a brief reference to the first one proves necessary for it was the origin of many community actions.

Invasion of land that would later become La Moran slum started back in 1959, following the overthrow of Perez Jimenez's dictatorship. The first community actions undertaken by the new dwellers of La Moran show both mobilization and confrontation. They were initiated to secure a stay on the occupied land. State authorities tried to avoid land

occupation, and prior-to construction work on the building site (cleaning, earthwork, terracing, etc.) because once the site was fit to be lived on squatters would start to get organized in order to obtain basic services. With the purpose of tackling the emerging problems and representing the community, community boards were created and leaders started to appear. Actions were undertaken to provide the community with water and electricity supply, sewers, perrons, school and a chapel.

During this period, efforts were substantially made by the community as a whole. The community dwellers took directly part in the construction of facilities, both private and collective.

In this way, the community managed to self-build and subsequently self-manage a medical care center, a chapel, and five educational centers. The moment when

Table 2: Chronology of conflicts between state and community in La Moran 1974-1983 (based upon interviews with the movement leaders, documentation obtained from La Moran Neighbourhood Association and the press).

PHASE	STATE ACTIONS-STANCE	COMMUNITY ACTIONS-STANCE
I	DECREES (1974-1975) Presidential Decrees 332, 333 and 855 are issued Slum programs	Slum people expectancy Contradictions in decrees are denounced.
II	PLANS AND PROGRAMS (1974-1975) Eviction from dangerous areas policy. Slum-remodelling plans. Slum-upgrading programs for La Moran, La Silsa, La Pinas. Urban renewal plan for western Caracas.	Anxiety due to eviction measures. Complain of eviction. Improvements reimbursement demanded, threat of fight. Complain of relocations in Tacagua and Caucaguaita. Relocation in INAVI developments demanded. Fears of relocation in
III	EXPLANATION (1975) Dwellers in the area are promised apartment blocks Council, Governor's Office, INAVI and FUNDACOMUN deal with eviction and relocation problems. Relocation program is implemented. INAVI's President explains scope of the program: 6,500 dwellings in western Caracas.	
IV	EARLY RESULTS (1976) Relocation of 3,600 people in La Quebradita. Insanitary slums in the west are eliminated	25,000 people evicted. Waiting for promised blocks. Evicted people (25,000) demand housing guarantees. Demand information about relocation. Denounce granting of dwellings to people not involved in the problem. Ask for inquiry about irregularities. Prevent demolition of self-built facilities.
V	EXPLANATION (1977) Slum housing programs are announced (Chamber of Deputies, Social Affairs Committee). Granting of 606 apartments without delay is promised. INAVI's Director explains problems in La Quebradita before Town Council.	Seminar on Scope of Decrees affecting 25 slums. After two years of first demand for relocation an immediate answer is called for. Demand to accelerate location. INAVI's failure to fulfill obligations is denounced.
VI	OTHER RESULTS (1977) Relocation of families in La Quebradita	La Moran community occupies apartments in La Quebradita due to granting of same to groups from other areas.

PHASE	STATE ACTIONS-STANCE	COMMUNITY ACTIONS-STANCE
VII	INTERVENTION BY OTHER STATE AGENCIES (1977-1978) Municipal Council to arrange relocation of La Moran people in INAVI developments.	Slum Commission goes to local authorities for solution. Time allowed to action. Documents are send to the President of the Republic
	INAVI submits report to the Commissioner of the Presidency	Relocation application is submitted before the Executive.
VIII		Neighborhood Association is created
IX	EXPLANATATION AGAIN (1978)	More denouncements over collection to relocated people. Dwellers' disagreement with pilot plan. No relocation for La Moran dwellers.
	Promise to relocate INAVI rejects charges	Apartment granting to families from other communities Fraud by INAVI
X	NEW ADMINISTRATION - TRANSITION PERIOD (1979) INAVI's elected President denounces serious irregularities "Heedless" housing granting in La Quebradita. "Heedful" granting is promised to program-affected dwellers. Deficit of 800,00 dwellings is announced.	Irregularities are denounced before authorities.
XI	CONTROVERSY (1980-1983)	Denouncements once again, and occupations (5 years are gone since implementation of pilot plan) More denouncements about irregularities in INAVI's Motor traffic is stopped-people claim for housing Press releases to: President of the Republic, President of INAVI, Municipal Council, Public Opinion Seizure of INAVI's headquarters Apartment occupation in La Quebradita II Failure of INAVI to comply with obligations is denied. New policy: not to demolish "ranchos" Eviction only when risk of landslides Affected dwellers continue to be relocated in La Quebradita
		Intervention requested from Congress District Attorney INAVI forces to relocate inhabitants Town Council meeting
XII	EPILOG (1983) The mobilization ends with the complete relocation of all families affected by Decrees 332, 333 and 855. ("Solution to the problem matter")	

bills on expropriation and demolition are passed, the community was highly organized and counted on the population's full participation in all activities. Besides, most dwellings and collective facilities had been built thanks to the efforts, sacrifices and organization of the whole population. Undoubtedly, this fact had a great impact on the community's behavior facing eviction and relocation policies.

The second period, which has been identified as a period of crisis and mobilization, started in 1974 following the application of decrees above mentioned. These decrees initiated the eviction and relocation of La Moran's population in barracks and the demolition of private and collective facilities. Consequently, a series of actions developed into a serious confrontation between the community and the State lasting nine years (1974-1983), and going through complex social process (which is summarized in Table 2). (Table 2 has been elaborated based upon interviews made with the movement's leaders and documentation obtained from La Moran Neighborhood Association and the Press.).

The previous overview shows that the conflict has gone through twelve stages. It started in 1974, when the above mentioned decrees were put into force by the State and it ended in 1983, when all families willing to leave the areas were relocated in new settlements. During this nine-year conflict, neighbors had to confront two different administrations and used different strategies to achieve their goals. Chronologically speaking, the community's reactions (expectations, anxiety, demands and even demonstrations) were very moderate at the beginning (Phases I and II). Nevertheless, as time goes by and new events take place, such moderation tends to disappear. In Phase IV, we are not dealing with demands any more, but with claims, accusations and the need for investigating some irregularities in the State institutions' proceedings. From Phase IV on, the slum inhabitants begin to act in an increasingly radical fashion. They seized some apartments, a street, thus stopping traffic, and the INAVI headquarters. This social movement showed peaks preceded by long periods of negotiations. Such peaks may be ascribed to the fact that all legal means - of top priority for the community - had been applied without success. The community needed to call the State's attention to their situation and, as a result, it decided to go beyond the officially accepted actions and adopted a more radical attitude.

This new attitude, together with letters and press campaigns, urged the State to give an answer. Other State institutions, higher than INAVI in hierarchy, intervened in the conflict but INAVI was always the arena of such dispute. (We are referring here to the Caracas Municipality, to the Commissioner



for the Presidency, etc.) It reflects that the State institutions are interdependent and that institutions higher in hierarchy always use their power to restore the ruling order. Regarding the overall goal and the political potentials of this movement, it should be noted that even though it is framed within contradictions in the sphere of consumption rather than that of production and all interviewees denied any link between them and any political party whatsoever, it managed to question and modify power relations in several occasions. An example of this is that the fight allowed the community to reach some goals that were something more than mere "claims".

To clarify this aspect we will refer to the difference between urban fights and claims according to Giuliano della Pergola (1974:122) who stated that a **claim** is a protest intended to improve the current standard of living and to ask for better social services, urban infrastructures and general upgrading. On the other hand, he defined a **fight** as a collective demonstration or mobilization intended to modify the relations existing between private property and users. A fight usually includes some claims but it is not merely that. A claim may be encouraged by the political or economic power, whereas a fight, owing to its class character, and its desire to break the balance of power, to eradicate the capitalistic use of land, the rent of land and the process of capital cumulation, will never be stimulated nor accepted by the ruling authority. On the contrary, local authorities will constantly try to transform a fight into a mere claim since it borders upon illegality and admits even violence.

We think that the case under study, even though it was sometimes reduced to a "claim", showed also some "fight" conjunctures. First of all, the initial movement, with squatting and fighting for a right to stay on the occupied land was against social order. It was a challenge to property relations, the capitalistic use of land and the prevailing legality. It cannot be denied that, while negotiating with the State, the movement received a certain degree of permissiveness in that allowed its members at least to stay in the city (Castells, 1981:24). In this case, such

tolerance depended upon the political will of public authorities, who tried to maintain dependence and control over those social sectors.

Similarly, some subsequent events showed a given "fight" conjuncture, such as the illegal occupation of apartments in "La Quebradita I and II" urban developments where the State was not permissive and several violent confrontations between the community and the police occurred. Furthermore, the mere fact that the community inhabitants managed to organize themselves to approach by themselves a wide number of problems like building their own services and controlling them, altered power relations to some extent and ratified the interrelationship, between the USM and the State policies in La Moran.

In our opinion, power is a synonym for being able to make a decision. Consequently, if a movement succeeds in giving to the community, thanks to its organization, the right to participate in the decision-making process, those power relations will be altered. A community that up to that moment lacked the ability to decide on their future given the presence of a powerful State is now an active agent of change.

Such a goal was sometimes clearly achieved when for instance the community succeeded in changing the implementation of eviction policies, in modifying the economic principles of granting apartments and in the relocation of people willing to be transferred to a new INAVI settlements. At times, the movement tried to transcend the territorial boundaries of the slum, when the community met together with representatives from many other urban slums for studying their problems.

At several times the La Moran movement tended to break the balance of power, incurring virtually illegality. This was perhaps the key to its success for it reached its goals, but also the key to its vulnerability and its transformation into a mere "claim" - movement. According to della Pergola's statements (1974) authorities are usually highly interested in transforming "fights" into meaningless "claim" mobilizations. In our opinion, that

was also the case in La Moran. A movement which started in 1959 and going through its most acute phase during the nine-year period, lost its organizational and struggling capacity just when relocation - its main goal - was completed. The movement leaders stated that relocation, and thus scattering, played a major role in weakening their organizational ability. Similarly, this phenomenon encouraged an integration co-optation process on the part of the State. (Thompson, McEwen 1958).

Moreover, Table 2 shows that both the State and the community interpreted differently the policies implemented by the State. The State as an agent of the policies affirmed the correctness of all measures whereas the community, recipient and object of those policies, thought quite the opposite. For instance, the State suggested that the problems faced by the Caracas slums would be solved with the enforcement of the decree according to which Silsa, La Moran and Las Pinas slums should be expropriated for the implementation of Building and Population Upgrading Programs. The community naturally felt very anxious about those measures and denounced eviction and relocation as unacceptable. Another example: the President of INAVI announced that the Caracas housing problem would be considerably ameliorated thanks to the granting of 6,500 dwellings to "thousands of Caracas inhabitants". Nevertheless, the Catia slum community denounced that 25,000 persons were evicted. The State preached that "insanitary slums in the west of Caracas" would be replaced by "towers of happiness", but the families living in those slums denounced such proclamations as an endless drama" (ULTIMA NOTICIAS 16/07/76) because the authorities decided to implement an urban renewal policy in an area without having planned any relocation.

One is faced with two contradictory interpretations regarding the same measures: On one side, we have the discourse of the State, highlighting the soundness of the policies implemented for the so-called "benefit" of low-income groups and on the other side low-income

groups who argue that those policies are detrimental to their interests and that they have to get organized and hopelessly struggle to turn the State proclamations into positive facts.

The network of interactions we mentioned before includes these two ways of interpreting the same reality. There is no denial of the fact that the State, for instance, started implementing urban renewal, eviction and relocation policies in a highly autonomous manner. However, in view of the community mobilizations, it was forced to reconsider some of its measures and as a result decided to stop relocating people in barracks and recognized improvements made by the community. The State also decided to stop granting dwellings to people who were not living in the slums affected by the Upgrading Program and to give priority again to those communities specially mentioned in the decree.

Finally the La Morana inhabitants were all relocated in apartments thanks to the community mobilization.

It is interesting to see how the State-community dialogue developed during the transition period. The community informed the new authorities of the situation through letters and interviews to invite the new administration's attention to its problem. The new administration started with criticism of denouncing irregular proceedings in the granting of dwellings by the previous administration. It announced new criteria according to which the granting of dwellings would take place. Such criteria were intended to exclude any irregular proceeding. Consequently, the new administration identified itself with the neighbors' accusations. However, such identification did not last too long before acute contradictions between the State and the community appeared again. The short dialogue between the state and the slum inhabitants was due to the transition from one political phase to another, from one administration

Left: One of the Government project's buildings.

Right: Self-built school in the barrio "La Morán"

to a new one, which always results in an attempt to alter the balance of power. A new administration is generally inclined to criticize the political party that preceded it in power, a normal reaction of administrations toward the pre-existent bureaucratic structure (Osziak, 1980:17).

If we consider how the State and the community interacted to finally solve the problem in question, we can conclude that the slum inhabitants fully succeeded in achieving their claimed objectives and that they managed to have a high degree of community organization at a given moment. They reached their main claimed goals when the slum families were all relocated in apartments and the State was forced to change its stance regarding eviction policies. The high degree of community organization is closely related to the way how it evolved. It included not only the initial organizational efforts made by the community to form a settlement in that area and to build its own services and manage its own institutions, but also its reactions to the decrees of 1974. The slum inhabitants showed a remarkable ability to struggle, a high degree of organizational autonomy and a strong desire to actively participate in the solution of their problems. More importantly, they were able to modify the balance of power to a certain extent since they managed to play a significant part in decision-making, and imposed some of the rules of their game on the State.

The State was obliged to keep the promises of relocation and granting of apartments, even if sometimes it seemed that it did not have the intention of doing so; the State had to modify and reorientate its actions several times as well as to grant a series of economic privileges.

It may look as if the community members were always the victors, but those victories caused a transcendental loss: the extinction of the social movement and organization. The State managed to coopt and transform a "fight" movement into a "claim" movement by granting apartments in different areas. Thus the strategy of upgrading finally resulted in a clear cooptation of the community of La Moran.

NOTES

- 1) Information sources for Table 1, were Romero and Yeguez (1978), Aguilera et al. (1979), Mazzei, M. (1981), Amor, F. (1978) and the Progress of Research CONICIT FAU-UJ (1984).
- 2) "Buildings containing rows of living quarters located in a remote suburb" (Karst, 1971), built as temporary dwellings which become a permanent solution.

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Slum Upgrading and Sites-and-Services Schemes under Different Political Circumstances

Experiences from East Africa

Land is perhaps the single most critical issue in our efforts to house people. Whereas skills can be trained and finance can be mobilised, land as a non-renewable resource always remains at a premium. And yet, in our efforts to launch large scale settlement schemes for the urban poor, we often take land for granted. Land is something which the government provides one way or another. As a result of this short-sightedness some well prepared housing schemes which had the benefit of the best technical, financial, legal and managerial advice, failed because they never came to grips with the fundamental question of land allocation.

Each country has its own set of rules on how to deal with property rights pertaining to land. The question of landownership, acquisition and allocation finds its expression in a policy framework which is firmly entrenched in the respective country's constitution. It is thus futile to generalise in an attempt to provide global answers for the just distribution and management of land resources. Although on the face of it many Commonwealth countries seem to have inherited similar administrative structures, they tend to vary greatly in the legislation and execution of their land policies. To demonstrate this point, two East African countries, Kenya and Tanzania, have been selected for a brief discussion of their respective land tenure systems and the effects these had on the implementation of two World Bank financed low-cost housing projects.

1. Land Tenure in Kenya

Land is perhaps the most sought-after commodity in Kenya and a title to a piece of land is the most desirable object to aspire for. Without too much exaggeration it can be stated that since independence land has become something of a "fetish" to the largely rural society of Kenya. At the turn of the century, when European settlers began to establish farms along the line of rail, various tribal groups had to give

up their fertile land to make way for the newcomers¹. The fate of the Rift Valley Masai and the Upland Kikuyu are only two examples of the forceful resettlement of the local population into "native reserves". In these Trustland areas the allocation of land was "entrusted" in the local chieftaincy and thus followed a communal ownership pattern. However, with the growing population, land in the native reserves became scarce and soon it became a political issue in the fight for independence.²

At independence the newly established government inherited three types of land holding:³


- urban land which is government owned and acquisition by individuals is on leasehold of up to 90 years,
- Farm land held on free hold tenure by individual and / or companies; and
- trustland not registered in individual or group titles but occupied by a given community and governed by customary law.

In the context of this paper, land within urban areas concerns us most. Until about 15 years ago nearly all land in urban areas belonged to the government and was alienated by way of leasehold arrange-

ments. The very rapid growth of urban centres in Kenya, however, has not only exhausted such pockets of government land but has also necessitated an expansion of municipal boundaries. This means that land previously held on freehold tenure or designated as trustland is being brought into the jurisdiction of local authorities. With regard to land-ownership, a commitment to the institution of private property is firmly entrenched in the country's constitution. Although in theory nothing prevents the state from mobilising compulsory acquisition procedures, if land is needed for urban development in practice the official policy is now that the Commissioner of Lands first negotiates such sales before any legal proceedings are undertaken. This can be a protracted matter, involving the publication of a notice in the gazette, the holding of an inquiry into the compensation claims and identifying the amount of compensation payable. In the case of trustland the county council plays an important role in the "setting apart" of such land by the divisional land control board.

Because of the complexities in the various tenure systems in Kenya, it is often difficult to establish a clear understanding of who owns what interest in a particular parcel of land. This can be a long drawn-out process and although the minimum statutory period for the acquisition of land for development is only four months, delays of up to eight years have been experienced in cases where landowners are unwilling to part with their property. Another typical Kenyan feature is the existence of Land Purchase Co-operatives. The emergence of such land companies dates back to the days just after independence, when many European settlers emigrated, leaving large farming estates behind.

These estates were more than what individuals could afford to buy and thus they grouped themselves into co-operatives to raise the capital needed for purchasing the respective farms. The size of such groups varies from a dozen to more than a thousand members and it is often difficult to assess precisely as to who the owners are, thus making acquisition procedures even more cumbersome.



Typical land tenure pattern in Kenya's Urban Areas (Example: Nyeri)

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The successful implementation of squatter upgrading and site and service schemes assumes the speedy acquisition of suitable urban land for this purpose. In Kenya the complex land tenure system has been a major bottleneck in the past, as a result of which many urban centres are facing a land availability crisis. The government commitment to private property combined with the special attachment to land which many Kenyans still have, has created a situation where even simple upgrading measures of roads and infrastructure become a major political issue. The system is further aggravated because it encourages speculative accumulation and/or use of land. The fact that the speculator can obtain freehold enables him to withhold land needed for development and consequently increase prices. The existence of a land use plan or any other form of authoritative statement of the town's future development becomes an effective tool in such speculative investment decisions. As a result, land values increase and the composition of landownership is transferred from low income groups to urban elites.

2. Land Tenure in Tanzania

Prior to independence Tanzania's land tenure system was based on similar lines as those for Kenya, but with some modifications. Urban land was divided into high, medium and low density residential areas. There were no building codes for high density areas, plots were small (300 sqm) and „traditional“ construction methods were in use. On receiving payment of the house tax, the government issued a right of occupancy for one year. In medium and high density areas, plots varied from 700 - 2000 sqm and land was owned on a freehold basis. Only permanent buildings could be constructed on these plots and levies were based on the capital value of the undeveloped land⁴. In the absence of any major settler community, the occurrence of freehold land outside urban areas was less frequent and largely restricted to industrial and commercial ventures, such as sisal and coffee plantations. Ownership based on customary law was common in all the remaining areas, usually referred to as „unsurveyed land“ and somewhat comparable to trustland in Kenya.

As a result of the nationalisation of land in 1963 the government became the owner of all land⁵. From now on every user of land was required to have a right to occupancy issued by the Commissioner for Lands. Thus the government controls all land in the country and only grants rights for its use and enjoyment. The right of occupancy is in many respects similar to the ground lease but the title derives from statute and is not a contractual arrangement between landlord and tenant. The title can also be revoked by government for good cause. Under the Land Ordinance Cap 113 „anyone, in-

cluding the government, who has been given the right to take land which has previously been developed, has to pay for the unexhausted improvements on such land“. A government valuer determines the value of the unexhausted improvements, such as buildings, crops and fruit trees and on payment of compensation the former developer has to vacate the land. Within two weeks of the publication of notice in the Gazette, the government can take possession of the land.

Under the same ordinance former freehold owners were issued rights of occupancy for 33 years, whereas in high density areas the government continued to issue right of occupancy of between one to five years. The latter grant requires no registration and permits the construction of traditional houses. Commercial plots were granted up to a term of 99 years and certain aspects of customary law were later on incorporated into the villagisation programme (Ujamaa).

In a deliberate attempt to eliminate the buying and selling of land for speculative purposes, the right of occupancy carries a condition against transfer without the Commissioners consent. There is thus no formal land market *per se*. At the same time, surveyed plots are scarce and difficult to come by. Due to lack of technical staff the surveying of new land for development is lagging far behind the actual demand. The plot allocation itself is cumbersome and riddled with red tape, taking up to a year for plots to be registered with the Registrar of Titles. In such a situation where scarcity of plots exists, the real price at which property changes hands is seldom disclosed to the authorities. Alternatively, a significant element of land value changes hands as part of the sale of the building.⁶

Because of this blur between public and private property or better between large areas of unsurveyed and small pockets of leasehold land, it is often difficult to control its proper use. In countries where most of the land is in private hands, property rights are carefully guarded and any encroachment is persecuted. In a situation where the government is by far the largest holder of land, it is more difficult to control the use or misuse of the same, particularly in Tanzania where an effective government machinery does not exist.

As a result of this more „relaxed“ attitude towards the ownership of land unauthorised settlements are quite common in Tanzania's urban centres. It has been estimated that 60% of the residents of Tanzania's main towns now live in squatter settlements.⁷ As in the case of Kenya, municipal boundaries had to be expanded due to the rapid population growth. In this case, however, large areas of unsurveyed land were being brought into the jurisdiction of the local authorities. With the land surveying department lagging behind in surveying these areas, they become a free-for-all for spontaneous settlers.

3. Kenya's Urban Projects

Three major low-cost housing projects have hitherto been implemented in several of Kenya's urban centres with financial assistance from the World Bank. The three schemes are usually referred to as Urban Projects I, II and III, the first one consisting of a 6000 unit site and service scheme in Dandora, eastern Nairobi. In this scheme prospective allottees were offered wet core units around which a number of rooms could be built by employing self-help construction methods. As part of the second Urban Project, certain variations were developed to bring the scheme within reach of the lowest income earning sections. Thus a basic infrastructure together with certain community facilities were introduced in existing squatter settlements. It was also conceived to offer levelled plots with communally located sewage and water points to reach even the poorest of the urban populations of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu⁸. In the meantime the Third Urban Project has begun to be implemented, covering a series of secondary towns ranging from Nakuru and Kitale to Voi and Garissa. Looking at the three projects as a „package“, the following interrelated project components can be identified:

- a) Site and Service
Preparation of surveyed plots in planned residential layouts to be allocated with legal titles (average plot size is 120 sqm). Most of the plot are provided with wet cores connected to the municipal sewer network.
- b) Squatter Upgrading
Provision of secure tenure and basic infrastructure including water supply, drainage, footpaths, roads and street lighting.
- c) Community Facilities
Provision of community facilities including primary schools, health centres and markets.
- d) Material Loans
Emphasis is on the self-help aspect of construction and thus material loans are limited to the bare minimum (between K Shs 3000 / - to 6000 / - per unit)

Project implementation was in the hands of the respective municipal authorities. In the case of Dandora, for instance, the Dandora Community Development Department was established as part of the Nairobi City Council. However, in order to safeguard a certain amount of coordination, the Department was accountable to a committee chaired by the Nairobi town clerk, which was composed of representatives of various ministries and the Provincial Commissioner of Nairobi⁹. This „localisation“ of the project administration certainly contributed to the relatively smooth execution of the three Urban Projects. Even though there were serious holdups in the land acquisition once these were overcome, the Kenyan



Dandora: Wet core Units demarcate each plot, 1977.
Photo: H. Schmetzer



Dandora: Construction work in progress, 1977.
(Photo: H. Schmetzer)

projects benefitted from the "decentralised" approach, as against Tanzania where an ineffective Ministry was unable to provide the necessary guidance to the various agencies involved.

The acquisition of land was the single most important obstacle that had to be overcome in the successful completion of the said projects. In particular, any efforts aimed at the upgrading of existing settlements were thwarted from the start. This had to do with the rather peculiar nature of squatter settlements in Kenya which is unlike most other countries. The site and service component, on the other hand, succeeded in achieving some of its objectives regarding the fast implementation as well as reaching the intended target population. The best way to illustrate this point is by comparing the development of Dandora with that of a squatter upgrading site.

3.1. Dandora's First Phase

Anyone visiting this site in 1977 would have been amazed at the tremendous building activity that was taking place. Most plots had signs of occupation, either materials were being stored, temporary shelters built or the actual house was under construction. A few houses had already been completed. The site is on government land located 10 kilometres to the north east of the city centre of Nairobi. It covers an area of 280 hectares divided into 1037 plots in the first phase.¹⁰ Those being allocated plots clearly saw the potential of the scheme and took advantage of it. The fact that the plots were not completely empty but partly covered by a wet-core unit, encouraged the physical occupation of the site. Thus prospective owners could establish a "foothold" on the site, either by erecting a temporary shelter or by occupying the kitchen, which came as an option with about half of the plots. The average plot size being 120 sqm, allowed for the construction of a further three to four bedrooms and it was this latter building activity that was so convincingly demonstrated in the early days of the scheme.

By the time the Dandora scheme was implemented, a considerable experience with site and services projects had already been accumulated. In one of such earlier schemes in Kariobangi, for instance, most of the allottees had sold their plots within a few years. To prevent this from happening again, a number of special rules were developed for the Dandora scheme. 16,018 plot applications were received for Phase I of the project, of which about 9300 would have qualified. The main criteria for rejection were¹¹:

- income below KShs 280 per month
- income above KShs 750 per month
- already having residential property in Nairobi
- less than two years residency in Nairobi
- not head of family, and family not living in Nairobi.

The further selection of allottees from among the qualified applicants was then accomplished by computer through a random number programme. Each step in the selection process was given much publicity; the names and plot numbers of the final allottees were published in the press¹². In spite of all these safeguards several examples of alleged mismanagement in the allocation of plots were quoted by the press. It was said that plots were being awarded to city councillors and to people with high incomes¹³.

Be that as it may, a household survey carried out by HRDU in Dandora in 1979 appeases such allegations. According to their findings, the average monthly income of plotheolders was KShs 706 and 20 years was the average time they had lived in Nairobi. The same statistics also reveal that 59% of the occupants stayed on the plot during the construction period and that only 3% of the plots showed no development at all. The remaining houses were either started (20%), partly completed (60%) or fully developed (17%). In addition, 76% of the rooms were sublet, thus generating a substantial additional income¹⁴. The reasons for the considerable success of this scheme can be summarized as follows:

- a) In order to avoid speculation, allottees were committed to build on their plots within 18 months and to live there with their families.
- b) For the same reason, allottees were prohibited from selling, transferring or other wise disposing of their tenancy rights except to the Nairobi City council.
- c) Allottees saw the advantage of plot ownership as a long-term investment and realised the potential of house ownership for the purpose of subletting.
- d) Allottees were able to obtain material loans from the Nairobi City Council without going through lengthy bureaucratic procedures.

3.2. Slum Upgrading

A number of squatter upgrading schemes from the second and third urban projects could have been selected for the discussion of the problems facing this type of development in Kenya. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this paper the author did not have access to any recent data which could be used for analysis. It is common knowledge, however, that hardly any of the proposed squatter upgrading schemes was ever implemented. To illustrate some of the obstacles, the author has therefore chosen examples from the Third Urban Project as they occurred during the preparation of the feasibility study¹⁵.

The term "squatter" in the Kenyan context is probably a misnomer and should be replaced by something more suitable. There are indeed very few genuine squatter settlements. The few there are, are restricted to small pockets of government land in the centre of town. These areas, such as Majengo in Nyeri, Bondeni in Nakuru and Nubia in Kisii usually have a long history dating back to pre-independence days. Often this land was given to returning soldiers at the end of the First World War. The transaction, however, was never legalised and as such its occupants do not enjoy any security of tenure.



View of Manzeze in Dar es Salaam
(Photo: H. Schmetzer)



A well-built house in Manzeze

What is mostly referred to as "squatter settlements" are densely populated areas at the periphery of towns on land previously used for farming. The land is in private ownership and the tenants have subsequently engaged in some form of rental agreement with the owner. These occupants therefore have a right to stay there and are protected by a landlord / tenant agreement. When several of the fast growing towns were forced to expand their boundaries, nearby farmers soon discovered that the returns on providing rental accommodation were much higher than in food production. Typical examples for this type of development are such areas as Ronda Estat in Nakuru, Langos Farm in Eldoret and Tuwaa Farm in Kitale. In each case a collection of linear barracks offers single room accommodation with a communal block some distance away. Mostly the land closest to town is already densely populated with the areas further away yet to be developed. None of these structures and/or subdivisions have the approval of the local planning authorities and where the development falls within their jurisdiction, it is strictly speaking "illegal".

When such settlements become included in one of the urban projects as part of an upgrading programme, a number of questions arise. The first is whether public expenditure should be authorised on an exercise which eventually will only benefit the land owner, especially in terms of improved land values. One of the likely results of upgrading is the escalation of rents in upgrading areas, often to levels the urban poor cannot afford. The second is whether the transfer of ownership through compulsory acquisition is at all feasible. Once it becomes known that a particular piece of land is designated for rezoning, the inevitable result is a highly speculative increase in land values. Thus for cost recovery reason such settlements cannot be included in any project addressed to the low-income sector.

The situation is even further complicated in those cases where land is held in multiple ownership. As pointed out in

before, the appearance of Land Purchase Cooperatives in Kenya has contributed to an increase in the number of smallholders. This rather positive development, however, has its drawbacks when such farming co-operatives are located close to or within urban boundaries. Again, the return on the investment gained from rental accommodation is so attractive, that the land is increasingly used for that purpose. In the case of Kamukunji in Eldoret, for example, 100 company members have divided the site into plots (50 x 165 meters) on which substandard houses are erected for rental purposes. The vast majority of the company members does not live on the site. In view of the complex ownership structure, compulsory acquisition of such a site is politically not feasible.

4. Tanzania's National Sites and Services Project

Under this heading the Government of Tanzania with assistance from the International Development Agency (IDA) launched a national low-cost housing programme in 1973. The Project became divided into three phases and was spread over seven urban centres: Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Iringa, Morogoro, Tabora and Tanga. The third phase concentrated on housing the workers next to a newly zoned industrial complex in Morogoro. Table 1 gives an idea of the magnitude of the first two phases¹⁶.

Table 1: National Sites and Services Project in Tanzania

	1st Phase	2nd Phase	Total
Squatter Upgrading (hh)	8,800	16,000	24,800
Sites & Services (plots)	8,900	19,000	27,900
Total No. of Units	17,700	35,000	52,700

Two thirds of the total project mass was allocated to the city of Dar es Salaam which, because of its rapid growth, received the lion's share. As in the case of Kenya the project was designed to have the following interrelated components:¹⁷

- a) Squatter Upgrading
Provision of secure tenure and basic infrastructure including water supply, drainage, footpaths, roads and street-lighting.
- b) Surveyed Plots
Preparation of surveyed plots in planned residential layouts to be allocated with legal titles (average plot size 300 sqm).
- c) Community facilities
Provision of Community facilities including primary schools, health centres and markets.
- d) House Improvement Loans
Establishment of loan facilities for building materials for self-help housing improvements in upgrading areas (up to TShs 10,000).
- e) House Construction Loans
Extension of loan facilities to low income earners for the construction of new housing on surveyed plots (up to TShs 35,000).

The major difference with the Kenyan project lies in the plot size and the lack of on site services, such as wet core units. Also full plot ownership in Kenya must be compared with the 33 years right of occupancy. Whereas the loan facilities offered by the Tanzania Housing Bank are far more elaborate than those available in Kenya.

Various agencies were involved in the implementation of the project. The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development had the overall responsibility for the project. The Sites and Services Directorate within that Ministry was in charge of planning, designing and construction of infrastructure and community facilities assisted by a firm of private consultants. Plot allocation and collection of dues was handled by the respective Regional Land Development Offices of the various project towns. As mentioned earlier, the Tanzania Housing Bank provided loans for house construction to

individual plot holders and co-operatives. Specialised components, such as power supply and small scale industries were handled by respective parastatal organisations¹⁸. This complex administrative set-up ultimately contributed to considerable delays in the implementation of the project. Thus Phase I lagged three years behind schedule. It was supposed to be completed in 1977, and Phase II performed likewise.

However, when analysing these delays more closely, it can be observed that the squatter upgrading component was completed much earlier than the allocation of surveyed plots. In both cases the acquisition of the land needed for upgrading of new development was relatively easy, and yet the actual implementation was quite different. To illustrate this point it may be useful to compare the development of two project sites in Dar es Salaam.

4.1. Manzese

Visitors who come to Manzese for the first time, will not believe that they are in the middle of one of the largest squatter areas in Dar es Salaam. The surroundings are green and full of vegetation. Houses are mostly well constructed and spread out with small gardens in between. Coconut palms, banana and mango trees provide shade as well as fruits for its occupants.

Manzese has nothing in common with some of the more disheartening settlements, such as Mathare Valley in Nairobi or any of the squatter areas in Bombay or Calcutta. The impression one gets is more of a rural settlement, though closely located to an urban centre.

Since 1974 some 7600 houses located in Manzese have been affected by the upgrading programme at a cost of TShs 3500/- per plot. An approximate population of 70,000 has thus benefitted from an improved neighbourhood. The construction and upgrading of roads, the provision of a network of standpipes, the building of two clinics and a nutrition centre, the erection of four schools, a large market and two small markets, all this took place within a matter of three years¹⁹. Although certain criticisms have been levelled against Manzese, when seen against the background of similar schemes elsewhere, it must be termed an undeniable "success".

One such criticism is directed towards the way in which displaced households were compensated. Those occupants whose houses were in the way of the planned infrastructure or community facilities were compensated on the basis of an arbitrary valuation of the "unexhausted improvements" and not on the market value. The amount of money thus realized is not sufficient as payment for the transfer to a new site. Of the 600 houses that were affected by displacement, only 125 took up the option to occupy a new plot provided

for in the sites and services area of Sinza. The rest became tenants or moved on to other squatter areas²⁰.

In terms of reaching the actual target population for whom this project was intended, it can be safely assumed that this was achieved. According to a study carried out in 1979 the majority of the heads of household were employed by the nearby textile industry (60%). The average wage earned in that industry was then around TShs 800/- per month. The relatively young age of the family heads (average age: 30) combined with the fact that half of them had moved into the area during the last five years, distinguishes Manzese as a typical transient working class area²¹.

4.2. Sinza

Sinza is situated adjacent to the above mentioned squatter settlement, covering an area of 234 hectares of open land dispersed with mangoes and cashew-nut trees. This area became subdivided into 4000 plots of 290 sqm, leaving half the land for community facilities and roads. In addition, piped water, electricity and surface water drainage were provided as well. The allocation of plots was done under an elaborate point system. Priority was given to Manzese's overspill population and to people with employment and large families (see Table 2²²).

Table 2: Selection Criteria for the Allocation of Plots

	Factor Points
For every child or dependants	1
Permanent employment	2
Monthly Income	
0 - 380	2
381 - 750	6
751 - 1000	3
over 1000	0
Willingness to join co-operative	1
Payment of land rent through salary	5
THB	5
Land Officer	0

A plot allocation committee was established to safeguard fair play in the allocation of plots. And yet, two striking observations could be made at the time when the project was being implemented: first, the very slow take-off and second, it was aiming at the wrong target group.

In early 1977 when the contractors had moved out of Sinza, they left behind a vast area of vacant land with a high level of infrastructure. One could drive for miles on tarmac roads without meeting a soul. Out of a total of 4000 plots only 402 loans were approved by THB by September of the same year and this situation did not change much over the next three years²³. In spite of the plot allocation committee, the system of obtaining a plot was so riddled with corruption, that the government had to withdraw wholesale occupancy rights under pressure from the World Bank. The culprits turned out to be

the land officers of the Kinondoni District Council. In their defence, however, one has to mention that their reasons were not entirely of a selfish nature. In allocating plots, the Council gave priority to those people with stable incomes who could comply with the building regulations enforced in surveyed plot areas. Contrary to the projects' original intentions it was assumed that the higher the income the higher the quality of the resulting dwelling.

Although the World Bank intervention was able to stall the plot allocation process, thus the slow take-off, eventually it could not prevent its malpractices. Some years later in 1980, a household survey revealed that by then the average income in Sinza had reached TShs 2000/-²⁴. This was exactly twice the maximum permissible income the project was aiming at. To explain this anomaly, one has to bear in mind that the plots were rather large, almost twice as large as in Dandora for instance. Although the plot size was originally determined by the low-cost sanitation system to be used, when looking at it from a different angle, such plots are also useful for the construction of large dwellings. In the absence of any alternative source of land for development in Dar es Salaam the middle and higher income groups have scrambled for the plots, thus buying out the original allottees.

Apart from the ostentatious demonstration of wealth of some of the buildings erected in Sinza, this trend is also confirmed by the size of construction loan applied for. Most of the loan applications from Sinza were around TShs 100,000 which was then the maximum amount provided for by THB²⁵. The large number of still undeveloped plots also points towards the gradual emergence of a speculative land market outside government control.

5. Conclusion

An attempt was made to analyse the success and failure of two recent low-cost housing projects in Kenya and Tanzania. Particular reference was made to the effect of the respective land tenure systems on the performance of the two main project components: site and service, and squatter upgrading. It is not an easy task to draw a simple set of conclusions from the amount of data presented in this paper. It should be possible, however, to arrive at a set of broad policy recommendations taking into account the specific conditions prevailing in each country.

5.1. Land in Kenya is at a premium, particularly urban land. In the absence of a clear-cut urban land policy, several of the larger towns face a serious land availability crisis. Drastic measures therefore seem to be appropriate. An effective way of controlling land speculation, but one which has not been used in the past, is land banking. The acquisition mainly

through purchase of land ahead of development is regarded by some as unproductive accumulation of land by local authorities. However, it does avoid the payment of colossal sums of money at the time when actual development occurs. A phased schedule for the acquisition of land is regarded a vital ingredient of any national development programme.

5.2 Such a land banking policy will inevitably clash with the interest of certain landowners who decided to participate in the housing sector by offering rental accommodation to the urban poor. The emergence of these "slumlords" must be stopped at all cost. This might be difficult in the light of the well established links they often maintain with municipal councillors. Drastic legislation is therefore needed to prevent the excesses of substandard living conditions on private farmland. Any violations to this enactment should be persecuted with the threat of compulsory acquisition.

5.3 Judging by the Dandora example, the general philosophy behind the site and service concept seems to have been understood and accepted by the Kenyan population. Seeing it as a vehicle to become the owner of property and generate income through subletting appeals to their economic instincts. Provided the local authorities maintain a sufficient supply of land, this type of settlement policy is there to stay. But even here improvements are possible and should be considered. More emphasis must be placed on user participation, i.e. consultations should take place with prospective allottees at an early stage of the planning process. In line with this recommendation one might even consider the concept of retrospective plot allocation, i.e. allottees can move onto their plots while waiting for the title deed to be prepared.

5.4 Land being nationalised in Tanzania puts the government into a powerful position regarding its ultimate use. This rather positive approach to urban development is, however, marred by the lack of enforcement and control which stifles any efforts aimed at land use

planning. This lack of control leads to a misinterpretation of the government's original intentions and is misconstrued as being "relaxed". Inevitably this has led to a proliferation of unauthorised settlements in most Tanzanian towns.

5.5 In the absence of any alternative strategy, squatter upgrading appears to be the only reasonable answer to this problem; and it seems to work as well, as the Manzese example has shown. Even here improvements can and should be made, particularly in the field of user participation. This could be organised with the help of the local Party, Chama cha Mapinduzi. Being well established at grass root level, it should be possible to fully engage the Party in the resource mobilisation for such upgrading programmes.

5.6 Any attempt at reviving the site and service concept in Tanzania is bound to fail, as long as alternative schemes are not provided for middle and upper income groups. Even here the question arises whether the urban poor are not already served by the above mentioned squatter upgrading efforts. However, mechanisms for the provision of surveyed plots will have to be improved regardless of who the beneficiaries are. In this respect some form of assistance may be needed to reorganize the entire subdivision and plot allocation machinery and make it more efficient.

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Commercialization of Housing in Upgraded Squatter Areas. The Case of George, Lusaka, Zambia

Introduction

Upgrading policies have been based on the view of squatters as people capable of satisfying their own housing needs by building their own houses, suffering primarily from insecurity of land tenure and lack of infrastructural services. Home ownership is a cornerstone in policies for squatter upgrading as well as for site and services schemes. The view of the builder-owner-occupier has been challenged for many years by reports uncovering a reality where self-building is the exception; where houses are commodities on commercial housing markets; where tenants make up a majority of the inhabitants by the sub-letting of owner-occupied houses; or where home ownership is turned into rental housing in the hands of big business. It has been argued that squatting according to the conventional view no longer exists, for example in Nairobi (Amis, 1984). It has also been argued that legalization and upgrading of squatter areas often supports the process of commercialization of housing. The term commercialization is used as a concept to cover all aspects in the development of market relations in the field of housing. It describes a development of housing from being primarily a use value to being an exchange value and a source of profit. In this paper I will try to assess how far this development has proceeded in an upgraded area of Lusaka.

The case of George

At the time of political independence, Zambia like many other African countries, had a low rate of urbanization and urban housing markets were not developed along commercial lines. In Lusaka as in many colonial cities, Africans had not been allowed to own property, and rental housing had not been profitable and attractive to private investors. In the rapid growth that followed, land in squatter areas was distributed by local political leaders in a way similar to how land was distributed in rural areas according to customary law.

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This was the case in George in Lusaka during the first years of growth in the sixties. Families built their first small houses themselves. As reported from many other countries, much of the actual construction of the houses was gradually taken over by small informal builders. The owner remained as manager of the construction work. He or she purchased the material and organized the work in stages. All the same, the term builder-owner is used in this paper to designate such people even if the construction work is done by hired hands. By the time plans were being made for an upgrading project in George, commercial relations had begun to develop in the production of houses. Houses were also sold and part of houses were let to tenants. Housing and rental markets were thus emerging, but on a very limited scale. The conventional view of squatters as builder-owners gradually improving their house was still relevant and close to the reality, experienced by the majority of inhabitants. In 1977, the implementation of an upgrading project began in George. George Complex was the planners' name for an area covering George and some

other smaller squatter areas close by, altogether around 9,000 houses. An extension of more than 2,000 plots was planned in order to cater for those who had to move from the original settlements due to provision of roads, water supply and imposed planning regulations. With the technical terminology of the planners it was called the overspill areas. 6,750 houses remained in the original settlements, whereof about 4,000 in the part which in this paper is called Old George. (Figure 1.) In 1980, funding from the World Bank came to an end, but work has continued. The area is now integrated in the responsibility of the Lusaka Urban District Council.

Many aspects of upgrading in Lusaka have been documented and widely discussed. The aspects of commercialization have, however, been unsatisfactorily covered. Indirectly, it is included in discussions on to what degree the target groups have been reached. It has been concluded that in the old upgraded areas the target groups were reached and to a large degree this was the case also in the overspill areas. (Schlyter, 1984:56.)




Figure 1: The George Complex

These conclusions were, however, based on observations made directly after the upgrading. The long term development remains to be assessed.

The purpose of this paper is to outline tendencies during the first five years after upgrading, regarding builder-owners occupancy, changes in ownership, housing costs, absentee landlords and sub-letting, all seen as indicators of a process of commercialization. Old George and the Overspill area are analysed separately, not because there are partly different sources of information, but because it can be assumed that commercialization will develop quicker in the overspill where plots are surveyed and all houses are built in permanent material.

Sources

Data use in this paper are drawn from:

- The 1982 census.
Data on household structure, type of housing units and tenure, number of rooms etc. are available on the level of census standard enumeration areas (CSA). The number of households in each CSA range from around 100 to around 500. Old George is covered by nine CSA, while the part of the overspill area which was developed in 1982 is covered by two CSA. One CSA is of mixed character.
- The municipal deeds register:
The documents of legal transfers of ownership of houses in George during the period 1982 to 1985 have been analysed. Files were available for 11 months of 1982, 1983 and 1985, but only for six months of 1984. The figures discussed below are estimations based on monthly averages each year.
- A survey of eight sections in the overspill.
- In December 1985 a hundred percent survey was carried out in the overspill area by staff from the Lusaka Urban District Council. The interview forms form 166 of the houses in the eight oldest sections were made available to me, and were analysed separately.
- A physical investigation.
As the survey above not included data on the physical consolidation of the houses, a separate survey was carried out recording size and material of the 200 houses in the eight sections.
- A study of 36 houses in Old George.
A longitudinal study of 36 houses and their inhabitants has been carried out, including field studies in 1969, 1973, 1977, 1980, 1982 and 1985, originally there were 60 houses included.
- Interviews with women heads of households.

In December 1985 interviews have been carried out with 40 women heads of households living all over George, as part of a study on the households' housing strategies.

The e) and f) provide data of mainly qualitative character. The small numbers make no quantitative conclusions possible. The repeated observations over a long period of time and the depth in the interviews, however, provide an insight in local problems which makes it possible for me to interpret, and also to be critical towards some of the quantitative data.

One of the weak points in the quantitative data is concerned with sub-letting. There are confusing figures in the census on tenants and on households living in "part of structure". In some of the enumeration areas these are a few percent, while in other these are almost half of the households. These diverging figures from very similar areas are not explicable if not related to defaults in data collection. Owners are reluctant to admit sub-letting as this is against the party policy. In my comprehensive interviews and investigations of houses I have recorded more tenants than what is recorded in a) and c), and I have several reasons to believe that this is an indication to take seriously. If I am right, the whole population of George is underestimated, and the situation in form of overcrowding etc. is worse than what the census shows. This has to be kept in mind when the figures from the census and the survey are analysed below.

OLD GEORGE

Old George with about 4,000 houses was in 1982 inhabited by at least 5,500 households of an average size of five persons. According to the census 86 percent of the households were headed by men, a rate which probably should be much lower if *de facto* female-headed households were counted. The area has the character of a working class area, and 44 percent of the male heads of households were employed in production or transport related work. 11 percent of the male heads of households were "white collar" workers, the rest were working in service or as "sales workers". Only four percent were recorded as not economically active. For the women heads the picture is different. They are effectively locked out from wage work; only a few percent were in production-related or "white collar" work. Most of them have to survive as self-employed mainly as marketeers and vendors. In the census more than half of the women were recorded as not economically active, a figure which seems strange to me as I found only a couple among the 40 interviewed women.

Builder-owner occupancy

In the 1982 census, 73 percent of the owner-occupiers in Old George claimed to be builders of their house. This must be regarded as a very high rate. Only nine original builder-owners still lived in the 36 houses which were all built between 1964 and 1967. (Figure 2.) However, another nine houses were inhabited by owners who had bought a house on the site which




Figure 2: Change of ownership and absentee owners in 36 houses in Old George 1964-1985

they had rebuilt, extended or improved to such an extent that they could be regarded as builder-owners as well. Similarly, it is likely that many builder-owners recorded in the census are builders of their present house, but had bought another house on the site. It is also likely that the high rate will decrease rather slowly, as the interview indicated that the building of a concrete house was an investment in future use-value and an important part of a household's long-term survival strategy.

Change of ownership

The purchase of property was totally informal until the upgrading was carried through and occupancy licences were submitted, giving the inhabitants right for thirty years to occupy the land on which their house was built. From 1982 the transfer of an occupancy licence was legal only if the purchase of the house was registered in the municipal deeds register. During the four years, 1982 to 1985, there was an average of little more than five transfers of ownership registered each month in Old George and the other old settlements within George Complex. There was no tendency towards increased activity on the market. Totally, it is estimated that 255 houses of 6,750 have legally changed owners during the period, i.e. not even one percent each year. (Table 1)

Figure 2 illustrates changes of ownership for the 36 houses and shows the number

Table 1.

Rate of houses legally transferred to new owners

	1982	1983	1984	1985
George Complex (except the overspill area)	0.8%	1.1%	0.9%	0.9%
The overspill area	0.9%	1.3%	1.3%	1.8%

of transfers during five four-year periods. There was a high rate of ownership transfers during the periods before upgrading, while the activity on the market slowed down during and after upgrading. An average of four percent of the houses had changed owner each year since 1980, a figure in accordance with the average found in the deed register.

House prices

In the deeds register, 12 percent of the transfers were done in the form of gifts or inheritance. In the census, 18 percent of the owners who occupied houses which they had not build themselves, said that the house was inherited or given to them. The differences is probably due to unregistered transfers.

The average prices of houses legally sold in Old George are presented in Table 2. Averages may however be a bit misleading. There has always been great differences in house prices, and this difference has increased. In 1985, some houses were sold for K20,000 and K15,000, while half the number of houses still cost less than K1,500, and some less than K250. The price of a small mudbrick house has not increased even in pace with

inflation. The market value of the occupancy licence which follows with a house has thus been rather constant. This indicates either a good supply of sites available for buyers with intentions to build or rebuild a house, or that the sites in Old George are not very attractive.

The cost of material for a one room core house in concrete was in 1981 about K 590, an increase to 20% compared to the year before. (Oesterreich & Weiss, 1981.) The cost of material has continued to increase drastically, and this is reflected in the prices paid for concrete houses. The sudden rise in prices in 1985 is also a reflection of the general inflation, raising from about 12 percent in 1982 to 37,2 percent in 1985. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986).

Loans and charges

During the period of upgrading owners in the existing settlement could take a loan of K 100 to improve their house. The loan was too small to cover the cost of rebuilding a mud house into a concrete house. Few actually took the opportunity to take a loan. None of the registered transfers in Old George were houses which had unpaid loans. 19 percent had defaults in payment

of service charges exceeding K54, which means that they had not paid for one and a half years. From this one should not draw the conclusion that the houses were sold because the owner could not afford the service charges. Indeed, the average rate of defaults was much larger. Only 20 percent of the participants in the whole upgrading project have been able to meet service charges of K3 per month (Sinkolongo, 1983:7)

Progress in building

The variation in house prices reflects the fact that some owners have built large concrete structures while others continue to live in their old mud houses. According to the census, almost half of the houses in Old George were built or rebuilt in concrete blocks, half of the houses remained in mud bricks, while a smaller part, about eight percent, were built of "pole and dagga" or of scrap material.

Among the 36 houses there are no sub-standard houses of pole-and-dagga or scrap material. 16 of the house were at least partly rebuilt in concrete, whereof eight were rebuilt after the upgrading during the period 1980-1985. Most of the houses were rebuilt in stages, with two rooms in the first stage, sometimes used together with the old mud brick house. Seven houses had reached the size of five rooms or more. Some of the houses had unfinished, unroofed extensions.

(Figure 3)

The fact that the houses are getting larger has not meant that indoor space per person has increased. According to the census, 64 percent of the households live in one or two rooms only. Every fourth household stated that they had a kitchen. From my more detailed interviews on use of space, I know that most kitchens are also used for sleeping.

The process of improvements is uneven and might be regarded as slow, but seen over a longer period there are substantial improvements done in spite of the very low income of the population. In 1985 I found less plans and projects among the individual house owners on improvements than in previous years. Most inhabitants had difficulties to make ends meet even without extra investments.

Absentee owners

In 1973 15 percent of the houses in George had absentee owners. In 1977 the rate had increased to 19 percent (Singini, 1978:31). Since then no survey has been made which gives figures on absentee ownership. In the 36 house the number of absentee owner has increased from one in 1969 to nine in 1985, i.e. 25 percent. Eight houses were let to tenants and one let to relatives. The tenants usually did not know or did not like to give out information on their landlords.

Table 2.


Average price of houses	1982	1983	1984	1985
Ares	K*	K	K	K
Old George	1806	1767	1914	3169
The Overspill Area	208	2012	2994	3899

* 1 Kwacha = US\$ 1.12 = SEK 6.36 in 1982
 1 Kwacha = US\$ 0.18 = SEK 1.42 in 1985




A bird's eye of Old George in 1977 (Photo: Schlyter)

PROGRESS IN HOUSING
The Case of an Owner Builder




1969

1977



1982



1985

5 metres

This is one of the houses which still in 1985 was inhabited by its original owner. In 1967 the first house was built in mud bricks. It was larger and more properly built than the average house in George at that time.

The owner had six children and his household was growing. More children, grandchildren and relatives were all housed. For one period a tenant household rented one room. In the beginning of the seventies the house was extended. The doors of the six roomed houses were changed several times to fit the various compositions of the household, which had about fifteen members.

During the upgrading two rooms in concrete blocks were added to the old house. At the same time two rooms were pulled down in order to give space to an extension of a neighbour's house.

The area is dense and a new house has to be built on the same spot as the old. To be able to do so while living in the house a technique is developed in George. The old house is surrounded by new walls. The building can go on for several months, even for years.

In 1985 the old mud brick walls were still used inside the house and the old roof sheets were just raised on a temporary construction. In contrast to the first two rooms which were built under supervision of technical assistants, the new walls were of poor quality with badly done brickwork.

In the future there is space for an extension of another two rooms, but progress is slow due to lacking resources.

This increase of absentee owners is a clear indication of commercialization. It should be pointed out, however, that there are no large tenement houses. Often, an absentee owner let the whole house to one tenant family. The tenants might then sub-let rooms to subtenants. Most of the tenants felt insecure about their tenure. They expected the owner to give notice any time. They assumed that the owner sooner or later was going to make use of the property for relatives if not for him- or herself.

Sub-letting

In 1977 30 percent of the houses in George were inhabited by more than one household, 14 percent being inhabited by three or more households. The average was 1.6 households per house. These figures confirmed the findings of a study of 58 houses the same year. 16 houses, 26 percent, had more than one household and the average number of households per house was 1.4.

In 1985 only 36 of the houses remained and were investigated. For two of them there is no information on sub-letting. In 16 of the remaining 34 houses one, two or three rooms were sub-letted. That is an increase of multi-household houses to 47 percent. Altogether, there were 20 tenant households renting part of a house inhabited by the owners or a "main tenant" households. The average is thus more than 1.7 households per house.

The houses were generally adapted to sub-letting by the provision of separate entrance doors for the tenant's rooms. It has been shown (Schlyter & Schlyter, 1980:122) that the mud brick houses allowed for a great deal of flexibility in this respect. The concrete houses are more rigid. Often concrete houses are built with rooms with separate entrances even if the rooms are not let to tenants but used by sons or other members of the owner household.

In 1977 more than half of the households in George were tenants (Singini, 1978:31). This survey as well as the census does not discriminate between tenants in sub-letted rooms and tenants renting a whole house. As already mentioned, the census gives diverging figures in the various enumeration areas, but with an average of 30 percent. In the 36 houses 40 percent of the households were tenants, and I am inclined to believe that this is more close to a true average. Within the 36 houses there has been a slow increase of sub-letting, but it is not clear if this is general tendency.

THE OVERSPILL AREA

In 1982, when the census was carried out, the overspill areas was still in the first phase of its development. 2,000 plots had been surveyed, but in this paper only figures for the first developed half of the area are analysed. Two enumeration areas cover about 1,100 houses. The census registered 1,110 households

The overspill area was intended for people who had to resettle due to the introduction of services in Old George and due to other adaptations to the Development plan of Lusaka. Ideally, the overspill area should show the same social composition as Old George. This is also the case at this early stage in the development with some small differences, though.

Old George was characterized as a working class area, and so can the overspill area be to an even larger extent. 57 percent of the male heads of households were in production or transport related work, while the figure on "white collar" workers was exactly the same as in Old George (11 percent). This indicated that the households in the overspill area were those for which the area was intended and that there has not been a massive invasion of higher income earners from outside.

The differences between the overspill area and Old George concern unemployed and women. The rate of non-economically active male heads of households was somewhat smaller (2.5 percent compared to 4 percent), and the rate of households headed by women was only ten percent compared to 14 percent in Old George. This reflects an expected effect of the resettlement part of the upgrading: the very poorest with no secure income were not able to participate in the resettlement. Some of them were tenants in Old George. As tenants they were theoretically eligible for a plot in overspill if they lived in a house which was demolished, but in reality few tenants obtained plots in the overspill area. They moved to another rented room somewhere else. In 1982, most houses in the overspill area were only of the size of one or two rooms, and therefore sub-letting was very unusual. One can expect an increasing number of tenants as time goes, and thereby an increased rate of inhabitants without employment.

Builder-owner occupancy

The eight sections surveyed in December 1985 are situated in the oldest part of the overspill area. The plots were allocated in 1977 and 1978. 83 percent of the circa six year old houses, were occupied by the owners. Of all owners occupying their houses 80 percent were also the builders of their houses. The corresponding figure in the 1982 census was 87 percent.

Change of ownership

According to the figures above, 7 percent of the owner-occupiers have sold their houses in four years. That is to say that about 5.8 percent of all houses should have been sold during the period. This figure is confirmed by the deeds register. 5.2 percent of all houses have been legally transferred during the period. A slight increase in transfers has been noted.

(Table 1)

In the eight sections in the oldest part of the overspill area sixteen percent of all houses were inhabited by owners who had bought their house. In these sections the rate of ownership transfer increased from one percent in 1978 to three percent in 1984 but then only two percent again in 1985. The figures are small, still they indicate a little more activity on the housing market in the overspill area than in Old George.

Do the changes in ownership entail changes in social composition? Do higher income groups buy themselves into the overspill area? The figures from the eight sections give no support to such assumptions. In 1985, the average income for all heads of households was K209.50. The average income of the heads of the buying households was K217.00. Additional household incomes were recorded, but only substantial ones. No information was given on small informal incomes. Figures on total household income were therefore unreliable and probably much too low. For comparative reasons, however, they can be used as rough indicators. The average household income was K240 in the eight sections. The average among the buyers was K254. The buyers did have a higher income, but the difference was rather small.

House prices

Seven percent of the legally registered changes of ownership were transfers without any sale price, i.e. gifts or inheritances. Table 2 shows the average price of the houses which were sold. The price is higher than in Old George, though not as much as one might have expected, given the fact that individual plots are surveyed in the overspill area. The whole area has the appearance of a modern

township, an asset which is often put forward by the inhabitants. The variation in prices is as wide in the overspill area as in Old George. The most expensive house was actually sold in Old George, but there are more houses sold to a price between K15,000 and K18,000 in the overspill area. Also in the overspill area more than half of the houses have been sold to a price lower than K1,500.

Loans and charges

Almost half of the houses sold in the overspill area had unpaid loans averaging K245. The original loans were K259 or K340. It was neither the cheapest nor the most expensive houses which had unpaid loans. The loans should be paid off over 15 years with 7.5 percent interest. One third of those who sold their houses with unpaid loans also had defaults in payment of service charges for one and a half years. The defaults in repayment of loan is seen as more serious than that for service charges. One might assume that the growing economic burden is one factor contributing to the sale of houses. On the other hand, the rate of house sold in the overspill area is lower than in Old George, in spite of the fact that most houses in the overspill area had loans while only a few had loans in Old George. Defaults in charges had to be paid by the buyer in order to make the transfer legal. The actual prices of the house were thus higher than recorded in Table 2.

Progress of building

The houses in the overspill area were usually built in concrete blocks according to model plans. Surprisingly, 30 percent of the houses were of mud bricks in 1982 according to the census. Probably many

of the mud houses were temporary shelters raised to cater for the needs during the construction period. According to the census the residential density was the same in the overspill as in Old George. 66 percent of the households lived in one or two rooms, and only 24 percent had a kitchen.

Usually, a house is built in stages and the final structure includes six rooms. Table 3 shows the sizes of houses in 1985. Only ten percent of the houses had reached the size of six rooms; most of them were still in the first stage of one or two rooms. There is, thus, a rather slow progress reflecting the economic difficulties of the owner and high prices of building material. Eight percent of the houses had unfinished extensions and many more had sand or concrete blocks or some other material piled up for future extensions.

Table 3.

Size of houses in eight sections in the overspill area 1985

No of rooms	No of houses	%
1	36	18.0
2	100	50.0
3	27	13.5
4	6	3.0
5	11	5.5
6	20	10.0
	200	100.0

Absentee owners

17 percent of the houses in the eight sections had absentee owners. Two percent were empty at the time of the survey, the others were let to tenants. The average monthly income from rent for absentee owners was K41. Most of the houses let had two rooms, some had only one and a few had five or six. As in Old George there were no tenement houses built for the obvious purpose of letting in large scale. The sizes of houses which were let do not differ from the average in the area.

The place of residence of the absentee owner was only recorded in five cases. Three owners lived within Old George while two lived in other towns.

The head of a tenant household differed from those of the average household by being younger, 31 years old compared to 39, and surprisingly by having a higher income, K289 compared to K210.

Sub-letting

There are no reliable figures on sub-letting in the area. In the survey of the eight sections, sub-letting is recorded in 10% of the houses. This is probably a low figure, as the owner are often reluctant to admit sub-letting. Two thirds of the recorded houses with sub-letted rooms had only two or three rooms in all. The average rent paid by tenant households was K23. The rent per room varied from K15 to K 20. Most of the landlords had incomes below the average. There are no large-scale



An overspill area in 1977

(Photo: Thomas Schlyter)



An old mud brick house



(Photo: Thomas Schlyter) New-built concrete block house in George 1984

investments for the purpose of making profit from rent. The widespread petty landlordism is rather part of a common strategy among individual households in order to afford participation in the home ownership scheme.

The figures from the 1982 census are confusing as the rate of households living in "part of structure" are recorded to three percent in one of the enumeration areas and to 32.2 percent in the other. The areas are very similar and no explanation to the difference can be found. The census does not discriminate between tenants, who rent a whole house and tenants in sub-letted rooms. The rate of tenants of all households are seven percent in the first enumeration area and 33% in the second. In a project evaluation report presented by the World Bank (Bamberger, Sanyal & Valverde, 1982) 14 percent of the owners are said to have additional incomes from sub-letting.

CONCLUSIONS

In my previous study of George I concluded that factors of special importance for the positive outcome of upgrading were:

- that land was nationalized and kept in the hands of local authorities,
- that there were some populist features in Zambian policies, for example restrictions against landlordism,
- that the upgrading was not a small isolated project, but covered a huge part of Lusaka,
- that market relations were poorly developed in relation to squatter housing. (Schlyter, 1984:94).

In this paper I have discussed how market relations have developed during the five year period since the area was upgraded. The conclusion is that market relations are developing slowly and unevenly, and that's interrelated to the other three above mentioned factors. It was found that still after twenty years every fourth house in Old George was inhabited by its original builder. Taking into account that many buyers of houses had partly or completely rebuilt the house, one could say that more than every second house was inhabited by its builder. This was certainly the situation in the overspill area. There was more

mobility on the housing market in George before than during and after the upgrading. In 1982, the rate of house sales was the same in the overspill area as in Old George. There has been a slight increase in the overspill area while the level of activity on the housing market was constantly low in Old George. The prices of houses built with modern materials have increased rapidly during recent years, a reflection of building material prices. To buy a simple mud house is still a cheap way to obtain an occupancy licence in the area. The right to land has been commercialized so far that you can buy an occupancy licence, but there is no strong demand on the market. Squatter areas where land is "free" are still growing outside Lusaka.

In the overspill area, the buyers of houses have a slightly higher average income than the average for all households in the area. There is no strong indication that transfers of houses have resulted in a shift towards social groups with higher incomes than the original target group. Judging from the house size and standard, the higher income households in George are easily counted. It can be assumed that the supply of houses or plots of the standard level of the overspill area is great enough thanks to the large scale of upgrading in Lusaka. Rather, the inhabitants seem to be too poor to fulfill the later stages of housing development.

The general progress in building improvements is slow. There is a continuing improvement going on but it should also be noted that poverty is visible and many of the houses are deteriorating due to lack of maintenance.

The policy of home ownership in Zambia includes restrictions against the ownership of more than one house per household in the city. The occupancy licences were issued and are legally transferred in accordance with this principle, but these things are not easy to control. In 1985, the frequency of absentee ownership was 25% in Old George and 17% in the overspill area. Some of these owners have left their houses for temporary work in other towns or for a temporary stay in the rural area. It is also known, however, that some live in Lusaka and let their house in George either as a source of income or to

provide relatives with accommodation. Almost half of the houses in Old George are subdivided and rooms are let to tenants. Much less subdivision is done in the overspill area as yet. Most tenants live in owner-occupied houses, and these owners are not the most well-off with sizeable houses but rather those most desperately in need of additional income. It appears that the owners in this low income area have difficulties in raising money to build even if they know it would be a good investment. In two or three years the cost of construction for a room is paid. Given this, it could be asked why the development of a rental market has not developed further than it has.

In many countries sub-letting is calculated in the project design as a way of financing the houses. This has not been the case in George. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the tenants may outnumber the owners in a few years. There is a growing awareness of the role of rental submarkets in research on the provision of low-income housing. The case of George demonstrates their importance even in areas which adequately can be described as self-help home-ownership areas and where market relations are developing very slowly.

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The Upgrading of a Squatter Community: Some Conclusions drawn from the Kalingalinga Integrated Upgrading Project in Lusaka, Zambia

1. The setting of the Project


In the first 6 years after Zambia became independent in 1964 the number of inhabitants of its capital, Lusaka, doubled to stand at nearly 300.000 in 1970. During this period the squatter population exploded from some 10.000 to more than 130.000 inhabitants. Their settlements had only wells and no piped water, tracks and no tarred roads and their buildings were made of mud and thatch. This standard, having been the rule in Lusaka also for most of the white population until near to independence, was now regarded as not being "decent".

The authorities were unable to improve the situation not only because of lack of funds but also because of lack of institutional facilities. There had been a number of site and service schemes. Experience had shown that they were too time- and personell-consuming to keep pace with a growth rate expected to remain at 10% p.a.. In this situation it seemed to be a good idea, if the big squatter areas were supplied with basic infrastructure and the inhabitants stimulated by means of granting tenant security and a small credit to improve their houses by themselves. The financing and the execution of such a venture combined with some more site and service schemes was offered by the World Bank.


During the period of implementation of that scheme and the gradual integration of the areas into the administered realm, the city as a whole continued to grow. The growth mainly took place in the smaller and often recently created squatter communities.

The Zambian government asked the FRG for assistance to upgrade one of the smaller squatter settlements called Kalingalinga. A procedure of upgrading was recommended which, while making the maximum use of the World Bank experience, was based on the participation of the political groupings of the population.

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LUSAKA, land use in 1980



Population growth in Lusaka 1930-1980

(Source: Oestereich 1980)

The objectives proposed were threefold: physical improvement, strengthening of local problem solving capacity, and economic promotion. The three objectives were seen as being of equal importance. At the same time they would serve each other mutually as instruments supported by operations instrumental to each of them.

The responsibility for the project was put into the hands of the municipality of Lusaka under the condition to delegate as much decision and implementation power as possible to the community itself. A local Project Team was to act as execution body of the local leadership. It was to be assisted, only periodically and in areas where his intervention was acceptable to everybody concerned, by a German Project Advisor.

Construction of public facilities and, in future, maintenance would be carried out as much as possible through the members of the community itself. To make good for unpaid self-help the municipality agreed to reduce the service charges payable by each house. Still, a large part of the budget had to be reserved for construction. Ways and means were explored to spend it to the largest possible degree in Kalingalinga itself, creating income and new jobs and, ultimately a small local economic circuit.

2. Some Socio-economic data of the community*)


Kalingalinga is a rather typical African squatter settlement. It originated on the land of two abandoned farms of together about 60 ha, in some 3 km distance from the CBD of Lusaka, being separated from other quarters of the town by marshland and an old airstrip.

Around 1940 the owners, who preferred some profit to orderlyness allowed squatters to settle on their land. The rent demanded was small, since no services were provided. Some wells were dug by the residents themselves. After a few years the steadily increasing number of shacks housed some 5.000 inhabitants. The latrines started to pollute the ground water. The place became known as being unhealthy and in-migration nearly came to a standstill.

Until 1976 for the authorities the only solution seemed to be demolition and resettlement. But an area in the vicinity parcelled off for resettling the inhabitants was quickly occupied by other people. Seeing no choice, the municipality installed some twenty communal water taps and considered the restructuring of the quarter in the form of terraced housing

1) For Details on Kalingalinga and on the upgrading scheme see: J. Oestereich (1986)

Right: Aerial photo of the settlement



on a grid plan. This plan was rejected by the community. They quite correctly foresaw that they would not be able to pay the costs involved.

In 1979 the community comprised about 13,000 inhabitants in 2,200 households. Of the roughly 1,300 structures - mostly with mud walls and second-hand corrugated iron roofs - more than 1,000 were partly or fully owner-occupied. The rest was let to one or mostly, several parties of tenants.



The majority of the household incomes were around ZK 40 - 60 (1 ZK at 0,8 US\$) being the minimal wage level in the formal economy, and around ZK 80-100, representing mostly households with more than one income source. 90% of the households had one person or more

employed in the formal sector of Lusaka. At the same time more than 30% of these had one member (or more) without a job and looking for one.

A few craftsmen, like tailors, tinsmiths, carpenters offered their services, but produced only occasionally because of the limited local demand. A local economic circuit was not in existence.

The community of Kalingalinga constituted one of the 23 municipal wards of the City of Lusaka. It was subdivided into 2 "branches" of the National Party, UNIP, which were subdivided in turn into 6 respectively 8 "sections" of 40 to 80 houses each. (This hierarchy of socially and territorially defined units corresponds to the indigenous political structure of chieftaincies, villages and hamlets).





Kalingalinga: Political structure in 1980

A particular political problem in Kalingalinga originated from the fact that before 1972, when Zambia was not yet a one-party-state, the community had been a stronghold of the opposition. After 1972 the old leaders, while possessing still authority, had difficulties in representing the community externally. Slowly, however, they lost their authority, withdrew from serving their people or moved out. The representatives replacing them were of inferior stature. The party, UNIP, therefore, tried to solve the problem by slightly enlarging the boundaries of the ward and selecting a party veteran, who was resident of the fringe area to become councillor. Although subsequently elected by the population of the ward, he became never popular, all the more, since he was reluctant to become involved in the daily problems of the Kalingalinga community.

As a consequence of this, a sort of informal leadership had evolved. The more active officers of the two party branches and certain prominent section leaders, many of them former opposition partisans, gathered in a so-called 'Residents Committee'. It was this committee which negotiated for the Project and was engaged in its preparation.

3. Physical Contributions

During the first phase of implementation until 1983 the Residents' Committee remained in office. It identified itself fully with the concept and the details of the Project: the estimate of the lump sum grant by the German Government, its subdivision, the amount of community contribution, the conditions of the housing

revolving fund, the economic promotion measures etc. were agreed with them, as well as the implementation through a field team of the Lusaka City Council. At the take off it was the Residents' Committee which decided on the road network, the location of schools, the clinic, the market and other facilities. Later they organized actions of collective self-help, particularly the clearing of the linings of the roads and of the sites for the communal facilities. The economic value of these actions was small. Their value lay rather in the common experience of practical work and in the subsequent identification with its results.

Not all work connected with infrastructure was supposed to be so called self-help. For example stormwater trench-digging and levelling requiring supervision by the City Engineer was carried out through direct labour. But no Kalingalinga resident was interested in being hired. Hence, people from other squatter areas had to be employed. Some days later, in another part of Lusaka, I ran into a group of Kalingalinga people digging trenches there. Somewhat embarrassed they confessed that they would do this kind of work only "where their friends could not see them". However the same people did similar work in Kalingalinga in the course of "self-help actions in which our leaders command us."

The most important contribution of the Residents' Committee was the supervision of the resettlement process, that is selecting the resettlers, allocating the plots, controlling the granting of loans, monitoring the house construction etc. All

decisions were arrived at in public discussions. In fact, through this close social control properly speculation and dropping out was nearly completely avoided.


It may be interesting to take a closer look at the process of housing. The principle that low-income families have to care for their accommodation goes unquestioned in Lusaka. Certain routines for owner-controlled construction, including a set of reduced building standards, a special title deed (30 years occupancy licence) etc., were developed in various site and service schemes since 1967, formalized in the "Statutory Housing and Improvement Areas Act" of 1974 and firmly established in the minds of all through is routinizing in the course of the World Bank Project.

According to these routines, priority is with those whose dwellings have to give way to any sort of infrastructure ("essential resettlement"). Later, other houses are going to be demolished in favour of other purposes or, simply for more equal spacing ("optional resettlement"). The family which moves, be it the owner or the tenant of the house, gets a plot for a new house in the resettlement area ("overspill") free and a package of building material on credit ("building loan"). In Kalingalinga this loan is granted on very favourable conditions (2% interest p.a.) so that the monthly repayment for a house is less than the rent for one room.

In the case of a tenant, the landlord is invited to come and collect the material of the old house which is going to be demolished. He gets no further compensation. Usually, he sells the lot to the family moving, who uses it as a "temporary shelter" on the new plot while building the new house. If the family prefers to stay in the old vicinity, a neighbouring family may move instead and render their house available to the first one. This swapping is quite frequent, because moving to the overspill, while giving prestige to the one, may become a burden to the other.

The actual house construction goes according to the established pattern of all site and service schemes. The allottee draws a set of building materials provided for on his loan card from the material store run by the municipal Field Team. He starts using a generally accepted standard plan under supervision of the Field Team, usually a core building of one or two rooms. The materials on credit are supplemented with others bought from own funds. It is quite frequent to draw on assets the allottee may have accumulated as an employee in the Zambia National Provident Fund.

One year after collecting the building materials the loanee is expected to begin the loan repayment. In Kalingalinga his payment goes back into the Housing Revolving Fund set up from project funds. Once the resettlement is terminated the



Kalingalinga: digging ditches

recollected money would be used for house improvement loans to be granted to other people of the same community. Because of the social control through which everybody knows that the money paid back is to be re-used to help other citizens of Kalingalinga, there are near to no losses in the repayment.

What had been felt missing most in the past by the people in Kalingalinga and is a problem still in the other peri-urban areas, was an effective control at the intermediate level: The spaces between the immediate environment of the houses, the roads and paths, gathering and playgrounds etc. looked untidy and neglected and, in the rainy season, immersed in mud. Neither the pre-school building nor the various gathering rooms were maintained, because nobody was held responsible. Refuse was deposited wherever one felt like doing so. The water of the wells was polluted. The personal security was easily threatened, especially during the nights. This lack of order had become a nightmare, and to get rid of it people were even prepared to expose themselves to the mercy of the police, although they could never be sure of correct treatment. It was a decisive step, therefore, when the political reorganisation created the conditions for a more consistent control of the environment.

A problem which is understood by the population as a general one of control too, is that of private ownership, be it land, structure or other property. In Zambia land is nationalized. Legal property is only what is called "improvement on the land" that is to say, the house itself. Consequently, the occupancy titles issued are only related to the place of the house. Moreover, title implies the owner to live on the spot. The transfer of an occupancy title to a third person, selling and buying is possible but needs the agreement of the authorities, in the case of Kalingalinga the Ward Committee which will always listen to the comments of the section head.

The population accepts these restrictions. It even regards them as beneficial, binding



Building a house

the household stronger to the community. The inhabitants take care of their living environment and try to improve it in a way as if it were freehold. Social control keeps any misuse within bounds.

4. Community Reorganisation

All these considerations resulted in a draft of finally institutionalizing participation and self-determination of the community. In line with the traditional idea of the hierarchical distribution of responsibilities the rights and duties were proposed to correspond to the following diagram.

The top level, the ward committee, headed by the elected councillor, supervises the actions of the lower levels and is responsible for the land-use of the parcels earmarked for public facilities and for commercial use. Consequently, it acts as a sort of authority of town-planning. It decides also on the construction and maintenance of the community centre and the economic promotion measures carried out on its precinct. During the course of the Project it had a word to say on the use of the project budget. Once the Project has come to an end the establishment of an own budget for the community is envisaged. Some officers of the Field Team will remain behind and form a kind of executive branch of the Ward. The exact amount of self-government, however rests to be defined.


The branch controls the use of its territory formed by the residential areas of its 8 to

12 sections and some additional pieces of land for playgrounds etc.. The branch is also responsible for construction and maintenance of a small community hall and two houses, one for a teacher and one for a nurse to live in one of the sections of its territory.

The section finally controls the distribution of its about 25 houses on a common plot (which is given to them undivided) and the way people make use of the land. Formally, the inhabitants are given an occupation right on a 30 years term for a house owned in a particular section and on a particular spot as defined roughly on a map of the settlement but not for a delimited plot.

This limited occupation licence plus social control makes absentee landlordship nearly impossible but allows for subletting. The sections may agree on the degree and type of internal subdivision. As a whole they are responsible for construction and maintenance of water supply, drainage, refuse collection. Household sewerage is the responsibility of the house owners.

After a thorough discussion the old Residents Committee approved on its own reorganisation along these lines. The process of reorganisation, however, turned out to be a time-consuming one. It presupposed a land survey, the existence of the new access roads and of the new water network which, in turn, had to be constructed partly by the new sections, anticipating their new composition.



The Resident's Committee had attained considerable political stature, because of all the important decisions it had to take. Yet it was, for the reasons mentioned, composed of politically and economically rather weak members. Some of these could not resist the temptation to look for personal benefits. This did not remain hidden to the community and led to internal conflicts. The local government elections of 1983 as a consequence, now based on the new subdivisions, produced a fairly different group of leaders.

I will not forget when, after the results were announced, the chairman of the old Resident's Committee came to the Zambian Field Team Leader and myself with tears in his eyes to be consolidated after a crushing defeat. Forgotten was, that he had tried to put pressure on the Field Team to have the house he had rented have declared obsolete, so that he could be given a plot in the overspill area. This was first rejected, since his house did not meet the described requirements. It was the Residents' Committee, the local sovereign which finally decided in his favor. His treasurer, similarly, could not reproduce some money collected for social events, a few roof sheets donated to the community for public buildings had seen on private houses etc... He also lost. More than every body else the chairman had spent his time to convince his people of the many details of the Project and mobilize them for collective or individual extra efforts. He had enjoyed the growing prestige going with it, of course. He identified himself fully with the progress of the Project and, more still, with the progress anticipated. And now, suddenly and obviously unexpected for him, all this was knocked out of his hand.

The new subdivision of the Ward followed the requirements put up by the Party. It resulted in the forming of 7 branches of about 10 sections each, comprising 25 houses on average. The only feature which goes beyond the official recommendations is that they are primarily related to a territory and only secondarily to a group of inhabitants, households and houses.

Since the elections, the new Ward Committee acts as a federation of branch officials and not, as it theoretically should, as Party committee. Its decisions show certain tendencies:

- a) The land use control is employed by the committee to act against any in-migration.

New plots at the fringe are reserved exclusively for people resettled from the more densely populated central areas plots for special uses (small churches for the many religious groupings, commercial facilities of all sorts, playgrounds etc.) are being spread evenly over the territory. Quite consciously and against the advice of European experts the local leaders tend to decide against privileged locations and especially against a spine of central services.

Since the lay-out of the eastern part planned, parcelled and partly developed by the City Engineer before the start of the project had proved to be inadequate, it was decided to change the planning of the western part of the resettlement. Now, the section-plots for 25 houses are being left undivided. Its exact subdivision and the corresponding lay-out for the 25 houses are discussed and decided upon by the settlers and approved by the Ward Committee assisted by the Field Team.

- b) In economic and income promotion the committee argued against the advice of the experts to invite small entrepreneurs from outside to set up workshops in the area. An abortive attempt proved them to be right. There is a feeling that as many inhabitants as possible but only them should get a chance. Generally it tries to minimize privileges and not to allow for too profitable opportunities. Too much accumulation of money and power is regarded with distrust.
- c) The housing fund which initially was designed to phase out due to the

continuing inflation is being reconditioned to be kept in continuous rotation. The committee waits for the results of the first rotation of the loans to decide on the final and definite conditions but the mood is definitely towards tightening the terms (interests, repayment, grace period etc.)

- d) Self-help actions and the mobilizing of material contributions (construction of nurses' and teachers' houses, maintenance of school pavilions etc.) are no more organized by the Ward, but delegated to the branches. It is they, significantly who tackle the problem of improving personal security, while the Ward Committee negotiates for a police post.

The branch committees - being party committees at the same time - assume responsibility for what had been in dispute between the sections and the Residents' Committee all the time: to grant or withdraw the right of residence and the land-use for residential and small scale economic purposes. They eagerly organise communal actions like clearing ditches and constructing the teachers' house. Whether they can guarantee the maintenance is still to be proved. Apart from that, they supervise the functioning of the sections on their territory and mobilize the section members, if the local leaders fail to do so, and sometimes act on their behalf.

The capacity of the sections to fulfill their responsibilities like maintenance of communal taps and refuse boxes, landscaping, clearance of stormwater ditches etc. seems to depend on the personality of the section leaders. Many are fairly weak and too much involved personally for exercising the necessary authority. Section leaders of low profile have difficulties in solving the one or the other trite conflict in their community (e.g. who owns a particular fruit tree, who is responsible for chicken or goats roaming around) in refusing unjustified claims of persons of equal or higher rank, or even in organising their people for self-help



Plan of Kalingalinga: new political subdivisions



Kalingalinga: the Branch Committee

action. In such circumstances the branch act as appeal authority, and in fact is doing so in an increasing number of cases.

On balance, it appears that the Ward is able to fulfill its responsibilities, especially if a budget and some executive officers of the Field Team are at their disposal. The level of the branch seems to be able to accomplish more tasks than have been attributed to it initially. The sections, on the other hand, appear somewhat overloaded. A redistribution of competences is advisable.

6. Some Conclusions

The people of Kalingalinga readily accept to contribute physically and otherwise to the upgrading of their environment, in whatever form whether collective or individual, spontaneous or organized, remunerated or not. This readiness may be influenced by the fact that they get something in return for their efforts: a substantial reduction in service charges. Apart from that they exert some influence on the establishments, maintenance and running of the public facilities in the ward.

It should be mentioned, too, that in Zambia self-help is not considered a privilege to be granted or withdrawn. Consequently, it does not represent an instrument of domination of the ruling elite. On the contrary, even the modest self-help actions of the Kalingalinga Community resulted in strengthening its weight in City Council and Party. In itself the venture was a lesson, which taught the people how to play their political role more effectively.

There was, at the start of the Project, little to no knowledge available on the intricacies of internal organisation of a community. Neither those people who invented the Party structure, nor the advisors of the Kalingalinga scheme or the people who enacted their own reorganisation contemplated much on the size of the units, on the procedures of vertical and horizontal cooperation and on the appropriate amount of competence and obligations. Although not being designed



Enjoying the new water tap

for this purpose, the Kalingalinga Integrated Upgrading Project turned out to become a test case for some of these questions.

One of the most obvious results was that a socio-territorial unit in the order of size of 250 houses or 2000 inhabitants is a much more effective one than had been anticipated as opposed to the rather inefficient level of a 25 houses sub-unit. But people concered and we as observers could learn much more. The most important lesson being that participation, devolution or community self-responsibility is not only a question of yes or no, but also of constitutional arrangements and their daily translation into routine and general behavior.

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Anita Larsson*

Old Naledi in Gaborone

The Integration of an Upgraded Squatter Area into the Capital of Botswana

Old Naledi is the first and only squatter settlement of importance in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana. It developed rapidly from the mid sixties up to 1975 when the Government of Botswana decided to recognize it as a residential area and to upgrade it.

The development of Old Naledi and Government's response to it follow the same principle pattern as that of many similar areas in African cities. When planning the new capital, housing projections did not include those having no or little income, not even the construction workers of the town were included. It was intended to house mainly civil servants. Migrants to town settled down on undeveloped land planned for industrial purposes and the development of Naledi began. When it had reached the size of about 5000 inhabitants, Government tried to bulldoze the houses and resettle people but failed in its efforts. Eventually it had to recognize and upgrade the area. The population had by 1975 reached 8000 corresponding to one fourth of the population of Gaborone but it occupied only one tenth of its inhabited area.

Naledi was in 1975 a comparatively large and uncontrolled area difficult to get an overall conception of. It lacked almost all facilities of a planned site and service area. There were no built roads, no ditches for storm water drainage and no street lighting. There were only four standpipes, all located close to each other. Houses were generally built in traditional or scrap materials. Only a few dwellings had a pit latrine. There was one small private school and shopping facilities were provided only by the many women selling vegetables and grocery from their plots. Planning was, however, facilitated by the fact that the area was clearly defined and all land was owned by Government.

There were two main objectives for upgrading Naledi. Firstly to supply the area with the same urban standards as planned site and service areas and

secondly to get rid of squatter settlements in Gaborone once and for all. To what extent has Government managed to fulfill these aims?

When it comes to getting rid of squatter housing in Gaborone, Government has been very successful. Within Gaborone no more such settlements have developed. The Town Council has been very firm in its commitment to prevent further squatting and have cleared the grounds immediately any signs of an embryo have emerged.

Such a policy is more likely to be successful if alternatives exists to squatting. At the same time as Naledi was upgraded several new site and service areas were developed in Gaborone. Up to some years ago, the provision of new such plots was sufficient to fairly well keep pace with the growth rate of the town (close to 13% 1971-1981).

Rooms for rent have lately become an important means of housing in Gaborone. In many site and service areas in Gaborone about 50% or more of the plot holders have one or several rooms for tenants.

Staying more or less permanent with relatives or friends is also a common way of getting accommodation in town today. Despite those alternatives, a severe housing shortage has now emerged in Gaborone.

For the inhabitants of Naledi the upgrading has meant considerable improvements. They have received security of land tenure and the possibility to apply for building material loans. To support people in their improving of housing standards, Town Council has established a ward-office of the Self-Help Housing Agency (SHHA), including a depot for building materials, in the area.

As a result of the physical planning, the infrastructural standards in Naledi now correspond to those of site and service areas. There are pit latrines on most plots, one standpipe for every 15th plot, roads, pedestrian ways and some street lighting. Also the community facilities are in line with other low cost areas.

Two primary schools, a clinic, a shopping centre and a community hall have been built in the area.

But there are more questions to raise when looking back at an upgrading project. Perhaps the most important question is if the project has been followed by gentrification process: have the original plottolders been replaced by new better off ones that want to and are able to get access to planned and serviced land. Though not openly outspoken one may assume that the aims behind the upgrading project also included a general development of the area that now could be gathered from the socio-economic characteristics of the population. To what extent this has happened is a second question. A third question is the extent of housing improvements, for which the plottholder themselves mainly are responsible.

In this paper I will discuss these questions. My prestaton is based on data from a Baseline Survey of Naledi from 1977 (van Nostrand, J. 1982), from the 1981 Population and Housing Census (Botswana Government 1982, 1983a, 1983b) and from "An Evaluation on the Self-Help Housing Agencies in Botswana" (Botswana Government, 1985), here referred to as the SHHA-evaluation.

My own research work in Botswana, consisting of qualitative studies about ongoing changes, from traditional to modern housing, in dwellings and related living patterns and about housing strategies of women headed households, supplement the above survey data. Interviews, together with general exploration of areas and plots, have been carried out in periods from 1983 to 1986 in different types of low cost areas, mainly in Gaborone. I will let a few of my case studies illustrate the survey data.

Socio-economic characteristics of Old Naledi

To start with I will investigate the changes in population characteristics after the project started by comparing figures from the 1977 Baseline Survey and the 1981 Census.

The population was in 1977 just over 10,000 and the number of households estimated to 2,500. At the end of the upgrading (early 1980) and after resettling about 450 households the population had

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decreased to 8,600 and the density from 20 to 15 households per hectare. According to the Census, however, the population of Naledi was in August 1981 9891 and the number of households 2,408, despite the fact that about 100 plots were found empty during the enumeration. Thus the 1981 figures were close to those before the upgrading started and the density was back to 20 households per hectare.

Those figure underline the high growth rate of Gaborone and the increasing possession of rooms or tenants, probably also that the provision of services in Naledi in itself pulled people to town.

The proportion of males was both in 1977 and 1981 about 60%, that is, above average for Botswana and Gaborone (47% and 50% respectively) and reflects the dominance of male migrants to town, at least during the first years. That is further emphasized by the comparatively low proportion of women headed households in Naledi in 1981, only 18% (around 30% for most site and service areas). Apparently men more often than women also acquired plot of their own (rather than stayed with friends or relatives) and thereby they became household heads. Other data from the two surveys do not indicate any major changes.

If data from different low cost areas in the 1981 Census are compared they show that a large proportion (50%) of the whole population of Naledi has never attended primary school (average Gaborone 31%, most site and service areas 30-35%) despite the fact that the proportion of people less than 15 years of age is the same in all areas. The proportion of

formally employed people are also somewhat less in Naledi.

The small proportion of educated and formally employed people in Naledi indicates that the people there are more poor. Data from the SHHA-evaluation, which included a social survey clearly shows that so is the case.

Data in this survey are given for Naledi, some planned site and service area built 1974-76 and some developed 1978-83, respectively. All areas are located in Gaborone. I will call the two groups old S&S and new S&S in the following presentation. The average length of owner occupancy is eight years for old site and service area and Naledi while it is three years for new site and service areas.

Data from the survey presented in Table 1 shows that in Naledi there exist a much larger proportion of households without any self- or wage-employed household member. The proportion of owners having a wage employment is, however, similar in all types of areas, while the number of household members working in the owner households varies considerably. There is also a considerable difference in the type of employment for additional household members.

The survey included also questions about household income. Answers given to such questions must always be treated with cautiousness, they may however be used for reasons of comparison. (Table 2)

Household income from employment is smallest in Naledi. When related to the household size, it becomes even smaller. The proportion of households earning less

than P50 or nothing is consequently largest in Naledi. For reasons of comparison it can be mentioned that the Datum Poverty Line per capita and month was in 1983 estimated to P21.40 (Marshall, Jelier, Oommen, 1983, p 3).

The above income figures include income from both self and wage-employment. The 1981 Census provides, however, very low figures for self-employment in all types of low cost areas. Only about 5% of the population above 12 years of age are reported as self-employed. One may conclude that people have been reluctant to give full information on this matter.

A good picture of what informal sector employment means in Naledi is given by "Naledi Economic Baseline Survey 1983" (Marshall, Jelier, Oommen, 1983, that investigated the informal sector specifically and included all plots in Naledi. It found that 26% of the plots were being used for informal business activities as well as for residence and that slightly more than half of the households were dependent solely on the informal sector. It also found that 75% of those engaged in the informal sector were women and concluded: "that indicates that a large number were wives supplementing the income of their husbands in formal employment". I think one can also conclude that women headed households often rely on only the income from informal sector.

Around 75% of the business activities conducted consisted of selling grocery, vegetables, cooked food and the like or of (brewing and) selling beer. Both activities were dominated by women, around 90% were women. Only 13% of the business activities consisted of service and production activities. Wood selling produced the lowest stated income, followed by beer brewing, then hawkers and last by producers and the like.

The survey does not provide income levels for the different activities of self-employment but my own experiences from interviews is that they often produce very little income, though there are very great variations. That is not a surprise since about every tenth plot were involved in selling grocery and another every tenth plot in selling beer, according to the survey. The dependence on selling beer (and the subsequent drinking of it) especially in Naledi, became very evident to me when visiting different low cost housing areas for interviews at weekends. While weekends were a good time for interviews in planned areas, I soon found that there was no use in trying to perform them in Naledi at such times. This experience is supported by figures from the SHHA-evaluation: 32% of households in Naledi want safety and security in the area, while corresponding figure for new and old site and service areas is 5 and 9% respectively.

The possibilities to perform self-employment has changed over time and in

Table 1: Type of employment in owner households. (SE means self-employment, WE wage employment and C casual).

Source: SHHA-evaluation table A.2.43, A.2.44, and A.2.45.

	Members working (in %)		mean number employed	type of employment for owner,			employment for add. members, %		
	none	somebody		SE	WE	C	SE	WE	C
Naledi	27	73	1.16	23	69	8	33	33	33
Old S&S	6	94	1.58	39	61	0	23	70	7
New S&S	5	95	1.49	12	83	5	19	79	2

Table 2: Average monthly income per household and household member in owner households.

Note, only household with a income are included in the three left columns of the table. Source: SHHA-evaluation table A.2.10, A.2.46 and A.2.47

	mean monthly earnings of owner hh in Pula	mean household size owner hh	monthly income per person in Pula	proportion of hhs earning \times P50 or nothing, %
Naledi	146	4.44	33	39
Old S&S	220	3.96	55	13
New S&S	180	4.15	43	11

some respects become worse rather than improved. Some old women have told me that, when they arrived in town at least ten years ago, they could collect firewood for selling close to Naledi. That is no more possible, firewood has to be collected far away and a means of transport is necessary. Firewood is today generally sold by male villagers that bring wood to town on donkey-carts.

Letting rooms is today another important source of income for households in low cost areas and often probably more important than that from the informal sector. The SHHA-evaluation reports that households with tenants receive in average about P20/month from rents. The following case from my interviews illustrate the dependency of a poor family on letting rooms.

The household head is 56 years old and widowed, she has never attended school. Two daughter, one unmarried and one a widow, and eleven grandchildren, aged three to twelve years, stay with her in the plot. Nobody has a job now but they used to sell firewood. The have three houses: one, of two rooms, in modern materials only, and two with mud-walls and zinc roofs containing three rooms in all. The modern house was built by BCC, the Botswana Christina Council, an organisation that supports the poorest in Naledi. The cost for materials has to be paid back, but over a long period and without interest, while the construction of the house is a gift. The whole household of 14 people now live in one room in the modern house. All other rooms are for tenants. In that way they get a monthly income of P95 which the whole household relies on.

Presented data in the SHHA-evaluation on rural property and connections along with income exchanges with rural areas indicate a different pattern of dependency for Naledi in relation to other site and service areas. (Table 3)

While households in Naledi have land (but not cattle) to a large extent than those in other site and service areas, they receive less often money from the rural area and especially send money less often to rural areas. Their comparatively long stay in town has not cut off the rural links totally. Instead one may include that they keep land as a security that may supplement the limited income in town.

The above presented data clearly show that Naledi houses households more poor than those in planned site and service areas. As the data are based on averages they do not exclude the existence of poor people in planned site and service areas. I have also met many such households in my interviews which points to the fact, recognized by many today, that planned low cost areas also house fairly well off households, some of which belong to the medium income group.

Table 3: Rural property and income exchange of all household, in %
Source: SHHA-evaluation table A.2.17 and A.2.50.

	Households owning			Household that		
	land and cattle	land only	cattle only	none	receive money	send money
Naledi	43	36	1	19	7	54
Old S&S	42	12	12	33	5	81
New S&S	44	16	9	31	10	67

Housing standards

While upgrading activities located outside the plot were the full responsibility of Government, upgrading the dwelling inside the plot was and is the responsibility of the plotholder. He or she is, however, supported by Government, mainly through the provision of building material loans. The amount of the loan corresponds to the cost of materials for a modern two-roomed house. The loan is based on the principle of affordability. Not more than 25% of a household's total income can be used for the monthly service levy and repayment of the loan. In 1980 that meant that a household earning less than P50/month could not get a full building material loan (compare to table 2).

In 1983, according to the SHHA-evaluation, 44% of the plotholders in Naledi had a building material loan (full amount or less), while corresponding figure for new S&S-areas was 71%. The figures are difficult to interpret. Many people are reluctant to borrow money and pay interest, whether they are entitled for a loan or not, others earn too much to qualify. A large group does not qualify at all. The upgrading project did not include a strategy for how the last group was to improve their dwellings. About 100 households in this group have, however, been helped by Botswana Christian Council, as in the case reported.

Housing standards can be discussed in terms of building materials, space standards and the provision of infrastructure services. The latter allow for installation of flush-toilets, electric stoves and so forth.

The provision of infrastructural services are very much the same today in the different types of low cost areas. Improvements based on individual initiatives are, however, possible. Gas in large bottles can be used for stoves and lighting, a septic tank built for sewerage treatment and water in the plot can be provided by an individual connection. As such improvements are very expensive it is not likely that there are any major differences in the standards related to infrastructure between the areas. My own work on the use of space in dwellings confirms this.

The main differences today, between Naledi and new site and service areas in

the physical appearance, are instead that plot sizes are smaller and that both traditional and modern building materials are common in Naledi. The average plot-size in Naledi is 350 square metres compared to the planning standard for new areas of 450 square metres. Houses in Naledi were, before upgrading started, built in mainly traditional materials such as mud and grass or scrap materials of different kinds. Corrugated iron sheets, so called zincs were also fairly commonly used for roofing.

As a result of getting security of land tenure and the possibilities to obtain building material loans the dwellings of the area could be upgraded. A considerable change is also the result. Hardly any rondavels with thatched roofs remain and houses built in cement blocks and zincs are today common. Despite that fact, many mud-houses remain. According to the 1981 Census, 52% of all main houses (of a household, not in a plot) have brick walls and 41% have mud-walls, while 87% have zinc roofs. In most site and service areas corresponding figure is close to 100%, as traditional materials are allowed only for temporary structures while the permanent ones are constructed.

According to the SHHA-evaluation, the median cost of the main house (of owner households) is P858 in Naledi while in new site and service areas it is P794 and in old ones P1500 (table A.2.31). The improvements (to house or plots) desired by the owner vary and seem to be closely linked to what people already have and consider possible to achieve. Despite the fact that the infrastructural services are very much the same in all areas, most people in Naledi wanted only to extend or rebuild their houses. Households in both new and old site and service areas, on the other hand, wanted to improve their toilet (probably to get a flush toilet) and to get access to water and electricity besides a better house and house design. Old Naledi also had the smallest proportion of plotholders who declared they were willing to pay more in return for improved services (table A.2.20).

The above data support observations that housing standards in terms of building materials are lower in Naledi than in planned site and service areas. They also

show that people in Naledi do not expect to be able to make such improvements as private connections to (future) sewerage and electric networks or build a septic tank.


The figures from the Census (concerning building materials of main houses) may indicate an ongoing transition of Naledi where traditional houses, as people can afford, are being replaced by modern ones. While this may be true if a sufficient long period is studied in the future, my own findings in studies of the use of space (both indoor and outdoor space) illustrate a more complex situation. Most households do not pull down their mud-house when new one is built, instead they are allowed to remain in the plot. Though it is the ambition of SHHA to get rid of the mud-houses, SHHA-officers do not force people to demolish such houses and people generally do not bother to do it if requested. I have found that, when household in Naledi and in planned site and service areas having a two-roomed modern house are compared, the ones in Naledi have most likely also a few rooms built in traditional materials. Their total indoor area is consequently higher and they are often less crowded indoors. The additional space is often used for cooking and storage purposes that otherwise would have to find space in a room mainly used for sleeping, or outdoors. The "extra" space may also be used for letting, though rooms in modern houses are more often let to tenants than rooms in traditional houses.

It seems to be a strategy among households in upgrading squatter areas to keep their mud-houses as long as possible and even to build new ones. This is a strategy not only of the poor households that may only afford to build a two-roomed house. It occurs also among more well off ones that have a large multi-roomed house, though not to the same extent. To conclude that the existence of mud-houses in Naledi is only caused by the poverty of the area is thus not the whole truth. An important conclusion is, however, that poor households (having a two-roomed modern house and/or traditional houses) are better off in terms of space in Naledi and other upgraded areas compared to those in planned site and service areas.

The layout from two plots, one from Old Naledi and one from a new site and service area, illustrates the difference in indoor space when mud-houses are allowed and not. Both dwellings house women-headed households with eight members. The description, to some extent, also illustrates their housing and living situation in general. (See boxes on the right.)

If one instead looks at Naledi as a whole and compares it to a planned site and service area, overcrowding become an evident phenomenon.

A dwelling in Old Naledi




The dwelling consists of three houses, A is of modern maerals (built in 1983) and has two rooms, a third room is under construction. When I came back a year after the first interview, no progress of the uncompleted room had occurred. B and C are one-room mud-houses with zinc-roofs (built in 1970). D is a shed of loose concrete-blocks covered with zinc-sheets (raised in 1985). E is a kitchen area, a low enclosure of loose cement-blocks.

The householder, a 60 years old divorced woman, sleeps in one room in A (in a bed) together with four grand-children aged three to nine (on the floor). In the other room of A, a 24 years old daughter sleeps with her small baby (in bed). A 20 years old daughter sleeps in house B, and house C is for visitors. D is used for storage purposes and when cooking on an open fire. When using a paraffin-stove they cook indoors, generally in house A. The enclosure (E) is used when heating large quantities of water for washing or a bath. Since last year a 30 years old son has joined them, he now sleeps in C.

The household's only income derives from selling traditional beer and wine. They do not know the net profit of it. They grow some vegetables in the plot and also have fruit trees.

A dwelling in a planned site and service area



The dwelling consists of only one house, a modern two-roomed house, built in 1981. The householder has spent P1400 on the house, on materials and a builder. She managed to save P700 by herself and her brother, working in the mines in South Africa, gave her another P700. She applied for a building material loan but none was available when she applied in 1981.

There is a small kitchen-area next to one side of the house. The householder, a 41 years old unmarried woman, sleeps in one room (in bed) together with two children (a girl aged 13 and a boy 5) and two small grandchildren, all children on floor. The other room is intended as a kitchen and furnished accordingly, there are no beds but a kitchen-table and a kitchen-cabinet. Despite that, three daughters, 22, 17 and 15 years old, sleep (on the floor) in the room. When I came back to the household about a year after the first interview a son, 19 years old, had joined them and he also sleeps in that room now. When she has visitors, they sleep outdoors.

Most of the time food is cooked indoors on a paraffin-stove in the "kitchen" but an open fire is used when heating large quantities of water. They store some

building materials at the back of the plot but valuable items are stored indoors.

The woman sews clothes at home and goes to villages around Gaborone to sell them. She estimates her earnings to P100-200 / month. She wants to extend her house but cannot manage that no because all her savings go to school-fees for her children in secondary school. She would like to build a mud-house in the plot but is not allowed by SHHA.

Table 4: Households-size, densities and the like for owner and tenant household respectively. (T = tenant household, O = owner household, N = number)

Source: SHHA-evaluation table A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.28, A.2.40 and A.2.41.

	N of people in plot O and T	N of sep house-holds O and T	mean N of rooms O	mean N of people/room O	mean N of rooms T	mean N of people/room T
Naledi	7.93	2.05	2.26	1.96	1.16	2.04
Old S&S	9.87	3.24	3.68	1.08	1.17	1.44
New S&S	6.01	1.69	2.48	1.67	1.32	1.60

Though Naledi does not have the highest density in terms of people per plot the figure is high, especially if one has in mind that plot sizes are smaller in Naledi. Naledi is the most densely populated area in terms of people / room whether tenants or owner households are considered.

A Gentrification process?

The many poor people of Naledi today is an important indication of the lack of an ongoing gentrification process. There exist no data on plot transfers covering a long period, but I have not come across plot transfers, that could be linked to such process, in my interviews. The legal system or plot allocations does not allow for a mobility within a town and people do not seem to try to get around the regulations in this respect. (There exist however other practised ways of getting around the regulations for plot allocations that will be discussed later on).

On the other hand, the 1981 Census does not strongly support the lack of a gentrification process. According to it, 43% of the 2400 households had in 1981 stayed in the area for at least four years. Having in mind that more than 800 of those households are tenants households, that we may assume have lived in Naledi less than for years, we can conclude that 66% of the plots were owned by households who had arrived in Naledi before the upgrading started in 1977.

The figures of the SHHA-evaluation correspond fairly well with the figures of the Census. They tell that 18% on the owner households have lived in Naledi for ten years or more, another 50% between five and ten years, and the remaining 32% five years or less. On the other hand, it also

found that, according to official documents, 90% of the holders of Certificate of rights (to land) in Naledi were the original holders. Certificates of Rights were issued 1978-80 (table A.2.13 and A.2.37).

If changes in „ownership“ haven taken place, they seem to have occurred before or during the period of upgrading but before the issue of Certificate of Rights.

Overcrowding of the area

Both the SHHA-evaluation and the 1981 Census show that the density of Naledi is very high in relation to most other housing areas in Gaborone. The high density, already when the upgrading of social and infrastructural services was complete, is now increasing further. The present high growth rate of Gaborone including a natural birth rate of 3,5%, firm control of new squatter settlements and an insufficient supply of new site and service plots today have created a severe housing shortage. The number of people and households per plot increases in all part of Gaborone due to tenant households and young people staying with parents or relatives, instead of creating a household of their own.

The SHHA-evaluation estimated the population to be close to 13000 and the density 28 households per hectar in 1983. Today the population may be over 15000.

In an area like Naledi the consequences of such increase may be serious. A population of 10000 was in the upgrading proposal considered the maximum population of Naledi. It was perhaps too high to be desirable, but a realistic figure for which schools, water pipes and the like were dimensioned.

The increase of tenants is an important factor in the increase of density. To have tenants in the plot can be regarded from different angles. From the tenant's point of view it is generally regarded as a temporary solution, that has to be accepted, as there are no other possibilities today to get a dwelling of one's own. It is expensive (a room in a modern house costs today P40-50) and it is humiliating as little privacy is possible and there may be restrictions on calls to the tenants.

From the plot holder's point of view it is a way of getting an important supplement to other incomes, sometimes it is the only or main income. Landlords can be divided into two rough groups: those who need the rent received to survive in town (the money is primarily used for food, firewood etc) and those who can set aside the rent for further housing improvements. In Naledi the first group seems to be most common.

Absent landlords are, however, not common in Gaborone. According to the SHHA-evaluation the proportion of plots, that had no member of the household usually staying in the plot, was in Naledi 14%, in old site and service areas 16% and in new ones 5%.

From the Government's point of view, tenant rooms are often regarded positively. They help the plot holder to pay his service levy and repayment of building material loans, as well as to improve his housing standard. They also contribute to the housing stock of town, thereby preventing to some extent new squatter areas to develop.

But if the increase of the population is too large the number of pit-latrines, the dimension of the water reticulation-system etc will not be sufficient to cater to such a big population and it may be exposed to health hazards. I am afraid that may occur in Naledi considering the poverty of the people and the fairly small plot-sizes.

My interview with the nurse in charge of the clinic in Naledi, underlines such worries. The most frequent diseases in the area, for which people came to the clinic for help, were generally related to a low



Before upgrading started most houses were built of mud and thatch, or scrap materials. Water had to be collected far away.



Among the achievements of the upgrading project were the provision of water standpipes, roads, regular garbage collection, and street lighting. (Photos: A. Larsson)

standard of living and to some extent to overcrowding. They were in order: tuberculosis, malnutrition, diseases transmitted by sexual contacts, respiratory diseases and assaults in connection with alcohol consumption. The situation in Naledi was also worse than in planned site and service areas, according to the nurse.

Explanation to the poverty of Naledi

Despite the improvement of infrastructural and social services in Naledi and the support of housing improvements, the population of Naledi is hit more hard by poverty than that of planned site and service areas. What are the reasons behind the comparatively poor population of Naledi?

An important part of an explanation is that migrants to town, lacking a regular income to pay for housing could up to 1975 get a plot and house of their own in Naledi, whereby they became householders. There were then also less possibilities to stay with friends and relatives due to the still small population of Gaborone. Today migrants to town do not have the possibility to settle down in a squatter area and only if they have regular income can they afford to rent a room. Instead many have to be accommodated with relatives or friends. The poor migrants of today are thus included in the households of those who are well enough established in town to have house in a site and service plot. The many large household in my interviews, including no only husband, wife and children but also relatives, confirm this situation.

That is however not an explanation to why additional members of households in planned site and service areas more often are employed and especially in the formal sector (Table 1). This finding on the SHHA-evaluation underlines a phenomenon called fronting and observed by many: people who are not entitled to get a plot in a site and service area, because they are not in the low income bracket, manage to get one by allowing a relative or friend with a low regular income, to apply for the plot. The house, often of high standard, is then built by the plot-holder's relative and inhabited by both. The above situation explains, to some extent anyhow, why the average household income is higher in planned site and service areas than in Naledi (Table 2).

The figures in Table 2 can also be regarded as an indication that more successful people moved away from Naledi when upgrading started, and only the less successful remained. By the strategy of fronting they managed to get a plot in a planned site and service area, at a time when a large number of such plots were developed. If this is true, it may explain why, according to the Census, about one third of the plots, got a new "owner" in connection with the upgrading process (1977-1981).



Many plottolders have improved their houses after receiving security of land tenure. Nevertheless mud houses are still very common. (Photo: A. Larsson)

Summing up

Through the upgrading project, the living conditions of the people in Naledi improved considerably. The upgrading project failed, however, to develop the area in such a way that it in a wide sense achieved the characteristics of a planned site and service area. Instead Naledi has become the area for the poorest section of the Gaborone population. Such a finding supports that those that benefitted from the upgrading project were the poorest and that there is no ongoing process of gentrification in the area. It indicates, however, also a process of segregation of low cost areas in general, into areas for the poor and areas for those having a decent income, sometimes close to a medium one.

The different development of Naledi can only be understood in relation to the development of Gaborone. Naledi developed during a period when few alternatives for the poor migrants to Gaborone existed and when there was no squatter control. The people represent the first generation of migrants of which the main part settled down in Old Naledi. Today the poor downward migrants are mingled with the better off population of planned site and service areas, often as household members, and do not stand up as clearly as the early migrants to Naledi.

The problem of squatting seems now to have been substituted by another one: housing shortage and overcrowding. The housing shortage of Gaborone, more serious today than only a few years ago, hits all income groups. Tenants and extended families have however a bigger impact on Naledi than on most other areas due to the comparatively small plots, the high density of the area and the poverty of the people. The consequences of overcrowding may be serious in the future. It may be necessary to upgrade the area again but with a different approach, or it will become the slum area of the city.

Restrictions on selling and buying houses are limited and the ones that exist are

poorly enforced. One may therefore expect an increasing market of selling and buying houses. That does, however, not seem to be the case. People generally want to keep the plot they have once been allocated. It provides security for the whole household in the long run, especially for the children that can take it over. In the short run it provides an opportunity to let rooms, an important way to earn cash today, not only for the poor but also for the better off population in Gaborone. And it is in this way that the housing market develops quickly and without few restrictions. Despite the fact, that it is not allowed to let several rooms without the consent of Town Council, plot holders in site and service areas do so. No rent control exists that limits the rent level or allows Town Council to collect a higher service levy from those that contribute to a higher utilization of services. Rent control has been considered but was rejected (Botswana Government, 1981,48). The present situation benefits both better off plottolders (among them some belonging to the bureaucratic elite) and the poor ones. The tenants, those queuing for a site and service plot and in the long run probably also the Government are the losers.

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Tamale Integrated Improvement Programme for the Urban Poor

Ghana like many developing nations is experiencing rapid urbanization. In 1948 about 12.8 percent of the total population of about 4.1 million lived in urban areas and rose to 23.0 percent in 1960. By 1970 the urban population increased from 28.6 percent of total national population of about 8.6 million to 31.3 percent of the total population of about 12.2 million. (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984).

A high average population growth rate of 2.6 percent per annum in 1984, with little or no economic growth, the rapid urbanization, the tendency of people to concentrate in a few large urban centres, urban unemployment and the escalating costs of construction materials results in an increase in the slum and squatter population in these centres.

Tamale is one such large urban centre, the third ranked in the country. It is the capital

and a fast growing commercial and intermediate-sized town in the agricultural Northern Region of Ghana. (Fig. 1) It is also the only service centre for Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions of Ghana.

Tamale has experienced a phenomenal population growth. Between 1960 and 1970 the population had grown from about 40,000 to 84,000 approximately. The most recent population census of 1984 gave the total population as 136,828.

The rapid population growth has led to unemployment, physical expansion of the centre and slum development - overcrowded and insanitary conditions, lack of services and uncontrolled development. Attempts by the urban poor to provide housing for themselves without the District Council's ability to provide infrastructure such as roads, water and sanitary facilities has led to haphazardly developed communities without basic services. The lack of resources to cope with the problem raised a concern among urban policy-makers at a time when there was considerable pressure for a reorganized local administration system that gave responsibility for district as well as urban development to District Councils in the country.

The District Council is the basic unit of Government and there are 65 of them in Ghana. The local Government set up gives the responsibility for the administration and development of their areas of authority and for the provision and maintenance of public services to the District Councils.

The Councils are expected to raise revenue by levying individuals and businesses various rates and fees within their areas of jurisdiction to provide the required basic services - access roads, drains, water, public toilets, refuse disposal and control of development.

In Tamale the capital of the Western Dagomba District, these services are woefully inadequate in almost all the privately developed neighbourhoods which form about 80 percent to the total housing development in the town.

The inadequacy of services persists because the District Council is unable to mobilize resources for them. The reason for that is poor financial management coupled with the lack of coordination in the development activities of the various development agencies operating in the district. It is estimated that about 40 percent of District Council's revenue in Ghana is lost due to inefficiency of revenue collection and a general inaccuracy of revenue estimates. (Tamale Land Use Program Project, 1981) The inability of the Western Dagomba District Council (WDDC) to provide the services has resulted in a 'chicken and egg' problem in that the Council is not able to raise enough revenue to provide the services and the inhabitants are unwilling to pay for services they do not get. The absence of these basic services coupled with haphazard and uncontrolled development therefore resulted in a wide scale slum and squatter development in the rapidly growing intermediate-sized town of Tamale.

The concern for this state of affairs at the local level coincided with a similar concern at an international level. For several years USAID's office of Urban Development, now the Housing Office had been concerned with the potential, as well as the problems of intermediate-sized cities in the developing world. While the process of urban growth has resisted control in many metropolitan areas, smaller urban centres with economic development potential appeared to the Housing Office as real beneficiaries of a process which combined land use control with measures to provide infrastructure, industrial expansion, housing, and other urban facilities. Moreover, it appeared that USAID could play a role in helping to get such a process established. In 1974 a study of intermediate-sized cities was commissioned an Rivkin Associates in their book "Land Use Programming and the Intermediate-Sized city in Developing Countries" recommended that international assistance agencies establish pilot projects in a number of centres with a common set of objectives which could be modified by the individual projects in relation to local situations but still



Fig.1: Map of Ghana

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directed towards getting such a process established. USAID then undertook to sponsor three pilot land use programming projects in Leon, Nicaragua, Chomburi, Thailand and Tamale, Ghana. (Rivkin Associate Inc., 1981)

When the Land Use Project started in Tamale in 1979 the principal need was to assist the District Council at the centre of development to integrate co-ordinated urban planning into its operations and those of the other development agencies in the districts, particularly those whose developmental activities have a bearing on planning and provision of infrastructure.

The Land Use Project was followed two years later by the Tamale Integrated Improvement Programme for the Urban Poor Project (TIIPUP).

The fundamental goal of any TIIPUP project activity is to improve the quality of life for the low income and disadvantaged households which constitute a majority of the population in most urban areas of developing countries.

In Tamale it aimed at developing a capacity for extending integrated services and improvements into low income and unserved neighbourhoods, making maximum use of local resources and it is intended that the approaches developed in Tamale will be a model for the other districts of Ghana.

This paper briefly describes the activities designed under the TIIPUP to build the capacity of the District Council to enable it fulfil its developmental role of providing and maintaining basic services and link those activities to a follow-up demonstration upgrading project. Finally it offers some conclusions and lessons learned so far that could be useful in the design and implementation of similar projects in similar situations.

PROJECT ACTIVITIES

Having identified the inability to mobilize resources, poor management and the lack of co-ordination as the major constraints to planning and implementation in the district, the project team set about in the first phase to develop first, the financial and managerial capacity of the District Council and second, to improve co-ordination between the District Council on the one hand and all the other development agencies on the other, and among all the agencies themselves that should be acting in concert with each other.

After two years of capacity building and improving co-ordination it was time to put into practice all that had taken place in the first phase. The second phase then consisted mainly of the actual neighbourhood upgrading project in which all the parties involved were brought together for a physical implementation of public infrastructure.

The TIIPUP project which consists of the implementation phase activities also included other small demonstration projects. These are: continuation of the revenue improvement activity² a sanitation project which is being done concurrently and as a component of the infrastructural project and³ a rabbit project at the end of it all as an income generating activity in the demonstration communities.

The succeeding paragraphs in this section give brief descriptions of the activities.

1. Financial Capacity Building

While the project work plan included the design of funding packages for development projects the team also worked with the Council to improve its own local resource base. It is implicit that to be able to replicate the demonstration activity WDDC had to mobilize its own under-utilized resources rather than depend on external sources.

The first step in this financial capacity building was a study by the project team. "An appraisal: The WDDC Revenue Improvement Project", which recommended activities that the project could undertake to improve the Council's revenue performance. One such was an experiment in revenue collection. For the first time students were employed to collect revenue on commission basis. The Council wanted to demonstrate a more efficient collection system than that used by permanently employed revenue collectors. Even after expenses and commissions were paid to the students revenue collected had exceeded the annual basic rate estimate by about 25 per cent. (Siita, 1984)

Another activity which has a longer term effect on building financial capacity was the updating of nominal rolls which were grossly out of date. The nominal roll is the registry of rateable adults and there appeared to be more adults living in a household than indicated on the outdated nominal roll. Students were again employed to do a house to house census of rateable adults.

Updated nominal rolls have two positive aspects, first, the Council now has a basis for fixing basic rate targets and second the nominal rolls are expected to facilitate the collection of more revenue.

2. Managerial Capacity Building

The goal of creating a frame-work for co-ordinated planning in order to use scarce resources more efficiently and increase the implementability of district development plans required a two step training programme. The target groups of the training programme were the WDDC Councillors and District Heads of Departments. The training programme was intended to overcome two basic problems.

(i) Although there had been a tradition of locally elected Councils, Councillors

never had the broad responsibilities outlined in the new District Council structure and therefore had little experience in co-ordinating development plans with several agencies; and

(ii) similarly the development agencies which have now become part of the District Council structure and are responsible for project implementation were accustomed to reliance on their ministries for project identification and budget matters. Few district level officers were associated to the dynamism required for local control of programmes and to co-ordinating programme phases with other agencies.

To overcome these problems a series of workshops were organized for the target groups of the training activity and these provided a forum in which planning, programming and implementation were discussed. District Officers presented their plans, programmes and budgets and implementation schedules. The discussions stimulated an understanding of the goals, responsibilities and functions as well as priorities, problems and resource constraints of each development agency. Gradually District officers began to learn that what they do in their separate agencies affect the work of other agencies and there was therefore the need to work in concert.

A second major training exercise for District Councillors and officers involved the presentation of an action budgeting system. The action budget process involved the setting of priorities, the identification of resources required to implement the priorities and phased implementation. This aspect of the training included the basics of management. The idea was to get them to understand the action budget as a management tool, by which scarce resources could be efficiently used, as a political tool, through which they could get nearer their goal by achieving locally defined objectives, and as a co-ordinating mechanism.

3. Formation of the Technical Co-ordinating Committee

The best indication of the success of the training workshops in creating support for a co-ordinated planning system is the extent to which the participants sought to operationalize the themes of the workshops. Following the Workshops the participating agencies voiced the need to create a more permanent structure to provide a forum for dialogue among district agencies and a mechanism for co-ordinating project activities. At their suggestion a Technical co-ordinating Committee (TCC) was formed. The TCC is composed of key District Officers and members of parastatal organizations who have the responsibility for services in support of development. They include the District Council, Town and Country Planning Department, Departments of

Social Welfare and Community Development, Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, Ghana Highway Authority, Electricity Corporation of Ghana, representatives of target communities, TIIPUP Project, Ministries of Health, Finance & Economic Planning and Ghana Education Service.

The first task of the committee was the implementation of the upgrading project.

While the establishment of the TCC reflects the districts' commitment to translating co-ordinated planning into co-ordinated implementation the committee also serves as a model for other districts in Ghana.

4. The Upgrading Project

At the start of the Land Use Project the District Council and planning officials realized that the planning oriented goals of the Land Use Project could be achieved best if its activities were focussed on the preparation of a specific programme and followed by a visible demonstration of the implementation of planned activities. In this way, the mechanism for co-ordination and participation could be put to practical use. The model planning studies would focus on a real project, and the benefit of proper development planning would be demonstrated to all who participated in the process: planners, service providers, decision-makers and the general population. The financial position of WDDC, however, would not permit it to undertake this type of activity without outside assistance. Consequently a request was made to USAID for additional funding. This was granted in the form of heavy construction equipment and materials for a demonstration development project. (Research Triangle Institute, 1982) This differentiated the Tamale Project from the other USAID funded effort in Leon, Nicaragua and Chomburi, Thailand which focussed more on traditional land use planning.

(I) Selection of Demonstration Sites:

The first step in the physical demonstration activity was the selection of potential demonstration sites. The project team together with District Councillors and planning officials identified three areas after evaluating some criteria based on project goals. These were presented at a regular Council meeting and two sites: Ward 'M' residential area extension and Gumah residential area were chosen as suitable. At this stage it appeared appropriate to involve only the Councillors who were representatives of all the wards of the district, anyway.

(II) Characteristics of the Sites: Ward M Extension

It is a low income community of about 2,000 residents in about 195 haphazardly developed residential structures (Fig. 2) at various stages of completion that violated



Fig.2: Ward „M“ Residential Area Ext. The Unplanned Development

all planning and land title regulations. Construction of houses took place even though the area had not been planned as required by the Town and Country Planning Ordinance and therefore had neither development nor building permits. Most of the houses had no toilet facilities, no access roads and a poor drainage system retains water during rains thus creating movement problems.

Some of the houses in the Ward, however had water and electricity, the connection of which were similarly haphazardly done. With the utility lines crisscrossing to the extent that hardly does any construction get done in Ward 'M' Extension without some pipe lines being broken. This typifies the lack of co-ordination that was common place in the development activities of the agencies.

The planning authority then had to superimpose a plan on the existing development after a household survey had been designed and carried out in order to develop a better understanding of the characteristics and needs of the population. To be able to provide access roads and other services quite a large number of landlords would have had to lose their houses through demolition. This resulted in extensive discussions with the Ward development committee and some other residents of the ward. In the end they agreed to a certain level of demolitions of the existing structures to give way to access roads and a general improvement to other infrastructural services. A final scheme to accommodate a total of about 2500 based on these discussions received the Ministerial approval (Fig. 3). Following this the plots were demarcated in preparation for registration of the acquisition by the lands Commission.

Gumah Residential Area

On the other hand Gumah residential area was largely undeveloped except for 22 houses which were inhabited by about 200 people. The site had already been designed and the plots demarcated to accommodate about 2400 inhabitants. (Fig. 4) The area had already been designated a resettlement area for families that would be dislodged by various




Fig.3: Ward „M“ Residential Area Ext. Proposed Development

proposed public development projects in Tamale. The plots had also already been allocated by the Lands Commission.

(III) The Physical Construction

The physical implementation consists of constructing a total of about 6 miles of gravelled access roads, concrete drainage channels, and 20 culverts as part of the drainage system.

The water scheme consists of laying a 4 inch PVC main pipeline along the roads as shown in Fig. 5 and 6 to facilitate connection of pipe borne water into each house in the two areas. While the desired policy is to encourage tapping of water into the houses the project is providing a few public stand pipes in each Ward to serve those families who cannot afford the connection into their houses.

Similarly the WDDC building regulations for the Tamale urban area require that a private toilet be installed in each house but the majority of houses do not usually have them. The project is therefore providing one demonstration public toilet alongside a refuse dumping area in each of the two areas.

(IV) Roles and Responsibilities:

The USAID funding package for the construction included five pieces of reconditioned heavy equipment consisting of a bull-dozer, motor grader, ditching machine, dump truck and a cargo truck. It also included clinker and PVC compound. The clinker and PVC compound were processed into cement and PVC water pipes respectively in Ghana by the Central Government.

The WDDX in which the project is based is responsible for providing the other construction materials such as timber and nails. The WDDC is also responsible for the running and maintenance of the heavy construction equipment.

Even though a few paid labourers are attached to the project by the WDDC for the construction activity the major part of the labour is expected to be provided, voluntarily by the community residents,




Fig.4: Gumah Residential Area



Fig.5: Ward „M“ Residential Area Extension Basic Infrastructure




Fig.6: Gumah Residential Area Basic Infrastructure

being the direct beneficiaries of the project. The objective of the target group participation is three-fold:

1. to reduce cost of providing the infrastructure;
2. to develop a spirit of self-help in them as neither the WDDC nor even the Central Government could afford to provide all their service needs all the times; and
3. to develop skills in them through their working under the supervision of the skilled TCC members.

(V) Stages of Completion

The implementation phase was supposed to have started officially in August 1981 but owing to some delays among which were ordering and delivery of the equipment and materials the actual construction could not start until June 1983 even though the project assistance completion date was in July 1983. There are internal factors too that have contributed on the project being behind schedule. The most important is frequent breakdowns of the secondhand equipment. Nevertheless some work has gone on in the two demonstration areas and the succeeding section indicates major items in relation to the construction and their stages of completion by today.

Item	Stage of Completion
1. Road construction	: 5 miles constructed
2. Drain construction	: 5 miles constructed but not concreted.
3. Graveling of roads	: 1.2 miles covered
4. Culvert construction	: 10 completed out of 20
5. Pipe laying	: 2700' out of the expected 22000' approx.
6. Public Standpipe	: 1 installed.
7. Public Toilet	: 1 out of the 2 under construction.

(VI) Cost Recovery

The Tamale Development project is an experimental project that is designed to institute a system by which the District Councils in the Country and similar institutions elsewhere could improve the living conditions of their urban poor.

Lack of funds has been the major obstacle to the implementation of development projects in this district and most likely in others. To be able to replicate the TIIPUP activities what funds have been put into them should be recovered. The project therefore is expected to develop a system of cost recovery.

While the whole process for implementation is still being developed some elements that could be put together for a cost recovery system are emerging. These contribute directly or indirectly to a reduction in cost and cost recovery. They are:

1. voluntary labor from target groups reduces total cost of project;
2. development fees are payable after the legal acquisition of plots and are meant to offset the infrastructural development costs;
3. building permit fees which are payable after grant of building permits are also meant for the provision and maintenance of services; and
4. water rates as user charges that eventually offset development costs and continue to maintain the service.

5. Economic activity

The TIIPUP demonstration activities also included the design of a small scale economic activity which was to be introduced and encouraged in the demonstration areas, to increase incomes and help maintain the services to be introduced.

Rabbit rearing was identified to increase incomes and productivity through improved methods in Cheshire, a village in the WDDX area, the inhabitants of which were already familiar with rabbit breeding. The

idea was to expand the activity in that village and thereby use it as a resource base from where it could be extended to the demonstration areas.

The resource base aspect of the rabbit project has just been completed and plans are being made for the extension.

Lessons learned

Implementation of the Tamale Integrated Improvement Programme for the Urban Poor Project is not yet completed. However some activities have taken place in all its components and done far enough so as to offer some possible conclusions in the areas of preparation, target group involvement, resource identification, co-ordination of activities, site design and construction, that could be useful in the design and implementation of similar projects.

The succeeding paragraphs give a detail account of the conclusion and lessons.

1. Build a self-sustaining financial and managerial capacity of the institutions involved in an up-grading project. This is necessary if scarce local resources should be mobilized instead of dependence on foreign sources for continued funding of a project. In June 1983 USAID unilaterally and suddenly cut off its sponsorship of the Tamale Project with about a third of the total grant meant for very essential inputs at that time, not disbursed. The project team however managed to mobilize other resources at the local level to enable the project to continue. The project has since operated mainly from funds generated at the local level.

The series of workshops helped the Councillors and district heads of departments to develop an insight into what was expected of them in relation to the project as a whole. It also increased their commitment to the project.

2. The combination of community project leaders with technical officers and political leaders as the technical Co-ordinating Committee (TCC) appears to be an effective institution for implementation.

3. More members of the target group should be involved in the decision-making at the planning stage of the project than just their political representatives.

In the 1980 household survey designed and conducted by the project team it came to light that about 4 per cent of the respondents in Ward 'M' Extension said they did not know their Councillors and only 57 per cent knew his name. That was not surprising for 87 per cent of the respondents said that throughout the year he never did meet with the residents of the Ward. (Siita / McCullough, 1982) It is even worse in Gumah, the other demonstration area where 78 per cent did not know their Councillors and only 22 per cent of the respondents could correctly state his name. Here too, about 91 per cent of them said he never did meet them during the year.

It is obvious then that the Councillors of the two target groups were not their true representatives. They had no contact with the target population and as it turned out the Ward 'M' Extension Councillor was not in a position to let the project team know of a deep and long standing local chieftaincy dispute involving two rival groups in the Ward which surfaced later and is disrupting the construction of the public toilet where they are expected to provide voluntary labour. This probably would have shown if the initial decision-taking involved not just the Councillor but also more members among the target group who were well versed with local traditional matters that could affect development of the Ward.

4. A variety of local resources can be mobilized for development.

Early on, the project team identified an apparent lack of resources as a constraint to development projects in the Western

Dagomba District. At the same time it was recognized that a thorough examination would identify currently under-utilized local resources. These were in the areas of the Council's own revenue categories and finally the identification of self-help activities demonstrated how scarce development funds could be stretched by beneficiary participation.

5. Scarce resources can be more efficiently used in co-ordinated activities. Key development agencies such as the Highway Authority, Water and Sewerage Corporation, Survey Department, Department of Town and Country Planning, WDDC and the Project team have teamed up in the TCC to provide services in the two demonstration more than ever before in any low income neighbourhood in the district, two neighbourhoods almost complete with basic services in a relatively short time.

In the traditional vertically bureaucratic system of Ghana these agencies would have acted separately and by that all the different services could not have been provided at the same time since the agencies would not have looked at those wards with the same level of priority in relation to their different services.

The co-ordinated action under the TCC is also likely to increase the awareness that co-ordination is important in avoiding duplication of efforts.

6. Where self-help is a major component in an upgrading project the target group should be very well educated in it.


Out of over a thousand residents of Ward 'M' Extension only the same few residents turned up for work regularly during the construction. It became obvious that the

residents had not been very well educated about the self-help approach to the project and the full extent of the role they were expected to play. Many regarded themselves as helping the few paid WDDC labourers to carry out a 'Government Project' rather than the latter helping the 'M' Extension residents to improve their own community. This attitude among others resulted in conflicts and had an adverse effect on the performance of the WDDC workers who thought that the residents ought to respond more to their own improvement programme.

7. Where demolition of some houses to make room for services is involved, some of the affected house owners seem to agree to it initially, but resist later when the demolitions become a reality.

At the site design stage community residents in Ward 'M' Extension were said to have agreed to a certain level of demolition to give way to access roads and other services. Opposition to the demolitions began when the constructions became a reality. Previous planning schemes were never followed by implementation so where displacements of houses were indicated in the plans they were never carried out as it was going to happen in this case. As it was, when the affected house owners agreed to the demolitions they did it with the mind that the project would not be implemented as all the others, their houses would remain while they held on to the replacement plots allocated for rebuilding their houses.

Consequently conflicts arose between the residents and officials and even among officials who differed in the matter. A series of meetings resolved the issue by reducing the displacements to a minimum by avoiding it altogether unless it was impossible to do so in some sections.



Typical House in Gumah



Infrastructure works



Whenever possible, proposed roads that would have adversely affected some houses were shifted to save the houses but then those sections were denied certain services.

8. Do not schedule construction to coincide with periods for farming, religious and local festivals.

One of the reasons for the delays experienced during the construction is that serious consideration had not been given to the effect of the periods for farming, religious and local festivals on the schedule of work. The schedule had to be revised because it was becoming difficult to get things done at the right time. At a time when there was the greatest need to get an excavation done for the construction of a culvert in Ward 'M' Extension before the peak of the rainy season it was also the month of fasting and community residents who were mostly 86.5 per cent Moslem had to observe it and were therefore not in any physical condition to do any exacting manual labour. It was also the farming season and residents would rather go to their farms than come out to participate in the construction. Voluntary labour is much more likely to be provided on a regular basis after farming and after the harvesting of crops.

9. The involvement of the target groups and the recognition of their service preferences can increase the commitment to project implementation.

Citizen involvement in the planning process through household surveys is not new. What is new is their participation from this initial step through all the processes to actual implementation where their service preferences were also recognized.

As products of the process were also realistic there was an increase in the commitment of the target groups as well as the development agencies involved in the project implementation.

10. The provision of basic infrastructure is a key technique for guiding urban growth. Since the construction of access roads and the provision of water begun in Gumah there has been an increase in housing construction and it is encouraging to note that so far all of them have been orderly and according to the plan. It is even more encouraging to note that the community residents are gradually becoming aware and accept development control as some have on occasions drawn the attention of the project team to attempted out of place developments. This new attitude could be attributed to the installation of basic infrastructure more than anything else as the roads particularly, have clearly defined the structure of the area and the location of individual units so easily identifiable by all.

CONCLUSION

The preceding sections of this paper have high-lighted the attempts made by the Tamale Demonstration Project to build the capacity of the WDDC to fulfil its responsibility of developing and controlling the development of the district.

The training of Councillors and district heads of departments should enhance the ability of the WDDX to mobilize resources, stimulate self-help, plan and assess the development needs of the district. The TCC should also be able to promote the planning and co-ordination necessary to implement projects.

Public Meeting in Gumah Neighbourhood

It has been the experience of the Tamale Project that implementation of the public infrastructural services of urban planning projects is very necessary if uncontrolled and slum development should be minimized. Planning must therefore be followed by implementation. The inability to do that has been the cause of the undesirable situation in Tamale and Ghana generally, in which planning struggles to catch-up with development. (Figs 2 and 3)

To fulfil a major objective of the project it is expected that the lessons and model being developed in Tamale will be extended to the other districts in Ghana and could form the basis for formulating an effective national housing policy.

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Per Rathsman*

The "Pacim" Project Mindelo, Cape Verde Islands

BACKGROUND

"Caminho" and "Ilha de Madeira" are two densely populated tin-house townships. They are the only ones of the kind in Cape Verde. They lie in Mindelo, a town of about 45,000 inhabitants. The town's origin is from its harbour activities. The island where it is situated has very poor agricultural conditions. The town attracts many people from neighbouring islands, who have a more rural structure, and only smaller urban centers.


"Caminho" and "Ilha de Madeira" have a total population of about 2,000 people, less than five percent of town. They have developed as small "islands" of poverty in an urban network that elsewhere shows a more even distribution of wealth over the different neighbourhoods. The two tin-house areas have absorbed the poorest families, many of which are immigrants from the "rural islands".

The illegal and unregulated occupation of land and the development of a precarious tin-house environment, seems to have been tolerated by the authorities. The dense land-use indicates that people clustered together in order to obtain some kind of security. In this way it would be more difficult for the authorities and land-owners to get at them. Initially, in colonial

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times (before 1975), a lack of interest probably kept authorities from intervening. In fact there might even have been a certain desire that these people remain there, always available for occasional employment in the harbour and in other activities with periodic need for unskilled labour. As the settlement grew, and its problems too, it became evident that there were no easy solutions. Several plans have been tried since independence in 1975, including resettlement in new houses financed and built by the government. Lack of resources and appropriate planning, though, have made impossible any improvements to the living conditions.

The density of the "Ilha de Madeira" area is very high, about 800 people per hectare. Caminho is better off with about 450 inhabitants per hectare. Neither area has any infra-structure such as water piping, electricity, sewage systems or paved streets. Water has to be brought in from some distance. The public fountains in nearby neighbourhoods function very poorly. Often one must wait for hours for distribution to even begin. There are no toilets or latrines in the houses. People use pots and empty them wherever possible - and possibilities increase after dark... There is no illumination outside the houses. At home people use kerosin lamps and candles. The dirtroads that



Section of residential street. In order to create a semi-public space car traffic is restricted.

separate the rows of houses are very unhealthy. You will find not only human excrements but also that of dogs, pigs, ducks and chickens. Animals and children spend their days there. Women do their work there. Older people sit and chat or play "Oril".

THE INTERVENTION PLANS

In May 1985 ARO signed an agreement with the Cape Verdean authorities to provide technical and material support for upgrading the two townships. ARO is a Swedish NGO organization with a long tradition of cooperation in Cape Verde, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as well as in the ANC and SWAPO camps in Tanzania and Namibia. In September 1985 the first ARO professionals arrived in Mindelo, an architect and a social worker. Later two more joined the team, a civil engineer and a carpentry teacher. ARO is financing the first part of the project, estimated to be about US \$ 150,000. This was made possible through funds granted by SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority), which furnishes eighty percent of the amount. ARO will have to raise the other 20% through campaigns among its members in Sweden. The ARO professionals work on two-year contract basis. Their presence will be continued over a project period of at least three years. Their salaries are furnished by ARO

Box 1 SUMMARY OF POPULATION AND DWELLING: CITY OF MINDELO AS COMPARED TO THE PACIM TOWNSHIPS.				
	Nº of Persons (1)	Persons per house- hold	Nº of households	Precarious houses (households)
City of Mindelo	45.077	5,65	7.973	791
Caminho	760	4,8	159	145
Ilha de Madeira	1.470	4,5	328	326

(1) Source: Cidade do Mindelo - Contagem da População Residente, 2 de Junho de 1985; Caminho and Ilha de Madeira - Inquérito Sócio-Económico do PACIM, Janeiro 1985.



Ilha de Madeira, general view with the "township" in the foreground.

outside the budget granted for the first project phase.


The project comprises three phases. The first one is the "set-up" phase. Here the plans are drawn up. An organizational network is being established with local organizations, authorities and township committees. Methods, techniques and model house designs are being tried on a small scale. Population data has been collected, using a two page questionnaire. All houses are visited and plotted on maps. This activity has a double function. Beside the collection of information, community residents are becoming involved with the project. Information is disseminated and details are discussed.



Ilha de Madeira, general view with the "township in the foreground.

Background information, project plans and budgets are presented in a general project description and a financing dossier. The Financing Dossier is divided into three volumes: The first one is called **Environmental Upgrading**. The second one presents the **Self-help Housing Programme**, and the third one deals with **Socio-economic Promotion**.

During the second phase complementary financing is being sought from international sources. Environmental upgrading activities are initiated in the townships. A day-care center is built in Ilha de Madeira, as well as apartment for the elderly in Campinho. The first public fountain is in operation. Three others are planned. The proposals for town plans developed under the first phase are presented to the township's committees for analysis by the community. Implementation of plans has begun. A number of families will be encouraged to resettle on new lands in an expansion areas in a nearby neighbourhood. It is necessary to reduce the number of residents in the existing townships, especially in Ilha de Madeira. Some families will be offered the opportunity to participate in a pilot project




Campinho, existing situation (1984)

of assisted self-help construction of houses.

The third phase comprises implementation of full scale project plans. A self-help housing programme involving about 400 families (85% of the households) is launched. It will span over three years. Water and electricity systems are executed. A sanitation system based on private latrines is introduced. Social facilities such as daycare centers and house for the elderly and disabled are built and will be administered by local authorities. Small-scale production enterprises within the areas is encouraged through material and organizational support. Production of construction components such as concrete blocks and pre-fabricated beams is one example. Carpentry and textile industry are other possible fields.



Ilha de Madeira, existing situation (1984)



Campinho, proposed plan

(NOTE ON) PLANNING TRADITION

The townplanning concept and the organizational model used can be traced back to the "neighbourhood planning" of the 1950's. Townships should not be merely residential areas or dormitory suburbs. They should have an inner life, an articulated range of functions such as commerce, social activities, production and recreation of which some could be administered by community organizations.

The basic ideas likely originated from the 19th century "utopists" during the childhood of industrialism, when unhealthy urban centers sprawled in England. Then they were developed by enthusiastic planners gathering in the young union of Soviet republics during the 1920's and 1930's.



Ilha de Madeira, proposed plan

The model has been revived in several "young" countries, such as Nicaragua, Cuba and Mozambique. The "Maxaquene project (Maputo, Mozambique 1978-80) is a one example. Those experiences were later used at the "National Directorate of Housing (DNH) in the training of "bare-foot planners". A manual showing good solutions of how to re-structure and articulate the inner network of a "communal township" was used as a "school-book" The participants had practical exercises where they were confronted with community representatives with typical problems.

In 1980 the Mozambican government organized a national seminar on "Cities and Communal Townships". The final resolution is an interesting document, presenting a set of guidelines on how to organize a city at a macro- and microscale. At the township level there is a distribution of responsibilities between the municipality and the residents of each township, represented by their people's elected township committee ("Grupos Dinamizadores" and "Comissoes de Moradores").

PLANNING AND PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION

The planning Team, composed of four "ARO" professionals, a Cape Verdean supervisor and a Cape Verdean architect, coordinates the project's activities. During the process plans can be prepared and changed. The general guidelines are established under the first phase, but much flexibility remains for decisions are more advanced stages of implementation.

A "Support Nucleus" composed of representatives from relevant authorities and organizations was created at the beginning over the first phase. It includes people from the national political party, the women's and youth organizations, the neighbourhood committees, the municipality and the local social service authority. At meetings with this nucleus, preliminary project plans have been presented and discussed. There have been meetings in the townships where intended plan and actions have been transmitted to the residents. Each group represented in the Support Nucleus has presented its own activity programme to be launched in the townships, in order to support the project and offer people ways to participate.

The "Neighbourhood Committees" is an existing structure, in which each committee represents an urban sector of several "townships". The project will need a finer network of contact between planners and people. "Township Committees" are being created through direct elections in the areas. Each block of 50-60 families will be represented by a man and a woman. The planners' ideas will be discussed with the committees. Information will be forwarded to residents and

LAND USE IN THE TIN-HOUSE TOWNSHIPS (EXISTING SIT.)							
	Area, hectares	Nº of houses (households)	Nº of precarious houses (households)	Inhabitants, total	Inhabitants/hectare	Owned houses (households)	Rented houses (households)
Campinho	1.5	159	145	760	480	104	55
Ilha d'Madeira	1.8	328	326	1470	800	240	88
Curral de Boi	0.1	20	20	88		18	2

LAND USE, SUMMARY OF AREAS OF DETAILED URBAN PLANS				
	Campinho (1) (existing township)	Campinho (2) "West" expansion area	Ilha de Madeira	Chã de Ti'Liza (3)
Dwelling	9000 m ²	2550 m ²	13000 m ²	5600 m ²
Community Buildings	300 m ²	150 m ²	600 m ²	550 m ²
Streets and Free areas	5200 m ²	1300 m ²	4500 m ²	4000 m ²
TOTAL	14500 m²	4000 m²	18100 m²	10150 m²

(1) Existing township.

(2) Expansion area.

(3) Chã de Ti'Liza is the expansion area for Ilha d'Madeira Township.

their concerns will be used to improve the plans and the feasibility of their implementation. With such an organization, a continuous flow on information and opinions is possible.

Residents' voluntary participation in projects of community interest will be solicited. The digging of ditches for water and sewage piping is one example; environmental cleaning campaigns is another. The renewal of houses will depend on the work of the residents, technically and financially supported by the project in the "Self-help housing programm".


PROGRAMME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL UPGRADING

This part comprehends town-planning, physical re-arrangements, the introduction of basic infrastructures and the distribution of permanent plots.

Most houses are to be renovated "on site", or on nearby plots, when this is more convenient. About 50 families from Ilha de Madeira will be offered new and larger lots in an expansion area outside the present township. According to the socio-economic survey made at the beginning of 1986, about fifty families are interested. The additional space created in Ilha de Madeira is needed for the central square, streets and community facilities, and indeed, to enlarge the dwelling lots, i.e. diminish density. The families that move will be relocated together. The new area will be developed with the project's support following the same guidelines as for the existing townships.

Water supply will be made through a system of public fountains, at a maximum distance of 80 meters from homes. The township committees will be in charge of water distribution and maintenance.

The sanitation system will consist of private latrines in the yard of each home. The high dwelling density requires an efficient solution: A Vietnamese design of a compact latrine with two chambers is used; the two-chamber latrine unit has one chamber in use while the other decomposes. Once decomposed, it is emptied. In this way it is a rotating system, with no further need to dig holes for new latrines, once one set has been built.





PUBLIC FOUNTAIN "SALAMANSA" Water supply to the areas will be provided by a net of collective public fountains. These will be connected to the Municipality's water net. Taking into account the deficiencies of present water supply in town (lack of water, irregular distribution), the system will be completed with tanks to guarantee an even supply. The criterium for the dimensioning of the net and the location of fountains is that no house will be further than 80 meters from a fountain. The fountains will be placed in the small squares of the neighbourhood.

THE ASSISTED SELF-HELP HOUSING PROGRAMME

Families will be supported in the renovation of their houses through an *Assisted Self-help Housing Programme*. It includes the following components:

* Model designs. Drawings and other necessary documents will be supplied free of charge.



- * Approved plots on a yearly rent basis.
- * Technical and organizational support of construction activities.
- * Development of appropriate construction methods, using local materials.
- * Financing through a favourable loan system.

Experimental houses are being built to test the designs and techniques, and to analyse the costs incurred.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROMOTION

This field can be divided in *Local Production* and *Social Facilities and Assistance*.

In order to improve the employment situation there will be efforts made to create different forms of local production. The construction activities of the project offers some possibilities that might have a continuity even after finishing the project, for example carpentry, construction components production, construction cooperatives etc. Activity groups for young women are already created, under the leadership of the local social authority. These will eventually develop to sewing cooperatives. The PACIM programme will give initial support in form of buildings, equipment and technical guidance.

Consumer co-ops will be promoted to improve the distribution of food in the areas, at lower prices.

Social facilities such as kindergartens and community houses for the elderly are being built. The housing units for the elderly appears in groups of four-seven houses with communal kitchen and toilet facilities. Each group will have a person working, preparing the meals, and doing the washing and cleaning.

FINANCING

The financing of the first and second phases of the project is supplied by ARO. This comprehends planning, construction of model houses, the first community facilities and other pilot experiences. Then there will be a need for further financing for the third phase, which is the *full scale implementation*. Cape Verdean Government resources are engaged throughout the whole project period. The distribution of funds from different sources is presented in the following box:

ARO funds excluding professionals 12.716.000 ecv (about US \$ 140.00000)



The first public fountain in in Ilha de Madeira, a very significant improvement. People come from all over the place to get their share of precious water; not only from Ilha de Madeira, but also from neighbouring areas.

ARO professionals (*)	8.100.000 ecv
(about US \$ 100.00000)	
Government funds (**)	4.500.000 ecv
(about US \$ 50.00000)	
Third phase financing	37.969.000 ecv
(about US \$ 420.00000)	

(*) Three years with an average of three persons.
(**) Three years.

The funds for third phase are being sought internationally. The planning team has produced the "Financing Dossier" and the Cape Verdean Ministry of Planning and Cooperation is making the external contacts.

The funds for the third phase will be distributed as follows:

1) Environmental Upgrading	27%
2) Self-help Housing Programme	37%
3) socio-economic Promotion	36%

The funds for the Self-help Housing programme will be distributed to the future house-owners in materials and skilled labour. The cost per house will be billed on the owner's account, to be repayed over a period of 20 years. The size of the loan is determined by the capacity of an average household (of the area). Each house-builder will be offered a loan of about 100.000 ecv (US \$ 10000 - 11000) at an interest rate of 6,5%. Monthly payments will be about 500 ecv. About 30% of the planned houses will be built with the funds raised through international aid. Then these houses will be used as a "guarantee stock" for getting further financing for another 30%. This process is planned to continue until the whole stock of 425 houses are renewed. The continuity of the this rotative system will be developed in cooperation with the State Bank of Cape Verde.

Inherent Limitations of the Scheme for Environmental Improvement of Slums in India

With rapid increase in the number of people living in shanty and squatter settlements in cities in India, a scheme for environmental improvement of slums began to be implemented as a temporary measure to relieve the extremely unhygienic conditions in such settlements. Recent government reports are urging for a long-term approach to slum improvement. Given that the established processes of Town Planning and the urban land market exclude the poor from some of the fundamental necessities of a better life, can slum improvement as presently implemented be an effective measure even to serve the limited objective it has set for itself?

My paper describes the historical development of the scheme for environmental improvement of slums and analyses its limitations in the context of the role of Town Planning in determining the access the poor have to urban land and basic services. Such an examination is necessary because, in the name of competing demands and constraints on resources, slum improvement is often put forward as a panacea for improving the living conditions of the low-income population. In the light of this analysis the paper attempts to suggest some of the essential components of an effective programme which will contribute towards improving the physical environment in which the poor have to live.

1. Slum Improvement: The Scope of the Scheme and The Progress of Implementation

The concept of improvement of slums was mooted in India more than 30 years ago. In 1956 the first Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act (which applied to some of the Union Territories including Delhi) was passed. Introducing the Bill, the then Minister for Home Affairs explained in the Rajyasabha, "According to normal standards, the population in an acre should not exceed 200. In Delhi, it is, on an average, as much as 600. But in the slum areas the numbers per acre in some of the

Katras - go up to about 2,500. So we have had recourse to this measure." (Birdi, 1982, p. 107.) The Minister told the Lok Sabha, "The population living in slums comes to nearly 2 lakhs, that is, about 40,000 families are somehow managing to exist in these slums. So, This Bill seeks to remove this evil. and we hope that vigorous measures will be taken to restore some sort of decency of life to the large numbers who are living under unimaginable conditions in these areas today." (Birdi 1982, p. 107.)

The Act primarily applied to dilapidated, overcrowded and insanitary buildings, since the problem, as explained by the Minister, was mainly of unhygienic living conditions in such buildings. The Act empowers the Competent Authority to declare as a slum any areas which is "unfit for human habitation"¹ and serve a notice on owners of buildings in such areas to execute the specified works of improvement. If the notice is not complied with within the specified period, the Competent Authority can carry out the improvement works and recover the cost (with interest) from the owner as arrears of land revenue. The Act provides for the demolition, if necessary, of buildings in a slum area and redevelopment of the land if it is in the public interest to do so. There is also a provision in the Act under which the government can acquire the land within, adjoining or surrounded by a slum area in order to facilitate improvement or redevelopment work.

By amendments made in 1964, the Act explicitly encompassed shanty settlements also.² The legal definition of slum areas places emphasis only on physical aspects of slums. It refers to the inadequacy of shelter in terms of its structural quality, hygienic condition, the availability of basic services and the quality of its environment. It includes both old, dilapidated, overcrowded and insanitary authorized buildings as well as unauthorized hutments. The Act, however, does not make any mention of the legality or the illegality of structures.

Slum Areas Acts similar to the Central Government legislation of 1956 have subsequently been passed by several states in India.³ It is important to note, however that there are some state in India where slum areas legislation does not exist even today.

Despite the legal provision, not much slum improvement work was done until the early 1970s on account of absence or inadequacy of budgetary provisions for the work. The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) made a small allocation for building subsidised housing for the lower income population. The Second Five Year Plan (1956-61), in addition, provided for rehousing of slum dwellers to clear slums. After the recommendations of the 6th Conference of Housing Ministers in 1962, the original Slum clearance scheme was extended to cover slum improvement (with loan and subsidy from the Central Government) (Detail of schemes obtained from Mathur and Mohan, 1983; Tinaikar, 1983). The Scheme provided loans for improvement of slums on private lands by the local bodies which were to recover the cost of such improvements from the landlords. Loans to local bodies were also provided for acquisition or requisition of such properties. In the absence of any means to recover the cost of improvement the progress of the scheme suffered a setback. Over time the problem of slums became so overwhelming and the funds proved to be so limited that it was decided to abandon the work of slum clearance altogether and from 1969 onwards the scheme was confined to slum improvement only. The Planning Commission reiterated this approach in its guidelines for the formulation of the Annual Plan Programme in 1970-71.

In 1972, the Central Government launched the present scheme for Environmental Improvement of Slums (mainly shanty and squatter settlements). Under the scheme State Governments receive financial assistance from the Central Government for undertaking improvement work in slums which are not earmarked for clearance for a minimum period of 10 years.

Originally, the scheme was to cover only 11 big cities, but subsequently another 9 cities were added to the list. During the Fifth Five Year Plan period (1974-79), its scope was further extended to cover all cities in the country with a population of cover 300,000. In 1974, the scheme was transferred to the state sector under the Minimum Needs Programme. Since 1979, the scheme has been extended to all urban centres irrespective of their population size.

* Dr. Meera Bapat, architect, works as free lance consultant in Pune, India, and was member of the 1983 Task Force Planning Commission.

The scheme aims at removing unhygienic conditions by providing certain minimum amenities in urban slums. The amenities provided are by definition, to be shared (common) and temporary in nature since the slums are expected to be cleared and "decent" housing provided to the people. The improvement work carried out under the scheme relates to the provision of

1. Water supply (1 tap for 150 persons)
2. Latrines (1 latrine for 20 to 50 persons)
3. Community bath (1 bathroom for 20 to 50 persons)
4. Open drains
5. Paved pathways
6. Street lighting (Poles 30 metres apart)

ESA report prepared by the Task Force appointed by the Planning Commission (1983) records that in the period from the inception in 1972 of the scheme to early 1983, 11 million slum dwellers have received basic services. According to Task Force estimates, the slum population in the country in 1981 was between 32 to 40 million people, constituting 20 to 25 percent of the total urban population. On the basis of the 11 million slum dwellers who have already been covered under the scheme, 21 to 29 million existing slum dwellers have yet to be provided facilities under the slum improvement scheme. This constitutes 66 to 75 percent to the total slum population in the country.

The Task Force (Planning Commission 1983) notes that the scheme for Environmental Improvement of slums has come under sharp criticism which stems from its actual implementation. The points raised are:

- a) Although the scheme has been functioning for well over a decade, there has been no systematic evaluation of its salient features and the extent to which it has achieved its basic goal.
- b) The scheme does not provide any flexibility for variation in the rate of expenditure in accordance with different needs of slum areas, nor does it make provision for higher costs involved in the improvement of slums which have peculiar geographical location. As a result, the very basic objective of improving the physical environment in slums cannot be properly fulfilled.
- c) There is a complete absence of financial participation by local bodies in the environmental improvement of slums. As a result, the amenities provided in slum areas are deteriorating rapidly on account of the lack of maintenance.
- d) The existing scale of amenities has proved impracticable both in physical and financial terms. There is a need to raise the cost ceiling.

- e) There is absence of a long-term approach to the problem.
- f) There is no evidence of slum dweller's involvement in the environmental improvement programme. Available evidence indicates that the scheme is being implemented mainly as a public works programme.
- g) Far from playing a pioneering role in improving the conditions of squatters on public lands, the Ministries / Departments of the Government of India have not permitted the local bodies to carry out improvement of slums on their lands.

The Task Force report (Planning Commission, 1983) concludes that "The problem, therefore, is one of financial resources, better monitoring, linking improvement with security of tenure and special funding arrangements for home improvement loans".

2. Slum Improvement and Urban Development

The Government reports have noted some of the shortcomings of the scheme for environmental improvement of slums which pertain to its implementation. There are others which relate to the wider question of urban development and access for the poor to urban land and basic services.

- a) In the present programme, there is no city-wide plan for slum improvement. Schemes are taken up on an ad hoc basis and without prioritization. There is a separate improvement project for each individual shanty settlement. Most such settlements are so con-

gested that in many cases even after the realigning of some huts, there is very little space for providing facilities (particularly latrines). Unless feasible and affordable opportunities are created for some of the households to move to other sites, no environmental improvement of the settlement is really possible. In the existing scheme for environmental improvement of slums there is no such provision.

- b) Generally, on account of budgetary constraints, the services are provided on such a meagre scale (often far short of the prescribed guidelines) that the hygienic conditions in most shanty settlements do not really improve. This has crucial consequences for the health of the people. A survey of shanty settlements has shown that the contribution of the physical environment needs to be considered in understanding the causal mechanisms behind malnutrition among children; gradual improvements in private incomes do not enable people to protect themselves from polluted surroundings; and a badly drained and ventilated environment will exacerbate the condition of those who may fall sick, whatever their access to curative treatment (Bapat & Crook, 1984). Over time, as the population of these settlements increases, which it is bound to do given the absence of affordable housing alternatives available to the low-income population, the services are further strained. This leads to severe deterioration of the environmental conditions and consequent deleterious effects on the health of the people.



A squatter settlement in Pune, India

(Photo: F. Steinberg)

c) Many shanty settlements occupy lands which are reserved in the City Development Plan for public purpose (e.g. schools, parks, hospitals). Such "reserved" lands are proposed to be acquired and used for the specified public purposes. On account of acute paucity of funds with local authorities to acquire the lands and/or cumbersome and time-consuming procedure involved, land acquisition does not take place for a number of years. The lands remain vacant and are often encroached upon by squatters. In many instances the poor are "encouraged" by politicians to occupy such sites because the encroachers are seen to constitute vote banks. Over time shanty settlements grow on such "reserved" sites. Can such settlements be improved? If the statutory provisions in the Development Plan are not to be violated, they must be cleared (which is rarely possible). Alternatively, they can be improved as a temporary measure. The guidelines for slum improvement (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1982), however, suggest that the slum must not be earmarked or clearance at last for 10 years from the date of effecting improvements. This compromises the Development Plan. A third possibility is to change the land-use of the "reserved" sites occupied by shanty settlements from the specified public purpose of housing for the lower income population⁴ when the plan is revised (there is a statutory requirement of revision of the plan every 10 years). This would, in all probability, mean less than adequate provision in the Development plan of public amenities for an area, such as schools and hospitals which are primarily intended to be used by the poor.

It is clear that the scheme for environmental improvement of slums as presently cast cannot be a corrective measure in even the limited extent of providing hygienic living conditions. Its limitations arise because of the simultaneous operation of the Town Planning procedures and attempts at slum improvement in the context of the urban land market. Contrary to government reports, effective slum improvement is not merely a problem of adequate project preparation and implementation, and more finance, it is related to the processes of Town Planning, and management and financing of urban development which determine people's access to urban land and services.

3. The Role of Town Planning

It is pertinent to briefly review the Town Planning efforts so far in order to understand their role in the creation of hygienic living conditions in cities. There is some variation with respect to Town Planning laws in different states in the



Squatters in India

(Photo: F. Steinberg)

country. As an illustration I will use the case of Maharashtra (a state in central-west India) and examples of Bombay and Pune.

The first Town Planning Act in the erstwhile Bombay State was passed in 1915. It enabled local authorities to prepare Town Planning Schemes for open areas within their jurisdiction which were in the process of development (being built). This Act which was based on the British Town Planning Act of 1909, introduced a model of urban form "characterised by low-density, low rise development which was quite contrary to the previous urban tradition determined by indigenous family structure, the urban economy, prevailing technology as well as cultural institutions" (King, 1976). Indigenous town had grown without any formal plans. They were compact, with buildings close to each other along narrow alleyways as there was no motorised transport; residences, craft industry and storage facilities were not laid out in separate areas but were intermingled. Such features of old towns were now regarded as undesirable. "Modern" town planning saw the future development quite distinct from the traditional urban form with separation of various activities, uncongested development with open spaces around building, wide roads and amplitude of basic services. The Town Planning Act was introduced in order to plan new development in a formal manner to avoid haphazard and unregulated extensions of towns and to ensure orderly development.

The Act laid down an elaborate procedure for "reconstituting" original, in most cases agricultural landholdings, into regular building plots, with land reserved for public purposes, roads etc., and for

calculating the amount of "Net Demand" by the local authority. The cost of the Scheme was to be met partly or totally from contributions levied by the local authority on each "final" plot in the scheme. These were calculated on the basis of the increment which was estimated to accrue to each owner due to the proposed development of the area.

In 1954, this Act was superseded by a new Town Planning Act. It made it obligatory for local authorities to prepare development plans for the whole of the area within their jurisdiction. The objective was to plan for comprehensive development of a city rather than planning for parts of it. It was argued that the preparation of individual Town Planning Schemes for different areas of a city led to uncoordinated and disaggregated development without adequate linkages between individual "planned" areas. The preparation, therefore, of an overall plan for the city was regarded as a pre-condition or ensuring its orderly and regulated growth. This Act brought the whole of the area of a city under formal planning and now Town Planning Schemes (as specified in the Act of 1915) were required to be prepared within the framework of a city Development Plan. In addition to newly developing areas, built-up areas could also now be included in Town Planning Schemes.

A Development Plan is primarily a land use map. It contains proposals for zoning the development in residential, commercial and industrial areas, allocations of land for public purposes such as open spaces, hospitals and schools infrastructural development such as roads, sewerage, drainage, supply of water and electricity, and for traffic and transportation network.

The document is accompanied by information regarding the cost of land acquisition, estimates of works and phases of development. Development Control Rules regulate the division of larger land-holdings into individual building plots, the density of people and Floor Space Index (maximum allowable built-up area in relation to the area of the plot). Building bye-laws specify the standards of structural quality, area of accommodation to be provided, ventilation and sanitation.

A dominant school of thought which is still persistent, regarding minimum standards for housing is well illustrated by the following extract from an editorial in the Journal of the Institute of Town Planners India (1955): "The basic standards in housing and planning are arrived at not only from considerations of cost but also from considerations of creating a desirable sociological and physical environment necessary for the healthy growth of the individuals and the community. Such standards have been established by various committees and technical missions recommending a two-roomed house with adequate sanitary facilities as the barest minimum if the normal aspiration of healthy living is to be achieved....The standards cannot be lowered, whatever the community, whatever the location and whatever the economic situation in the country. Sub-standard housing is but a step towards slums. Deliberate sub-standard housing will lead towards the creation of future slums. The basic standards must be adhered to at all costs."

The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (M.R. & T.P.) Act was passed in 1966. This Act further enlarged the scope of planning to include the region surrounding metropolitan and industrial centres. The earlier Act provided for the preparation of physical plans to control and guide the development within the city limits. However there was considerable, mainly industrial, development just outside the limits of some of the cities, and it was unregulated. The new Act was therefore, passed in an attempt to ensure adequate infrastructural development and orderly growth in the region surrounding such industrial centres. Planning of metropolitan regions was also regarded as one of the measures to encourage industrial dispersal. The Act made possible the development of New Towns in such Regions if it was "expedient" in the public interest to do so.

The Regional Plan, like the city Development Plan, is again primarily a land-use map. It shows allocation of land for various purposes - residential, industrial, agricultural, forests, mining, reservation of areas as nature reserves, for dairies, animal sanctuaries etc. It contains proposals for the network of transport and communication, for conservation and development of natural resources and

"such other matters as are likely to have an important influence on the development to the region".

Whatever the eloquence of the exposition in Regional or City Plans, they largely remain paper documents. Statutory requirements of providing estimates of work, a statement of cost and phases of development remain mere academic exercises. For instance only 38 per cent of the works (in terms of expenditure) proposed in the Development Plan for Bombay were carried out during the 10 years for which the plan was prepared.

With each successive piece of legislation, the area under physical planning has been enlarged. Each successive Act contains within it provisions of the previous legislation with only minor modifications, if any. In spite of the Town Planning efforts of over seven decades, our cities bear vivid testimony to the ever worsening living conditions of a majority of urban residents. Town Planning determines the distribution of a city's resources (land, water, revenue) among different groups of a city's residents. Since it takes place within the context of urban land market forces and private property development, what it achieves is to create infrastructural advantages (transport facilities, roads, public buildings, open spaces, etc.) so that the private building sector can reap benefits. "The development plans drawn up by municipal planning departments can only be realised if they are subordinated to the interests of developers..."

A city's control over the planning and equipping of its territory is more or less limited to the creation of situational advantages... on which parts of the profits of property capital are based." (Lamarche, 1976).

The poor being incapable of competing in the urban land and housing market are forced to live in unauthorized shanty settlements in what can only be apologies for shelter and with no or minimal services. As a consequence of Town Planning, polarization in living conditions between the rich and the poor has increased and an increasing proportion of the urban population is forced to reside in unauthorized settlements in total contravention of City Development Plans. In the name of creating an orderly, hygienic and aesthetically pleasing environment, Town Planning, in fact, denies the poor access to adequate housing and even basic services. The poor are forced to become illegal, unauthorized city residents because they do not have the means to afford even the "minimum" authorized accommodation. This is the context in which we need to view the efforts for slum improvement.

4. Slum Improvement as a Long-Term Strategy

As the population of shanty and squatter settlement increased to "alarming" proportions, the scheme for environmental

improvement was launched to relieve the wretched conditions in slums. It is claimed to be a temporary measure and the Slum Areas Act which provides the legal basis for facilitating slum improvement has been cast accordingly. The Act makes its central concern the provision of a sanitary environment. It makes no reference to the legal status of slum settlements.

An "attractive" feature of the Slum Areas Act relates to the protection it offers from eviction to residents of a notified slum area. They can be evicted only if alternative accommodation which is within their means is available to them. This gives a quasi-legal status and a sense of security to slum dwellers. Even in the case of notified or improved slums, however, the ownership of the land on which they are located is retained with the original owner; the residents get no legal status or right to stay there. These settlements remain as aberrations on the City Development Plan. In fact, the Slum Areas Act merely enables the Competent Authority to carry out improvement work in slums even on privately owned land, without being treated as trespassers. Since the ownership of the land is retained with the original owner, it leaves open the option to expel the slum dwellers (after fulfilling certain conditions) in order to restore the advantages of the site to property capital. This may be done ostensibly for environmental reasons or under the disguise of rehabilitation (Bapat, 1986). Thus, the Slum Areas Act concedes very little by way of urban land and basic services and helps protect interests of dominant groups.

The Task Force report (Planning Commission, 1983) decries the absence of a long-term approach to slum improvement. It stresses that the scheme must be linked to the granting of tenure and home improvement loans. This is no doubt, a significant measure which will to some degree ensure for the poor access to land at advantageous locations. However, by itself it will not be sufficient as a long-term measure to improve the living conditions of the low-income population, since the present practice of Town Planning continues to exclude the poor from some of the fundamental necessities of a better life.

A recent judgment given by the Supreme Court of India in the case of pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay (Writ Petition Nos.- 4610-4612 of 1981) is relevant in this connection since it has profound implication for urban land-use. It states unequivocally that "the right to life which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and... it is established that if the petitioners (pavement and slum dwellers) are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood." In order, therefore, to protect the fundamental right to life of the urban poor in particular, the nexus between their habitat and work places must be maintained. This is not

possible if urban planning is subordinated to the urban land markets and interests of private property development, since land is the most crucial determinant of urban plans.

The price of land is a function of accessibility and neighbourhood characteristics. The price curve shows that land prices decline from the city centre to the periphery, the fall is more gradual along main roads and the prices rise around secondary (commercial) centres. Since the urban poor have low paying capacity, in order to bring housing (even in the form of site and services) within their reach, it has to be located near the city limits where land is relatively cheap (and less attractive to private builders for commercial exploitation). For this reason, in the revised Development for Pune (Dratt) a belt of land running along the periphery of the city as been reserved for accommodating low-income households. Faced with the operation of the land market, the poor are thus pushed out towards the fringe of the city, away from the services required for their livelihood. If their right to life, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in its judgement, is to be so protected, intervention by the state is necessary. In this connection; the granting of tenure to existing slums is crucial for preserving sites in different areas, including the inner city, for low-income settlement.

In the present context, for slum improvement to be an effective measure, it will have to be a package of strategies implemented vigorously. The package would have to contain environmental improvement of existing slums (with granting of tenure and to relieve the congestion, incentives for some of the households to move to alternative sites), site and services projects on large scale, joint development (land-sharing) projects (Bapat, 1985) based on a cross-subsidy for low-income population, to take into account the opportunity cost of prime land, and such other strategies. It will have to be formulated on a citywide basis and dovetailed into the City Development Plan. The objective must be to create affordable shelter opportunities for the poor. This is a stupendous task since the interest of the low-income population is antagonistic to the interests of private property development.

The Task Force report (Planning Commission, 1983) states categorically that slum/squatter settlement are the product of poverty and social injustice. It concludes that despite objectives in favour of the poor stated in the Plan documents (Five Years Plans), there is insufficient evidence as to the extent that the urban poor have benefitted from these (social housing) schemes. This, however, is no mere lapse. A Five Year Plan, after all, is only an exhortatory document, but there are several instances of laws passed in the name of the underprivileged, which have been used by dominant groups to serve

their own interests. For example, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which was passed for the expressed purpose of preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few, is a classic example of a piece of legislation enacted in the name of the poor but skillfully manipulated to benefit private builders (Bapat, 1985). The main objective of the Act, as explained in the preamble, is to "prevent concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and prevent speculation, profiteering therefrom and with a view to bring about equitable distribution of urban agglomeration to subserve the common good." In practice, however, it has enabled private developers to get a firm stranglehold on the urban land and property market.

In these conditions, creating improved living conditions for slum dwellers is clearly not a problem of better formulation and efficient implementation of slum improvement schemes. Because, "to change their living conditions, the squatters need to change the structural roots of the urban poverty from which they suffer. ... An ability to start from a local demand and proceed from there to raise policy issues and to obtain enough political support to win, seems to be the most fruitful line of development that urban movements could follow." (Castells, 1982).

In this long struggle, a city-wide campaign for improved living conditions as against the present slum improvement scheme may have a better potential for organizing the slum dwellers. The existing scheme for environmental improvement of slums divides the slum-dwellers in small groups as residents of each slum press for the improvement of their own settlement and negotiate with the authorities separately. A citywide campaign may bring them together. This does not in any way underestimate the stupendousness of the task involved, given the present politics based on dispensing patronage to individuals or small groups which frustrates community mobilization (Bapat, 1986).

Notes:

- 1) The Act states that
 - 1) Where the Competent Authority upon report from any of its officer or other information in its possession is satisfied as respects an area that the buildings in that area-
 - a) are in an respect unfit for human habitation; or
 - b) by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors are detrimental to safety, health or morals, it may, by notification in the Official gazette, declare such area to be a slum area".
 - 2) In determining whether a building is unfit for human habitation for the purposes of this Act, regard shall be had to its condition in respect of the following matters, that is to say-
 - a) repair; b) stability,
 - c) freedom from damp; d) natural light and air; e) water supply;
 - f) drainage and sanitary conveniences;
 - g) facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of waste water; and the buildings shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid if and only if it is so far defective in one

or more of the said matters that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condition."

- 2) For instance, the Act originally stated:
 4. Power of competent Authority to require improvement of buildings unfit for human habitation.
 - 1) Where the Competent Authority upon report from any of its officers or other information in its possession is satisfied that any building in a slum area is in any respect unfit for human habitation, it may, unless in its opinion the building is not capable at a reasonable expense of being rendered so fit, serve upon the owner of the building notice requiring him ... to execute the works of improvement specified therein and stating that in the opinion of the Authority those works will render the building fit for human habitation".
- An amendment made in 1964 added:
 "Provided that where the owner of the building is different from the owner of the land on which the building stands and the works of improvement required to be executed relate to provision of water taps, bathing places construction of drains, open or covered as the case may be provision of waterborne latrines or removal of rubbish and such works are to be executed outside the building, the notice shall be served upon the owner of the land."
- 3) These states are
 - Andhra Pradesh (1956)
 - Madhya Pradesh (1956)
 - Assam (1961)
 - Punjab (1961)
 - Uttar Pradesh (1962)
 - Tamil Nadu (1971)
 - Maharashtra (1971)
 - West Bengal (1972)
 - Gujarat (1973)
 - Karnataka (1974)
 - Kerala
 - 4) The Draft Development Plan for Pune (Revised), for instance, terms 290 out of 325 shanty settlement in the city as Zone for Housing the Economically Weaker Sections of the population. And this is regarded as a public purpose.

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Jan van der Linden*

Implementation and Impacts of a Legalization and Improvement Programme in Karachi: The Case of Ghouseia Colony

INTRODUCTION

Ghouseia Colony is a squatter settlement in Karachi which for a protracted period of time has had a very low level of security of tenure. Consequently, its development stagnated. Political reasons suddenly made it a priority case for legalization and improvement. This historical development renders Ghouseia Colony an unusually interesting case. Normally, when squatter settlements of Karachi are legalized and improved, this is just one milestone in a long process of increasing de facto legality and concomitant improvements of the housing stock. The impacts of government interference, then, are quite limited. In the case of Ghouseia Colony, such impacts can be expected to be much more manifest (Nientied et al., 1982, 95). Because of the sudden change in policy for Ghouseia Colony, it constitutes a unique case to study several specific topics. One item that lends itself to an interesting comparison is the impact of the policy itself. In the past, studies had been undertaken of squatter settlements improved and legalized, without there being a policy guiding such actions (Van der Linden, 1977, chapter X). Now, it can be assessed what difference the existence of a policy and set rules and procedures makes.

Secondly, in the case of Ghouseia Colony, the possibility of a test-control study offers itself, which otherwise is difficult in Karachi (Nientied, 1986, 19-24; Nientied & Van der Linden, 1986). Close to Ghouseia Colony is another squatter settlement that is still stagnating in its development due to insecure tenure: Usmania Mahajir Colony ("Usmania" for short), where surveys were held in 1973 and 1983 (JRP-IV, 1975; Nientied, 1984a). A comparison of the development of land pices in Usmania and Ghouseia Colony reveals one important impact on improvement and (impending) legalization.

In the third place since Ghouseia Colony is rather centrally located, pressure on land is higher than in the more peripheral Baldia, where longitudinal research did not reveal displacement processes of any significance (Nientied, 1984b). Longitudinal study of Ghouseia Colony started in 1983 only but the preliminary results of a second-round survey in 1986 render a first comparison possible between displacement in Baldia and Ghouseia Colony.

In a concluding comment, some remarks will be made regarding the findings in Ghouseia Colony in the light of different theoretical viewpoints.


Ghouseia Colony; some basic information on the colony and the context.

Ghouseia Colony is a squatter settlement created from the early fifties onwards in the then

periphery of Karachi. It covers 18.5 acres (7.4 hectares) and has been laid out without a trace of planning. Before the improvement and legalization programme started, the colony had around 10,000 inhabitants, i.e. approximately 540 inhabitants per acre (1350/hectare).

Over the years, the colony's location has become very favourable. It is now in the inner ring around the city center; it has excellent bus- and other connections with all parts of the city; it has all kinds of facilities close by, while the immediate surroundings offer diverse job opportunities. For instance, adjacent to Ghouseia Colony is Karachi's wholesale fruit and vegetable market, while different middle- and upper class neighbourhoods are within easy walking distance (cf map).

Ghouseia Colony's population is composed of different ethnic groups, the common denominator being that a large majority of



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them are poor. Over two thirds of the heads of households earn their living as salesmen (mostly hawkers), drivers, unskilled labourers and servants. More than half of the heads of households are either self-employed or on daily wages. Most households consist of families, either nuclear, or with relatives or in-laws coresiding. The average household size is seven.

The population is quite stable: the 1983 data show that almost three quarters of the households in Ghousia Colony have resided there at least for the last 15 years.

For a long period of time the level of security of tenure in Ghousia Colony has remained on an extremely low level, amongst other reasons, because of plans to extend Karachi's central jail on the land on which the colony is built, there was little or no hope that the residents would eventually be allowed to remain where they lived. In fact, until the end of 1980, Ghousia Colony was on the list of settlements to be removed.

Low levels of security are attended both by low levels of investment in individual houses and the dwelling environment. Indeed, until the mid seventies, apart from a few standposts, there were no public facilities in the area.

Also, the development of individual houses has been extremely slow as compared to other squatterments of Karachi. In 1971, only 30% of the houses were of a semi-permanent nature; the rest were mere huts or mud houses (Rauf, 1971). By 1975, the percentage of semi-permanent houses had risen to 60, but not a single household had dared to build its house beyond that level (Van der Linden, 1977).

Over the years, many residents' associations had requested different authorities to regularize Ghousia Colony and to bring in public facilities, but to no avail. The bureaucracy had invariably forwarded such requests from one desk to the other, until some dead end was met. One of the excuses for public agencies' inaction in the case of Ghousia Colony was that the position of the land on which the colony is built was unclear.

An alternative to approaching government agencies is to seek patronage from some powerful person, e.g. a politician, who can pressurize the government machinery (cf. Van der Linden, 1977, 282). In the case of Ghousia Colony, such attempts have not been very successful either. One reason is the relatively small size of the colony, as a result of which the influence to be gained by the patron is limited; for instance, a limited number of votes can be caught only. This is even more the case when different ethnic groups live in an area - such as is the case of Ghousia Colony - who are not willing to unite behind one and the same politician.

Apart from that especially with regard to centrally located colonies on potentially valuable land, there exist strong counterforces against the regularization of squatters.

It should be noted, finally, that for a long time, there had been no policy for 'katchi abadis' (i.e. illegal settlements), apart from a few shortlived (and abortive) attempts to 'crush programmes' whereby all of Karachi's illegal settlements were to be cleared. Thus, what happened to squatterments largely depended upon random government decisions which in their turn mostly depended upon the amount of pressure which the residents managed to mobilize. All in all, until 1980, as to Ghousia Colony's regularization and improvement, nothing at all had been achieved.

During the seventies, conditions for regularization of katchi abadis started changing. Within different government agencies, the idea slowly gained ground that squatter settlements could be regularized and transformed into decent quarters of the city. In the Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-'81), the Government of Pakistan proposed new guidelines for dealing with the housing problem; it proposed that the existing housing stock be preserved wherever possible. In 1976, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) published a policy document entitled 'A new approach to Substandard Urban Areas', in which an outline of a city-wide regularization and improvement programme is presented (KMC, 1976). Besides, within KMC, the central Planning Team was formed, whose task it is - amongst other things - to perform improvement planning for illegal settlements.

Although the legal basis of KMC's policy document was weak, at least, from 1976 onwards, there is a government agency where regularization and improvement projects for katchi abadis are framed (meanwhile the Central Planning Team has been renamed Directorate Katchi Abadis and Evaluation (DKAE)).

In 1978, Martial Law Order no. 67 was issued, called 'Regularization and Development of Katchi Abadis', which was reconstituted in 1979 (MLO 110), and again in 1982 (MLO 183), and complemented by the Sind katchi Abadis Rules of 1982. Basic in these orders is that 'the Government may declare (an) area to be a Katchi Abadi, and the Katchi Abadi so declared shall be regularized and developed in accordance with the provisions of this Order'.

With the provisions of the MLO and Katchi Abadi Rules, regularization and improvement programmes had got a firm legal basis.

A third change stems from the reinstatement of a Municipal Council in 1979. Councillors are elected area-wise, every four years. Thus inhabitants of an area now have one representative through whom - at least in principle - the population's needs and wishes can be voiced.

These three changes have by no means ruled out all the obstacles in the way of smooth and concerted action in regularization and improvement on an adequate scale. Still, the problems of bureaucracy persist, as do the pressures from counterforces, within and outside the katchi abadis.

However, the changes mentioned are crucial assets. There is now a well defined channel through which the residents can, in principle, make themselves heard. There is a government institution which can competently frame regularization and improvement projects. Finally, there is a legal basis from which people, councillors and DKAE can operate.



Ghousia Colony: New construction inside the walls of the former houses to make place for the street widening scheme.

The breakthrough in Ghousia Colony.

In 1979, a councillor was elected who, during the election campaign, had promised to try his best for Ghousia Colony and other similar areas within his constituency. This councillor's interest not only stems from the possibility to catch votes; also, he previously was a contractor and he still maintains strong links in contractor circles.

This councillor has good contacts with the local administration, having been chairman of the Works Committee and member of the Land Control Committee, both bodies composed of Metropolitan Council Members, who advise the Chief Engineer, KMC and the Director Lands, KMC, respectively. Besides, this councillor can bank on the Mayor's backing since he had greatly obliged him during the Mayor's election struggle. Finally, the councillor is on very good terms with the Commissioner. Thanks to this councillor's efforts, in November 1980 in a meeting convened by the Commissioner, a decision was taken that Ghousia Colony 'stands regularized', subject to a number of conditions. The most important of these conditions was that a 30' wide strip alongside the central jail was to be cleared.

Almost a year later, the Metropolitan Council, by a Resolution, declared Ghouseia Colony a Katchi Abadi and forwarded the Resolution to provincial authorities for notification.

Shortly after, backed by the Council's Resolution, DKAЕ published a public notice about the colony's development plan which they had prepared meanwhile and invited public objections and suggestions within 30 days. Only relatively few objections²⁷ were received, most of them concerning details of the lay-out planning, while two objections were made by outsiders claiming that (a part of) the colony should be totally cleared rather than regularized. All the objections were rejected.

The lay-out plan for Ghouseia Colony had been prepared by DKAЕ, in line with its policy for planning in existing katchi abadis (Saleem et al., 1983). Starting point is 'demolition of houses or parts thereof in kept to the minimum with the aim to preserve the housing stock of katchi abadis' (ibid., 4).

As a result, planning standards are far more realistic than before and take account of the existing situation. Prescribed widths of streets and lanes, for instance, relate to the minimum needed to bring about the infrastructure rather than to any handbook, as the following table shows.

Table 1: Width of roads and lanes prescribed by DKAЕ

Arterial Roads	as proposed in Master Plan
Major roads	40'
Minor roads (connect. neighbourhood)	25 - 40'
Minor roads (limited vehicular traffic)	10 12'
Lanes (non-vehicular) if need be	10' down to 8'

As a general rule, no house should be more than 100 yards away from a vehicular road for the sake of accessibility during emergency.

Clearing of the strip of land along the jail caused the elimination of some 200 houses and affected another 30 houses partially. As regards the interior of the colony, all the streets and lanes had to be widened under the lay-out plan. In this plan, lanes are brought to a minimum width of 10', and in some cases 8', while through going streets are widened to 12 or 15'. Fig. 2, showing a part of DKAЕ's lay-out plan, illustrates this. As can also be seen from this map, a large majority of houses are affected in some way or other. A very few houses are so badly affected by the widening of streets (e.g. some houses on already small corner plots), that no sufficient space is left for the inhabitants. People so affected were allotted alternative plots, as were the shiftees from the strip of land alongside the jail.



Ghouseia colony: Street scene

Further developments.

Three months after KMC's Resolution declaring Ghouseia Colony a katchi abadi, action was taken to clear the strip of land long the jail. The shiftees were allotted plots on instalment basis in a location at the South-Eastern outskirts of Karachi. They got no recompensation for their lost properties.

In contrast to this unusually quick action, the further plans for Ghouseia Colony still awaited approval from different sides. For instance, the Master Plan Department of the Karachi Development Authority failed to send their comments on the proposed lay-out plan. More importantly even, DKAЕ had to repeatedly remind the Deputy Commissioner of their request to trace out the area's survey number which the Government of Sind needed in order to officially transfer the area to KMC. This transfer is required because KMC cannot issue individual leases before the land is in their hands.

Only in Spring 1984, Survey of Pakistan sent their staff to survey the (contours of the) colony. Again, after that, it took them almost a year to assign a survey number to Ghouseia Colony.

Once the survey number had been assigned, transfer of the land to KMC took place in April 1985 and the area was notified as a katchi abadi within a week's time after that. However, even though this last hurdle on the way to issuing of leases had been overcome, by October 1986 leasing was yet to start. The most plausible reason of this is that fresh Councilor elections will be held in September 1987. By prolonging the illegal status of the colony, the councillor keeps the inhabitants in a dependent position which doubtlessly will influence the coming election results. One effect of this delay is that KMC cannot collect the lease-and improvement charges and consequently, loses money. A possible by-effect is that

by the time leasing starts, the de facto security of tenure has become so high that many people are little inclined to take leases anymore: when they are sure they run no risks, why should they pay for something which they have been getting free for a number of years already?

While leasing was kept pending year after year, the councillor, having won the confidence of many of the inhabitants of Ghouseia Colony, could guide further activities for the betterment of the colony. Most important amongst these activities has been the cutting of house- and / or compound walls in order to widen streets and lanes. A very large number of dwellings are affected in this way.

Mostly, the councillor himself, together with some leaders, put the marks on the houses which indicated the parts that had to be demolished. Subsequently, all the owners of structures affected by the lay-out plan have voluntarily, and mostly happily, sliced parts off their houses, even though the plan still awaited the Council's official approval. By Autumn 1984, cutting of houses and bringing streets and lanes to the required width had been completed. Quite a few of the inhabitants had meanwhile also started adding a floor to their houses. The fact that people dare to invest substantial sums in such improvements of their houses, again testifies their confidence that the legal and administrative aspects of legalization will pose no insurmountable problems, whatever the delays.

Similarly, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board undertook a number of works in Ghouseia Colony in anticipation of the formalities yet to be performed. A water reservoir was laid into the colony. Also a main sewerage line (12" diameter) was laid in the strip of cleared land along the jail. In both instances, again, the councillor was greatly involved, both in advising in the design and in paper pushing. In Spring 1986, the strip along the jail was metalled.



Fig. 2: Layout plan of Ghouseia colony.

SOME COMPARISONS


The meaning of a changed context.

In a study of legalized and improved Squatments of Karachi during the time there was no trace of a policy, the following characteristics of public agencies' dealings were noted:

- instead of policies determining which settlements qualify for legalization and upgrading, this is a function of the amount of pressure in favour of such a programme. In place of set criteria come intercession by influential persons and/or bribes. As a result, orders from above frequently overrule earlier decisions made by the public agencies.
- since there are no regulations whatsoever for a legalization and improvement programme, public agencies initially resist the developments and are consequently unable to keep ahead of them; finally they resign to the accomplished facts.
- the coordination between the agencies is extremely poor. Frequent reminders sent by one agency to the other are one symptom of this; as a result, enormous delays are the rule.
- as regards the planners' role, it was noted that, in accordance with the above points:
- the planner appears on the scene in a late stage only;
- he applies completely irrelevant rules and standards which bear no relation to people's needs, preferences and possibilities.
- his plans are invariably overruled. (Van der Linden, 1977, 282-4).
- In the literature on execution of low-income housing programmes in Third World cities, the poor performance of public agencies is often blamed on 'institutional constraints' (e.g. World Bank, 1980). The above analysis illustrates what, indeed, the effects can be of lacking, or insufficient, institutional arrangements to support (e.g.) legalization and upgrading programmes.

It is interesting to see in how far the meanwhile accomplished fulfilment of the institutional conditions has changed the course of affairs in the case of Ghausia Colony.

- First of all, there is now a policy for dealing with squatments. It should be noted however, that according to this policy, Ghausia Colony was on the list of squatments to be demolished. Only upon interference by an influential person, and against policy criteria, it became a priority case and earlier decisions were easily overruled.
- The resistance of the directly involved public agency (DKAE) has been brief and regarded the priority rather than principles (suddenly a priority case was imposed). Also, in a number of respects the agency has been capable of



guiding the programme instead of running behind the facts.

- However, due to 'coordination problems' DKAE has not been in a position to fulfill some of its major tasks, especially leasing.
- The planers (of DKAE) have in this case been realistic, and on time. Their plan was executed, albeit in an informal way, in the absence of the due sanctions.

The conclusion from this comparison is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, one might rightly argue that the institutional arrangements have made little difference. Rather than by application of set rules and procedures it was through a strong patron's influence that Ghausia Colony was improved. Also, after 6 years, legalization is still pending in spite of all the arrangements which, in principle, have paved the way to speedy and smooth implementation.

On the other hand, the institutional arrangements, and amongst these especially the rules for planning, have made it possible that Ghausia Colony could be taken up as a case for upgrading and legalization, and that appropriate planning was done.

Obviously, the institutional arrangements are a necessary condition for upgrading programmes in areas such as Ghausia Colony, which would otherwise never have stood a chance to qualify for such a programme. The relative smallness of the area, the poverty and ethnic composition

of the inhabitants, and its central location are all factors that had consistently worked against the colony's development. However, the now existing rules and regulations can apparently be applied, even in the case of a stagnating katchi abadi.

At the same time, evidently, the necessary conditions are by no means sufficient. The arrangements - and for that matter: any arrangements - still leave ample room for obstruction and manipulation. On the surface, in the case of Ghausia Colony, it was Survey of Pakistan failing to assign a survey number to the area; however, it may safely be assumed that this is no accident.

The councillor's position is strong enough to push such trivial matters. Precisely this he did not do, the probable reason being that he wants to keep the population dependent on him until the next elections (1987), or beyond. No institutional arrangements will overcome such hurdles if their implementation is not backed by either sufficient political will at the top, or sufficient political pressure from below.

Comparison between Ghausia Colony and Usmania; an approximation of test-control study.

Close by Ghausia Colony, another squatment is located, having very similar characteristics, as the following table shows:

Table 2: Characteristics of Ghausia Colony and Usmania


	Ghausia colony	Usmania
Area (acres)	18.5	9
Population (appr.)	9,500	6,500
Average length of residence (years)	19.1	20.4
Average monthly income H.o.H (1983; Rs)	898	723
Average monthly H.H income (1983; Rs)	1,496	1,268
% H.o.H. working within 1.5 mile radius	60	56
Average H.H. size	6.82	7.14

HH - Household, HoH - Head of Household,


(Source: Niented, 1986: 25)

Figure 3: House conditions in Ghousia Colony and Usmania Mahajir Colony in different years*

Ghousia Colony



Usmania Mahajir Colony



* The house types I - VI can be roughly described as follows:

- I: very temporary, entirely made of reed or second-hand tin sheets.
- II: temporary, mainly reed and tin, but also mud, stones and / or planks are used.
- III: prolonged temporary, mainly stones, mud and / or planks are used.

- IV: semi-permanent unplastered concrete blocks are used for the walls; roofs of asbestos or corrugated iron sheets.
- V: provisional permanent, like IV, but with plastered walls.
- VI: permanent, houses with a roof of reinforced concrete cement. (Cf. Van der Linden 1977: Ch.V, where also the calculation of the index is explained.)

Until recently, both colonies had a very low level of security and consequently, in both colonies, the condition of houses and environment was poor. In a study in 1975, it was argued that security in Ghousia Colony (called Aqab Jail Colony at the time) was even lower than in Usmania, because there were plans for alternative use of the land on which Ghousia Colony is built. The development of individual houses reflected this difference in security of tenure (Van der Linden, 1977, 230).

By 1983, the situation was reversed: suddenly, in Ghousia Colony, security had become high, while not much had changed with regard to Usmania (cf also Nientied, 1984a). Usmania is located on land belonging to the Public Works Department (PWD) which is a semi-autonomous body to which MLOs for regularization and development of katchi abadis do not apply. In fact, PWD has refused to transfer the land of Usmania to the municipality, because (it says) it wants to use this land for office buildings.

Figure 3 illustrates the different development of individual houses in both colonies. The importance of the difference in development which can be observed from the diagrams lies in its indicating that living conditions in katchi abadis are dependent to a great extent on government decisions. For a study by Peter Nientied, 50 value estimates of residential plots in each of the colonies were done by an estate agent. This study first of all showed that according to key-informants, up to end 1982, the value of dwellings of equal quality of construction, facilities, plot area, location, etc. was higher in Usmania than in Ghousia Colony. The estimated differences were in the range of 15-20%. This is wholly in accordance with the previous tenure and housing situation, as described above.

The study also shows that in 1984, the average value of dwellings in Ghousia Colony was found to be 10% higher than in Usmania. This change (from 15-20% under, to 10% over the value of dwellings

in Usmania) excludes factors such as house consolidation and can therefore be attributed to KMC's decision to regularize Ghousia Colony.

Displacement

Because of the greatly increased security of tenure and the improved facilities of Ghousia Colony, its attractiveness as a residential area has been enhanced substantially. The results of the study on development of plot prices presented above, confirm this. The danger is very real, then, that the poorer households are bought out and displaced by better-off households.

To gain an insight into this question, the 10% sample survey of 1983 is being repeated in 1986 amongst the same plots. The 1986 data are not yet complete. Yet, 90 of the total 111 interviews had been completed by the time of writing this paper, so that a fair preliminary assessment is possible. First of all, it should be noted that Ghousia Colony's population was found to be fairly stable in 1983, as the following table shows.

Table 3: Length of residence in Ghousia Colony

Number of Years	%
0 - 5	5
6 - 10	12
11 - 15	11
16 - 20	25
21 - 25	24
26 - 30	15
31 -	8
Total	100 (N = 111)

(Source: Van der Linden, 1984, 7)

Further, it was found that 92% of the population lived in owned houses; only 4% were renters, while another 4% lived free in houses owned by relatives.

For the purpose of studying displacement, the residents of Ghousia Colony interviewed in 1983 and 1986 can be divided into three groups:

- 1) Stayers, i.e. those residents interviewed in 1983, who were living on the same plot also in 1986;
- 2) Leavers, i.e. 1983 interviewees who were no longer residing on the same plot in 1986;
- 3) Newcomers, i.e. those 1986 interviewees who were not living on the same sample plots in 1983.

Some preliminary data pertaining to the question of displacement can be summarized as follows:

Table 4: Stayers, Leavers and New-comers in Ghousia Colony, 1986

	N	%
Stayers	79	88.8
Leavers / Newcomers	10	11.2
Total	89	100

(missing case: 1)

Considering that in a period of almost 3 years (34 months), only 11% of the population had moved from their previous plots, a first conclusion is that, anyway, large-scale displacement is not taking place.

Although not all the leavers have been traced yet, it is already known that 3 of them have shifted to other places within Ghousia Colony. In two cases, leavers' households left the plots after the death of the head of the household and moved out of Karachi. Thus, 5 cases are left, where possibly displacement could have taken place as a result of the improvement programme (i.e. 5.6% of the cases interviewed).

Amongst the ten leavers, there are 3 (out of the 4; the fourth one is yet to be interviewed) 1983 renters and one household which in 1983 was putting up with relatives. The renters in katchi abadis

of Karachi are a very mobile group in general (Nientied et al., 1982, 88; Wahab, 1984, 17); living with relatives often is a temporary arrangement only.

While the numbers and characteristics of the leavers do not provide indications of serious displacement on a large scale, it is worth noting that the average 1983 monthly household income of the leavers is 10% lower than the overall average household income of Ghouseia Colony in 1983 (Rs 1345.-- against Rs 1496.--).

However, the 1983 average size of leavers' households is also well below the overall 1983 average (6.1 against 7.06). The monthly income per head of the leavers (1983: Rs 220.49) is even higher than the average income per head calculated in 1983 (Rs. 212.--). This conclusion also holds when the 5 potential cases of displacement are considered (average income per head Rs 213.--, so that the leavers can not be considered 'the poorest').

As regards the 10 newcomers, their first eye catching characteristic is that 8 of them are renters. Thus, even in the incomplete sample, the number of renters has doubled when compared to three years earlier. In five of these 8 cases, renters live in houses previously inhabited by the owners (or their relatives), who apparently did not sell their houses when they left. Only tracing of the leavers / owners will reveal what their circumstances and motives are. However, the present data certainly do not give rise to suspicion of better-off people buying out the poorest residents of Ghouseia Colony. It is of interest, finally, to note that the newcomers, on average, have much higher incomes than the stayers (Rs 3303.50 against Rs 2121.70). One could argue that, because of the rise of price of land and houses and the concomitant rise of rents (Rs 375.-- on average against Rs 275.-- three years ago), only relatively well-to-do newcomers can be expected in Ghouseia Colony.

From the data, however, it looks as though the newcomers can be divided into two groups. Four of them earn household incomes far below Ghouseia Colony's average; their average household income is a mere Rs 761.25 (i.e. 36% of the stayers' average). The other 6 enjoy relatively high incomes, averaging Rs 4998.33 (i.e. 235% of the stayers' average).

Of course, the number of newcomers is far too small to draw any definite conclusions from these figures. Yet, the division is so sharp that a tentative conclusion is warranted. The assumption could be justified, then, that on the one hand there is a group of poor, stagnating bridgeheaders', people who do not have the means to consolidate their position in an owned house and who are caught in continually changing rental accommodation (Van der Linden, 1982). It is amazing that evidently

such poor people still find access into Ghouseia Colony. An explanation might be that landlords have a strong preference for tenants whom they know directly, relatives or friends (Wahab, 1984, 12).

One the other hand, there is a group of people who could afford living in an own house. They may be delaying their consolidation till the time they have saved enough. Alternatively, they might be sufficiently well-off not to care much about their tenure status, but attach high priority to the facilities and amenities present (the 'status-seekers', in Turner's terminology; Turner, 1968). If this could be so, one might expect that this group would be much less mobile than other renters in Karachi's squattments: they could easily cope with regular rises of rents. A more stable renters population could also match with a possible motive of leavers who have not sold their houses, but want to keep these as a regular source of income.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

First of all, the case of Ghouseia Colony shows the enormous potential of squatment upgrading. Conditions in Ghouseia Colony were extreme: the lay-out was very problematic and practically every plot was affected by the upgrading programme. On the other hand, there was no government assistance, nor even a formal sanction to the upgrading programme. The inhabitants have taken their chance as soon as they felt safe to do so, and have turned their neighbourhood into a very liveable area, indeed.

Secondly, this change has not brought about displacement, as some theories would predict (cf e.g. Burgess, 1978). Again, in this respect, Ghouseia Colony is an extreme case. In a longitudinal study of Baldia Township - another squatment area of Karachi - no serious displacement was found. However, it could be argued that a) since Baldia is located at Karachi's periphery, pressure on land is moderate; b) since Baldia is a neighbourhood in its own right (some 250,000 inhabitants), having a strong labour-class image it would not be very attractive to richer Karachiites, while c) Baldia had come about through illegal commercial subdivision, so that it has a tendency to house the relatively well established households amongst the poor, having more stable jobs and / or being less poor than the average Karachi squatter.

More in general, it can be argued that in most squattments of Karachi which are legalized, the de facto security of tenure was already high before formal legalization took place. This could be even more the case after promulgation of the MLOs for legalization and improvement. Therefore, it could well be that selection processes amongst the population, such as displacement, have already taken place long before the legalization programme starts. This could be one reason why, for

instance in the Baldia surveys, no displacement was discovered.

In a centrally located settlement, such as Ghouseia Colony, the situation is different: pressure on land is certainly high; it is worth recalling, how in 1973, a high central-government official, commenting on Usmania, confessed: 'the land is pure gold'. Also, as the study on land prices showed, these increased considerably as a result of the upgrading programme. Also, Ghouseia Colony is surrounded by middle and upper class neighbourhoods. Although on average the Ghouseia Colony households are not significantly poorer than their Baldia counterparts, their employment situation certainly is less secure.

Even after promulgation of the MLOs for legalization and improvement, security of tenure in Ghouseia Colony continued to be extremely low. Therefore, in this case, displacement as a result of a slowly increasing de facto security of tenure and in anticipation of formal legalization cannot have taken place. Rather, one might assume that some of the better-off inhabitants of Ghouseia Colony would have looked for a safer place to live, while the poorer part of the population has stayed. In spite of all this, turnover of population in Ghouseia Colony on an annual basis was found to be even lower than in Baldia (3.9 between 1983 - 1986 in Ghouseia Colony, against 8.5, 5.1 and 5.4 respectively in the periods '77 - '79, '79 - '81 and '81 - '83 in Baldia).

It seems as though displacement is dependent on many more factors than those entailed by an upgrading and legalization programme and the incomes of inhabitants of squattments alone. For instance, the resistance against displacement can be very strong amongst those people who for economic reasons would be the first victims of displacement processes. It is precisely these people who much depend on their local networks (credit from the grocer around the corner, help from neighbours, etc.) and cannot easily survive without these (cf. Nientied et al., 1982, 25). Apart from that, many more factors should be taken into account, such as the scale on which improvement projects are undertaken, the real alternatives to shiftees, attitudes towards renting and (sub-)letting, several features of the project areas (plotsizes, distances to places of work, etc.) and of the projects themselves (standards, costs, etc.) (cf. Nientied et al., 1986).

Thirdly, we have seen that institutional arrangements play a somewhat ambivalent role: on the one hand they made for the possibility of including Ghouseia Colony in the legalization and upgrading policy. Also, the DKAE was able to prepare realistic plans for the area and did so in time. As compared to the situation of say -10 years ago, these are major achievements. At the same time, the case

of Ghouseia Colony shows how marginal the role of institutional arrangements is. No institutional arrangements can be thought of which can overcome the root problems in squatment upgrading, viz. a low priority for low-income housing in government policy and the concomitant chances for many other interests to dominate the execution of projects in this field. This conclusion is contrary to the belief that a major bottleneck in the execution lies in institutional constraints, weak coordination, red tapism, etcetera, and that restructuring of the government institutions and training of their staffs would go a long way in solving the problem. However essential overhauling of the government machinery and training of their staffs may be, the root causes of the almost universal problems lie much deeper (van der Linden, 1986).

This brings us to the fourth and last conclusion which regards the overwhelming importance of the political aspects. Again, these are a double edged sword. On the one hand, it was for political motives that Ghouseia Colony shifted from the list of settlements to be demolished to a top priority case, while, at the same time, political motives are the cause of enormous delays in the execution of the programme and the concomitant losses to the Municipality. In line with the previous conclusion, it looks as though the political can easily overrule the institutional arrangements.

But, apparently, it also overruled economic considerations in the case of Ghouseia Colony. The possibility to recognize the poor's right to a share of 'pure gold' stems from political grounds. It could well be that the political potential - including the sort of motives which Ghouseia Colony's councillor fosters - has been insufficiently exploited in the recent past. NGOs as well as individuals inside and outside the government agencies could play a major role in this respect.

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Making Microplans

An Action Development and Design Approach or The Intuitive Science of Muddling Through in Urban Settlement Upgrading

This approach deals with programming and implementation and is directed at upgrading projects. It provides local personnel with methods which enable this work to be completed within a few days. It is intensely participatory and action based. Only a minimum amount of information is collected in order to facilitate decision-making. Long surveys, sophisticated data management, master planning are all avoided. The implementation team is assumed to include residents, technical personnel and other interested parties (e.g., health workers, etc.)

The approach introduces quick, easy techniques for program making, design, implementation and monitoring. These are structured to balance the need for strategic planning with local, more spontaneous action; problem-seeking with problem-solving; community needs with government objectives; off-site preparation with on-site development and implementation. Training is designed to go hand-in-hand with implementation, following learning-by-doing principles, and then helping to accelerate development. The structure provides a general and non-specific framework, which is locally interpretable, to reflect local issues and needs.

Structure The approach includes procedures which are grouped under four related action areas:

1. Problem identification
2. General strategies or actions to deal with problems.
3. Program agreement by assessing options and tradeoffs.
4. Implementation planning - who does what, when and how.

1. Problem Identification

In Step 1, procedures are delineated for making short, sample surveys with checklists of "What to look for".

In Step 2, the various problems as identified and perceived by each group are defined with an indication of why and for whom these problems exist.

In Step 3, game playing techniques are used as a tool with which to agree on problems, and their the level of priority. The outcome is a list of those problem areas which all agree are critical, and an equivalent list which one or other party feels to be important, but cannot get agreement on.

2. Generale Strategies

The goal is to identify alternative ways in which the critical problems identified

above can be tackled, and to have these prioritised. Again, three steps are outlined with specific procedures and checklists of things to consider whilst proceeding.

In Step 1, each interest group prioritises the strategies which it thinks may be appropriate with some indications of those that are immediate, or urgent and need to be tackled now, and those that can wait until later.

In Step 2, through negotiation, a summary list of actions are agreed amongst the groups.

In Step 3, these are prioritised by all parties.

3. Agreeing a program.

The goal here is to identify several appropriate ways of carrying out the strategies agreed above, and then to select the most appropriate one based on the balance between feasibility and desirability. Two essential steps for doing this are considered.

In Step 1, a list is made of the alternative ways in which a strategy can be carried out, and an overall cost index is attached, based on the assumption that the work will be done entirely through formal government contract channels. The project team (which includes the ultimate beneficiaries) is then able to offset this cost by negotiating and agreeing alternative levels of community involvement in doing the work.

In Step 2, the project team is asked to decide which options are most technically feasible, affordable, and desirable. As more information becomes available, and as discussions continue, it may be necessary to revert to Step 1 and to re-negotiate the community input.

4. Planning for Implementation

In this section, the objective is to establish a step-by-step procedure for the implementation of the program as agreed above. The outcome - a set of action plans delineate the who, what and how, relative to the work to be done and defines in more detail the physical planning requirements for dealing with improvements and additions to both site and dwellings. In this case, 4 steps for doing this are delineated, with checklists and other supportive procedural material. During the first step, each part of the program to be implemented is scheduled, together with the tasks involved, and who does them and how. In Step 2, site improvements include the new additions as located in the plan, and checked against local conditions, and in Step 3 a similar procedure is adopted for the house. In Step 4, a detailed schedule of how to proceed is drawn up, together with where to start and when for all the agreed components of the project. Thus the action plan is inclusive of proposals which also link physical improvements with other social and health programs (community development plan, health education, technical skills development training, etc.).

Comparative Evaluation of Papers presented at the International Symposium on Slum- and Squatter-Upgrading

Berlin, Nov 27 - 30, 1986

AUTHOR	Fadda	Schmetzer	Schlyter	Oestereich	Larsson	Siita	Rathsman	Van der Linden
Nature of paper:	Policy Paper	Evaluation	Evaluation	Evaluation	Evaluation	Project Report	Project Report	Project Report
Countries covered:	Venezuela	Kenia/Tanzan.	Zambia	Zambia	Botswana	Ghana	Cape Verde I.	Pakistan
City / Town	Caracas	Nairobi/Dar	Lusaka	Lusaka	Gababarone	Tanale	Mindelo	Karachi
Settlement	La Moran	[var]/Manzeze	George	Kalinglinga	Old Naledi	Ward "M"/Ghana	Campinho/Made	Ghousia Colony

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA:

Population affected by project:	11 500	> 100 000	> 10 000	15 000	12 000	5 000	> 300	> 5 000
Context:	City center	Suburb	Suburb	Suburb	Urban	Suburb/rural	Middle s.town	City center
Origin:	Squatter set.	Squatter set.	Squat. settl.	Squat. settl.	Squat. settl.	Squat. settl.	Squat. settl.	Squatter settl.
Densities: before project start	?	?	400	?	ca 100	60-80 p./acre!	480 / 800	540
(inh./ha.) after completion	?	135	>400	100	ca.140	40 inh./acre!	390 / 600	540

PROJECT ELEMENTS: (Measures)

LEGALIZATION OF LAND TENURE		X	X	X	X	X		X
LAND BANK		X						
CASH LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS		X	X	X			X	
UPGRADING OF HOUSES		X		X			X	
ROAD CONSTRUCTION		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY		X		X	X		X	
UPGRADING OF SANITATION		X		X	X	X	X	X
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE			X	X	X	X	X	
BUILDING MATERIALS BANK			X		X			
BUILDING MATERIALS PRODUCTION			X	X			X	
JOB CREATION						X	X	
VOCATIONAL TRAINING						X		
INSTITUTION BUILDING				X		X		
RELOCATION	X							

AGENTS INVOLVED:

	a) in project design	b) in implementation	c) in finance	d) in future maintenance	e) in subsequent project	f) in resistance
Individuals affected:		d		de	c	abcd
Community:	f			de	e	abcd
Local Government:	abc	bd	abcd	bode	abde	abcde
Regional Governat.:						
Central Government:		abce	ac		abe	c
US-AID					abc	
Other bilateral agency:				abc	bc	c
World bank:		ace	abc		e	
Other intern. agency:						
Local NGO:					b	
Foreign NGO:						abc
National Housing Bank		c				
Local contractor						

FINANCE

	o = not intended	+ = planned	* = realized	‡ = not achieved
Full cost Recovery:	o	+	‡	o
Cross subsidy:	o	+		
Revolving fund:	o	o	*	‡
Part subsidy:	+	o		‡
Fully subsidized:	*	o		

OBSERVED EFFECTS

Physical consolidation:		YES	YES	YES		YES		YES
Social integration:		YES		YES		YES		
Gentrification/displacement	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO (?)		NO	NO
Overcrowding:		NO		NO	YES	NO	NO	
Loan repayment defaults:		YES	NO	NO	YES			
Service charge defaults:			YES					
Political mobilization:	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO			
Political de-mobilization:		NO						
Employment:				MORE		MORE		
"Commercialization":				LESS				
Current household expenditure:			MORE					
Rented accommodation (subletting)	ONLY		MORE	LESS	MORE			
Industrialized building material	ONLY			LESS	MORE			
Subsistence (re-) production:	LESS			LESS				

Note:

The evaluation is based on a questionnaire completed by the authors of the papers concerned. The cases included in this volume of TRIALOG are on the left page, the remaining on the right. Since not all authors completed the questionnaire, the list is not complete. The original questionnaire was compiled by Kosta Mathéy, the evaluation was carried out jointly by K. Mathéy and Rita Mrotzek-Sampat.

AUTHOR	Ciecior	Serageldin	Wilkinson et al.	Oestereich/2	van Nostrand	Sarna	Hennion	Turkstra-Wolff
Nature of paper:	Evaluation	Project Rept.	Evaluation	Evaluation	Evaluation	ProjectReport	ProjectReport	Evaluation
Countries covered:	Venezuela	Egypt	Egypt	Senegal	Botswana	India	India	India
City / Town	Ciudad Guayana	Ismalia	Helwan	Dakar	Gaborone	Visakhapatnam	Kanpur	Madras
Settlement	[Sites+Serv.]	M.S.Town Ext.	Worker's City	Pikine	Old Naledi			

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA:

Population affected by project:	100 000	37 000	35 000	> 5 000	10 000	> 100	> 10 000	> 300
Context:	Urban	New Town	Urban	Suburb	Urban	Middle s.town	Urban	Suburb
Origin:	Squatter set.	Squatter set.	Plats	Subdivision	Squat. settl.	Slum	Squat. settl.	Squatter settl.
Densities: before project start	< 200	260	?	?	83	?	?	?
(inh./ha.) after completion	100	265	?	200	72	?	?	ca. 1800

PROJECT ELEMENTS: (Measures)

LEGALIZATION OF LAND TENURE	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
LAND BANK								
CASH LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS	X		X					X
UPGRADING OF HOUSES		X	X	X	X			X
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	X	X			X	X	X	
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	X	X			X	X	X	
UPGRADING OF SANITATION	X	X			X	X	X	
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE	X	X		X	X		X	X
BUILDING MATERIALS BANK	X				X			
BUILDING MATERIALS PRODUCTION					X			
JOB CREATION	X							
VOCATIONAL TRAINING	X							
INSTITUTION BUILDING		X		X	X			
RELOCATION								

AGENTS INVOLVED:

	a) in project design	b) in implementation	c) in finance	d) in future maintenance	e) in subsequent project	f) in resistance
Individuals affected	abcde	abcd	abcd	bcd	abc	c
Community:		abcd		ab	ab	b
Local Government:	cde	ab			abcd	abcde
Regional Governat.:		ab				c
Central Government:	abcd	a			abce	ce
US-AID		abc				
Other bilateral agency:		abcd			bc (CIDA)	
World bank:					abc	ace
Other intern. agency:						abd (UNICEF)
Local NGO:						
Foreign NGO:						ab
National Housing Bank						ce
Local contractor			X			

FINANCE

	o = not intended	+ = planned	* = realized	† = not achieved
Full cost Recovery:	o		*	†
Cross subsidy:				o
Revolving fund:	*			o
Part subsidy:				o
Fully subsidized:				o

OBSERVED EFFECTS

Physical consolidation:	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Social integration:	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Gentrification/displacement	NO		NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
Overcrowding:	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Loan repayment defaults:	NO			NO	NO		YES	YES
Service charge defaults:								
Political mobilization:	YES				YES		NO	NO
Political de-mobilization:					NO		NO	NO
Employment:	MORE				MORE		NO EFFECT	
"Commercialization":	LESS	MORE	MORE		MORE	MORE	MORE	LESS
Current household expenditure:	MORE		MORE		MORE		MORE	MORE
Rented accommodation (subletting)	LESS	MORE			MORE	MORE		
Industrialized building material	LESS	MORE	MORE		MORE		MORE	MORE
Subsistence (re-) production:	LESS				MORE		LESS	

A List of papers presented at the International Symposium "Strategies for Slum and Squatter-Upgrading" in Berlin Nov. 1986.

This list only includes those papers which have not been included in this TRIALOG issue. Copies may be obtained directly from the authors only (for addresses see below).

The presentations marked by ** have not been submitted as a written paper.

Vikram Bhatt & Witold Rybcynski, The Morphology of Informal Settlements, 39s.

Rod Burgess, Slum Upgrading and Self-Help Housing Policies in Economically less Developed Countries: Some Current Problems and Misconceptions *

Marisa Carmona, Elsa Blischeroux, An Approach to the Integrated Upgrading of Marginal Urban Areas

Bernd Ciecior, Facilitation and Participation Strategies in the Guayana Project, Venezuela A Review of Alternative Policies, 10s.

A.P. Cotton R.W.A. Franceys, Engineering for Low Income Urban Housing in Sri Lanka, 29s., 17ill.

Tony Dominguez Alam, Non-Governmental-Organizations, the Government and Participatory Upgrading Programs: The Case of Santo Domingo, 36s.

Rainer Ernst, Housing Revitalization Pilot Project in the Historical Center of Salvador de Bahia *

Max Hennion, Induced Mobility among Slum Dwellers during a Slum Upgradation Programme. The Case of Kanpur, India, 7s.

Bryan Higgins, Slum and Squatter Settlements in Nicaragua: Before and After the Revolution, 23s., 2ill.

Jan van der Linden, Implementation and Impacts of a Legalization and Improvement Programme in Karachi The Case of Ghousia Colony, 26s., 7ill.

John van Nostrand, Squatter and Urban -Upgrading and the Idea of a Town. Lessons in Urbanization from Botswana and Lesotho, 24 p.

Jürgen Oestereich, Internal and External Limitations to the Self Management of Squatter Communities The Case of Pikine and Grand Yoff, Dakar, 36s., 13ill

J.A.C. Okafor, Alternative Housing Solutions Slum Upgrading in Anambra State

Sopon Pornchokchai, Socio-Economic Characteristics of Bangkok's Slums - and the Consequences for Upgrading Opportunities 39s., 12ill

Bh. Venkateswara Sarma, Slum Upgrading in Visakhapatnam A Critical Study, 20s., 13ill.

Hany B. Serageldin, Mohammed Eid & A.M.A. Rahman, An Evaluation and Analysis Study of "Hail el Salam" Project (- Ismailia), Egypt, 39s., 10 ill

David Stewart, Building Regulations and Technology Transfer: Some Lessons from Low Cost Housing in Papua New Guinea.

Percival Thomas, Squatter Environment and Upgrading Techniques in Trinidad. Results from an Investigation. 6 s.

Jan Turkstra Mark Wolffe, Squatter Settlements in the Urban Fabric of Madras, 29s., 4ill.

Günther Wehenpol, Inhabitant Participation in the Process of Squatter-Upgrading - with special Regard to the Technical Infrastructure, 37s., 25ill.

Nicholas Wilkinson, Graham Tiplie with Magdi Noor, Are Self-Help Extensions the Way forward in Multi-storey Walk-ups? Lessons from Helwan, Egypt, 30s., 8ill

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Billigflüge weltweit mit der "Net"

(... warum woanders mehr zahlen? ...)

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Buchbesprechungen

Book reviews

Slum- and Squatter- Upgrading

Jop de Wit, Slum Dwellers, Slum Leaders and the Government Apparatus. Urban Research Working Papers No 8, 68 Seiten, ISBN 906875-008-9, Institute of Cultural Anthropology, Free University, P.O.Box 7161, NL-1007 MC Amsterdam, 1985.

Diese Broschüre gliedert sich in zwei Teile: zunächst wird theoretisch untersucht, welches legale und organisatorische Instrumentarium für Slums in Madras relevant ist, und welche Interessenskonflikte praktisch von vornherein vorprogrammiert sind. Anschließend überprüft der Autor am Slum-Upgradingprogramm von Sandosh Nagar wie stark sich die Nutzer mit ihren Interessen gegenüber den anderen Interessensgruppen durchsetzen konnten, und welches die größten Hinderungsgründe waren. Obwohl die Studie feststellt, daß einer Selbsthilfe nach Turners Verständnis in diesem Fall enge Grenzen gesetzt waren, bleibt für alle Beteiligten unterm Strich ein Nutzen sichtbar.

Kosta MATHÉY

Jürgen Oestereich, COMMUNITY UPGRADING: The Kalingalinga Project in Lusaka, Zambia, 56 Seiten A4, Ratingen 1986. Erhältlich vom Autor: Am Dinkelsbach 10, 4030 Ratingen.

Lusaka dürfte weltweit die Stadt mit der größten Upgrading-Erfahrung sein, und neben den international durch die Weltbank geförderten Quartieren wurden auch diverse Projekte dieser Art in bilateraler Zusammenarbeit durchgeführt. Die BRD finanzierte z.B. durch die GTZ die Sanierung des Stadtteils „Kalingalinga“, und Dr. Oestereich hatte als ausländischer Betreuer die Gelegenheit, das Projekt über Jahre hinweg regelmäßig zu verfolgen und zu evaluieren.

Seine hier vorliegende Publikation über das Upgrading Projekt enthält zunächst einen Bericht im üblichen Sinn, in dem das Projektgebiet selbst, sein Kontext, Projektziele und -vorgänge erklärt werden, und eine vorläufige Evaluierung vorgenommen wird. In einem zweiten Teil vertieft der Autor einige, in der internationalen wohnungspolitischen Debatte aktuellen Aspekte (wie Selbsthilfe, Partizipation, Arbeitsbeschaffung oder Baukostenreduzierung durch Anwendung Angepaßter Technologien) im Lichte der in Lusaka gemachten Erfahrungen.

Wie schon Susanna Godehart in den ASA-Studien Band 7 (Augel et al. „Die verplante Wohnmisere“, Saarbrücken 1986) schildert Oestereich die gemachte Erfahrung in Großen und Ganzen als positiv, insbesondere wegen der im Vergleich zu den vorangegangenen Weltbank-Projekten wesentlich ausgeprägteren lokalen Initiative und Entscheidungsbefugnis, und wegen einer Kosteneinsparung von rund 39% (d.h. geringere finanzielle Belastung der Bewohner und damit weniger Verdrängung). Als eine für den Erfolg unabdingbare Voraussetzung wird auf eine ausreichende, den notwendigen Lern- und Akzeptanzprozessen der Ausführenden angemessene Projektlaufzeit hingewiesen. Eher unauffällig erscheint hier die Kritik an den deutschen Geldgebern, die für eine solche Entwicklung offensichtlich nicht genug Geduld aufbrachten, sondern bestimmte Baumaßnahmen an gebietsfremde Bauunternehmer vergab, nachdem die Zielgruppe selbst sich nicht imstande zeigte, dieselben (unter Ausnutzung lokaler Ressourcen), terminge-

recht fertigzustellen. Entgegen dem in der neo-marxistischen Debatte häufiger vorgebrachten Argument, Selbsthilfe-Wohnungsbauprogramme hätten den Nebeneffekt doppelter Ausbeutung und politischer Pazifizierung, stellt Oestereich fest, daß dies für den zambischen Zusammenhang nicht zuträfe. Stattdessen würde das Verhandlungsgeschick der Betroffenen gegenüber dem Establishment geschult, zusätzliche Lohnarbeitsplätze würden geschaffen, und ein negativer Einfluß auf das Lohnniveau sei nicht beobachtet worden. Auch die Gefahr einer „Kommodifizierung“ (durch Spekulation und soziale Umschichtung) sieht er - im Gegensatz zu Godehart - für nicht gegeben, da Grund und Boden verstaatlicht sind, und ein Transfer von Pachtverträgen lokaler Kontrolle in der Nachbarschaft unterliegt, und darüberhinaus durch bürokratische Hürden erschwert wird.

Abgesehen von dem Vorzug einer - unabhängigen (d.h. nicht von den Sponsoren herausgegebenen) - Projektinformation aus erster Hand gefällt diese Broschüre durch den Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Auswertung der Felderfahrung. Es wird auf fast alle brennenden Streitpunkte in der Diskussion von Upgrading- und Selbsthilfeprogrammen eingegangen, obwohl der Umfang der Publikation nicht erlaubt, alle Argumente voll auszuführen. Die Herkunft der verwendeten Daten und Behauptungen wird nicht im Einzelnen belegt, dafür wird der Leser mit einer ausführlichen Literaturliste zu jedem Kapitel entschädigt.

(Kosta MATHÉY)

John Parry & Andrew Gordon (Eds.), Shanty Upgrading, 90 Seiten, Intermediate Technology Workshops, Cradley Heath. Bezug: Parry Associates, Overend Rd, Cradley Heath, West Midlands B64 7DD, England. Preis 8,95 engl. Pfund plus Porto.

Das Handbuch wurde von der „Overseas Development Administration“ einer englischen Entwicklungshilfebehörde, in Auftrag gegeben, und versteht sich als Ergänzung zu dem 1983 erschienen „Urban Housing Manual“ (vergl. Rezension in TRIALOG 3, Seite 33), die Schwerpunkte dieser Publikation liegen in den administrativen/organisatorischen Fragen, und der Auswahl einer angepaßten Technologie für Wohnungsbau und Infrastruktur. Vier kurze Fallstudien (Botswana, Colombia, Sri Lanka und Pakistan) auf den Gebieten veranschaulichen die Ausführungen.

Die Broschüre richtet sich anscheinend an Politiker und Projektpersonal ohne Vorkenntnisse zu dem Thema. Der für die Darstellung gewählte Stil erinnert an den eines „Geschichtenerzählers“, und auch die flotten Zeichnungen der Illustrationen entsprechen dem Genre. Beiläufige Hinweise auf bekannte Upgrading Projekte (und ihrer Schwierigkeiten) aus der ganzen Welt verraten eine weitgehende Sachkenntnis der Autoren, die im Übrigen anonym bleiben. Mögliche Mißerfolge werden primär als Problem der Projektimplementierung - und nicht als Folge struktureller Konflikte - gedeutet. Es wird die Auffassung vermittelt, daß sich das Wohnungsproblem in der Dritten Welt mit dem Instrument der Upgrading-programme, gekoppelt mit Sites-and-Services Projekten, endlich in den Griff bekommen läßt.

(Kosta MATHÉY)

Bamberger, M., Hewitt, E., Monitoring and Evaluating Urban Development Programs A Handbook for Program Managers and Researchers, Washington 1988 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 53), 263 S., US \$ 15,00 Bezug: UNO-Verlag, 53 Bonn 1, Simrockstr. 23

Dieses Handbuch für Politiker, kommunale Manager und für Praktiker in Stadtentwicklungsprojekten bietet eine umfangreiche Arbeitshilfe durch alle Stadien einer Projektevaluierung, beginnend bei der Konzeption von „Monitoring“ und Evaluierung bis hin zu praktisch-technischen Details. Monitoring/Evaluierung als praktische Instrumentarien haben das Ziel, kontinuierlich und posthum zu überprüfen, ob ein Projekt die vorhandenen Mittel sinnvoll und in beabsichtigter Weise eingesetzt und ob die angestrebten Ziele erreicht wurden, bzw. bis zu welchem Grade sie sich einlösen ließen.

Als Rahmen der Evaluierung gelten das Performance Monitoring und das Process Monitoring (als quantitative/qualitative Erfolge und ihre zeitlich-organisatorische Dimension), die „Impact evaluation“ (Kontrolle der sozialen Zielgruppen) und die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse. Wesentlicher Bestandteil dieser so aufgebauten Monitoring Strategie ist wiederum effektives Evaluierungsmanagement. In dem Handbuch wird eine Unterscheidung getroffen zwischen einfachen Evaluierungstechniken, die für jeden Projekttyp relevant sind und zwischen mehr komplexen Evaluierungstechniken multisektoraler Projekte. Fazit: Die Verfeinerung des Instrumentariums zur Abwicklung städtischer Entwicklungsprojekte schreitet fort. Mit diesem Handbuch veröffentlicht die Weltbank in der Tat ihre eigenen Evaluierungstechniken, wie sie in den von ihr geförderten Pilotprogrammen erprobt und später in verschiedenen Ländern getestet wurden. Eine sehr wichtig Veröffentlichung für den Projektpraktiker wie den Forscher.

F. Steinberg

Samir Amin und John Ehrenberg, Wie die Namen der Autoren schon vermuten lassen, bewegen sich alle Beiträge auf einem hohen Abstraktionsniveau, lohnen aber die Mühe ihrer Lektüre. Kosta MATHÉY

Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT), Amenagements en Quartiers spontanés Africains, 284 Seiten, Paris 1986. Bestelladresse: ACCT - Réseau, 13, quai André-Citroën, F-75015 Paris.

Der Band dokumentiert zwei Fortbildungslehrgänge für westafrikanische Stadtplaner, die 1985 in Mail, und 1986 in Burkina Faso vom Pariser „Institut de l'Urbanisme“ geleitet wurden. Als Veranstalter zeichnete die „Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique“, die 1970 als Bindeglied der frankophonen Länder ins Leben gerufen wurde. Neben den eher organisatorischen Informationen zu den beiden Lehrgängen enthält die Publikation auch eine Reihe gut geschriebener Erfahrungsberichte über verschiedene Squatter-Sanierungsprogramme in Bamako, Bobo-Dioulasso und Ouagadougou. Obgleich auch diese Beiträge wenig Informationen enthalten, die sich auf andere Länder übertragen ließen, dürften die hier zusammengetragenen und zum Teil sehr anschaulich abgefaßten Berichte aus erster Hand eine ausgezeichnete planungspolitische Einführung für Besucher der drei genannten Städte darstellen.

(Kosta MATHÉY)

Wohnungsversorgung

Dieter Hampel (Ed): Wohnen in der Dritten Welt; 352 Seiten DIN A4

Die Materialien-Sammlung kann gegen Zusendung von DM 3,00 in Briefmarken angefordert werden bei Kontakt- und Informationsstelle bei der Kubel-Stiftung GmbH, Darmstädter Str. 100, 6140 Bensheim 1. Diese Materialien-Sammlung behandelt auf 352 Seiten folgende Themenbereiche: Die Situation der Betroffenen (Wohnverhältnisse und Wohnereignisse in der Großstadt/ Aufbruch der Landbewohner in die Stadt) - Merkmale und Ausmaß der Verstädterung und Wohnungsnot - Umweltprobleme der Großstädte - Analyse der Ursachen - Wohnungsbaupolitische Strategien: von staatlicher Seite / Integration von Initiativen der Bevölkerung in staatliche Maßnahmen / Initiativen der betroffenen, Selbsthilfebewegung - Selbsthilfe, Stadteinkämpfe und staatliche Politik - traditionelles Wohnen - Perspektiven - offizielle Stellungnahme, Programme - Dritte Welt, Erste Welt.

Autoren sind u.a. Florian Steinberg, Gunter Mertins, Heiner Wieseler, J. M. Mghweno, Einhard Schmidt, Goodwin Nyau, Peter Grüpner, Paul Harrison, Tilman Evers, Hans Harms, Lother Kuntze, Irina Bucha, Hans-Jürgen Fiege, R. Kibe Muigi, Werner Lengau, Paul Schmarling, K. A. Immel, Hans Dieter von Frieling, Jakob Rössel, Klaus Bodemer, Gerhard Heilig, Peter Heerle, Remy Medou Mwomo, Rüdiger Seibert.

Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartmann, Ann Meyerson (Eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Housing*, 686 Seiten, ISBN 0-8722-396-3, Philadelphia USA-19122: Temple University Press, ca. US \$ 15,-

In 33 Aufsätzen spiegelt dieser Sammelband den Stand der Diskussion zur Wohnungsfrage unter den Linken in den USA wieder. Das Werk gliedert sich in drei Teile: Private Wohnungsfragen, Staatliche Intervention, und alternative Strategien. Diskutiert werden insbesondere die Folgen der Individualisierung und Privatisierung des Wohnungsproblems, und die Rolle des Staates in der Verteidigung von Privilegien für die Reichen. Auf der Suche nach Alternativen werden Erfahrungen aus dem Ausland aufgearbeitet, und Szenarien für künftige Strategien entworfen: Steve Schiffer analysiert die Fehler der englischen Wohnungsbaupolitik, R. Apfelbaum fragt, was aus dem schwedischen Modell zu lernen und übertragbar ist, Peter Marcuse röllt die Geschichte der Wohnungsprogramme im roten Wien der 20er Jahre wieder auf, Jill Hamburg gibt einen Abriss cubanischer Wohnungsversorgung seit der Revolution und Tony Schumann versucht das Gleiche für Nicaragua. Mit Blick auf die Zukunft spekuliert Dolores Hayden über Form und Implikationen einer nicht-sexistischen Stadt, Robert Kolodny und Tony Schuman kritisieren konventionelle Selbsthilfekonzeppte, E.M. Achtenberg und Peter Marcuse schlagen eine schrittweise „Entmarkung“ (decommodification) der Wohnungsversorgung vor, und Chester Hartmann entwirft zusammen mit Michael Stone eine alternative sozialistische Wohnungspolitik.

Auch wenn das Buch mit dem Blick auf eine Veränderung der Wohnungspolitik in den USA zusammengestellt wurde, enthält es so viele allgemein gültige Ideen, die für andere Länder genauso zutreffen. Außerdem sollte die politische Vorreiterrolle der USA auch für die Sozialpolitik vieler Entwicklungsländer nicht vergessen werden. Kurz gesagt: Das Buch ist eine gute (und gemessen am Gegenwert billige) Investition für alle, die sich für Wohnungsbaupolitik interessieren. (K. Mathéy)

Shelter and Homeless - In the international Year of Shelter for the homeless, Special issue of CITIES, vol. 4, No. 1 Guildford 1987, 104 pp. (Butterworth £ 26,-)

Diese Sondernummer bietet sicher keinen umfassenden Überblick zum Thema des internationalen Jahres der Menschen in Wohnungsnot, aber dafür einige sehr wichtige Beiträge, die das Wohnungsnotproblem und neuere Trends in der 3. wie der 1. Welt charakterisieren. Struyk/Keare beschreiben die Schwierigkeiten exakter Quantifizierung von Wohnungsdifferenzen, während McAuslan die elementaren gesellschaftlichen Hürden, v.a. Planungsgesetze, Richtlinien und die Bodenproblematik zusammenbringt. Gilbert weist auf die bislang wenig berücksichtigte Rolle des Mietwohnungssektors in Lateinamerika hin, während Renaud auf die produktive Rolle von Wohnungsbauinvestitionen, selbst durch „informelle Bauherren“ die Aufmerksamkeit richtet. Während der Beitrag von Rooijmans Managementprobleme niederländischer gemeinnütziger Wohnungsbau-Associations in Zeiten relativ ausgeglichener Versorgung mit Wohnraum umreißt, gehen Redburn/Buss der bei uns weniger bekannten Massenobdachlosigkeit, dem Leben in wilden Behelfssiedlungen und Asyl in den USA nach.

Eine gute Ausgabe CITIES, aber äußerst teuer.

F. Steinberg

Angel, S., Mutual Aid: House Construction Through Building Groups, Training Module, UNCHS, Nairobi 1986 (Bestell-Nr. HS / 98 / 86 / E.)

Dieser Text für einen kurzen, 3-5 tägigen Trainingskurs will die Möglichkeiten und Beschränkungen von gegenseitiger Selbsthilfeunterstützung in Billig-Wohnungsbauprojekten, die Organisationsmethoden und -techniken von Selbsthilfegruppen entwickeln, auf die spezifischen Bedürfnisse der Bewohnergruppen in Hinblick auf Projektunterstützung, interne Organisation, Projektkonzeption, Hausentwürfe und Bautechnik eingehen. In sehr übersichtlicher Weise werden Fragen der Organisation von Selbsthilfegruppen, ihrer Organisierung, ihres Zeiteinsatzes, des günstigsten Konzeptes von Haus- und Siedlungsentwürfen sowie der finanziellen Abwicklung dargestellt. Als Demonstrationsbeispiel dient das bekannte „Building Together“-Projekt in Bangkok und andere Projekte in El Salvador, Hyderabad. Es bleibt offen für die Wohnungsbaunternehmer und -träger die Politik der Nachbarschaftsbezogenen Projektentwicklung auch in breiterem Maße zu unterstützen. Der Training Module legt das als Zukunftsperspektive nahe. (F. Steinberg)

Wong, A.K., Yeh, S.H.K. (eds.) *Housing A Nation, 25 Years of Public Housing in Singapore*, Singapore 1985, 536 S., ISBN 9971-954-22-2 Maruzen Asia Publisher.

Dieses umfangreiche Buch wurde zum 25-jährigen Jubiläum des Housing & Development Board veröffentlicht, eine Auftragsarbeit des HDB selbst, der nicht nur stolz über die Leistungen des weltweit kaum übertrifften öffentlichen Wohnungsbaus ist, sondern auch der internationalen „Gemeinde“ der Spezialisten des öffentlichen Wohnungsbaus die besonderen Erfahrungen nahe bringen will.

Mit Stolz wird vermerkt, daß heute 81% der Singapo-reaner in HDB Apartments leben, etwa eine halbe Million WES wurden durch den HDB gebaut und mit den Jahren ging es nicht mehr nur allein um eine Grundausstattung mit dem nötigsten Wohnraum, sondern besonders auch um qualitative Steigerungen. Die „Behausung“ einer Nation ist also - laut HDB - eine Art modernes städtisches Wunder, das nur durch die besondere Motivation der Regierung zu erreichen war.

In 14 Kapiteln wird eine detaillierte und komplexe Schilderung der HDB Arbeit, ihrer Ressourcen Planung, Siedlungsplanung und Entwurfsarbeit, der Infrastrukturversorgung, den sich verändernden Bau- und Sicherheitsstandards, dem Auftragsmanagement, der Durchführung von Bauprojekten, dem Baustellenmanagement, der Umsiedlung aus alten oder Squatter-Wohngebieten, der Bewohnerreaktion, ihrer Lebensweise in HDB Apartments geliefert.

Die heute deutlich feststellbaren Veränderungen des Lebensstils der Singapo-reaner lassen sich mit Gewißheit auf die neuen Wohnverhältnisse zurückführen, aber werden auch durch insgesamt veränderte Lebensbedingungen ergänzt.

Die sog. „self-sufficient“ Wohnsiedlungen des HDB haben - laut Selbsteinschätzungen des HDB - das allgemeine Niveau der Lebensqualität erheblich gesteigert. Dennoch ist es wichtig hervorzuheben, daß die Singapo-reaner z.B. nach ihrer Umsiedlung vor allem über gewaltige Mietsteigerungen und lange Buswege zur Arbeit und zum Schulbesuch ihrer Kinder klagen. Ebenfalls wenig überzeugend wirken die Gegenüberstellungen der Wohnverhältnisse der dörflichen Kämping-Hütten und der modernen Siedlungen nach der Umsiedlung. Das Lachen auf den Gesichtern ist verschwunden, aber dafür wird nun modern und beengt gewohnt (s. Fotos 20, 21, 22, 23). Doch in den Ergebnissen des HDB ist der Grad der Zufriedenheit der Bewohner moderner Hochhausausstellung nicht nur hoch, er ist sogar über die Jahre gestiegen (p.397)

Während in der abschließenden Einschätzung des Buches nochmals die Rolle des entschlossenen Einsatzes der Regierung für das HDB-Programm hervor-gehoben wird, bleibt ein Faktor jedoch unerwähnt: in Zukunft muß der HDB mehr über die verborgenen menschlichen Bedürfnisse lernen.

Darüberhinaus verändert sich über die Jahre die Rolle des HDB von einem Wohnungsbauträger zu einem Wohnungsverwalter. Aber wird diese Politik der schlüsselfertigen Wohnungsversorgung nochmals 25 Jahre lang für sozialen Frieden und Zufriedenheit der Singapo-reaner sorgen können, wie die Autoren zum Schluß dem HDB wünschen? (F. Steinberg)

Anzorena, J., Poussard, W., A Time to build, People's Housing in Asia, Parkville / Australia 1985, 63., US \$ 4.00 (Bezug: Plough Publications, 49 Princess Margaret Rd, Kowloon, Hong Kong)

Dieses kleine Büchlein erzählt zahlreiche Geschichten von Menschen, die ihre eigenen Häuser und Nachbarschaften durch Eigeninitiative geschaffen haben. Der Gemeinschaftsgeist, die Kreativität, Lebensweisheit der engagierte Einsatz des „einfachen“ Mannes sind die oft einzige Perspektive in einer verzweifelt Situation der Wohnungsnot und Armut. Die hier vorgestellten Beispiele aus Indonesien, Thailand, Pakistan, Indien, Philippinen und Korea reflektieren die neue Erkenntnis, daß die Partizipation und Selbsthilfe oft genug der einzige Weg zur Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse darstellt. Zur Unterstützung von partizipatorischen Projekten werden einige radikale Regeln für den Einsatz des „Fachmanns“ im Dienste der Armen vorgestellt: 1. Respekt für die Armen, 2. Wandel ist möglich, 3. die Energie des Volkes ist die größte Resource, 4. das Volk bewältigt seine Angelegenheiten am besten selbst, 5. jeder, der will, kann partizipieren. Zum Anlaß des IYSH '87 auf den Markt gebracht, zeigt diese kleine Büchlein natürlich nur „Hoffnungsschimmer“ und „erfolgreiche“ Partizipations-beispiele, die Absicht ist mehr propagandistischer Art. Zielgruppe: Sozialarbeiter wie auch Manager und Planer von Wohnungsbauprojekten. (F. Steinberg)

Yeung Y.M., McGee, T.G. (HRSG) *Community Participation in Delivering Services in Asia*, Ottawa 1986, 279 S., Bezug: IDRC, P.O.B.8500 Ottawa Canada K1G 3H9.)

Von 1981 -84 förderte das International Development Centre eine Fünf-Länder Studie von innovativen Projekten, die „Community Participation“ auf den Gebieten der technischen und sozialen Infrastrukturversorgung illustrieren. Dieses Buch entstand aus vergleichenden Forschungsarbeiten und es zeigt eine an der städtischen Praxis identifizierbare Wende hin zur Self-Help-City“, deren Bewohner mit (oder ohne) staatliche Unterstützung einen Teil ihrer lebensnotwendigen Dienstleistungen organisieren und technisch selber gestalten. Die Projekte aus Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippinen und Indonesien illustrieren, daß staatliche Institutionen angesichts des dynamischen städtischen Wachstums nicht umfassend genug in der Lage sind, die essentiellen Dienstleistungen bereitzustellen und auf welche Weise städtische „communities“ mit den Mechanismen der Selbsthilfe und der Partizipation in Entscheidungsprozessen auf lokaler Ebene experimentiert haben. Sämtliche Projekterfahrungen, die unter sehr unterschiedlichen politischen Bedingungen stattfinden, spiegeln einen delikaten Konflikt zwischen Emanzipation und Instrumentalisierung wider. Auf der einen Seite mögen staatliche Organisationen an der Kosten- und Konfliktreduzierung durch Förderung und Tolerierung von Selbsthilfe-Projekten interessiert sein, auf der anderen Seite misfällt staatlichen Instanzen die Infragestellung ihrer Kompetenz, ihrer Macht und die Veränderung von Entscheidungs-zonen. Die Fallstudien dieses Buches zeigen a.) sehr unterschiedliche Arten von Infrastruktur-Entwicklungen, ihrer partizipatorischen Mechanismen, b.) Mechanismen der auf Selbsthilfe gestützten Schaffung von Dienstleistungen, c.) mögliche politische Konsequenzen für Stadtplaner und Administratoren. Dieses Buch öffnet eine neue Dimension in der Selbsthilfe-partizipations-Diskussion und bringt in sehr ausgeglichener Weise die wissenschaftliche Position mit den Fallstudien zusammen. Weitere Arbeiten zu diesem Thema, in anderen Ländern und Kontinenten werden nötig sein, um zu weiteren entwicklungspolitischen Konzeptionen generelleren Charakters zu kommen. (F. Steinberg)

Moser, C.O.N., Chant, S., The Role of Women in the Execution of Low Income Housing Projects Training Module, DPU Gender and Planning Working Paper No.6, London 1985, 72 S., 4.5 L (Bezug: DPU, 9 Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0ED, UK).

Dieses Trainingshandbuch, von der DPU für Kurzeit-kurse zum Thema „Planning with Women for Urban Development“ benutzt, wurde im Auftrag der UNCHS (Habitat) erstellt. Die Anleitung für Kurse von mindestens 3 Tagen für 10-20 Personen ist gegliedert in:

- 1) Hinweise für den Kursleiter,
 - 2) verschiedene Kursmaterialien für die Teilnehmer und
 - 3) diverse Literaturangaben zur weiteren Vertiefung.
- Die Kursmaterialien beschreiben Aspekte der Beteiligung von Frauen bei Wohnungsbauprojekten, wobei die verschiedenen Phasen der Projektdurchführung auch unterschiedlichen Beteiligungsgrad ermöglichen.

Dabei werden die folgenden Fragen angesprochen:

- a) Warum wird Beteiligung von Frauen in Siedlungsprojekten angestrebt?
 - b) Was sind die Hindernisse einer effektiven Frauenbeteiligung?
 - c) Was bedeutet Beteiligung oder Ausschluß von Frauen für die Projektdurchführung?
 - d) Welche Empfehlungen für die Absicherung weitergehender Beteiligung können abgeleitet werden?
- In verschiedenen kurzen Projektbeschreibungen von Sites and Services und Squatter Upgrading Projekten wird die Vielfalt der kulturspezifischen Aktionsformen von Frauen illustriert.

Dieser Training Module ist nicht nur wegen der neuen Thematik sondern auch wegen seiner guten didaktischen Struktur sehr empfehlenswert! (F. Steinberg)

Stadtentwicklung

Kitay, M. G., Land Acquisition in Developing Countries, Policies and Procedures of the Public Sector, Boston 1985 (Ölschlager, Gunn & Hain Publ., 131 Clarendon Street, Boston MA 02116), 197 pp.

Der Autor dieses Lehrbuches ist „Chief Counselor“ für die Wohnungs- und Stadtentwicklungsprojekte der US Agency for International Development und hat über mehrere Jahre am Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in

anderes Forum ist wie „Ästhetik und Kommunikation“ dazu prädestiniert, undogmatisch eine so breite wie stimulierende Palette möglicher Entwicklungsszenarien auszubreiten, und dafür namhafte Autoren zu gewinnen wie Manuel Castells, David Eversley, Thomas Sieverts, Robert F. Wagner jun., oder Ernst Sandvoss - um nur einige der vertretenen Namen zu nennen.


(Kosta Mathey)

B. Crousse, E. Le Bris, E. Le Roy (Hrsg.): Espaces disputés en Afrique noire. Pratiques foncières locales. 426 Seiten, ISBN 286537-146-8, Paris 1986, 150 Francs. Erhältlich vom Verlag: Karthala Editions, 22-24 boul. Arago, F-75013 Paris.

Der Band enthält 21 Vorträge, die ursprünglich 1983 auf einem Kolloquium in St. Riquier gehalten wurden. Gemeinsames Thema ist der Umgang mit der Landfrage in verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen und geographischen Zusammenhängen. Die Texte wurden von den Herausgebern grob gegliedert nach lokalen Charakteristika: Metropolen, Industriezentren, Mittelstädte, industrielle Landwirtschaft, traditionell-bäuerliche Ansiedlungen und rein konzeptionelle Überlegungen ohne konkrete lokale Referenz. Gut drei Viertel der Texte beziehen sich auf Westafrika, zwei Aufsätze berichten über Lateinamerika (Mexiko von M. Scheingart, und Ciudad Guayana / Venezuela von G. Schneier). Obwohl es schwerfällt, eine so große Anzahl von wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten zusammenfassend zu beurteilen, fällt auf, daß fast alle Autoren die Auflösung traditioneller (und in der Regel nicht individualisierter) Verfügungsstrukturen über Grund und Boden, und die Einführung formaler, d.h. meist kommerzieller Eigentumsregelungen thematisieren. Der Schilderung des aus der „Entleerung“ resultierenden Elends der früheren Nutznießer folgt in einigen Papers die Suche nach lokal akzeptablen, nichtkapitalistischen Alternativen im Bodenrecht. (Kosta Mathey)

Goethert, R., Kairo - Zur Leistungsfähigkeit inoffizieller Stadtentwicklung. Schriftenreihe Politik und Planung 17, Deutscher Geographischer Verlag / Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Köln 1986, 324 S.

Dies ist die erste, umfangreichere deutschsprachige Arbeit zum Phänomen des informellen (hier „inoffiziellen“) Wohnungsbaus in Kairo. Goethert hat seit vielen Jahren sich am MIT mit Kairo beschäftigt, war beteiligt an diversen gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekten von Cairo University-MIT (und US AID) zur Entwicklung der ägyptischen Bauwirtschaft und zur Neudefinition eines Reformansatzes in der Wohnungsversorgung, hauptsächlich durch die Propagierung des (in Ägypten bisher kaum praktizierten) Site and Services Ansatzes und der positiven Bewertung der Erfolge des informellen Bauens. Dieser „inoffizielle“ Wohnungsbau Ägyptens produziert heute schon 80% der neu gebauten Wohnungen Kairo. Goethert zeigt mit zahlreichen Karten die urbanistische Morphologie solcher „inoffizieller“ Stadtrandansiedlungen Ihre Entwicklungsstufen von der Neugründung bis zur Konsolidierung, analysiert ihre städtebaulichen Werte (Dichte, GFZ / GRZ, Flächennutzung) und vergleicht sie mit „offiziellen“ Siedlungen. Neben der Dynamik des „inoffiziellen“ Siedlungsprozesses werden auch Standards und Kostenvorteile herausgearbeitet, welche Grundlage für eine Standardrevision des „offiziellen“ Wohnungsbaus sein könnten. Im letzten Schritt seiner Arbeit kommt Goethert zur Bestimmung verschiedener Szenarien bezüglich der Ausrichtung des zukünftigen Stadtwachstums (an dem der „inoffizielle“ Wohnungsbau seinen erheblichen Anteil haben wird) und formuliert die Empfehlung eines „Large Ordering Framework“ (LOF), einer Steuerung des zukünftigen Stadtwachstums durch planerische Eingriffe in Baulandbereitstellung und Ausdehnung der Infrastrukturmetze. Mit dieser Schlußfolgerung gelangt der Autor zu einem der heikelsten Punkte im gegenwärtigen Konflikt um die Ausrichtung der ägyptischen Stadt- und Wohnungspolitik, welche noch immer aus deutlich privatwirtschaftlichen Motiven - an der Konzeption des schlüsselfertigen Bauens festhält... Die Arbeit Goetherts - eine Dissertation - überrascht neben der hohen Qualität ihrer Kartenmaterialien und dem Gehalt der Schlußfolgerungen durch sehr holperiges Deutsch; der Bezug zu einigen neueren Untersuchungen / Gutachten wie das von der Weltbank geförderten Municipal Extension Services-Projekt (auf ähnlicher Linie wie Goetherts LOF) fehlt leider, wie überhaupt manche Daten nicht mehr letzte Aktualität besitzen. Aber hier kommt es im Wesentlichen auf die wichtigste Aussage an: der „inoffizielle“ Wohnungsbau ist eine effektive Alternative für die Bewältigung der Wohnungsprobleme Ägyptens und ihn zu unterstützen kommt billiger als alle anderen konventionellen Politiken. F. Steinberg



Urban Moroccan districts according to spatial and socio-economical gradients

Citadins, Villes, Urbanization dans le Monde Arabe aujourd'hui. Numéro hors série de la collection URBAMA. 181 Seiten, A4, 1985. Erhältlich vom „Institut de Géographie“, Parc de Gramont, F-37200 Tours, Frankreich.

10 Konferenzbeiträge aus dem Jahr 1984 von Mitgliedern des Forschungsschwerpunktes „Stadtentwicklung in der Arabischen Welt“ an der Universität Toulouse enthält dieser Sammelband. Die sechs Papers des SYMPOSIUM FRANCO-BRITANNIQUE C.N.R.S. - E.S.R.C. in London) sind in französisch abgefaßt, die vier restlichen Vorträge - gehalten auf der 18. Jahresversammlung der MIDDLE EAST ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA (in San Francisco) - in englisch geschrieben; eine Zusammenfassung gibt es jeweils in der anderen Sprache. Die französischsprachigen Aufsätze beschäftigen sich fast ausschließlich mit methodologischen Forschungsproblemen, oder analysieren bereits zugängliche Forschungsergebnisse hinsichtlich gemeinsamer Trends in der Themenstellung, wobei die benutzte Systematik in vielen Fällen auch für andere Projekte bzw. Regionen nützlich sein könnte. Der englischsprachige Teil befaßt sich direkt mit konkreten Situationen, und berichtet über Stadtentwicklung und den informellen Sektor in Tunesien, eine sozio-räumliche Typisierung städtischer Quartiere in marokkanischen Städten, und das Wachstum von Städten der Golf-Emirate in jüngerer Zeit. (K. Mathey)

Hakim, B.S., Arabic-Islamic Cities, Building and Planning Principles. London 1986 (KPI Ltd. / Routledge & Kegan Paul, ISBN 0-7103 00948. Ca. 130.-DM) Eigentlich hätte dieses Buch, wie der Autor vermerkt, Maghribi Islamic Cities oder North African Cities oder auch Morish Cities heißen sollen, doch dann hat er sich für den allgemeineren, anspruchsvolleren Titel entschieden. Leider kann der Autor jedoch nicht sämtliche Städte des arabischen Raumes mit empirischem Material belegen, das Buch ist mehr oder weniger ein Buch über Tunis - mit einigen Beispielen aus Marokko. Sonderformen des arabisch-islamischen Urbanismus, wie z.B. in Kairo, oder ältere römische oder mesopotamische Ursprünge durchaus verwandter Stadtkultur (z.B. in Syrien oder Irak) entfallen, wengleich der Autor den Anspruch erhebt, für alle arabischen Städte die auf dem Islam basierenden Bau- und Planungsprinzipien identifiziert zu haben.

Im ersten Kapitel geht Hakim auf die Ursprünge des islamischen Rechtsdenkens zurück und er zeigt, wie besonders die Maliki-Schule einen detaillierten Kodex für Bau- und Planungsaktivitäten auf Quartiersebene definierte, welcher vor allem die familiäre Privatheit, Wege- und Nutzungsrechte schützte und Handlungsspielräume (z.B. begrenzt zulässige, private Aneignung von Außenraum) definiert. Auf der Basis dieser allgemeinen Regeln werden eine „Entwurfssprache“ mit ihren städtebaulichen und architektonischen Elementen durch zahlreiche Beispiele besonders aus Tunis vorgestellt. Eine Interpretation des gebauten Kontexts, anhand weiterer Beispiele aus Tunis zeigt im 3. Kapitel die Beziehung von Bauprozess und gebauter Form, worin besonders auf die Rolle und Verantwortlichkeiten der beteiligten Akteure eingegangen wird. In diesen beiden Kapiteln liegt die Stärke des Buches, welches somit mehr ein Tunis-Buch als ein Werk zum arabisch-islamischen Urbanismus ist. Zwar kann man dem Autor in seinen Schlußfolgerungen zustimmen, daß erst seit kurzem die besondere Qualität des arabischen Urbanismus untersucht wird, und daß auch für den heutigen Städtebau viele Lehren darin zu finden sind (z.B. statt starrer Bauordnungen flexible „performance“ Standards, welche der nachbarschaftlichen Übereinstimmung bedürfen). Doch kann man sich fragen, ob die beharrliche Interpretation des Islam und

einiger darauf basierender Rechtslehren wirklich das soziale, ökonomische und materielle Leben und damit den Städtebau so komplex erklären können. Die materielle Basis der arabischen Gesellschaften kommen im theoretischen Ansatz völlig zu kurz, während der geistige, hier religiöse Überbau in dieser Arbeit überinterpretiert wird. F. Steinberg

URBAN INDIA BEFORE THE RAJ (a), MARGREB: FROM COLONIALISM TO A NEW IDENTITY (b), WATER AND ARCHITECTURE (c) drei Schwerpunktheft der Zeitschrift (A.A.R.P.) Environmental Design Rome / London (Bezug: Lavis Marketing, Old Malthouse, 19 A.Q. Paradise Street, Oxford OX 11 Ld).

Eine neue Zeitschrift des ebenfalls neu gegründeten „Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre“ bei Rom sucht nicht nur über die englische Sprache eine weitere Verbreitung, sondern sie setzt auch in Niveau und Aufmachung die Tradition der Art and Archeology Research Papers (AARP) fort, welche hier im Nebenteil erscheinen.

a) In der Nullnummer präsentiert Environmental Design eine Reihe seltener stadt- und architekturhistorischer Materialien über Delhi des 16. Jahrhunderts, in der Umgebung des Hanuman Mausoleums, über Fatehpur Sikri als Exemplar einer Moghul Stadtgründung, über die indo-islamischen Städte in Gujarat, und dazu noch eine Studie der organischen Struktur Ahmedabads und der Vohra-Hofhäuser, über den Königspalast in Vijayanagar und koreanische Architekturmetaphern in Hyderabad.

b) Der Schwerpunkt dieses Heftes - die vom Kolonialismus beeinflusste und deformierte Baukultur als Ausgangspunkt für eine architektonische Identitätssuche beschäftigt sich überwiegend mit Projekten der Stadtplanung z.B. in Casablanca, Tunis, Algier, Teheran oder mit dem Wirken einzelner (kolonialer) französischer, tunesischer oder italienischer Architekten, welche nach Ansicht der Herausgeber zur Identitätsfindung beigetragen haben: Die Arbeiten Marmey's in Tunesien und Marocco werden im Lichte dieser Sichtweise als eine Auseinandersetzung von moderner, rationalistischer Architekturkonzeption mit der arabischen Tradition gesehen. Laprade's berühmte Planung für eine arabisierende Neustadt in / bei Casablanca (Darb El Habous) als Rückbesinnung auf Werte traditioneller, gebauter Umwelt bezeichnet. Nach einer Homage an Ecochard, den bekanntesten, spät-kolonialen französischen Stadtplaner werden anhand von Tunis das völlige Nebeneinander von arabischer Medina und kolonialer Stadt, das Beispiel der selbst nach westlichem Vorbild initiierten Modernisierung im Zentrum Teherans während des 19. Jahrhunderts sowie der Bau imperialer Boulevards im kolonialen Algier vorgestellt.

Viel knapper werden - im Verhältnis zur stark historischen Ausrichtung dieser Beiträge - leider die jüngeren Arbeiten arabischer Architekten z.B. in Marocco und Tunesien behandelt. Stattdessen erhalten Portugiesische arabisierende Entwürfe der römischen Moshchee, eines Königspalastes, Flughafen, Geschäftszentrums etc. wieder breiteren Raum. Ein kritischer Beitrag zum architektonischen Niveau der Aga Khan Architekturpreise, einige Exotica und eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Kuppel als Bauform runden das Heft ab.

c) In diesem bislang letzten E.D. Heft wird vor verschiedenem lokalem Hintergrund die außergewöhnlich hochstehende Wasserkultur der islamischen Welt beschrieben: Wasser als Quell des Lebens, eine besondere Kostbarkeit der ariden Zonen des Orients. Die Beispiele reichen hier von traditionellen Wassergewinnungstechniken im Iran, den Ecosystemen in der Sahara Timimoun), in Gujarat, in der türkischen Kultur der Wasserbauten, im Moghul-Indien, in Fez, in der Alhambra sowie in diversen Beiträgen zum Gartenbau. Bleibt zu hoffen, daß diese für den Spezialisten (!) produzierte Zeitschrift weiter existieren kann und in Zukunft auch mehr gegenwartsbezogene Beiträge publiziert.

F. Steinberg

Jean Racine (Hrsg.), CALCUTTA: La ville, sa crise, et le débat sur la planification et l'aménagement urbains. Veröffentlicht am CNRS Talence. 500 Seiten, ISBN 2-7351-01046-0, Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'homme (54 boul. Raspail, F-75270 PARIS Cédex 06), 1986, 198 Francs.

Der Grundstock zu dem vorliegenden Band wurde im Rahmen eines Seminars am Centre Culturel Français in Calcutta 1979 gelegt, zu dem die meisten der Beiträge erstmalig vorgestellt und diskutiert wurden. Das Material wurde in der Zwischenzeit kompliziert, aktualisiert, und mit Plänen und Illustrationen verse-




Fig. 1.1. L'intégration de l'énergie de Calcutta: un exemple de planification

hen. Das Ergebnis ist eine umfangreiche Dokumentation, deren Hauptteil sich in vier Abschnitte gliedert. Unter dem Motto: „comprendre Calcutta“ wird die Geschichte der Stadt und ihres Hinterlandes aufgezeichnet. 20 analytische Untersuchungen aktueller sozialer Konfliktfelder (Demographie, Wohnungsversorgung, Ökonomie, Energie, Kriminalität, Stadtplanung) enthält der Abschnitt „Une métropole en crise“, während die Vorstellungen von Lösungsstrategien (17 Aufsätze) unter der Überschrift „Maîtriser la crise“ stehen. Es folgen im letzten Block einige prinzipielle Abhandlungen über politische und technologische Alternativen, die sich der aus Wahlen hervorgegangenen, kommunistischen Regierung dieser 10 Millionenstadt stellen. Der Band wird ergänzt durch diverse Anhänge, darunter eine allgemeine und eine literarische Bibliographie, eine Filmographie und ein Index. Sowohl über die Stadt Calcutta generell, wie auch über Probleme ihrer Stadt- und Wirtschaftsplanung, dürfte dieses Werk mit Abstand das zuverlässigste und ausführlichste auf dem Markt sein. (K. Mathéy)

Richard O'Connor, A Theorie Of Indigeneous Southeast Asian Urban - ISM. Research Notes and Discussion Paper No. 38, 132 Seiten, ISBN 9971-902-61-3. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang), Singapore 1983.

Der Autor, Assistent an der 'University of the South' in Tennessee, geht von der These aus, daß westliche Stadtentwicklungstheorien ungeeignet sind, die Städte in Südost-Asien zu beschreiben, da sie im Wesentlichen auf ökonomischen Modellen basieren. Stattdessen bietet er eine bodenständige (indigene) Theorie an, in der die östliche Stadt primär in Gemeinschaft (Community) und Hierarchie ihre Kohärenz findet. Diese beiden Elemente haben ihren Ursprung in ursprünglichen, lokalen Traditionen (die Gemeinschaft) einerseits, und der indischen Einwanderung und Dominierung andererseits (die Hierarchie). Islamische Einflüsse und europäische Kolonisierung wirkten zusätzlich als modifizierende Faktoren, indem sie zum Beispiel Status mit ins Spiel gebracht haben. Ein Element, das noch nicht genügend ausgeprägt sei, ist „Modernität“, führt O'Connor weiter aus. Den wünschenswerten „Shortcut to Modernity“ aufzuzeigen sei nunmehr Aufgabe der gebildeten Elite, schließt der Autor im Resümee seiner Ausführungen.

Das Buch enthält eine reiche Fülle an Detailwissen zu fernöstlicher Geschichte, Mythologie und Kultur, und erklärt viele wichtige Idiome in diesem Zusammenhang. Zum Aufbau einer neuen Theorie gehört allerdings mehr, wobei zum Beispiel eine gründliche und gerechte Kenntnis, Auseinandersetzung und Widerlegung bestehender und konkurrierender Theorien der Anfang sein sollte, aber nicht emsthaft angegangen wird. Auch die Formulierung von Policyempfehlungen hat hier im Grunde nichts zu suchen. Im Übrigen eine sehr ermüdende Lektüre! (K. Mathéy)

Kirkby, R.J.R., Urbanization in China: Town and Country in a Developing Economy, 1949-2000 AD. London 1985, 288 S., (Croom Helm, £ 27.50).

Im revolutionären China, speziell während der Kulturrevolution, war die Rhetorik immer stadtföndlich: „Konsumentenstädte“ sollten durch „Produzentenstädte“ ersetzt werden. Besonders der Linken Europas und Nordamerikas galt China als ein Beispiel für Ent-

wicklung ohne unkontrollierte Urbanisierung, für eine neue Logik räumlicher Organisation, welche sich aus der Umgestaltung der Produktivkräfte und Produktionsverhältnisse entwickeln konnte. De-Urbanisierung, wenn auch verknüpft mit Massendeportationen, wurde gepriesen und immer wieder wurde das chinesische Beispiel als Vorbild für andere Länder bemüht. Kirkby nimmt diese bekannten Allgemeinplätze zum Ausgangspunkt seiner minutiösen Studie: Die ideologischen Grundlagen des chinesischen Anti-Urbanismus und eine klare Beschreibung der Maßnahmen zur Beschränkung des Stadtwachstums werden verknüpft und zeigen die Härten und persönlichen Konsequenzen dieses De-Urbanisierungsprogrammes. Definitionen von Stadt und detaillierte Zusammenstellungen der Wachstumsziffern 1949-1982, und die räumliche Verteilung der Population stellen den Hauptteil dieses Buches dar; es gelingt dem Autor schwer kompatibles Datenmaterial zu ordnen und neuere statistische Veröffentlichungen erweisen sich als Schlüssel zu diesem komplexen Gesamtbild, das so lange in Ermangelung der Daten unmöglich war. Die Wohnungsmisere und die Modernisierung der Landwirtschaft zeigen das Ausmaß zukünftiger städtischer Probleme - gigantischer Investitionsbedarf in den oft noch als 'unproduktiv' angesehenen Wohnungsbau und die zunehmende Freisetzung von ländlicher Arbeitskraft, welche in die Städte drängt. Durch die Liberalisierung der 80er Jahre sind Land-Stadt-Wanderung nicht nur leichter geworden, sondern sie wird implizit durch ein Programm der Förderung von Mittelstädten und großen „Schlüssel“städten auch weiter angeregt. In den Diskussionen der 80er Jahre in China zeichnet sich denn auch eine Abkehr vom Anti-Urbanismus ab; offen ist dagegen die zukünftige Schwerpunktsetzung, ob mehr Förderung der Mittelstädte oder der Millionenstädte oder eine gleichgewichtige Entwicklungsförderung sich durchsetzt.

Mit der Politik der Modernisierung und ökonomischen Liberalisierung hat China erkannt, daß Entwicklung und Urbanisierung einander bedingen und somit Urbanisierung sogar wünschenswert ist. Bleibt nur zu hoffen, daß es China gelingen wird, die Übel städtischen Wachstums, das die anderen, gerade in Industrialisierung und Transformation befindlichen Gesellschaften so entscheiden getroffen hat, besser zu kontrollieren. Im Moment sieht es so aus, als stünde China vor einer neuen Welle städtischer Expansion...

Florian Steinberg.

Gesellschaft und Politik

CHINA, in: Geographische Rundschau 3/1986 (Bezug: G. Westermann Verlag, G. Westermann Allee 66, 33 Braunschweig)

In diesem Schwerpunktheft werden die Auswirkungen der jüngsten Liberalisierungen der Post-Mao-Ära dargestellt. Traditionelle ideologische Barrieren fallen und erlauben weitreichende Strukturveränderungen durch Privatisierung. China auf dem Wege zum „Gulaschkommunismus“? Zur Illustration dieser Tendenzen Beiträge zur Stadtentwicklung, der Industriepolitik, der Regionalentwicklung, des ländlichen Strukturwandels und ein sehr gründlich bearbeiteter, farbiger Atlas-Teil zu China. F. Steinberg

Marlin Franzbach, KUBA. 113 Seiten, ISBN 3-921600-39-1, 2. Auflage 1986, Vervuert, Frankfurt.

Zuverlässige und unvoreingenommene Informationen über das heutige Kuba sind für den Normalverbraucher in der BRD nicht leicht zugänglich, und nur wenige Buchhandlungen haben cubanische Literatur auf Lager. Angesichts dieses bedauerlichen Zustandes verdient die Anstrengung Franzbachs besonderes Lob, die vorhandene Literatur zu sichten, nach historischen und sozialen Themenbereichen auszuwerten, teilweise sogar zu übersetzen, und das Ergebnis in einem handlichen Band der deutschsprachigen Leserschaft zugänglich zu machen. Der Band eignet sich zugleich als Begleitmaterial zum Fachseminar, wie als Vorbereitungslektüre für Kuba-Reisende. Es bleibt zu hoffen, daß die Ähnlichkeit des Einbandes mit dem bekannten „Polyglott“ Schmalzpur-Reiseführern auch Nicht-Experten zu einem (bewußten oder unabsichtlichen) Erwerb dieses Bandes verleitet.

Dieter Eich und Will Germund (Hrsg.), Vulkan der Träume, Nicaragua: Utopie und Alltag. 225 Seiten, Verlag K.D. Vervuert, Frankfurt 1986.

Es gibt wenige Drittweltländer, über die in den vergangenen Jahren in Deutschland so viele Bücher geschrieben wurden wie über Nicaragua. Im Vergleich zu der Mehrzahl der Publikationen bleiben die fünf-

zehn Einzelbeiträge dieses Sammelbandes nicht bei einer (relativ kompletten) Schilderung relevanter Aspekte der heutigen nicaraguanischen Gesellschaft stehen. Als in ihrem Fach kompetente Entwicklungshelfer, Experten und Journalisten benennen die Autoren mehr und weniger offensichtliche Probleme der Regierung in der Verwirklichung wichtiger politischer Ziele der Revolution. In solidarischer Kritik analysieren die Ursachen von Mißerfolgen, wobei ihnen die die Standardklärung des auferzwungenen Krieges nicht ausreicht.

Ich halte diese Aufsatzsammlung nicht nur für die aktuellste, sondern auch aufschlußreichste Darstellung der nicaraguanischen Gegenwart, und empfehle sie nicht nur allen an Nicaragua interessierten Kollegen als Pflichtlektüre, sondern auch denen, die Revolutionäre Bewegungen auch woanders in der Dritten Welt nicht nur als Hoffnung, sondern als diffizile, tagtägliche Herausforderung auf Projekt- und Berufsebene erkannt haben. (Kosta Mathéy)

Contemporary Marxism no 9: IMPERIALISM AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM, 175 Seiten, ISSN 0193-8703, Sylthesis Publications, San Francisco 1984.

Bezug in Europa ueber Third World Publications, 151 Stratford Rd, Birmingham B11 1RD, Grossbritannien. Angesichts aktueller reaktionärer Bewegungen in West und Ost wird häufig von der „Krise des Marxismus“ gesprochen, - es fällt nicht leicht, optimistische und gleichzeitig realistische Prognosen eines fuer die naechere Zukunft absehbaren Uebergangs zu „befreienden“ sozialistischen Gesellschaften zu zeichnen. Das klassische Modell einer Revolution als unmittelbare Folge der Zuspitzung kapitalistischer Krisenproduktion hat an Glaubwürdigkeit eingebuesst, und junge sozialistische Gesellschaften verfolgen nicht ueber die notwendige oekonomische Grundlage eines Mehrproduktes, das ihnen die kapitalistische Produktivitaetssteigerung vererben sollte. Stattdessen beobachten wir eine Umkehrung des Modells: Wo immer soziale Kaeampe aufzuckern, reagiert das Kapital mit Produktionsabbau, Demontage der Arbeitsstaetten, Flucht ins Ausland und Sabotage. Die exogen erzwungenen Defensivanstrengungen der jungen Staaten ziehen nicht-demokratische Varianten der Volksvertretung und Bürokratie nach sich, wie James Petras in seinem Artikel bemerkt. Die uebrigen Autoren dieses Heftes von CONTEMPORARY MARXISM sind u.a. Marlene Dixon (als Herausgeberin), Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin und John Ehrenberg. Wie die Namen der Autoren schon vermuten lassen, bewegen sich alle Beitrage auf einem hohen Abstraktionsniveau, lohnen aber die Muehe ihrer Lektuere. (Kosta Mathéy)

Tom Lodge (Ed.), Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies. Southern African Studies, vol. 4, 255 Seiten, Johannesburg 1986. Erhältlich vom Verlag: Raven Press, P.O. Box 31134, Braamfontein, 2017, South Africa, oder ueber Third World Publications Birmingham.

Die acht Aufsätze dieses Bandes entstanden im Umfeld des African Studies Institute an der Witwatersrand Universität in Johannesburg. Obwohl die einzelnen Beiträge unabhängig voneinander entstanden, kreisen sie um ein gemeinsames Thema: der Widerstand der schwarzen Bevölkerung gegen weiße Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung in den vergangenen sechzig Jahren. Bis auf einen Aufsatz (von John Lonsdale), der sich mit dem Mau-Mau Aufstand in Kenia befaßt, und ein Bericht (von Tony Emmet) über Namibia beziehen sich die Artikel ausschließlich auf Südafrika. Angesichts der skandalösen Rassenpolitik im heutigen Südafrika entsteht leicht die Gefahr, daß die aktuelle Berichterstattung den Untersuchungen über historische Widerstandsbewegungen nur eine untergeordnete Bedeutung zumißt. Dieser Sammelband, der sich zudem auch spannend liest, könnte da ansatzweise abhelfen. Eingeschränkt wird diese Chance jedoch durch den winzigen Druck, der das Auge des Lesers auch bei größtem Interesse zu schnell ermüden läßt. (K. Mathéy)

The Best of Antipode 1969-1985. Antipode vol 17, no 2 und 3, 1985. 186 S., 10 US. Bestelladresse: Basil Blackwell, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 1JF, England.

Antipode - bekannt als „A Radical Journal of Geography“ - ist eine Zeitschrift, deren Entwicklung gleichzeitig die noch kurze Geschichte marxistischer Geographie widerspiegelt. Zu Zeiten der Studentenbewegung geboren, galt Antipode lange Zeit als Sprachrohr des Anti-Establishment, und wurde über 16 Jahre hinweg semiprofessionell von einer kleinen Gruppe von hauptsächlich amerikanischen Studenten und

Akademikern redigiert und produziert, während die inhaltlichen Beiträge als Compendium der intellektuellen Avantgarde betrachtet werden konnten und können. So ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß das Modell von Antipode auch bei der Gründung von TRIALOG Pate stand, selbst wenn sich die Zielgruppe nicht nur in der Sprache und dem Fach, sondern auch in der Generation unterschied.

Mit Anfang der Achtziger Jahre begann Antipode die Rezession, und damit die politische Wende an den Universitäten zu spüren. Nicht nur der Absatz an Heften, auch der darunterliegende revolutionäre Enthusiasmus von Lesern und Autoren ließ nach, Pluralität und Professionalität lösten theoretische Escarpaden, Spontaneität und Selbstausbeutung ab. Das Layout von Antipode wurde ab 1980 gesetzt statt getippt; 1985 wurde der Vertrieb einem kommerziellen Verleger überlassen. Ein Anlaß, die durchgemachte Entwicklung Revue passieren zu lassen, - und kritisch zu reflektieren.

Der bisherige Herausgeber Richard Peet (Clark University Worcester) versucht in einem einleitenden Artikel die Entstehung der Disziplin „Radical Geography“ in den USA zu rekonstruieren, und ihren Werdegang anhand der Antipode-Jahrgänge nachzuzeichnen. Es folgen aktuelle Bestandsaufnahmen der Diskussion in England, Frankreich und Skandinavien (Phil O’Keefe, Jacques Lévy, Steen Folke). Der Rest des Heftes vereinigt die wichtigsten grundsätzlichen Beiträge (teilweise gekürzt oder aktualisiert) aus früheren, z.T. vergriffenen Antipode-Ausgaben der Autoren James Anderson, J.M. Blaut, Murray Bookchin, Myrna Breitbart, M.Buch-Hanson, Rod Burgess, Steen Folke, C. Hadji-michalis, David Harvey, Alison Hayford, Brian Hudson, R. Kates, Richard Morill, Bue Nilson, Milton Santos, John Short, Neil Smith, Edward Soja und Gerda Werkele. (Kosta Mathéy)

Anthony J. Catanese, The Politics of Planning and Development. Sage Library, of Social Research vol. 156, 232 Seiten, ISBN 0-8039-2315-5 (Pk), Beverly Hills (California) 1984, 15.50 £

Dem Autor, Städtebauprofessor in Atlanta, geht es in diesem Buch hauptsächlich um die Reflektion über die besten Möglichkeiten, Stadt- und Raumplanung durchzusetzen. Das Erfolgsrezept liegt seiner Auffassung nach in einigen zum Besten gegebenen Verhaltens- und Strategierezepten für den Planer, dessen persönliches Auftreten, Loyalität zu den Politikern, und angemessener Einsatz von Medien und neuen Technologien um Bürgerbeteiligung besser handhabbar und weniger zeitaufwendig zu machen. Als Gefolgsmann des früheren Präsidenten Jimmy Carter skizziert Catanese ein Berufsbild des Planers, das für die USA richtungweisend sein mag, aber vor dem sich unsere Kollegen in Entwicklungsländern in Acht nehmen sollten. In seiner ideologischen Unverfrorenheit und wissenschaftlicher Oberflächlichkeit eignet sich das Werk immerhin als Anti-Lehrbuch. (K. Mathéy)

Faruque, R., Johnson, E., Health, Nutrition, and Family Planning in India: A Survey of Experiments and Special Projects. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 507, Washington 1982, 97 pp.

Dieser Bericht ist eine zusammenfassende Darstellung von neuen Projekten und Experimenten im Gesundheitsbereich, in der Versorgung mit ernährungswissenschaftlichen, ernährungstechnischen Informationen und in der Familienplanung. Zu den wesentlichen Schlußfolgerungen der Studie gehören:

- Die Integration von Gesundheits-, Ernährungs- und Familienplanungsprojekten ist kostengünstiger als separate Serviceleistungen;
- "Community Participation" führt zu einer besseren Abwicklung und wirkungsvollerem Unterhalt solcher Projekte, zu besserer Akzeptanz durch die Zielbevölkerung und gerechterer Verteilung der Dienstleistungen;
- die professionelle Unterstützung sollte hauptsächlich im kurativen oder präventiven Bereich liegen.
- Die erfolgreichen Projekte schließen auch Trainingsmaßnahmen ein. (Florian Steinberg)

Technologie

Armstrong-White, A., Urban Transit Systems, Guidelines for Examining Options. World Bank Technical Paper No. 52, Washington 1985, 77 pp.

Dieses Paper behandelt die Charakteristiken und Kosten der wichtigsten Transportformen wie Bus-, Zug-, Schmalspurzug-, Schnellzug- und Vorortzugverkehr. Zur Vermeidung der Entscheidungen für kostenintensive Formen des öffentlichen Nahverkehrs werden

„feasibility“-Studien empfohlen, welche neben den sich ändernden Nutzererwartungen, dem Subventionsbedarf, der Finanzierung und der Leitlinie zur Kostendeckung auch die Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt berücksichtigen. (Florian Steinberg)

Katalyse (Hrsg.), Umwellexikon 522 Seiten, ISBN 3-462-01730-6, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1985, DM 36,-

Unter 2.000 Stichworten aufgeschlüsselt nimmt sich dieses Buch vor, sowohl einführende Kurzreferate zu ökologischen Schlüsselbereichen, wie eine möglichst umfassende Datensammlung als leicht zugängliche Referenz verfügbar zu machen. Wie bei den meisten Lexika, ist der Leser beim Durchblättern des Werkes von der Informationsfülle beeindruckt, doch beginnt das Problem erfahrungsgemäß dann, wenn der Benutzer zu einer bestimmten Frage nicht das richtige Suchwort kennt, unter dem er die Antwort findet. Die letzte Rettung sind dann Querverweise, die in diesem Werk großzügig eingeführt wurden. Ein zusätzlicher Bonus ist außerdem die 33-seitige Adressenliste von Institutionen und Gruppen, die in bestimmten Detailfragen weiterhelfen können. Für den Planer und Architekten in Entwicklungsländern sind Argumentationshilfen zu ökologischen Fragen immer willkommen, weshalb sich die Anschaffung dieses Lexikons auch für Trialog-Leser lohnen dürfte. (K. Mathéy)

United Nations (ed) Energy Requirements and Utilization in Rural and Urban Low-Income Settlements (HS / 61 / 84) Nairobi 1984, 76 pp.

Neue Technologien für verbesserte Nutzung fossiler Energieträger, die Förderung der Entwicklung nicht-fossiler, erneuerbarer Energien (Wind, Sonne, Wasser, Biomasse etc.) werden hier im Zusammenhang mit der Siedlungssituation in ländlichen und städtischen Gebieten der Entwicklungsländer gesehen. Ausgehend von den gegenwärtigen Mustern der heutigen Energiegenutzung, ihrer Probleme, besonders in der Perspektive zukünftiger Engpässe werden die möglichen Alternativen, die Leistungsfähigkeit und Kostenfaktoren der technologischen Optionen diskutiert. Als politische Empfehlungen werden folgende Postulate herausgestrichen: umfassende, integrierte Planung von Siedlungen und Energieverbrauch; Förderung regenerativer Energieerzeugung; dezentralisierte Energiesysteme und Förderung von Pilot- / Demonstrativprojekten. (F. Steinberg)

UNCHS (ed.), Planning of the Construction Industry, with emphasis on the use of indigenous production factors. Nairobi 1985 (HS / 82 / 85 / E)


Diese kurze, sehr allgemein gehaltene Studie geht von der Annahme aus, daß der Bausektor durch ernsthafte Beschränkungen behindert ist. Es wird eine Umstrukturierung und bessere Planung der Bauwirtschaft sowie die Stärkung der institutionellen Kapazitäten und selbst internationale Kapitalverbindungen zur Verbesserung des Planungs- und Produktionsniveaus empfohlen. Ganz ins andere Extrem fällt dann die Empfehlung, den informellen Sektor nicht zu übersehen, ihn zu fördern durch Unterstützung der darin operierenden Organisationen und Firmen. Unterstützung soll besonders durch Informationsweitergabe und Ausbildung erfolgen. (Florian Steinberg)

UNCHS (ed.), The Use of Selected Indigenous Building Materials with Potential for Wide Application in Developing Countries. Nairobi 1985 (HS / 83 / 85 / E)

Diese Studie geht von hohen Kosten und unzureichender Versorgung mit Baumaterialien in Entwicklungsländern aus, was teilweise ein Konsequenz der bestehenden Importabhängigkeit ist. Orientierung der Untersuchung ist die Förderung von Importsubstitution und Eigenständigkeit, was geradezu nach drastischer Steigerung der Produktion einheimischer Baumaterialien ruft. Und in den meisten Entwicklungsländern besitzen die Möglichkeiten zur Produktion solcher Baumaterialien wie Kalk, Keramikstoffe, Misch-Zemente, Gipsbinder etc. Die sozialen und technischen Beschränkungen einer Produktion dieser Baustoffe werden diskutiert und ihre Bedeutung für Billig-Wohnungsbau wird herausgestrichen. Hauptziel dieses Reports ist die Reform der existierenden Baumaterialienproduktion und der betreffenden Politiken. Beispiele von der Produktion einheimischer Baumaterialien in Indien, Tanzania, Rwanda, Indonesien, Botswana, Philippinen und Cap Verde werden zusätzlich kurz vorgestellt. (Florian Steinberg)

John Norton, Building with Earth: A Handbook. 68 S.A4, 1985, ISBN 0-966688-33-8, Intermediate Technology Publications (9King Street) London.

Dieses übersichtliche und gut illustrierte Heft richtet sich an Handwerker, Nutzer, Projektierer, die in verschiedenen Teilen der Erde ein Gebäude aus Lehm errichten wollen. In komprimierter und direkt ohne komplizierte Geräte anwendbarer Form werden Grundlagen, Techniken und Testmethoden für den Lehmbau beschrieben. Eigene Kapitel gibt es auch über Dachkonstruktionen, Stabilisierungs- und Verputztechniken



Traditionelle Flachdachkonstruktion im Iran (Norton)

Minke, Gernot (Hrsg.)

Bauen mit Lehm

Band 2: Stampflehm und seine Anwendung


ISBN 3-922964-21-4, 1985

Band 3: Lehm im Fachwerkbau

1985, ISBN 3-922964-22-2

Jeder Band 84 Seiten für DM 14,80, erschienen im ÖkobuchVerlag Freiburg, Postfach 5360.

Wie schon der erste Band (vergl. Trialog 5) greifen die beiden neuen Bände jeweils einen Teilaspekt zum Thema Lehm auf, der in Aufsätzen unterschiedlicher Autoren teils prinzipiell, teils an Hand von realisierten Projekten dargestellt werden. In jedem Heft wird zusätzlich das begonnene Inventar historischer Lehmbauten in Deutschland fortgeführt, und aktuelle Mitteilungen, zum Beispiel über wichtige Konferenzen, angefügt. Die Reihe empfiehlt sich sowohl als spezialisierte Zeitschrift für den Lehm-Experten, der über den neuesten Wissensstand auf diesem Gebiet auf dem Laufenden bleiben will (vielleicht könnte hier ein verbilligtes Direktabonnement / Subskription angeboten werden), sowie als Einzelheft auch für den Selbstbauer, der sich für eine bestimmte Lehmbauweise entschieden hat, und sich die Erfahrungen anderer mit dieser Technik zunutze machen will. Bisher wurde die Dritte Welt in der Reihe kaum berücksichtigt, aber das kann sich ja noch ändern ... (K. Mathéy)



Lehmfußboden (Ökobuch)

Holger König, Wege zum gesunden Bauen; 188 Seiten, ISBN 3-922964-16-8, 1985, Ökobuch Verlag Freiburg

Die klassischen Bücher über Baubiologie zeichnen sich fast ausnahmslos durch einen Stil aus, der bei dem Leser den Eindruck einer unnötigen Vermengung von Fakten und Ideologie hinterläßt. Hier jedoch hat der Autor den lobenswerten Versuch unternommen, eine auch für Studenten und Drittweltkollegen bezahrbare Baustoff-, Baukonstruktions- und Bauentwurflehre nach baubiologischen Grundsätzen zusammenzustellen. So gliedert sich das Buch in vier Teile: Der (leider nur) auf Raumklima und Strahlung bezogene Einführung zum Thema Wechselwirkung Mensch-Bauwerk, folgen systematisch und übersichtlich aufgebaut Abschnitte über die verschiedenen infragekommenden Baustoffe, über deren Verwendung beim Zusammenfügen der einzelnen Bauteile eines Hauses, und einige ausgeführte Beispiele. Im Anhang folgt eine nützliche Zusammenfassung relevanter Normen und Bestimmungen, und eine magerer, auf nur 14 Titel reduzierte Bibliografie, deren Kriterien für die Zusammenstellung ein Geheimnis des Autors bleibt. (K. M.)

Arends, G.J. & Donkersloot-Shouq, S.S.
An overview of possible uses of Sawdust 159 Seiten,
57 Ill., ISBN 90-70857-02-2, Amsterdam 1985, Dfl.
19.50 plus postage. Bezug über Tool, Entrepotdok
68a, NL-1018 AD Amsterdam.

Sägespäne werden in vielen Entwicklungsländern als Abfallprodukt betrachtet, zumal eine eventuell vorhandene Holzindustrie in den seltensten Fällen in der Nähe größerer Ballungsgebiete oder Industriezentren liegt. Um die Möglichkeiten einer nützlichen Verwendung dieses Rohstoffes am Beispiel von Kenya zu prüfen, hat die holländische Regierung eine Studie über bekannte und in der Forschung befindliche Verfahrenswesen in Auftrag gegeben, die jetzt veröffentlicht worden ist. Der Bericht gliedert sich in die Kapitel: 1. Verwendung als Brennmaterial, 2. ... in der Landwirtschaft, 3. ... zur Baustoff-Fabrikation, 4. ... zur chemischen Weiterverarbeitung und 5. ... für unkonventionelle Zwecke.

Da bei der sich herausstellenden Fülle auch bisher wenig bekannter Verwendungsmöglichkeiten (wie als Viehfutter, Feuerlöcher, Korken, Zuschlagstoff für Stuck und Putz, Straßenunterbau, Dünger usw.) die Beschreibung der einzelnen Verfahren nicht sehr in die Tiefe gehen kann, eignet sich das Buch besonders für die Ideensammlung und erste Konzeption von Entwicklungsprojekten, die einem Sägewerk oder einer Schreinerei angegliedert werden sollen, und bei denen das gewünschte Endprodukt noch nicht feststeht. Die gewissenhaft angegebenen Quellen der Studie müßten jeweils für eine weiterführende Planung konsultiert werden. *Km*

Miles, D., Syagga, P., Building Maintenance, A Management Manual, (Intermediate Technology Publications, 9 King Street, London WC2E 8HW, UK) London 1987, 213 pp. Dieses handliche, übersichtliche und gut verständliche Handbuch der Bauunterhaltung entstammt den von der International Labour Organization geförderten Arbeiten an Construction Management Programmes. Die Autoren streichen heraus, daß regelmäßige und geplante Bauunterhaltung zu erheblichen Kosteneinsparungen führt im Verhältnis zur ad hoc-Bauunterhaltung als Reaktion auf plötzlich auftretende schwere „Unterlassungsünden“. Geplante Bauunterhaltung wird somit der geleisteten Investitionen besser gerecht. Das Buch richtet sich vor allem an Manager, Entscheidungsträger in der Bauadministration, aber kann auch Bauunternehmern oder Entwerfern eine nützliche Orientierung sein. In drei Teile gegliedert bietet das Manual Einblick in die strategischen Optionen, die Formen des Managements und Technischen Verfahren der Bauunterhaltung, beginnend beim unterhalts-freundlichen Entwurf, und beschreibt die Schadensdiagnose und mögliche Rettungsmaßnahmen. Abschließend wird die Notwendigkeit einer klaren Politik zur Bauunterhaltung und der zukünftige Forschungsbedarf angedeutet. In Bezug auf die soziale und „operationale“ Konzeption der Bauunterhaltung werden von den Autoren allerdings auch konventionelle Verfahren diskutiert: Bewohnerkontrolle, Eigenmanagement oder Partizipations-Modelle, doch die Bewertung dieser Konzeptionen, welche in manchen Ländern schon Praxis sind, wurde nicht geleistet. *Florian Steinberg*

Ryan, Beverly A. & Mara, Duncan, World Bank TAG, Working Paper 06, 16 Seiten. Erhältlich von WUD, Room 713, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington DC 20433, USA.

Diese Broschüre basiert auf Feld-Experimenten in Botswana und Zimbabwe, bei denen herausgefunden wurde, daß für die Wirksamkeit von belüfteten Grubenroletten die Windgeschwindigkeit einen größeren Einfluß hat als der thermische Luftauftrieb. Konstruktive Verbesserungen, die diese Beobachtung berücksichtigen, werden vorgeschlagen. *Kosta Mathéy*

Brassel, Marble, Duane F.; Peuquet, Kurt E.; Kishimoto, Donna J.; Haruko (Eds.) Proceedings of the International Symposium on Spatial Data Handling, Aug. 20 - 24, 1984; Geogr. Institut, Abt. Kartographie / EDV, Universität Zürich - Irchel, 2 Bde.; Zürich 1984, 65.- Sfr. Die Verarbeitung räumlicher Daten ist auch im Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit von zunehmendem Interesse. Dabei kommt den Möglichkeiten der Verwendung von Computern eine Bedeutung zu, die im umgekehrten Verhältnis zur nach unten gerichteten Preisentwicklung der verfügbaren Hardware steht. Die in den vorliegenden Bänden dokumentierten Vorträge stellen eine Sammlung von Beiträgen verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen zum Problem der EDV-gestützten Analyse und Darstellung räumlicher Beziehungen und Probleme dar.

Daß dabei auf die spezifischen Probleme der Planung in Entwicklungsländern nur in einzelnen Beiträgen und dann auch nur am Rande eingegangen wurde, liegt im wesentlichen an der in den industrialisierten Ländern fortgeschrittenen Forschung in diesem Bereich, für die von den Seiten der Entwicklungsländer bisher nur rudimentär Problemstellungen formuliert wurden.

Trotzdem haben von den insgesamt 36 Vorträgen und 8 Kurzfassungen (abstracts) bei einem am Thema interessierten, an Entwicklungsländerproblematik orientierten Planer wie mir, immerhin 9 Vorträge ein näheres Interesse geweckt. Dies ist vermutlich ein guter Durchschnitt für eine Dokumentation deren Stärke darin liegt, Forschung und Stand der Software-Entwicklung in einem breiten Anwendungsbereich aufzuzeigen.


Dabei zeigt sich auch, daß gerade für die Anwendung in einem so dynamischen räumlichen Kontext wie den Planungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der Dritten Welt, in denen computergestützte Verarbeitung räumlicher Daten eine höchst sinnvolle Innovation sein könnten, praktisch keinerlei nutzerorientierte Entwicklungen vorliegen. Adressenverzeichnis und Literaturangaben erleichtern die Basis für Kontakte und Forschung in einem Bereich, der sich mit Hilfe der "Proceedings" sicher leichter abgrenzen läßt.

Insgesamt eine für einen begrenzten Trialog-Leserkreis interessante Veröffentlichung, die sicherlich ein gewisses Maß an Vorkenntnissen in der EDV erfordert. *Klaus G. Erzigkeit*

Architektur

J. M. Richards, I. Serageldin, D. Rastoler: HASSAN FATHY; ISBN 9997-84-125-8, 172 Seiten, 112 Farbtafeln, 130 s/w Abbildungen. Mimar Books / Concept Media Verlag Singapur und The Architectural Press Ltd London, 1985.

Dieser exzellent edierte MIMAR-Band ist ein erneuter Leckerbissen für Bibliophile und repräsentiert Person wie Lebenswerk des ägyptischen Architekten H. Fathy. Da er in der ganzen Welt den Ruf hat, einer der, wenn nicht gar der geistige Vater der „Bewegung“ des kulturell angepassten Bauens zu sein, beginnt diese Monographie auch mit einer Einordnung seiner inspirierenden architektonischen Botschaft im internationalen Kontext. Fathy, der eigentlich mehr Philosoph und Lehrer ist, hat mehr im Ausland seine Ideen verbreiten können, als ihm dies in Ägypten gelang. Sein berühmtestes Projekt in Ägypten, das Dorf Neu-Gourna, nur teilweise ausgeführt, wurde „Sturmstunde“ seines Schaffens, daß neben anderen, kleineren Dorfprojekten, zahlreiche Villen und schließlich sogar eine Moschee mit Gästehaus in New Mexico umfasste. Es ist bezeichnend für die ägyptische Situation der Baukultur, daß seine Lehmbauten, mit Kuppeln und Gewölben gedeckten Häuser keine Leitbilder für den kostengünstigen Massenwohnungsbau setzten. Vielmehr blieb Fathy's Wirken auf eine kleine Gruppe ägyptischer Intellektueller beschränkt. Neben den zahlreichen exzellenten Abbildungen kommt Fathy mit einigen Kernsätzen seiner architektonischen Philosophie („man muß Musikalität in die Stadtplanung und Architektur bringen“) zu Wort. *F. St. / K. M.*




Grundriß in Neu-Gourna (Hassan Fathy)

Genevieve Libaud, Symbolique de l'Espace et habitat chez les Beni-Aissa (Süd-Tunesien), 220 Seiten, ISBN 2-222-03787-5, Centre de Recherches et d'Études sur les Sociétés Méditerranéennes, Paris 1986. Erhältlich von: Editions du CNRS, 15, quai Anatole France, F-75700 Paris, 150 Francs.

Die Beni-Aissa sind ein den Matmata zugehöriger Berberstamm in Süd-Tunesien, der teils in mediterran

armutenden Bruchsteindörfern, teils in ausgegrabenen Hohlendörfern lebt. Das Verdienst der Autorin liegt insbesondere darin, diese Wohn- und Lebensformen nicht nur phänomenologisch zu beschreiben, wie das die meisten Bücher über traditionelle Architekturen tun, sondern die Entwurfsprinzipien der Erbauer aufzuspüren und im Rahmen ihres kulturellen Zusammenhangs darzustellen. Dabei berücksichtigt sie sowohl städtebauliche Aspekte, wie das einzelne Haus oder die Einrichtung individueller Räume. Die Bedeutung unterschiedlicher Orientierung von Zimmern und deren Niveaudifferenzen werden erklärt, auch über rituelle Nutzungen des Raumes wird berichtet. Es gibt nicht viele Bücher über indigene Architekturen, die gleichermaßen gründlich recherchiert und kompetent verfaßt worden sind wie dieses. *Kosta Mathéy*



The Aga Khan Award for Architecture (ed.), Architecture and Identity, Exploring Architecture in Islamic Cultures 1, Geneva 1983, 104 S. (Bezug: Concept Media, Singapore)

Wieder einmal widmete der Aga Khan Award ein internationales (Experten-)Seminar den Fragen der kulturellen Identität, und dieses scheint nur der Anfang einer neuen Serie, welche sich „Exploring Architecture in Islamic Cultures“ nennt.

In den Beiträgen wird das Spannungsfeld kolonialer und fremder Kultureinflüsse und ihre Relevanz für kulturellen Wandel, für die Philosophie und Lebenskultur Süd- und besonders Südostasiatischer Länder umrissen.

Identität als „dynamisch sich entwickelnder Prozess“ kann nicht künstlich geschaffen werden und es gibt eine Vielfalt der Entwicklungswege und Formen von Identitätsfindung - so lautet das Resümee dieses Seminars. Architektur spiele dabei eine wesentliche Rolle als kultureller Katalysator.

Neben allgemeinen Ausführungen von C. Correa (einem Aga Khan-Referenten, der wohl auf jedem Seminar anzutreffen ist) werden Fallstudien aus Malaysia, Indonesien, Singapur, Thailand und Indien vorgestellt. Teilweise werden die Bezüge und Einflüsse der „modernen“ Architektur für diese Länder, die Rolle der wichtigsten „Lehrer“ und Trendsetter (z.B. F.L. Wright) herausgehoben, z.T. werden im Rückblick auf die traditionelle balinesische und thailändische Architektur der Niedergang und das Ende dieser kulturellen Ausdrucksformen beklagt.

Während im Falle Indiens - als Selbstlob des Referenten zaghafte Ansätze eines „neuen“ indischen Bauens (wenn auch nicht ganz ohne gewisse „Postmodernismen“) gezeigt werden, plagen sich Malaysia und Singapur speziell viel mehr mit der Rechtfertigung ihres neuen Stadt- und Weltbildes der Hyper-modernen Gesellschaft. Die Präsentation eines Hochhauses- / Geschäftskomplexes für Kuala Lumpur gerät nicht nur zur peinlichen PR-Show der Designer, sondern der Anspruch, soziale, kulturelle und ästhetische Qualitäten des an eigener Kultur reichen Malaysia zu verkörpern, wird zur lächerlichen Rhetorik.

Ein gut gemachtes Buch, nur leider illustriert es, daß „the search for some light at the other end“ noch lange dauern wird. *F. Steinberg*

Cantacuzino, S. (Hg.), Architecture in Continuity, Building in the Islamic World Today, Aperture / New York 1985, 191 pp. US \$ 45.00

Dieser prächtige, überwiegend mit Farbphotos ausgestattete Band zelebriert(!) die durch den 2. Aga Khan Preis für islamische Architektur prämierten Projekte einer neuen Architektur-Qualität für die islamische Lebenskultur. Der seit 1977 bestehende Architekturpreis, alle 3 Jahre verliehen, zeigt ein besonderes Interesse für Projekte, welche moderne (Bau-)Technologie mit der „Kultur“ und „Identität“ der Welt des Islam vereinen. Von den 11 prämierten Projekten fallen allein 7 in den Bereich der Restauration historischer Gebäude(komplexe). In kurzen Beiträgen ergänzt durch Projektinformation im Anhang des Buches - wurde vortestellt: das Hafsia-Viertel in Tunis, das Darb Qirmiz

Veranstaltungshinweise und Konferenzbericht

September 13-16, 1987 - Ankara, Türkei. „Housing and Urban Management Through Cooperatives“. Information: KENT KOOP, Batıkent Konut Üretim, Yapı Kooperatifleri Birliği, Atatürk Bulvarı 57, Ankara, Türkei.

Oktober 13-17 1987, West Berlin. „XIII IAHS World Congress on Housing-Innovations in Sciences and Technologies for the future“. Information: Prof. Dr.-Ing. G. Nedeljkov, Kurlurstendamm 200, 1 Berlin 15.

Oktober 20-23 1987, Ottawa, Kanada. „Capitals of the World Conference“. Information: City Hall, 111 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Kanada, K1N 5A1. Teilnehmergebühr Cdn.\$ 525.

November 1987, Amsterdam. „International Design Participation Conference“. Information: DPC 87, c/o S.O.O.N., P.O. Box 616, NL-2600 AP DELFT

November 11-17 1987, Melbourne und Sydney, Australien. „Self-Help Housing-Owner Building and Earth Architecture“. Information: Dept. of Architecture, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australien.

November 30 - December 4, 1987, New Delhi, Indien. „International Seminar on Income and Housing in Third World Urban Development“. Organized by IHS / P Indian Settlements Programme. Information: N. Bhattacharjee and Peter Nientied, IHSP c/o HUDCO, 121 Asian Games Village, Khelagoan Marg, New Delhi 110 049.

November 30 - December 3 1987, Kinshasa, Zaire. „Habitat du plus grand nombre“. Information: siehe TRIALOG 12.

Dezember 5-11, 1987, New Delhi, India. „Planning and Actions for Shelter for the Homeless“, IIRD ISoCaRP Congress. Information: International Society of City and Regional Planners, Mauritskade 23, NL2514 HD The Hague.

März 25-28 1988, Neu Delhi, Indien. „Poverty, Development and Collective Survival“, 19th SID World Conference. Information: Henry Helmich, SID International Secretariat, Palazzo Civita del Lavoro, 00144 Rome Eur, Italien. Teilnehmergebühr von US \$ 25-135.

Mai 14-19, 1988, La Habana, Cuba. „XVIII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos“. Information: Palacio de las Convenciones de Cuba, Apartado 16046, Habana, Cuba

Mai 15-20 1988, Den Haag, Niederlande. „Looking forward after 75 years of IFHP“. Information: International Federation of Housing and Planning, Den Haag.

Juni 27-Juli 1 1988 - Amsterdam, Niederlande. „International Research Conference on Housing, Policy, and Urban Innovation“. Information: ÖTB / TUD, Postbus 5030, 2600 GA Delft. Teilnehmergebühr Dfl. 450 / 550.

Juli 5-8 1988, Delft, Niederlande. „Looking back to the future“. IAPS 10th Konferenz. Themen - Housing, Workspaces, Public spaces, Recreational spaces, Perception, Methodology of Research and Education. Teilnehmergebühr von Dfl. 140-460. Weitere information: Secretariat IAPS-10, BK RM 12.50, P.O.Box 5043, 2600 GA Delft, Niederlande.

September 5-8 1988, Stockholm, Sweden. „Healthy Buildings '88“. Information: Siehe TRIALOG 12.

Konferenzbericht:

INTERNATIONALE KONFERENZ: Appropriate Technologies for Building in the Third World, Berlin, 10. & 11. June 1987

Die Konferenz war von TRIALOG (Geschäftsstelle Süd) in Zusammenarbeit mit 11 anderen Organisationen aus neun Ländern vorbereitet worden, und wurde wegen der zu erwartenden Überschneidung der Teilnehmerkreise zeitlich und räumlich mit dem HABITAT FORUM BERLIN verknüpft. Das Programm der beiden Kongreßtage sah 18 Referate vor, wobei jedem Beitrag der Zeitraum einer vollen Stunde eingeräumt worden war (20-30 Min. Vortrag, 10 Minuten Co-Referat durch einen mit dem Thema vertrauten „Commentator“, und allgemeine Diskussion).

Die Wahl des ehemaligen Reichstagsgebäudes als Tagungsort war durch die Einbindung in das HABITAT FORUM vorgegeben, wurde jedoch wegen seiner städtebaulichen Isolierung, seiner Weitaufigkeit und wegen der offiziellen Sicherheitsbestimmungen diverse Einschränkungen mit sich. Auch wurde von verschiedenen Teilnehmern angemerkt, daß die repräsentative Ausstattung dieses Haus für eine Dritte-Welt-Wohnungsbau-Tagung eher befremdlich anmutet.

Am Beginn der Veranstaltung stand die Vorstellung der Ergebnisse von einem vorangegangenen (und ebenfalls von der DFG geförderten), einwöchigen Workshops über konzeptionelle Fragen zur Angepaßten Technologie. Es folgten im gleichen Block Referate über „angepaßte“ Lehrmethoden, ein Beitrag über die relativ geringe Akzeptanz von AT (am Beispiel Indiens), und ein Vortrag über die Relevanz von AT für Frauen als Nutzer und Produzenten von Wohnraum in Entwicklungsländern.

Bei vielen primär praktisch / technisch interessierten Wissenschaftlern provozierte diese eher „gesellschaftlich“ ausgerichtete Themenstellung zuerst Verunsicherung, dann Widerspruch, was schließlich in eine lebhafte, aber befruchtende Diskussion einmündete. Eine Konfrontation gegensätzlicher Wissenschaftsauffassungen war von den Veranstaltern vorausgesehen und erhofft worden, und führte erfreulicherweise im weiteren Verlauf der Konferenz zu einer Annäherung der beiden Standpunkte.

Der Abend des ersten Tages war einem international bekannten Architekten, dem Neapolitaner Fabrizio Carola, und der Vorstellung seiner Bauten in Westafrika vorbehalten (darunter auch das Hospital von Kaedi in Mauntanien - siehe auch Ankündigungspakat zur Konferenz).

Obwohl diese Bauten im Vorteil der Veranstaltung sehr heftig und widersprüchlich diskutiert worden waren, blieben die kritischen Stimmen an diesem Abend aus. Es kann nur darüber spekuliert werden, ob die Zurückhaltung der Kritiker auf die überzeugend wirkende Ausstrahlung des Architekten, oder auf Ermüdungserscheinungen bei den Zuschauern nach einem inhaltsreichen Konferenztag zurückzuführen ist.

Die Beiträge (in zwei parallelen Gruppen) am Vormittag des zweiten Konferenztags galten (mit Ausnahme von Octavio Tapia) galten der Diskussion von **konkreten Produkten und Technologien**, die unter dem Label von „AT“ propagiert werden.

Besonders erfolgreich waren dabei die von Prof. Ortega in Kolumbien getestete Meeres-Elektrolyse für die Herstellung von Bauelementen und anderen Strukturen, und die inzwischen ausgereifte Dachziegelproduktion aus Faserzement.

Bei der Meereselektrolyse wird eine dünne Armierung aus Kaninchendraht für 200 Stunden im Meerwasser an eine Schwachstromquelle (z.B. Photovoltaik) angeschlossen, wodurch sich verschiedene im Wasser enthaltene Mineralien an der Armierung anlagern, und im Verlauf von einigen Wochen zu einer betonähnlichen Substanz aushärten. Das Endprodukt ist selbsttragend, abgas- und seewasserbeständig, und eignet sich als extrem kostengünstiges Baumaterial insbesondere in Küstenregionen.

Fiberzementplatten unter Einschluß von natürlichen Fasern (Sisal, Agave, Hanf etc.) werden schon seit etwa 10 Jahren erprobt. Durch Reduzierung von Platten auf Ziegelgröße und den Einsatz von (z.B. handbetriebenen) Rütteltischen hat sich diese Technologie inzwischen zu einer ernstzunehmenden Alternative zu konventionellen Dacheindeckungen in Entwicklungsländern entwickelt.

Interessant sind in diesem Zusammenhang übrigens auch neuere Forschungsergebnisse, die zeigen, daß die Fasern für die Festigkeit der Platten nur während der Abbindphase eine Rolle spielen, und frühere Bemühungen, einer späteren Zersetzung dieser Fasern entgegenzuwirken, somit überflüssig waren.

Im letzten Block der Veranstaltung, am Nachmittag des zweiten Tages, kamen Vertreter von AT-Organisationen in Entwicklungsländern zu Wort, die einstimmig nicht die Spezialisierung einzelner Technologien, sondern einen *integralen und interdisziplinären* Ansatz als wichtig für ihren Arbeitszusammenhang und die Probleme ihrer Länder ansahen.

Die Frage nach der *Definition* von angepaßter Technologie wurde unterschiedlich beantwortet. Während einige Sprecher die Ansicht vertraten, daß alle Technologien angepaßt seien, sofern sie ihre Aufgaben erfüllten, wurde - damit der Begriff überhaupt einen Sinn behält - eine gleichzeitige Abgrenzung zu traditionellen wie zu hochentwickelten Technologien von anderen Rednern für notwendig befunden.

Als Indiz dafür könnten z.B. die für jeden Arbeitsplatz erforderlichen Investitionskosten (z.B. zwischen 1000 und 100000 US \$) herangezogen werden. Übereinstimmung herrschte jedoch über andere Kriterien der AT, wie die Verwendung lokaler Ressourcen und die ökologische, ökonomische und kulturelle Verträglichkeit.

Die Erwartung einer Kostenreduzierung durch AT am Bau hat sich nicht generell erfüllt. Grund dafür ist zum einen der bei arbeitsintensiven Produktionsmethoden zwangsläufig höheren Lohnkosten, wie auch der prozentual geringe Anteil einzelner AT-Lösungen (z.B. Dachplatten) an den Gesamtbaukosten. Besonders die zuletzt genannte Beobachtung führte zu der bereits erwähnten integrativen Arbeitsweise der bekanntesten AT-Institute.

Die Tatsache, daß viele AT-Projekte auf Experimentalsbasis von „Einzelkämpfern“ gegründet wurden, brachte die Wiederholung üblicher „Einstiegsprobleme“ von bestimmten Technologien in verschiedene Projekten mit sich, und trug zu dem amateurhaften Image von AT bei.

Um die Akzeptanz von AT bei der Zielgruppe, wie auch gegenüber den Förderinstitutionen, zu erreichen, scheint die Zeit reif für eine „Professionalisierung“ von AT-Experten.

Gleichzeitig darf jedoch nicht übersehen werden, daß auch erfolgreiche Anwendungen von AT lange Eingewöhnungszeiten beanspruchten, bis sie von den Nutzern auf breiter Basis akzeptiert wurden.

Rückmeldungen von den Teilnehmern bestätigen, daß gemessen an der relativ kurzen Zeit von nur zwei Tagen (die auch termingegängige Experten aus der Wirtschaft zur Teilnahme ermunterte) ein Optimum an Informationsaustausch erreicht wurde.

Eine Auswahl der Konferenzbeiträge soll 1988 in einer Sondernummer von TRIALOG veröffentlicht werden.

TRIALOG

Zeitschrift für
das Planen und Bauen
in der Dritten Welt

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TRIALOG

Vereinigung zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung
des Planens und Bauens in Entwicklungsländern e.V.

61 Darmstadt, Ploenniesstraße 18

TRIALOG, die Vereinigung zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Planens und Bauens in Entwicklungsländern, wurde 1983 von Fachleuten gegründet, die sich mit den Problemen der Wohnungsverorgung in der Dritten Welt in Forschung, Lehre und Praxis beschäftigen. Der eingetragene Verein, dessen Gemeinnützigkeit anerkannt ist, hat ein interdisziplinäres Verständnis von Planen und Bauen in Entwicklungsländern. Die Mitglieder sind Architekten, Stadt- und Regionalplaner, Bauingenieure, Geographen, Soziologen, Anthropologen und Ökonomen im deutschsprachigen Europa. Sie arbeiten an deutschen oder ausländischen Hochschulinrichtungen, in anderen Fachinstitutionen, bei Consulting-Unternehmen oder sind selbstständig.

Die Ziele der Vereinigung sind der Austausch von Erfahrungen aus der Praxis, die wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung, und die Förderung und Koordinierung von Forschungsarbeiten.

TRIALOG ist ein Forum aller, die wissenschaftlich und praktisch auf dem Gebiet des Planens und Bauens in der Dritten Welt arbeiten. Auf Kontakte und intensive Kommunikation mit Kollegen aus dem Ausland, besonders aus den Entwicklungsländern selbst, wird großer Wert gelegt. Die Vereini-

gung organisiert internationale Seminare und Tagungen (z.B. 1985 über Wohnungsverorgung in sozialistischen Entwicklungsländern, 1986 über Ansätze zur Sanierung von Slums und Spontansiedlungen, 1987 über Angepaßte Technologien), tritt als Antragsteller für Forschungsprojekte bei Förderinstitutionen auf, und gibt als ihr Organ die Zeitschrift TRIALOG heraus.

TRIALOG ist die einzige deutschsprachige Fachzeitschrift zu Themen des Planens und Bauens in Entwicklungsländern. Sondernummern, z.B. die Beiträge zu internationalen Tagungen und Seminaren, werden in englischer Sprache veröffentlicht. Es kommen deutsche und ausländische Autoren zu Wort, die die Diskussion von kontroversen Standpunkten, Forschungsergebnisse und Praxiserfahrungen einem breiteren Publikum zugänglich machen. Jede Ausgabe von TRIALOG wird von regionalen Redaktionsgruppen redigiert und selbstverantwortlich gestaltet. Zusätzlich zu dem jeweiligen Schwerpunkthema werden Ankündigungen und Berichte über fachbezogene Kongresse und Tagungen, und Mitteilungen aus Forschung und Lehre aufgenommen. Aktuelle Fachpublikationen werden rezensiert, und Leserbriefe veröffentlicht.

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