Camp Cities

Editorial

Refugee camps are commonly thought of as transitory emergency situations, set up for the protection or containment of displaced victims, planned by technocrats, run by humanitarian missions, protected by the military. But the reality of camps reveals complex built environments that undergo "urbanisation processes" reminiscent of those in informal neighbourhoods and slums around the globe. Beginning as tent cities, they quickly develop differentiated quarters with local sub-identities, economic zones, markets, shops, meeting and gathering places, and forms of representation and collective action.

Camp urbanisation, however, remains a taboo and most humanitarian organisations or host governments attempt to deny or restrict it. As the civil rights of camp refugees, such as the right to employment or mobility, remain restricted, camp populations cannot become self-reliant and thus remain dependent on aid. Although exact figures on how many of the 51 million displaced people worldwide live in camps or camp-like settings are lacking, the number is significant and growing.

At the time of the writing of this editorial, the German city of Berlin has decided to house refugees and asylum seekers in newly built container camps at the periphery of the city which, conveniently, they will share with other marginalised populations such as the homeless. Thus, camp dwellers will have little or no chance to find local employment or integrate themselves into the social, cultural or economic life of the city. This out-of-sight out-of-mind strategy differs little from the way host governments with much fewer resources in Asia, Africa or the Middle East deal with their own refugee populations. Among refugee groups, in the aid community, amongst activists and an increasing number of academics, protest about camp conditions is growing. Camps, be they in Europe or the developing world, have been criticised for their resemblance to spaces of confinement and control, for their tendency to compromise civil rights, and their inability to guarantee civil dignity. In the language of social science, the establishment of camps also produces extra-territorial spaces, spaces of victimisation, spaces "outside all places" (Agier 2011) whose inhabitants are reduced to "bare life" (Agamben 1998) without access to political and legal representation.

Do we need to rethink refugee camps so as to make them places with civil dignity, or indeed abolish camps altogether? The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in the release of its new policy in 2014, seems to favour the latter, advocating for protection solutions for refugees outside of the camp system. Have camps, through their restrictions, indeed hindered refugees more than protected them? Or is this policy shift merely a recognition of the inability to serve the growing number of refugees worldwide in a time when the international community has lost interest in the plight of refugees and has radically reduced funding? As desirable as a world without refugee camps would undoubtedly be, we should not delude ourselves.

Thousands of refugee camps currently exist, and many will be constructed in the future. In our world, where the number of conflicts is constantly increasing, displacement is also increasing – and with it, the need to protect and aid displaced populations. Camps are and will remain a reality. What urgently needs to be reconceptualised, however, is how camps are designed and constructed; how they connect to their social, economic and physical context; and how they evolve over time.

This TRIALOG issue calls upon architects, planners and development experts to engage with the issue of refugee camps – be it with the initial moment of emergency planning that gives "birth" to camps, with older urbanised camps, or with the discussion on the future of refugee camps within the respective host countries. A more constructive engagement could lead to a radical re-conceptualisation of what constitutes a "refugee camp": rather than being a space associated with structural discrimination, it could become a space where inhabitants can and should live with dignity.

In this issue, three different moments in the development of refugee camps are looked at. Part 1 concerns the "zero hour" of camps – a phase often underestimated in its decisiveness for the future. Part 2 looks at the post-emergency phase by highlighting the visible consequences of urbanisation processes as well as the increasing contradictions and tensions between the humanitarian order and the more-local order on the ground. Part 3 speculates on the future of refugee camps. Can camps be considered long-term assets and development catalysts for the host country? Can and should camps eventually dissolve into cities?

This edition of TRIALOG has been jointly edited by Julia Hartmann, Franziska Laue, Pia Lorenz, and Philipp Misselwitz. The idea for the issue arose during the joint preparation and production of the BMZ (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)-funded and GIZ commissioned exhibition "Space, Time, Dignity, Rights". Curated by Philipp Misselwitz, the exhibit opened at the German Architecture Centre DAZ in Berlin and eventually toured to the World Urban Forum in Naples (<www.space-time-dignity-rights.com>). The exhibition focused on new ways to improve Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East through participatory and community-driven approaches.

Julia Hartmann, Franziska Laue, Pia Lorenz, Philipp Misselwitz

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Camp Cities

Volume Editors: Julia Hartmann, Franziska Laue, Pia Lorenz, and Philipp Misselwitz

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1ˢᵗ Phase

A visit to almost any of the hundreds of refugee camps that exist worldwide confronts us with a complex reality and forces us to rethink our preconceptions. Instead of ordered tent cities, we are more likely to find streets, markets, shops or public buildings surrounded by jungles of makeshift buildings: urbanised settings, often only distinguishable from its host environment by the ubiquity of UN flags or the logos of international NGOs. Instead of temporary situations, we find de facto permanent environments that refuse to disappear, ambiguous spaces somewhere between emergency camp and emergent city. A closer study of the evolution of camps reveals that this ambiguity emerges almost at an instance. As soon as a form of normality sets in, sometimes only weeks or months after arrival, refugees turn into camp dwellers, adapting themselves to life in a new environment. Camp dwellers become experts in surviving on minimal means, improvising, making do with what can be found and almost immediately transforming the physical, spatial, social and economic constitution of their initial emergency setting. Tents are adapted, extended or replaced with more stable structures. Makeshift tables with goods for sale are turned into shops.

The current practice of camp planning and management remains, however, largely oblivious to the actual needs and resources of camp dwellers. As **Jim Kennedy** notes, camps conceived merely as efficient emergency operations rarely take into account their potential endurance and the need to provide space for population growth, for social interaction, for distinctions between the public and the private sphere, and for the need to build livelihoods. Do they adequately enable the development of social, economic and political life in a medium and possibly long-term time frame? **Anooradha Iyer Sidiqqi** detects an increasing influence of commercialisation and industrialisation fuelled by paradigms of efficiency, standardisation and speed of delivery. Curated by **Franziska Laue**, a selected range of examples shows how architect, planners, artists and activists have begun to respond to the insufficiency of current practice by rethink shelter design. Using the case of Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya **Anooradha Iyer Sidiqqi** reflects on the dilemma between emergency response and developmental needs. **Rasha Arous** reminds us of the condition of the majority of refugees who do not become camp dwellers, using the example of urban refugees manoeuvring through the Egyptian megacity of Cairo in search for shelter and, moreover, security. Articles by **Yaşar Adnan Adanalı** and **Ayham Dalal** provide fascinating insights into the tensions between humanitarian order and the emerging reality on the ground by studying camps set up in response to one of the most recent refugee crisis. Finally, a conversation with **Ingrid Schwörer** reveals the challenges faced by host governments vis-à-vis this unfolding crisis.

Zaatari camp in Jordan, the second biggest refugee camp in the world, was opened in July 2012 at 10 kilometres distance from Al-Mafraq City. Initially, it was planned to host 10,000 Syrian refugees, but the increasing influx of refugees caused the camp to grow to the size of a city. More than 350,000 refugees were once registered in the camp; however, this number has significantly decreased recently.

Photo: Ayham Dalal

EMERGENCY
The "Zero Hour"

Design, Manifestation and Development in Camps for the Displaced

Jim Kennedy

Design, Erscheinungsformen und Entwicklung von Flüchtlingslagern

Ein immer wiederkehrendes Thema der Darstellung menschlichen Leidens – sei es in Port au Prince nach dem Erdbeben oder im noch andauernden Bürgerkrieg in Syrien – sind Berichte von Menschen, die lebensbedrohlichen Situationen entkommen, ihr Heim verlieren und für die der Zufluchtsort – das Lager – wieder zu einem Ort der Entbehrungen und des Leids wird. Mangelhafte, schlecht geplante Lager stehen in direktem Zusammenhang mit tödlichen Epidemien und ansteckenden Krankheiten oder sie schaffen Räume, die Gewalt sowie Missbrauch von Frauen und Mädchen befördern. Seit langem erheben sich kritische Stimmen, die darauf hinweisen, wie in den immer zahlreicheren Fällen, welche die UN als „in die Länge gezogene" Fluchtsituationen beschreibt, durch das „Einlagern" von Bevölkerungsgruppen in Camps Lebenschancen zerstört werden. Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass ein relevanter Teil der hier Lebenden seit mehr als fünf Jahren in dieser Situation ist, oft ohne ein Ende in Sicht. Der Artikel berichtet über die historische Entwicklung der Planungskonzepte für solche Camps – seien es Flüchtlingslager oder Lager für Katastrophenopfer – sowie der für sie gültigen Standards. Auch wenn anerkannt wird, dass die schlimmsten Situationen oft diejenigen sind, in denen gar keine Planungskonzepte zur Anwendung kamen, ist das Hauptargument dieses Artikels, dass die von der internationalen Hilfsgemeinschaft adaptierten Lagerdesigns zu starr sind und eine von den Bewohner(inne)n der Lager selbst gesteuerte Weiterentwicklung nicht vorsehen. Während sonst meist die Auswirkungen des Bevölkerungszuwachses auf die Entwicklung von Flüchtlingscamps diskutiert werden, stellt dieser Artikel die oft viel größeren Auswirkungen der wachsenden Wirtschaftsaktivitäten und der Einkommensentwicklung in den Mittelpunkt, unter anderem anhand einer im letzten Teil des Beitrags vorgestellten Fallstudie über Lager in Port-au-Prince nach dem Erdbeben vom Januar 2010.

From post-earthquake Port-au-Prince to the on-going civil war in Syria, a constant theme of the images of humanitarian suffering is that of families displaced from their homes into camps (Norwegian Refugee Council 2004, Save the children 2012). Often, the narrative is of families who have escaped from life-threatening situations, but for whom the location of refuge – the camp – is still a place of suffering and deprivation. Living in sub-standard, badly planned camps has been directly (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996), or as being the enabling loci of violence and abuse towards the most vulnerable of the population, particularly women and girls (Norwegian Refugee Council 2004; Crisp 1995). Just as constant are the voices highlighting the destruction of lives and opportunities through the "warehousing" of populations (Harrell-Bond 2002) in camps during the significant number of what the UN now terms "protracted refugee situations" (UNHCR 2001, 2004), whereby a significant percentage of the population continues to be affected by conflict for at least five years, often with no end in sight.

This article reviews the history of the design concepts for camps, whether for refugees (i.e. those who have crossed an international border to escape from violence or persecution) or for those who have lost their homes through natural disaster, such as with recent events in Haiti or Pakistan. Whilst acknowledging the fact that the worst camps are often those that do not even have the help of

these designs, the main argument of this article is that the designs that have been adopted by the humanitarian community are too limited in scope to take into account the development of the camps as driven by camp inhabitants. Although there has been discussion in previous texts about the impact of population growth over time upon the performance of camps, this article also highlights the often even greater impact of exponential economics or livelihood development in camps, in part through an analysis in the second part of the article of camps in the Port-au-Prince area after the earthquake of January 2010.

Standards for camp designs

Humanitarian organisations have developed complex sets of guidelines for all aspects of camp design and camp management. Often overwhelmed by the sheer size of the populations with acute, life-or-death needs (BBC 2012), the humanitarian organisations have justifiably focussed first on sets of standards for camp designs that can ensure – as equitably as possible, given the limits or lack of resources available – an existence with at least the minimum necessary safety and dignity for all inhabitants (Sphere 2011). Without this minimum, there can be literally no existence possible within camps, and faced with the many experiences where even this minimum has not been achievable, hard-pressed humanitarian aid workers in the field are right to prioritise

these considerations first. However, in terms of the guidelines available for the technical design of camps, the numerical standards for minimum distances between shelters or other buildings, or the minimum availability of infrastructure or services, fall far short in their degree of comprehensiveness.

The technical guidelines for all aspects of disaster response (IFRC 1994, Sphere 2011) state that the goals of any response, once life-saving has been achieved, should be to go beyond this bare minimum and to encompass a process, often in reality incremental in nature, which supports affected populations in their choice of "sustainable" or "durable" (UNHCR 2007) solutions, whilst promoting above all else the affected population's resilience to risk and, likewise, capacity to rebuild their own livelihoods. In some ways, this transitional process is more easily visualised in situations where the affected population as a whole remains undisplaced, close to their pre-disaster locations of origin, and with the greater potential for an early start to reconstruction. It is the question mark of impermanence hanging over the existence of every camp that is perhaps the key factor in the constricting of the comprehensiveness and indeed the ambition of the technical guidelines for camp design. This then results in designs where the limited goals of a minimally secure, dignified existence for all the inhabitants are constantly undermined by the inability of the limited set of design elements to take into account the effects of population growth and economic or "livelihoods" development, both within the camp and in the wider geographical area in which the presence of the camp has an impact.

Although guidelines on camp construction note clearly that the construction of camps must take into consideration possible future camp population increases over time as the lifespan of the camp extends (UNHCR 2007; Norwegian Refugee Council 2004; Lambert and Davis 2002), there is nevertheless little or no guidance within these documents regarding how to do so, or how to plan for this within the initial design. What guidance does exist is, in the main, limited to just expanding the residential shelter blocks at the edges of camps or within the blocks of space left fallow within the original camp area (Corsellis and Vitale 2005; Norwegian Refugee Council 2004). There has been little in the way of sustained discussion about the fact that in many camps it is not only the increase in population (and the resulting decrease in bare land-space per person) that is the issue: an additional experience in a number of camps is that, at a certain point in the camp's lifespan, the usage of space by the inhabitants, and the variety and combinations of those ways, increases markedly. Often, the modes of use that develop are neither predicted nor accounted for in the written guidelines, nor are they anticipated by the designers of the individual camps themselves. The greater question explored in this paper is the intensity of the development, and the differing ways in which this economic development manifests itself in the evolving morphology of a camp and its surroundings, in contrast with the official camp design.

That is, although much writing on the impact of camp design upon life in a camp has concentrated upon the sets of minimum standards created by the humanitarian organisations, and has assumed that these sets of guidelines do in fact act as a full and adequate set for measur-

Cluster type: B4
Aerial view of community cluster

ability, further observation indicates that although the negative shifts in the ratio of space to people, through population influxes or birthrates, do indeed have a large and wide-ranging impact. In many ways it is the exponential increase in the complexity of the use of space, through economic development in the camps and the context of the camp surroundings, which is the key factor for assessing how a camp design performs.

The current standards – and the small set of templates for drawn models – for the design of refugee camps, often expressed in a list of indicators of basic minimum spaces or minimum distances, come together as a whole as a combination of quantifiable numerically expressed minimum standards (e.g. minimum distance, measured in metres, between each separate shelter) and modular design. A single-household shelter must have a minimum internal space based upon a ratio of square metres per person. These single shelters are then physically grouped together to form a small "cluster" or "community" (typically between 12 and 20 individual shelters). [Fig. 1]

If each shelter does not yet have its own latrine, shower space or refuse dump, then these will be in a smaller number and shared communally within the "cluster". A number of "clusters" combine to form a "block", for which there may be provided a minimum number of basic infrastructures, including taps or access points for water for drinking and household use. Those blocks, in turn, are then grouped together to form "sectors", into which there may be larger types of non-residential buildings situated: schools, markets, police posts. According to the numeric indicators, there should be a minimum gap between each shelter (UNHCR 2007), a larger gap between the "clusters" and between adjacent "blocks", and much wider firebreaks between "sectors" (UNHCR 2007). [Fig. 2] Latrines and water points also have determined maximum and minimum distances from shelters, as well as a minimum ratio of people per item. The same applies at the "sector" level for the ratio of people per school: overall, the estimated minimum space ratio per person in a minimally-provisioned camp is 45 m² per person.

In the last decade, the more commonly used sets of guidelines have been at pains to emphasise the fact that these should be seen as being qualitative as much as quantitative. But in reality, it is the shorthand, numeric

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Figure 2: Groups of shelter clusters make up blocks. Source: Norwegian Refugee Council (2004) Camp Management Toolkit

Principle Layout - Camp for 10 000

1 Schools
2 Market/Distribution Point
3 Religious Building
4 Play Areas/Community Areas/Future Expansion
5 Administration
6 Community/Culture Centre etc.

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indicators put in place to judge whether these standards have or have not been met that are still taken to be the actual building blocks for the layout of camp plans.

Camp designs are underpinned by an assumption of non-permanence governed by the international legal instrument that defines what a refugee is in the first place: the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN 1951). Whilst this instrument clearly indicates the various responsibilities a state has vis-á-vis those who have crossed international borders because of a well-founded fear of persecution, it also states that such responsibilities, and the status of "refugee", are contingent upon there being an observable cause for such fear in the country of origin. At any point when the cause of such fear of persecution has been judged by the asylum-

giving country as having been removed, the individual person's status as refugee is also removable, and the person's continued stay in the host country is then dependent upon that country's normal laws concerning immigrants and non-citizens.

Although there are camps in Palestine that have been in existence since 1948, the enduring assumption – and the one that controls the designs – is that all camps are not only non-permanent, but will be as short-lived as possible. The fear is that without such a fig leaf, many host-country governments would be reluctant to allow the construction of camps. But the presence of such a status of "permanent non-permanence" also means that the opportunities for economic development within the camps are often officially ignored in large extent.

What is a good Camp?

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that there is no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a "good" camp (apart from reaching the numerical indicators in Sphere), but what is a little more notable is that, for the most part, a definition of what is a camp is also missing in the literature of humanitarian organisations. Neither the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies (UNHCR 2007) nor Sphere (Sphere 2011) offer any definition, nor do more camp-specific documents such as the inter-organisational Camp Management Toolkit (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). In one other key set of shelter guidelines, Transitional Settlements: Displaced Populations, the first document which claimed to provide categorisation of shelter options for all types of displaced populations, there is a definition of a "planned camp", but rather than describing the sum of the parts it tends to be merely a list of elements to be found in the camp:

Planned camps are places where displaced populations find accommodation on purpose-built sites, and a full services infrastructure is provided, including water supply, food distribution, non-food item distribution, education, and healthcare, usually exclusively for the population of the site. (Corsellis and Vitale 2005: 124)

Confusion over the definition of a camp is, in post-disaster situations, sometimes exacerbated by local politics in which the governments do not want to name sites explicitly as camps in order to avoid losing face. There have also been situations, notably in southern Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami and in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, where the national government created an arbitrary cut-off number for the minimum amount of families in a gathering of shelters for the application of the term "camp" – in these cases, any grouping of shelters with less than 50 families was not a camp according to local government categorisation.

The first available humanitarian guidelines that refer to camp design and camp construction, dating from 1959, come from a set of American Red Cross guidelines for response to natural disaster within the USA. They state simply:

> *In designing the layout of the camp, it is recommended that the team leader secure the technical assistance of an experienced military person familiar with the establishment of tent camps. The advice of the military specialist in properly spacing the camps and their grouping into residential and community service areas should be followed. (American Red Cross 1959)*

It wasn't until 1971 that a consultant for USAID and for various international NGOs working in disaster response, Fred Cuny, started to research prototypes for alternative camp designs, which, although intended to be non-permanent, would mimic in their morphology the villages, neighbourhoods or towns from which the refugees would have come. By 1973, a design had been made that could in theory be expanded for much larger numbers of population, accompanied by statements that this "community" approach to camp design would reduce overall costs by increasing the capacity of the communities to look after each other and, therefore, also reduce the dependency upon continued support from the NGOs, Red Cross or others. The actual designs created by Cuny and his consultancy company, Intertect, would look familiar to anyone studying camp designs from 2013 [Fig. 3] – the individual shelters, one per family, loosely grouped together into groups of 12 or 16, with intended space within these clusters of shelters for that particular "community" or grouping of households to share in common. Between each of the clusters was a clearly demarcated pathway,

and towards the middle of the entire camp was a group of public buildings or administrative service buildings. [Fig. 4] To the degree indicated, any expansion of the camp would be done by replicating, or "tiling", more community clusters of shelters, although there are some drawings from that period which, whilst never negating the primacy of the first centre of the camp, indicate some sort of eventual extra administrative hubs for the most outlying of the residential expansion areas (Kennedy 2008).

This was certainly a large improvement upon the military-style camps with undifferentiated rows of tents. But the observable results in the first half of the 1970s, at least, benefited from the fact that the examples of camps of

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
CAMP LAYOUT

FIGURE TWO

SITE PLAN

SITE SECTION A-A

BLOCK PLAN

Figure 5: Intertect plan for Bangladeshi refugees, design by Hartkopf and Goodspeed, 1975. Source: Fred Cuny Center archive

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this design that were actually built shared a number of key features that may have exaggerated the success of the design. Firstly, whether in Nicaragua or Bangladesh, the camps were relatively small, never going beyond a few hundred families. In the case of Nicaragua after the 1972 earthquake, the residents of the camps were not refugees according to the UN definition, but were in their own country and facing no threat of man-made violence. By coincidence, all these camps involved populations who were culturally comfortable with shelters allocated to non-extended, "nuclear" families and with having shared community spaces (although, in the case of the camps for Moslem Bangladeshi refugees, there were greater physical barriers created between the interior shared spaces within the clusters and the truly public spaces in the pathways) (Kennedy 2008). [Fig. 5]

At more or less the same time, discussions started between Intertect and some of its humanitarian partners concerning solutions for the phenomena of the rising number of NGOs working in emergency situations and, at the same time, the increasing number of cases where emergency aid failed, or made the situation worse, or at the very least provided assistance that had wide ranges of inequity. The recommendation made by Intertect was that all aspects of humanitarian response should be go-

verned by a series of minimum standards to be achieved by the implementing agencies: if the repeated symptom of failures in humanitarian response was widespread disease, malnourishment and death amongst the disaster-affected populations, then the safeguard would be these minimum standards, numerically expressed and modelled explicitly upon the concept of minimum dosages of medicines in the field of health (Kennedy 2008).

A short booklet published for the World Health Organisation in 1972 (Assar 1972) eventually provided the list of numbers that Intertect proposed as the benchmark standards, which Cuny – prompted by another exponential increase in the numbers of NGOs in the field and another set of humanitarian failures marked, in particular, by public health failures in overcrowded camps during the refugee crisis on the Cambodia-Thai border in 1980-81 – then introduced into the first edition of the guidelines for emergency response for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). As the numeric standards from the 1972 WHO publication were inserted more or less in their entirety into the first edition of the UNHCR guidelines, they became the universal standard and have not been seriously discussed since. Thus, the concept of using a small set of numerically quantifiable minimum standards as the sufficient tool for all aspects of camp planning, and with the protection of public health as the main priority, has stayed. [Fig. 6]

In part, the lack of further serious consideration on how to conceptualise and execute camp design guidelines has been because of the changes in policy, particularly by UNHCR and in response to a growing sense of host-government fatigue with refugees and camps, towards accentuating the repatriation of refugees (once they are no longer under any perceived threat in their country of origin, in order to avoid accusations of refoulement) as the preferred solution for refugee situations. Throughout the 1970s, some African countries had programmes of permanent local integration of refugees, but by 1985 UNHCR was circulating documents stating that repatriation would from then on be the main strand of the policy towards "durable solutions" (UNHCR 1985, 1986; Kennedy 2008). Within five years, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was calling the 1990s the "decade of repatriation" (UNHCR 1991). There are now "livelihoods" projects in some camps, with activities to promote resilience in eventual repatriation, but this has not been reflected in any change in the camps' physical design. This lack of discussion of alternative camp designs has been enjoined by those who have declared in writing that camps should be, at best, the shelter response of "last resort" and the least-preferred shelter option, or those who declare that there should never be camps at all, under any circumstances (Harrell-Bond 1998).

The remainder of this paper will seek to explore the ways in which, and the degree to which, economic development within camps has an impact, unforeseen by the camp designers, upon the camp design and upon life in and around the camp, and how the manifestations of economic development not only transform the morphology of the camp but also often undermine the original more-limited objectives of the designers. This will be done through a study of the impact of economic development in camps in Haiti.

Port-au-Prince, Haiti

The case study in this paper refers collectively to observations of features shared by a number of locations in the Petionville and Delmas areas of Port-au-Prince during the first 12 months following the January 2010 earthquake. The sites in the post-earthquake Port-au-Prince area were not called "camps", but "spontaneous" settlements. Because the inhabitants were citizens of Haiti, neither their right to stay in the country nor their right to stay in the camps was determined by a non-permanent refugee status. This is not to say that the camps' inhabitants had any security of tenure within the camps, with the government's official policy for much of the time since January 2010 being the eventual closure of all camps.

Another key difference with other camps described in this paper is that although families in the settlements in Petionville and Delmas may typically have moved up to a few hundred metres from the original homes, many of them were not displaced in terms of having to leave the entire city or cross borders.

At the height of the movement into the settlements, there were estimates that the number of camps in the earthquake-affected areas was more than 1500 (Haiti Humanitarian Response 2013), with estimates of the total numbers of inhabitants in all the settlements combined totalling more than one million (IOM 2013). The size of individual camps ranged from a small number of families to camps of over 10,000 people.

Generally, there were significant challenges in mapping and quantifying the settlements. This was not just because of the limitations of the technology or other resources of the humanitarian organisations. The population sizes of the settlements, particularly in the first weeks after the earthquake, changed rapidly, and in some cases there seemed to be a tendency for some smaller, more-peripheral settlements to spontaneously close down, whilst the larger, more-central and better-supported settlements increased in population. As the settlements were for the most part contained within built-up areas, the geographic footprints of the camps were not able to increase in time, and so any population increases resulted automatically in increases in density of people per square metre.

The settlements were created in the first days after the earthquake, when there was as yet little presence of humanitarian organisations on the ground. Therefore, the post-earthquake settlements in Port-au-Prince were with almost no exception "unplanned". This, however, does not mean that they were not organised. In fact, the layouts of those settlements were created and evolved under a complex set of social and economic influences. Furthermore, the humanitarian organisations working in the camps used their given guidelines' set of minimum standards as the benchmarks for their work, even if it was imposed upon a camp that the humanitarian organisations had found in situ, rather than having created themselves.

The complex manner in which, in the first days after the earthquake, families, communities or neighbourhoods negotiated with each other to appropriate available

spaces, and how those families divided the spaces between them, has not been recorded. There was some visual correlation between the sizes of the shelters and the spaces between the shelters in the post-earthquake camps and the corresponding indoor and outdoor dimensions to housing in some of the slums in Port-au-Prince that had not been severely damaged by the earthquake, but there has been no further study of whether this was merely coincidental or not.

The larger changes in the camps, and those fuelled by the economic activities centred in the camps, started in earnest after the humanitarian organisations had started their own activities of support to the populations in the camps. Much has been made, in articles and evaluations, of how the targeting of humanitarian support only to the camp populations slowed down or halted any process of

Figure 6: Current suggested shelter cluster design from UNHCR. Source: UNHCR (2007) Handbook for Emergencies ▼

Figure 7: Cinema hall in a camp in Port-au-Prince, 2010. Photo: Xavier Genot

Figure 8: Stalls selling food in a camp in Port-au-Prince, 2010. Photo: Xavier Genot

return to neighbourhoods of origin; what has had less quantifiable documentation was the irregular but constant drip of smaller-scale support from small groups of often faith-based, self-styled volunteers who were not associated with any of the more-established NGOs. However, it is likely that even without the presence of the NGOs distributing non-food items, or supplying clean water, many camp populations would have decided to remain in the camps for a significant amount of time.

Within the first two months of the earthquake, whilst the humanitarian organisations typically installed their water-delivery infrastructures, latrines, shower cubicles and other structures at the corners of the camps (frequently the only parts of the camp where the organisations could get truck access and the turn-around space for the trucks to leave again after delivery), the inhabitants of the camps installed their own means of livelihood around the edges of the camps as well. The enterprises that started off in the earliest days included stands selling food supplies, but then quickly moved to include stands selling barbequed and other cooked food as well. The placement and clustering of the stands or kiosks was somewhat randomised, but often depended upon a combination of factors such as heavy customer traffic and, soon, the availability of electricity supply (cabled in from outside the camps). The food stalls were then joined by other, non-essential enterprises, including DVD sellers, beauty salons, and video cinema halls.

Because of the locations of the camps, inside a large city, much of the potential customer traffic for these edge-of-camp enterprises did not need to come from the camp dwellers themselves. This external stimulus only served to increase the ways in which the camps were "hardened" or "solidified" (www.nytimes.com 2011). The external stimulus supported not only the income for those lucky

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enough to own the enterprises, but meant that a greater array of products and enterprises could be made available to those in the camps. Even if homes were repaired, or the fear of aftershocks abated, in many places it was the undeniable truth that many of the enterprises of the old neighbourhoods were now standing at the edges of the camps, giving inhabitants of the camps even less incentive to leave. In terms of the internal morphology of the camps, satellite images of the camps from early on after the earthquake already showed that the self-built shelters tended to cluster not towards the middle of the camps, but towards the edges: the middles of the camps were in some cases hollowed out, with all the activity going on at the sides, where the camps touch the streets. [Fig. 7-9] Of course this tendency eventually became a self-reinforcing cycle: the more structures were placed at the edges of the camps, the less people were able to get into the centre of the camps, and so the less economic activity occurred there. For the morphology of the city as a whole, despite an official UN and government of Haiti policy (since 2011) of supporting the return to neighbourhoods and departure from camps, there remain, at this time of writing, many tens of thousands of people still in the camps. Some voices are claiming a pragmatism by stating that everyone should acknowledge that, in the end, at least some of the camps will become permanent settlements. But as the original selection of sites was to a degree randomi-

sed, and as there is no way of controlling, through principles of urban design, which exact camps should be selected for closure and which should be selected for permanency, it remains to be seen how the old camps, as continued hubs of economic resurgence, will affect the development of the rest of the city in the long term.

The case of the settlements in Port-au-Prince illustrates the relevance of considerations for camp design and construction, and that it is not just relevant for rural displaced populations but may also be relevant to the responses to complex emergencies in urban areas, and in places where one of the key influences upon the humanitarian responses is the lack of capacity of local governmental authorities. And even though the built environment of Port-au-Prince is a lot less malleable than that of a refugee camp built primarily out of mud in rural Africa, it is still a built environment with enough plasticity that the economic impact of the camps can have a large-scale impact upon the city as a whole.

The challenge, perhaps unanswerable, is that these economic or livelihoods activities are so powerful precisely because they are so varied in nature and in stakeholder. Thus, it would be almost impossible to ever devise meaningful, measurable standards for how they operate in an emergency built environment.

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Humanitarianism and Monumentality

Anooradha Iyer Siddiqi

Humanität und Monumentalität

Humanitäre Hilfe hat den Anspruch, nicht profitorientiert zu sein. Internationale Organisationen mobilisieren Gelder in Milliardenhöhe für weit entfernte Bevölkerungsgruppen, die unter umwelt- oder konfliktbedingten Notsituationen leiden. Bereits Hannah Arendt reflektierte über die inhärent politische Natur dieser massiven Hilfen. Flüchtlingslager scheinen eine unverzichtbare räumliche und gebaute Manifestation dieser internationalen Hilfsleistungen zu sein und werden als herkömmliche Strategie kaum hinterfragt. Temporäre Lager können sich jedoch zu stadtähnlichen Siedlungen entwickeln, die dann über Generationen bestehen bleiben. Mit jedem Flüchtlingslager entwickelt sich auch die milliardenschwere Ökonomie der internationalen Hilfsindustrien. Die Entwicklung von Notunterkünften wird kommerzialisiert und ihre Produktion wird zunehmend Teil globaler industrieller Strukturen. Als Verkörperung von Krisen und Konflikten werden sie darüber hinaus zu Orten architektonischer und urbaner Studien. Dieser Artikel beginnt mit der Diskussion, inwiefern in Architektur, Verstädterung und materiellen Kulturelementen Anzeichen für einen Kulturimport unter dem Deckmantel der Humanität zu finden sein können. Was veranlasst Hilfsorganisationen dazu, große, zusammenhängende temporäre urbane Formationen entstehen zu lassen? Könnten stattdessen Innovation und kulturell angepasste Strategien gefördert werden durch eine kritische Reflexion des Gebauten, seiner Materialität, seiner bestehenden und zukünftigen Räumlichkeiten?

"[…] Foreign aid, even if given for purely humanitarian reasons, is political by nature precisely because it is not motivated by the search for profit. Billions of dollars have been spent in political and economic wastelands where corruption and incompetence have caused them to disappear before anything productive could be started, and this money is no longer the "superfluous" capital that could not be invested productively and profitably in the home country but the weird outgrowth of sheer abundance that the rich countries, the haves as against the have-nots, can afford to lose."

—*Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951*

Two questions lurk within Arendt's assessment of the nature of aid. The first has to do with the political nature of the not-for-profit gesture. The second has to do with the political nature of gestures born of excessive abundance. These two catalysts lie at the crux of what is now often accepted as a de facto response to crisis: the mobilisation of massive support to faraway populations upset by armed conflict or environmental disaster. With these conditions setting the scene, what material form does such support take, and what meanings does it convey? An emergency response involving some sort of sheltering encampment where supplies and services may be efficiently delivered is one common iteration.

The formation of camps as a strategy to assist and ultimately manage affected populations speaks to only one experience of displacement, and is widely considered a last resort by those responsible for bringing them into being. Nevertheless, this strategy frequently arises, often with expressive architecture and coordinated planning at the urban scale. Perhaps herein lies a response to Arendt's questions around the politics of things "not motivated by the search for profit" or stemming from the "weird outgrowth of sheer abundance". Both support the will toward the monumental, that is, a sublime response to crisis. These celebrations of – and memorials to – the humanity at the core of the aid gesture often result in built form.

Monumental urbanism

As such, "camps" provide compelling objects of architectural study, as a category of space in the collective imagination and an embodiment of a crisis of dwelling – for the displaced person and humanitarian caregiver alike, as both groups adopt various levels of risk and live in special political (and occasionally extreme physical) circumstances. In the world of aid administration, there is a common presumption that establishing a camp merely requires finding a source of water. However, historical and archaeological research suggests something altogether different from this reductive technical characterisation. In fact, it may be argued that a refugee settlement is an artefact of a complex, nomadic, globalised civilisation, and results from profound industrialisation and cultural activity.

To examine some of the broader implications of the recent history of camp-building, it is important to note a set of phenomena that reified throughout the Cold War, and promoted the geopolitical currency of multilateral humanita-

rianism in the 1990s and beyond. The project of international humanitarianism, based on European paradigms of charity and humanity after World War Two, mushroomed into a multi-billion-dollar global enterprise. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, reached its highest operating budget ever. This same agency, the most prominent body designated to address concerns around displacement, assumed unique new assertive responsibilities, aligning its mission expressly with military peacekeeping in war contexts (Loescher 2001). A new United Nations humanitarian reform initiative aimed to strengthen international partnerships by streamlining emergency response funding. Post-Cold War and postcolonial realignments forced the reorganisation of national boundaries. Dramatic urbanisation exacerbated vulnerability to natural disasters. Together, these conditions occasioned mass flight within and across borders.

In this context, temporary settlements were built at the scale of cities, not for the first time, but against a confluence of new factors. For example, working evidence showed that settlements in certain regions would likely remain in place for generations. Unprecedented numbers of people sought refuge at sites such as Benaco in Tanzania, where, in April 1994, over a quarter million people crossed the Rwandan border in a twenty-four hour period. [Fig. 1] The international scene was dominated by highly professional coordinated emergency planning between state agencies and nongovernmental organisations. These actors applied the concept of the "kit" to large urban configurations, assembling settlements overnight from prefabricated materials flown or driven to sites. A settlement

for a quarter million people could be assembled overnight from materials flown or driven to sites; for example, a delivery for Médicins Sans Frontières could include an inflatable medical hospital and ten thousand prefabricated shelters (Phelan 2008). [Fig. 2] Occasionally, the shelter sector of the aid industry converged with the design disciplines and commercial manufacturers to develop technologies and practices.

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Figure 1: Benaco camp, Ngara, Tanzania. 250,000 Rwandans fied in 24 hours, April 28, 1994. From *Camps: A Guide to 21st-Century Space,* by Charlie Hailey. Photo: © Chris Sattlberger/ Panos Pictures

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Figure 2: Médicins Sans Frontières prototype for inflatable hospital, Bordeaux, France, 2012. Photo by author

Figure 3: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mission page on website: ICRC vehicle crossing the border checkpoint between Basra and Khorramshar in order to repatriate the mortal remains of two Iraqi soldiers of the Iran-Iraq war. Photo: © CICR / Thierry Gassmann 2003; V-P-IQ-E-00323

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Settlements for refugees or displaced persons have been analysed discursively as instances of urbanism – sites for economic productivity, social reconfiguration, politics, and conflict. Researchers have also examined domestic architecture, institutional and infrastructural frameworks, and the systemic physical and environmental impacts of refugee settlements. While these physical, social, and environmental conditions are important, they are bound with the problem-solving goals of practice and policy. Instead, re-conceptualising post-Cold War humanitarianism as a globalised, technological complex (interpreting technology not just as an artefact, but as a set of systems and a representation of activities) enables the contemplation of its more generative impulses – that is, its behaviour as an industry, or an alternate form of productivity. Evidence in visual, spatial, and material artefacts and practices suggests that through the reification of this complex, the humanitarian gestures of recent decades exhibit a larger, if latent, cultural expression of monumentality.

Fundamental to this conception is the notion that humanitarian relief does not require the creation of large urban formations, which begs the question of why, then, objects of this scale and economic, political, and cultural value have been erected, repeatedly and systematically, solely for the purpose of delivering aid to populations in transition. There is an industrialising component to this, but also a cultural project at play. Both involve the continued assertion of the nation-state, even as the notions of territory and citizenship are radically challenged on the ground.

This reconceptualisation of the humanitarian project is crucial to forwarding an important cultural theory within a typically policy- and practice-based discourse. To that end, it may be helpful to investigate the emergence of this global civilisation (made up of humanitarians and the people they serve) in selected institutions and practices, as well as some of its spatial and visual forms at different scales.

Territorial and material signification

The notion of the border begins to set out territorial, spatial, and even visual terms, while delimiting the legal category of displacement. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees located the refugee outside a national spatial boundary (UNHCR 1951). Meanwhile, the borderless organisation aiding and managing fleeing populations defines a more practical condition, with transnational mobility and an associated cosmopolitanism forming a substrate of the sans frontières humanitarian movement. Nongovernmental organisations often mobilise the image of border porosity as a visual trope in the subtext of an activist or aid mission. [Fig. 3]

While border disintegration diminishes territorial definitions of space, camp architecture acts to communicate a fleeting existence in time. Architectural signs of permanence socially threaten host countries, signal a protracted state of displacement for refugees, and politically complicate the activity of humanitarian stakeholders.

Structures imported to house and serve displaced people, however physically permanent or semi-permanent, have embodied – and functioned to denote – ephemerality. In the post-Cold War era, as the United Nations entrenched the policy of refugee repatriation, the architecture of camps acted as an instrument of signification and its visual legibility served as subtext to its quotidian purpose (Stevens 2006).

The message of transience finds one of its forms at the scale of material, in the tarpaulin. Since 1985, the UNHCR's first-response strategy for shelter has been mass distribution of lightweight plastic sheeting. Mandated to respond to a disaster within 72 hours, the UNHCR currently airlifts approximately five hundred thousand to a million reinforced polyethylene tarps from stockpiles in Copenhagen and Dubai, procured from China. The material's low bulk price creates a ubiquitous field of blue colour at recovery sites. A tarp can collect rainwater, approximate a medical stretcher when suspended over two pieces of bamboo, and wrap corpses for proper burial – all civil and cultural needs that informally expand its purpose beyond emergency sheltering.

Exhibited by the Museum of Modern Art with the curatorial conceit that "sometimes the best design is the simplest", the material has evolved into a densely-woven fabric, "stabilised against ultraviolet rays and excess heat for long outdoor exposure" and refined with features such as aluminium eyelets to promote flexible use (UNHCR 1985). Curated by Paola Antonelli in the Museum's Department of Architecture and Design, the SAFE exhibition assigned emergency response materials a meaning beyond the utilitarian, as objects associated with displacement, and therefore representative of the modern human condition. [Fig. 4]

Aspirational architecture

At the scale of architecture, the UNHCR sponsored a series of initiatives in the 2000s to update the tent, its most critical mobile shelter unit. The new tent expressed a different architectural language from that of its military surplus-grade predecessors, quoting commercial models

both aesthetically and functionally, with some products literally fabricated by recreational equipment manufacturers. Some design elements overtly addressed universal human rights concerns, not just proposing basic shelter, but suggesting expressions of dignity, and offering explicit protections against disease, elements, and the threat of domestic violence. Some innovations developed out of agency initiatives, some due to the work of individual or team authorship, and others from the private sector.

When interviewed in 2002 by the UNHCR to take over the post of Senior Physical Planner, Ghassem Fardanesh was asked if he could develop a "lightweight tent", a need for which had been identified by the agency over a decade earlier. He worked with a supplier in Pakistan to upgrade the canvas ridge version modelled after military field equipment to a tent with the potential for greater longevity (up to twenty years), better durability, shelf life, and storage capacity, and, perhaps above all, lighter weight; at the time, a plane chartered at the cost of two hundred thousand dollars to carry emergency shelters could only accommodate four hundred canvas ridge tents, at one hundred kilograms each – three times fewer than the new design would allow.

The process to decrease weight, increase shelf life, and maximise durability and cost-efficiency resulted by 2006 in a tunnel-shaped lightweight emergency tent (LWET) that would sleep "a family of four to five persons" – though, in reality, many more (Fardanesh 2009). [Fig. 5] The LWET was modelled in part after commercial recreational tents, with similar specifications for quality (UNHCR 2006).

Fardanesh marshalled the development of this design into the prototype and batch rollout and delivery phases,

based on a process which included information-gathering at Geneva headquarters and collaborative design with a supplier, as well as his own technical training in mechanical engineering, and thirteen years of field observation of living patterns, and health, social, and human rights conditions among displaced people in diverse regions (Fardanesh 2009). His team visited each of the suppliers in China, issuing a report on factory capacity and technology that expanded on human rights conditions, noting at one of the factories, for instance, "the mission did not see any child labour" (Fardanesh 2005). As an instance of the assertion of moral interests from a senior position of authority, it might be argued that voice rather than policy was instrumentalised here, through signature design practice.

Cultural expression

This example in many ways exposes a system of autonomy in which a practitioner's concerns for refugees' lived experience translated itself into institutional policy. Human rights standards not articulated in United Nations documents such as the Invitation to Bid or Prequalification of Suppliers appeared in a mission report. No clear, transparent process emerged for awarding contracts.

These slippages, qualified by individual discretion, point to a quality that philosopher Adi Ophir has described as a "moral residue" – real, active, human moral interests at work within "untamed events, under-codified interactions, hybrid situations, and positions that evade the classifying power of the sovereign, or of any other authority" (Ophir 2007: 169). Such autonomy in the realm of the moral gains significance against the backdrop of uniform practice and standardisation expected for efficient responses to large-

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Figure 4: Repatriation kit: plastic sheeting, blanket, gerry can, soap. From the Museum of Modern Art exhibition *SAFE: Design Takes on Risk,* 2005. Photo: UN/UNHCR # 203107C

Figure 5: LWET in East Timor camp, Airport location, 2006. Photo: courtesy of Ghassem Fardanesh

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2 Also, Architectes de l'Urgence in France, Article 25 in England, and Architecture for Humanity in the United States, expanded the mission once the domain of Habitat for Humanity.

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Figure 5: LWET in East Timor camp, Airport location, 2006. Photo: courtesy of Ghassem Fardanesh

scale political and ecological crises, and again makes a case about cultural expressions of monumentality. Ophir further elaborated on the matter of scale in terms of "technologies of disaster", defined as a "structured assemblage of power and knowledge that includes … coordinated physical instruments, spatial arrangements, means of communication, means of data collecting and processing, organisational procedures, and discursive practices" (Ophir 2007: 161-166).

Such a concept describes collaborations in the past two decades to improve accountability and standardise protocols for disaster response, resulting in new and updated best-practice manuals for camp planning and management, some with critical input from architects and aid workers. **1**

It also speaks to a professionalising tendency; for example, planners and architects began to assume a variety of roles in emergency response and relief fundraising, in government agencies and their own humanitarian organisations, holding academic and practical workshops to focus exclusively on shelter and environment, and linking with the disciplines and audiences of the design vanguard during a moment of heightened public sensation around the opening of Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao and the public discussion of proposals for the for-

mer World Trade Center site (Zimba 1993: 2, 43). **2** Again, these global activities arguably highlight a monumental impulse behind the cultural production of humanitarianism.

The spatial and material practices discussed here in terms of monumental expression also represent the conversion of ideology into industry in the recent historical and political context of humanitarianism. Such a conclusion ultimately argues for new disciplinary approaches to the study of humanitarian issues. To date, most research has been policy- or practice-oriented, ostensibly because of its acute effect on human lives. However, an equally profound urgency lies in purely humanistic inquiry that turns away from action or problem-solving and toward reflection or cultural study.

Given that most research in humanitarian environments is sponsored or hosted by an entity with a vested political interest in some aspect of the status quo (even those resisting it), and that therefore no research remains unaffected by such political frameworks, then disengaging from the problematics, language, and goals of situational problem-solving to probe more fundamental humanistic concerns – the nature of war, or the state – is a crucial endeavour with long-term impact, even if it may hold less immediate interest for direct stakeholders.

Shelter Architecture – Emergency Versus Innovation, Contextualisation and Flexibility

Franziska Laue

Obdach-Architekturen – Notfalllösungen mit dem Anspruch auf Innovation, Kontextbezogenheit und Flexibilität
Das Konzept der Versorgung durch temporäre Unterkünfte existiert spätestens seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Seit Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts gehören standardisierte und systematisierte Notunterkünfte, häufig im Lagerkontext, zu den gängigen Lösungsansätzen der großen humanitären Organisationen. Im Laufe der vergangenen Jahrzehnte haben sich die Entwürfe verändert und der von Hilfsorganisationen dominierte Diskurs zu "Emergency Shelters" hat sich um innovative akademische und professionelle Reflektionen erweitert, um neue Ansätze und deren Verwirklichung. Diese neuen Ansätze umfassen eine Vielfalt von technischen und räumlichen Designs mit variierender Kontextbezogenheit, Größe, Materialität und variierendem finanziellem Aufwand. Der Beitrag gibt einen ersten Einblick in verschiedene Obdacharchitekturen, die vom alternativen Zeltdesign über sich konsolidierende Einzelbauten bis hin zum mehrgeschossigen Wohnungsbau reichen.

Emergency shelters as a response have been used since the 18th century but became subject to systematisation and standardisation only in the 20th century, when Europe was dramatically affected by large intra-continental movements of refugees and displaced families. Ever since, referring to military considerations and guidelines for emergency housing established in the 1950s (IRFC 2008), responses have become rather top-down and technocratic (Iyer Sidiqqi 2013). For example, early shelter types ranged from various tent forms to barracks provided by governmental and supranational organisations such as the UN.

In the 1970s, however, organisations such as Oxfam and Care supported a rethinking of camp and shelter architecture to one which takes locally available resources and the refugees' origin into account. Community involvement as a crucial element to regain solid livelihoods was initiated and particularly pushed by pioneers such as Ian Davis and Fred Cuny, who formulated the first alternative guidelines in 1973 leading to the testing of new materials (Iyer Sidiqqi 2013) and the identification of minimum standards, i.e., the Sphere Project in the 1990s (Oxfam 2004). Especially the widely debated use of plastic sheeting (Ashmore 2010, Kennedy 2005), as described in some of the following examples, can remain of fundamental benefit when it is an adequate and protective part of a comprehensively reflected shelter architecture.

With an increasing number of actors in the humanitarian field, solutions are shaped not only by public but also private and academic initiatives. Designed, built, tested and discussed in multiple contexts, the results are futuristic, pragmatic and flexible prototypes. The Internet in particular increasingly serves as a platform of communication, exchange and promotion for making shelter designs accessible and affordable. Furthermore, new shelter architecture is regularly documented in periodicals including, since 2008, "Shelter Projects" (by UNHCR, IRFC and UNHABITAT), and engenders critical commentary by the international community such as Architecture for Humanity.

This leads to on-going innovation and also brings the architect, designer and planner – serving as a link between affected communities and service providers such as governments and aid organisations – closer to working for society. The Japanese architect Shigeru Ban, for instance, engaged in emergency shelter design after observing how insufficiently the plastic tents provided by the UN protected Rwandan refugees from the surrounding climate; this insufficiency resulted in deforestation when trees were cut for heating, particularly during cold periods in 1994 (Ban 2013). Ever more diversified shelter experiments and reflections can be witnessed, at the latest, since the Tsunami in 2004 and Haiti in 2010. In particular, disaster events trigger a rethinking of shelter architecture, resulting in further rethinking of transitional shelter architecture and new collaborations such as that of UNHCR and IKEA.

The following catalogue, however, focuses on initiatives outside of those of the large aid organisations, and includes research as an opportunity to provide innovative solutions and prevent responses blinded by routine. Based on decades of past experiences, the following examples reflect on how and why emergency shelters need to provide more than just a roof over the head. Consequently, this contribution includes a very brief selection of shelter designs that have been conceptualised, tested, and employed worldwide. All example descriptions are based on correspondences with the respective offices and initiatives. Though varying widely in the breadth of their provided services, funding, scope and material, they nevertheless display inspiring consideration towards being applicable throughout the transition from the immediate need for refuge to the consolidation and/or resettlement into a former or new context.

The figures and photographs in the following catalogue are reproduced by kind permission of the mentioned practitioners and researchers.

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1   Tent structures and modular systems – DOMO modular system

DOMO

Team
Morethanshelters in colla-boration with international NGOs and research institutes

Designed
2013

Size
21.1 m²

Set-up time
within 1–2 hours

Costs
the targeted price is
€ 600 – € 700

Contact/info
<http://morethanshelters.org>

▶

Figure 1: Simulation / rendering tents. Source: Morethanshelters e.V.

Figure 2: DOMO shelter prototype. Photo by Morethanshelters e.V.

▼

There have been numerous attempts that aim at developing and improving the concept of tent shelters for decades. For instance, UNHCR revised its tent architecture in 2002 (Fardanesh 2004). This includes the reconsideration of a tent's financial, material, spatial and protective qualities, its potential to serve as a basis of consolidation, and its flexibility. Alternatively conceptualised tent designs span from spider-like solutions by Future Systems (1989) to inflatable hemp houses in Japan by Technocraft (since 1999) or tree tents by Dré Wapenaar (1998).

Another conceptually transitional tent design is the "DOMO shelter". It was developed by Morethanshelters, a Hamburg-based non-profit association committed to finding innovative shelter solutions for humanitarian purposes. The addressed beneficiaries are people in more or less acute emergency situations, particularly refugees. Furthermore, aid organisations are addressed as potential customers and partners. Currently being built, tested and upgraded through on-site development, DOMO is a one-storey modular shelter kit first established in 2012. As a patented transitional sheltering system, it functions for emergency situations and as along-term housing solution, meeting all criteria of logistics and existing standards for transitional shelters.

The basic version has a base size of (l./w./h.) 21.1 m × 290 cm × 301 cm. Pilot projects are planned for 2014 in Jordan in collaboration with the Federal Agency for Technical Relief. Erectable within minutes, it can be shaped and transformed into whatever solution is needed. [Fig. 1 and 2] With an anticipated material selection aiming at climatic, geographical and cultural adaptability, DOMO is designed to adjust to rural and urban situations. The modular architecture, with its base units, can realise various building forms and usage requirements. This system can last up to 6 months and can adapt to changing needs. While the DOMO shelter aims at supporting common space by placing the tents in ensembles, its long-term applicability still needs to be tested in practice.

As the international discourse on emergency shelter increases, numerous efforts are being made by associations and companies to provide flexible yet custom-made designs that can be sent in large numbers to various loci worldwide. Designs span from basic foldable "Global Village Shelters" made of corrugated cardboard (Daniel A. Ferrara 1995 – 2005) to flat-packed lightweight plastic shelters by IKEA, who partnered with UNHCR. The place of production as well as storage and availability is global, hence they can be shipped on short notice.

The shelter MK5 was designed in 2010 by the Australia-based office MADDEL International, which focuses on low-cost shelters for mass production and rapid distribution. The designed shelters address survivors of any form of calamity as well as the abject poor, and aim at being usable in both urban and rural contexts. The design is a result of continuous input from the Geneva-based Shelter Centre and other aid organisations. Prototypes were tested in Australia and presented at the shelter field day in Geneva, Switzerland. [Fig. 3]

The modular system and lightweight material aims at easing the process of assembling and erecting the shelter by unskilled people without tools. Following the principle of transportability, each shelter is packed in eight flat packs (about 38 kg each). Accordingly, the shelter features a simple module building system consisting of impervious 8-mm corflute polypropylene sheeting, a solid lightweight steel structural frame, and aluminium window and door-frames. [Fig. 4] The shelter frame and filling can be repeatedly relocated and rebuilt without losing any structural integrity.

Such framing allows for the replacement of the plastic sheeting with local materials, thus enabling the shelter's transformability from temporary to permanent. The MK5 aims at being extendable in length and can be raised up to 2 storeys. Such a shelter design reduces costs and logistics and allows for swift, on-site assembly. The moderately small size likewise allows a flexible local (urban) arrangement. With a minimum lifespan of 3 years and a material able to stand harsh UV conditions, it can serve for incremental upgrading. However, such shelter designs need to be constantly revised and adjusted according to changing contexts.

Figure 3: Artist Impression – MK5 transformable shelters being overclad with local materials to form permanent dwelling. Graphic by MADDEL

Figure 4: Interior, exterior and details of M5 prototype. Photos by MADDEL

Paper log house

Project team
Shigeru Ban, Mamiko Ishidas

Structural engineers
Minoru Tezuka, TSP Taiyo-
Eiichiro Kaneko

Planned and built
May – June 1995

Size
16 m²

Set-up time
within 1 day

Costs
US$ 2,000 (250,000 yen) per
piece

Contact/info
<www.shigerubanarchitects.
com/works/1995_paper-
log-house-kobe/index.html>

One major reflection for emergency shelters is based on the continuous experimentation with materials that serve the aim of being temporary, yet locally and climatically appropriate and durable. Such consideration contributes to achieving increased resource efficiency on the local level and the optimised use of available resources. This can include reused elements such as wood pallets ("Pallet House" by I-Beam Design, 1999), but also recycled materials such as plastic or paper.

The office Shigeru Ban Architects is known for its wide range of innovative and feasible designs. However, Ban, who has continuously experimented with paper tubes since 1986 (Ballesteros 2008: 119), started developing emergency housing concepts in the early 1990s responding to shortcomings associated with conventional tarpaulin tents. The paper log house concept comprised singular shelter architecture as well as temporary collective-use housing and community spaces with a socio-economic focus.

The one-story shelter design of the paper log house initially addressed victims of displacement following the earthquake and tsunami in Nagata, Kobe, Japan. [Fig. 5 and 6] Volunteers constructed a total of 27 shelters in summer 1995. The modular system as well as the assembly follow a simple principle with walls that are produced of paper tubes (PTS). No storage is required, and the construction manual and required materials are transported only when they are needed. The ceiling and roof consist of membrane material, and the foundation consists of sand-filled beer cases. Whereas some materials and elements need to be produced beforehand, other constituents and tools can be purchased in a local shop. With the paper and recycled cardboard serving as the base material, the shelter is inexpensive and both easily and quickly assembled. Thanks to the technical flexibility of its elements – for instance, the tubes can be coated waterproof if needed – the structure is applicable to diverse contexts such as Japan, India, Haiti and Turkey. As stated by Ban's office, it therefore fits diverse urban and rural contexts for temporary housing (Ban 2013). The structure is horizontally extendable and can be linked by a common space through joined roofs. Consequently, this shelter type, which is adjustable to each new setting, reflects the different overlapping constraints of the given emergency context and considers the pragmatic use of available resources and manpower as well as time pressure.


Figure 5: Detail section of shelter. Source: Shigeru Ban Architects

Figure 6: Image of the camp in Kobe. Photo: Shigeru Ban Architects

Natural materials and local identity – earthbag emergency shelters

Another essential aspect of shelter in an emergency context is the reference to local traditions, materials, construction types and spatial arrangements. Earth, sand and rubble ("Rubble House" by LA Architects, 1999) are easily available materials for emergency housing, and can also serve for setting up transitional shelters and incremental development. One major inspiration came from the Iranian-American architect Nader Khalili's extensive experimentation in low-cost sandbag shelters (Iran 1995).

Another shelter design, one referring to centuries of earth structures, was designed by Dr. Owen Geiger and Patti Stouter for recipients of disaster aid or people in need as a part of the UN Emergency Shelter Proposal. The building concept consists of "earthbag" walls and tarps for roofing, and provides superior protection against wind, rain, heat, cold, snow, bullets, fire, flooding, hurricanes and noise. Designed in 2008, the size of each shelter's living space is 2 m × 3 – 3.5 m; the structures can be built singularly or joined together and upgraded into permanent housing. When setting up the structure, most materials can be reused and recycled. Polypropylene or burlap bags are filled with local sand, soil, or other materials and then stacked like blocks or bricks after the analysis of the given level or moderately sloping building site. [Fig. 7 and Fig. 8]

Two storeys are possible with a bond beam, and the shelters can be built in urban and rural contexts. Shelter costs remain considerably low, with about $200 for materials, assuming that the recipients do the labour at no cost. The recipients can be of any gender, but require training from community volunteers like those who pitch in to fill sand bags to prevent flood damage. Despite requiring more intense labour in comparison to tents, such shelter minimises the impact on local resources and is extremely durable (rammed earth structures can last for centuries). [Fig. 9] Furthermore, beneficiaries can easily modify the design according to their own requirements. Major advantages in comparison to tent structures are the enhanced security and privacy as well as the ability to withstand extreme heat and cold.

Figure 7 and 8: Shelter during construction process. Photos by Chankamol Kumjuang

Figure 9: Rapidly completed earthbag shelter. Photo: Owen Geiger / Patti Stouter

5 Reconstruction and incremental architecture – Reclaiming Heritage

Reclaiming Heritage

Team
Reclaiming Heritage Team /
TU-Berlin: Holly Au,
Eduardo Barros, Miguel Delso
Páez, Federico Rota,
Alejandro García Gadea,
and Carmen Gómez Maestro

Faculty Sponsors
Renato D'Alençon and Luis
Beltrán del Río

Designed and built
2011 – 2012

Size
15 m² – 30 m²

Set-up time
incremental

Costs
estimated US$ 1,260 (plus
self-construction labour)

Contact/info
<www.reclaimingheritage.org>

The consideration of locally available materials can more-over lead to conceptual approaches, including the reuse and recycling of building elements from collapsed buildings, the use of which can ease and accelerate the transformation of incremental shelter into permanent housing.

The following example suggests the reconstruction of damaged physical and urban structures with reclaimed materials in Croix-des-Bouquets, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Still in its conceptual prototype phase, the design is from Reclaiming Heritage, a Berlin-based international cooperation project dealing with reconstruction in catastrophe context. They came up with the initial concept after the earthquake of 2010. The families of the local community of Croix-des-Bouquets that were able to stay on site and follow an incremental reconstruction process were the original target group. [Fig. 10 and Fig. 11] Applicable in rural and urban contexts with pre-existing partially demolished buildings, the shelter concept involves the progressive reuse of pre-existing destroyed houses and foundations along with the addition of a new module. [Fig. 12 and Fig. 13] It consists of a (new) central module 15 m² in size, while other variable types can be up to 30 m² in size as well as up to two storeys in height.

According to the office, the modules can be prefabricated and put in place, but local residents need to be trained to serve as labour to recover the destroyed pre-existing walls and foundations. As the availability of local demolished material shrinks with time, alternative materials are needed. Therefore, existing foundations and concrete blocks (in Haiti) serve as the locally available material basis, which can be complemented later with new materials such as timber. Consequently, there is no need for imported emergency structures. By default, this approach actively includes the affected local population in a process of recovery of previous settlement structures, be they urban or rural. Hence, it is transferable to other catastrophe contexts.

Figure 10: Simulation of affected area, leftover buildings and foundations. Graph by Reclaiming Heritage

Figure 11: Growth simulation of potential incremental rebuilding. Graph by Reclaiming Heritage

Figure 12: Simulation of a sample shelter. Graph by Reclaiming Heritage

Figure 13: Section through prototype and outdoor living spaces. Graph by Reclaiming Heritage

Incremental architecture and modular system – the Liina Transitional Shelter

Academia, especially architectural design studios, are increasingly involved in identifying options for emergency shelter typologies and testing 1:1 prototypes. Design studios and competitions such as the "Shelter Contest" (held by World Vision in cooperation with the American Christian John Brown University) or the "DESIGN 21: Shelter Me" competition (2007) have produced promising concepts, although few have been commercially realised so far. The advantage of academic shelter experiments is the independence of design agendas and the high level of experimentability, especially in terms of material, funding and context.

One prototype is the "Liina Transitional Shelter", which was developed by a team of Finnish architectural students within the framework of the Aalto University Wood Program 2010-2011. The shelter was designed as a temporary building to be used in cold and harsh climates during crisis situations around the globe. [Fig. 14] It can house a family of five persons for up to five years during the post-disaster reconstruction phase. As a one-storey building

with a saddle roof, the design follows a simple principle [Fig. 15] – to assemble the structure, six panels are joined together with simple, wooden-dowelled joints to form a frame, which is tightened using nylon straps ("liina" in Finnish). [Fig. 16] A foldable waterproof canvas (plastic sheeting), which can be easily replaced if needed, protects the shelter from rain, snow and UV damage. The panelised system of construction allows it to be assembled by two adults in one day with only common tools and a simple visual diagram. [Fig. 17] Among the innovative considerations is the use of a simple flat-pack system of prefabricated timber panels so that all components for two complete shelters can be shipped in a standard European shipping container. Straps are transportable without large volumes. Whereas the shelter was built for the Finnish context, the basic modular concept is adjustable to locally available materials. Consequently, this would require additional technical adjustments of joints and spacing and material selection.

Liina shelter

Team
Students and volunteers

Designed and built
2010 – 2011

Size
flexible, at least 18 m²

Set-up time
within 6 hours

Costs
not indicated

Contact/info
<https://blogs.aalto.fi/shelter>

Assembly Diagram

2 flat-pack shelters fit in a standard shipping container

Connect beams to level foundation

Step 1: 6 panels assemble to make 1 frame

Step 2: Tighten 2 liina around the top and bottom of the frame

Step 3: Tilt up the entire frame

Step 4: Slide in the end wall side pieces and attach the center fitting panel

Step 5: Make and tilt-up other frames

Step 6: Make and tilt up the last house frame with shelf and tension strap

Step 7: Wrap and tighten liina around top and bottom of the walls

Step 8: Make and tilt up terrace, attach 2 liina on roof ridge and terrace base

Step 9: Unroll canvas over shelter and attach to foundation beams

Total Time for Assembly:

15 minutes/frame
45 minutes/end wall
30 minutes/canvas
60 minutes/furniture

Total: 6 hours

Figure 14: Projected shelter use. Collage by Aalto University Wood Program

Figure 15: Exterior of final shelter with straps and cover. Photo by Anne Kinnunen

Figure 16: Strips at the exterior of the assembled modules. Photo by Anne Kinnunen

Figure 17: Assembly diagram of the Liina shelter. Diagrams by Aalto University Wood Program

7 Incremental shelters, consolidation in dense urban areas – KATYE temporary shelters in Haiti

KATYE shelter

Team
Katye programme, volunteers and local residents

Designed
2010

Built
2011

Size
11.9 m² per floor,
23.8 m² total size

Set-up time
within a week

Costs
US$ 8,000 per shelter

Contact/info
<HTT@usaid.gov> /
<www.usaid.gov/haiti/shelter-and-housing>

Shelters in an emergency context are predominantly associated with camps in rural contexts or on urban fringes. Only a limited number of cities, such as in Amman (Jordan), Damascus (Syria), and Dhaka (Bangladesh) include urban neighbourhoods that originally formed as (mostly unofficial) refugee camps. However, with increasingly frequent occurrences of natural disasters that affect both rural and urban settlements, shelter types are needed that fit into existing and consolidated, often previously dense, urban structures.

In 2011, the USAID KATYE programme developed a shelter type for urban residents displaced from the Ravine Pintade neighbourhood in Haiti by the earthquake. It followed an integrated approach to rebuilding neighbourhoods in post-disaster urban and informal contexts. To guarantees more flexibility, the design is based on modules that can be added and subtracted for more adaptability to different contexts. The two-storey transitional shelter has a floor area of 11.9 sqm each storey and an exterior staircase to reach the second floor. [Fig. 18] The initial plywood and plastic sheeting used for walling are replaceable and reinforceable with plaster and concrete. The roof consists of metal sheets coated on the underside with a layer of foam for insulation. Despite the criticism for using plastic sheeting in an emergency-shelter context, a targeted usage can be of short to mid-term duration. For instance, the plastic sheeting on the exterior offers protection and can be replaced by sheet metal. Thanks to the structural materials consisting of light gauge steel and a concrete foundation, this shelter type can withstand category-3

hurricanes and is also seismically resistant. [Fig. 19] In its implementation phase, it took three days to complete a shelter with 10 local residents after one week of training, requiring few tools such as drills and bits. Similar to the MK5 shelter and paper log house, materials are reusable and sturdy and can be replaced with more durable materials to transform the shelter into a permanent structure. [Fig. 20] This shelter was designed as a response to an extremely dense context with small plot footprints of 12 m² and smaller, particularly in urban context. Many residents even had more utility space than previously.

▶
Figure 18: KATYE shelter under construction – steel structure. Photo by Kendra Helmer, USAID

◀
Figure 19: KATYE shelter without plastic sheeting. Photo by Kendra Helmer, USAID

▶▶
Figure 20: KATYE shelter in a finished state. Photo by Kendra Helmer, USAID

Another example illustrates the redesign and reutilisation of the internationally and vastly available shipping containers.

In 2011, Shigeru Ban Architects, along with the Voluntary Architects Network, developed multi-storey housing units for families who lost their houses during the Onagawa earthquake in Japan. [Fig. 21] This solution referred to the prevailing difficulty to construct enough temporary housing due to insufficient amounts of flat land.

Consequently, two- to three-storey units were made from (20-foot-long) shipping containers, each hosting around 1 – 4 or more residents. A total of 189 units were setup by volunteers in 2011, funded through donations. Assembling the container elements follows a simple system: due to the lack of skilled workers in the disaster area, structures were designed to be assembled by stacking the pre-made steel units, in a checkerboard pattern. [Fig. 22 and Fig. 23] Both interior and intermediate spaces are part of an overall open living area and include built-in closets and shelves. [Fig. 24] The resulting intervals between the containers provided open spaces for families as well as parking areas and community facilities. Such a multi-storey solution can be applicable in contexts with limited land availability and a high amount of individuals in need of shelter. The containers' compact and standardised prefabricated layout serves as the basis for various examples of pragmatic reutilisation for multiple purposes such as housing, storage, and trade in the urban and rural context.

Consequently, reusing containers shortened the construction period and provided spatial flexibility and seismic performance. As cities have to rely on making the best use of limited land and high density, this project demonstrates one economical short-term option.

Container shelter

▲
Figure 21: View of the container shelters. Photo by Hiroyuki Hirai

◤
Figure 22: Section of container shelter. Plan by Shigeru Ban Architects

◀◀
Figure 23: Axonometric view of container shelters. Plan by Shigeru Ban Architects

◀
Figure 24: View of interior. Photo by Hiroyuki Hirai

Emergency or Development?
Architecture as Industrial Humanitarianism

Anooradha Iyer Siddiqi

Notfall oder Entwicklung? Architektur als Form industriell erzeugter Humanität
Das Dadaab Refugee Camp in der kenianischen Wüste ist das weltweit größte Flüchtlingslager. Seit seiner Gründung im Jahr 1991 hat sich seine Bevölkerungszahl verfünffacht. Zusammen mit den angrenzenden Siedlungen bildet das Camp die drittgrößte Bevölkerungsansammlung Kenias nach Nairobi und Mombasa. Die ständige Intervention multilateraler humanitärer Akteure und das stetige Wachstum des Lagers vollzogen sich im Kontext einer zunehmenden Standardisierung und Professionalisierung der hier erbrachten globalen Hilfeleistungen. Der Artikel beschreibt, wie Flüchtlingslager internationale Karrieren befördern aber gleichzeitig auch Raum bieten können für konkurrierende Ansichten in Bezug auf Soforthilfe und Entwicklung. Das Beispiel des Dadaab Flüchtlingslagers veranschaulicht die sich entwickelnden Konflikte zwischen vor Ort in verschiedenen Rollen agierenden humanitären Akteuren und verdeutlicht die Gratwanderung zwischen einer Umsetzung humanitärer Soforthilfe und zukunftsorientierten Entwicklungsprojekten.

Refugees and humanitarians at Dadaab

"The world's largest refugee camp" – the common descriptor for a territory of settlements in the Kenyan desert – exemplifies a localised phenomenon of global industrial activity (UNHCR 2012). As the ongoing iteration of a multilateral humanitarian intervention that began in 1991, these settlements in the vicinity of Dadaab, in Kenya's North Eastern Province, increased in scale more than five-fold during their lifetime, a period marked by intense standardisation, professionalisation, and codification of global humanitarian practice. In spite of the notoriety of this site within certain spheres, and its status as the third-largest population grouping in Kenya after the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa, it has rarely appeared on formal or informal maps, other than those with a relevant

concern. In spite of appearances and intentions, it behaves less as a transitional entity than what the UNHCR has defined as a "protracted refugee situation". [Fig. 1]

The complex sustains an infrastructure of community services, economic markets, and some measure of civic activity, and has engendered significant population growth and social change. International refugee-related operations expanded from a budget of under thirty thousand United States dollars country-wide in 1990, in preparation for an influx from Somalia, to one hundred million in 2010, concentrated in the Dadaab complex alone, where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently contracts multiple nongovernmental organisations to implement social services, physical planning, and the management of aid distribution. Initially housing approximately four thousand refugees in an ad hoc layout in one designated area, with aid workers living in adjacent open-air accommodations, this former emergency operation has evolved into a physical complex with a refugee population numbering a half million, living in four distinct settlements, and the employees of international humanitarian organisations living in a gated compound, all located twenty minutes from each other on unpaved highways. [Figs. 2, 3, 4]

In 1991, Dadaab was a pastoralist village of 5,000 inhabitants, not yet electrified when the UNHCR set up its field office there (Corsellis 2006: 78). It was situated "south of an existing borehole and related livestock watering installations" and the agency mission recommended drilling operations for four new wells to accommodate the incoming refugee population (Dualeh 1991: 10). In twenty years, the host population within a fifty-kilometre radius has grown well in excess of the Province's average rate, to over 148,000 (Gildestad 2010). By the mid-1990s, the Kenyan government had established a rigid encampment policy reinforcing the concentration of refugees at two

Figure 1: Satellite view of Dadaab and the neighbouring refugee settlements, 2012. Source: Google Earth

Figure 1: (see left)

ferent locations" (Amin and Thrift 2002: 52). In an examination of refugee contexts, typically dominated by the culture of urgency and the paradigms of development and area studies, such theoretical frameworks not only support the critical investigation of geographies and histories of power; they also problematize a structuring global historical tradition in the disciplines of architecture and urbanism that, in various ways, has been bound up with an operative project to support ideological foundations for the modern movement. This project, in turn, has discursively idealised the aesthetic properties and downplayed the pragmatic role of architecture, a thrust that has coexisted, ironically, with the humanitarian and refugee regimes' reductive interpretation of architecture as a simply utilitarian device. Both positions elide a view of architecture as a technology of power with important political, social, and cultural functions.

Permanent ephemerality: from the transitional to the protracted

With the current situation in Somalia changing from day to day, it is difficult to predict what will happen to the refugee camps, or when the refugees can return home …

Figure 2: Composite image of Dadaab and the neighbouring refugee settlements, produced in 2011 from analysis of satellite imagery acquired in 2009 and 2010. Source: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT)

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Figure 3: Map of Ifo settlement. Source: produced by the UNHCR mapping unit in 2010, courtesy of UNHCR

sites in the country, Dadaab being the largest. It experienced population growth and change due to multiple influxes from Somalia, the relocation of refugees from wars all over Africa at several different times, and regular flows of economic migrants from within and outside Kenya. Over two decades, as the largest humanitarian organisations in the world situated themselves there (occasioning their own peripheral industrial activity), the roster of aid workers constantly shifted, the location looming large as a prestigious station for field duty. In short, the project of refugee-hosting at Dadaab has triggered forms of urbanity and provoked new cosmopolitanisms, attracting and co-opting people from different communities, ethnicities, and nationalities, all cohabiting and dialoguing in some sense, forging new spaces, new commodities, and new meanings.

If the existence of these spaces and activities in the absence of a normative sovereign environment produces some cognitive dissonance, it also models a set of ethnoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes within a "disjunctive global cultural order" that Arjun Appadurai laid out in the years after the Dadaab settlements were established (Appadurai 1996: 32-37). It also substantiates a reading of the city proposed by Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift as "assemblages of more or less distanciated economic relations which … have different intensities at dif-

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CARE is committed to remaining in the camps until their closure. It has retooled its programme to begin assisting refugees in preparing for their eventual return … CARE-Kenya's wish is that the refugees eventually return to their country, and return with a sense that they have been well served in their time of need in Kenya, and have been well prepared to face the realities of the new Somalia.

—CARE Kenya 1991–1993 Refugee Assistance Project report, 1994 (Redding 1994: 10)

We are attempting development approaches mid way [sic] through a programme that has been profoundly non developmental [sic]… We built the schools. We assumed what type of education was required. We built community centres and ran around like headless chickens trying to force people to use them. They were used. Their use coincided precisely and uniquely with the arrival of senior staff from Nairobi… We gave and they took. We didn't like them, the refugees, very much. We believed they had to be controlled, made to understand. They were not to be consulted lest they took advantage of the situation. The context was one of mutual dislike and suspicion. No one thought about this because it was an emergency situation.

—CARE Kenya internal memo on camp management, October 29, 1993 (CARE 1993: 2)

If a site housing hundreds of thousands more closely resembles a scene of development than of emergency, then the contrast between these two statements – one from an official report and one from an internal memo – demonstrates the ambivalence that dominated the refugee hosting project in Kenya from its earliest days.

While the Dadaab refugee settlements retained the same basic framework for social services and site management for approximately fifteen years, an emergency context simultaneously prevailed, both in actuality and in its affective dimension, even as populations grew and fluctuated. This occurred largely under the management, and ultimate governance, of the international organisation CARE, from mid-July, 1991, when the UNHCR contracted the organisation's Kenya branch to manage emergency assistance for refugees in Dadaab's Garissa district, to 2010, when the same agency splintered the responsibilities previously merged under CARE's "camp management" operations, and distributed them among twenty other organisations (Awuye 1991).

From almost its first year of existence, tensions existed in the Dadaab operation between the emergency relief and development projects. These were tied to the uncertainty that refugees might be repatriated at any time, due to the unpredictability of conflicts in neighbouring states. At the same time, external sources reported an institutional am-

Figure 4: Aerial view of Ifo, the first refugee settlement at the Dadaab site, commissioned by the UNHCR in 2009. Source: courtesy of UNHCR

Ifo camp
November 2009

bivalence at the UNHCR. The position of emergency coordinator was not filled after 1992. Late that year, the United States Committee for Refugees reported of "complaints that Geneva has not yet seen this as an emergency for the fast track", demonstrated by only ten of its fifteen field positions being filled, unlike the other fully-staffed agencies and organisations on the ground, UNICEF, MSF, and CARE (Hoskins 1992: 1).

Meanwhile, CARE programme managers cited unreasonable expectations from donors, particularly its largest, the UNHCR: "They seek to judge us by development standards and criticise us when we don't meet them", while also being "anxious that nothing we do should encourage the refugees to stay" (CARE 1993: 6). Following criticisms from senior staff, CARE programme managers noted a sudden turn in organisation policy from a strong climate of relief to one of development, focusing only on "physical" results: "How many trees, how many girls in school, how many beans…" (CARE 1993: 3).

They reported myriad problems resulting from this divided approach. Primarily, it hindered CARE from being able to sufficiently staff programmes and properly train its teams. It unreasonably raised refugee expectations and thus weakened efforts by CARE to build relationships with the communities it served, exacerbating social disparities between refugees and those in authority to distribute aid. It consistently wasted resources, because refugees CARE trained would attempt to leave as soon as they gained skills. Income generation programmes were futile within an immobile population whose only market commodities stemmed from the aid they received, and where even "the most basic infrastructure … is likely to be a target for theft" (CARE 1993: 8).

These complications stood out against a backdrop of contradictions posed by donors. Short funding cycles were based on goals tied to relief rather than develop-

ment, and yet the expectations remained paradoxical: "We are criticised for not producing enough mats to sell, yet we must not allow refugees to become in any way financially independent lest that encourages them to stay in the camp" (CARE 1993: 6).

Global industry

Arguably, the introduction of development aspirations into the emergency context stemmed from a broader context of industrial activity on the global level. With unprecedented numbers of people seeking refuge at sites, humanitarian building programmes around the world facilitated an expansion of the concept and scope of camp management to that of governance. Coordination between the United Nations, states, and nongovernmental entities in the 1990s became highly organised at both international and local levels, and overall standardisation increased (Sommers 2000).

Architecture in this context expressed an off-the-shelf quality, and indeed, assemblies began to derive from commercial rather than military or state sources; for example, the UNHCR procured emergency materials from Chinese manufacturers of recreational tents (Fardanesh 2005). The physical planning sectors – from logistics to water and sanitation to shelter – shored expertise, at first via individual organisations, and later, systematically, through conferences and publications. [Fig. 5]

Also, if the example of Dadaab was an extreme rather than typical case, it nevertheless provided material evidence of a changing spatial approach to aid delivery and to the politics of humanitarianism. During its lifetime, the number of settlements around the world for displaced populations decreased, even as their mode of production systematised, involving more professional spatial practices. These aspects together – an expanded scope of work, globally coordinated communications and project execution, standardisation of materials, a systematic production and distribution system that facilitated the erection of built environments, and an overall professionalisation, including mechanisms for education, certification, networking, and formalised knowledge exchange – suggest an industrialising tendency.

That the Dadaab settlements have existed for twenty years may be a matter less momentous than the presence of the industry that brought them into being in the first place. This industry has had pronounced aesthetic aspects, facilitated by inputs from the fields of design, architecture, and territorial-scale planning, and commodities related to the material and spatial realisation of built environments. Moral problematics may exist in conceptualising a humanitarian intervention as an industrial process or a technological event.

Both interpretations potentially exhibit ambivalence toward human suffering or even inappropriate voyeurism, as the stakes for human life are so high. However, from a historical perspective, such essentialist positioning of crisis raises even higher stakes, and has arguably given rise to a fully-fledged humanitarian-industrial complex. This posturing of urgency compels critique of the development of an industry around crisis, particularly as it relates to the commodification of human suffering.

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Initial Exploration of the Experiences of Syrian Refugees in Cairo

Rasha Arous

Untersuchung der Integrationserfahrungen syrischer Flüchtlinge in Kairo
Ägypten ist ein Land ohne deklarierte Vorgaben für eine Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in Lagern oder ähnlich kontrollierten Unterkünften. Stattdessen haben Ankömmlinge die Möglichkeit, sich unmittelbar in den bestehenden Siedlungen niederzulassen. Der folgende Beitrag untersucht die verschiedenen Optionen, die sich derzeit für syrische Flüchtlinge bieten, um in der Metropole Kairo anzukommen und die Bedingungen ihres Aufenthalts mit der hier ansässigen Bevölkerung und lokalen Mittelsmännern zu verhandeln. Es eröffnen sich komplexe Verknüpfungen von potentiellen Zufluchtsorten mit bestehenden urbanen und politischen Dynamiken. In Kombination mit formellen und informellen Verwaltungsmechanismen gewähren diese den Neuankömmlingen Schutz und bestimmen ihre Lebensgrundlage und -realität. Der Artikel stützt sich auf empirische Untersuchungen in der sich stetig vergrößernden syrischen Flüchtlingsgemeinde in Kairo, beschreibt die verschiedenen Ankunfts-, Unterkunfts- und Integrationsmöglichkeiten für urbane Flüchtlinge und zieht daraus Lehren für die Gestaltung von Integrationsprozessen, die auch auf andere Flüchtlingsgruppen in anderen Kontexten übertragbar sein könnten.

"I am not a refugee and I am going back, yet it seems that it is taking longer than expected."

—Interviewee: Dr. Anas, 2012

Cairo, together with other urban centres in the global south, has increasingly developed as a place of refuge, though mostly as a transit city to resettle elsewhere (Zohry 2005), for individuals and groups seeking sanctuary due to conflicts or other reasons. The refugees in Cairo come from Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia amongst other places (Danielson 2012).

Recently, the city's refugee community has progressively also encompassed Syrians who, since the escalation of the Syrian crisis, are fleeing in huge numbers to the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. Today, the Syrians form the largest community of registered asylum seekers in Egypt and, on 19 December 2012, were included for the first time in the Regional Response Plan (RRP), which expects the total number of Syrian refugees in the region to reach 1.1 million (UNHCR 2013). On 28 February 2013, the number of registered asylum seekers with UNHCR reached 20,292, a dramatic increase from three months earlier, while the number of unregistered ones is alarmingly higher, exceeding 150,000 individuals in Egypt (UNHCR RO-Cairo 2012a). However, this paper considers both registered and unregistered ones as "refugees" as per the United Nations definition of a refugee. [1]

Besides the no-visa requirements for Syrians in Egypt and the strong social and economic ties between both countries, the Egyptian government also allows Syrians access to basic education and health services. Ostensibly, many are attracted to come to Egypt due to the cheaper means of living in urban areas in Egypt as compared to Lebanon and Jordan (Gittleson, B 2013). The majority of the poorer Syrian groups are also driven by their repugnance of the encampment policies of Jordan, Iraq and Turkey and the hospitality and supportive attitudes of the host community in Egypt (primary data 2012). Anonymity and political participation, in a country passing through a transitional situation like Egypt, is appealing to political activists and anti-Syrian-regime groups in general, who form the majority of those fleeing to Egypt (primary data 2012, UNHCR, UNCEF and WFP 2012).

This paper contributes an initial exploration of the urban setting of Cairo as a place of refuge, the ways in which the displaced Syrians are accommodating themselves in the urban fabric of the city, and how they position themselves in the host communities of Cairo. It also looks at some experienced journeys in between different geo-political spheres of the city. However, it is worth mentioning that the ongoing influxes of newcomers and the changing dynamics of their conditions make this paper more of an attempt to understand these dynamics and factors, and to bring about a contextual overview, than to present rigid conclusions.

Journeys to Egypt

Wealthier groups who could afford the move and political activists were the first to come to Egypt. Later, as of August 2012, poorer groups started to characterise the influxes: those who cannot classically afford the journey and must sell off parts of their assets or borrow money for the rescue (primary data 2012).

[1] According to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the definition of refugee is: "Any person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself." (UN 1951)

The journeys to reach Egypt are diverse and exhausting, involving for many prolonged waits, bribery, and shifts in routes. Planes from Syria and Lebanon to Egypt are usually fully booked two months ahead, as the most common way to come from both countries is by plane. Some come by land via Jordan. Recently, waves of Syrians have arrived in Egypt via the ports of coastal cities by ferry from Iskenderun in Turkey, at a cost of around $100 per person (primary data 2013).

Hundreds reach Egypt every day, and then must navigate their way through the country, pushed and pulled by many factors. Tendencies have been reported in the pull factors behind the dispersion trends of the Syrians in Egypt, such as coastal-city residents targeting Alexandria or skilled carpenters from eastern Ghouta settling in Damietta, a location famous for furniture manufacturing (UNHCR RO-Cairo 2013).

The longest reported length of stay in Egypt is since January 2012. This does not mean that people did not come earlier, only that the emergence of a Syrian refugee community was not noticeable earlier than spring 2012, one year after the eruption of the Syrian uprising.

Cairo: In between reception and reticence

The groups of Syrians residing in Cairo and its satellite cities, more than 50 percent of the asylum seekers registered with UNHCR (UNHCR RO-Cairo 2012), form a large proportion of the total arriving in Egypt. Cairo ostensibly constitutes the main social and economic hub of Egypt and has its own attractions. It also bears many characteristics and provides its sets of conditioning factors for the asylum experience. In literature, refugees, looking for ser-

vices more readily available as a choice of a lifestyle opposing to the camps (Kobia and Cranfield 2009), assess their situations to be better in urban areas. Further, refugees hunt for greater chances of communication, better networks, and access to ethnic enclaves or other forms of social and political structures, such as proximities to power brokers (Landau 2009). Anonymity is another motive (Horst 2002).

In the context of Cairo, some reasons are valid and others are not quite corresponding. Whereas the city provides anonymity, diverse options and various avenues, its compartmental structure with the complexities of its urban settings make it sometimes segregative and unwelcoming (Grabska 2006). Cairo disperses refugees over huge areas in spaces that show little or limited resemblance to their urban experience or personal image of the city, with its scales and modes of urbanisation (Focus group discussions 2013).

With the huge political and economic transformations Cairo is undergoing nowadays and the varying, sometimes polarised, levels of political participation in each of its urban spaces, the reception and hosting of refugees is varied. It is controlled by sets of push-and-pull factors that are closely linked to the socio-political and economic profiles and local power relations of these urban spaces.

Forecasts regarding the future of refugees in Cairo in such turbulent times are difficult to make. The produced and reproduced interactions between the different urban environments and the refugees' background and political participation concerns lead the city to scenarios ranging between cosmopolitanism or, more commonly, heightened xenophobia (Landau 2009).

Figure 1: Syrian refugees' spatial dispersion in Greater Cairo Region following the form of refugee community and not individual cases with highlights on the different urban forms they are accommodated in. Source: Rasha Arous, Feb. 2013, based on Sims and Sejourne 2009, cited in Sims 2011

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Figure 2: Rehab gated city. Photo: Rasha Arous 2013

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Figure 3: Omraneya – a whole block inhabited by Syrians as of Feb. 2013. Photo: Al Omar 2013

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Figure 4: Map of case studies – Rehab gated city, Masaken Othman public housing, Omraneya informal settlement. Source: Arous, Feb. 2013, based on Sims and Séjourne 2009, cited in Sims 2011

The spatial dispersion of the Syrians in Cairo

Researching refugees in Cairo is similar to pursuing a moving target as their places keep changing, especially at this early stage of settlement. It is also difficult to learn the size of their community. Examining a Greater Cairo Region (GCR) map and reviewing different resources (including field visits, interviews with refugees, service providers and actors), it would seem that Syrians, driven by a multitude of factors, can be found in diverse urban spaces and have started to form communities in some areas. Some of these factors are housing supply and their economic profiles, earlier experiences, security concerns, social networks, and economic opportunities.

Yet, the subsequent choices are in many cases not maintained for a long time. Figure 1 provides an initial exploration of the places of concentration. The prevailing tendency is to live in the satellite cities, where quietness, cleanness, organisation and social cohesion are the most important pull factors. Security has also been listed

among the main pull factors, as the insecurity of some urban spaces (especially in the post-Egyptian-revolution era, with its urban upheavals or images of violence and criminality) is a considerable push factor. Some people nevertheless still consider the options inside the city, such as better connections, proximity to work and to city life, and activities. However, those who cannot afford to choose are left to informal settlements, remote housing projects, and shared tiny apartments in inner-city areas. The largest Syrian community is found in the satellite city of Sitta October, an area now dubbed "Little Syria" and in which Syrians now constitute more than 10% of the city's residents (Gittleson 2013; primary data by March 2013).

Cairo's housing dilemma

To a greater extent, the refugees' choice of where to stay is dependent on the housing supply, which in turn interacts with the demand side of the waves of refugees. The production of vast housing stock in the outskirts of Cairo and its satellite cities is a phenomenon that has resulted

in a huge number of vacant apartments. This is because they are commonly targeted to the middle and upper middle classes and not to the demand-side of those in need of housing (Séjourne 2012). Some of these empty abodes, which are usually obtained for the second generation of children or grandchildren (as investment in buying empty flats is part of the local culture), have been utilised to cater for the refugees' demand for housing. The section below looks at a few urban modes [see Fig. 4 for locations of these spaces] in which refugees are being accommodated, particularly at modes that represent products of neo-liberal economic transformation: gated enclaves, informal areas, and a remote and exclusionary housing project.

The gated enclave of Rehab

A large community of Syrians resides in Rehab City, which is one of the private gated cities in the suburbs of Cairo. [Fig. 2] Housing in Rehab and in other gated communities is commonly attained by better-off groups. Denis 2006 argues that the move of people to gated communities is linked to the "security risk" discourse, which associates the city and its poorer inhabitants with an image of poverty, criminality, disorder, pollution, and terrorism (Singerman and Amar 2006). The establishment of such communities is discussed in light of the political economies of neo-liberalism and the production of segregated urban geographies, which enforces detachment from the city and creates isolationist attitudes in the residents. The "other" is not welcome in such neighbourhoods, and is usually a synonym for people from "informal settlements" or "poorer groups". Only like-minded people of the same "class" share this space.

Maraf 2011 reported very little political participation of the residents of Rehab City in the turbulences during April 2010, the revolution in 2011, and the subsequent events (Maraf 2011). Most of the interviewed Syrians in Rehab think that Rehab is similar to their cities of origin in its cleanness, organisation and fresh air, but also has an extra asset of being gated, which is new to them. Furthermore, it provides them with a sense of security they are seeking. [2] Protection, urban services and security are provided and managed by private urban administration, thus the political background of those who seek refuge in Rehab is not only varied but also obvious. Pro-regime groups can afford to show up in Rehab, given their financial capacities to get commodified security services and protection.

Urban administration in Rehab has reported a flourishing economy with the influxes of Syrians living there, as many business activities have opened. Furthermore, real estate values have risen by 20% in the last eight months (from August 2012 till March 2013); [3] yet, for most of the interviewed persons, and with the depletion of financial resources for some of them, the preferred place to move to is the newly established gated city of Madienty, which is less populated and has cheaper rents.

Omraneya: an informal settlement

In Omraneya, Giza, which is an informal settlement on agricultural land with winding streets and dense buildings, a group of Syrians of Turkman origin sought accom-

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modation clustering themselves around their ethnic origin and family relationships. [Fig. 3] They came with the influxes of poorer and disadvantaged groups arriving since August 2011, specifically after the eruption of the Aleppo battle. They are from different cities, but were already interconnected in Syria through their ethnic networking.

The main attraction to the area has been due to charity networking: the focal point of attraction in the area is an iconic mosque which, similar to many other areas in Cairo, houses a religious school and charity organisation that periodically dispenses basic support to the refugees. These charity groups, which are faith-based, have further connections with groups and charity assistance inside Syria, and they help fleeing individuals and groups in Egypt. The arriving groups at the mosque then allocate themselves in the close-by areas and further inside the neighbourhood as the numbers start to grow due to other pull factors of community cohesion.

Most of their places are rented; payments are provided or subsidised by charity. Anonymity and being hidden in the area, as they are hardly reached by UNHCR and other organisations, are some of the assets of such an area. The reasons behind that are not clear though. Most probably, and as reported by few people dealing with the groups in Omraneya, they are engaged in organised begging and move between Egyptian cities and towns, coming back to these places. Their political views as non-supporters of the Syrian uprising could also be another reason, but this needs further investigation. [4]

Masaken Othman: remote and exclusionary housing projects

Masaken Othman, located on the oasis road around 40 kilometres from downtown Cairo, is one of the governmental housing projects to compensate groups displaced due to the demolition of housing stock in inner-city areas. [Fig. 5] It is on the fringes of the satellite city Sitta October. The inner-city groups who live in exile and exclusion in such areas and who lose access to jobs in the informal sector mostly go back to where they traditionally lived, creating vacancies to rent or sell. Accommodation for the Syrians here is provided rent-free by a faith-based organisation, which rents in mass. Therefore, to get a place in this area is a matter of networking and not affordability.

2 Interviewees in Rehab, 2013, by researcher.

3 Interview with the city hall in Rehab, 2013.

4 Interviews in Omraneya and observations in the visited homes of Syrians there.

Abu Abdu from Homs. His journey in 6 months was pulled by job opportunities and pushed by depletion of resources and rent values which ended in the informal settlement of Ain Shams

Abu Ahmad from Aleppo. His journey in 4 months followed charity networking and rent-free housing and ended up on the fringes of Sheikh Zayed City which is considered as better than the far-end fringes of Sitta October where he also was accommodated for free by faith-based organizations.

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Figure 6: The journey of Abu Abdu, who came by land, lived for a time with a family he knows in Sitta October, moved downtown in search of work, and then had to find cheaper housing in an informal area as his resources started to get depleted. The journey of Abu Ahmad, who came by plane, stayed one night in a hotel in downtown Cairo, and was directed to the Jam'ya Ashariya, which provided him with free-of-charge housing in Masaken Othman. Source: Rasha Arous 2012, based on Sims and Sejourne 2009, cited in Sims 2011

5 Observations and informal meetings with such persons in the same area by researcher.

The reception happens through another iconic mosque, which is the base of that organisation in Sitta October. Today, the area forms a pocket of the "displaced", be they inner-city groups or Syrian refugees, with an interesting yet complex social structure. In addition to the escaping families who found their ways there through networking, the area also accommodates other specific groups. Political actors who are well-connected to the (governing) faith-based organisation are accommodated to get treatment when injured, and then return via Turkey to areas where the Syrian Free Army rules. **5** Therefore, the remote and marginalised nature of this area has been an asset for such activists.

The challenges posed by these areas are mobility, accessibility, integration and image. The areas have a bad image among the Egyptian community, which is transferred to the Syrians as they cohabit the space with the informal areas' "ashwayeat" people, who are stigmatised as drug dealers, thugs and thieves (Bayat 2012). This has posed as an additional distress and is causing disintegration between the two groups. The area is also not accessible by direct transportation, except for the TukTuk, which travel to Sitta October only until early evening.

The way in which both of these groups have appropriated the urban environment is worth further study, as it reflects their cultural backgrounds of making a place "here" like "there". Rents have not shown any increases in the last few months, as they are controlled by the renting faith-based organisation. This renting process could be a good example for the Syrians to formulate local Syrian renting structures such as cooperatives to rent in mass and then control the market.

In general, the places where Syrians reside show different levels of appropriation, integration and social cohesion, and some are not maintained for a long time. The following section shows two spaces not maintained and discusses the corresponding reasons why.

Cairo journeys: marginalisation of place and livelihoods

When seeking sustainable means of living, better networking, social cohesion, cheaper or free accommodation, people move continuously. In Masaken Othman, a high level of residential mobility outwards towards other areas has been reported.

Although accommodation is free, people still search for opportunities to work and socialise and to escape both the insecurity and bad image of the area, and thus look for other options. Some in other areas are driven by the rise in real estate values.

In figure 6, two different journeys and the underlying motives are presented, from arrival to latest settlement. In the first journey, the family was driven by the search to sustain resources and ended in an informal area where housing is both cheaper and not far from where the head of the household intends to work in Nasr City.

In the second journey the family followed the provision of free-of-charge housing and escaping exile. The journey reveals a web of networking to charity that provided another rent-free housing option with a better location and reputation on the margins of Shiekh Zayed City, yet not far from exile again. [Fig. 6]

Political setting: actors, networks and self-organising Initiatives

The study of the different networking that has established itself among refugee communities highlights the continued need to consider how intersecting geopolitical city spheres, governance and actors impact refugee settings, services and social structures (Danielson 2012). For the Syrians, and unlike for other refugees in Cairo, the government's position, like that of the local Egyptian community, has been supportive. [Fig. 7] Nevertheless, feelings of insecurity due to the general unrest in the country have been reported by Syrians (UNHCR, UNCEF, WFP 2012).

Although Egypt is a signatory of the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 protocol, it still lacks national asylum legislations (Bailey 2004). This places responsibilities on UNHCR beyond its mandate. Bureaucracy and low quality of the services deter Syrians from utilising their rights to access health and education services (Gittleson 2013). Only a small percentage of the Syrians are registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers, despite all the facilitations to reach out to them and make doing so easier.

The reasons are numerous. Among them are the fear of jeopardising the safety of their families who are still in Syria, the concern of being identified or that their information might be shared or leaked, and simply not knowing about it. They also, more importantly, have not constructed a "refugee" identity due to their feeling of temporality and outlook of soon returning to Syria. Moreover, better-off groups think that they do not need to register as they do need the provided services.

It is argued that "in urban centres refugees are offered a less disproportionally distributed and insufficient assis-tance, which leads to higher degrees of self-sufficiency than those in camps" (Kobia and Cranfield 2009). The employment sector is one of the key issues in making self-sufficiency possible. Due to the pressure on the formal employment sector in Egypt, the creation of parallel systems and cycles of dependency is overloading the already tenuous informal sector, which seems to be the only option for refugees (Kagan 2011).

The Syrians seem to have access to support through many channels. Egyptian governmental and civil society organisations, community-based and local, international and religiously-affiliated non-governmental organisations in addition to individual donors as well as the host Egyptian community are all contributing in different ways to providing assistance. All of them have differing agendas and target groups and sectors. They have started to set forward their own local structures and mechanisms of establishing networks using technology and other means.

However, these new-born channels and structures need further institutional and financial nurturing to survive and fully function. Networks are happening among people of the same city of origin, who share the same geographical place, through community nodes or meeting points such as the area of Al Housari [Fig. 8], and through liaison entities such as charity organisations, NGOs and other structures.

Although the Syrian presence in Egypt is relatively new and well-developed networks and local structures would need more time, there is a clear discrepancy in the levels of communication and outreaching in between the different urban areas. This implies a shift is needed from the formulation of universal policies to area-sensitive approaches based on a serious understanding of how each urban form and mode of governance functions.

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Figure 7: The loop of actors in the context of the Syrian refugees in Cairo. The more the actor gets inside the frame the more outreaching is done by it. The few circles refer to structures that are being formed. Source: Rasha Arous 2012

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Concluding remarks

Examining the mega city of Cairo as a place of asylum and refugee brings about debates of multi-disciplinary nature. It is important, in order to study the city as a place of refuge, an understanding of how the city functions as "a non-refugee" location is needed to be able understand the particularities of the refugee places. Urban spaces as "expressions of infrastructure networks working harmoniously and discordantly at once to provide inhabitants with shelter, contact, energy, water and means of transportation" are conceptually and functionally loaded with extra meanings for a refugee experience (Wahdan 2012). Cairo, and as stated in the introduction, widely considered a transit city for African refugees, could shift its function in that regard with the new types of refugees and with the changing regional and local political settings.

Cairo seems to have created multi-choice avenues for refugees to navigate their ways through. It has catered to some people's prospects and imaginations and yielded chances to provide housing and channels of livelihood and support. Nevertheless, it is exhausting for a larger population with its demanding nature. A city like Cairo, with its contested, fragmented and diverse urban spaces, makes the experience of navigation through its spaces a difficult yet interesting one. Not to forget the extra burdens that are posed by livelihood difficulties, security and stability problems due to the transitional period, and the implications of that on daily routines. These aspects fall harsher on minority and marginalised groups and on the urban poor, among which refugees are a major constituent.

The Syrian refugees' backgrounds and socio-economic and political profiles influence the way they are being accommodated into the city. Political participation and engagement in the ongoing events in both places of origin and in Cairo are among the issues of concern for refugees while navigating through the urban spheres, as urban modes of governance allow for different levels of participation. The city offers the better-off more chances for dignified lives and marginalises and exploits the poor. Its offered options are not consistent and are driven by the need for sustaining the living means, which cause the ongoing move around the city's compartmental structures.

Refugees, similar to migrants, have their feet in multiple spaces of the city in order to get the best possible options of its offers learning from the urban poor. As coping mechanisms naturally emerge, the Syrian refugees have started to form sorts of communities, to allocate themselves within more-supportive host communities, and to form their own channels of networking. Furthermore, they have started organising help and systemising it into social and political structures. This all, with the composition of governance in each part of the city interacting with the Syrian refugees' governance, will influence the city's urban structure and call for a more in depth and systemised study of Cairo as a place of urban refugees.

This article is a preliminary exploration of a field research conducted in February 2013 and has been developed by the researcher later into a thesis.

The Politics of Space:
Imagining Syrian Refugee Camps in Turkey

Yaşar Adnan Adanalı

Die Politisierung von Raum – Reflektionen zu syrischen Flüchtlingslagern in der Türkei
Seit der Eskalation des Konflikts in Syrien erfuhren die südlichen Grenzgebiete der Türkei einen massiven und andauernden Ansturm von Flüchtlingen aus dem Nachbarland. Tausende Syrer suchten Zuflucht in den von der türkischen Regierung stark kontrollierten, zentral verwalteten und gut ausgerüsteten Lagern, die aus Zelten oder vorgefertigten Wohneinheiten bestehen. Dieser Artikel diskutiert die Besonderheiten der syrischen Flüchtlingslager in der Türkei mit Blick auf politische Dynamiken innerhalb und außerhalb der Lagergrenzen. Die Flüchtlingscamps sind in diesem Fall nicht nur räumliche Manifestationen eines politischen Konflikts, sondern auch Orte politischen und strategischen Wirkens. Anders als sonst sind die Flüchtlinge in diesen Camps nicht nur passive Nutznießer von Hilfslieferungen, sondern Personen, die das räumliche Umfeld seit Beginn aktiv mitgestaltet haben und ihre Lager als Ausgangspunkte regionalpolitischer Aktivitäten nutzen.

Since the outbreak of conflict in Syria, Turkey had been experiencing a massive and increasing influx of refugees from its neighbour. Thousands of Syrians continue to seek refuge in well-established, highly controlled and centrally managed tent and prefab camps along the border, and many more moved into cities. Refugee camps are not only a spatial manifestation and victimisation of a political conflict, but also active agents of politics. Hence, unlike the reductionist representation of the refugees in the camps as being passive recipients of humanitarian aid in need of urgent protection and shelter, from the very beginning the people brought their own subjectivity to the physical space and engaged with the broader political conflict.

This article discusses particularities of Syrian refugee camps in Turkey with regards to the dynamic nature of politics within and outside the camp boundaries. Firstly, the article sets the ground for the formation of the camps by explaining the changing relationship between Turkey and Syria. Secondly, an overview of the Syrian refugees and their camps is given. Thirdly, the reclaimed and invited spaces of participation within the camps are articulated by contrasting supply-driven policies with demand-driven interventions of refugees.

Background: Turkey-Syria relations

Historically, bilateral relationships between the two neighbouring countries of Turkey and Syria have almost always been with tensions. According to the former, for a long time Syria was considered to be "an enemy of the state" due to harbouring "terrorists", creating problems in the use of cross-border water resources, and claiming territory (Hatay Province) over Turkey. For the latter, Turkey has not equitably shared water resources, was an ally of the "West", and occupied Syrian land. After being forced to send the Kurdish Guerrilla leader Abdullah Öcalan out of the country and signing a treaty with Turkey on anti-terrorism cooperation, there was a period of politi-

cal, economic, social and cultural rapprochement lasting from 1998 until the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011. In May, 2009, the improved relations reached such a level that for the first time in history, the Turkish President visited Syria. Following this visit, in September, 2009, the visa requirements for citizens of both countries was mutually lifted. Nevertheless, parallel to the turmoil in the region and the Arab Revolts, Turkish foreign policy shifted rapidly against the regimes of, initially, Gaddafi and Mubarek and, finally, Assad. Turkey re-positioned itself openly to side against the Syrian government and started to support proactively the opposition groups, both civilian and armed. This re-positioning had a direct impact on the formation of Syrian refugee camps in Turkey, their management, their image among the Turkish citizens, and the discourse revolving around them.

The active involvement of Turkey in the conflict paved the way into the erosion of the distinction between refugees and rebels within the imagination of many Turkish citizens. Those opposing the government's intervention policy often perceive refugees as "trouble-makers". Moreover, the outbreak of conflict in Syria coincided with the devastating Van earthquake in the eastern part of Turkey, as well as the post-disaster humanitarian relief works for both emergency situations. The prompt response of the government to the refugee crises was compared with the highly unsatisfying post-earthquake relief work.

Figure 1: Syrians are crossing the border via the Orontes River in North Western Syria with the help of Free Syrian Army. Photo by Onur Çoban

Figures 2 and 3: Camps are planned, constructed and operated by AFAD, the Government Agency for Disaster Management. Photos: AFAD

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The lack of tents and limited number of prefab barracks in Van were contrasted with the so-called "dream camps" at the Syrian border. For instance, cunningly capitalising on nationalist sentiments, Tayfun Talipoğlu, a famous TV presenter, commented on the two humanitarian aid efforts in his TV programme in 2012, stating that "the Syrian refugee camps are the best camps that I have seen so far, including those established after the earthquake. From laundry rooms to schools, occupational training centres to sport areas, they have all the necessary services. They are like holiday resorts… When I listen to those refugees and think about our citizens in Van staying in emergency tents, I want to become a Syrian refugee" (Talipoğlu Apr. 5 2012).

The Syrian refugees in Turkey

Together with Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt, Turkey is one of the host countries in the region sheltering Syrian refugees. Having its longest border with Syria (almost 900 km), since the beginning of the conflict Syrian refugees have been arriving to Turkey from formal and informal crossing points along the border. [Fig. 1]

The Turkish government has kept its borders open since the early days of arrivals and declared a "temporary protection" policy in October 2011, which entailed "unobstructed admission to Turkish territories, no forcible returns, and the provision of basic needs upon registration with the authorities" (hCa-RASP 2012). As of 18 July 2014, there are 218,847 persons registered in 22 camps in Turkey and over a million refugees living in urban areas, according to the Government Agency for Disaster Management (AFAD), the chief public agency in charge of providing humanitarian support for Syrian refugees.

Turkey's temporary protection policy for Syrians does not represent the official "temporary asylum" policy for "non-European" refugees in Turkey. Non-European refugees and asylum-seekers are dispersed and placed in more than 50 urban centres, called satellite cities, where they are required to stay until the end of their asylum process. According to this system, durable solutions for non-European refugees, following the formal refugee status determination process carried out mainly by UNHCR, are limited to voluntary repatriation or resettlement in third countries, but exclude local integration. Syrian refugees are not addressed by the temporary asylum policy: they have been provided refuge in well-established, highly

controlled and centrally managed tent and prefab camps along the border.

The overview: Syrian refugee camps in Turkey

From the very beginning of the refugee influx to Turkey, the government kept the gates of camps wide open to Syrians but strictly closed to the outside world. Both press and international humanitarian organisations had a very limited access to the camps, hence the commentary below mostly reflects the analysis of official press releases, photo archives and secondary resources. [Fig. 2 and 3]

Camps are planned, constructed and operated by the Government Agency for Disaster Management (AFAD), tied directly to the Prime Ministry, in coordination with the Turkish Red Crescent. Of the 22 camps at 10 different provinces in Turkey, six consist of prefab barracks and the rest of tents. In terms of population size, the camps range from 7,549 people in Malatya to 24,884 people in Akçakale

Figure 4: The Plan for Öncüpınar Prefab Camp. Source: Hürriyet Newspapar

Camp in Şanlıurfa. Most of the camps are located in close proximity to the border. There are barracks (prefab or tent), schools, mosques, commercial units, centres for police and health services, press briefing rooms, children play areas, units for watching TV, water depots, water treatment facilities, generators, and power transformers in the camps. The AFAD provides infrastructure for water and electricity as well as pre-paid cards for buying food products at private supermarkets established by the AFAD.

The "dream" refugee camp: the prefab city of Öncüpınar

Opened on 17 March, 2012, the Öncüpınar Camp consists of over 2,000 prefab barracks, covering an area of 315,000 square metres and sheltering more than 13,000 refugees in the Kilis Province of Turkey. The AFAD provided the infrastructure for the site, including ground improvement, a water and sanitation system, an electricity grid, wastewater treatment facilities, roads, and telephone and Internet connections via contracting construction companies. [Fig. 4] Other than the rows of uniformed prefab barracks, there are 6 children playgrounds, banking services, commercial units, a kindergarten, internet cafes, TV rooms, occupational training areas, laundry rooms, 2 mosques, and 174 classrooms for the education of the over 11,795 Syrian children in the camp. For the security, there are 14 watchtowers and 98 CCTVs around the camp.

During her second visit to the Syrian refugee camps in Turkey in September, 2012, the UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie was quoted by the Turkish media with the following statement on the conditions she observed at the Prefab City of Öncüpınar:

> "It is very generous of the Turkish government to set up such a wonderful camp. This is really impressive … I haven't seen such a camp anywhere else in the world" (NTVMSNBC Sept. 13 2012).

The prompt, comprehensive and high-quality response of the Turkish government to the influx of Syrian refugees into the country was praised by various international organisations. From a bird's-eye view, indeed, the infrastructure and services provided at the numerous camps along the border is impressive. In June, 2012, a UNHCR report stated that "the emergency response by the Turkish authorities has been of a consistently high standard, with new arrivals rapidly settled in the camps prepared by the Turkish authorities and set up by the Turkish Red Crescent. Food, accommodation and medical assistance have been provided for the camp populations without interruption" (UNHCR June 2012).

Lack of or too much participation – the veil of secrecy

Other than the delivery of relief items by a couple of local NGOs to complement the Turkish Red Crescent, there has not been any substantial operational presence of NGOs inside the camps. Despite the fact that numerous human rights and refugee advocacy NGOs requested to be allowed to visit the camps, the officials turned them down on confidentiality reasons. Helsinki Citizens Assembly, a credible human rights organisation based in Istanbul, states that "the lack of transparency regarding the proce-

dures and practices at the borders and in camps is a major problem" (hCa-RASP Nov. 16 2012).

Comparing the extent of the partner organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees between Turkey and other host countries reveals a "veil of secrecy" in the former. For instance, UNHCR lists more than 180 national and international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations as partners and service providers in Jordan, whereas in Turkey only four UN organisations (i.e. IOM, UNHCR Turkey, WFP Turkey, WHO Turkey) are allowed to be involved, with but limited responsibilities and functions (UNHCR 2013).

In November, 2012, three renowned intellectuals, Anthony Giddens, Hany el Banna and Fuat Keyman, sent an open letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, requesting him to accept the financial and technical support of the international community. They stated that "all refugee-hosting countries must allow international humanitarian organisations to operate within their borders. We urge Turkey to join Jordan and Lebanon in enabling these specialist organisations into the country to support this effort with their technical skills and resources" (Todayszaman.com Nov. 27 2012).

One could argue that the extreme secrecy and lack of collaborative space in Turkey is related to the "culture" of non-participatory governance in general and linked to the perceived "political" importance of the conflict in particular. Turkey's handling of the Syrian refugee crises is amalgamated with the government's involvement in the Syrian conflict. Turkey has not been shy to promote regime change in Syria, both by providing direct support to the Free Syrian Army (or other armed groups) and by seeking the international community's more direct intervention. Hence, the more Turkey is involved in the conflict, the less other potential stakeholders (camp communities, national and international non-governmental organisations, UN agencies, etc.) are allowed to involve themselves in the planning, governing and monitoring of the Syrian refugee camps. Nevertheless, the Syrian refugees

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Figure 5 (top left)**:** Standard bunk bed with metal frame. Photo: Onur Çoban

Figure 6 – 10 (smaller images)**:** The multiple uses of standard bunk beds as commercial unit, as outdoor patio, as playground, as sleeping facility. Source: Hürriyet Newspaper

▼

Figure 11: Refugees have made numerous attempts to shape and redesign their highly uniformed built environment. Source: <www.genelgundem.com>

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have been appropriating and reclaiming their spaces in the camps, hence initiating a bottom-up participatory process in various ways.

Self-help interventions

Even though, initially, the camp space was produced by the Turkish state as a fully-serviced, humanitarian "dream", the refugees quickly adapted to, altered and re-produced the space according to their needs. One such interesting example is the multiple uses of standard bunk beds with metal frames, provided in each of the container shelters at the Öncüpınar camp in Kilis. Other than using them for the most obvious purpose (sleeping), bed frames have also been utilised for/as:
• Creating a little outdoor patio in front of the shelters;
• Hanging laundry outside;
• Playgrounds for children; and
• Setting up commercial units for selling food products to the camp community. [Fig. 5–10]

Refugees have made numerous attempts to shape and redesign the highly uniform built environment tinged with a heavy sense of the Turkish state's presence, such as:
• Shades have been attached to the barracks;
• Bed sheets have been hung as curtains for windows and doors;
• Folding screens made out of oilcloth have been set up in front of the shelters for providing a semi-private space;
• Fences have been utilised for hanging laundry; and
• Graffiti has been inscribed on the prefab walls. [Fig. 11]

Moreover, as soon as the refugees settled in the camps, they started to engage in small business activities and searched for ways to generate extra income to fulfil their needs. Going beyond the image of "passive victims" of the conflict and "helpless receivers" of the government hand-outs without any other option, the refugees have even been reported to sell the relief items, such as cooking oil, flour, sugar, to the local small businesses at the nearby Turkish settlements (Tanış T. 2012). This little informal trade activity in a highly formal/official management system could easily be interpreted as an act of refugee-initiated participation in the camp life. The refugees alter the supply-driven humanitarian aid with their demand-driven strategies to serve the self-identified needs.

Maybe the most extreme case of "agency" in the camps is related to the way in which the refugees participate in

the broader political framework that caused their initial displacement. It is reported that the camps serve as "logistical hub, rest and recuperation place[s] by the Free Syrian Army (FSA)", and that the agents of FSA openly carry out recruitment and political mobilisation activities in the camps. Clearly, in terms of maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, the militarisation of refugee camps is not a legitimate practice. However, it demonstrates that the camp space is a highly politicised one and various actors and agendas are at work, thus redefining the meaning of the space and its inhabitants.

"Role-playing" democracy: camp elections

The disparities between Turkey's supply-driven policies and the demand-driven strategies of refugees have been causing discontent and upheavals in the camps. In order to alleviate the conflicts arising from the non-participatory, centrally-commanded camp management, in January, 2013, Turkish officials introduced "camp elections" in which refugees aged 18 and over could vote for the administrative representatives of different camp neighbourhoods.

In the Öncüpınar Container City, a total of 17 candidates, including three women, ran to be the chief of their districts. An 18-member administrative council was also elected during the camp elections. Each of the six districts in the camp had to have at least one female candidate, who was also required to be over the age of 30. The elected representatives support the administrative services of their districts – such as the coordination of humanitarian assistance, security, health, education and religion – together with the local governor's office.

The elections were promoted in the media as enabling refugees "to practice democracy in the camps, which is currently not possible in their homeland" (Küçükkoşum S. 2013). Moreover, this was an "invited space" of participation for refugees with an attempt to regularise the particularities of participatory governance.

Conclusion

According to the Helsinki Citizen Assembly, "overall, the Turkish government has done a commendable job of taking responsibility for the refugees from Syria, declaring from the onset that the borders would be kept open and quickly setting up camps entirely on own resources. It appears that the principle of non-refoulement is respected and the basic humanitarian needs of the population in the camps are met. That said, ongoing uncertainties about the legal status of Syrian refugees and lack of consistent and adequate official guidance, coupled with shortages of transparency and oversight, are cause of concern" (hCa-RASP 2012: 4).

From the very beginning of the conflict, "politics" has been an indispensible part of the formation, management and imagination of Syrian refugee camps in Turkey. Although highly praised for the excellence of its supply-driven policies, Turkey prefers to govern this process with a veil of secrecy, and hence has kept very limited room for participation. Nevertheless, refugees have brought their own subjectivity to, and have reclaimed, the physical space, and engaged in the broader political conflict.

The Emergence of Habitat in Zaatari Camp in Jordan: Between Humanitarian and Socio-cultural Order

Ayham Dalal

Die Herausbildung eigener Wohnformen im Zaatari-Flüchtlingslager in Jordanien – im Spannungs-feld von humanitären Vorgaben und sozio-kulturellen Bedürfnissen
Die Millionen von Flüchtlingen zur Zeit der größten Fluchtwelle in Folge des syrischen Bürgerkrieges wurden aus Sicht der Gastländer als Belastung wahrgenommen. Der Aufbau von Flüchtlingslagern schien eine Lösung zu sein, um diese Last zu verringern. Die Lager sollten die Versorgungssituation ver-bessern und die lokale Infrastruktur entlasten. Sie sind jedoch charakterisiert durch Probleme der Aus-grenzung und der zeitlichen Beschränktheit und daher ein schwieriges Feld für die Siedlungsplanung. Dieser Artikel untersucht die rigiden Planungs- und Ordnungsvorgaben, welche die Entstehung des weltweit zweitgrößten Flüchtlingslagers – Zaatari in Jordanien – begleiteten. Dabei traten Spannungen zwischen den institutionalisierten Vorgaben und den sozio-kulturellen Bedürfnissen der Bewohner zu-tage. Um diese Spannungen aufzulösen, sollten Lager nicht auf Basis standardisierter Pläne geschaffen werden; die Bewohner sollten die Möglichkeit bekommen, ihren Lebensraum selbst zu gestalten.

The Syrian crisis has resulted in what is now considered to be one of the largest exoduses in recent history (UN 2014 a). The demographic pressure of more than three million refugees dispersed in the region has become a burden on the shoulders of the hosting countries (ibid). [1]

While the establishment of camps is appealing as a solu-tion for elevating the pressure on local resources, servic-es and infrastructure, they are problematic in terms of their relation to the hosting state and the humanitarian mandate. Due to their exclusion and temporality, refugee camps are a problematic topic for urban planning.

Zaatari camp in Jordan [Fig. 1] has grown into the second biggest refugee camp in the world; this paper examines the planning policies and strategies implemented in the camp in order to accommodate the increasing numbers of refugees. Drawing on the Lefebvrian (1996) distinction between "the city" and "the urban", this paper looks at the dynamics and tensions accompanying and leading to the emergence of urbanity in Zaatari camp while focus-ing on habitat and its social spaces. [2]

The findings of this paper are the result of intensive field research carried out in Zaatari camp between February

[1] This was especially critical in Al-Mafraq governorate, where the ratio of Syrians to Jordanians exceeded 60% (MercyCorps, 2013). This pressure influenced a pub-lic survey in 2012 in which 80% of residents of Al-Mafraq affirmed that Syrian refugees should be segre-gated from the hosting communities and accom-modated in camps, which led to the opening of Zaatari camp in July 2012 (ibid).

[2] Henri Lefebvre considers the city as *"a present and immediate reality, a practi-co-material and architec-tural fact"*, and the urban as *"a social reality made up of relations which are to be conceived of, constructed and reconstructed by thought"* (1996: 103). Based on that, it could be said that the city in Zaatari camp is limited to a repetition of very few elements, which transform the camp into a homogenous carpet. How-ever, this distinction allows us to distinguish the urban, and not be deceived by the limited materiality of space.

◄
Figure 1: Zaatari camp as seen from its margins. Photo: Ayham Dalal, 2014

Figure 2: The growth of Zaatari camp between August 2012 and January 2014. Source: Ayham Dalal, 2014

3 Closed camps were introduced by Sari Hanafi (2008) as an unnatural setting where refugees are socially and contextually segregated from the hosting state. Therefore, they are considered to be a matter of disciplinary power, which has negative impacts on refugees and camps in terms of poverty, urban identity, and relation to the nation state.

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August 2012

September 2012

December 2012 *

February 2013

May 2013

July 2013

January 2014

Previously Existing Shelter Structures ■

Added (or moved) Shelter Structures ■
Compared to Previous Satellite Image

No analysis for this date was provided *

and April 2014, during which the published documents, surveys and reports about Zaatari camp, and the personal observations and in-depth interviews with UNHCR's planning unit and the Syrian refugees, were compared, connected and analysed.

Planned and unplanned: a humanitarian "far" order

Located 10 kilometres away from the closest urban centre (Al-Mafraq city), Zaatari camp was constructed as a "closed camp". [3] It was planned to host 10,000 Syrian refugees (UN 2014b), but the increasing influx caused the camp to grow from the size of a farm (30 hectares in September 2012) to the size of a city (530 hectares in March 2013). More than 350,000 refugees were once registered in the camp; however, this number has decreased, and currently it houses around 80,000 registered refugees (UNHCR 2014 a; Dalal 2014). [4]

In July 2012, the camp was under the responsibility of a Jordanian NGO. [5] Refugees there spontaneously settled within the boundaries of the humanitarian space, influenced by the built structures: one asphalted street cutting through the camp, main facilities constructed in juxtaposition to each other and facing the same street, and the communal infrastructure between refugee tents. [6] Within this setting, the allocation of refugees produced a distinctive urban footprint known as the "old camp". [Fig. 2] The old camp grew to make up around 40% of the current camp's area. However, the unplanned old camp was challenging for humanitarians, as it was congested, dense, and difficult to make meet humanitarian standards. Therefore, with the proliferating numbers of refu-

gees arriving at the camp every day, the decision to extend and plan a "new camp" was taken.

Satellite images show that the work on the new camp started in November 2012; UNHCR, however, took charge of the camp in March 2013. The analysis of the agency's programmes at Zaatari camp shows low attention towards the urban and spatial settings which appeared in the outcome (Dalal 2014). [7] The new camp is a group of seven rectangular sub-camps (around 75 × 50 meters) defined by the road network extending from the old camp. Each district consists of a grid of 12 residential blocks supplied with infrastructure and services. The planning of these blocks, which all follow the same grid, is as follows: a residential zone of 12 × 7 caravans, a drinking-water tank, four communal latrines, three communal kitchens shared by two blocks, and a multi-activity space on the side. [Fig. 3]

Despite the differences in spatial settings, the old and the new camp both follow the same humanitarian standardised policies. For instance, UNHCR supports each refugee family of less than six members with only one shelter unit. These units are either a tent of 23 m² or a caravan of 16 m² (REACH 2013: 5). [8] The one-room space is used for sleeping and living, whereas the communal infrastructures (kitchens, latrines, and water tanks) provide the other needed services. Within this arrangement, refugees are supplied with two types of space: covered and open. The planning of the entire camp is based on this structure. [9] The standardisation of living, the separation of functions, and the commonality of services provide easy and clear strategies for the camp to be rapidly constructed; however, apparently, not for refugees to live.

Caravan

Communal latrine

Communal kitchen

Facilities/ multi activity centers

◀ **Figure 3:** A planned block in Zaatari camp. Source: Ayham Dalal, 2014

Figure 4: An example of a household developed from a caravan and two tents. Source: Ayham Dalal, 2014

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10 Meaning one family or more living together due to direct kinship, or the hosting of individual relatives that are not directly related (uncles, husbands of aunts, wives of uncles, nephews, etc.).

11 The current camp policy provides one caravan per family. However, some refugee families decide to live together and group caravans to create a bigger household, some families purchase previously distributed caravans from other families, while others simply inherit a caravan from relatives who have left the camp (REACH & UNHCR 2013). Keep in mind that around 300,000 of the refugees assisted in the camp have since left it (UNHCR 2014a).

12 Outer courts can also be observed where additional materials were added to create a sort of fence and to define the household's borders.

Space for raising chickens
Toilet and bath built behind a stone wall
Space for receiving guests
Cement step
Space for living and sleeping
Semi-Pirvate space for family and relatives
Gardening

Toilet hole dig into the ground

Entrance for the second tent

Different functions associated to the semi-private space

The small garden is planted with herbs for cooking

Counter planning: a socio-cultural "near" order

The implemented strategies and policies are rather embarrassing as they implicitly challenge the culture, values and traditions of the refugees. One of the main aspects is the mixture of gender in relation to space. Starting with the most private space, the shelter unit, many refugees report a sense of humiliation and discomfort regarding the housing policy. As one explained: *"Imagine that because we all have to live in this room, my daughter has to change her clothes in front of her brother! What a shame! We never did that in Syria"* (Dalal 2014). This becomes even more problematic within extended family structures, which are very common in Zaatari camp. **10**

The usage of communal infrastructure is also not favoured by the refugees. A recent survey states that 33% of respondents have safety concerns regarding the use of the communal latrines during the day, and 48% during the night (ACTED, JEN, OXFAM, UNICEF 2013). Lack of hygiene, privacy, and the long travels needed to reach them at night are among some of the concerns. Furthermore, refugees consider it disrespectful for women and elders to use such communal facility. One refugee elaborated:

"My mom is an old woman. She has done an operation for her kidney…she needs to use the toilet every hour … do you think I can carry her whenever she needs? I'm not there all the time" (Dalal 2014). The same situation applies for kids, as one refugee explained:

"We cannot keep going back and forth to [the] toilet every time we need it …I have a little child, you see … " (ibid).

This explains why communal latrines are constantly vandalised, as they do not meet the collective approval of the refugees for which they were planned and constructed. Communal kitchens and water tanks are also vandalised, but to a lesser extent.

Socio-culture acts as a driving force, encouraging refugees to find appropriate solutions for living and shelter with the limited resources made available by the humanitarians in the camp. The expansion beyond the standardised housing unit first started when tents were substituted with caravans. As caravans are solid and stable, their sides could act as a core upon which tents could be hung to create additional spaces. The resulting spaces are flexible and varied in their level of privacy, which depends on their function. [Fig. 4]

However, while this may partially relieve the social tension, the real turning point is the acquisition of more than one caravan. **11** Since they function as isolated and movable rooms, caravans can be put in front of each other, connected with a cement floor, and shaded by curtains, bags or tents to create a private inner court. [Fig. 5]

Communal facilities such as kitchens, toilets and water storages have been substituted with private ones, placed directly inside the court or between shifted caravans. **12** In their attempt to release the social tension, the refugees have produced households that are similar in their concept and design to the traditional Islamic house. This is not surprising since the refugees, the actual architects, follow codes of culture and traditions that are mostly derived from Islamic values.

The principles upon which the households were designed have influenced the resulting habitat as well. While many parts of the new camp are still in a state of transition, the crystallised urban structure of the old camp is similar in its organic compositions to that found in the old medina, where the privacy of the households produced and shaped all the other spaces. [Fig. 6 & 7] For instance, a micro study in the old camp revealed that the streets surrounding the clusters had become spaces for interaction between the new neighbours. [13] The resulting irregular urban form not only helped refugees to increase the privacy of their households through curved entries and side doors, but also produced niches and corners for socialising and economic activities – semi-public spaces.

An owner of a vegetable stall explained: *"I enjoy being around the hara here where my friends and I can sit, drink tea and talk … like an 'aade shabeye* (informal gathering)*"* (Dalal 2014). [14] However, while women may have less presence in semi- and public spaces than men, communal kitchens have appeared as an alternative for social gathering and public interaction. [15] Moreover, *cul du sacs* have been curved throughout the clusters, reaching the households inside and creating semi-private spaces that are exhaustively shared between residents. Refugees compared these spaces to other urbanised settings in Syria, like the old *haras* or even the highly urbanised Palestinian camps, which gives an indication of the level of urbanity connoted within these spaces and reached in Zaatari camp.

Conclusion

This paper sheds light on one aspect of many regarding the urbanisation of Zaatari camp. [16] The emergence of

habitat is a result of the reciprocal relationship between a humanitarian order that is constrained within its very limited, standardised, and universal nature, and a socio-cultural order that is inherited, yet collectively produced and reproduced, by the daily activity of refugees in the camp. The tensions produced by this relationship are framed by planning policies that serve as a rapid tool for

13 When tents were substituted with caravans in the old camp, refugees took the initiative to connect their households, thus producing large clusters that may now include up to 25 families or more. Some of them are even collectively connected to the sewage system. For more info see (Dalal, 2014).

14 *Hara* is an Arabic term that means neighbourhood. However, it holds strong social connotations of solidarity and belonging.

15 One refugee expressed this fact by saying: *"I have a private kitchen at home, but I prefer to use the communal kitchen where I meet my friends and neighbours … There we can talk about Syrian habits of cooking, and discover the differences between them … I'm learning a new recipe in the kitchen every day"* (Dalal, 2014).

16 For more information, see: Dalal 2014.

The caravan behind the water tank was recently repositioned to create an inner court

A shop for selling dry goods and snacks for kids

A vegetable stall and social gatherings found their place in this niche

Cul de sac leading to two households

A wedding-dresses shop extended from the household structure

Caravan

Toilets/Kitchen

Shop

17 Giorgio Agamben (1998) introduced refugee camps as "states-of-exception" – an apparatus of alienation, control and exclusion. While he was attempting to draw attention to the dangers that this model has on "normal" life, to insist that refugee camps be considered and dealt with as "states-of-exception" does nothing but foster the fact and lead them to be more excluded and alienated.

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response and implementation but fail to address the socio-cultural needs of refugees. Under these circumstances, the planning of refugee camps needs to shift from imposing services and policies towards enabling the active users of the site to actually design the camp.

However, it cannot be said that UNHCR is not aware of the shortcomings of its planning paradigm. It has been long criticised for utilising the same principles with which Zaatari camp was planned. Recently published and unpublished documents by UNHCR attempt to address these problems and to develop proper strategies for shelter. Some of them even go beyond this and attempt to find alternative solutions for refugee camps. However, the following two essential facts cannot be neglected anymore and need to be urgently addressed in order to provide a ground for UNHCR's future operations.

First, in its Global Strategy for Settlement and Shelter 2014-2018, UNHCR (2014b) provides guidelines on methods and approaches for delivering sustainable shelter and livelihoods for refugees. In this document, UNHCR continues to use its technical humanitarian language to

vaguely define terms such as a "master plan" in times where meaningful urban planning should have long been introduced in refugee camps. Indeed, UNHCR is not a planning agency. However, to keep a blind eye on the importance of urban planning in refugee camps means to put all humanitarian strategies and operations under the risk of failure or, worse, means to put refugees under the risk of living in conditions where they feel humiliated and undignified.

In addition to this is the questionable perception of refugee camps as exceptional spaces. **17** The supposed exceptionality of camps not only makes them highly appealing for "exceptional" and heroic interventions, but also makes them unworthy of being looked at and dealt with as urban sites. Therefore, and instead of addressing the real challenging situation caused by certain equilibrium of power relations, planning becomes an excuse to escape reality, causing other sorts of unwanted trouble.

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Syrian Refugees in Jordan – Camp, Authority and Community. An Interview with Dr. Ingrid Schwörer

Pia Lorenz

Syrische Flüchtlinge in Jordanien – Lager, Autorität und Gemeinschaft: ein Interview mit Dr. Ingrid Schwörer
Ingrid Schwörer hat die Situation der syrischen Flüchtlinge in Jordanien im Rahmen ihrer Tätigkeit für die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH untersucht. Dieses Interview wurde im September 2013, kurz nach einem ihrer Aufenthalte in Jordanien durchgeführt. Wir haben Ingrid Schwörer gefragt, wie die staatlichen Behörden in Jordanien den Zustrom an Flüchtlingen wahrnehmen und was nach deren Auffassung die größten Herausforderungen darstellen. Wie interagieren die Flüchtlinge mit der jordanischen Gesellschaft und den aufnahmebereiten urbanen Nachbarschaften? Welche Konflikte entstehen in diesem Zusammenhang?

Ingrid Schwörer assessed the situation of Syrian refugees residing in Jordanian municipalities on behalf of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [1] (GIZ). This interview was conducted in September, 2013, shortly after her Jordan visit. In the context of the tremendous influx of Syrian refugees, we asked Ingrid Schwörer what authorities in Jordan perceive as the greatest challenge vis-à-vis the refugee influx. How do the refugees interact with existing urban communities? What conflicts arise?

How does the Syrian society perceive the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan?

Within the two years since the Syrian exodus started, the situation has changed quite a bit. In the beginning, mainly Syrians who lived right across the border came to Jordan, and they were received with compassion. They usually had family – Jordanians would say "tribal" – or business connections. Thus, community support in the beginning was quite strong. Many landlords, for example, knew how

◀
Figure 1: Zaatari Camp, Jordan. Photo: Ayham Dalal, 2014

severe the situation was. Some were generous when collecting rent. Also, neighbours were very supportive as well.

Later on, the question of Jordan's absorption capacity and the burden on services, housing, and low-paid jobs became very important. Especially in times when, on an international political level, nothing was moving, people feared that the refugees might stay for longer or even forever. By now, I think the empathy and welcome mood of many Jordanians is overstretched. Nevertheless, I must admit that I admire the open-border policy, if I compare it to the shameful treatment in the European border regimes towards refugees.

What is the situation of the refugees in the official camps?

It was only in the summer of 2012, the time when violence escalated in Syria and the number of refugees increased tremendously, that a refugee camp (Zaatari) was opened up in haste. Lots of people came and it now hosts over 120,000 persons, making it one of the biggest refugee camps in the world. The conditions have been improving, but for long they were not adequate – which also affected the situation outside the camp, as people moved in and out of the camp. There is also movement back to Syria.

At the beginning, there was some kind of bailing-out system to leave the Zaatari camp. The legal option envisaged the family to take responsibility and to pay the bail-out fee. Besides, some bailed out illegally. Both options were quite costly. When the families managed to leave the camp, they tried to make a living on their own – which was hard in an environment with few jobs and no work permit. Some had to come back to the camp when living conditions became unaffordable in the city.

The camp situation in Zaatari must have been really bad and partially violent and unsafe. If you could, you avoided it. The Jordanian government and the international community have put lots of effort into improving the situation. That's why, more recently, a more "urban type" refugee camp is under construction which could receive 100,000 to 130,000 refugees (Al Azraaq). This is meant to

Figure 2: Shelter porch in Zaatari Camp, Jordan. Photo: Ayham Dalal, 2014

▼

be different and better organised. More space, decentralised service points, and facilities like schools, medical facilities, playgrounds are organised in village or neighbourhood patterns, foreseen for refugees from the same home region, probably with the intention to reduce conflicts and boost social cohesion and control. Refugees are expected to take on greater responsibility in the camp.

There is another camp supported by the Gulf States, which is described as a five-star camp. Politically, I would not understand who gets the privilege to live in that camp.

Have you observed any conflicts between Jordanians and Syrian refugees?

There seem to emerge conflicts around different resources. Water scarcity is one issue. Other public services and infrastructures are overburdened such as schools, medical services, and waste management. Housing and rent increases are of concern. Wages, especially in the lower brackets, are decreasing because of the competition with Syrians. The perception of increasing insecurity is another often-mentioned fear.

Concerning water, arguments have come up that Syrians are not used to living with water scarcity and thus don't behave properly in a water-scarce environment. With regard to jobs, the Jordanian government does not grant the refugees the right to work. They don't give out work permits as they have to cope with their own unemployment problems. Still, many refugees or their children work in the informal low-wage sector in Jordan. This is seen as a threat, as the wages are decreasing.

A similar mechanism, but vice-versa, can be observed in the education sector: Private school fees have tripled in areas with lots of Syrian refugees – although, apparently, only 40% of the children living as urban refugees are enrolled into schools. Public schools in especially affected areas are now supported to set up morning and afternoon shifts to accommodate the large number of kids.

Still, one of the biggest problems is housing. The refugee influx created an increasing demand, and in some places rents are reported to have quadrupled. Further, many refugees have trouble to pay their rent. They came with little money, which ran out quickly, and now they are struggling to pay their living with small informal jobs. There are refugee support systems in place in the hosting communities. Understandably, the Jordanian government wants to ensure that these support measures by relief organisations do not put the refugees in a "better" situation than indigenous poor, which would lead to even more conflicts.

What is the role of the Jordanian landlords with regard to the housing problem?

I would definitely not condemn the landlords for taking advantage of the situation. There is a market economy in Jordan and if demand is higher, housing prices go up. It is a very difficult situation to manage. Cash transfers from

relief organisations certainly contribute to rising prices for rent or subletting. NGOs have contracts with landlords and finance renovations or extensions to create space for refugees. This might also increase prices. To manage such a fast increase in demand for shelter for a population group regarded as "temporary" – refugees are supposed to return after the end of a conflict – remains a challenge.

Does the government have a plan to solve these conflicts about scarce resources?

The government finds the housing issue difficult to manage. They don't have any specific policy to interfere. They are trying to increase the supply side and set up little support programmes for NGOs to extend or renovate rooms in order to rent them to refugees. Of course, this cannot be done fast enough.

The Jordanian government sends out the message to provide the same public services to refugees as to their own citizens. It is a big issue for the government to look at the balance of Jordanian poor and refugees, especially as some people have started to complain that refugees are receiving more public service than the poor locals. The government thus attempts to send as much money to the Jordanian poor as the refugees receive, but that is very difficult to manage. Government officials are afraid that such behaviour may create the need for more subsidies on the side of the Jordanian poor, which the government would not be able to sustain once international support for the refugees vanishes.

More than any other government level however, municipal administrations are under pressure. Municipalities are the ones that are addressed with the complaints and that have to cope with the refugee influx. They have to organise the very local interventions through international and local CBOs.

▲
Figure 3: Sanitary facilities in Zaatari Camp, Jordan. Photo: Ayham Dalal, 2014

What have you observed concerning the perception of safety among refugees and Jordanians?

The perception of safety is one of the most interesting aspects, I realised, when talking to people. Some Jordanians think they cannot have their wives or children walk around safely near schools or markets anymore. They also complain about increased criminality. Syrian refugees, on the other hand, have the exact same perception of living in an unsafe environment. Of course, the experience of war and flight creates personal insecurity.

In my view, this has very much to do with perception, and a lack of community linkages and mutual understanding of the two groups. Lots of projections dominate on both sides. Generally, Jordan is a very safe place in comparison to other countries. On the side of the Jordanians, this has certainly to do with a feeling of what is happening in the whole region and especially in neighbouring countries. How might international politics influence the future of their country? Looking at Egypt, thinking of what will be the future of the Arab Spring and, of course, what will happen in Syria. How can you create urban spaces where both parties feel safe? It might be a psychological issue now, but it will certainly become an urban challenge in the future.

◄
Figure 4: Informal stall in Zaatari Camp. Photo: Ayham Dalal, 2014

Disclaimer: This interview was conducted in September 2013 and presents the personal views of Dr. Ingrid Schwörer.

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2nd Phase

In 2011, more than 10.3 million refugees (or more than two-thirds of the entire registered refugee population) lived in so-called "protracted refugee situations", defined as concentrations of more than 25,000 refugees for more than five consecutive years. This technocratic language is symptomatic for the conceptual and operational crisis humanitarian organisations slide into with time, when the already immanent contradictions between civil needs and the rational of humanitarian aid intensify.

The second part of this edition of TRIALOG focuses on "urbanised" refugee camps, which occupy an ambivalent space between the temporary and the permanent, between being a waiting room or emergent spaces of new identity. While many camp cities are amongst the most congested and impoverished urban settings in the world, the contributors argue against considering these environments as space mainly associated with victimisation, but as built environments which are increasingly shaped by the innovation, resilience and hopes of dwellers striving to reconcile living in dignity while holding on to political refugee rights.

Illuminating those often conflictual internal dynamics, **Katharina Inhetveen** discusses camp governance in a Zambian refugee camp as a complex encounter of external power structures of international humanitarian organisations, the residues of political structures of old political parties and new emerging political mobilisation from within the camp. Three contributions are devoted to Palestine refugee camps, which evolved over a period of 66 years from tent cities into kasbah-like structures, representing some of the most extreme examples of the global trend towards "camp urbanisation". For decades, attempts to improve the physical infrastructure of the camps were shunned as politically motivated acts of "normalisation". Only recently, the argument that defending political rights does not necessarily need to compromise the right to a more dignified life has begun to open a window for change. **Gudrun Kramer** and **Jonas Geith** provide a vivid description of the attempt to develop new socio-cultural spaces in camps. **Muna Budeiri** describes how through institutional reform, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has begun to test new developmental approaches beyond traditional relief-provision. Finally, **Philipp Misselwitz**, **Franziska Laue** and **Pia Lorenz** offer a close-up of a pilot test of community driven planning in the Palestinian refugee camp of Talbiyeh. Rather than being considered passive beneficiaries, refugees have been acknowledged as active partners in camp improvement, defining needs and driving the implementation of diverse improvement project. Participation in planning and change has become a way of reclaiming some of the dignity lost. Planning with refugees poses fundamental questions about camp governance and the mandate of international humanitarian organisations – and might force us to radically re-conceptualise of what constitutes a "refugee camp".

The Shu'fat refugee camp was set up in 1966 for refugees from 55 villages who had lived in the Jewish quarter of the old city of Jerusalem since 1948. At the time, the camp was set up adjacent to the Jordanian-ruled village of Shu'fat, which lent its name to the camp. In 1967, the territory became part of the municipality of Greater Jerusalem through Israeli annexation, which has not been recognized internationally. Over the course of 36 years, the population of the camp has increased more than 14 times, from 1,500 to 22,000 by 2003. This dramatic increase was facilitated through self-initiated, informal construction, which has led to radical verticalisation. Consequently, the camp has become the densest urbanised area in the Jerusalem metropolitan region. Since the mid-2000s, the separation wall constructed around the camp by the Israelis has severed the area from the municipal territory of Israeli Jerusalem, which it formally remains a part of. Camp residents have to deal with large queues in front of a checkpoint to attend hospitals or workplaces inside the city.

Photo: Philipp Misselwitz

POST-EMERGENCY
The "Mid-life Crisis"

Another Kind of Empowerment? Refugees, Imported Power Structures, and the International Refugee Regime in a Zambian Refugee Camp*

Katharina Inhetveen

Importierte Machtstrukturen und das ‚Internationale Flüchtlingsregime' in einem sambischen Flüchtlingslager

Dieser Artikel diskutiert Konsequenzen, die sich aus dem Zusammentreffen der Organisation eines Flüchtlingslagers als Institution des ‚Internationalen Flüchtlingsregimes' (des festgelegten Regelwerks für Fluchtsituationen) einerseits und den importierten Strukturen einer Bürgerkriegspartei andererseits ergeben. Untersucht wird der Fall des Lagers Nangweshi in Sambia. Inwieweit werden die in das Lager eingebrachten UNITA-Strukturen dort beibehalten, modifiziert oder aufgelöst? Wie nimmt das Personal der Hilfs- und Verwaltungsorganisationen diese Strukturen und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Arbeit im Lager wahr? Welchen Einfluss haben die Strukturen der Bürgerkriegspartei auf den Betrieb des Flüchtlingslagers? Inwieweit richten sich diese importierten Strukturen gegen die Lagerverwaltung? Inwiefern wirkt sich eine solche Konstellation auf das institutionelle Ziel des empowerments der Flüchtlinge aus?

In refugee camps, management and humanitarian agencies – in most cases UNHCR, the host government and NGOs or other "implementing partners" (Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1995) – face a specific kind of clientele. More often than not, war refugees arrive in the host countries not as isolated individuals, but as groups. These groups bring with them consolidated internal structures stemming from their life before fleeing (Inhetveen 2010, 271-72). Social scientists, practitioners and the media have paid attention to the so-called "refugee-warrior communities" (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989, 275-278); armed groups that are active in civil wars in their country of origin use refugee settlements and humanitarian aid for supplies and as retreat and recruiting areas (Lischer 2005; Nyers 2006). But even refugee groups that are no longer active in the war causing their flight bring with them structures that influence camp life in the country of asylum.

The import of pre-existing social structures into refugee camps leads to interaction between institutionalised camp structures, established by the agencies, and the internal structures of the refugee inhabitants. This article explores which consequences this interaction entails for the power relations in a refugee camp. Before embarking on the analysis, some remarks on the specific refugee camp, its population, and the research project on which my comments are based will provide the necessary background information.

The camp: Nangweshi Refugee Camp was situated in Zambia's remote Western Province, on the western bank of the Zambezi River. It was founded in early 2000 for a large group of Angolan refugees. Three years later, at the time of the field research, over 17,000 refugees lived officially in the Nangweshi main camp, and almost 10,000 more were hosted in the new extension camp. [Fig. 1]

Every family was assigned a plot of 10 x 20 metres, on which they built a house, kitchen and latrine, and maybe a little garden. The plots were close-packed, 50 of them on each road, forming a so-called block. Five blocks formed a section; the main camp consisted of 16 sections. [Fig. 2] The camp was run by UNHCR, the Refugee Officer as representative of the Zambian government, and five international NGOs implementing projects in domains such as health, water and sanitation, or education. Zambian police forces, both regular and paramilitary, were also present. Nangweshi Refugee Camp was closed at the end of 2006 in the course of organised repatriation to Angola.

The refugees: The refugees of Nangweshi came as a group of followers of the Angolan rebel party UNITA. When Angolan government troops conquered the former UNITA base, Jamba, in the southeast of the country around Christmas 1999, its inhabitants fled, crossing the Cuando River to Zambia, with many people drowning in the attempt. Around 12,000 refugees made it to the Zambian border town Sinjembela during the subsequent weeks, others followed later. Within a few months, Nangweshi Camp was set up to house this group. Among the refugees were high-ranking UNITA generals and other officials, rank-and-file supporters, and forcibly recruited UNITA members, many with their families.

The research: The main empirical material on which the following analysis is based stems from a six-month period of ethnographic research in two Zambian refugee camps, Nangweshi and Meheba. While this article focuses on Nangweshi, some results from Meheba are included for the sake of comparison. Meheba was founded in 1971, and refugees from several countries arrived there in small groups. The political affiliations of the Angolan refugees in Meheba were heterogeneous. Some were

close to UNITA, some were closer to the governing MPLA, and some had no close relationship to any party. Unlike in Nangweshi, several neo-traditional Angolan chiefs lived in Meheba, as did some of their followers or "subjects" (see also Powles 2000). The empirical research material comprises interviews with refugees and agency personnel, observations and informal conversations, as well as documents. In both camps, I worked with research assistants, who were young refugees themselves. The fieldwork was part of a research project, situated at the University of Siegen in Germany, on the political order of refugee camps (for more information on methods, see Inhetveen 2006; Inhetveen 2010). Since the topics addressed in this article were highly politicised in Nangweshi, many refugees were hesitant to talk about them. Consequently, careful de-personalisation of the following presentation was a high priority and, in case of doubt, took precedence over presenting precise details.

UNITA refugees in the situation of encampment

Life in Jamba was dominated by a strict military administration. Reports from the UNITA base tell us about the population's regulation, control and disciplination in all aspects of life, with cruel punishments, executions and disappearances of alleged "traitors". They also tell us about an extremely efficient structuring of social life (see Albuquerque 2002; Conchiglia n.d.; Minter 1990). Dissidents talk about the Pol-Potian society of Jamba (Guerra 2002, 160), while some refugees depict Jamba as a living space in which "the party" supplied them with everything they needed and took care of them (see Miranda 2000, 22-23). In south-east Angola, UNITA assumed most basic functions of a state, to the extent of forming a "quasi-state" (Stuvøy 2006). This was the long-term background of Nangweshi's refugee population. When government troops attacked Jamba at the end of 1999, large parts of its population fled together. Thus, the group arriving in Nangweshi was already structured and shaped as a part

of UNITA. Among them were leaders, avid followers from all hierarchic ranks and functions, and forcibly recruited members (see also Brinkman 2005, 74-75).

Once in a refugee camp, the UNITA functionaries could not continue to act openly as such. It was not possible to appear there as the official of a party fighting in the Angolan civil war. The refugees took it for granted that the power connected to high UNITA ranks could not be claimed in the camp. UNHCR and the host government attached highest importance to the "civil character" of refugee camps (UNHCR 2002, 128).

According to official standards, refugee aid is supposed to be apolitical and strictly humanitarian (McGuinness 2003, 135). The refugees in Nangweshi were not allowed to engage in concentrated work for the party, or ochitundo, as it is specifically termed in Umbundu. Even clothing displaying political motifs could not be worn in public; it was kept in boxes or used in private spaces only. For example, a chitenge, a piece of cloth celebrating a UNITA jubilee with party symbols and portraits of Savimbi, which was used as a latrine curtain (but not as a skirt or baby sling). When Savimbi was killed in early 2002, there were obsequies and celebrations, but both behind closed doors.

"Politics", in the sense of party politics, is generally banned in refugee camps. However, refugee aid programmatically includes "democratic" and "participatory" elements (Turner 2006, 53-56). In Nangweshi, as in other camps, the camp administration organised elections of refugee representatives, or "leaders", at block and sectional levels. [Fig. 3] The elected leaders conciliated conflicts in the neighbourhood and functioned as intermediaries between the administration and the refugee population. From their own ranks, the leaders in Nangweshi elected the five members of the camp council, the highest refugee body in the camp.

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Figure 1: Nangweshi Refugee Camp. Photo by author

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**Figure 2:** Map of Nangweshi Refugee Camp. Source: CARE Zambia

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The rationale for the involvement of refugees in camp organisation and project implementation, as elected leaders or agency employees, is twofold. Firstly, there are practical benefits in the institutionalised participation of refugees. Fewer resources have to be brought in from outside the camp; in addition UNHCR (2000, 61) expects higher levels of success from projects which involve their clientele. Secondly, such forms of participation correspond to institutionalised values of the refugee regime, namely the goal of empowerment – refugees should be enabled to solve their own problems, and their responsible involvement is also expected to raise their self-esteem (Norwegian Refugee Council 2004, 46).

When Nangweshi was newly established, many of these leadership positions were immediately occupied by persons who had held a corresponding position in Jamba. Among them, initially, were UNITA military leaders, who also dominated the camp council. An NGO employee depicts the power of these men:

"These were people who could say 'today you will die', and then you will surely die. One of them, the former camp leader, when he was in a meeting, nobody talked, and when he had talked, the meeting was over."

In 2001, the administration took action. The Zambian government, supported by UNHCR, compelled the most prominent UNITA leaders and their families to relocate to Ukwimi, an abandoned refugee camp on the Mozambican border (UNHCR 2001a; Bakewell 2002, 14-15). But even after about 1,300 refugees had left for Ukwimi, the continuity of UNITA structures in influential positions remained high. This applied to elected offices as well as positions in aid projects, in which refugees were employed for a small incentive. As teachers, craftspeople or nurses, the NGOs recruited trained and experienced refugees, often following recommendations made by others employed by an agency.

Thus, many of the refugees working for an organisation in Nangweshi had the same function as previously in Angola. One example out of many is the workshop producing prostheses for the more than 800 amputees in Nangweshi. [Fig. 4] Workers and know-how came directly from a prosthesis workshop run by UNITA for their war casualties. These continuities of imported structures interacted with the institutionalised setting of a refugee camp, and thus the "transplanted" structures did not have the same impact as they had in Jamba. In the new context, hierarchies and networks functioned differently, and Nangweshi was not Jamba. However, there was a distinct continuity, and it was recognised by those involved at camp level.

The continuity of UNITA structures was well-known among the agency staff. An NGO employee explained to me that UNITA "transplanted" their structures from Jamba to Nangweshi. Officially, such a heritage from a warring party with a military-autocratic order is frowned upon in the humanitarian field. It would be impossible for UNHCR and the camp management to officially rely on the structures of an armed group active in a civil war, as UNITA was when Nangweshi was established (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989, 276). Nevertheless, agency staff appreciated the way project work ran smoothly in Nangweshi. I was told that the refugees of Nangweshi didn't make trouble; they were "good people" and not "crooks" like the refugees in some other camps. Even when they were not happy with an administrative decision, they relied on defensive strategies (Spittler 1981, 69-73) rather than open, or even violent, resistance. Overall, the UNITA structures in Nangweshi were not officially seen as legitimate, but nevertheless were largely condoned and consciously relied upon in the daily work.

Camp administration and UNITA structures

The "import" of UNITA structures to Nangweshi Refugee Camp enabled the aid agencies to recruit experienced and trained refugees to work in schools, workshops or the hospital, and to generally rely on a high rate of alphabetisation – a result of UNITA education policies. Even more importantly, the imported structures entailed crucial consequences for the relationship between the camp administration and the refugee population as a whole.

Two aspects of UNITA structures are especially important here: discipline and organisation.

Discipline, respect, control

The refugees in Nangweshi, compared to those in other camps, were noticeably disciplined and respectful, as agency staff repeatedly emphasised. An NGO employee explained this as a heritage of the time the refugees spent in Jamba: "It's in their heads; they lived under military rule. It's difficult for them to question authority." Here, a habitualised respect for authority is described; it functions without being reinforced by sanctions. In addition, the remarkable discipline of this refugee group was maintained by control. The spatial and social architecture of the camp provided optimal conditions for observing the conduct of all inhabitants, for communicating any unruliness to community leaders, and for sanctioning disobedience accordingly.

As measured by African standards, the people in Nangweshi lived very close to each other – and they complained in conversations of being exposed to their neighbours' eyes and ears all the time. [Fig. 5] The elected refugee leaders considered it as part of their office to have an exact overview of the population, "controlar o pessoal", as one leader put it in Portuguese. Several of the leaders I interviewed showed me their written records with detailed lists of the characteristics of each household; the leaders bought pens and paper for this chore themselves, without support from the administration.

Organisation and the ability for further organising

The population of Nangweshi, with their imported UNITA structures, was highly organised from the outset. Upon their arrival, communication channels and hierarchies were already established. A division of labour was well-rehearsed, and many inhabitants were specialised in specific areas of responsibility. Moreover, the structures imported into Nangweshi were those of a (military) bureaucracy. The refugees were trained in dealing with a bureaucratic administration; they understood its basic procedures and knew how to utilise them.

Beyond this established organisation, the refugees at Nangweshi were able to further organise themselves. Facing new challenges, they quickly formed new structures. The refugees' organisation was not rigid, but adaptable. This became obvious for example in the case of the forced relocation of leading UNITA officials to Ukwimi. The remaining refugees reacted by filling the vacated leadership positions with persons who had also been influential in Jamba, but in the civilian realm, and thus were not categorised as ex-combatants by the administration. The refugees' ability to organise also became visible in daily camp life, for example when they were involved in administrative work and aid projects.

The refugees themselves explained their ability to organise in terms of the experiences they gained in UNITA under conditions of war:

"The organisation of this population has come from over there, has come from Angola. We can put it like

this: a people who lived under the pressure of war, this people was forced to learn to utilise all moments of its own organisation. (…) This people has learned to organise itself. It has learned to organise itself. And parallel to the war programme, UNITA also conducted formation, education, schools, schools. Then health (…). It is this organisation which permeates this people which came" (translated from Portuguese by the author).

The discipline and organisation of Nangweshi's refugees was observable during my field research. One case in point is a joint meeting of UNHCR and refugee leaders. While UNHCR was running late, the refugees were on time, and their chief of protocol noted their attendance. After the meeting had finally started, the refugee leaders listened intensely to the UNHCR chairperson. His occasional question whether all was clear was answered in chorus: "Claro!" This is a form of affirmative and coordinated communication that is also known from meetings in Jamba (UNITA n.d., 11-28).

As in this meeting, the refugees' discipline, organised structure and ability to organise had palpable advantages for administrative work in Nangweshi. They ensured disciplined cooperation on the part of the refugees, and reliable communication via established channels. Some agency employees stated explicitly that the imported UNITA power structures made the implementation of aid projects easier. As one UNHCR official put it, a refugee group living under such tight control can be a negative aspect, but nevertheless it can be an advantage for the work in a camp: "When you introduce something, you can control the outcome." Leading UNITA figures are contact persons for the administration who are able to realise plans within the refugee population. "You can say 'I want this done,' and it is done." He summarised the match between aid programmes and UNITA structures: "The programmes fall in easily with that type of structure."

According to Heinrich Popitz (1992, 190-197, 228-29), a group's relative ability to organise itself represents a resource of power. The case of the refugees in Nangweshi illustrates that this ability to organise can also constitute a resource for those administrating the group – in the refugee camp, these are the agencies managing the camp and conducting aid projects.

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Figure 3: Elections of refugee leaders in Nanweshi Extension Camp. Photo by author, digital editing: Christina Patz

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Figure 4: Prosthesis workshop in Nangweshi Refugee Camp. Photo by author, digital editing: Christina Patz
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Refugee administration countering imported structures

In Nangweshi, open conflicts between refugees and administration were rare. The refugees generally accepted their subordinate position in relation to the camp management, and they went along with most decisions that were made concerning their living arrangements. The point at which the refugees resorted to active resistance was not reached easily in Nangweshi – but if it was, the degree of opposition reached high peaks, as shown by the case of Mr. Tapero. This most intensive conflict between refugees and administration in the history of Nangweshi Refugee Camp took place about two years before my fieldwork, when the war in Angola was still ongoing. The accounts I got from refugees who were involved or who observed the process, as well as agency staff in different positions, diverged in some points; by relying on the common elements in the more elaborate reports, the following course of events can be outlined, though with some caution:

When Nangweshi Camp was first opened, UNHCR employed an allegedly Zambian officer to work there, Mr. Tapero. It seemed to be an advantage that he was fluent in Portuguese. However, refugees soon became suspicious of his behaviour, especially those in official and informal leadership positions. There was talk about contacts between Mr. Tapero and the Angolan consulate (which was connected to the MPLA government of Angola), about night-time visits of strange cars in the camp, and about secret meetings of Mr. Tapero with refugees of a certain ethnic group. In particular, Mr. Tapero is said to have contributed, by systematic spying, to marking camp inhabitants as "ex-combatants" for forced relocation to Ukwimi.

As several refugees told me, they finally came to know about a letter from Mr. Tapero to Angolan government agencies. This letter alleged that certain refugees were involved in UNITA activities, to the point of hiding weapons and fighters in the camp. These accusations also pertained to leading figures of the refugee population. The refugees' explanation of Mr. Tapero's actions was that he

was really an Angolan, a former UNITA member who had left the party in disgrace and was now connected to the MPLA government of Angola. The refugees resorted to active resistance. There were manifestations in the camp, some people even talked about protest rallies. Finally, refugees wrote a letter to UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, complaining about the activities of Mr. Tapero.

UNHCR eventually removed Mr. Tapero from Nangweshi Camp. A high UNHCR official told me that this was in no way a reaction to the refugee protests. Obviously, there were also allegations of sexual abuse incriminating Mr. Tapero. But from the perspective of the refugees I spoke to, as well as NGO staff, Mr. Tapero had to leave because of the refugee resistance to his spying activities. An NGO employee connected the refugees' vigilance, which led to Mr. Tapero's exposure, to their past in Jamba under UNITA rule:

> "[T]hey are very aware of what's going on, they are always with the eyes and the ears open. That's why they found out about Tapero, I mean, they did whatever they could to get him out of here, until they succeeded. Yes, I think they are influenced by their previous past, their previous lives are an influence on how they are now."

According to this interpretation, it is the combination of distrustful alertness, established communication channels, and adamant, coordinated resistance that makes the refugees successful in ending a UNHCR officer's employment in the camp.

On the one hand, the structures imported from Jamba facilitated smooth day-to-day work for the camp administration, and the refugees seldom resisted openly. But if the wary attentiveness of the refugees registered something threatening, if their cooperative and obedient attitude was finally exhausted, their opposition was all the more intense.

When the refugees of Nangweshi rebelled against the administration, they did it in an organised and disciplined way that capitalised on their familiarity with bureaucratic structures. Accordingly, their resistance was effective – more so, for example, than the more frequent commotions in Meheba Refugee Settlement. There, the refugee population was more fragmented, less disciplined and organised, and the camp inhabitants regularly rebelled against management decisions. This resistance, however, was mostly weak. The administration could end it by painless concessions, limited police action, or simple stalling tactics. Comparing Nangweshi and Meheba, it becomes clear that refugee groups with a stronger internal organisation and ability to organise have, in case of conflict, a better position vis-à-vis the camp administration than groups with weaker organisation. Day-to-day administration, however, becomes easier for the agencies running the camp when the refugee population is strongly organised.

Concluding remarks: an organisational match of ideological antipodes?

From the perspective of organisational sociology it may not be surprising, but the match between the humanitar-

Figure 5: Bird's eye view of Nangweshi Refugee Camp. Photo by author, digital editing: Christina Patz

ian bureaucracy of a refugee camp and the imported structures of a totalitarian military administration still seems odd. In day-to-day camp administration, the imported UNITA structures facilitated a smooth implementation of projects and general camp management. The camp management depended on intermediaries, and the imported structures offered trained and influential contact persons among the refugees, frictionless flows of information, a reliable recruiting of trained refugees for certain projects, and discipline among the camp inhabitants through continuing hierarchies and control mechanisms.

At the same time, the planned and institutionalised structure of the refugee camp facilitated the continuation of the imported UNITA structures. In Nangweshi, the refugees from Jamba were crowded together in a small space, while the peripheral location of Nangweshi limited external influence. The institutions of participation in the camp, especially the election of refugee leaders and the employment of refugees in aid projects, functioned as a formal and already legitimised framework for perpetuating UNITA hierarchies. Finally, the organisational match is also obvious in the case of resistance.

An organised refugee population has a double-edged potential for cooperation and resistance. Their UNITA background equipped these refugees with better resources for conflict with the administration than the fragmented, neo-traditionalist structures of refugees in other camps. In Nangweshi, structures that would appear, from a humanitarian perspective, as cruel and inconsistent with human rights are the very ones that enabled refugees to have at least some influence on camp politics.

The institutionalised structures of a refugee camp and the imported structures of UNITA supported each other. Thus, it is not possible to speak of a one-sided instru-

mentalisation of refugee aid by a warring party. Rather, there was a mutual functionality, facilitating both smooth working of the camp administration and a continuation of the hierarchies and networks that the refugees brought with them from Jamba.

When project-related and administrative work in a camp unofficially relies on imported structures among the refugees, this can be accounted for as practices of "participation" and "empowerment". These concepts, as they are institutionalised in the refugee regime, only partially answer the question as to which of the refugees are "empowered". UNHCR and NGOs seek to give more influence to certain groups, especially women, in the leadership structures of a camp, so that they have more influence than they often have in their societies of origin. The gender dimension features highly in the concept of "empowerment" (see for example UNHCR 2001b). At the same time, other dimensions are neglected in the institutionalised interpretation of empowerment; one of them is the political hierarchy that refugee groups import into camps.

Thus, empowerment means, for example, that women must be well represented in the committees and leadership positions of the refugees – but no one asks systematically whether these women are high party officials, or maybe the wives of high party officials, or whether they have been forcibly recruited and are only reluctant party members with no influence.

In Nangweshi, participatory structures led primarily to an empowerment of those who were already powerful in the imported UNITA structures; and in the case of refugee resistance against the camp administration, these very structures were a source of empowerment for the camp population, giving them at least some influence on camp politics.

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Mediating Socio-cultural Spaces in Palestinian Refugee Camps – the Regional Social and Cultural Fund in the West Bank

Gudrun Kramer, Jonas Geith

Schaffung soziokultureller Räume in palästinensischen Flüchtlingslagern – der Regionale Sozial- und Kulturfonds in der Westbank

Das Recht auf Rückkehr für die palästinensischen Flüchtlinge steht im Zentrum der palästinensischen Nationalbewegung. In der Westbank sehen sich die Flüchtlinge in einem ambivalenten Verhältnis zum palästinensischen Staat, dessen Aufbau diese Grundforderung ausblendet. In diesem Kontext arbeitet der ‚Regionale Sozial- und Kulturfonds für palästinensische Flüchtlinge und die Bevölkerung in Gaza'. Das Vorhaben der GIZ wird in enger Partnerschaft mit dem Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme von UNRWA durchgeführt. Ausschlaggebend für den Erfolg des Vorhabens ist die Erkenntnis, dass infrastrukturelle Verbesserung mit der Schaffung von soziokulturellen Räumen einhergehen muss, in denen die komplexen Strukturen im Umfeld der Flüchtlinge sowie die Konfliktlinien zwischen Flüchtlingslagern und Anrainergemeinden konstruktiv bearbeitet werden. Dieser Ansatz wird im Rahmen dieses Artikels anhand von zwei konkreten Projekten vorgestellt.

"We need to shift our mentality away from mediating a person to mediating a space."

—*John Paul Lederach, 2013*

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The fight for the right of return for Palestinian refugees has been at the core of the Palestinian liberation struggle from its very beginning in the 1950s. The refugees, scattered all over the Middle East, have become a living symbol for the injustice done to Palestinians. As such, the refugees have been perceived as victims and heroes at the same time, who endure the harsh living conditions as well as marginalisation and exclusion in the host countries in order to contribute to the Palestinian struggle (Khalili 2007). More recently, the refugee community is becoming increasingly marginalised inside the West Bank, where Palestinian refugees live in the midst of fellow Palestinians.

Palestinian refugees among fellow Palestinians

When the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Oslo Accords in 1993 and engaged in negotiations for an independent state based on the borders of 1967, many refugees were afraid that the right of return would be traded off. This is the reason why, during the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), representatives of the refugee community insisted that the PNA could not represent the interests of the refugees. Nevertheless, as the solution on a political level failed, the international community supported the state-building process, which strengthened the PNA and weakened the PLO, leaving the refugees with a weak political representation. This state-building process not only contributed to a general economic development in the West Bank in the last decade, it also increased social and eco- nomic inequalities amongst the local population as well as regional disintegration.

Today, the almost 800,000 Palestinian refugees inside and outside the 19 official camps in the West Bank are confronted with the same social inequalities and contradictions that are characteristic for their host community. In this context, refugees have to negotiate between two contradictory sets of identity. On the one hand, they are still regarded as heroes, the spearhead of the Palestinian resistance, who persevere in the waiting hall of history. On the other hand, their everyday life is increasingly affected and shaped by conflicts with the surrounding community. Although it is almost impossible for the untrained eye to detect a refugee camp in Bethlehem, as they appear to be a part of the city, refugees continue to be excluded as a social group. Stereotypes against the refugees are strong, and while refugees participate in the social and cultural life of the Palestinian society, local Palestinians rather seldom blunder into the refugee camps. These fault-lines are further nourished because many Palestinian non-refugees perceive the camps as economic and social burdens. Most refugees living in the camps do not pay for electricity and water, while the services provided by UNRWA are often seen as more beneficial than the services provided by the PNA. At a time when both the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the PNA are facing a chronic budgetary crisis, these stereotypes more often than not trigger mistrust and open resentment. As a result, an ambivalent relationship has developed between the refugees and UNRWA,

operating with multilateral funds from the international community. The manifestation of tensions into violence is further boosted by the fact that the governance structures in Palestinian refugee camps are not transparent and not understood by the refugees themselves. Sari Hanafi (2010) describes how UNRWA, which does not have a mandate to govern the camps, is still often perceived as the governing body and held accountable as such. On the other hand, two different bodies within the PLO claim to represent not only the refugees in the West Bank, but all Palestinian refugees on a global level: the Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA) and the Executive Office for Refugees (EOR). The roles of both bodies are not clarified; decision-making processes are not defined and additional to these "official" structures traditional clan structures and notables, such as *wajahaas*, *moukhtars* and *sheikhs*, hold substantial decision-making powers. These informal governance structures inside the camps can probably best be pictured as a web of relations between influential, notable camp dwellers, almost exclusively male and above 40 years old. Thus, how efficiently a camp is governed often depends on the capacities of a few individuals and their relations to other powerful individuals within the Palestinian society.

The complexity of power structures within the socio-cultural space of a refugee camp has to be extended even further when considering the territorial divisions (A, B, C)

of the West Bank leaving 70% of the territory under full civil and security control of Israel.

Situations of emergency and crisis create social homogeneity of groups because, suddenly, social inequalities disappear; rich and poor, men and women, old and young, etc. have to face the same situation. Also, in situations of emergency, all people ask for support and service provisions. But after three generations of refugee-hood, especially the young generation now asks for participation in decision-making. When governing structures are not clearly defined, the question is how to participate where and when.

Combining mediating the socio-cultural space with improving the camp infrastructure

In 2010, the GIZ was commissioned by the German government with the implementation of the Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees (S&C Fund). [1] The aim was to enable refugees to better cope with the on-going conflict situation and to develop life prospects for themselves and their community. By choosing the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department (ICID) of UNRWA [2] as the strategic partner in this field, a strong interdependence between participatory urban improvement and cultural and social work, as well as between the development of infrastructure and social institutions,

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1 See <www.giz.de/themen/en/30016.htm>, last accessed on April 27, 2013.

2 See <www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=31>, last accessed on April 27, 2013.

Figure 1: Dheisheh camp near Bethlehem – more than 14,000 refugees live here. Photo: Brita Radike

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was acknowledged. Based on ICID's experiences as described in Muna Budeiri's contribution in this publication, it became evident that any improvement of the infrastructural space needed to be accompanied by a transformation of the socio-cultural space, not only within the camps, but also with and within the hosting community.

Together with the refugees, the ICID and S&C Fund teams have formed a group of learning companions, one which has been seeking to find solutions for shared problems and conflicts by creating both infrastructural as well as socio-cultural spaces. By creating safe spaces, the group of learning companions could reflect on socio-economic and political contradictions as well as on collective and individual narratives. In the course of these processes, the group became aware of the need to enhance relations between the camps and their surrounding communities. The aspiration arose to turn refugee camps into

places of socio-cultural interaction with their urban or rural communities and with the Palestinian society as a whole. After over 65 years of exile, they recognised the need to renew the way refugees perceive themselves, the way they portray themselves, and the way they would like the outside world to relate to them.

Based on these reflections, two initiatives took form. While the given emphasis is different, both aim to transform invisible socio-cultural boundaries and to have this reflected in the built environment.

"Campus in Camps" – creating common socio-cultural spaces within and between the refugee camps

"Campus in Camps" **3** is an initiative situated in the five refugee camps of the southern West Bank. In the middle of Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem [Fig. 1], the ICID

and S&C Fund teams supported Al Quds/Bard University to establish a university campus. By offering a study programme in combination with the creation of a physical campus, not only a public space [4] has been created in a refugee camp, but the first university campus within a refugee camp as well. In itself, the campus is a strong symbol of the changing needs of third-generation refugees: not only primary education is needed, but also tertiary education. A core group of young camp dwellers are engaged in a two-year theoretical and practical process leading them to become the carriers and mediators for emerging images, notions, and forms of representation of contemporary refugee-hood. [Fig. 2]

Participants are confronted with the post-colonial discourse in refugee studies that prevails at renowned universities. They are encouraged to de- and reconstruct their own conceptual frameworks in which socio-cultural and infrastructural initiatives are being planned and implemented in cooperation with the camp community; they are *reconciling knowledge with actions*. [5]

Internationally renowned academics give public lectures that attract interested persons from all over the West Bank to Dheisheh, and they confront the visitors with the physical space of the camp and the emerging self-images of refugees, which do not equal most preconceived images. [Fig. 3] Thus, young refugees have direct access to influence academic studies that are done "about" them, and sometimes are even invited to contribute actively to international research.

"Bridges" – creating common socio-cultural spaces between camps and surrounding communities

"Bridges" [6] is an initiative implemented in and around six different refugee camps of the West Bank by REFORM, a Palestinian partner organisation established by practitioners in conflict transformation and mediation. As the project title already indicates, it focuses on the space in between the refugees and original inhabitants and aims

at jointly creating and designing socio-cultural and infrastructural spaces. Young people from refugee camps as well as from surrounding areas are being trained in methods of conflict transformation and facilitation of community development.

The process aims at allowing the participants to come up with joint visions, strategic directions, and action plans for local development. Thus, the participants become social activists, who initiate voluntary community service groups, which are empowered to jointly administer the common space created. They become the main actors aiming at engaging their communities into a dialogue on their joint environment. Establishing mutual trust allows the identification, discussion and reframing of stereotypes towards each other. [Fig. 4] At the same time, these newly established networks of social activists are engaging traditional power structures with the aim to foster larger participation, especially from women and youth.

John Paul Lederach (2013) recently pointed out that social change can be achieved by mediating a space rather than mediating persons. A mediated space *"generally is filled with something that is more akin to teams, to sets of people, than it is to a particular person. And in that reference, what it points toward is that you can have sets of people who connect to different parts, who collaborate, who find a common space for the benefit of both, their particular piece of it and the wider hall"* (Lederach 2013).

Both initiatives, Campus in Camps and Bridges, aim exactly at this. And by combining mediating the socio-cultural space with improving the camp infrastructure, both tangible as well as intangible transformative processes are put into a holistic relationship. In this respect, urban development cannot be successful if the dynamics of the socio-cultural spaces of the communities and their environment are not taken into account. The spaces need to be mediated when aiming at improving living conditions without raising unnecessary suspicion and jeopardising the internal cohesion of the society.

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On Camp Improvement

Muna Budeiri

Die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen in Camps – ein Paradox?

Vor allem palästinensische Flüchtlingslager befinden sich im Spannungsfeld zwischen dem vorgeblich vorübergehenden Charakter der Notsituation und der Realität seiner langjährigen Permanenz. Viele der Wiederaufbau-, Umbau- und Entwicklungsprozesse dieser Camps haben gezeigt, dass gerade in solch einem Spannungsfeld die Camp-Bewohner im Zentrum aller Prozesse stehen und in die Gestaltung ihres Lebensraumes einbezogen werden müssen. Versuche, Flüchtlingslager „von außen" oder „von oben" zu verändern, zu regulieren oder zu verwalten führten zu großem Unmut und zu Misserfolgen. Das in den letzten Jahren entwickelte Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP - Programm zur Verbesserung der Infrastruktur und der Lebensbedingungen in den Lagern) hat in großem Maße dazu beigetragen, dass Planung nicht fragmentiert sondern ganzheitlich und von den Bewohnern gesteuert stattfinden kann. Die Einbindung ermöglicht es den Flüchtlingen, die Camps nach ihren Anforderungen zu gestalten und damit eine höhere Lebensqualität zu erreichen. Steht eine solche Verbesserung der Lebensqualität jedoch nicht im Widerspruch zum politisch bedeutsamen Recht auf Rückkehr, das weiterhin eingefordert wird? Mit einem Fokus auf Raumplanung, auf Menschenrechte, auf innovative und flexible Interventionen sowie mit der engen Einbindung der Bewohner versucht das ICIP in diesem schwierigen Kontext, den dringend benötigten Raum für Veränderungen zu schaffen.

During al-Nakba ("the catastrophe") of 1948, approximately 750,000 refugees sought safe-havens behind the ceasefire lines. Refugee camps were set up on land made available by the host governments. Arriving refugees grouped and constructed their tents and self-built shelters with families, clans, and groups of people from the same villages to form clusters and quarters based on their traditional, rural hosh concepts. The shape that these clusters assumed resulted from the topography and their surrounding context, and benefited from any natural resources in the surrounding area. [Fig. 1 & 2]

Rational planning efforts in the camps were not initiated until the mid-1950s, when the newly established UNRWA launched the first large-scale shelter-building programme to replace the tents. This plan eventually failed because the refugees had already established clusters and quarters that were strongly rooted in traditional family sup-

Figure 1: Historical evolution of Al Amari refugee camp, Ramalla, West Bank. Source: Camp Development Research Project, University of Stuttgart/UNRWA, based on archival plans, FESCO archive, UNRWA WBFO

port networks. In most cases, the urban and spatial environment of the camps continued to evolve without any overall system of planning, similar to how informal neighbourhoods grow and expand. Any proactive, traditional planning practises were hindered by the camps' unique, political and legal ambiguities and symbolism to the refugees. A paradoxical reality emerged in which refugee camps could now be regarded as "temporary-permanent". Today the camps continue to be complex environments comprised of different layers of meaning. At one level, each camp serves as a "spatial archive" of proof of the injustice that befell Palestine refugees with al-Nakba and, likewise, as a constant reminder that their plight has yet to be resolved. On the other hand, each camp is also a living space, a part of everyday life, a source of shelter, refuge, services, and work – and in many places is also a centre of neglect, poverty, and inequality.

Compared to the initial tent cities [Fig. 3], today's camps are dense, overcrowded, and hyper-urbanised settings. [Fig. 4 & 5] They have a rate of density reaching 100,000 persons per km2 (10m2 / person) in some camps that, in turn, also invariably contain large areas of concentrated poverty and under- or unemployment. The effects of such urbanisation on the quality of life and human development have been greatly detrimental. Public and open spaces have borne a great deal of the cost of this expansion.

Environmental and service infrastructure facilities have not been able to keep up with the demand. Most systems (water, sewage, storm water drainage, and electricity) are substandard in their appropriateness and fitness for purpose, and are distributed irregularly. Roads have steadily become narrower as households have expanded, posing challenges to circulation and mobility within camps, and hampering access for emergency and service vehicles. [Fig. 6] Overcrowding in the camps has negatively affected the quantity of natural light in homes and the quality of ventilation, resulting in significant adverse health effects. Ad hoc building activities have often resulted in substandard shelters that are structurally and

environmentally unsafe. Residents with special spatial needs, such as the elderly and people with disabilities, receive very little by way of support from the camp's infrastructure. The pace of demographic and urban growth shows no signs of abating. Indeed, refugee camps are approaching a tipping point. In the future, any planning or architectural interventions may likely become increasingly difficult and costly, if not downright impossible.

Figure 3: UNRWA-registered refugee camp of Al Fawwar, West Bank, in the early 1950s. Source: UNRWA photo archive, Gaza

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Figure 4: UNRWA-registered refugee camp of Al Fawwar, West Bank. Photo: Philipp Misselwitz, 2008

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Figure 5: Shuafat refugee camp, East Jerusalem in 2007. Photo: Philipp Misselwitz

Figure 6: Alley in refugee camp. Photo: Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department, UNRWA HQ Amman
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UNRWA's changing role and organisational reform

UNRWA has come to realise that the spatial and environmental conditions in which refugees live are directly related to their livelihood or wellbeing. The quality of the built environment greatly affects the quality of everyday life. It is essential to understand that improving the Palestine refugees' living conditions goes hand-in-hand with their socio-economic development. More-enabled, capable refugees will be in a better position to improve their environment in other sectors and in parallel to the physical improvement, thus ensuring the sustainability of the development. In a context this complex and multi-layered, any attempts by an external agent "from above" to improve, regulate, and administer space have been an utter failure on all levels. The only hope lies in an approach that places refugees at the heart of decision-making.

Projects such as the re-housing projects in Gaza, the rehabilitation of the Neirab camp, the reconstruction of the Jenin camp, and most recently the reconstruction of the Nahr El Bared camp [Fig. 8], as well as the Camp Improvement Pilot Projects in the West Bank [Fig. 7] and Jordan, have proven that any attempted interventions in the camps run a great risk of failure unless refugees are partners in the process.

It is in this light that the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP) has taken on the task of improving the built environment of the camps by using an integrated, developmental, participatory, and community-driven approach. This is a major shift from the piecemeal, fragmented, and top-down method that strongly characterised previous interventions. The aim is now to develop new work systems that emphasise coherent and comprehensive plans for development.

For the refugees, the initiation of this programme raised concerns regarding the political resolution it might entail,

despite the conclusion reached at the Geneva conference. The dual character of Palestine refugee camps, as both symbols and living spaces, generates tension when any proposal is made to improve camp conditions. A balance must be struck between the need to maintain the camps' character as places of "temporary emergency refuge" and the need to ensure habitability, between the refugees' insistence on return and the building of attachment and belonging, between the permanent and the temporary, and finally, between stillness and action.

The Infrastructure & Camp Improvement Programme

The ICIP is premised on a set of conceptual pillars that structure and inform its working strategy:

Importance of the built environment

The programme is based on the recognition of the connection between the quality of the built environment – from the micro/domestic to the macro/camp-wide scale – and the quality of everyday life. In this respect, there is much emphasis on shelter conditions; the quantity and quality of public space, institutional and recreational space; socio-economic "infrastructure", including UNRWA facilities; the quality of physical infra-structure networks; and finally access, mobility, and circulation.

Urban planning

The ICIP uses the tools and methodologies of urban planning as the proven good practise that can enable the Agency to operate holistically on an urban scale and tackle the contemporary urban complexities that characterise Palestine refugee camps. Only through strategic urban planning can those actively involved, be they staff or community members, connect and link the various components that comprise the built environment.

Integrated interventions

The ICIP also seeks to deploy urban planning as an operational platform that integrates the various outputs of UNRWA departments and interventions by the host governments and the civic society, bringing together their disparate outputs and activities in a way that rationalises and connects the different interventions in the built environments of the camps.

Innovative and flexible interventions

As the camps have evolved into complex urban spaces with varying degrees of densification that comprise different social and political environments, improvements increasingly demand flexible and tailored proposals that respond to the camps' diverse problems and conditions. These should be prioritised and defined by the camp residents and negotiated with the community and other stakeholders.

Community participation

Camp residents have invaluable knowledge about their own local environments; although they are spaces of hardship, the camps nevertheless contain vast pools of

experience, skills, assets, and innovation. In such a scenario, comprehensive improvement is only realistic if the local community is the key agent of change. The ICIP is the first programme in the Agency to systematically study and document a camp's spatial character, while systematically involving its residents in the planning of its character. It involves the local community in a structured way across the entire project cycle, from assessment and planning right through to implementation and monitoring.

Fulfilment of human rights & protection

The ICIP focuses on the mobilisation of the full potential of local community resources and imparts skills and capacities. These range from fundraising and proposal writing to environmentally aware building methods that actually support human development as opposed to the typical relief efforts. Furthermore, the ICIP advocates and oversees the attainment of the refugees' rights to shape their own built environment on all levels within the Agency itself, donors and host governments.

Sustainability of change

It is now clear that improving the Palestine refugees' living conditions goes undoubtedly hand in hand with their socio-economic development. More-enabled, capable refugees will be in a position to improve their living environment along with their development. The ICIP seeks to mobilise different implementation strategies to assist the refugees in gradually building their capacities to plan and implement self-identified interventions. Examples of this process include home financing, revolving funds, organised self-help and micro project cycles.

By combining these conceptual principles, the ICIP has developed a unique methodology and working strategy that can successfully address challenges posed by con-

Figure 7: Participatory planning workshop in the West Bank refugee camp of Dheisheh. Source: UNRWA Camp Improvement Office, West Bank

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Figure 8: Participatory planning workshop with Nahr el Bared refugees in 2009. Photo: UNRWA archives and NBRC

temporary urbanisation in Palestine refugee camps and also further the human development of their residents through the creation of Camp Improvement Plans, or CIPs. CIPs are a key tool that translate the complexity of such spatial configurations in the camps into workable visions reflecting the camp residents' needs and aspirations, while also ensuring the sustainability of the initiatives by being based on the concept that improvement projects should be "owned", maintained, and developed by the camp community.

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The Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP). A Close-up to Talbiyeh Camp in Jordan

Philipp Misselwitz, Franziska Laue, Pia Lorenz

Das Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP) – eine Nahaufnahme des Flücht-lingslagers Talbiyeh in Jordanien
Die immer stärkere Überbevölkerung der palästinensischen Flüchtlingslager und die unwürdigen Lebens-bedingungen in den Camps zeigen, wie notwendig die Entwicklung neuer Möglichkeiten zur Verbesse-rung der Situation ist. Mit dem Programm ICIP zur Infrastrukturverbesserung in den Lagern wurde ein integriertes Planungsinstrument geschaffen, mit dem Flüchtlingsgemeinschaften mehr Verantwortung zur Gestaltung ihres Lebensraumes übertragen wird. In ersten Pilotprojekten wurde dieser Ansatz seit 2007 erprobt und ständig weiterentwickelt. Dieser Artikel soll einen Einblick in solch einen im Flücht-lingslager Talbiyeh durchgeführten partizipativen Planungsprozess geben. Die Bedürfnisse der Bewohner hinsichtlich Raum und Infrastruktur stehen dabei genauso im Zentrum wie soziale und wirtschaftliche Aspekte. Welche Projekte wurden dabei umgesetzt? Welche Herausforderungen hat die Implementie-rung mit sich gebracht? Welche Rolle kommt Machtkonstellationen innerhalb der Lagergemeinschaft und Spannungen zwischen verschiedenen Autoritäten bei der Durchführung der Planungsschritte zu?

The Infrastructure & Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP) was born out of the recognition of worsening conditions of poverty, overcrowding, and exceptional hardship endured by residents of Palestinian refugee camps. Camp improvement projects aim at alleviating some of the camps' worst physical problems, at improving socio-economic conditions, and at helping to create a more sustainable built environment. At the same time, camp improvement introduces a participatory and integrated process, driven by the camp community, marking a new chapter in the formerly top-down-driven cooperation with camp communities.

While it still has to be underlined that real and lasting solutions for Palestinian refugee camps can only be achieved as part of a political settlement for peace in the Middle East, in the meantime the programme aspires to ensure that the basic right to live in a safe environment, offering basic standards of living quality and environmental health, is guaranteed.

The seven ICIP steps

A seven-step methodology was developed during the unprecedented cooperation involving UNRWA, the University of Stuttgart, and the refugee camp communities of Amari, Dheisheh and Fawwar in the West Bank. Talbiyeh Refugee Camp, Jordan, was one of the ten refugee camps that served as pilots for the implementation of the new participatory planning approach.

Figure 1: Timeline of CIP in Talbiyeh Refugee Camp. Source: the authors

Step 1 addresses the question of how to initiate and build support for a new camp improvement project, and how to prioritise amongst the many needy camps. Most importantly, it suggests the formation of a working group as the participatory platform to be set up at camp level.

Step 2 initiates the integrated needs assessment. Here, existing resources and capacities are mapped and a broad range of needs identified.

Step 3 provides recommendations for the gathering and prioritisation of the identified needs. Current problems and potentials in the physical, economic, and social sphere are diagnosed and key items with particular urgency for camp improvement are prioritised. The output of a "Camp Priority List" sets the tone and direction for further planning.

Step 4, the process of developing a comprehensive vision for camp improvement, favours the development of overarching goals and targets instead of specific, issue-related solutions. It results in the output of a "Camp Improvement Plan" (CIP) as an integrated strategic development concept.

Step 5 targets the development of a concrete agenda for implementation of the identified vision: the "Action Plan". It involves the conceptualisation of concrete projects, budgeting, lobbying for donor support, and drafting implementation plans.

Step 6 focuses on the implementation of the pilot projects and how the work of the "Camp Improvement Teams" and community participation can be further enhanced.

Step 7 concentrates on the measurement of the desired impact and the distribution of benefits according to target groups, timeframes, and costs. But most importantly, this step proposes mechanisms for evaluating success according to local ownership and maintenance by the community itself. The final step does not mark the end of the project but, following the logic of project cycles, is

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Figure 2: The 7-steps cycle. Source: UNRWA, Philipp Misselwitz

intended to ensure that camp improvement becomes an institutionalised, ongoing activity.

Talbiyeh refugee camp, Amman, Jordan

Talbiyeh is one of the ten refugee camps in Jordan serviced by the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA). UNRWA provides basic educational, health, social, and relief services to the camp residents. The Talbiyeh Camp Improvement Project was initiated in 2008 as one of several pilot projects to test UNRWA's new approach of community-driven participatory planning based on the needs, assets, and aspirations of the local community. The project received funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), project duration: 2008 – 2012.

Step 1 – Initial contact and formation of the Working Group

Camp improvement planning has introduced a new planning body, the "Working Group", which brings together representatives of the refugee community and UNRWA staff. As a joint decision-making platform, it seeks to transform what was once a hierarchical relationship between the relief provider (UNRWA) and the beneficiaries (camp residents) into an eye-level partnership. Although it strives towards consensual decisions, the debates within the group can be intense and contentious. This often begins with the question of who should be represented in the Working Group. The fault lines that frequently emerge are indicative of societies in transformation. Traditional rural customs collide with contemporary urban expectations, generational differences are revealed, gender divisions exposed, and established privilege is challenged. The effect of its creation on the power structures of the camp can also not be neglected.

The hub

At the beginning of the camp improvement process, an office space for the planning team is set up and quickly acquires multiple functions. Known as "the Hub", it serves as a meeting place for the executive committee of the Working Group, an office for the external facilitators of the planning process, a meeting place between UNRWA staff and the community, an exhibition space or gallery, as well as a place to receive guests. It further functions as a collection point (archive) of material produced throughout the future planning process. Positioned in the centre of the camp, it serves as a one-stop office accessible to all those who are interested or participate in the camp improvement process.

The archive

The camp improvement process for Talbiyeh is the most carefully documented. All original work results, such as minutes of meetings, notes, photographs, videos of meetings and discussions, etc. are collected and digitally archived at the CIP office. Another relevant segment of the archive consists of a large collection of flipchart papers containing relevant discussion results such as priority lists, timelines, and signed budgeting agreements. Due to this detailed documentation, projects can be monitored properly by the involved institutions (e.g. UNRWA, BMZ, GIZ) as well as by the local community. Subsequent steps can be planned or adjusted accordingly, and the data can serve as a basis for discussion on camp improvement projects in other contexts. ICIP staff and Talbiyeh volunteers jointly manage the archive.

The Working Group

The main purpose of the Working Group is to provide access to the camp's grassroots and ensure a broad and representative degree of community input into the planning process with the aim to transform what was once a hierarchical relationship between the provider of humanitarian assistance and the camp residents.

The Working Group serves as a decision-making forum and meets on a regular basis, collecting and prioritising the needs of the community. Compromises reached in workshops and Focus Group meetings are laid out for discussion in the Working Group, which is then responsible for formulating a planning vision – the Camp Improvement Plan.

The formation of the Working Group at the beginning of the camp improvement process is one of the most important steps. Sometimes, nomination of its members may require the approval of host authorities. Despite this interference, 2/3 of the Working Group should consist of community members. It has to be assured that all main camp constituencies are represented and a balanced gender and age representation is achieved. Also, UNRWA's role in this process has to be considered with particular care and sensitivity. The organisation has to be careful not to control the composition and thus the outcomes of the planning process.

> "During our first meetings with community representatives, it became clear to us that the communities were not used to open invitations. Many of them didn't like it. They would have rather wanted to be part of a closed group. Apparently this has something to do with the status."

> "In the initial meeting, some people immediately gave us a list with needs to be addressed, including the problems that existed. Coming from other committees for camp improvement, the problems seemed obvious to them and they saw no need in a repeated identification. We had to explain that our camp improvement approach was planning step by step. Some people considered it a waste of time."

Step 2 – Integrated needs assessment

With the Working Group in place, the integrated needs assessment begins. Here, all existing resources and capacities are mapped and a broad range of needs is identified. The assessment comprises the following components:

(1) Conduct participatory needs assessment involving the camp community

(2) Gather information and organise expert analyses

(3) Gain input from other UNRWA departments and programmes

(4) Survey existing local camp initiatives and institutions

Figure 3: The Hub in Talbiyeh Refugee Camp, Amman, Jordan. Drawing by Thomas Rustemeyer

key role in defining the range of community segments to be represented by a Focus Group. The key outputs of a Focus Group meeting are its community prioritisation procedure, the "Focus Group Priority Lists" and the "Long Needs List" (LNL).

Upon the identification of common needs and additional needs depending on how many lists the issues appeared, a facilitator from the Camp Improvement Team does the final grouping for the Long Needs List.

This Long Needs List is meant to represent most directly the voice of the community. It sets the agenda for the further strategic planning process. In most cases, the Long Needs List will be a mixture of needs, desires, and issues. Some might even contradict each other. However, this does not lessen its quality. It should be remembered that Long Needs Lists are the direct, non-mediated, raw output of community participation and not the product of an expert analysis. The production of the LNL should be in the hands of facilitators trusted by all partners.

"Some people had difficulties in understanding the logic of the Focus Group. Even after finishing the discussions, some of the inhabitants still had difficulties accepting the idea of a group of people with certain similarities coming together to discuss a particular issue."

"We faced the specific problem of accessing the youth. All Focus Groups suggested by the Working Group were comprised of adults, not youth. There existed a lack of acceptance to the idea of talking to children about the children's issues or talking to youth about the youth's issues. The Working Group still perceived itself as a guardian and as the source of information for all groups, including these particular ones."

"Some of the Working Group members did not like the presentation of the findings from the Focus Group discussions, as they considered themselves as the committee responsible for this task. Finally, after many presentations and discussions on the Focus Groups, the majority of the Working Group's members understood and accepted the tool."

Step 3 – Integrated diagnosis and Camp Priority List

While the integrated diagnosis is deliberately comprehensive and inclusive, camp improvement cannot address all issues at the same time and at once. But how can the various inputs be analysed and synthesised? What needs carry more weight than others? What should be done if needs contradict each other? The Working Group was called upon to produce a balanced and integrated diagnosis as a basis for a "Camp Priority List": a concise list of urgent items to be addressed by camp improvement.

Although all camps share similar problems of poverty and congestion, a one-size-fits-all upgrading approach does not work well as each camp has evolved in a very unique way, resulting in a specific local identity, space, and culture. Spatial structure, economic opportunities, and social values are context-specific. Thus, the beginning of each camp improvement process entails an open inquiry, including not only technical surveys and statistical data gathering but also workshops and Focus Group discussions with diverse camp constituencies – even playful storytelling with children. For many participants, to speak of their camp not only in terms of deficiencies and problems but also in terms of potentials and opportunities can be an emotional discovery – and an eye-opening experience for planners.

Focus Groups

In order to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach, the specific context of each refugee camp has to be investigated in depth. Focus Group discussions serve as a method to collect qualitative data on the refugee camp's characteristics and to define key priorities for camp improvement.

Each Focus Group session targets a specific community segment, such as children and youth of certain ages, men, women, elderly, etc. Depending on the size of the camp and on the specific local context, the number of Focus Group sessions varies considerably. There is no definite size for an Focus Group, but the recommended maximum is 15–20 persons, as this helps ensure that all members have a chance to truly participate.

Focus Group output

Ideally, Working Group members should refrain from participating in Focus Group meetings; however, they play a

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Figure 5: Developing a 'Camp Priority List': qualitative and quantitative assessment. Source: Franziska Laue based on Fatima Nammari

ority List anticipates the "Action Plan" and serves as a key reference point when defining pilot projects and measures. It is a "declaration of intent" – not legally binding – and defines the general direction and focus of the strategic planning process. The final version has to be approved by all major stakeholders: the host authority, UNRWA, and the Working Group.

> *"Initially, the Working Group wanted to cancel the list of identified needs by the Focus Groups and put their own list forward, which became a big challenge for us. We wanted a list of needs that was not created by the Working Group, but by the grassroots representing the entire community."*

> *"A lesson learnt from this process was to make clear that Focus Groups are not a competitor to the Working Group, and that their input does not challenge the established decision-making power of the Working Group."*

> *"In addition to the Focus Groups, we set up neighbourhood groups assembled from people of different ages who sat together and discussed what needed to be done in their particular neighbourhood. We wanted to bind solutions and discussions to specific localities and involve the people who were actually living there. For our internal work, if something was mentioned three times or more, it was identified as a need."*

> *"Some exercises undertaken for the integrated diagnosis in the Working Group meetings were very helpful, such as identifying resources. We asked people to identify resources on a map. As some members were not used to reading a map, it took us a while to introduce the tool."*

Integrated diagnosis

The integrated diagnosis identifies assets and potentials as well as problems and constraints of life in the camp, categorised into natural, spatial or physical, financial and economic, and social aspects. The output plan of both (assets and constraints) highlights the location and spatial extent of an issue, its physical proximity to other issues, spatial concentrations, etc., and therefore extends the integrated diagnosis to a new level. The introduction of plans introduces "spatial thinking" and makes the transition to the planning stage smoother.

Camp Priority List

The Camp Priority List is created on the basis of the integrated diagnosis. It contains a limited set of development priorities with high urgency that will make the most significant and rapid impact on the lives of refugees in the camp. As a "declaration urgent for action", The Camp Pri-

Step 4 – The Camp Improvement Plan

The Camp Improvement Plan identifies an overall vision and sets goals and targets for upgrading the living conditions in the camp over the next five years. This requires "strategic thinking" as opposed to "project-based thinking". Planning cannot only be identified through defining specific solutions to specific problems. The biggest challenge is that many camps are located in unstable environments where trust in anything long-term is extremely limited and immediate remedies and visible results are preferred.

Each community decides on their own scope and timeframe, as the plans are not rigid and fixed master plans but open-ended, strategic, process-oriented, and dynamic tools. Their flexibility means that they are frequently changed and adapted. They provide the basis for operational action plans, which translate visions into concrete projects customised to fit concrete budgets and timescales.

Step 5 – Action Plan

The Action Plan translates the broad vision of the Camp Improvement Plan into a concrete list of realistic projects to be implemented in a set timeframe. The Action Plan does not address all aspirations and visions formulated in the Camp Improvement Plan. The Working Group continues to function as a central platform to decide on which project to prioritise and reviews all project concepts. Further Action Plans are necessary once a first project cycle has been completed, and the Camp Improvement Plan must also be revised.

Priority project selection can be a difficult and conflictual process. Camp Improvement Teams have to mediate between different stakeholder positions and ensure that the interests of the community (enshrined in the Camp Improvement Plan) are upheld. Sometimes, it may not be possible to strictly adhere to the Camp Priority List when priorities do not match the funding criteria of donors. On the other hand, the Working Group should not agree on the imposition of irrelevant or ill-conceived projects, which might endanger the entire camp improvement process.

"When we were discussing the needs and the problems, we came to the conclusion that training would support the Working Group to systematically identify and undertake this process. We did two assessments: firstly, we asked the Working Group itself to assess its training needs based on the role that it identified for itself, and secondly, we made an assessment on our own. Some of the identified training needs concerned how to manage projects and tried to define development. Simultaneously, we identified training needs in terms of gender issues, sustainability, the difference between a development project and a charity project, issues that relate to leadership, conflict resolution, etc."

"Empowering the local organisations from the minute we entered the camp allowed for a parallel line to the Working Group at the project implementation stage. We provided training for all organisations on how to write proposals, on project management, and on accounting. We also introduced different donors. But any project that was proposed by the local organisations to be part of the Action Plan needed the approval of the Working Group."

"The creation of the Action Plan comprised three steps. First, the community decided which projects from the Short Needs List they actually wanted to implement with the money we had. Second, they had to decide how to divide the money, and third, we started preparing the designs."

"The second step included participatory budgeting, which was a double-edged experience. On the one hand it was good, as the community had to discuss in detail what had to be done in each project and to delineate the boundaries and the risks of the project. They consequently stopped their wish-list approach. On the other hand, it was striking that as soon as we started to talk about money the meetings ended in fights. Everybody insisted that his project should receive funding. In the end, we voted on ballots for the projects. Also, everybody was shocked by the high costs of the projects, and also felt that if they implemented the projects themselves, it would be a lot less expensive, obviously because the standards are different. The impression that projects were so expensive caused tensions. Some alleged that UNRWA was stealing their money, and demanded that UNRWA should give the money to the community directly."

"This first space had several problems. First, phasing had gone wrong. It would have been better to implement all spaces at once, because when we opened the first space everybody, even people from outside the camp, came and completely overused it. At one point, 100 kids were using the area although it was only designed for 20–30."

"Second, ownership had to be secured. We realised that the Working Group couldn't own open spaces, but that they have to be owned by the neighbours in order to exercise authority."

"Third, authority was unclear. We learned that we had to make sure that someone has control over the space and represents the interests of the neighbours."

"Fourth, we learnt that power struggles could destroy the project. We invited the Camp Services Committee to the Working Group, but they had rivals in the camp and some people did not trust them. As a result of this conflict, the space we had been planning to upgrade was used by the Working Group to discredit the Camp Services Committee and vice versa. The project became a matter of hegemony over space in the camp. Soon, the space was completed vandalised; trees were cut and bad words were written everywhere. The space became the arena for a war between different power structures."

Step 6 – Implementation management

Even though most camp improvement budgets were modest, a number of projects set precedent and broke traditional taboos concerning the use of camp space. The symbolic significance of a new playground, co-produced with input from children and women in the camp, the positive contribution of a film school to the community – even the simple removal of an obstacle in a road – cannot be underestimated. The process of conception, budgeting, and bargaining is as important as the implementation and the outcome itself.

Open spaces (pockets & greening)

Talbiyeh's children used to play on narrow lanes or within private shelters. Multi-use open spaces as well as a playground were designed and built to change this situation. The first implemented project was meant to appropriate a small empty lot in the centre of the camp and targeted small children and their mothers, providing space for different uses. This "play pocket" was designed through a participatory design that involved children and local women. However, start-up problems, questions of authority, and local power struggles have led to an unfruitful outcome.

Large playground

Concerning the large playground, we tried to claim the project was owned by the Camp Services Committee in order to diffuse tension and in order to save their face in the camp, which worked out pretty well.

Triangle garden

With the triangle space, we proceeded in a totally different manner. We isolated the Work Group from the Camp Services Committee and worked a lot with the neighbours. We tried to keep it low-profile in order not to interfere with the Camp Services Committee, and we made sure that it was clear that the ownership of the space is with the neighbourhood so that they can maintain control and choose who uses the space.

Figure 7: ICIP projects and initiatives 2008–2012. Source: Thomas Rustemeyer, based on UNRWA

Improvement of access

The participatory needs assessment identified the limited vehicular access to the camp as a major constraint and security risk in emergency situations. Several new access roads were built by demolishing a number of shelters and obstacles.

Budget: varied between $15,000 and $ 80,000.

Time span for planning and implementation: two years.

Actors involved: Department of Palestinian Affairs of the Jordanian Government, UNRWA, the Working Group, neighbours.

"The implementation of this space went pretty well. The key issue here were the residents and shelter owners of the places that had to be relocated. But the owners concerned knew they were violating the plan of the camp, which included the accessibility of the street they had built on. After having agreed to the project to certain conditions, however, they were given the advice from a Working Group member that they could gain more profit from their position. Thus, after construction had started, they blackmailed the project and demanded more money than agreed upon. This is business in the camp. Individuals try to profit to the largest extent possible from any project. Things like that will happen again, and we have to expect such attempts for individual gain in the context of every project."

"Agreements with people in the camp are not necessarily binding. Each project is seen as an opportunity for gain. They are very poor and they consider this is the best way for them to improve their circumstances."

Health Centre

UNRWA owned the space, so the health department was responsible for any changes. They were cooperative in terms of community planning and implementation strategies. Usually we had much more trouble to introduce the new participatory planning techniques with UNWRA departments.

School improvement

The UNRWA education department – responsible for the school space – was not very cooperative. They insisted in many ways in their autonomy and hegemony over the schools. They wanted to be fully in charge of the decision making over the school space.

The community wanted a higher wall for the girl's school to hinder the boys from jumping inside, but the engineering department was not cooperative in this. The community also requested higher handrails for the safety of their children, but the engineering department claimed to stick to international standards and was not ready to make alterations. The engineers basically considered their standards to be infallible and did not listen to the community. In the end, there were improvements and the community was ok with it. But for the future, we need to train our engineers to work with the community not only in the community. They are oblivious to the concept of community planning.

Capacity building for the Working Group

The capacity building contributed to helping the Working Group understand what the purpose of the participatory planning process was. (Why do women need to participate? What's the difference between charity and development?)

The idea behind the capacity building was that the people who participated should carry on the function of the Working Group in the long-term by founding a new organisation. However, in the end, the people who founded the NGO were not those who had received training but other powerful camp residents. UNRWA was not able to direct the process towards ensuring that the trained Working Group members constitute the new NGO. Training resources thus have been misdirected and the trained residents have lost trust in UNRWA.

Outlook

In order to "institutionalise" camp improvement in all fields, many questions still need to be addressed. First, the question of how to monitor implementation, ensure maintenance of projects, and revise or update Camp Improvement Plans in accordance with the progress on the ground needs to be solved. Also, new mechanisms of stakeholder dialogue and interaction need to be created to ensure smooth planning and implementation.

The question of transferability and implementation of similar planning processes remains open as well. ICIP has established a "by the book" participation process that possibly provides guidelines not only in the context of Palestinian refugee camps, but also for establishing an approach within other urbanising camp structures. For example, urban neighbourhoods outside any camp context, which are likewise characterised by deprivation, overcrowding, and exceptional hardship in comparison to the surrounding urban area.

Figure 8: Location of ICIP projects and initiatives. Source: Thomas Rustemeyer, based on UNRWA images

The quotes are based on interviews with a former UNRWA expert closely involved in the project.

Philipp Misselwitz

Prof. PhD., is an architect and urban planner based in Berlin. He was educated at Cambridge University and the Architectural Association London and received his PhD from Stuttgart University for research on urbanised Palestinian refugee camps. He initiated an EU-funded research project which led to the development and testing of community-driven planning methodologies (CIP) conducted in Palestinian refugee camps across the Middle East. He worked for the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and as a consultant for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) before becoming the Chair of International Urbanism at the University of Stuttgart (2010–2013). In 2013 he was appointed Chair of the Habitat Unit at the Institute of Architecture of the Technical University of Berlin, a globally networked research and teaching centre. He is a network partner at the Urban Catalyst Studio, a planning design consultancy group based in Berlin, and works as a freelance curator on projects such as "Refuge" (Rotterdam Architecture Biennale, 2009) or "Space, Time, Dignity, Rights" (World Urban Forum, 2012). He is co-editor of this issue of TRIALOG. Contact: <misselwitz@tu-berlin.de>

Franziska Laue (see page 19)

Pia Lorenz (see page 81)

3rd Phase

Currently, UNHCR lists three possible "durable solutions" to refugee crises: voluntary repatriation; local integration; or resettlement to a third country. The camps themselves do not play a part in official solution scenarios. The third part of this edition of TRIALOG challenges this taboo. During their urbanisation history camps have accumulated assets – physical, social, economic and cultural – constructed, developed and maintained by refugees. What role could these assets play in a durable solution? By acknowledging camp urbanisation as a fact, could we even consider camps as part of longer term strategies beyond the pretence of short term humanitarian "care and maintenance"? When imagining possible futures for refugee camps, the relationship to the host environment, including the political willingness of host governments to grant refugee rights, plays a decisive role. An increasing number of scholars demonstrates how strengthening local infrastructure and investing in possibilities for education and employment could benefit refugees and hosts alike. Yet, as **Merill Smith** from the "Warehousing Refugee Campaign" points out, most humanitarian agencies serving protracted encampment situations simply continue to cast refugees as passive aid recipients, undermine their ability to build livelihoods, and compromise their dignity.

During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of different approaches were sought. By charting the history of several Tanzanian camps, **Julia Hartman** demonstrates how refugee camps (and the international aid flows that followed) were conceived as development catalysts for rural hinterlands. Rather than remaining dependent on external aid provision, these settlements were constructed around principles of local integration and self-reliance. However, those approaches earned much criticism for understanding self-reliance in material terms only, while refugee convention rights such as the right to mobility, employment, or political representation were consistently denied.

French ethnographer **Michel Agier** insists that the reality of camps today shows a much more powerful thrive towards social, economic and cultural integration with the host society than aid agencies and host governments would like to admit. Could camps be thought of as cities right from the start – camp cities whose dwellers would no longer endure employment or mobility restrictions? Even UNHCR seems to acknowledge that greater integration of camps into the local context could help "to empower refugees and nationals in the areas to the extent that they will be able to support themselves" and that mechanisms should be established "that will ensure integration of services for the refugees with those of the nationals" (UNHCR 2005). Can refugee camps transform into sustainable and self-sustaining long-term living environments? Finally, by introducing the principle of "convertible urbanism", **Regina Orvañanos Murguía** shows how even in the case of return or resettlement, the abandoned camps and their infrastructure could remain an asset and resource for the host population.

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Mae La is the largest of nine refugee camps along the Burma/Myanmar border in northwestern Thailand. With an informally built infrastructure, which was meant to be a temporary solution, the Mae La camp has hosted up to 50,000 refugees for almost 40 years. Recently, a small number of refugees have been relocated, and many hope that a return to their homeland will soon be possible. Yet, for all those within the camp who feel a strong desire to remain in Thailand, Mae La will need to become a self-sustaining community.

Photograph by Line Ramstad, Gyaw Gyaw, <www.gyaw.org>

FUTURE
Closure, Integration, Transformation?

The 1951 Convention and the Warehousing Refugee Campaign. An Interview with Merrill Smith

Pia Lorenz

Zur Genfer Konvention von 1951 / Die Kampagne zur Beendigung der „Lagerung" von Flüchtlingen – Merrill Smith im Interview mit Pia Lorenz
Merrill Smith steht der Einrichtung und Aufrechterhaltung von Flüchtlingslagern abgesehen von extremen und kurzfristigen Notsituationen sehr kritisch gegenüber. Kurzfristig können Flüchtlingslager Leben retten. Langfristig lassen sie genau diese Leben durch restriktive Politiken und eine unangemessene Rechtslage verkümmern. Jedoch steht nicht der Kampf gegen Flüchtlingslager im Vordergrund, sondern die Umsetzung der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention. Dabei spielen das Recht auf Nicht-Zurückweisung, physische Schutzleistung, Zugang zur Justiz, Bewegungsfreiheit und freie Wahl der Wohnstätte, das Recht sich seinen Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen und das Recht auf öffentliche Unterstützung eine große Rolle. Welches sind die Konsequenzen dieses Ansatzes für die Gastgeber-Länder? Welche Rolle spielen die Regierungen der Gastgeber? Trägt die humanitäre Notsituation in den Flüchtlingslagern nicht manchmal positiv zum politischen Argument der Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen bei?

What does the expression "Warehousing" specifically refer to?

"Warehousing" refers to the long-term forced encampment or more general denial of refugees' rights to work and freedom of movement. Some UN literature refers to the same phenomena as "protracted refugee situations". For us, however, the main issue is not the duration of the refugee situation before a durable solution is found, but the quality of refugee protection in the meantime: What rights are granted, what rights are denied?

The question we wanted to address was the different applications of rights. We wanted to focus on the right to live as normal a life as possible even while being in exile. That's how we came up with the term "Warehousing". It is emblematic for the situation of most of the refugees in the world, namely of those living in camps.

But I also want to be realistic about the limitations of the term. It is short and catchy and gets people's attention but we did not exclude the situation of urban refugees. It may also seem that we are just "anti-camp", but we are not. If you'd simply tear down camps and let refugees live where they want without granting them their rights as economic actors that would not fulfil the Convention. We would still consider the refugees 'warehoused' even if the spatial aspect of the metaphor was less applicable.

Please give us some insight into the campaign to end refugee warehousing. How did it come about and how did it develop?

The campaign grew out of my editorship of the World Refugee Survey which began in 2002. We sharpened the focus of the Survey to not simply cover the inadequacies of humanitarian aid but to focus more specifically on the realization (or not) of the rights of the 1951 Convention.

We eventually graded countries on this grouping the norms into five categories. This required some arbitrariness but we wanted to make it as simple as possible: (1) Nonrefoulement and physical protection, (2) detention and access to justice, (3) freedom of movement and residence, (4) the right to earn a livelihood, and (5) the right to public assistance.

Throughout our research, we found that freedom of movement and the right to earn a livelihood were the most substantially neglected provisions of the Convention. Even though most camps are not surrounded by barbed wire and armed patrols the freedom of movement is typically restricted by the fact that refugees have no legal status or right to reside outside of the camp. They generally have no legal right to work or to receive humanitarian aid outside of the camp. The combination of these denials rights outside the camps with the exclusive provision of international humanitarian aid inside the camps can confine people more effectively than barbed wire.

We recognize the need to compromise and to accept incremental improvements but some putative reforms may be counterproductive. For example, by freedom of movement, we certainly did not mean mere day passes from the camp as in prison work-release programs. There are many half steps that are not progressive but, in effect, serve to further entrench the system. Setting up factories in or around the camps with otherwise restrictive access to the labour market exploits both refugees and the national labour market. Worse, it creates a constituency in the business community with a vested interest that restrictions to labour market access continue rather

than gradually becoming more relaxed. At a minimum, as the Convention provides, freedom of movement includes choice of residence, the right to live anywhere within the country.

Do you see any advantages in the existence of camps?

Well, open camps that refugees may freely leave do not necessarily violate the 1951 Convention, as long as refugees may legally work and reside wherever they choose. But humanitarian aid should follow the refugee and agencies should not require that refugees reside in camps to receive it. That's not a strict requirement of the Convention – although access to the host country's public relief on par with nationals is – but it would enhance the effectiveness of the nominal right to reside where one chooses.

Some say that even closed camps can save lives in immediate, emergency situations, but they may waste those same lives in the long run. And the long run is often quite path-dependent. Humanitarian funds for camps are generally easier to get in the initial phases of crises and camps have administrative efficiencies for agencies.

This, however, often becomes self-perpetuating. Other, more integrative forms of aid – say, reimbursement of host-nation health, education, and other service providers – may fall under development or other bureaucratic rubrics. The difference is not just semantic but highly political. The bureaucratic networks that humanitarian and development aid streams support extend from donor countries through different UN and other intergovernmental agencies, through international aid delivery groups (whose headquarters generally are strategically located in the major cities of donor countries), through different subsidized governmental bodies in the host

countries. Shifting funding streams from one of these networks to another requires prying many jealous fingers off of it!

Would you go as far as promoting the provision of citizenship in the hosting country?

That would be a wonderfully generous offer on the part of the host country and a durable solution to the refugee's status and we would certainly support it, but neither we nor the 1951 Convention hold that as a requirement for refugees to lead normal lives with the right to work and freedom of movement. Hosts should allow them to life normal lives but whether they grant them citizenship or not is optional. Worse, implying that citizenship is a requirement or the natural or inevitable consequence of granting refugees their rights to live normal lives for the duration of their refugee status – i.e., the effect of misusing the term "local integration" to refer to a durable solution (the correct and more precise term of the Convention is naturalization) – may scare host countries off from allowing refugees any freedoms or from admitting them altogether.

What are the consequences of a rights-based approach for the host countries and the international community in terms of assistance?

Most refugee rights don't cost money by themselves. But if refugees choose themselves where they live and work, they will be sending their kids to local schools and using the same hospitals nationals use. This is what the international community should subsidize at least to the point that the refugees are not a burden to poorer host countries. This could entail a vital protection – as opposed to

Figure 1: State parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and/or its 1967 protocol – as of September 2012. Source: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

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population management – role for UNHCR and other international agencies: they could verify host countries' inclusion of refugees in education, health, and other services on par with nationals. Hospitals and schools would welcome them knowing the international community will reimburse them, which might help develop these structures for locals as well. The confirmation of host countries' claims for reimbursement for expenses could be based on the refugee's enjoyment of Convention rights. The goal is to turn refugee rights into a win-win proposition for both refugees and hosts.

Do you have any specific idea where such a kind of win-win situation has already appeared or is most likely to take place?

Perhaps the best example is the way the U.S. federal government provides initial aid to refugees and local agencies helping them including medical and cash assistance to defray expenses. This is far from perfect in relieving the burden on schools and other providers but, because it comes with complete freedom (and very strong encouragement) to work, the adverse impact on local communities is minimized. This is in the context of at least potentially an eventual permanent status (i.e., a durable solution) but there is no reason why this cannot be offered on a temporary basis as well. Donors could apply the resettlement model to community hosting in countries of first asylum, giving local organizations the same aid they give the resettlement agencies and local governments in their own countries.

How did you experience the role of host governments and the UNHCR when trying to push for refugee rights on the ground?

Our campaign was not anti-UNHCR by any means. In fact, it was through the UNHCR that our office in Thailand was funded. Even before our campaign was launched, they had an evaluation and research unit that did marvellous work. When I was drafting the theme piece for the 2004 World Refugee Survey launching the campaign, I drew heavily on sources published by UNHCR. So I give them credit for promoting an open dialogue.

We also have to acknowledge that the UNHCR is an organization of governments: it can only go as far as governments want to go. But the problem is not just with refugee hosting nations and just pointing fingers at them is not helpful.

United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees (1951 Convention)

The United Nations 1951 Convention is a global legal instrument that defines the responsibilities of nations towards refugees within their territory. It also defines who is to be regarded as a refugee and states their rights as well as their obligations towards their host country.

Drafted in 1951, in the aftermath of WW2, the convention was originally intended to be applicable solely to the mass of displaced people with unclear status in Europe.

But when it became clear that mass flight and displacement were a growing global problem, a protocol was added in 1967 that effectively removed the deadline and geographical restrictions. Since then, the 1951 Convention has been ratified by 145 nations worldwide.

§ 1 defines a refugee as

"A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it…"

*§ 3 states that the convention shall apply **without discriminations** as to race, religion, or country of origin. Excluded from protection are refugees who "are reasonably regarded as a danger to the security of the country, or having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, are considered a danger to the community".*

*§ 33 states the cornerstone of the convention, the principle of **non-refoulement**. It means that the refugee "should not be returned to a country where he or she faces serious threats to his or her life or freedom".*

Influenced by the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, other important refugee rights included in the convention are:

§ 4: The right to freedom of religion

§ 16: The right to access the courts

§17 to §19: The right to work, including both wage-earning and self-employment, and the right to practice liberal professions if qualified

§ 21: The right to housing

§ 22: The right to elementary education

§ 23: The right to public relief and assistance no worse than that accorded to nationals

§ 26: The right to freedom of movement within the territory

§ 27 and § 28: The right to be issued identity and travel documents

§ 32: The right not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined conditions

§ 31: The right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting state

With the numbers of refugees rising, and with global migration now being perceived a serious issue particularly by European governments, the convention's flexible formulations are increasingly being stretched. Even though refugee rights are clearly stated in the convention, the application of concepts such as persecution are frequently being questioned, and other programmes such as "temporary protection" are being used to replace the original convention, all making it progressively easier for ratifying states to apply their own standards to the treatment of refugees.

It also is a problem of the international donor community, which subsidizes the phenomenon. It may seem cynical to refer to humanitarian aid delivery as an industry, but in many cases it very much functions that way and a lot of money is involved. In some places there are separate, parallel aid streams to refugees and host communities, creating rivalry and jealousy rather than solidarity and integration. Reluctance to promote alternatives is also part of the problem. We in the West were trying to re-structure how humanitarian aid was being delivered to refugees and to get development aid to include refugees and the exercise of their rights, especially economic.

Many major refugee-hosting countries that are not party to the 1951 Convention but are nevertheless members of UNHR's governing body known as the Executive Com-mittee or ExCom. Every year, ExCom promulgates Conclu-sions (resolutions) that experts consider to international 'soft' law. They are not binding but represent a consensus of the international community dealing with refugees, in-cluding the major refugee-hosting countries. Non-party but ExCom member host countries therefore cannot sim-ply state that they never agreed to refugee rights because many of these rights are articulated in ExCom Conclu-sions. They are often watered-down and in vague termi-nology but they are there. That's also an important func-tion of UNHCR.

While you were working on the campaign, did you work with any refugee organizations on the ground, any smaller refugee initiatives?

Yes, very much so. For our annual country reports in the World Refugee Survey, we could not afford to send our researchers to every refugee situation and we did not want to exclusively rely on UNHCR and international aid agencies. We wanted some on-the-ground reality check so we engaged local research partners, typically with independent national human rights groups with a broad-er perspective, and we tried to cultivate these relation-ships.

Of course, there was also a political reason for that: we wanted to develop refugee rights awareness as a human rights issue in the host countries among other human rights issues they might have. We were also particularly anxious to engage organic civil society, e.g., the local business, labour, and faith communities, in the refugee hosting countries.

A contrasting standpoint to the anti-warehousing cam-paign is the idea that encampment adds visibility and legitimacy to the political cause of the refugees. A typi-cal example would be the Palestinian camps, where integration and thus normalization is often portrayed as undermining the refugee's right of return. How do you handle this controversy within your campaign?

For me, normalization refers to people having the right to live normal lives while they are in exile. That does not by any means imply normalization of the political situation that caused them to flee. It is protection – the minimum international law requires – not a durable solution. This is a very important distinction to make.

In Syria, for example, Palestinian refugee camps still exist but no one is required to live in them. In fact, Palestinian refugees in Syria have full Convention rights even though Syria is not a party. Syria is still a poor country, but they do not withhold from Palestinians any economic right that they allow their own citizens.

Most Palestinians would make clear that this is not a so-lution to their fundamental political problem. Neverthe-less, I am not aware of any refugees who reject these rights on that account. They are exercising that right with considerable vigour and none are saying that they would prefer to be locked up. In any event, it would be immoral to further victimize people just to accentuate their initial victimization in the political events that caused their flight. Human beings are ends in themselves and not means to other ends.

Some – most notably officials of the Polisario guerilla movement – claim that the Sahrawi refugees in the camps outside the remote garrison town of Tindouf, Al-geria, actually prefer staying in the sweltering camps for decades on end to living and working elsewhere in Alge-ria because this makes their struggle with Morocco over the sovereignty of the Western Sahara more internation-ally visible. This is dubious for a number of reasons, not least of which are the movement controls and nearly insurmountable restrictions Algeria places on refugees attempting to obtain work and residence permits outside the camps – governments generally don't restrict activi-ties that people don't wish to engage in anyway. But even if it were true – and the truth likely lies along a spectrum of refugee personal opinion – this would raise another question for the international community: is this what scarce international humanitarian aid is for, subsidizing human political displays by one side of a dispute?

What crucial aspects need to be considered in order to transform emergency camp situations into more rights-based approaches to aid?

We always hope that refugee crises will be short-lived and that refugees will be able to return quickly. It is tempting to overlook violations of the Convention in the areas of employment and freedom of movement as relatively minor if it's only temporary. Some say, rights can come later; the first thing is to distribute ra-tions. But given that the average refugee situation is now lasting something like 17 years from beginning to durable solution (entailing the end of the refugee status), it may be wiser to accept the long term as the default and start with more integrative forms of aid even if that may be more administratively difficult in the short term. You already ought to begin planning for the long term in the emergency phase.

The entrenchment of refugee camps is path-dependent and hard to undo. It would be better to incorporate an anti-warehousing approach from the beginning.

The interview was conducted in September 2012.

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Local Integration as an Alternative to Encampment – Lessons from Tanzania's Refugee Settlements

Julia Hartmann

Lokale Integration an Stelle von Flüchtlingslagern – Lernen von Tansanias Flüchtlingssiedlungen
Die Langzeitunterbringung von Geflüchteten in Lagern wird sowohl wegen der damit verbundenen Beschneidung von Grundrechten als auch wegen der Behinderung einer eigenständigen Existenzsicherung scharf kritisiert. Andere Ansätze, die eine Integration der Flüchtlinge in ihrem Aufnahmeland ermöglichen, scheinen rar. Dies war jedoch nicht immer so. Die in den 1970er Jahren neu geplanten Agrarsiedlungen Ulyankulu, Katumba und Mishamo in Tansania sind Zeugnisse der damals unternommenen Versuche, Flüchtlinge im Aufnahmeland anzusiedeln und wurden oft als Beispiele gelungener wirtschaftlicher Eigenständigkeit und Integration gepriesen. Wie der Blick in die Geschichte und auf die heutige Situation dieser Siedlungen zeigt, hängt der Erfolg oder Misserfolg von Flüchtlingshilfe jedoch nicht allein von den jeweiligen Diskursen zur besten Form langfristiger humanitärer Hilfe ab. Auch in Tansania wandeln sich die Konzepte der „Integration" vor dem Hintergrund sich ändernder globaler und nationaler politischer Bedingungen und wirtschaftlicher Interessen. Eine kritische Analyse solcher Beziehungen ist ein notwendiger Schritt auf dem Weg zu einem anderen Ansatz der Flüchtlingspolitik im Sinne der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention.

Today, the most visible and prevalent mode of humanitarian aid is the relief camp. In the light of the increasing duration of displacement, it is also the most controversial mode of refugee assistance. Neat rows of tents, water dispensaries, and hygiene stations might initially enable efficient aid delivery, but when the logistics of temporary relief drag on for too long, they do more harm than good. As researchers like Jansen (2009), Agier (2011) and Herz (2012) have repeatedly pointed out, self-organised economic and cultural activity often begins soon after the camp's set-up. But when relations to the local environment develop, such activities are often restricted to small-scale trade and barter of rations and supplies. Although both locals and refugees might be benefitting from such exchanges, many scholars agree that the refugees' sustained isolation and the continued welfare mode of assistance prevents the development of any further ties and, in the long term, impedes the recon-

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
Figure 1: Mishamo original settlement layout. Source: Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981

struction of meaningful lives and livelihoods (Black 1998; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005; Agier 2011). Sooner rather than later, camp settings become a hindrance rather than a support for refugees' lives and ambitions.

There are many reasons for the continued "warehousing" (Smith 2004) of refugees. Preoccupied with eventual re-patriation as the preferred solution, humanitarian organisations today concentrate on re-integration measures at home and tend to ignore the problematic of long-term encampment (Crisp 2001; Fielden and Crisp 2008). Host governments have other motives for preferring refugees to stay isolated and idle. In today's crisis regions, refugees are largely perceived as a burden on the economy, environment, and infrastructure of the receiving country. In unstable regions, large refugee influx is often considered a serious security issue. But camps are not only about control and containment. The mode of refugee assistance is often dependent on economic considerations of cost and benefits to the host country. For cash-strapped economies, the refugees' visibility in camps is often considered a precondition for receiving international assistance and support (Kaiser 2006).

But rather than considering refugees as a burden, and keeping them dependent on humanitarian "care and maintenance" regimes, their presence could be understood as able to make a positive contribution to the host country. Investing in the host's local infrastructure and allowing refugees to establish social and economic relationships with their environment could benefit refugees and their hosts alike (Smith, this Issue; Phillips 2003).

Rural settlements: another approach to refugee assistance

Such thinking, which links the fate of refugees positively to that of their host, is not without precedent: during the 70s and 80s, the idea of refugees contributing to the development of their host country enjoyed widespread popularity both with humanitarian organisations and host governments (Crisp 2001; Meyer 2006). Under UNHCR's "Aid and Development" programmes, refugee assistance was explicitly linked to rural development strategies. This goes particularly for the African continent, whose predominantly rural and comparatively sparse population seemed to allow for different solutions for long-term refugees. During that phase, hundreds of rural refugee settlements were planned and set up with the aim to "help refugees to reach self-sufficiency", to allow for their "integration into a local context until a durable solution could be found", and to "establish mechanisms that will ensure integration of services for the refugees with those of the nationals" (UNHCR 2005). At the time, the principle of local integration and even the further-reaching notions of permanent settlement attracted little controversy in the international community. During cold war times, refugee assistance was widely associated with supporting people who were fleeing from "hostile" governments and, in the aftermath of WW2, permanent asylum had been widely practised in the west (Jacobsen 2001; Crisp 2001).

The newly independent Tanzania, led by the charismatic socialist president Nyere, was one of the first host countries to embrace the new approach. The resulting rural

settlements Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba are some of the oldest and largest planned refugee settlements in the world that exist until today. Tracing the story of these villages teaches some valuable lessons for today's aspirations to improve refugee assistance. It also illustrates the paradigmatic shifts in attitudes towards refugees both locally and in the international community – and their inextricable ties to prevalent political and economical ideologies.

African socialism and international development – a win-win situation?

In 1972, over 150,000 Hutu refugees crossed the border from their native Burundi into Tanzania, after a genocidal massacre by Burundi's Tutsi-controlled army, which had left another 200,000 dead (International Crisis Group

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Figure 5: Farm house in Katumba Settlement. Photo: Dan Rather Report/Lucian Read 2011

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Figure 6: Construction works in Lukama village, Mishamo settlement. Photo: Dan Rather Report/Lucian Read 2011

1999; Chaulia 2003). Initially, they had settled close to the border, but soon UNHCR, the Lutheran World Service and the Tanzanian government entered into a tripartite agreement with the aim of establishing a series of planned rural refugee settlements further inland. The settlements were explicitly aiming at achieving the refugees' integration and self-sufficiency "until a durable solution could be found", with both refugees and Tanzanians able to "benefit from the infrastructure and community that is being established" (Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981: 181).

But the founding of Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo was no singular effort. It was embedded into the largest and most severe rural restructuring process of its time (Stein and Clark 1990). The Ujaama village campaign, initiated in the early 1970s by the socialist Nyere, intended no less than a permanent resettlement of the majority of country's population in planned "modern" agricultural communities (Scott 1998). The new village's crop schemes, physical layout and internal organisation were a feat of high modernist agricultural planning, intended to go from drawing board to reality in the space of a few years. At the time of the Burundian refugee crisis, the President's incentives to relocation and communalisation had so far not been particularly welcomed by its population. Reluc-

tant to give up their lives as scattered subsistence farmers and pastoralists for an insecure future in village collectives, they had preferred to stay put (Scott 1998; Chaulia 2003).

Thus, rather than being conceived a burden or a threat, the influx of a large number of rural refugees in the notoriously difficult-to-settle and largely abandoned western regions of Tanzania provided a possibility for Nyere to both exercise Pan-African humanism and hospitality and to put the villagisation programme into practice (Chaulia 2003). What had once been virgin forest was now to be brought into productive agricultural use by the refugees.

For international donors, the establishment of agricultural refugee settlements equally appealed from a developmental perspective and as a new approach to aid delivery. As Scott (1998) notes, large rural settlement schemes were not merely a unique vision of Tanzania's new socialist elite. The idea of development through intensive infrastructural investment and aggressive agricultural restructuring was shared by the World Bank and most other international agencies at the time (ibid.). From this perspective, combining refugee assistance with rural development activities made sense.

No doubt, for both donors and hosts, the guiding motivation for a settlement approach was an increased awareness of the inhumanity of isolated relief camps. But local integration, with an emphasis on the refugees' self-sufficiency, also simply seemed more economical. After an initial period of high investment in infrastructure, refugee settlements would be handed over to the Tanzanian government and eventually cease to rely on foreign aid. Donor support for extended aid delivery had been dwindling for some time, and there was an increasing desire, as Crisp puts it, "to reduce the number of refugees on the international community's books" (Crisp 2001: 72). With Tanzania's government offering the hospitality and the required land, and the internationals covering the lion share of infrastructure investments (Chaulia 2003), the settlements seemed a win-win situation.

Engineered communities

UNHCR documentation of that time reveals the staggering scale of the operation: settlement areas stretched from over 1000 km² for Ulyankulu to 2000 km² for Mishamo. (UNHCR 1981, Malkki 1995). Covering vast areas with little or no previous infrastructure, settlements comprised up to 20 villages, each divided by buffer zones and connected by a network of main roads. [Fig. 1] Within villages, up to 400 household plots of 5 hectares each were set approximately 1 km apart along rectangular grids of feeder roads (Malkki 1995). [Fig. 2, 3 and 4] In line with the principle of service integration, infrastructure such as water supply systems were extended to nearby Tanzanian villages, and primary schools and medical facilities were intended to cater to locals as well (Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981).

Notes from a subsequent field study commissioned by the UNHCR describe the initial setup process: from reconnaissance teams identifying suitable locations for agriculture to the setting up of temporary headquarters, stores, health facilities and temporary reception centres where new arrivals were welcomed and registered, the logistics seem impressive. Burundians with "a profession useful for the settlement" such as teachers, doctors, engineers, and nurses, were directly employed by the settlement direction, while all others were supplied with "agricultural tools, clothing, household utensils, soap, food and blankets" and given agricultural plots. Upon arrival, people were expected to build shelters and clear land for cultivation themselves. [Fig. 5]

An extensive community building programme was meant to "help people to live and work together" and "foster a community spirit of self-reliance and cooperation" (Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981: 183). So-called "rural development centres" offered not only primary schooling and adult literacy programmes, but also library services and training in bookkeeping and management. In line with Ujaama village principles, community building was also an exercise in social re-organisation: refugees were to organise into communities of 10 families, whose "10-cell leaders" were supposed to select road leaders, village chairmen and secretaries. These were to determine local needs and initiate "self-help" projects (ibid.).

But in fact, much of this simply meant the setting up of the required basic infrastructure, such as clearing roads and building schools. In addition, villages were to be working within a cooperative system, with multi-purpose-cooperatives organising such diverse tasks as timber cutting and furniture building for schools and the running of bus services (Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981). [Fig. 6]

But the main emphasis was placed on the planned agricultural production, and most documentation of the settlements initial phase is occupied with crop schemes and anticipated agricultural outputs. The harvest of maize, cassava, and beans was not only meant to cover the families' basic needs. The villages were meant to contribute to the overall food production of the country, and the village cooperatives' main function was the buying up of

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Figure 7: Daily chores in Lukama village, Mishamo settlement. Photo: Brendan Bannon 2008

agricultural produce for the government. In addition, cash crops such as cotton and tobacco were introduced to provide both an income to the refugees and foreign currency for Tanzania. Reports show that food production took off quickly, with considerable remittances from food sale within the space of a few years. Less than 4 years after their setup, the settlements were proclaimed to have reached self-sufficiency (UNHCR 1981; Lutheran World Federation and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 1981).

When the settlements were handed over to the Tanzanian government in 1978 (Katumba) and 1980 (Ulyankulu and Mishamo) respectively, they were widely seen as pioneering examples of successful refugee assistance. But how did the settlements fare in the long term? And what was life like there for their inhabitants?

Marginalisation and economic hardship

Already in the 1980s, researchers were starting to note that refugee accounts were missing from the many papers and documentations produced on the settlements (Armstrong 1988) What emerges from the few studies actually questioning the affected people themselves is that the much-lauded local integration, while certainly successful on an economic level, did not translate easily into the refugees' reality. This goes particularly for the most isolated of the settlements, Mishamo. In 1988, Armstrong, who had been monitoring the development of the settlements since their inception, still called Mishamo an "isolated and vulnerable community", where almost a quarter of the male population did not speak the local language of Kiswahili, and 40% of the women had not acquired the local language yet (Armstrong 1988: 67).

In her seminal study on the inhabitants of Mishamo, Liisa Malkki (1995) found that settlement refugees were far more likely to see themselves as part of an exiled "Hutu-nation" than self-settled Hutu refugees in town, and were increasingly nurturing ethno-nationalist identities. Malkki also shows how the refugees insisted on calling their villages "camps", arguing that as they were forced to stay

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Figure 8: Selling produce in Katumba settlement. Photo: Dan Rather Report/Lucian Read 2011

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Figure 9: Church in Katumba settlement. Photo: Dan Rather Report/Lucian Read 2011

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and farm with no other choice, this was the more appropriate term.

Thus, the apparent lack of adaption to their new circumstances cannot only be attributed to the refugees' unwillingness to integrate. While their basic needs, compared with the living standards of most of Tanzania's population, had been covered, other fundamentals were lacking: refugees were paying taxes, for example, but they enjoyed virtually no political representation – contrary to the apparent set-up of local decision-making structures. Armstrong, citing a 1974 UNHCR report, notes that Tanzanian settlement commanders were exerting an "almost military authority" over the settlements (Armstrong 1988:67). Indeed, under Tanzania's 1965 refugee act, movement for refugees was severely restricted, and leaving the settlements for as much as a day trip required a seldom-granted permit (Mbazumutima 2007).

This lack of freedom of movement also had implications for the refugees' economical situation. Contrary to the initial enthusiasm, the top-down engineering of agricultural production did not always lead to the anticipated results. In parts of the settlements, soils were quickly exhausted or turned out to be unsuitable for agriculture. Others suffered from inadequate water supplies, and tsetse fly infestations frequently made livestock keeping impossible (Armstrong 1986). [Fig. 7]

In fact, such planning failures had been apparent almost right from the beginning, when 24,000 residents of Ulyankulu had to be resettled to newly founded Mishamo due to miscalculated soil capacities and overcrowding (Armstrong 1988). While crop yields were generally reported to be high in the settlements' initial years under the tripartite agreement, the situation changed after handover. Without continued support in forms of fertilisers, seedlings, and agricultural advice, agricultural production plummeted (Armstrong1988, Neumann 1985). As a result, few refugees seemed actually able to achieve a substantial surplus beyond self-sufficiency, and the movement restrictions affected any other attempts at income generation beyond farming. A 1984 report cites a serious threat to the viability of Katumba, and continued support in foodstuffs and agricultural tools by both UNHCR and the Tanzanian government remained necessary (Neumann 1985). The promise of self-sufficiency and local integration had hardly been fulfilled.

A new economic order

Since then, Tanzania has been through another period of severe economical restructuring. While the charisma and humanist convictions of President Nyere had been an inspiration for emerging post-colonial governments and western academics alike, his socialist vision led to economic catastrophe. Following Nyere's resignation in 1985, the country entered the global market economy. From then on, the government's benevolent attitude towards the refugee settlements changed quickly. In the light of extensive public sector cuts prescribed by World Bank and IMF, the continuous support of the settlement's health, education, and basic production infrastructure seemed an unnecessary burden (Chaulia 2003).

At the same time, structural adjustment policies called for a hike in agricultural output, and the increased production quotas put even more strain on the already struggling settlements (Kweka 2007). But not only economic policies took a U-turn. The 1990s saw another escalation of violence in the whole Great Lakes region, and the million-strong second influx of Hutu refugees from war-torn Burundi was seen as dangerously overstretching the limited capacities of their host. The new government quickly shifted their approach back to placing new arrivals into confined camp settings, but the situation also impacted treatment of settlement refugees (Kamanga 2005). Contrary to their status as heavily controlled but nonetheless welcome "resident guests" of the 1970s, all refugees were from now on largely perceived as a security threat, with the accompanying rhetoric and restrictions on social, political and economical participation. Since the 1990s, controls on their movement have further increased, eventually restricting refugees to a 4-km radius around the given settlements' centre (Mbazumutima 2007).

The natural assumption is that these measures have further diminished the possibilities for the settlements' successful integration. But this would be discounting the refugees' persistence and ingenuity in their struggle to build successful livelihoods. Over the years, refugees have found ways to establish relationships with their environment. Despite their physical isolation, and the increasingly hostile political and economical climate, settlement farmers find ways to bypass the government purchase of surplus crops in order to sell privately to local markets

(Sommers 2001). When visiting the settlement centres today, differences between a local village market and the refugee economy are hard to make out (personal communication Bannon 2013). [Fig. 8] Food production attracts many traders, and recent reports show Mishamo and Katumba producing 40 per cent of their region's agricultural output on just 4 per cent of the land (Moore 2012). The increased economic activity of the settlements is seen to positively affect the surrounding areas (Malkki 1995; Nordic Consulting Group 2010). Certainly in the less isolated settlement of Katumba, progress towards integration has been made: refugees are supplying services such as tailoring to the local population, and a secondary school that opened in 2006 is now being attended by both Tanzanian and refugee children (personal communication Anuradha Mittal; Lucian Read 2013).

But while the refugee settlements are tentatively integrating and certainly making a positive overall contribution to the local economy, the refugees themselves are still being perceived as outsiders. Research conducted in Ulyankulu in 2007 revealed continued perceptions of marginalisation and exclusion from Tanzanian society, with the refugees likening their status to "slaves" of the Tanzanian government (Mbazumutima 2007). Three quarters of the residents believed that decision-making entirely lay with the government and referred to their settlement as "a large prison" (ibid:56). Economic development seems to have produced winners, but also an increasing share of losers: 69 per cent of Ulyankulu's residents stated they were struggling to feed their families, and the lack of cash money was perceived as a serious issue in all three settlements (ibid; Sommers 2001).

But despite their marginal status in Tanzania, ambitions are increasingly set on other goals than repatriation. With more than three-quarters of the residents now belonging to a second generation, the memory of the home country is fading. As Sommers (2001) illustrates in his account of a group of youngsters from Katumba, younger refugees are dreaming of leaving the boredom and poverty of the settlements for a life in "Bongoland" (a colloquial for the

Tanzanian capital Dar es-Salaam) – much like young people in any other Tanzanian village. But while some manage to sneak away and support their families with money earned in the capital, most people seem to have accepted the villages as their home. [Fig. 9]

When the refugees were finally offered the choice between either returning to Burundi or naturalising as Tanzanian citizens in 2008, almost 80 per cent of the 222,036 refugees in the settlements opted for staying (Kweka and Hovil 2008).

Looming closure

But what seemed almost like a happy ending has recently been revealed to be yet another twist in the ill-fated story of refugee integration. Unknown to the refugees deciding to spend their lives as Tanzanians, another shift in political and economic paradigms is now threatening their hard-won subsistence. Shortly after the refugees' decision, the Tanzanian government announced the settlements' impeding closure. While the days of structural adjustment are over, Tanzania's current policies are basing future economic and social development on direct foreign capital investment – meaning, among other things, a new generation of export-oriented agricultural biofuel production. In 2012, an investigation by the Oakland Institute, an independent think tank on land grabbing, revealed that the land on which Mishamo and Katumba stand is about to be acquired by the US-based company Agrisol Energy (Moore 2012). UNHCR's High Commissioner for Refugees has praised the naturalisation process as a "model programme of durable solutions". But the inhabitants of the settlements feel cheated and confused. A recent UNHCR report cites some of the refugee's reactions. Statements such as *"What about our graves, our permanent houses, our businesses?"* and *"I have lived here for 36 years and was told to build a permanent house, schools, without the government's hand, why should I move now?"* (Kweka and Hovil 2008:33) were common. Given the overlaps in decision-making personnel, an explicit link between the government's

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Figure 10: Maize cultivation in Mishamo settlement. Photo: Brendan Bannon 2008

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Figure 11: A refugee midwife at the Kanogi Health centre in Mishamo settlement. Photo: Brendan Bannon 2008

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decision to close the settlements and the pending deal is yet to be proven, but rather likely (Rather 2011; personal communication Anuradha Mittal 2012). What is clear is that the residents of Katumba and Mishamo had not been told that the vote for staying in their homes would mean further displacement, and none of them were told about the government's plans to sell the land (Kweka and Hovil 2008). With plans for the forced removal and dispersed resettlement of the refugees already announced, it is unlikely the villages have much of a future. The laboriously cultivated land and basic infrastructure, once put into place through "self-help" projects, will now be put to use for other interests, with homes and other facilities likely to be dismantled. In a press release by AgriSol Tanzania, the deal was propagated to "bring lasting food security … create jobs and spur local infrastructure improvements" (Simba 2011, quoted in Baha 2012). [Fig. 10 and Fig. 11]

Lessons for refugee integration

Despite the settlement's inglorious end in the name of durable solutions, Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba have certainly provided safe refuge, food security, and the chance to start a new livelihood for ten thousands of displaced people. It would be unjust to discount the genuine humanitarian objectives that led to the settlement's establishment – especially when considering the current trend to warehouse refugees for ever-extending periods of time in camps. It also seems that some of the settlements have fared better than others, with the least-isolated Katumba achieving the highest degree of integration. But from today's perspective, all the settlements have fallen short of their promises. While the settlements have made a significant contribution to the food production and economic vitality of the host country, they have neither enabled real local integration nor established genuine self-sufficiency. The economic hardship produced during the later years of the settlements is as much due to the top-down modernist planning schemes as to the increasing economic pressure during liberalisation. But the crucial failure of the settlements is the continued exclusion of their inhabitants and the denial of the refugees' rights. If anything, the settlement experience has shown that any real alternative to encampment cannot merely mean providing refugees with the means to achieve material self-sufficiency. As Malkki has shown, from the perspective of the refugees, the difference between encampment and organised settlements is largely perceived as nominal.

We are not likely to see any more refugee settlements in Africa soon. While this may or may not be a good thing, it seems that the idea of local integration has been discounted for all the wrong reasons. The turning away from local settlements is probably not an acknowledgement of the failings of their paternalistic and freedom-restricting social engineering, but due to the fact that Africa's once-abundant arable land has become scarce, and is quickly turning into a much-competed-for commodity. More than anything, the story of the settlements shows how refugee assistance tends to be a barter between the donors' objectives and the economic needs and political fears of the host countries, with the refugees' rights coming last. The growing number of long-term refugees, and the current critique of sustained encampment, does call for a renewed analysis of approaches to refugee integration – whether their stay is perceived as temporary or not. But as long as humanitarian assistance is dependent on the refugees' continued visibility for the donors, and married to host government's agendas of control and containment, local integration policies are likely to fail.

From Ghettoes to Cities.
An Interview with Michel Agier

Julia Hartmann

Von Ghettos und Städten – die urbane Transformation von Flüchtlingslagern
In zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen beschäftigt sich Michel Agier mit dem Verhältnis von Globalisierung, Orten des Exils und der Formierung neuer urbaner Kontexte. Im Interview mit Julia Hartmann geht der Ethnologe und Anthropologe der Frage nach, wann, wie, und unter welchen Bedingungen Flüchtlingslager tatsächlich zu Städten werden könnten. Während der humanitäre Diskurs der Soforthilfe und die Logistik der Kontrolle die Entstehung von Urbanität behindern, haben die Bewohner der Flüchtlingslager ihre eigenen Interpretationen und Ambitionen in Bezug auf ihre Lebensumwelt. Die urbane Transformation ist unausweichlich – doch nur die Gewährung von Gastfreundschaft und Asyl verhindert die Verwandlung in Ghettos und ermöglicht eine Öffnung hin zu einer städtischen Zukunft.

Mr. Agier, according to UNHCR figures, there are now about 6 million people in the world living in refugee camps. In common perception, this is related to the growing need for emergency relief due to catastrophes like war, famine and natural disasters. What is your interpretation of this growing trend?

First of all, we can indeed take the idea seriously that there are emergencies. War, violence, or natural catastrophes – these are emergencies that make people go away and need help. Perhaps there even are more emergencies than before. But in fact, the concept of emergency is disputable. In my investigations in the context of the humanitarian organisations, I realised that in the very moment of emergency, generally nobody is there, and the people organise their relief themselves. The humanitarian organisations are not like firemen, you do not just call and they come. It takes at least weeks, sometimes months, before the emergency intervention arrives. This means the official reason for the intervention has passed.

What we call the "culture of emergency", for me, is the illusion that all this mechanism of humanitarian intervention is for emergency – while in fact it is not. What you really see is traffic of very big trucks taking people from one place to another, reorganising the people who were saved, organising and developing new spaces, taking care of and governing people. Putting them in one place and not in another: that means security, controlling the situation. The culture of emergency is an illusion, and it is on this illusion where all the logistics are built on. It is also a very big market which occupies a space – and in this space, there is a built camp.

Could you describe the life in the camp? What is the difference between the official view of emergency relief and the reality on the ground?

There is a conflict. The people of the humanitarian organisations can be nice people, but they enter into a kind of mechanism where they have a role to take. They have to count people, they have to include some and exclude others, they have to distribute alimentary rations. They have to consider that people must not stay in a particular camp because logistics demand that they are transferred to another camp elsewhere. Often, when humanitarian aid workers are coming back from operations, they are much more critical than I could ever be. Their experience is very different, very far from the rhetoric they heard and the discourse they used to believe in.

The other aspect is that people do not let themselves be treated like this for a long time. There are misunderstandings. For example, people think the alimentary ration is not enough, and steal an alimentary card. Aid workers from the camp catch them and call them liars – "You are trying to cheat the organisation which came here to help you, you are a thief, a liar, a bad guy!" These classifications develop in the language of the humanitarians quite quickly, even if they have the best intentions.

At a certain moment, the people do not play the role of the victim anymore. In that moment the misunderstandings begin, and there can be conflict, real conflict.

In Guinea for example, a UNHCR employee was counting the people, saying it was for logistic reasons. People knew that these were preparations to take them forcibly to Sierra Leone, for forced repatriation, and there was a violent fight, throwing stones, a kind of riot. These are attempts at emancipation, and it is quite frequent, this kind of disaccord. I call it the beginning of a transition from victim to political subject.

Another aspect is that there is a very quick cultural transformation. In the language of the anthropologist, I have described refugee camps as new cultural areas: people are mixing their language with the language of the majority of the place and with the International English, this creates a kind of pidgin that everybody is learning. Education changes as well, there are primary schools, which

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Figure 1: Street in Talbiyeh Refugee Camp, Amman, Jordan. Photo: Franziska Laue

are perhaps better than the place where the people are from. With alimentary rations, there is a new kind of eating: people are discovering bulgur from the United States, and Liberian and Sierra Leone ladies must learn to cook American bulgur…

It also means learning from the international organisations: learning to know what the white man wants. For example, some Liberian people in a camp in Sierra Leone were to be repatriated, and they had made a project for the development of a new city: they explained to me that going to a village was dangerous, and if they were presenting an urban design, the people from the NGO would think "This is very good" and help them. It is a very quick change: learning to speak, learning to know what the people in the global world want to hear.

We associate refugee camps with tents, with suffering and insecurity, but they often become long-term setups. What happens when camps endure past the official emergency stage?

You speak of the camp as tents, and precarity. I have investigated the history of 20, 30, 40 camps in various countries. The precarity continues, the tents continue, but after more or less two years, there is a kind of stability in place. In a material sense, stability means the place is not exactly tents anymore. People find mud and wood and build houses. Materials are being recycled; the sheet metal of food canisters and drums is being flattened to make doors, windows, tables, even hen coops. Sometimes, international organisations, like the German GIZ, transport wood and material to aid with construction.

So there we have another illusion. The calls for donations are legitimised by images of suffering and precarity – but there are people organising their habitat, there are people reorganising their life, even when they hope to return back home or to be resettled in another country. Life is changing, social life is changing. Although they are generally not allowed to do so, people leave the camp for days or weeks to find work somewhere in the area. New families are formed after some months or years. Churches are created where people meet and develop a kind of a communal life.

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Figure 2: Back lane in Talbiyeh Refugee Camp, Amman, Jordan. Photo: Franziska Laue

Generally, the international NGOs tend to reaffirm the memory of the violent past they are attempting to cure.

By concentrating on return as the preferred durable solution, they put an emphasis on the memory of the "origin" – but people might want to forget this past and create new links and projects instead. That's why feeling stuck inside the camp makes people frequently say they are in a prison – something expatriate humanitarian workers don't understand. There is an uneasy relation between the control of the camp and what the people are doing.

What happens when repatriation is delayed indefinitely, as is often the case? When camps stay for decades, how does this kind of consolidation develop?

The main example here is the case of the Palestinian camps, which were set up more than sixty years ago. First of all, there is a change in materiality. Take the Balata camp in the West Bank for example: at first, I could not make out whether I was in Nablus or whether I was in the camp. People had to explain to me where the camp was. After some time I could recognise it – because the camp is poorer, there is more informality, more urban density, and there are more Palestinian leaders. But at first, I could not.

The camp Shatila in the south of Beirut is another example. I am now working on Sabra, the neighbourhood where the camp is situated, but a part of Sabra is like the suburb of the camp. In this space, you have a camp that created its own proper urban polarity. It is an establishment of people who are not officially in the camp, but are nonetheless refugees or migrants. They are either people from the original camp, or people who want to benefit from the resources of the camp. They come and build outside the camp, in much informality and illegality, but this is proper urban growth, which is important.

After sixty years, in the Palestinian situation, which is not the same as in the Asian or African context, there is a kind of urban integration – but it is enclosed. Like Foucault said: "Enclosed outside." But this "enclosed outside" ends up growing and having a place in the city, in the periphery.

In Africa, this is also developing, but for us in Europe, it is not as obvious as in Beirut or Nablus or Bethlehem, where the camps have quite an important materiality – they look like poor urban neighbourhoods.

You say that these places resemble urban situations – does it still make sense to call them camps?

I do not mind. European people have a problem with the word "camp" because it is associated with the memory of the Shoa and the Death Camp. Therefore "camp" seems something which is absolutely exceptional, far away from "us", when actually you have many kinds of encampments even in Europe today. The word "camp" is still used in any of the places in the Middle East and Africa or Asia. Speaking about a camp means designating an existing problem of which there is also an urban form.

At the same time, I am not very convinced about the very structural theories about the so-called "form of the camp", which are oriented towards the idea of exception.

I think the idea of the exception is present and I think the idea of extraterritoriality is also very present, and that there is exclusion – excluding people in the sense of, "We don't want them here, we want them there". Exception, extraterritoriality and exclusion are three principles of encampment in general. But this is only a part of the problem.

The other part is that the people in the camps have other interpretations of the place and other motivations. They eventually have projections on the place. They can refuse it, they can flee or destroy it – or they can change the place, and that is what happens anyway. In the Palestinian camp, the future, the very near projection, is that it is a city in becoming. It is something like an urban becoming, but it goes more towards a ghetto than to an open city. This is something called "ghettoisation", something the Palestinians do not like, nor do they like if you speak about becoming a city. They consider it a political "normalisation". But one can also consider this urban transformation of the camp as a political appropriation and as the formation of a political urban subject.

Similar to the case of the Palestinian camps are the Sahrawi camps in Algeria near the Morocco border. There is a kind of urban transformation, while people and their leaders say, "No, we do not want to change, we are still a camp." Because of the political ideology as it is now, there is still a need for the idea of that place: "camp" – while the facts on the ground have changed.

Last year, I was giving a group of seminars in the West Bank to Palestinian refugees, and we had a very interesting discussion. They were all students and people who had already finished their university education, very well informed. During the whole discussion they were saying, "If you say that the camp is becoming a city, this will be normalisation, we do not want normalisation. We are the camp because we want to maintain the idea of the Return." But actually, the urban transformation is already

happening. While people are not saying it, they are already generating an urban improvement or urban transformation, and this is a quite logical process. This contradiction is quite easy to understand.

Can you imagine a possible future where the camp can become a city?

There is a historical work on the city of Rome by the nineteenth-century French historian called Jules Michelet. He was investigating the foundation of Rome by Romulus. He wrote: "From asylum the city is born." Romulus came from Alba, from another city where strangers and lawless, beggars and poor people were refused to establish themselves. He went to Rome with these people, and they are considered the founders of the city. On one side, on the upper side of the city, was the aristocracy, and on the lower side the people, the plebs. And their place was called asylum. I say when we offer asylum, when we offer hospitality, this makes a city. The city can be a place of hospitality.

When there is no hospitality, when there is no asylum, then the people who are not welcome look for refuge. I work mainly with refugee camps but also with any cases of informal encampment of people who look for refuge. When these spaces grow and endure, then you have something like a ghetto developing. This is what I mean when I say, "From refuge the ghetto is born." These places develop into some kind of ghetto – until the moment something is opened, until something can be opened.

How can such an opening look like? Are there any development perspectives for camps apart from the choice between ghetto and city?

In Dheisheh camp near Bethlehem, the same place where people were telling me they wanted to stay a camp, there is something very interesting happening.

Across the main street beside the camp, on the other side, is Al Doha – a city created about fifteen years ago. And there is a bridge which goes over the street and joins the camp and the city. The people's account says that refugees created that city. Seventy-five per cent of the inhabitants of Al-Doha are from the camp of Dheisheh and some other camps in the area. Most of the councillors of the town, including its Mayor, are from the camp of Dheisheh.

The camp created the city, it did not become a city but it created its proper city. And there was no NGO programme. There were some people who started to build houses. Now, with this kind of urban double, the space of the camp is opening. The expression "camp" continues as a political symbol – but when relations with a welcoming outside are possible, the life in it is changing. There were no international humanitarian organisations talking about improvement, it actually happened just like this. With or without NGOs – when something happens, it is because the people make it happen.

The interview was conducted in October 2012.

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Julia Hartmann (see page 88)

Convertible Urbanism.
Reusing Refugee Camp Structures

Regina Orvañanos Murguía

Konvertierbarer Urbanismus. Die Um- und Weiternutzung der Bauten und Infrastruktur von Flüchtlingslagern
Flüchtlingslager sind dynamische Siedlungen auf einem unsicheren Entwicklungspfad zwischen erzwungenem Ausnahmezustand und zunehmender Urbanisierung. Die ungeklärte Frage ihrer urbanen Zukunft ist die treibende Kraft hinter dem Konzept eines konvertierbaren Urbanismus. Im Gegensatz zu den oft unflexiblen traditionellen Planungswerkzeugen berücksichtigt ein solcher Ansatz den kompletten Lebenszyklus der gebauten Umwelt und verfolgt eine bestmögliche Nutzung der materiellen Investitionen, indem er eine Um- und Weiternutzung in verschiedensten Situationen ermöglicht. Dieser Beitrag illustriert die Herausforderungen einer solchen Herangehensweise anhand von Beispielen sowohl ungenutzter Möglichkeiten als auch erfolgreicher Adaptierung. Die Analyse der Flüchtlingssituationen aus der Perspektive der gebauten Umwelt will die Debatte über eine Neudefinition von Flüchtlingslagern bereichern. Das letztendliche Ziel eines konvertierbaren Urbanismus ist die Schaffung einer Basis für eine Entwicklung, in der Flüchtlingslager Magneten für eine erfolgreiche Urbanisierung werden können.

1 Palestinian refugees are not considered in this figure as they are under the protection of UNWRA.

"Convertible" is an adjective that describes the ability to be transformed in form, function or character. The concept of *Convertible Urbanism* refers to the reuse of urban structures and urban form, the shift in functions, and the adaptation to new uses and users. Applied to refugee camps, it promotes the capacity of camp facilities and urban structures to be reused after they are no longer utilised by the refugees; that means either to be transported or, in the case of camps that have become permanent settlements, to allow for the integration of local users.

Refugee camps are not static entities, but dynamic settlements that continuously adapt to ever-shifting situations. In 2010, there were 10.55 million refugees worldwide, **1** of which approximately one-third were residing in camps (circa 2.46 million). The average lifespan of a refugee camp is seven years, although it can approach 20 years in protracted refugee situations (Loescher and Milner 2009).

As time passes, some refugee settlements experience an urbanisation process caused by continuous population growth and the progressive establishment of services and infrastructure, such as water sanitation, marketplaces, health centres, and schools. Others remain in a forced state of emergency due to development restrictions imposed by the host countries.

Yet, camp development does not follow a linear path and may jump from a process of rapid growth into sudden contraction, closure, and disappearance. The restrictions and imbalances in camp evolution result in an "incomplete, unfinished, form of urbanity" (Agier 2002: 337), which might resemble a city but is not. As cities without citizens, their evolution is a broken path that may not lead to an urban future.

The urban future dilemma

The benefits of urban concentration are linked to the "critical mass of people, ideas, infrastructure and resources acting as a magnet of development" (UN-Habitat 2012: 26). Nevertheless, refugee camps do not fully enjoy the wide-ranging benefits of urbanisation: the restrictions imposed on the inhabitants confine their freedom and prosperity. According to UN-Habitat (2012), cities can achieve prosperity and develop adequate responsive strategies by creating the conditions that allow understanding and anticipating trends of urban growth or decline. However, the only certainty in camps is their uncertain tomorrow. The camps' futures depend both on the driving forces of urbanisation and the expelling factors of forced displacement, as well as on the external political situations that define their fates. The urban future dilemma of camps is the driving force behind *Convertible Urbanism*.

The concept of *Convertible Urbanism* considers the complete lifecycle of the built environment and pursues the best utilisation of the physical investments in place, irrespective of the departure or length of stay of the refugees. It advocates for an environmentally, socially and economically sustainable way of conceiving camp development: environmental as it optimises the use of resources; economical by providing higher value for the humanitarian investment, resilient to changing social and political situations; and inclusive by increasing the number of potential beneficiaries beyond the initially targeted population.

Camp stages and scenarios of urban reconversion

Opportunities for *Convertible Urbanism* are most visible at the closure stage, when the population's needs and the

settlement's requirements evolve. While some services in place become unnecessary, other needs appear. Thus, creativity for finding alternative solutions is required. Nonetheless, if the basis for camp reconversion is defined at the early stages of the camp's existence, future transformation, integration, closure or rehabilitation will be easier.

Camp closure is a multidimensional, complex process. It can be the consequence of any of the official solutions to a refugee situation: repatriation, integration or resettlement, or the abandonment by the humanitarian organisations due to deteriorated security or the termination of funds. While some camps disappear without a trace, in others the assistance and service provision is phased out but the settlements stay put, leaving population behind. Often, infrastructure (such as roads, canalisation or public facilities) is left behind and may or may not be used by the remaining communities. However, the potential to reintegrate these assets is not always capitalised on.

Depending on the various stages of the camps' life cycles, different scenarios of conversion and transformation are possible. According to the camps' various futures, these could be classified as follows:

1. Succession of users;
2. Integration of services;
3. Portable structures;
4. Camp restoration.

In the following paragraphs the potentials and challenges of these scenarios are illustrated through examples of successful as well as missed opportunities. As will be shown, in some of these cases the concept of *Convertible Urbanism* has been more successfully applied than in others.

1. Succession of users: Kacha Garhi refugee camp in Pakistan and Hartisheik refugee camps in Ethiopia

Between 2002 and 2009, UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, conducted the largest repatriation programme in its history into Afghanistan. Almost five million refugees were repatriated from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Established settlements housing several thousand people, such as the Kacha Garhi camp in the outskirts of Peshawar, were evacuated with the argument that they had been hosting terrorists. The Kacha Garhi refugee camp, set up in 1980, had housed more than 70,000 refugees (Abudlhadi 2008). By 2007, the camp had become a proper settlement with mud dwellings similar to villages in rural Pakistan. It had schools, basic health units, as well

as water and sanitation facilities. During the evacuation process in 2007, refugees were made to demolish their own houses, recovering whatever could be carried along in the convoy (HRCP 2009).

Soon after the refugees' evacuation, the camp was reopened to internally displaced people (IDP) fleeing from the unrest in the Bajaur Agency (Abudlhadi 2008). After two years of reuse, in December 2009, the last IDP families were relocated to other camps (HRCP 2009) and the Kacha Garhi camp was finally shut down, dismantled and decommissioned. The land was handed back to the government and is still in disuse. [Fig. 1 and 2]

The superimposition of inhabitants seen in the Afghan camp – the transition from housing refugees to IPDs and back to the neighbouring local population – was also experienced in Ethiopia. The Hartisheik camp in northern Ethiopia was opened in 1988 for refugees from the Gabiley and Hargesia areas escaping from the Somali civil war. By the early 1990s, it had turned into the largest camp complex in the world, reaching 250,000 inhabitants, and soon became an active marketplace between Somaliland and Ethiopia.

The Hartisheik camp was closed in 2004. After the refugees were repatriated to Somaliland, the region remained occupied by IDPs escaping famine, drought and war in the region bordering Eritrea. Yet, due to insufficient water resources in the area, the transition of dwellers was unsustainable. From the beginning, the semi-deserted area lacked water, which had to be transported everyday from 70 km away. Water dams and storage facilities were built by humanitarian organisations, but their short lifespan did not allow for long-term use. After the refugees left, the provision of water was insufficient to meet the needs of the population, and the IDPs – who outnumbered the local population – were eventually relocated to other areas of the country (UNHCR 1996).

Hence, from the examples illustrated: in the *urban* camp of Kacha Garhi, the infrastructure was completely demolished, while the settlement of Hartisheik proved to have inadequate infrastructure to support continued use by the displaced and host community. This raises the question whether camp structures should be purposely built to permit their reconversion into new uses, allowing for the longer-term gain of the investment into the infrastructure and services. *Convertible Urbanism* comes into place by promoting a camp configuration in which a succession of users can potentially benefit from the investment in infrastructure and services initially provided for refugee assistance.

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Figure 3: Refugee from Burma at Umplum Refugee Camp in Thailand carrying a roof structure. Source: © 2008 UNHCR/R. Arnold

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2. Transformation through integration: Eritrean camps in East Sudan

Camps configured with a developmental approach are more likely to apply the principles of *Convertible Urbanism* through the use of regional strategies that benefit the population beyond the refugee camps' boundaries.

In this spirit, recent UNHCR initiatives such as "Development Assistance for Refugees" (DAR) or the "Transitional Solutions Initiative" (TSI) put emphasis on the provision of services and programmes that can benefit both displaced and host populations and improve life quality while waiting for a durable solution. This approach recognises that local populations may be just as much in need of assistance as the refugees profiting from higher standard services and, furthermore, that life improvements for both refugees and hosts enrich the relations between them. For this reason, Corsellis and Vitale (2005) recommend that whenever possible, "infrastructures in camps should be planned from the beginning to be handed over to the local authorities". The process of handing over the facilities includes the physical level as well as the institutional process of passing responsibilities over. The procedure "should mitigate the discrepancies in support between refugees and host population" (Bartsch and Dualeh 2011); as some difficulties here include the transition from the provision of free health and education to their incorporation into the local or national governments.

The case of the Eritrean refugees displaced in East Sudan provides a good example of the reuse of facilities through local integration. In the mid-1980s, the Sudanese refugee operation reached over one million refugees at its eastern border. In this period, refugees in many districts of eastern Sudan, such as the town of Kassala, outnumbered locals by a factor of four to one. In 1967, the government granted land to the first wave of refugees from the Horn of Africa who settled under a local settlement policy. The camps almost became self-contained villages. Many of the locations, like the Um Sagata and Salmin camps, eventually became self-reliant and integrated with the community.

Between 2002 and 2003, nine out of 26 camps were vacated, closed and handed over to the local authorities, but some refugees chose to stay, despite the cessation of assistance. As the availability of services in refugee

camps was higher than in the surrounding villages, local communities were expected to benefit from the services established for the refugees, but this required that the facilities be accessible to the local people. To prepare the handover process of the closed refugee camps, UNHCR decided to rehabilitate selected health, education, water and sanitation services and infrastructure in the refugee-affected areas. For this purpose, an infrastructure consortium was established to select the facilities to be repaired, based on the distance from local villages, but some were too remote and therefore useless. Health centres were in a poor physical state because they had been constructed as temporal structures and now required an improvement. Some of the services, like schools and health centres, were already used to some extent by the host population but still needed some rehabilitation as well.

By 2003, at the closure of six camps, UNHCR handed over to the Sudanese authorities a hospital ward and water facilities in the vacated sites. Many of the closed camps, such as Um Sagata and Karkora, became local villages and were virtually indistinguishable from the other villages. Infrastructure remaining from the assistance was largely intact and maintained by the community, while clinics and schools were serviced by the state authorities (Bartsch and Dualeh 2011).

Examples of successful integration like this one base their achievements on policies favouring local integration and self-reliance. Unfortunately, recent tendencies point to a more restrictive global asylum climate. The case also exemplifies that temporal facilities and poor-quality construction undermine the efforts to rehabilitate for re-use. Other factors, like the planning approach, political climate and relation with host communities, determine the level of potential reconversion. When planned at an early stage, flexibility is greater and so are the opportunities to benefit from it.

3. Portable structures: Dolo Ado camps, Southern Ethiopia

The location of a camp is a determinant factor in the selection of an appropriate urban reconversion strategy. A camp's remote location makes reconversion neither always possible nor desired. In this case, the reversibility of the construction process or the portability of assembled built elements comes into play. As camps close, shelters are often taken apart by the family; tents and other distributed non-food items (NFI) are taken along with them. Larger infrastructure elements, like water tanks, can be collected by the service providers; electrical wiring in the site may be dismantled by the authorities and become property of the municipal council (Norwegian Refugee Council 2008: 190). Reusable elements, like roofing structures [Fig. 3], wooden poles, doors and windows, are usually carried away. When semi-permanent shelters have been erected, earth bricks may be easily destroyed and reincorporated to the environment, and organic construction material will be disposed of and decompose.

Several efforts have been made in developing shelter strategies based on flexibility and portability. These include transitional, semi-permanent, modular, or collapsible shelters. Among others, this approach is applied in

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the Dolo Ado camps at the southern Ethiopian border with Somalia. The developmental strategy for today's second-largest camp in the world involves the construction of semi-permanent shelters made out of bamboo [Fig. 4], which can easily be dismantled and taken along in the event of a repatriation or resettlement. The construction of prefabricated structures is done in a workshop that brings together host and refugee populations (Røsholm Eckroth 2012). The benefits of portable structures lie in the sustainable management of resources, which considers the entire lifecycle of the products utilised in refugee operations.

4. Camp restoration:
Kosovan camps in Macedonia

A final stage of camp transformation is the environmental restoration. When the site location is clearly inappropriate for human occupation due to lack of resources, hazards to health, and natural risks, or the settlement is severely affecting fragile environments, site restoration to the former condition may be an adequate solution.

During the Kosovo crisis, NATO's air strikes caused a sudden mass influx of refugees into Macedonia. Rather than selecting the most habitable sites, the procedure for the selection of campsites to host the 110,000 refugees was a political decision looking to maintain the ethnic balance of the country. Out of the eight refugee camps erected, the Bojane and Neprosteno camps well as the Suto Orizari collective centre were previously used as illegal dumpsites. They presented health hazards for their inhabitants. Others, like the Radusa and Blace camps, were located on fields used for agricultural production.

Repatriation and camp closure was implemented after only three months. Despite their short-term use, and the environmental reconversion process undertaken, a complete environmental rehabilitation was not possible. Although the sites were cleaned, gravel covered most of the land and inhibited future agricultural use (UNEP 2000: 6-11).

As the Macedonian example shows, even when low density and short occupation make restoration more feasible, the urban uses of the camps' sites may impede their return to their previous state, particularly back into greenfields.

Conclusions

This article intended to pave the way towards a new understanding of uncertain futures of refugee camps and the possibilities of action. The analysis of the refugee situation from a perspective of its built environment – often forgotten in the studies of human settlements – hopes to bring more elements into the debate of re-defining refugee-camp development. As emergencies are becoming more complex, displaced populations with very different origins are mixing in the same channels of migration. In dire situations, refugee camps and their aid structures attract other population groups, particularly IDPs.

In refugee camps, the benefits of urban concentration seldom act as a magnet of development. Their many restrictions prevent them from becoming prosperous human settlements. A more flexible way of conceiving the futures of the camps may help in thinking outside of the toolbox of traditional refugee assistance. The cases presented show that complex emergencies require flexible solutions. As a concept, *Convertible Urbanism* has a valuable potential in enabling agencies to adopt planning approaches that are more applicable to ever-changing situations. As seen in the examples, the effective reuse of permanent or semi-permanent facilities is closely related to an integrated regional development strategy that, despite the numerous uncertainties, takes the sequence of beneficiaries into consideration. *Convertible Urbanism* takes up certain transformations and consolidating processes that already occur on the ground and pursues physical integration as a beneficial measure for the localities in the longer term.

The final objective of *Convertible Urbanism* would be realising a full cycle of use for facilities that could be progressively upgraded as situations evolve, populations increase, regions urbanise, and demands for development grow. By considering the complete lifecycle of the built environment and pursuing its optimal utilisation, infrastructure investments in the surroundings of refugee camps can create the basis for further development in the affected regions. Then, refugee camps could become magnets of a prosperous urbanisation dynamic – not only to refugees, but to the remaining and following population groups as well.

Regina Orvañanos Murguía

Mexican architect and urban planner. Regina studied in Mexico, Finland, France and Germany. She has work experience as a spatial planner and technical adviser on the sustainable built environment. Her career was significantly influenced by her experience designing infrastructure in the informal neighbourhoods of Caracas and later, as part of a non-profit organization in Guadalajara, advocating, for better urban planning policies. Following a stage in the Shelter unit at UNHCR, her Master Thesis analyzed the Physical Planning mechanisms of Refugee Camps. Since a couple of years, she has been based in Nairobi, working as a consultant for motorized mobility for East African cities and for energy-efficient buildings at the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). She is currently working at UN-Habitat on the promotion of Urban Prosperity. Contact: <regina.orvananos@unhabitat. org> / <reginaorvananos@ gmail.com>

Conference Report – RC21 Conference "Resourceful Cities"

Organised by the Research Committee 21 on Sociology of Urban and Regional Development of the International Sociological Association (ISA) – held on August 29 – 31, 2013 in Berlin and hosted by Humboldt University

Julia Hartmann and Philipp Misselwitz

The global phenomenon of "camp urbanisation" also triggers an increasing interest from urban researchers and theorists in a domain previously mainly discussed from a legal or human rights perspective. At the 2013 edition of RC21 in Berlin, refugee camps were included in several sessions:

The conference theme "Resourceful Cities" evolved around (unequal) access to urban resources, equally determined by power relations and spatial in- and exclusions, and by how new resources are being generated through the social infrastructures of everyday urban life. As an enduring socio-spatial formation, urban camps not only share some of the mechanisms of exclusion and inequality in access to resources found in other urban places, they also overlap and interact with the broader structure and infrastructure of cities and operate as sites of an informal, marginal, and urbanised life. In an acknowledgement of this relatedness, "Resourceful Cities" devoted two sessions and an accompanying round table to urban camps. **Silvia Pasquetti**, of the University of Cambridge, and **Giovanni Picker**, of the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, led a diverse set of academic research projects under the heading "Global Camps from an Urban Perspective".

The sessions revealed the broad range of spatial typologies subsumed under the notion of camp: From refugee camps to planned Roma villages, from centres for asylum seekers to large-scale encampments for the homeless, what makes these extremely different urban or urbanising socio-spatial formations camps is their origin in often-violent mechanisms of segregation and marginalisation. As

such, as **Amanda S. A. Dias** pointed out in her comparison between Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and a Favela in Rio de Janeiro, these mechanisms and their spatial outcomes show similarities to other structural processes of urban exclusion.

In the various presentations, a clash of perspectives became apparent – between an analytical focus of the top-down structural processes influencing camp formation (for example through the actions of humanitarian agencies or governments concerned with governing mechanisms of camp administration, planning, and management) and a focus on the bottom-up processes generated by the agency of camp dwellers. The former perspective was presented by researchers such as **Marianne F. Potvin**, who shed light on the neoliberal paradigms underpinning the humanitarian urbanism of UNHCR's programmes for refugee assistance in Kabul. Questions of citizenship, forms of state control, theoretical references to Agamben's concepts of "bare life", and extraterritoriality also dominated the presentation by **Elena Fontanari** on detention centres and camps for asylum seekers in Germany, **Adriana Carbonaro** and **Fabio Quassoli**'s research on immigrant control and exclusion in contemporary Italy, and **Romain Cames**' report on Roma camps.

Other researchers took a more bottom-up view by charting the motives, ambitions, and strategies of the camp dwellers themselves. As **Christopher Herring**'s contribution on the diverse forms of self-organisation and identity in homeless encampments in the United States poignantly illustrated, both the

camps' actual physical structures and the corresponding urban life can also be shaped and transformed to a greater or lesser extent by the self-image and agency of the camp dwellers themselves. Ethnographer **Helene Simon-Loire** compared the livelihoods, emerging social structures, and mechanisms of informal housing production of Liberian refugees in a Ghanaian camp with the solidarity networks of urban refugees of the same origin in the city of Conakry in Guinea. **Noura Alkhalili** considered projects initiated by Palestinian camp dwellers themselves, such as a bridge between the refugee camp of Dheisheh (West Bank) and the neighbouring refugee town of Doha.

The most optimistic contribution from this perspective was probably **Irit-Katz Feigis**' presentation, in which she charted the emerging collaboration and growing solidarity in a planned Israeli settlement for World War II refugees. In the isolation of the desert, the shared experience of powerlessness and exclusion forged an unlikely alliance between the Jewish refugees, settled in the desert against their will, and the local but severely marginalised nomad population. Their recent collective success in lobbying for the administrative integration of the nomadic settlement and the provision of much-needed infrastructure might hopefully be setting a precedent for how the structural violence of encampment can be countered and overcome.

Book Reviews / Neue Bücher

Ökologie

Transcity (Simaon Franke): Valiz (Astrid Vorstermans et al.), eds. (2013) Farming the City. Food as a Tool for Today's Urbanism. 240 S., ISBN 978-90-78088-63-9, € 27,50.

‚Urban Agriculture' war über Jahre – wenn nicht Dekaden – ein von der Avantgarde besetztes Thema. Es ist daher erfreulich feststellen zu können, dass dieses Thema endlich im Mainstream angekommen ist. Die knapp 20 verschiedenen Beiträge wurden sechs Abschnitten des Buchs zugeordnet: Introduction; Food Policy; Food Economy / New Social Topography; Urban Society; The Selection (a catalogue of innovative initiatives) and The Epilogue. Gemeinsam haben Texte eher die Qualität assoziativer Statements in Stil eilig gezoppter Fernsehbeiträge. Die eingestreuten Grafiken und Piktogramme verschließen sich dem Verständnis konventioneller wissenschaftlicher Praxis – etwas Abwechslung kann ja nicht schaden (man muss nicht immer alles verstehen können). Als Leser wechsle ich zwischen Querlesen und einer wiederholten Textanalyse jeden Satzes und Paragrafen. Ich stimme mit diesem Konzept insoweit überein, als dass sich eine intensive Beschäftigung mit der Thematik ‚Urban Agriculture' lohnt und dass unterschiedliche Zugangsweisen das Spektrum der erreichten Adressaten verbreitern.

Besonders hervorzuheben ist der mit ‚Selection' überschriebene Abschnitt mit 35 Fallstudien innovativer Projekte im internationalen Kontext städtischer Landwirtschaft. Jeder Initiative sind zwischen einer und fünf Seiten gewidmet – aber in keinem Fall mehr als eine einzige Spalte erläuternder Text. Für jene, die mehr wissen wollen, sind die Internetseiten der Initiativen angegeben. Der Rest sind große und bunte Fotos – wie in einem Greentea-Table-Book, gedruckt auf Öko Papier. Aber die Website-Adressen sind auf jeden Fall hilfreich.

Resümee: Das Anliegen der Herausgeber ist zweifellos seriös und viel Mühe wurde in die Recherche investiert, was Lob und eine Empfehlung rechtfertigt. Die Aufmachung der Publikation ist Geschmacksache und gewöhnungsbedürftig – vielleicht auch nur eine Generationenfrage. Vielleicht erreicht diese unkonventionelle Präsentation sogar mehr Leser, Leserinnen und Aktivisten als ein klassisches Fachbuch. Damit wäre der Zweck voll erfüllt.

Kosta Mathéy

Landrecht und Bodenpolitik

Buttenberg, Lisa; Overmeyer, Klaus; Spars, Guido (Hg.) (2014) Raumunternehmen. Wie Nutzer selbst Räume entwickeln. Jovis-Verlag. Berlin. 168 Seiten. ISBN 978-3-86859-319-8. € 22,00.

Nachdem sich die Bonner Montag-Stiftung im Jahr 2012 mit dem Thema ‚Raumunternehmen und die Aktivierung von Nachbarschaften' befasst hat, folgt nun im vorliegenden Buch eine vertiefte städtebaulich-praktische und bodenökonomische Analyse zu dem Thema. Was ist ein Raumunternehmer? Um diese Definitionsfrage zu klären, muss man auf Seite 85 des vorliegenden Werkes vorblättern. Raumunternehmen seien eine neue Generation zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure, die sich an der Schnittstelle von Zivilgesellschaft, Projekt- und Stadtentwicklung bewegt, lokal-räumliche Initiativen anstößt und öffentliche Orte mit einem Programm und Gemeinschaftsstrukturen schafft, welche durch staatliche Organisationen und privatwirtschaftliche Unternehmen in dieser Form nicht kreiert werden können.

Dies sind auf den ersten Blick Worthülsen, könnte man meinen. Und während viele Publikationen zu eben diesem Thema in der (Planungs-)Theorie stecken bleiben, gelingt es Lisa Buttenberg, Klaus Overmeyer und Guido Spars, ihre Vorschläge auf sinnvolle Weise zu konkretisieren. Mit anderen Worten: Projekte und Ideen nicht nur zu artikulieren, sondern Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten zu liefern. Für diese Konsequenz erweisen sich Raumunternehmer u. a. als geschickt agierende Günstlinge der Immobilienkrise.

Wenn Investoren in Hamburg (Gängeviertel), Rotterdam (Schieblock) und Berlin (ExRotaprint) nicht in Liquiditätsschwierigkeiten geraten wären, hätte sich die Gelegenheit für die alternativen Nutzungsmodelle wohl nicht ergeben (S. 114 ff.). Dass an zahlreichen Stellen von „Erbpacht" statt richtigerweise von „Erbbaurecht" geschrieben wird, ist nur ein kleines stilistisch-juristisches Problem. Interessant ist die Feststellung, dass Raumunternehmer für einen Nutzer planen, den sie in der Regel gut kennen: für sich selbst. Dies erleichtert gewiss das Facility Management-System und macht teure Befragungen zur Nutzerzufriedenheit obsolet. Das Wohl und Wehe dieser Projekte – gleichgültig ob Stiftungs- und Genossenschaftskonstruktionen oder durch das Erbbaurecht – hängt freilich am Wirtschaftlichkeitsrahmen. Nicht immer steht eine (kapitalkräftige) Stiftung als Mit-Financier zur Verfügung. Raumunternehmer, obwohl sie in

den seltensten Fällen aus der Immobilienbranche stammen, müssen zahlenaffin sein und sich auch der bodenpolitischen Bedeutung bewusst sein. Denn gegen Profit zu sein heißt nicht, nicht ökonomisch zu denken und zu handeln (S. 138). Müller/Spars thematisieren zutreffend die eigentumspolitische Verstrickung der Raumunternehmer. Letztlich geht es darum, dem Grundstückseigentum einen veränderten, zeitgenössischen sozialpflichtigen Inhalt zu geben – worauf wir seit der obskuren und unpolitischen Sozialbindung des Artikels 14 Absatz 2 GG („Eigentum verpflichtet") seit dem Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes 1949 warten.

Soziale, durchaus auch benevolente Bodenpolitik, eine „Land policy by empowerment", eröffnet innovative Verfahren und Regelungen für öffentliches und auch privat-kollektives Gemein(-schafts-)eigentum. Raumunternehmertum beginnt und endet daher politisch-bodenpolitisch. Es braucht Verbündete in der jeweiligen Stadtverwaltung. Wie diese Suche nach Kooperationspartnern gelingen könnte, dafür weist dieses Buch einen innovativen und mit viel Liebe zum (Graphik-) Detail gestalteten Weg. Die Zeichnungen von Thomas Rustemeyer zu den Fallstudien bereichern den gut lesbaren Text enorm; dem Zeichner gelingt es, die Ökonomie von Raumunternehmen zu visualisieren und selbst komplexe Instrumente wie das Erbbaurecht zu veranschaulichen. Mein Gesamteindruck: sehr zur Lektüre und ggf. zur Mitwirkung empfohlen!

Fabian Thiel

Götz-Sebastian Hök (2012) Handbuch des internationalen und ausländischen Baurechts, Springer Verlag Heidelberg. Dordrecht. London. New York. 2. Aufl. 1.714 Seiten. 10 Abb. ISBN 978-3-642-12999-5. € 134,99.

Kann man ein Werk von mehr als 1.700 Seiten noch guten Gewissens als „Handbuch" bezeichnen, wie es der Einband-Buchdeckel der vorliegenden Publikation tut? Trotz der schieren Masse sollte sich der Leser nicht abschrecken lassen. Denn erstens ist das Buch gar nicht dafür gedacht, in einem Durchgang studiert zu werden und zweitens bietet es eine enorme Fülle von Informationen.

Das Handbuch von Götz-Sebastian Hök (Rechtsanwalt in Berlin) ist in zweiter Auflage bereits 2012 erschienen, es avanciert aber zunehmend zum Standardwerk, das sich wachsender Beliebtheit erfreut und so unbedingt empfohlen werden muss – wie es aktuelle Fälle und Erfordernisse im internationalen Bau-, Anlagen-, Infrastruktur- und Investitionsschutzrecht belegen.

Das Werk ist deshalb auch bei weitem nicht nur auf die juristischen „Kniffe", Fallstricke, Vertragsmuster und Rechtsschutzmöglichkeiten für Investoren beschränkt. Sehr grob umrissen lässt sich das Buch in drei (Haupt-) Teile gliedern. Der erste Teil (§§ 1 bis 30) umfasst die Grundlagen des internationalen Bauvertragsrechts (Anlagen- und Bauverträge), die Typologien der am Bau Beteiligten, Subunternehmerverträge und – als Herzstück – die Verfahren der alternativen Streitbeilegung (Alternative Dispute Resolution).

Der zweite Abschnitt beinhaltet in den §§ 32 bis 50 eine Länderauswahl, von Algerien bis zum Vereinigten Königreich. Hök präsentiert hier Spezifika des Bau- und Planungsrechts in diesen ausgewählten Staaten. Aber auch Ausführungen zu Grundstücksmärkten und Wertermittlungsbesonderheiten kommen gleichsam „nebenbei" zur Sprache und ergänzen die juristischen Aspekte gut. Hier finden sich auch Staaten (etwa Syrien und Rumänien), zu deren Grundstücks- bzw. Planungsrechtsrahmen es nur wenig deutschsprachige Literatur gibt, geschweige denn Lehrbücher. Die abschließenden Paragraphen 51 bis 53 geben auf immerhin 440 Seiten (!) Vertragsmuster und Rechtsvorschriften für im Ausland zu erbringende Bauleistungen und Streitbeilegungsmechanismen wieder.

Die wachsende Internationalität und Streitanfälligkeit der Bauwirtschaft macht dieses Buch zu einem unverzichtbaren Begleiter der oft von Unsicherheit, Risiken (Insolvenz; Enteignung; Störungen im Bauablauf) betroffenen Akteure. Das Erfordernis, sich rasch in international übliche Bau- und Projektmanagementverträge einzuarbeiten, diese Dokumente sprachlich zu verstehen, zu bewerten, ggf. anzupassen und auf mögliche Fallstricke hin zu überprüfen, ist weltweit betrachtet gestiegen. An Höks Handbuch kommen Bauherren, Investoren, Projektentwickler samt ihrer juristischen und betriebswirtschaftlichen Berater somit kaum (mehr) vorbei.

Sehr treffend ist dazu das Vorwort von Axel Jaeger, der auf den Leitsatz „Ignorance of the law is no excuse" verweist. Im Baustellenbetrieb kann diese Ignoranz den Vertragspartnern sehr teuer zu stehen kommen. Einer der Schwerpunkte der zweiten Auflage sind die „FIDIC"-Vertragsmuster zu Standardverträgen, zum Claim Management, zu Vergabebedingungen (bidding conditions for supply and installation of plants and equipment) und Streitbeilegung. In vier der 11 Hauptkapitel nehmen diese Regelungen des Internationalen Ingenieurverbandes (FIDIC) eine prominente Stellung ein.

Gut gelungen ist ferner die Einführung in das Europarecht und Internationale Privatrecht. Aus meiner Sicht ist zudem das Kapitel 5 sehr

praxisrelevant für global agierende Investoren in Grund und Boden/Infrastruktur. Dieser Abschnitt untersucht die Vergabeverfahren der Weltbank, die nicht nur für die technische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wichtig sind.

Mit diesem Werk hat der Autor profunde Herkules-Arbeit geleistet, einschließlich der akribisch zusammen gestellten Fußnoten, Literatur zu internationalen Gerichtsentscheidungen („Tribunal"), Schrifttumsnachweisen und Standardvereinbarungen. Das Buch ist durch seine Interdisziplinarität und Übertragbarkeit auf die Beilegung von Investitionsstreitigkeiten – etwa auf Dispute über faire und gerechte Behandlungen ausländischer Investoren im Rohstoff-, Energie- und Immobiliensektor (Beispiel: „Vattenfall gegen Bundesrepublik Deutschland"), bei Enteignungen oder Umweltauflagen zu Lasten eines ausländischen Vertragspartners wie etwa beim Kohlekraftwerk Hamburg-Moorburg geschehen – weit mehr als nur eine Baurechtspublikation.

Insgesamt liegt ein gründlich recherchiertes, vielseitiges, für Wissenschaft wie (Bauvertragsrechts-)Praxis gleichermaßen nutzbares Nachschlagewerk vor, dessen vergleichsweise hoher Preis durchaus seine Berechtigung hat. Götz-Sebastian Hök hat meinen internationalen Baurechts- und Streitbeilegungshorizont jedenfalls erheblich erweitert.

Fabian Thiel

Stadtentwicklung

Peirce, N.R., Johnson, C.W., and Peters F.M. (2008) The Century of the City. No Time to Lose. The Rockefeller Foundation. New York. 447 S.

Mit diesem Buch versucht die Rockefeller Foundation einen Führungsanspruch in der Stadtdiskussion einzunehmen. Die Veröffentlichung beruht auf einer von der Rockefeller Foundation durchgeführten Veranstaltung des Jahres 2007, zu der etwa 200 Vertreter ausgewählter Institutionen eingeladen waren.

Wie der Titel des Buches schon signalisiert, sind seit etwa dem Jahr 2000 Urbanisierung und Stadtentwicklung zu einem epochalen Thema erklärt worden, als die weltweite Tendenz einer die 50% Marke überschreitenden Urbanisierung bekannt wurde. Das Buch beschäftigt sich mit den Herausforderungen dieser Entwicklung. Vornan stehen immer noch die Grundbedürfnisse, Wasser und Abwasser und Wohnungen, deren Finanzierung trotz jahrzehntelanger Bemühungen immer noch nicht gesichert ist. Das Paradox der

heutigen Welt besteht darin, dass ein enormer Wohlstand und materieller Reichtum nicht von inklusiver und an Grundbedürfnissen orientierter Entwicklung begleitet ist. Rockefeller konstatiert diese Umstände und setzt auf eine größere Rolle der Communities und ihrer Kapazitäten, durch Selbsthilfe und Eigeninitiativen an diesen Zielsetzungen mitzuwirken.

Die Agenda der Grundbedürfnisse wird noch weiter belastet durch den fortschreitenden Klimawandel. Städte und ihre Infrastrukturen müssen umgebaut werden, um dem Klimawandel widerstehen zu können. Auch hier steht wieder die Frage der Finanzierung solcher Adaptionsmaßnahmen im Vordergrund. Selbst reiche Länder suchen nach Wegen zur Finanzierung dieser Langzeitausgaben, und ärmere Länder sehen kaum die Möglichkeit, ohne verstärkte Hilfe von außen die Risiken des Klimawandels zu reduzieren. Umweltbedingte Gesundheitsrisiken treten weltweit vermehrt auf und der Umgang mit ihnen wird heute schon als Teil der Stadtentwicklungsarbeit angesehen. Im Bereich der Gesundheitsversorgung gilt die präventive Versorgung als der beste Ansatz, und auch hier ist die aktive Beteiligung der Communities gefragt.

Die Kapitel zu den Themen der urbanen Langzeitstrategie, der Vision für den Transportsektor, der Zukunft der Metropolen und der Nachhaltigkeit der Städte befassen sich überwiegend mit der Situation der USA. Dies ist erstaunlich in einem Buch, das solch einen globalen Anspruch hat, denn die Situation der USA ist nur beschränkt relevant für viele Länder und Regionen des Südens. Aber immerhin sucht das Buch nach Gemeinsamkeiten, welche auf der Suche nach städtischer Nachhaltigkeit helfen können.

Als Postscript soll hinzugefügt sein, dass inzwischen von Rockefeller eine Kampagne gestartet wurde, die nach 100 Beispielen guten Stadtmanagements sucht, und diese 100 Erfolgsprogramme oder Projekte sollen zum 100. Geburtstag der Rockefeller Foundation im Jahre 2014 prämiert werden. Wir dürfen schon gespannt sein auf eine weitere Veröffentlichung.

Florian Steinberg

Veranstaltungen / Forthcoming Events

October 21–23, 2014 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
3rd international conference on sustainable built environment (icsbe): Bringing Coastal Cities into the Future: Challenges, Adaptation, and Mitigation. Hosted by Faculty of Civil Engineering and Planning, Islamic University of Indonesia, Kampus Terpadu, Jl. Contact / more information: <http://icsbe.uii.ac.id/>

October 21–25, 2014 in Copenhagen, Denmark
Island Cities and Urban Archipelagos. Hosted by Island Dynamics. Contact / more information: <icua@islanddynamics.org>, <www.islanddynamics.org/islandcities.html>

October 27–28, 2014 in Rome, Italy
The First International Conference on IoT [Internet of Things] in Urban Space. Hosted by ACM SIGAPP, SIGCHI, and SIGSPATIAL. Contact: <conferences@eai.eu>, more information <http://urbaniot.org/2014/>

October 29 – Nov. 1, 2014 in Hong Kong, China
The 6th Global Conference of the Alliance for Healthy Cities. On behalf of the China Hong Kong Chapter of the Alliance for Healthy Cities. Contact: <hcpo@hohcs.org.hk>, more information:

November 12–15, 2014 in Nashville, USA
12th Annual Green Roof & Wall Conference. Hosted by Green Roofs for Healthy Cities. Contact: <emacinnes@greenroofs.org>, more information:

November 13–15, 2014 in Istanbul, Turkey
CUI '14 / Contemporary urban issues conference on Informality. Hosted by Chamber of Architects of Turkey.
Contact: <info@cuiconference.org>, more information: <www.cuiconference.org>

Nov. 27–29, 2014 in Brussels, Belgium
15th N-AERUS Conference: REAL CHANGE? Exploring and assessing ways to co-produce knowledge for tangible transformations in the cities of the South. Hosted by N-AERUS, the Faculty of Architecture of the Université Libre of Brussels and the Université Saint-Louis of Brussels. Contact: <Naerus2014@ulb.ac.be>, more information:

Dec. 4–5, 2014 in Mexico City, Mexico
Philosophy of the City II: What do philosophers have to say about urban life? Hosted by the Center for Environmental Philosophy, Center for Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy, University of North Texas, Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, and Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, Mexico City. Contact : <shane.epting@unt.edu>, more information:

January 7–8, 2015 in Hong Kong, China
ICSU 2015: 2nd International Conference on Sustainable Urbanization. Hosted by Research Institute for Sustainable Urban Development & Faculty of Construction and Environment, The Hong Kong Polytechnic Univ. Contact: <icsu.2015@polyu.edu.hk>, more information: <www.polyu.edu.hk/risud/ICSU2015/>

March 16–19, 2015 in Berlin, Germany
Urban Fragmentation(s): Borders & Identity III. Hosted by the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (GWZ). Contact: <bic2015@gwz-berlin.de>, more information: <www.bic2015.de/>,

March 23, 2015 in Atlanta, USA
Park Pride 2015 Conference: Parks and People: A Declaration of Interdependence. Hosted by Park Pride. Contact: <conference@parkpride.org>, more information: <www.parkpride.org/conference/>

March 24–28, 2015 in Tunis, Tunisia
World Social Forum 2015, organised by the International Council of the World Social Forum. Contact: The Organizing Committee of the World Social Forum 2015, 47 Avenue Farhat Hachet, Bloc A, 2ème étage, 1001, Tunis. Phone: +216 7125 7664, Fax: 7125 7665, <contact@fsm2015>, more information: <www.fsm2015.org>

April 8–10, 2015 in York, United Kingdom
HSA Conference 2015: Housing the Generations: Justice, Inequality and the Implications of Political Change. Organised by the Housing Studies Association (HSA). Call for papers, deadline for abstracts: January 30, 2015. Contact: Gareth Young <gjyoung1@sheffield.ac.uk> and Ben Pattison <bmp248@bham.ac.uk>, more information: <www.housing-studies-association.org/event/hsa-conference-2015/>

April 8–11, 2015 in Miami, USA
Transnationalism from Above and Below: The Dynamics of Place-making in the Global City. Hosted by Urban Affairs Association. Contact: <info@uaamail.org>, more information: <http://urbanaffairsassociation.org/conference/conference2015/>

April 9–11, 2015 in Gwangju, Korea
2015 APNHR Conference: Housing 2.0 – Search for New Paradigms for Collaborative Housing. Hosted by Asia-Pacific Network for Housing Research. Contact: <apnhr2015@gmail.com>, more information: <http://apnhr2015.org/>

May 25–29, 2015 in Edmonton, Canada
XVth Biannual Conference International Association for the Study of the Commons: The Commons Amidst Complexity and Change. Contact: <bparlee@ualberta.ca>, more information: <www.oss.org.uk/globalcommons-conference-canada-25-29-may-2015/>, <www.iasc2015.org>

June 28 – July 1, 2015 in Lisbon, Portugal
ENHR conference: 'Housing and cities in a time of change: are we focusing on people?' Organised by the European Network on Housing Research (ENHR). Call for paper; deadline 13 March 2015. Contact: Rua Alberto José Pessoa, LT D – BL D3 Loja Esq Lisboa, Lisboa 1950 – 379. Phone: +351 218 593 634, Fax: +351 218 593 635, <lisbon@enhr2015.com>, more information: <www.enhr2015.com>

August 27–29, 2015 in Urbino, Italy
RC21 Conference 2015: The Ideal City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for tomorrow's urban life. The event is organised by the Research Committee 21 (RC21) on Sociology of Urban and Regional Development of the International Sociological Association and hosted by the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy. Deadline for abstracts is 31 January 2015, deadline for early bird registration 15 May 2015. Contact: Yuri Kazepov, DiSSPI, University of Urbino "Carlo Bo", Via Saffi, 15, 61029 Urbino (PU), Italy. Phone: +39 0722 305739, Fax: +39 0722 305731, <yuri.kazepov@uniurb.it>, more information: <www.rc21.org/contacts.php>