Editorial

For a long time, scholars and practitioners interested in urban planning and management worked quite independently from those who were convinced of rural development as the base mechanism for poverty alleviation in the Global South. Institutional classifications and policies strictly differentiating “urban” from “rural” fields of development have further substantiated this dualistic conception. This perception has changed over the last two decades with rural-urban linkages becoming an important topic in development research and in the development policy discourse. An early example for this change was the Istanbul Conference’s Habitat Agenda in 1996 that called for promoting an even-handed and mutually beneficial rural-urban development. In the practical field, several development agencies are now providing financial and technical support to programmes that strengthen economic, mobility-related and trade linkages as well as new governance arrangements between rural and urban areas.

In this TRIALOG issue we place a focus on migration related linkages in order to show that in many countries of the South the living situation of individuals and households can best be understood from an integrated rural-urban perspective. While global statistics and development prognoses suggest progressive urbanization processes implying a complete transition from rural to urban occupations, lifestyles and land uses, individual and family practices tell a different story: Within this context, rural to urban mobility has an important livelihood function for enabling the amalgamation of, for example, rural and urban occupations and assets. Hybrid rural-urban livelihoods, as well as their potential poverty-alleviating effects, have been documented with respect to a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. However, other aspects of the rural-urban interface have not been addressed so prominently such as the advantages and disadvantages of rural-urban migrant networks, the relevance of rural-urban mobility for certain development and planning fields as well as the role and impact of rural-urban migration for specific population subgroups.

With this issue of TRIALOG we thus intend to shed light on some of these aspects. The issue opens with an article by Mi-Ran Choi discussing the influence of migrant networks on livelihoods in rural India. While from the perspective of migrants and their families, these networks enhance the benefits of migration while attenuating its risks, the article also pinpoints their limited scope of action using this as a rationale for complementary public policies.

The subsequent two contributions discuss gender and age biases in regards to access to migration opportunities and benefits. The article by Petra Dannecker addresses temporary labour migration within Asia. The in and out migration movements have a dramatic effect on societies since migrants introduce new patterns of living. Building on the case study of rural Bangladesh, she describes the social changes from migrating women and men and the gender related notion of future life in the villages. Emmanuelle M.J. Tamanja reports in his article the findings of a study on how school children, living in a rural deprived locality in northern Ghana, use seasonal rural-urban migration as a livelihood strategy and also to access basic education.

The following four articles address rural-urban migration from the perspective of specific sectors. Herein, the debate on the environment-migration nexus has recently gained much prominence, especially in the discussion of the global impacts of climate change. So far, however, this discussion has remained rather intangible, particularly in respect to specific national or regional contexts. The article by Benjamin Schraven, Christina Rademacher-Schulz, John Amegashitsi and Asaah Mohammed thus identifies some important uncertainties related to environmental change and migration, grounding their reflections with experiences from Ghana. While improved communication and transportation technologies tend to go undisputed as facilitators of both temporary and permanent migration, the influence of discrete technologies on rural-urban livelihoods has hardly been studied in-depth. Saiful Momen’s article therefore provides empirical evidence on the impact of enhanced mobile telephony technology on rural livelihoods in a de-agrarianising context in Bangladesh. According to his findings, it is only some strata of rural society who benefit from the new technology in terms of improved market access. Anne Floquet’s article provides an in-depth analysis of four selected informal rural-urban trade networks in Benin. By disclosing the elementary contribution these networks have had to regional food security, she offers a novel perspective on the potential role of the informal sector for pro-poor development and starting points for supportive policies.

Obviously migration flows depend a great deal on the quality of the transportation networks found within individual countries. This is true of permanent migration but is even more crucial in a world where non-permanent migration flows are the order of the day. Heiner Monheim’s essay focuses on the relationship between transportation networks and long- versus short-distance migration, embedding these in reflections on the applicability of migration models in the Global North to mobility experiences in the Global South.

The issue closes with a book review by Eva Dick of Doug Saunders’ seminal book “Arrival City” which takes up the relationship between the urban transition and rural-urban linkages from multiple perspectives.
Urban Rural Linkages

Volume Editors: Renate Bornberg, Eva Dick and Einhard Schmidt-Kallert

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Pillars of Rural Livelihood:
Migrant Networks in Uttarakhand, India *

Mi-Ran Choi

Rural livelihood and labour mobility

In many developing countries, rural livelihoods are neither solely based on agriculture nor are they exclusively limited to rural areas: this is because small farmers generally cannot rely on subsistence agriculture alone, while at the same time local labour markets hardly offer other employment opportunities. In such contexts, rural livelihoods are closely linked to peoples’ willingness and capability of mobility. Thus labour mobility forms an integral part of the livelihoods of rural population.

In this regard, one can differentiate between labour mobility for survival and for additional income. While in the former case “remittances may be necessary for the household to meet basic needs, and keep people alive,” in the latter, additional income which has not to be spent on daily upkeep can economically uplift the household. Although the outputs of labour mobility can be beneficial, it is a risky undertaking that can result in high costs: households might take a loan or invest savings for the migration of a member. If this member is not able to send enough remittances, migration can turn into an economic loss. Moreover, the absence of household members can lead to lack of physical labour on home farms. If in such cases “remittances are so low that the households are not able to hire in labour or invest in other income generating assets,” the economic level of the households can worsen. Furthermore, labour migrants are often more vulnerable to exploitation, inadequate living conditions, or lack of security and information than the local labour force.

Against this background, several scholars argue that restrictive policies on labour mobility or the lack of institutional support would minimize potential benefits and increase related risks and costs. At the same time, it can be observed that in spite of restrictive contexts, labour migration is taking place in high numbers. Moreover, in the absence of institutional support, labour migrants adopt their own coping strategies amongst others through migrant networks.

This paper focuses on these social networks and their role for labour migrants and their families at the source areas based on a sample survey conducted in Northern India in 2008. The survey examined 176 cases divided into four respondent groups: current labour migrants, former labour migrants, migrant households (households with migrant members) and non-migrant households (households without migrant members). The interviews contained of group overlapping as well as group specific questions. The rural source area studied comprised of 22

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1 C.f. Wienold 2007, 7
2 Ellis 1998, 9
3 Waddington 2003, 40
4 Deshingkar/Grimm 2004, 27
5 E.g. Deshingkar 2006, Skeldon 1997
6 Current labour migrants: 43 interviews, former labour migrants: 15 interviews, migrant households: 78 interviews, non-migrant households: 40 interviews. Additionally, qualitative interviews were conducted with experts and specific migrants.

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* This article has been peer reviewed by two independent reviewers. A group of about 30 distinguished experts is engaged in TRIALOG’s peer review process.
villages in the mountain region of Uttarakhand, with a total number of 1751 households facing similar challenges as described above: agriculture was the main source of livelihoods but generally yields were not sufficient so that labour mobility played an important role.

Out of the 22 examined villages, 44% of all households could be classified as migrant households whereby the shares of migrant households in the villages ranged from 10% to 88%. The reasons for labour mobility were mainly of economic nature whereby lack of local employment opportunities played a major role. Several interviewees complained not only about the lack of jobs but also about the temporary and insecure nature of most existing occupations (e.g. construction work).

Patterns of labour mobility from rural Uttarakhand

Within the sample, labour mobility was mainly undertaken by men who usually migrated alone while their families remained in the villages. However with growing tendencies, whole families were leaving the rural mountain region. Among the studied migrants, 57% could be classified as permanent/long-term migrants and 43% as seasonal migrants who on average migrated for 3.5 months. The differentiation between permanent and long-term migrants was challenged by cases where migrants had initially planned to return to the source area but later on decided to remain at their destination.

Labour migrants were found within all economic and educational levels whereby these factors often influenced patterns such as the time frame or the work at the destination: while lower educated migrants were more likely to migrate seasonally, higher educated ones usually migrated on a long-term/permanent basis. Seasonal migrants usually worked in the low-wage sector (e.g. on apple orchards, as luggage porters in tourist places), while long-term/permanent migrants were found in the manufacturing sector as well as in gastronomy, office and government jobs. Mobility patterns can also be influenced by the location of the source village: one of the studied villages was very close to a tourist place and almost every household had at least one male member migrating there seasonally, even for very short time periods. In this case the geographical location of the village reduced the costs and risks of migration.

Although the majority of interviewees (85%) stated that labour mobility was beneficial to their households, 43% of the surveyed current and former migrants had faced problems during their migration. This applied regardless of the level of education, economic background or the destination of the migrants. Problems related mostly to health issues, finding accommodation, getting the agreed payment, and high expenditures at the destination, which reduced the amounts remitted home. The data indicates that seasonal migrants face problems more often than long-term/permanent ones whereby the share was 58% to 24%.

Seasonal migrants were also more likely to be dissatisfied with their living conditions at their destination: 80% of the surveyed permanent/long-term migrants were satisfied while this applied to only 50% of the seasonal migrants. Reasons for being dissatisfied were mainly related to issues of accommodation: Rooms or tents were crowded and lacked basic facilities such as beddings, access to water and sanitation. This especially applied to seasonal migrants. Even if working at the same destination every year, in many cases the living conditions had not improved.

85% of the studied migrants sent remittances whereby the propensity to remit and the remitted amount differed according to income, time frame of migration, and place of work.

This corroborated foregoing studies in the region by Mamgain, Bora and Ghansiyal.

This question was asked to migrant households, current and former migrants: n=136.

However, there were also found several university students migrating seasonally in order to finance their education fees.

This question was asked to migrant households, current and former migrants: n=136.

However, the yardstick for being satisfied or not, differed from migrant to migrant: Some interviewees related to be satisfied with having to stay in overcrowded rooms or tents whereas others saw these conditions as dissatisfactory.

This question was asked to migrant households, current and former migrants: n=136.

Figure 2: Accomodations of labour migrants in the construction sector (photo: Mi-Ran Choi)
of residence of the nuclear family. Seasonal migrants though on average earning less, generally remitted higher shares of their income since usually the nuclear families remained in the villages. Table 1 emphasizes the importance of labour mobility for livelihoods but also corroborates the widespread criticism that remittances are mostly spent on consumption instead of being invested. However, where households are only able to meet their basic needs through remittances, this criticism seems inappropriate.

Within the sample, there were several cases where labour mobility led to a lack of manpower in agriculture, especially during harvest season. In some cases, seasonal migrants had to return home earlier to help. However, most households were able to cope with it through other household members, employment of workers, giving parts of the land to other villagers while in return receiving part of the yield or “labor exchange”. The latter indicates that households help each other by first working together on one household’s field and then working together on the other household’s field. In two cases the migrant members had not worked in agriculture before, so their absence did not cause a lack of labour.

The findings confirm that labour mobility is an important strategy of securing livelihood and improving socio-economic status. These were the main expectations stated regarding migration. While provision of livelihood could generally be achieved, socioeconomic uplifts were found rather seldom. This could be due to the fact that such uplifts usually take longer periods of time, e.g. remittances invested in the education of younger household members might show their impacts only when these members

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**Table 1**: Spending of remittances - multiple response  
(source: Mi-Ran Choi)

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**References**

enter the labour market. Although being a common strategy of livelihood, the study showed that many labour migrants, regardless of their socioeconomic background, were exposed to problems. In this regard, social networks were crucial.

**The role of migrant networks**

Migrant networks can be defined as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and nonmigrants in origin and destination area through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.”

They can be considered as social capital lowering costs and risks of migration, e.g. through assistance in finding employment and accommodation or psychological support. Recent migrants receiving assistance from experienced ones gain their own knowledge and experience and can, in turn, help “newcomers”. According to De Haas, “besides material and human capital, social capital is a third, crucial migration resource in (1) enabling and (2) inspiring people to migrate.”

The importance of these three kinds of capital was confirmed by the findings of the study: Out of the 40 non-migrant households, 20 stated that they would actually like to have a member migrating. In most cases, lacking one or several of the aforementioned types of capital impeded migration. In this regard, the study ascertained that it is not absolutely necessary to possess all three kinds of capital in order to migrate: E.g., a person with little material capital might still be able to migrate when knowing other migrants who offer support or a person with high economic and human capital might be less reliant on the help of others.

Out of the surveyed current and former migrants, 98% had received support regarding their mobility process. The most important sources of support were family, agents and friends (table 2).

It is striking that no formal support was mentioned. This could indicate that there were no official supporting structures or that migrants avoided or did not know about them. The kinds of support given mostly referred to financial support, finding employment, and accommodation.

Support by the nuclear families, which in most cases remained in the source areas, was generally financial (table 3). This could be an indicator for labour mobility as a household strategy as the family invests in the mobility of one member who later sends remittances. However, it is difficult to see households as monolithic units and not all households supporting migrant members required remittances. It seems that the household strategy approach applies to cases where the husband migrates alone while his wife and the children remain in the source village, rather than in cases where unmarried sons or whole nuclear families migrate.

Acquaintances at the destination or migrating together play an important role in providing support and information: Within the sample, 42% of all employments had been found through family, friends and relatives, while 23% of the employments were provided by agents. The role of agents was brought up by the demand of seasonal labour at destinations and the supply of labour at source areas. Agents and employers can also form part of migrant networks benefiting by provision of reliable labour: Several migrants stated that agents usually select labourers with whom they had already worked together. This shows that social networks can be beneficial for those being part of them and at the same time can be disadvantageous to those who are excluded.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 2: Sources of support – multiple response (source: Mi-Ran Choi)</th>
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1. Financial support
2. Finding employment
3. Finding accommodation
4. Moving to the destination
5. Provisions of food

References (cont.)


Table 3: Support received by migrants – multiple response (source: Mi-Ran Choi)

- Massey et al. 1993, 448
- De Haas 2008, 20
Social networks can also influence the choice of labour destinations: Within the sample, 58% of all current and former migrants selected their destination among others because friends, relatives or other villagers were already working there. Knowing other migrants at the destination can provide a certain security: 48% of the surveyed current and former migrants had gone to their destination without having secured a job beforehand. Out of these, 79% stated to have found work within one week. Within the studied cases, migrant networks also facilitated the transfer of remittances: sending money home through other migrants from the same source area was a common way of remitting.

“Migration studies is not just about movement, but also about the interconnectedness of place of origin and place of destination”. Migrants at the destination and family members/friends/communities at the source areas are interconnected and hold up collective social and economic spaces. In this regard, Parnwell speaks of a “simultaneity” or “multiple being” in two or more places”, which he refers to as translocalism. The study found such translocal linkages between destination and source areas in terms of visits, communication, and transfer of information, goods and remittances. Further, several of the surveyed migrants stated that they feel at home both at the destination and in the home village. Within the sample, there were cases where younger household members were sent to the urban destination to stay with the migrant member to exploit the better educational possibilities there. This shows that households use the advantage of having members at different places. However, this was generally limited to households of higher economic status.

Against the background of their own experiences, current and former migrants were asked which kind of support should be given to labour migrants. The most frequently mentioned answer referred to information about job vacancies at the destination. Finding employment was a major issue for labour migrants and was largely overcome with the help of social networks. However, social networks do not have a complete overview of labour markets and can only provide information within limited scopes. Furthermore, interviewees asked for formal contact points in case support would be needed in finding accommodation, in case they suffer from health problems, or if employers/agents refuse to pay or pay less than the initially agreed amount.

All these mentioned services and support structures could be provided by a formal institution. Apart from institutional support, interviewees mentioned that the legal framework should be adapted to current realities: it was criticised that the ration card procuring essential commodities at a subsidised rate in the home villages would not be transferable to single household members and could not be used at the destination areas.

Conclusion

The study confirmed the crucial role of migrant networks in labour mobility processes. However, it also found that there are further factors influencing “successful” labour mobility, i.e. material and human capital. Moreover, even the selectivity of mobility through educational level, economic status and social networks can be reduced by other factors such as the geographical location of the source village.

Consequently, it can be said that social networks play a crucial role, but that they display one out of several important factors. Moreover, depending on the pattern of labour mobility and the individual characteristics of a migrant, social networks might be more or less important. The individual characteristics do not only refer to the educational level or the socioeconomic background, but also to the working and mobility experience. In this regard, several of the interviewed seasonal migrants stated that in the beginning they had migrated together with friends and other villagers, but after a while they had been able to migrate and find employment on their own. However, they still enjoyed the company of friends.

The study showed that although almost all surveyed current and former migrants received support, 43% of them faced problems. This indicates that in spite of receiving support, migrants are still in a vulnerable position. It is striking that none of the interviewed migrants received institutional support, further highlighting the importance of informal migrant networks. In absence of formal support these networks are somehow closing gaps, however, they are not able to close them fully as shown by the migrants’ wishes for further information and support.

Labour mobility forms an important part of rural livelihood. However, in many of the studied cases, migrants would have preferred to work in their home villages. In this regard, it is striking that in 96% of all examined mobility cases, migration would not have happened if given employment in the village. This applied to seasonal as well as long-term and permanent migrants. Only a few people in the sample would still have migrated in order to learn new skills or because of the rural lack of infrastructure and services. These findings however are closely linked to the study’s focus on those migrating alone while their families remain in the villages.

In order to improve rural livelihood opportunities, several interviewees requested more information, guidance and training regarding (new) agricultural methods. Further, it might be helpful to support farmer-led market research to identify niches for small scale farmers (e.g. growing of products requiring more attention, supply to the local tourism industry). Another approach could tackle the educational sector: Several interviewees criticised education in the mountain region for being of low quality and not being labour market oriented so that even university graduates would either face difficulties in finding employment locally or when migrating face difficulties in competing on the national labour market. Moreover, educational institutions seemed to not be adapted adequately to the surrounding environment: Several younger interviewees stated a lack of technical institutes or subjects of local relevance such as agricultural economy or veterinary medicine.

Rural livelihoods are not only linked to agriculture nor to one specific place, i.e. the home village. It is a complex phenomenon. Therefore improvement and support of rural livelihoods need a holistic approach not only focussing on rural development and farming but also on different aspects such as migration policy, education policy, labour market policy as well as infrastructural development.
The Changing Rural Landscape in Bangladesh through Return Migration –
A Gendered Perspective *

Petra Dannecker

Veränderungen ländlicher Gebiete in Bangladesch durch Rück-Migration –
eine genderspezifische Betrachtung

Introduction
Temporary labour migration within Asia has increased tremendously in the last decades. The patterns of these ‘new’ movements and the implications for the sending as well as the receiving countries have been discussed in the last years, primarily with regard to economic transformations and developments. Thereby the focus has been placed on global economic restructuring and the increased demand for cheap and flexible labour, primarily in the export-oriented sectors in the so-called newly industrialised countries in Asia (see Hutchison & Brown 2001). The working conditions and living situations of this new, often female migrant labour force have especially been critically analysed (Beneria 2003 or Caraway 2007). The new pattern of temporary labour migration is accompanied by policies trying to avoid the social or political integration of temporary labour migrants in the receiving countries. Nevertheless, temporary labour migrants are very visible in the receiving countries, and often stigmatized as endangering the imagined homogeneity of the respective societies. Especially in South-East and East Asian cities, migrants have become part of the urban ‘marginal’ masses, leading to the coexistence of different social, symbolic and economic spaces (Evers & Korff 2000: 23), and to the constitution of transnational spaces between sending and receiving countries. In this context, social cohesion becomes an increasingly significant issue, and cities have become breeding grounds for conflicts and struggles in public, as well as in politics of identities, citizenship, rights, and entitlements.

With regard to development, migrant workers, and lately female labour migrants in particular (Ramirez et al 2005; Piper 2009), have been discovered as new development agents. Their remittances are seen as important for the reduction of poverty and thus for development processes in the migrants’ countries of origin, also by international and national development organisations. Thereby the definition of development is often very modern, meaning it is defined as economic development. Social changes in the sending countries, which are also a part of migration processes, are, at least in the mainstream discourses on migration and development, not yet being systematically discussed even though the term social remittances has recently entered the debate (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves 2011; Levitt & Nyberg-Sorensen 2004).

In this paper I shall analyse how migration processes are affecting the rural areas in Bangladesh. It discusses how labour migrants experience return after years abroad, how the experiences of working and living in urban areas in the receiving countries changes their perceptions of the rural areas where they, in most cases, originated from, and what cultural and social changes they initiate (unintended or intended) after returning. This is of special interest since temporary labour migration implies at least temporarily return. Labour migrants have to return either as a result of deportation or because their working contracts have ended and they no longer have the opportunity to stay as documented migrants (Cassarino 2004). On the basis of qualitative interviews with male and female returning migrants in rural Bangladesh, as well as on secondary information, the focus will be on how urban experiences are perceived and used for negotiating social changes in their rural areas of origin. Therefore the dimension that will be highlighted in this paper, according to the empirical data, is that men and women experience urban life differently, which also influence the social changes, they try to initiate after returning.

* This article has been peer reviewed by two independent reviewers. A group of about 30 distinguished experts is engaged in TRIALOG’s peer review process.
1 The UN Population estimates out of the 241 million migrants worldwide, 62 million are migrants within Asia. The number is probably much higher since only documented migrants are counted. Thereby it is important to highlight that two-thirds of migrants move within the global South (Munck 2009: 4). Nevertheless, the one-third moving from South to North is getting most of the attention, resulting in a quite unbalanced understanding of international migration.
2 See for example Evers and Korff 2000; Kraas 2007 or Beall et.al. 2012.
3 For a discussion of the migration development nexus see Faist 2008; Dannecker 2009; De Haas 2008; Faist & Fauster (ed.) 2011.
4 The data is based on qualitative interviews with migrant workers in Malaysia and return migrants in Bangladesh conducted in 2004 and thereafter.
This is not to say that economic, social, cultural or political changes in the sending countries due to migration processes have not been discussed. Especially in approaches to transnational migration it has been shown how networks and transnational activities between sending and receiving countries constitute new social spaces and link rural and urban areas (see Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Pries 2008 or Faist 2004). Transnational social, economic and political activities have been analysed in quite a number of studies recently, revealing that migration can no longer be conceptualized as a one-way or a one-dimensional process and that clear definitions of ‘home’ and ‘receiving country’ or of ‘migration’, ‘return’ and ‘mobility’ are getting blurred. Nevertheless, the focus has so far primarily been on the linkages between sending and receiving countries, especially when international migration is being dealt with. The linkages between rural and urban areas are issues that are primarily the focus of scientific interest when it comes to internal migration or of studies dealing with remittances or the role that hometown associations play in the development of sending countries. Furthermore, and this can also be observed in Bangladesh, studies focussing on the rural context and changes in the rural areas due to migration processes tend to either focus on the economic aspects of remittances or the influence of Bangladeshi transnational or diaspora communities in western countries on their rural ‘home’ communities (Siddiqui 2005). But, and this is the main argument put forward in this paper, the influence and the changes that the transnational activities and networks of transnational or diaspora communities initiate in rural areas have other implications than being ‘forced’ temporarily or permanently return as in the context of temporary labour migration. Return, in the latter case, is a compulsive part of the migration process and influences the notion of ‘home’ and the construction of identities differently. ‘Home’ is thus not an imagined place, as often argued for within diaspora communities, but a physical place, which temporary migrants have to return to. But these places, mainly in rural areas, are under permanent transformation due to outmigration, and through the migrants’ experiences abroad, as will be discussed in the following section.

Migration from Bangladesh

In general it can be argued that migration from Bangladesh has had a long history closely connected to the country’s colonial past. For decades, people, especially from the northern district Sylhet, have migrated to the West, mainly Great Britain, and most of these migrants have become long term residents or citizens of the destination countries (see for example Siddiqui 2003; Rahman and Fee 2005). There is a considerable amount of literature on the ‘South Asian’ Diaspora (see for example Eade & Garbin 2006 or Kibria 2012), whereas studies of the communities from which the first generation came or the effects migration has had on the area are fewer (Gardner & Osella 2003, Dusche 2011). A strict immigration policy in the West from the 1970s onward and the simultaneous rise of oil prices, which generated a huge demand for temporary migrants in the Middle East, lead to a change of direction as well as to new migration patterns. Temporary labour migration to the oil-rich Arab countries and also to the prosperous countries of East and South-East Asia from the 1980s onward has increasingly played a vital and indispensable role for the national economy of Bangladesh, and in particular for people in rural areas. This change of direction was due to new possibilities the regional labour markets provided, and to the emergence of a labour recruitment system involving not

References

- Figure 1: Meeting point of the men in a village in Bangladesh (photo: Alexander Jachnow)

This is not to say that economic, social, cultural or political changes in the sending countries due to migration processes have not been discussed. Especially in approaches to transnational migration it has been shown how networks and transnational activities between sending and receiving countries constitute new social spaces and link rural and urban areas (see Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Pries 2008 or Faist 2004). Transnational social, economic and political activities have been analysed in quite a number of studies recently, revealing that migration can no longer be conceptualized as a one-way or a one-dimensional process and that clear definitions of ‘home’ and ‘receiving country’ or of ‘migration’, ‘return’ and ‘mobility’ are getting blurred. Nevertheless, the focus has so far primarily been on the linkages between sending and receiving countries, especially when international migration is being dealt with. The linkages between rural and urban areas are issues that are primarily the focus of scientific interest when it comes to internal migration or of studies dealing with remittances or the role that hometown associations play in the development of sending countries. Furthermore, and this can also be observed in Bangladesh, studies focusing on the rural context and changes in the rural areas due to migration processes tend to either focus on the economic aspects of remittances or the influence of Bangladeshi transnational or diaspora communities in western countries on their rural ‘home’ communities (Siddiqui 2005). But, and this is the main argument put forward in this paper, the influence and the changes that the transnational activities and networks of transnational or diaspora communities initiate in rural areas have other implications than being ‘forced’ temporarily or permanently return as in the context of temporary labour migration. Return, in the latter case, is a compulsory part of the migration process and influences
only agencies of the government, but also private recruit-
ment agents and local intermediaries (Siqqiql 2003). The
agents and intermediaries increasingly recruited people
from rural areas, who had not been involved in migra-
tion processes to the West, and had, until the 1980s, not
developed a “culture of migration” (Kandel & Massey
2002). Nowadays, temporary labour migration is the most
common form of population movement from rural Bang-
ladesh as defined in a localised Islamic way (Dannecker
2005), as skilled and unskilled female employment as well
as on gender.

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Most of the labour migrants are male, although the
number of female labour migrants is growing, due to
the demand for female labour in export-oriented sectors
located primarily in urban areas or suburbs of the receiv-
ing countries. The fact that the Bangladesh government
is not actively supporting female labour migration and,
on the contrary, has banned so-called unskilled female
migrants and portrays it as a violation of the existing
gender order and the ideal of women’s decent behaviour
as defined in a localised Islamic way (Dannecker 2005),
has led to most women migrating undocumented, despite
the fact that equal rights for men and women to migrate
for employment were recognized for the first time in
2006. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
estimates that out of the five million Bangladeshi workers
who lived and worked overseas in 2011, approximately 14%
were women, although only 5% of these women were
officially registered (Uluma 2011). Whereas data concern-
ing the official number of migrants, their educational and
professional background, age, and formal remittances
(around $12,000 million in 2011) is widely available, there
are no figures concerning the areas of origins, return or
re-migration. Due to the networks and the important role
of rural recruiters, it is argued in the literature that labour
migrants primarily come from a few rural districts, mostly
in the South. This, however, is statistically undocumented
and also counts for the number of people returning to
their countries of origin. The ‘missing’ data can be inter-
preted as a general lack of interest in returning, especially
by governments of sending countries. As shown else-
where (Dannecker 2011), returning is primarily perceived
as an economic burden, allowing for the conclusion that
migration in general, and temporary labour migration in
particular, are seen mainly in their instrumental function
for national economic development in general and rural
development in particular by the government as well as
migrants’ families. Thereby the focus is on remittances
and the possible economic benefits of buying land, con-
structing houses, investing in businesses or improving the
living standards for rural areas. Studies analysing the pure
economic impact of migration and remittances reveal that
economic benefits and thus the economic transformation
of rural areas in Bangladesh are not as obvious as often
argued in mainstream literature on the migration
and development nexus (see for example Rahman 2011;
Kibria 2004, Dannecker 2009). Instead, social inequalities
between regions and within communities are also an
often observed outcome.

This short summary of the discourses dealing with
remittances and return of migrants reveals that possible
changes of rural areas due to migration and transnational
networking are primarily looked at from an economic and
material perspective, which is due to the fact that rural
settings in developing and sending countries are defined
as fixed and static. Changing the perspective, as will be
done in the following section, by focusing on the migrants
in general and female migrants in particular, will reveal
that social and cultural changes can be observed in rural
areas due to migration, the return of people from urban
areas, and the new linkages between the two.

Figure 2: Traditional female realm in rural Bangladesh (photo: Alexander Jachnow)

5
Temporary or short term migration means that after a
work contract is over (on average between 3 to 5 years)
the migrants return. Settlement abroad is not intended
or not possible.

6
Unskilled is defined as low education and low ability and
productivity. However what is defined as skilled and unskilled
is a social construct depending on the political framework,
regional and global demands as well as on gender.

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The migrants: Gendered experiences, perceptions and transformations

It can generally be argued that the stay abroad for all returned migrants interviewed, especially the experiences of urban life and lifestyle, has influenced their perception of the rural area as much as their working experiences, although differently among male and female returnees, as the empirical data reveals.

The empirical data shows that through the migration process and the urban experiences abroad for most male migrants, their rural areas of origin are imagined as ideal places to live. This is attributed to the fact that, in particular, male migrants returning from Malaysia experienced discrimination in social, religious, as well as cultural ways, as Nayeem puts it: “People in Malaysia think we are backward since we are coming from a poor country and rural areas”. Thus while being abroad they were building up strong networks in Malaysia with co-workers from their areas of origin and they were drawing a border between themselves and the ‘others’: the different local and migrant groups in Malaysia.

Thereby several migrants, like Nabi, another migrant from Bangladesh, stated that life in the city is much more stressful, and that people do not care about each other. He feels that women especially do not behave morally, meaning they wear miniskirts and go out at night “even though Malaysia is a Muslim country like Bangladesh”. Female Bangladeshi migrants were also accused of having a loose lifestyle while being abroad, which is, according to the male migrants, a result of the temptations of the cities and the lack of social control in urban areas. The result is a strong identification with their rural home, which leads to the orchestration of local and religious practices or a ‘local’ lifestyle after their return. This does not correspond to the daily life of the rural communities and families, or to the transformations that took place while they had been abroad. Thus, while in many families gender relations and the decision-making structures (or daily life in general) have changed due to the absence of a male family member and the remittances sent back, the returning migrants come back with an idealized and often invented image of rural life.

Quite a lot of family members were therefore stunned, for example, by the fact that returned migrants criticized the use of remittances by their families for consumption goods. The families are trying to use these remittances for not only a change in social status, but also to belong to an urban consumer class, according to the way they imagine such an identity. The migrants however used part of the money earned abroad to invest in religious symbols, like supporting the mosque, or criticized the local Islamic culture as having become blurred. This is especially significant with regard to gender relations and, within this context, the model of separate spheres for men and women. This has always been a myth, but as White (1992, 23) argues, “…not in the sense of being unreal or untrue, but as a symbolic expression of relations between male and female, with simultaneous ideological and material dimensions.” Thus, conflicts and negotiations over gender and social relations, as well as so-called cultural practices, symbols and identities, are part of migration and returning to the place of origin, and are leading to transformations and changes in rural settings.

The returning female migrants also initiate changes and negotiations, but differently. Female migration from rural areas especially stands for a transgression of spaces, since women have entered so-called male spaces. Female migration is an issue controversially discussed in Bangladesh, with not only Islamic leaders and political actors, but also male migrants and their organizations raising their voices against women leaving the country without male guardians. Working and living not only outside the country but furthermore in urban spaces, which are portrayed as a constant threat and danger for women’s proper behaviour, is put forth here. It is argued that women not only lose their izzat (honour) due to their movements, but also that the families’ public position will suffer.

Female migration challenges the local social construction of womanhood and gender relations, as briefly discussed above. This applies both to international and rural-urban migration (Dannecker 2002). These discourses influence the different phases of the migration process, the networking as well as the return. This is the main reason why the female migrants interviewed evaluated their stays abroad quite positively, like Nasma, who states: “I liked my work and my stay in Malaysia. People treated me in a respectful way, I liked to live with my colleagues and I saw many new things in the city.” Whereas the women experienced an increase in status while being abroad - the frame of reference for this perception is the home country - for the male migrants the situation is different. For them, migration primarily means a decrease in status abroad and an increase at home.7

Thus, whereas for the male migrants the rural area of origin is constructed as the ideal place, for the female migrants, the contrary can be said. They felt hemmed in back in the villages, for example, especially due to the existing gender relations at ‘home’. Most of the interviewed women did not have the possibility to move or travel while being abroad. Thus for them women’s employment outside the houses, in their cities of arrival like Kuala Lumpur or Penang, is defined as part of an urban life. Many women thus began the negotiation of gender relations by criticizing local gender relations (Rozario & Gow 2003: 67). Furthermore, it could be observed that many women also tried to perpetuate experiences from abroad after coming home, implementing new practices based on practices and goods that they define as being urban. The returned female migrant workers furthermore turned out to be much more mobile than the women who did not migrate. They directly contested local practices, for example, through giving loans to other women or by visiting former colleagues. Some of the women dressed differently, at least at home, or they criticised their husbands and families by referring to the Malaysian and the urban context and their experiences there. Many women even started to argue on religious grounds, well aware that in Bangladesh, Malaysia is perceived as a very successful Islamic country; a role model for Bangladesh. Especially the fact that in a successful Islamic country female employment as part of urbanization is a matter of fact, whereas in Bangladesh female employment outside the house is perceived as a violation of the local and rural gender order. This was put forward by the returned

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7 This can be also analyzed in other regions, as already discussed by Goldring in 1999.

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female migrants in discussions and used, for example, in negotiations with husbands or family members to challenge gender relations and the power of this myth. Women thus develop their own presentation of gender and home through migration and their experiences in an urban setting. Non-migrant women are adopting some of the new practices and are starting to imagine living and working abroad in, as one woman put it, “...a big city” (see Dannecker 2005).

In this context, returned female migrants used the term “we” in the interviews not for their families but for their fellow migrants; their “imagined community.” A common conscience and shared experiences led to networks and social forms that are important for the renegotiation of gender relations, which has not been enabled until now, due to the fact that the male migrants are still better positioned. Gilroy (1997: 316) notes that “the awareness of multi-locality stimulates the desire to connect oneself with others, both ‘here’ and ‘there’ who share the same roots and routes”. This desire is obvious within the rural areas where the women were always very eager to show pictures of themselves and of other workers in Malaysia in front of the Twin Towers, a shopping mall or a restaurant. The photographs are used to show the success story of their migration and can be interpreted as an expression of the confidence that was developed. Furthermore, they are used to show that they were not only workers, but also developed a certain urban life style, including sightseeing tours and wearing jeans. Often, the women presented pictures of workers they did not know thereby suggesting an ‘imaginary coherence’ (Hall 1992) between themselves and the workers abroad, between the rural and the urban, showing the transformation of identities, awareness and memory, which accompany these processes. Thus, for the male migrants, the rural area developed into an imagined place to be, while for the returned female migrants, the urban areas abroad are the places they are longing for. For them migration is equated with urbanity, defined as living and working together with others, being more mobile and with less social control and as Selma puts it “…meeting other people and seeing other places”. Thus, while for the majority of female returned migrants re-migration is the goal, most male migrants were not eager to migrate again.

Migration, as well as returning to the country of origin, leads to disagreements over meanings (Goldring 1999: 168) for male as well as female migrants, especially over meanings concerning gender relations (but in opposite ways). Whereas the male migrants try to implement the cultural ideal of separated spheres for men and women (with men occupying the public and women the private and domestic sphere), this cultural ideal is increasingly questioned through female migration in general and the new “urban” practices of returned female migrants in particular. Even though the female returnees are not yet in a position to change the existing gender order, renegotiations do take place which are changing the rural areas.

Conclusion
As shown, issues of gender relations, sexual and social conduct, women’s space, place, work, dress, and rights are often getting increased significance when a difference from others is to be marked. Furthermore especially gender issues, as mentioned, are referred to when a collective and national (or as in the case discussed above, a rural identity) is to be constructed, represented or defended. Thereby the migration of women from rural to urban areas is an issue used by different actors in these processes. In the discourse around the international labour migration of Bangladeshi women, urban spaces, where most of the migrant women work and live abroad, are constructed as dangerous sites for women’s honour since women are said to not be able to handle the temptations of urban cultures. Urbanity does imply mobility in rural Bangladesh, but also a lack of social control and consumption that women are, at least according to the male migrants, not able to resist. Therefore, the symbols of success of a life abroad such as a tin roof, a TV, clothes, hairstyles or electronic goods which, in rural areas, are closely connected to an urban lifestyle, are only presented by male migrants and their families. For the female migrant, urbanity is used synonymously with employment opportunities, respect, and interactions outside the family. For them, the locally defined Islamic gender order is the frame of reference for defining urbanity.

The social changes in rural Bangladesh due to migration and return, and the negotiation processes that take place within these spaces, are embedded in the different and gender specific experiences of migration as well as urbanity in the receiving countries. For the male migrants, the urban space abroad was perceived as a space where they experienced discrimination on different levels. Thus, the rural area became the imagined ideal place to live. Conflicts and negotiations occurred after return since the places had changed while they had been abroad. The female migrants tried to initiate changes due to their experiences abroad, which they all described using colourful images especially with regard to gender relations and women’s possibilities in particular. However, in rural areas, gender relations and the myth of women’s proper behaviour is difficult to change, especially if support from other actors is missing. Thus, re-migration seemed the only feasible possibility for most of the women. Nevertheless, all these developments reveal that what is “rural” or “local” is by no means free from the influence of various trans-local processes (Appadurai 1996, 204).

Through migration, and especially return migration, those who are moving and those who are staying are changing, as are their perceptions of ‘home’ and rurality and urbanity. Negotiations of social and cultural changes are as much part of these processes as economic developments. This is not to argue that the working and living situation of temporary migrant workers should not be critically analysed. Political steps on different levels have to be taken in order to improve their situation both abroad and at ‘home’. But temporary migrant workers are not only victims of global economic restructuring nor are they agents for development. They are actively changing rural landscapes, transgressing the dichotomy between rural and urban areas, and they are actively negotiating cultural and social changes. As shown above, gender relations play a very important role in these processes. To understand the implications and the transformations caused by migration, the economist deadlock that occurs when temporary migration is analysed should be broken, as should the fixed and stable notion of what rural areas in the global South are.

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Petra Dannecker

PhD, is a Locum Professor of Sociology of Development at the Institute of International Development at the University of Vienna, which she chairs. Her main topics are development politics, globalisation and migration, gender studies, transnationalism and migration. Until 2007 she was an assistant professor at the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Bielefeld, Germany, and after that at the German Institute for Development Politics, Bonn, Germany. Contact: <petra.dannecker@univie.ac.at>
Spatial Disparity and Livelihood in Northern Ghana: The Case of Seasonal Migration of Basic School Children in Namoo

Emmanuel M.J. Tamanja

Introduction

Seasonal migration has long been part of the livelihood portfolio and strategy of poor people and does not only occur during times of emergency or distress (Deshingkar and Start, 2003:1). Whereas some people migrate for survival and livelihood (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009:18; Schmidt-Kallert, 2009:325 & 329), others migrate to accumulate wealth (Deshingkar and Start, 2003; Steinbrink 2009:53f) and to diversify their sources of income (Schmidt-Kallert, 2009:324). Furthermore, others migrate to improve their household and individual well-being and income sources (Deshingkar, 2004; Bigsten et al 2003; Dick and Schmidt-Kallert 2011: 27). In any case people migrate because they want to better their lives by making use of resources in spatially differentiated localities. These movements take place within and outside the borders of a country.

In Ghana, internal migration flows have mainly been in response to the spatial distribution of natural resources across three ecological zones: the northern savannah, the forest/middle belt, and the coastal belt (Kwankye, 2009: 1). Although literature on migration tends to focus more on the movement of adults (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011:13), the role and participation of children in migration cannot be underestimated. Children as young as 8 years old are reported to be involved in migration in Ghana (Awumbila, 2007:2). Such children, who would normally grow up in the care and protection of their parents and should be in school, are involved in migration with its attendant ramifications that include dropping out of school. This notwithstanding, some children in northern Ghana undertake seasonal rural-urban migration as a novel strategy to enhance their livelihoods and thus access education.

This study reports on the preliminary results of a PhD research project and explores how school children in Namoo (a deprived rural community in northern Ghana) utilise opportunities in urban areas to access and progress in education. It specifically seeks to understand why children in Namoo migrate, where they migrate to, the type of work they engage in at their destinations, what they earn and how they spend the earnings.

Study context and methodology

The study was conducted during the qualitative phase of a sequential exploratory mixed methods design (Creswell, 2009:211) in which data was collected from October to December 2011 through a combination of interviews and discussions. In-depth interviews were conducted with 13 migrant school children in Junior High Schools (JHSs) within the age range of 15 to 17 years old. However, a 19-year-old respondent who migrated when he was less than 18 years and was still attending JHS at the time of the study was also interviewed. Furthermore, discussions were held with parents and community leaders.
to understand their perspective on the phenomenon of childhood migration. The interviews afforded the children the opportunity to narrate their motivations and experiences in seasonal rural-urban migration, and to show how their experiences influenced their ability to access and progress in their pursuit of education. Children have been defined in this study to include persons who are less than 18 years old.

Namoo is a rural community in the Savannah Ecological Region of Ghana. It is located in the northern fringe of the Bongo district in the Upper East Region of Ghana and at the border with Burkina Faso (see figure 1 & 2).

The main economic activity of the residents is rain-fed subsistence farming, but they also engage in petty trading to supplement their household income. The area experiences unfavourable rainfall amounts for four months, followed by eight months of the year without rain. This results in idling and inactivity of residents (BDMTDP, 2010). The dependence on unreliable rainfall for farming, coupled with the long dry season lead to exhaustion of food stocks before the next rainy season and resulting in food shortages and general poverty of the local residents. Consequently, the period between planting and the next harvest is known as the ‘Hunger or Lean Season’ where households have insufficient or virtually no food stock to live on until the next harvest.

In order to cope with the harsh conditions, basic school children in Namoo migrate to urban localities (mostly to towns in the south) during long school holidays to do various kinds of menial work to earn income for their personal upkeep and also to purchase items they need for school during the following school year. This strategy is possible because of the structure of the academic calendar for basic (primary and junior high) schools in Ghana.

The basic school calendar is segmented into three terms to cover 42 weeks of schooling in a year (see figure 4). The first and second terms cover 15 weeks each with the first term beginning from September and ending in December, while the second term begins in January and ends in April. The third term in the academic year spans 12 weeks, from May to July. Each of these terms is followed by school holidays.
Figure 3: Crop Cycle in Namoo (source: author’s photographs/ author’s construct)

Figure 4: School Calendar and Migration Cycle in Namoo (source: Own Illustration, 2011)
In between the first, second and third terms are 18 days each of school holidays, but between the third term and the beginning of the next academic year is 5 weeks (39 days) vacation. School children usually do not travel during the first and second term holidays (most likely because of the short duration), but migrate during the third term vacation to destinations outside their communities (mostly to urban settlements in the south) and return at the beginning of the academic year in September.

This period coincides with the lean or hunger season (a period within the crop cycle when harvest is not yet due but food stocks of households have been exhausted) that begins in April through to September (Decker, 2008) (see Figure 3), leaving families to innovate for their means of survival. School children take advantage of the vacation holidays to travel to places (mostly urban areas) where they will not only be able to work and earn some money, but also relieve their households of extra mouths to feed during the lean season.

**Motivation to migrate**

Although children migrate for various reasons, parental/ household poverty, idleness and desire to earn income drive children in Namoo to migrate. These were echoed in almost all 14 interviews with the children. The following response by Dakomasore, an 18-year-old JHS 1 pupil who migrated to Accra when he was 17 years old, typifies the motivations for such migration:

Ahh, there is nothing here to do so every long vacation I will go there [Accra]. If you are staying at this place [Namoo] it is just a waste of time. You can’t do anything and you don’t have money too.

Other responses similar to that of Dakomasore include:

I was not doing anything here [Namoo] and I didn’t also know where I will be able to get money when school reopens. But I heard from my auntie and some of my colleagues in school that you could work and get money in Kumasi. So I wanted to go there and also work and get the money to buy the things I need in school. When you are in school other people will be having money to buy food during break time and also have nice bags and uniforms and you will not have anything (Badabatu, 17 year old JHS 2 girl).

It can be deduced from these responses that children migrate because of poverty of their parents and the inability to engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays. They are expected to find work to do and engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays. They are expected to find work to do and engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays. They are expected to find work to do and engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays. They are expected to find work to do and engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays. They are expected to find work to do and engage children in economic activities, especially during school holidays.

These revelations affirm that poverty is the main reason why children migrate from Namoo. But poverty is intrinsically linked to the inability to engage children in productive activities, leading to idleness and thereby culminating in the migration of children at the least opportunity, especially during school holidays.

**Destinations of child migrants**

School children in Namoo migrate to several destinations, but the major ones are Kintampo, Techiman (in the Brong Ahafo region), Kumasi (in Ashanti region) and Accra (see figure 5). It emerged that 5 out of the 14 respondent children went to Kumasi, 4 to Accra, 3 to Kintampo, 1 to Sunyani and 1 to Agona Wassu in the Western region. The reason of a destination is influenced by a number of considerations ranging from proximity, cost of transport, network, and availability of work. Whereas Accra and Kumasi [part of the ‘Golden Triangle’ (Kwankywe and Tagoe, 2009: 132)] are the preferred destinations, some pupils ply their trade at Kintampo and Techiman. These towns are prominent ‘stopovers’ for long distance travellers and vehicles that traverse the country from Accra through Kumasi, Bolgatanga and to Burkina Faso and beyond.

Kintampo is about 359 km from Namoo while Techiman is 439 km from Namoo. Consequently, it is easier and less expensive to travel to those destinations than it is with getting to Kumasi and Accra, which are 567 km and 837 km from Namoo respectively, it is worth noting however, that distance and cost of transport are not the only determinants of the choice of destination of child migrants. Social networks, such as having a relative or an acquaintance at the prospective destination, played an important role in choosing a destination. All the respondent children however, expressed the strong desire to migrate to Accra or Kumasi as their ultimate destinations:

If I can get someone who I will go with to Kumasi or Accra, I will go there, but if I don’t get, I will go with my friend again to Kintampo next year (Patabongo, a 16-year-old JHS 2 girl).

**References**

gold mining. The following narration of a 17-year-old JHS 2 Monasore typifies the daily schedule of child migrants working in chop bars:

When we (I and my colleagues) wake up in the morning at 5, we will go and fetch water from the stand pipe and fill the containers. Then we will sweep and arrange the tables and chairs. Then we will help in the preparation of the soup. We were not cooking the banku or fufu because we were not strong enough to do that. After that we will go and bath and then come back and be selling the food. The house is just by the chop bar so we were not going far. We will close at 5 in the evening and then fetch water again before bathing and going to sleep.

It can be inferred from Monasore’s narration that children who work in chop bars do not have specific or clearly defined work schedules. They do all kinds of work depending on their abilities and what needs to be done, such as fetching of water, washing of bowls and cooking utensils, serving customers by taking their orders, and placing the food from the counter to the eating table. Although children do similar jobs, the reporting and closing time differ. Whereas Monasore and her colleagues worked from 5:00 am to 5:00 pm, 16-year-old Patabongo (who travelled to Techiman) did similar work but with a different time arrangement:

We will go there in the morning at 6 and fetch water, sweep and then arrange the tables and chairs. We will then go back to our place and bath before coming to sell. We were taking food to the buyers on the tables and when they finish eating we will take the bowls and go and wash. We will work and close around 7 in the evening. We will wash all the bowls, pots and tables before we go to our house to sleep.

Unlike Monasore and her colleagues, Patabongo and her colleagues stayed at separate locations from their place of work and began their day’s work at 6:00 am, probably because it might not have been conducive or safe for them to report to work at 5:00 am. These differences notwithstanding, children worked about 12 hours in a day.

On the other hand, work in ‘galamsay’ (illegal) gold mining is more arduous and risky. As such, children are accordingly assigned tasks that are risky but commensurate with their abilities. Dolanire (19 years old and in JHS 2) spent one year when he was 17 in illegal gold mining near Kumasi and shared his experience:

When we wake up in the morning we will bath and take taxi to the mining site. There machines were digging and crushing the rocks. Then we will collect the crushed rocks and then wash them to sort the gold out from the rocks. We were also using head pans to carry the crushed rocks from the place where it was crushed to the place where washing was done, and that was very hard and tiring.

The experience of Dolanire, though not so pleasant, elucidates the challenges children go through when...
they migrate, and it might just be the tip of the iceberg. They engage in jobs for which they have no training and expertise and have to learn by doing, exposing them to all forms of danger not only to their health, but could also negatively affect their progress in school. Dolonire had to sacrifice one year of schooling because of his involvement in migration. However, he considers his experience as a blessing in disguise because “it has positioned me to better appreciate the value of education and the need for me to work hard to achieve my goals in life” (Dolonire).

Earnings and uses

Children are compensated in different ways depending on the work they do and where they work. Those who worked in chop bars were paid a flat rate, irrespective of the amount of work they did in a day. Whereas children who migrated to Accra and Kumasi earned GHS5.00 (US$1.34) per day, their counterparts in Kintampo received GHS2 (US$0.91) per day for similar work done. “I worked for one month and got GH$60 (US$27.27) because I was paid GHS2 (US$0.91) a day” (Badabatu, 17).

On the other hand, Dolonire’s earning was not based on a daily fixed rate:

I was not paid but given commission, depending on the amount of gold I was able to wash in a day. So the money was not fixed. I could get between GH$55 (US$22.70) and GH$20 (US$9.09) a day. I stayed there for one year and when I was coming I got GH$600 (US$272.75) (Dolanire, 19).

The earnings children make from migration are used in various ways and for different purposes, depending on the economic circumstance of the child and the household. However, most children spend their earnings on school items and pocket money to buy food during break time in school. According to Monasore, “I used some of the money to buy my sandals, school uniform and I bring some to school every day to buy food during break time”. Children find it difficult to go to school if they do not have money to buy food and other things they need in school. Tintanini, who helped her sister to sell non-alcoholic beverages in Accra, shared the following:

When I was coming back my sister gave me GHS120 (US$54.55) and that is what I bring to school to buy food during break time. If I don’t go there [Accra], I will only be looking into the face of my mother to give me money but she too doesn’t have money and coming to school will be difficult for me (Tintanire, 16).

It can be realized from how children use their earnings that, notwithstanding the debilitating effects of migration on schooling, it none the less enables them to acquire things they need to attend school. It also affords them the opportunity of experiencing life differently from that of the home community, and this could serve to enhance their fortunes and future prospects. Monasore was of the opinion that:

I will like to always go back there [Kumasi] because the woman I worked for treated me very well. We were sleeping in her house and she asked her son, who is a teacher, to be teaching us anytime we were not working. She bought exercise books for us and the son was teaching us. She said she will find a school for me to go when I write my final (BECE) exams. I have her telephone number here and I have been calling.

Although the real motives of the employer of Monasore are not known, it can be suggested that her migration to Kumasi could help her access better resourced schools which hitherto would not have been possible if she had not migrated.

Conclusion

Children in Namoo are motivated to migrate for various reasons. Paramount among these are parental/household poverty, idleness, and the desire to earn income. Their main destinations are Kintampo, Techiman, Kumasi, and Accra, while the choices of destination are influenced by proximity, cost of transport, social networks, and availability of work. Children do various jobs at their destinations ranging from cleaning in chop bars, helping to work on the farm, selling, and gold mining. They are compensated in different ways depending on the work they do and where they work. The earnings they make are used to buy personal belongings they need in school as well as pocket money to buy food during break time in school.

In view of the emerging findings, child migration in Namoo and other deprived areas in Ghana will perpetuate unless commitment and concerted efforts are made to address imbalances in development between rural and urban areas in Ghana. In this regard, it is necessary to build synergy among development actors at the local, regional and national levels for coordinated and well targeted interventions. This needs to be spearheaded by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), with support from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, and through the Plan Coordinating Units at the Regional and District Assembly levels.

Furthermore, supporting and scaling up interventions of local NGOs and local government organisations and agencies who understand the dynamics and context of poverty in the area will be crucial to yield the desired results. They should first work to eliminate the lean season by establishing irrigation facilities that will ensure all year farming and thus reduce idleness. On the other hand, microfinance institutions and NGOs working in the district could collaborate to make microcredit more easily available (especially for women), as well as to build their capacities in the retail businesses they are engaged in, and to enable them to expand and increase efficiency in their operations. This could help improve their economic fortunes leading to increases in income and thereby reduce individual and household poverty, which could then enable parents to effectively provide the basic needs of their children and keep them in school.

In the long term however, commitment and sustained efforts are needed from the central government through the Bongo District Assembly to improve upon the road network, electricity, water and sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure in order to open up the area and leverage the people to engage in more viable economic activities that will reduce idleness and poverty.
Trends and Policies Concerning Environmental Change and Migration: Insights from Ghana*

Benjamin Schraven, Christina Rademacher-Schulz, John Amegashitsi and Asaah Mohammed

Migration trends im Kontext des Umweltwandels und Antworten darauf: Erfahrungen aus Ghana


Environment and migration on the global level: research findings and definition problems

Both sudden- and slow-onset ecological events have always had an impact on the movements of human populations. However, in the last decade and a half, the issue of environmentally induced migration has received a high degree of public attention, which certainly must be perceived and analysed in the context of rising awareness and fear regarding the possible consequences of global climate change. Several research initiatives on environmental change and migration on the global level (e.g. Jaeger, 2009; Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change, 2011) have been launched in the past years. The studies mentioned have come to a couple of very interesting findings:

Migration as a reaction towards environmental change is an important adaptation or coping strategy. In particular, peasant households in regions threatened by environmental degradation (e.g. the Sahel) follow traditional migration patterns to cope with the effects of extreme environmental hazards. These resulting migration forms are mainly voluntary, temporary limited and limited to one or a few members of a farm household.

Migration as a pure survival strategy under extreme environmental conditions so far plays rather a minor role. Evidence from the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC; www.internal-displacement.org) and International Disaster Database (EM-DAT; www.emdat.be) suggests that only between 15–20 per cent of the global population affected by sudden-onset ecological events were temporarily or permanently displaced.

Migrants affected by ecological factors usually move within their countries of origin or to neighbouring countries. There is hardly any evidence that large-scale international migration patterns are affected by environmental factors. Furthermore, current research in the environment-migration debate emphasises two aspects, which have not gained much attention so far. The first issue addresses so-called trapped populations: in the past, both those in the policy arena as well as in academia have strongly focussed on the migrants. But many people do not have the capabilities to migrate, since they do not have the adequate financial means to do so or they are too old or too sick. These people usually have to live under harsher conditions than the migrants. Another neglected aspect addresses the destination areas. Migrants oftentimes do not move away from ecologically vulnerable areas but rather move to these. This is valid, in particular, for urban slum areas, in which migrants furthermore live in socially, economically and politically marginalised conditions.

Apart from these findings and considerations, there are still a lot of uncertainties in the context of environmental change and migration. Meanwhile, there is a consensus that ecological factors solely have an impact on migration decisions only in rather rare cases. They are in most of the cases accompanied by a wide and complex range of social, political and economic factors. But this indicates a definition problem: In which cases are ecological factors significant enough to label the resulting migration process as environmental migration or environmentally induced migration? This question remains largely unanswered, as the research on how ecological factors in particular impact on livelihood decisions is still in its infancy. It is hardly possible to define criteria to measure, for instance, the exact degree of an ecological stimulus. Against this background, it is also very difficult to make statements concerning the socio-economic impacts that environmentally induced migration may have – however environmentally induced migration may be defined.

The case of Ghana

Many of the global trends in environmental impacts on migration described can also be found in the Ghanaian case. Just as in many other parts of West Africa, Ghana has a very long tradition of human mobility that dates
back to pre-colonial times. In particular, the still dominant pattern of seasonal migration from the poorer northern savannah areas of Ghana, which is mainly populated by subsistence farmers, to the country’s wealthier and wetter southern region has had an environmental component for decades. Especially in times of environmental stress (droughts, floods, etc.), traditionally, one or more young men leave their household in the dry season (November to May), when no work in rain-fed agriculture in Northern Ghana is possible. A classic pattern is that seasonal migrants mostly work in Ghana’s centres of commercial agriculture (Brong-Ahafo Region, Ashanti Region) as seasonal farm labourers on cocoa or maize plantations. This pattern basically allows migrants to earn some money during the dry season and to return to their home regions to do work in rain-fed agriculture during the rainy season. Remittances in cash and kind and the simple absence of one or more “eaters” during the dry season are the ideal-typical “function” of seasonal migration, with the desired effect that households better cope with the effects of environmental stress, which manifests itself in harvest failures, leading in turn to increased food insecurity. Furthermore, migrants have in the past oftentimes been “agents of change”, as they were the origin for many innovation processes that they imported from Southern Ghana. An important example is dry season irrigation farming. In some parts of Northern Ghana, it constitutes a real alternative to seasonal migration, given the wide lack of public development initiatives for Ghana’s poorest region (Abdulai, 1999; Anarfi et al., 2003; Schraven, 2010).

Northern Ghana is at present facing several ecological challenges ranging from local soil erosion to deforestation (Brown and Crawford, 2008). However, the most severe pattern of climatic and environmental change in Northern Ghana certainly is the increase of rainfall variability. Many farmers report that, within the last decades, the onset of the rainy season has been delayed more frequently, which makes it ever harder to find the right time for sowing. According to some regional climate models (Laux 2009; Jung and Kunstmann 2007), the irregularity of the onset will increase even further in the next decades, whereas the rainfall amounts as well as the end of the rainy season will remain quite stable. This increases the danger of environmental hazards like droughts and floods. In short, besides the few opportunities for income diversification, ecological events causing frequent instances of food insecurity are (and most likely) will be strong drivers for North-South labour migration in Ghana.

Recent studies on the nexus between environmental change and migration in Northern Ghana (Rademacher-Schulz and Mahama, forthcoming; van der Geest, 2011; Schraven, 2010) suggest that the framework conditions for seasonal migration have fundamentally changed in recent years: many temporary migrants report that they are facing more and more difficulties in finding jobs and accommodation. Migrant networks, which have...
For the final project report of the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) from June 2011, the issue of environmental change and migration as an adaptation strategy is predominantly applied by a peasant household, as it both does not receive remittances and lacks the labour force in the rain-fed cultivation process. However, due to lack of sufficient livelihood alternatives in many parts of Northern Ghana, migration remains the only option for thousands of households (see also Box: Migrants in their own words).

On the other hand, migration as a means of adaptation is no option for the very poor households, as many simply cannot bear the costs for it. Accordingly, they are the ones who are hit hardest by food insecurity triggered by ecological events. Oftentimes, reducing the daily caloric intake is the only strategy they can pursue during these hardships. In contrast, the wealthier households do not have to utilise migration as an adaptive strategy, since their vulnerability towards (mainly) environmentally induced food insecurity is much lower. For these households, migration is rather a strategy to accumulate wealth and/or to gain more education. Hence, migration as an adaptation strategy is predominantly applied by a peasant middle class.

Migration policies in Ghana

So far, the issue of environmental change and migration has hardly been an issue in Ghanaian policies. Generally, Ghana is still in the process of establishing a harmonised national migration policy. In 2006, an inter-ministerial team traditionally functioned as agencies for these services, can hardly fulfil this role anymore.

Furthermore, the danger of labour exploitation and crime as well as high living and transport costs have severely worsened the living and working conditions of many migrants. As a result, many are facing financial constraints and have accumulated debt and struggle to go back to their home villages. This, in turn, means that seasonal migration stays may become forced permanent or medium-term migration (Amegashitsi, 2009). This has potentially negative effects for the sending household, as it both does not receive remittances and lacks the labour force in the rain-fed cultivation process. However, due to lack of sufficient livelihood alternatives in many parts of Northern Ghana, migration remains the only option for thousands of households (see also Box: Migrants in their own words).

References


A rather reluctant attitude towards internal migration is also reflected in the area of environmental politics in Ghana. This becomes apparent, for instance, in a draft version of the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) from June 2011 (EPA, 2011). In this document migration is mentioned as constituting one of the most important dimensions of climate change-related vulnerability in Ghana. It is described as a phenomenon that is attributable to both climate change and socio-economic vulnerabilities. However, migration is not being perceived as an adaptation strategy, but as something that has to be prevented by measures introduced in the NCCAS. This is also valid for the newly established development initiative “Savannah Accelerated Development Authority” (SADA) targeting the development of Northern Ghana.

But not only is internal migration a neglected policy field; migrants and agricultural smallholders are also mostly excluded from political decision-making and planning processes. Experience since the introduction of a new democratic constitution in Ghana in 1992 has shown that NGOs or district assemblies are frequently involved in development planning and policy formulation processes. In contrast, agricultural smallholders or migrant networks are usually not consulted – not to mention integrated (e.g. Zimmermann et al., 2009).
The declared aim should not be the eradication of migration, but rather the promotion of development in the migration context. The adaptive potential of migration under the influence of the state in that regard would be necessary to foster issues and a more active, protective and mediating role of food insecurity and an increase of resilience towards ecological impacts – is not recognised.

So far, internal migration has not played a role in Ghanaian politics. At best, there is the aim to reduce the need for migration. The adaptive potential that migration in the context of environmental change might have – reduction of food insecurity and an increase of resilience towards ecological impacts – is not recognised.

But a change of perception towards internal migration issues and a more active, protective, and mediating role of the state in that regard would be necessary to foster the adaptive potential of migration under the influence of environmental changes in the Ghanaian context. In times when the traditional migrant networks fail to do so, a more active state should, for instance, provide help to mediate jobs and accommodation. Moreover, it should protect the migrants’ rights to approach problems like labour exploitation.

On the other hand, promoting development in the migrants’ regions of origin is certainly likewise important. The declared aim should not be the eradication of migration – which is certainly unrealistic – but rather the provision of sufficient alternatives for income earning, which take the effects of environmental change into consideration. In the case of Northern Ghana, that would have to be based on an adaptation- and peasant-orientated rural development process. Important components would be the promotion and facilitation of, just to name a few, high-yielding crop seeds; improved animal husbandry; soil conservation techniques; irrigation / dry season gardening; and the setup and extension of accordant value chains (Warner et al., forthcoming).

As Ghana is not an exceptional case concerning the importance of migration for household livelihood security in the context of environmental change, the outcome of many countries future efforts in the field of climate change adaptation and development oriented activities will have to be measured against the creation of substantial livelihood alternatives and better framework conditions for migration.

Migrants and their family members in their own words

“The Rainy season harvest was not good for my family and so I went to work to get some food for my family… I will also go next year since the rainy season does not do really well for us.” (23 year old from Kandiga, Upper East Region)

“There was no food left in the house and I had to go to earn some money to buy food… I could not find any job. I went to Suryari before, because a relative lived there. But this year there was nothing I could do… I could not bring anything back home. Nothing. I was even afraid of not coming home.” (25 year old from Doba, Upper East Region)

“My children need to supplement household food needs by migrating to find money.” (71 year old from Nanville, Upper West Region)

“I did not earn much money in the South. Most of it, I had to spent for the transport back home. What was left, I spent for buying some maize” (45 year old from Kandiga, Upper East Region)

“Some cannot earn anything… So, there is nothing they can send or bring us home. Another very bad thing is that those household members are not available for work here” (52 year old from Sirigu, Upper East Region)

Conclusion

The case of Ghana shows some features that are typical for migration in the context of environmental change: it is a traditional and mainly seasonal peasant adaptation and coping measure that is especially applied in times of ecologically induced food insecurity; it happens within country borders rather than on a larger international scale and it is in addition to ecological factors influenced by social, political and economic factors. In the case of Northern Ghana, migration is influenced by the lack of livelihood alternatives. Furthermore, migration is a coping and adaptation measure that is not accessible to the poorest households. They suffer the most from food insecurity. The migrants, on the other hand, are facing economic, social and political marginality.

References (cont.)

What’s the Point of Having Information? The Limited Impact of Mobile Telephony on Livelihood Improvement

Saiful Momen

The late 1990s and the 2000s saw the introduction and dramatic increase in coverage and ownership of mobile phones in most low-income countries. As with many technologies before it, mobile telephony became a new object of analysis in a number of (pre-existing) bodies of literature. It would seem natural that mobile telephony’s impact on the major objects of analysis in the rural-urban linkages literature—such as flows of people (migration), goods (trade), capital (investment and remittance)—and information was ripe for empirical investigation. However, it appears that the findings of research projects in these themes are only recently being published (e.g., Muto, 2012; Aker, Ciemens, & Ksoll, 2011).

This paper reports the impact of mobile telephony on the well-being of people in a de-agrarianizing high poverty area in Bangladesh. In doing so, it reports on some of the phenomena listed above. But it is not intended to focus on rural urban linkages per se, especially in the same sense as the nebulous and all-encompassing way the term “rural urban linkages” has come to be used. From the very beginning (see Tacoli, 1998), a diverse set of social, demographic, economic, and spatial phenomena was put under the label “rural-urban linkages”. For example, multi-locational households, multi-sectoral households, inter-sectoral (agriculture and industry) interaction, spatial pattern of value chain, peri-urban land use dynamics, and even morphology of mega-urban regions are some of the phenomena that can be found to be discussed under the label “rural-urban linkages” (e.g. see Tacoli, 2006). One common thread that runs through the above is that they all provide reasons to discard the rural-urban divide in development policy. However, there is no such framework as “rural-urban linkages” that can help guide an empirical research.

In contrast, the widely known sustainable livelihoods (SL) framework (Carney, 1998) provides a comprehensive approach to investigate the impact of mobile phones on the well-being of households. It is therefore used in this paper to address the questions whether, to what extent, and how mobile telephony has impacted the livelihood opportunities of the households in high-poverty rural regions.

Mobile Telephony and Livelihoods Framework

Beginning in the 1990s and continuing still today, there is considerable optimism around mobile telephony’s use in and potential impact on development. Three major rationales of this optimism were: (a) mobile phones would remove “information poverty”, however vaguely-defined the term was/is, (b) they would help with delivery of essential services such as health and nutrition, and agricultural extension and marketing, and (c) mobile phones themselves would become a service and the phone hardware a commodity to be sold by low-capital entrepreneurs. Later, especially with the success of M-Pesa (a mobile banking service in Kenya), such services became an additional source of optimism.
The successful use of mobile phones in the latter two themes is more tangible. The success stories, albeit small in number, attract sensational reporting. However, the process(es) through which mobile telephony is supposed to develop does not appear to be laid out in the literature. For example, despite initial intuitive appeal, the term “information poverty” is not easy to define. One early definition of information poverty mentioned the absence of “factors that are needed in order to get access to information” (Nafstad & Iversen, 1996). The factors, for Nafstad and Iversen (1996), included both physical infrastructure and appropriate information. The physical infrastructure part is straightforward, but what constitutes desirable and appropriate information is rather difficult to ascertain. While the “lack of physical infrastructure” continues to be cited as the source of information poverty (see definition by Aminuzzaman et al., 2003), it is conceivable that despite the presence of infrastructure, appropriate information can be absent or inaccessible to segments of the population.

There is a lack of empirical insights into how the increased access to telephony impacted people’s well-being. In accumulating empirical insights, an important question is that of the theoretical lens used to look at the impacts. Mobile telephony’s impact on a diverse set of topics has been observed. Examples include social capital and trust (Molony, 2009), migration, and empowerment (Aminuzzaman et al., 2003) and livelihoods (Souter et al., 2005). However, the lens of sustainability of livelihoods as laid out in Carney (1998) and later adaptations allows for a more complete understanding of the impact of the technology.

The central idea of the sustainable livelihoods approach is that households construct their livelihoods from multiple sources based on their capabilities, assets/capitals (e.g. human, natural, social, physical, financial capital), and vulnerabilities, which in turn are impacted by, among others, social customs and government policies. Livelihoods are based on income (in cash, kind, or services) obtained from employment and from remuneration through assets and socially/legally-sanctioned rights. These assets can be enhanced or diminished by, among others, natural calamities, changes in social institutions (such as common property regimes), and policies of the government.

The framework offers a great tool to evaluate the impact of an intervention (such as mobile telephony) on well-being by examining the impact on the components of the SL diagram and the interactions among them. By looking through the lens of the SL framework, this paper does not stop at information poverty. Rather, the use of information in securing livelihoods becomes a greater part of the investigation.

**Mobile Phones and the Dynamics of Livelihoods: Research Questions**

An individual’s or a household’s ability to secure a livelihood depends on the possession of the five assets identified in the well-known pentagon of the SL framework. However, information plays a crucial role in determining how the assets are used and enhanced, and vulnerabilities are reduced. The importance of information prompted Odero (2006) to call for an explicit recognition of information as an asset (capital) in the framework. Despite the intuitive appeal of this idea, it has to be recognized that what is considered useful and relevant information varies from household to household. For example, for a household selling an agricultural product, price information is of interest. For a potential emigrant (often seasonal) in a rural area, information related to cost and rewards of migration is crucial.

Given the SL framework, and the recognition of appropriate information as an asset, the immediate question arises: To what extent do mobile phones (1) enhance the assets and capabilities, and/or (2) reduce shocks and vulnerabilities, and/or (3) increase the ability to be resilient? One associated but different question of policy relevance is: To what extent does mobile telephony change the locational pattern of livelihoods?

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2 For example, the coverage of M-Pesa or the Gates Foundation award for use of cell phones to check on self-care of pre-natal mothers.

3 After the interviews for this study were conducted, Duncombe (2012) was published. It laid out a detailed research framework in this theme.

4 Three southern sub-districts of Noakhali district (in the southeastern part of Bangladesh) comprising roughly 1,200 sq. km. and 1.07 million people.
of Bangladesh, was chosen to meet these criteria. The district of which the study area is a part is mostly rural where the two largest towns have populations of 100,000 and 80,000. Out of the 550,000 households in the district, 35% do not own any arable land. Another 20.75% own less than a half acre of cultivable land. With large areas in the southern part of the district un-irrigated, the cropping intensity is a low 165% (compared with as high as 300% in irrigated areas). The poverty rate in the district is slightly over 40%, however, the southern part of the district where the study area is located has a poverty rate in the upper 60% range.

As part of the southeastern estuaries of Bangladesh, the study area has seen major river erosion and accretion, with a net gain of close to 1000 km2 since 1973. Much of the accreted land, despite explicit policies and programs to the contrary, was grabbed by the power elites in and outside the rural region (Adnan, 2011). As a result, the de facto land ownership in most parts of the study area is highly skewed, and almost all of the large owners are from outside the micro-region. With significant absentee ownership of land, the use of such land is shaped by commercial interests in the larger economy beyond the district, as opposed to a subsistence mode of decision-making by smallholders. The surplus from the area accrues to interests outside the region, constituting an economic leakage from the local economy.

Most of the study area came under mobile phone coverage about six years ago, which is long enough for livelihood changes to take shape while allowing for easy recall of the pre-cell phone conditions of assets, constraints, and opportunities. Most households have a small amount of land (physical capital) and low levels of education and professional skills (human capital), and much of the traditional common property resources were found to be increasingly inaccessible. For example, while inundated during the rainy season, even privately owned crop fields used to be accessible to all for fishing under the traditional property rights regime. But that regime no longer applies as some owners are fish-farming in temporary pens. Many of the canals and small rivers are cordoned off by the powerful people for fish farming converting these common property resources to de facto private property. Thus, changing social institutions are shrinking the “physical capital” for many. As a consequence, for people with little land, the physical capital is rather small.

Research Method in Brief

Many of the concepts in the SL framework will not lose meaning if reduced to an operational variable for the purpose of numerical measurement. A quantitative before and after (cell phone use) analysis of sources of livelihood would not be informative either. Therefore the focus of this study was to understand nuanced stories of the household decision making processes, and attitudes and beliefs of the people with regard to mobile phones. The insights and information gathered from observations and interviews offer many nuanced stories. Two landless households can have different connections to a rich household (i.e. social capital), resulting in differences in the availability of food (meals) as charity. Two households with similar access to land can have different earnings based on their luck in having a son sent to the Middle East as a laborer.

It was hypothesized that a household’s ability to take advantage of mobile telephony would be greatly influenced (directly or indirectly) by the ownership of land. Thus essentially there were two populations to be studied: (a) functionally landless households, and (b) middle farmers. The large landowners and power elites were not interviewed. The research questions also required investigation into the importance of extra-local sources of livelihoods, creating two further categories within the populations: (a) households with significant extra-local sources of income, and (b) households with little to no extra-local sources of livelihoods.

Households from each of the four sub-groups were selected as purposive samples while maintaining uniform geographic spread across the three sub-districts and to include communities both far from and close to major roads and market places. The snow-balling sample size stopped after 39 interviews as additional ones yielded little new insights. Twenty-one households were functionally landless and 18 were middle farmers.

Interviews followed a semi-structured questionnaire that allowed for further questioning depending on the answers. Throughout the process, the SL framework provided the guideline as to what information to gather.

The Impact of Mobile Phones in the Study Area

The impact of mobile phones on the four categories of households is described in the next four subsections, before it is summarized in the section that follows.

- Functionally landless households with significant sources of livelihood outside the district

Functionally landless households comprise more than half of the households in the study area. Several such households, and some households with more male members than is required to work the small amount of family land, turn to an indentured form of employment for 5 to 6 dry months of the year. During these 5 months, the person (always a male) goes to work in a brick factory, often in another district. Under this arrangement the person is contracted by a local middleman (known as a majhee) who in turn contracted with a brick kiln owner to supply workers. The wage for 5 to 6 months of labor while residing on the site of the factory is $US 450 to $US 700. The worker often asks for and receives money from the majhee throughout the year, especially a lump sum before leaving the village at the beginning of brick-making season. During their stay at the brick factory, the workers are provided rudimentary accommodation and meals. They are
allowed a small amount for snacks, tea, and cigarettes at a restaurant on site. Often, the workers exceed that amount and owe money, and they can pay back the money by working next year. Such borrowing throughout the year and over-running the “tea” expenditure during work months often ties the workers to working for the same company during the following year.

The extent of use of the lump sum amount for acquiring some assets varies from one household to the other. Some have used it to pay off portions of family debt. A very small number used it to partly finance the migration of another male member of the household to the Middle East. Others used the money towards purchasing land for homesteading or agricultural purposes. However most reported the money being spent on day to day consumption. Except for a few, the workers in the brick field were effectively cashless by the time next brick-making season began.

Working in the brick fields is common as a source of livelihood in the southern half of the study area. However, all the brick field workers have much less rewarding and often uncertain sources of livelihoods during the rest of the year. In one case, a worker who is the only male person in the household supplies fish fingerlings to fishpond owners in the area during the wet months. He solicits orders from fishpond owners in his village. Once he gets an order, he rides his bike 6-8 miles to the wholesale fish fry sellers in larger markets or hatcheries.

Often, he calls the sellers on their cell phone to check if the item is in stock, and he also occasionally catches fish in one part of a government-owned canal. Whatever catch (rarely more than a kilogram of assorted small fishes) he can have, he sells at the local market paying a toll. Asked if he can be a labor contractor himself one day, he said it is generally a closed group of businesspeople who run the labor supply business. He does not believe that he can break into that group.

Another brick-kiln worker works during the off-season as a transport worker in Dhaka City. As a mark of remarkable entrepreneurship, he brings one hundred kilogram vats of mustard oil whenever he can to his rural home from Dhaka to sell to local grocers at a higher price.

The impact of mobile phones on the livelihoods of both these persons and others was found to be minimal. For both persons, the sources of livelihood did not change after obtaining a mobile phone. The person who works as a transport worker in Dhaka purchased a mobile phone 5 years before his rural home came under phone coverage. He bought the phone, he confided, primarily because it was an object of desire. The person selling fish fingerlings often saves walking and bicycle trips by calling his buyers and the suppliers. However, the time saved by not having to make a trip has little opportunity cost since given the infrastructure and economy in the village, there is little that he thinks he can do with that time. Having to walk the bike with large canisters full of water on a muddy road is a bigger problem for him during the wet months.

There were other functionally landless households who did not get into such businesses because, as it appeared during interviews, they did not have the entrepreneurship to build the connections at different places. Many of them work as irregular agricultural laborers in the village during the wet months. Most of them had cell phones that helped them to stay in connection with families and friends. However, very few households in this and the next category would call distant relatives or non-relative acquaintances with any regularity. This is important because as Granovetter (1973) argued, this group of people is important in creating and taking advantage of economic and other opportunities.

- **Functionally landless households with principal sources of livelihoods in the locality**

During snow-ball sampling, it was clear that this was the largest category. This is also the most heterogeneous category in terms of livelihood sources. They include, among many others, small shop owners, rickshaw-pullers, petty traders, agricultural laborers, and women working in small enterprises. The poorest and most precarious households encountered were in this group. In the case of a household that is female-headed and in this category, the household is often destitute. We did not come across any female-headed households in this category that owned a cell phone. Often such households would borrow from one micro-credit organization only to repay the loan taken from another. Small livestock farming (often as meager as one goat), hand-embroidery work in some parts of the study area, and dependence on charity are the sources of livelihoods for such female-headed households.

None of the occupational categories mentioned here showed any need for cell phones for business. None interviewed perceived the lack of a cell phone as the cause of not being able to attain a better livelihood.

- **Middle-farmer and large sharecropper with sources of income in the locality only**

The agriculturalists who cultivate between 2 and 7 acres a season are considered middle-farmers and large share-croppers. Very few households own more than 3 acres of land, especially in the southern parts. Those operating relatively large amounts of land are sharecroppers who are cultivating the land of urban absentee landowners. A typical farmer in this category would cultivate two (rarely three) crops a year, and in areas where irrigation is available, often two crops (i.e. two seasons) of rice are cultivated. In most parts of the study area however, irrigation during the dry season is expensive as the water table is too low, and crops requiring less irrigation such as peanuts and beans are cultivated.

Most such farmers take a loan from local branches of the bank in the beginning of the season to purchase fertilizer (and seeds in some cases) and rent tilling equipment. Immediately after harvest, the farmers sell the produce to traders from the local market.
The producers feel that there is no economy of scale in processing and transporting their yield to the market, and the toll they have to pay for the use of market space to sell produces weighs in as a deterrent. Cell phones have increased the opportunity to know the price of produce in distant markets. However, most farmers do not have an acquaintance in distant markets to call up, a fact that highlights their lack of social capital. The individual volume of production is not large enough to create economies of scale in transport to distant markets. There were calls in the development literature for cooperatives to circumvent some of these problems associated with guaranteeing a just share of value-added for producers. Vested groups have always resisted the attempts at forming marketing cooperatives. For example, when small farmers in another district of the country organized to rent trucks to transport their produces to a distant market for higher prices, the traders there did not buy from them. By doing so, the traders preserved their network of marketing that guarantees them a large profit (Ittefaq, 2010).

Middle farmers with significant sources of livelihoods outside the locality

A small number of middle farmers and large sharecroppers were able to send one or more sons to cities or, in a small number of cases, to the Middle East as a laborer. Even fewer households had a member doing petty trade or working in an urban area, and such households receive remittances every few months. None of the remittances were channeled through mobile banking in the manner of M-Pesa in Kenya, however, there are multiple outlets of the money transfer company Western Union in the area. The remitter from outside the country sends money to these outlets, and tells the recipient in the study area over phone the secret code given by the sending office in the Middle East.

With almost no landline phone, cell phones are essential for such quick remittances. Before the area came under cell phone coverage, banks in local towns were the only channels for remittances. The wait period used to be higher, and collection of the money needed at least half a day’s travel for many of the recipients.

In the case of the households whose trans-local source of livelihoods is within the country, the migrant brings the money home with him/herself or sends it with another person. Mobile banking is yet to take root. The adoption of mobile banking cannot be evaluated now since only a few months have passed since the creation of the first company offering such service in the country.
Mobile Telephony as a Link in the Chain of Sustainable Livelihoods

Livelihoods and their sustainability depend on a host of things. The role of mobile telephony in it can be subjected to the “weakest link” analogy. If there are significant deficiencies in the “capitals”, it is unlikely that mobile phones alone will enhance and sustain livelihoods. However, it is conceivable that mobile phones can create resources and capitals out of what was once useless, or they could unleash the potential of some pre-existing skills.

The study area did not offer any cases where mobile telephony played such a role. Indeed, in the large rural markets there are phone repair and accessory shops that created income for some, but other than being a commodity itself, cell phones do not appear to be a force that unleashed potentials of existing assets (which are meager for many households). For example, this study did not come across any instances where mobile telephony made any formerly non-tradable item tradable.

Almost all interviewees conﬁded that the expenditure on their cell phones often is more than what they would ideally like. It essentially is a drain on the household budget with few ﬁnancial returns. Many interviewees were prioritizing spending on phone talk time over nutrition and education of the children. This resonates with experiences stated elsewhere (Comfort & Dada, 2009).

Many of the known constraints in the path to poverty alleviation were still observed. For example, for all small and medium farmers, getting the right price of their produce is crucial for improving income. However, in the marketing chain, the large traders capture most of the value-added proﬁt. For example, at the time writing this paper, a regional news outlet on the Internet (Sen, 2012) published an opinion piece highlighting the fact that the peasants in the study area are getting a fraction of the price of produce in the urban markets.

Even in the local markets where local producers sell in small quantities, the toll to be paid to the market operators is signiﬁcant. It is well known that the rights to collecting a toll from (government owned) rural markets are obtained by some form of corruption and/or coercion. As important hubs of rural economies, the trading places help extract a portion of the surplus by creating rent through monopoly (Ricardian rent). Given this, it is unlikely that mobile telephony alone can help the poor people get better returns from their products.

When peasants are forced to borrow at the beginning of the season from the buyer of their produce, they inherently are the weaker side of the bargain. No amount of information will change that unequal relationship, as found by Molony (2008) in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. The cell phones in Molony’s case study merely help the large trader (who is also the creditor) keep in touch with the rural producers and ensure adequate supply. In the study area, the presence of microfinance organizations and banks has reduced the dependence of small producers on such lenders. Nevertheless, the lack of economies of scale in marketing leads some small producers to get into such relationships with the traders cum creditors. Large traders are the only ones with the access to logistics to react to instant information on the price and supply of agricultural and craft products. In that sense, mobile telephony has strengthened their position in the bargain.

Mobile telephony does not seem to have changed the locational pattern of livelihoods of the households. The Middle East has been a coveted destination for households for nearly four decades, and for migrants, remittance and staying in touch with family is easier with the arrival of mobile phones. However, this is not a crucial factor in deciding to pursue a passage to the Middle East. Even for seeking livelihoods in the national capital or other urban places, cell phone ownership is not a make-or-break factor.

However, for some individuals who sell their labor in small, irregular contracts in other parts of the district, staying connected with the employers is crucial. But it appears that all aspirant laborers now own or have access to a mobile phone. Possession of a cell phone does not get them ahead, but merely ensures that they do not miss out on an opportunity to get hired for a few days to weeks.

Concluding Remarks on Policy Implications

This paper runs counter to some early optimism about mobile phones. The absence of any signiﬁcant positive impact of phones here may have resulted from the characteristics of the rural region studied (high poverty, coupled with a generations-long tradition of seasonal emigration). However, such characteristics are fairly common among the rural regions in the low-income world.

This study highlights the (constraining) role of rural power structures, and the lack of assets of the poor to build upon. Mainstream development work mostly bypasses the issue of power and is guided by expediency as manifested in programs and projects in the low-income world. This study highlights the limits to expedient development work. For example, giving loans to a poor person to sell phone cards (or airtime), as many livelihood supporting projects are doing, does not solve system-wide problems. The phone card seller can ﬁnd customers even among the poor, reasons for which were encountered in this study (phone as object of desire, prioritizing expenditure on phone talk time). Such individual successes within a “ﬁxed (even shrinking) pie” should not distract from the overarching constraints.

Mobile telephony still continues to hold promise as something that can be used in innovative ways in health and nutrition services, agricultural extension, community mobilization, and improving law and order. There are encouraging innovations in progress in many parts of the world. Together with structural constraints, perfecting these innovations deserves to be on the agenda.

References (cont.)

Trade and Social Relations:
Rural – Urban Networks Involved in Informal Food Trade in Benin *

Anne Floquet

Introduction: Networks as historically anchored institutions in insecure environments

Networks connect people who have knowledge about each other, directly or via third parties, and who develop or could develop transactions. Transactions can be domestic or related to income generating activities. Trade networks facilitate transactions by personalizing them, building trust among partners, and preventing an unpredictable opportunistic behavior while partly solving the credit and information problems between distant production and consumption places. Opportunistic behavior has been recognized by Williamson as standard behavior affecting transactions and a source of transaction costs (Williamson 1979; 1994). Actually, such behavior should impede trade in situations of weak legal protections and highly asymmetric information: after a first transaction, as soon as one partner has been cheated, one should restrain to barter. This dilemma has been addressed by Granovetter when he considers that trade is embedded in social relationships that give clues for potential partners to analyze the transaction situation and possibly trust their partners (Granovetter 1985). Networks improve considerably the chances not to be cheated because of the knowledge members can gain on each other. Reputation is an asset in social life and in trade in particular, and it should not be spoiled by inconsiderate moves. Networks do not provide any guarantee either and can also be used for cheating and racketing, but they make it possible to take the risk of a transaction.

A trade network often initially builds on people with a high social proximity, and then it feeds itself and possibly trust their partners (Granovetter 1985). Trade networks facilitate transactions may become stable by partners engaging in quasi contractual arrangements. Traders operating at the same market may organize in associations and agree on a set of rules including minimal prices. Some trade networks also have developed specific institutions and control mechanisms such as landlords and brokers, who can attest the morality of both parties in trade and solve disputes. Such institutions differ across products and markets, and they evolve over time. Networks ride on ethnic and religious ties as factors of common systems of norms and trust, but they also allow for constructing ties across communities resilient enough to endure in times of political and ethnic crisis as shown in Nigeria by Lyon and Porter (2009). Trust is a main reason for stable relationships up to the consumer level as shown in research on food and innovations in the food chain (Cheyns and Bricas 2003).

Surveys have quantified the reduction in transaction costs for traders in associations (Ayouz and Tassou 2005) and showed that transaction volumes are larger for well-connected traders (Fafchamps and Minten 1999). Subsequent market models confirm that insertion in networks is an advantage for traders (Fafchamps 2003).

In West Africa, trade networks are recognized as historical facts. Major trade networks developed historically facts. Major trade networks developed

Handel und soziale Beziehungen: Stadt-Land Netzwerke im informellen Nahrungsmittelhandel in Benin


This article has been peer reviewed by two independent reviewers. A group of about 30 distinguished experts is engaged in TRIALOG’s peer review process.

1 There were 4 towns with more than 10 000 inhabitants in 1960 (Cotonou, Porto-Novo, Abomey and Ouidah), all in the South and 77 in 2000, some of which also in the North. In 2008, the shares of population in the three large cities (Cotonou, Porto-Novo and Parakou) and the mid-sized towns are respectively 18 and 25%.


*
transcontinental trade in pre-colonial Africa along ethnic ties and resulted in diasporas out-posted all over West Africa. Mourides, Haoussas, Igbo, and Yoroubas among others developed specific networks in terms of regions, products, network morphology and market institutions, and focused mainly in either the eastern, the central or the western part of the region (Grégoire and Labazée 1993; Grégoire 1993; Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012; Tidjani et al. 2010).

In parallel to these historic networks, new trade networks have recently been shaped as a consequence of urbanization combined with economic stagnation, structural adjustments, and food crises that have hit people in cities, ejecting many from formal employment and enhanced the development of informal activities. Most of these activities are small scale, and many concern petty trade. How such people have mobilized resources from their social networks has not been researched in a systematic way but has been documented through other studies such as the 123 survey conducted in the capital cities of the West African Economic and Monetary Union on employment (Brilleau et al. 2005).

In this paper we compare four food trade networks in West Africa, more specifically in Benin, and analyze how rural-urban social ties are reinvested in trade activities and contribute to renewing informal trade institutions. This introduction has briefly reviewed discussions on networks and more specifically trade networks as a framework for trade institutions. Part II of this article presents the context of urbanization and the expansion of an informal economy in Benin. Four food trade networks, which have been chosen for their economic relevance and heterogeneous patterns, are compared in part III. They all link rural to urban stakeholders but differ strongly in their spatial coverage as well as in their skill and capital requirements. This in turn affects the informal institutions emerging over time. In the context of weak formal institutions, we conclude about some of their positive and not so positive effects on trade organization, urban supply, and employment.

**Urban population and their rural social ties in Benin**

In Benin, population has been increasing by 3.25% per year and urbanization is an on-going process: 10% of the population was urban in the 1960s, 26.5% in 1979, 39% of the population in 2002 and 41% in 2008. The three largest cities (all above 50,000 inhabitants) have attracted most of the flow in the 1970s and 1980s, however later on small and mid-sized towns grew faster (NSAE 2008). The development of mid-sized cities “filling the space” is a common trend to all West African countries (AFD et al. 2008). Many mid-sized cities have expanded as a concentration point of trade activities, places where merchandises are assembled or stored and exchanged between wholesalers from production areas and consumption markets (Igue and Soulé 1992). They represent different types of market towns located on main roads and on the borders of the country, and most probably develop faster than cities expanding solely around administrative, health, and educational services. It has been documented at the regional level how connectedness of rural hinterlands to cities and their markets speeds up their economic development, especially in facilitating trade relationships for food products and providing essential services to both the rural and urban population (Baker 1990; Snerch 1994).

Patterns of internal migration in West Africa show that most people are on the move from rural to urban areas or back, as well as from rural to rural areas. Internal migration is a trivial event in a lifetime. People are on the move for a season, years or intend to permanently settle into a new place. Young people from rural areas may move for a few years to cities in search of jobs. In many cases, uneducated girls may work in cities as domestic servants and help in trade before being called back to their place of origin for marriage, whereas young men may return at a later time. Educated people may remain in town until their retirement, and even pastoralists have tended to move to town since the 1970s (Salih 1995).
who lost their herds in times of drought found jobs as drivers for urban cattle owners (escorting livestock on markets and between markets), or jobs as meat grills, while some reached and stayed in Cotonou (Djedjebi 2009). They graft on stakeholders in the livestock trade networks and some succeed in restocking a herd or developing urban activities unrelated to cattle such as petty trade, warden jobs, etc.

In cities, most of the urban population is composed of first generation or non-permanent migrants. Thirty-eight percent of the population in the city of Cotonou is composed of immigrants, half of them having lived in the town for less than 10 years (Brilleau et al., op.cit). This is in accordance to the 2002 census that showed that one quarter of the population in Cotonou had been immigrating for less than 5 years, and even more had left the city during that period (INSAE, 2003)). Among rural people with an experience in urban migration, many return migrants can therefore be found. In the remote Atacora region, for example, one quarter of the farmers (male and female) have an experience of urban migration (Floquet and Mongbo 2009).

Urban migrants of the first generation keep strong social ties with their localities of origin, which some of them are going to use in trade. Such social ties are continuously renewed by participating in ceremonies with kin and allies. Few people would neglect their family up to the point of compromising their own burial according to the ancestors’ rituals. They take an active part in organizing traditional and modern rituals with brass bands, choirs, processions and cotton cloth “uniforms” within the family. Such rituals also provide opportunities to strengthen wider social ties. Large audiences of colleagues, friends and relatives are invited to take part in these ceremonies. Afflicted persons then have to host and feed their friends and relatives who came to provide support. In the end, one will travel every week-end to assist afflicted families. The magnitude of such movements and the expenses they cause are large. Significant yet unmeasured flows of money are channelled back into the area of origin and network ties are nurtured through these regular exchanges far beyond the family ties. Such patterns can be observed in many places in West Africa (Gugler 2002). Aside from these activities related to social events and ceremonies, wealthier urban people prepare for activities after retirement. They may invest in plantations, livestock, or other small businesses, a fact that had already been acknowledged in different settings in Africa (Peil 1995). Many former migrants go back to their village or the nearest small town and develop new farm and non-farm activities. In Benin it is even a major cause of land concentration especially in peri-urban, well-connected areas. Such return migration also concerns elder men interested in transforming wealth into social and political prestige in local arenas (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004). Through migration, urban as well as rural people span networks in a range of localities, creating access to new resources in terms of employment, market access, information, land and productive assets, and develop multiple urban-rural linkages (Tacoli, 2002).

City expansion in times of crisis and structural adjustment brought about the need for people to develop businesses in the informal sector. The 123 survey conducted in 2001 in West African capital cities revealed that 70% of Cotonou households depended partly or totally on earnings from informal activities (INSAE 2003). Among these activities, trade came first and within trade, food trade was predominant. Street trade, wholesale with warehouse and street cooked food sales, concerned at least 60% of the households, food processing not taken into account. Households also made more than 90% of their purchases in the informal sector because of the lower prices. In mid-sized cities, many city dwellers are also engaged in food trade sometimes combined with farming in rural areas. Urban people nurture their urban-rural social networks and may rely on them when they return to their area of origin, but they also rely on these networks for the development of the food trade. In doing so, they interact with already existing, historically anchored trade networks.

A diversity of food trade networks with common features

Networks patterns and institutions have been shaped as a response to the traded product’s specific requirements (Table).

Maize is a major staple food in the entire West African coastal area. Maize production has increased following changes in demand, through an expansion of cultivated areas from the agroclimatic areas of Guineo-Sudanian to Sudanian, and its trade has also expanded. In Benin, maize production increased from around 200,000 tons in the 1970s to over one million tons in 2010 through both area and yield expansions, but production remains to a large extent scattered among many smallholders who mostly market less than one ton, often split in several sales adjusted to their cash needs Collection is therefore an issue. Purchasing power of urban consumers is also very low so that most of the families buy on a daily basis and sometimes on credit. Retail is therefore also an issue.

Maize trade business is in many cases a family business. On average, it employs more than one family member: a daughter, son or nephew, sisters and brothers. Spouses may run the same business; women help their husbands or run separate and complementary businesses. Stands on the market are inherited. Collection and retail is mainly women’s business while wholesale and storage are in many cases in the men’s hands. Maize wholesalers therefore partly rely on apprentices or family members for organizing supply and retail but, because many urban people have entered this business, there is a growing competition among traders. When traders’ activity is expanding, they also have to rely on professional assemblers or commissioners who buy grain from producers on their behalf at the farm’s gate, on local markets, or on the way to them, as well as from petty wholesalers who dispose of a limited capital and have to quickly sell in order to buy again. In all cases, traders tend to rely on a group of stable product suppliers; social and commercial relationships are inter-
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Maize trade</th>
<th>Yam trade</th>
<th>Cattle trade</th>
<th>Processed fresh food</th>
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<td>1 000 000 tons maize in Benin</td>
<td>2 700 000 tons yam in Benin</td>
<td>1.5 million cattle yearly traded in West Africa, 300,000 through or from Benin</td>
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| Scope | National trade (mainly) with flows towards Sahel | National trade (mainly) | Cross border regional trade | Peri-urban to local trade |

| Common constraints | Scattered supply and small-scale demand (low purchasing power), no access to credit in all segments of the chain; |

| Specific constraints | Low barriers to entry, many temporary traders. In spite of its storability, product hardly stored because of cash constraints. | Remoteness of production areas. Bulk and low storability. High diversity in varieties and their aptitudes. | Long distances between main production (Sahel) and main consumption (Coastal cities) areas. Variability in animal qualities, specific skill requirements for husbandry (on the hoof storage) and evaluation. | Very low storability. Quality control by consumers difficult. |

| Complexity of functions | Medium complexity of arrangements for secure supply and transport and rapid sales and capital rotation. | High complexity of arrangements for secure supply and quick retail sales: personalized relationship between producers and traders and involvement of family members in retail. | High complexity of assemblage, marketing, transport, sales and retail; long distance trade with many stakeholders. | Low complexity: very short chains. |

| Historic anchorage of the trade networks | Through apprenticeship as a youth and inherited market stands and business, but also constant in and out of trade actors in the petty trade segments | Through control over main markets entry and inherited stands, | Yes, with stable institutions (landlords, brokers) enabling less personalized long distance trade relationships | Through food, cultural identity and specific demand from urban dwellers with regional origins |

| Ethnicity in networks | open | Three regional networks connecting the 3 main producing areas to 3 main markets groups | Initially Haoussa-Dendi ethnic networks, now extended to local butchers and livestock keepers/traders from other groups | Specificity of some of the products, some with a strong identity of origin |

| Importance of urban-rural ties for trade | Part of the supply from the region of origin for urban traders; especially from seasonal petty traders at harvest time | Supply in the region of origin of urban traders; personalized ties between producers and traders and between traders from production areas and main consumption market traders | Personal ties between local livestock-keepers and assemblers/butchers or mediated through a market broker. Hosting and service provision in every main market where long distance traders have to stay. | Supply in the region of origin for urban traders and consumers |

| New peri-urban ties and chains | Fresh cobs and grain seasonal petty trade at harvest time. | Direct farm to door sales by yam producers wives. Seasonal petty trade at harvest time. | Supply of trade and urban jobs for rural impoverished livestock keepers. New urban chains especially for milk products, such as cheese. | Rising market for products with an (informal) “Identity of Origin”. |
A specific case concerns farmers from migrants’ communities in remote farming areas who may use their ties to their region of origin when located in a densely populated area. Large farmers and especially hamlet heads send a wife back and she organizes direct sales of the production to regional wholesalers, retailers or consumers (such as processing units), bypassing intermediaries. Such arrangements can be combined with secondary education of the children in town (own observations).

Newcomers in trade who cannot enter such existing trade networks join the large group of itinerant (large efforts, low return) petty traders. Urban petty traders searching for an income generating activity are numerous in retail at a small scale. They have no market stand and can sell on the sides of streets. They may use their social ties in their locations of origin to enter the maize trade business and get some supply directly; they travel on their own with the products or contract taxi and bus drivers who convey the products and also return the payments. Their activity may be seasonal, focused on harvest times. Eventually, both established professional trade networks and ad hoc social networks mobilized for occasional small scale trade activities connect urban areas and areas of origin. Peri-urban and urban smallholders also rely on direct sales of fresh maize and many urban women jump on the temporary activity of grilling and boiling cobs they have been purchasing in their surroundings (Tossou et al. 2007).

Because trade requirements are higher in yam trade than maize trade (high transport costs, low storability, high product diversity), traders are less numerous and have built more stable and secure trading relationships over time that are intertwined with social ties. In Benin, three trade networks have been woven over three production areas along socio-ethnic ties, concerning respectively the central, north-western and north-eastern parts of Benin (Adanguidi 2001).

Yam is a major staple in West Africa. In Benin, yam production yields the highest share of the agricultural GDP (24.8% according to FAOSTAT in 2010). Its trade is facing a steady increase in demand from urban consumers, even those who had not had yam as a staple food (from 500,000 tons in the 1970s to more than 2,400,000 tons in 2010). In comparison to grain trade, yam is even more challenging. Because of its high requirements in soil fertility, yam is cultivated in the remotest areas; it is bulky and difficult to store over time. Supply therefore requires from wholesalers intensive investment in regards to relationships with producers and intermediaries. Buyers also have to cope with a heterogeneous final product (very large number of varieties, some being appropriate to their cooking into pounded yam “fufu”, others not). It is therefore even more difficult than for maize to collect such products, store them, and put them on the market all over the year and make them available to all segments of consumers.

Figure 2: Grain petty wholesalers on the Parakou market – limited storage capacities (Photo: Anne Floquet)
The southern network has access to the main consumer markets in coastal cities (such as Dantokpa in Cotonou – cf. map), where some wholesalers have their stores and stands as well as production and redistribution markets\(^8\). According to a survey conducted in 2010 in the Fon network, most of those operating on the Glazoue production market buy yam at the farm’s gate ( Hornybodé op. cit). Wholesalers have a net of intermediaries who can discuss with farmers on possible terms of a “contract”. Some wholesalers rely on low-cost credit before harvest for the producers in order to secure the transaction and on commission for the buying agents. They then have to keep control of these agents who might well cheat them on the real transaction prices or begin a trade on their own. Other wholesalers build on more personal relationships. Yam is mainly cultivated in scattered hamlets where land has been newly cleared and is still fertile. Hamlet chiefs act as (informal) administrators of the land and control the settlement of new migrants interested in the profitable crop. Some hamlet chiefs are mobilized by wholesalers to ensure that yam will be sold to them. No commission is necessary as the relationship belongs more to the economy of affection and relies on gifts attesting recognition as well as on assistance in bad times. Some hamlet heads even make it a condition for their new migrants. As soon as sufficient quantities are secured and farmers are ready to sell, the wholesaler organizes transportation (Adanguidi op cit).

In order to get the perishable product sold quickly\(^9\) and get their cash for further purchases, yam wholesalers also use fairly stable intermediaries. Members of the already quoted southern yam network tend to mobilize agents, who all have a range of potential sale clients (retailers, large street food processors). The product is sold, in most cases on a credit base, and the agent has to visit the indebted regularly in order to get it paid back as soon as the buyer has sold it. They also rely on retailers within the family: their own children, but also “apprentices” who may be distant relatives from the village. Because of the diversity of yam in terms of varieties and attributes, the retailers and consumers are also often from the same region as the traders. Such a regionalization is stronger than within grain trade where varieties and final products differ less.

It is not very easy for unspecialized urban petty-traders to enter this activity because of its requirements in terms of knowledge, stores and cash. Yet, in cities close to production areas, short value chains can also be observed. It is the case of the mid-sized city Parakou, where 60,000 tons of yam are still produced in the vicinity of the urbanized area (within the commune). Many new operators enter the activity at harvest time. Rural women from peri-urban yam farming communities bypass markets and sell yam directly to consumers. Many urban women engaged in all kinds of trade also jump on yam at that time: they assemble small sales from many women living further from the city, transport them to the markets or sell it as retailers in the city. Some transport their purchases in motorbike taxis, while others share a rented car (Ramanou and Auriole 2007). Here again densification and the development of mid-sized cities offers an opportunity to maintain direct sales and short chains alongside long distance well-structured trade networks for those who cannot fulfill the conditions for entering historically constituted professional networks.

**Livestock** is the highest valued agricultural commodity in intra-regional trade in West Africa. More than 1.5 million cattle are traded annually at the regional level in West Africa. Most of the 60 million heads of cattle have been raised in the Sahel in remote and scattered places and are consumed in coastal cities, especially in Nigeria (FAO 2012). Therefore cattle trade requires long distances movements of live animals. Benin is a production and transit country for cattle cross-border trade (Guibert and al. 2009).\(^{10}\) Trade is confronted to the same issues as the grain trade, but it also has to cope with the vagaries of the movements of live animals, the difficulties of obtaining information on very distant outlets, and the guarantee that animals put on the market have not been stolen elsewhere. It also requires specific skills for keeping animals in good shape until their destination for slaughter, as well as dealing a good price for animals which are heterogeneous in their size and shape.

\(^{10}\) More than 200,000 cattle heads from Burkina Faso and Mali and a marginal amount from Niger pass through the Parakou transit market towards Nigeria and nearly 100,000 heads raised in Benin are exported.
Cattle trade has the highest requirements in terms of capital, trust and skills. Cattle trade has long been monopolized by merchants from specific ethnical groups – Haoussa-Dendi in the eastern region, Djoula in the western region – who developed networks and specific institutions facilitating trading activities. Their outreach was enlarged by out-posting members of their social group in all locations where cattle in transit would have to stay until they reach main consumer cities at the coast. Out-posted members developed separate quarters called “Zongo” where they live and provided services for the traders: as “landlords” they host the cattle traders and the drovers travelling with their livestock, as well as provide meals and help them in their transactions on the market.

They also developed connections to the local butchers. They can give guarantees on the transaction to both local butchers and cattle sellers and contribute to solve disputes. They sometimes guarantee sales on credit and monitor reimbursement (Ufford 1999; Haan and Ufford 2002). The principles of a common origin and of a strong feeling of solidarity within the network of the cattle trade on one side, of neighborhood on the other side are used for building trust between trade protagonists, with the landlord as guarantee giver. Cattle trade institutions contributed to a peaceful urban insertion of cattle trade and made large movements of traders, drovers and livestock possible. Regional economic integration was in process long before its formalization.

Nowadays, the demand for meat and the volumes of the cattle trade flows have increased to a point where newcomers from other ethnic groups have entered the trade (Fulani, Bariba). Their more localized rural-urban trading networks also rely on already established trade institutions (Haan et al. 1999). Urban traders in mid-sized cities and butchers develop fairly stable relationships with Fulani settlements, some of which tend to become permanent and more and more often in the vicinity of a market town.

Cattle trade activities are not suitable to non-professional newcomers, but the networks also feed the development of an urban small scale informal economy. Thousands of people are employed as drovers on markets (every day unsold cattle have to be lead to grazing areas), for transit movements, as meat griller in cities, and some may find employment by urban cattle owners. An increasing involvement of Fulbe young people in trade and conveying activities has been observed over the last decades, and such activities form opportunities for impoverished herders’ sons to make a living in the livestock sector (Boutrais 2001).

Last but not least, in peri-urban areas (apart from fresh milk directly sold to consumers by Fulani women) value chains are emerging for new products, especially waogashi cheese. Here again, urban female assemblers in mid-sized cities obtain their cheese supply from a stable net of Fulbe women on local markets and in Fulbe settlements and sell them to consumers and wholesalers.

Prepared food products build on expanding markets in urban areas where many people have neither time nor the means for cooking several daily meals. Street restaurants are flourishing but also pre-cooked food products that one can easily prepare at home. Among these products a few are extremely popular because of their convenience and low price (cassava based dry grid “gari”), while other precooked food such as fermented maize pudding have strong cultural and regional identities. “Lio”, for example, is a fermented and ready to eat product processed out of maize that can be stored for a few days, and it is specific to the area of Abomey (Floquet et al., 2005). A main issue in trading such fermented wet products is that they have to reach their consumers without delay.

In the opposite of long distance trade networks, fresh food products are mainly being marketed in the next cities. This does not concern only fresh raw products such as maize fresh cobs or vegetables, but also some of the processed food products with limited conservation. A large share of the production is directly marketed by the hundreds of women engaged in processing in the same area, but consumers originating from the same area and living in the large coastal cities are fond of such food as well because it is a part of their cultural identity. New forms of linkages are developed over time in order to satisfy this growing demand. In the area of origin of the product, consumers are rather confident that the product responds to traditional standards. In these areas, petty traders with very low capital try to catch travelers on the main tarmac roads. In Bohicon, for example, half of the regional production of the fermented maize “Lio” product is being sold through such “race – sales”. A significant share of larger processing small businesses relies on relatives engaged in trade in large cities who are sent loads of products through transporters and send the money back through the same way. Here, trade is built on restricted and reliable nets of relationships. The buyer can be confident in the quality and the origin of the product, which are essential attributes for keeping their own customers’ trust and the seller won’t remain with an unsold perishable product.

Historical and “ad hoc” trade networks and their functionality

Newcomers can be incorporated in the larger “historical” trade networks and contribute to exploring all their potential supplier and consumer segments no matter how small they may be, or they can provide transport and services. In trade with low entrance barriers like maize, most of the petty traders are related to trade networks through weak ties, and they rely on their relatives and social “domestic” networks for organizing supply directly from their production areas. They then often by-pass traditional markets and sell at home or on the streets. Former migrants back home may also use the social ties they had crafted in migration for trading labor as middlemen and -women. Rural urban social ties developed through internal migration are mobilized for informal economic activities. Intertwined with the historical
Trade networks, domestic networks span their webs over a large range of mostly small scale, sometimes seasonal and sometimes also emergent activities. Both groups are not separate, and some of the actors in short chains may also upgrade and enter or develop professional specialized networks as their activities expand and new food products are integrated into everyday consumption patterns.

Trade relationships are intertwined with social ties for more stable sale arrangements and protection from opportunistic behavior. Many traders therefore purchase in their region of origin where they can either rely on kinship or enter into some patron-client relationships. It improves their chance of getting the required supplies, gives them the possibility to engage in pre-financing harvests, and also to be supplied on credit and pay for the purchase after it has been resold. Opposite to this, large producers and processing entrepreneurs may ask relatives in town to sell their production since they have access to an alternative network. Also consumers have more security in obtaining a product of the quality they require when they develop a more stable relationship with a few retailers. This is especially true for products displaying a large range of qualities and specificities such as yam and processed food. Stable relationships open more stable outlets to producers and provide access to credit, however costly it may be, and both encourage production. A stable relationship is a necessity for all those other stakeholders relying on credit: small consumers depending on retailers, who themselves may well to be supplied on credit, etc. Such services are provided to small consumers by small scale retailers in spatial and social proximity but might not be provided by large scale modern supermarkets. Smallholders might also be assessed as too small and unreliable for supplying supermarkets while they can find outlets through informal trade.

In the 1990s, as the consequences of structural adjustments on urban poverty were visible, the ability of trading systems to feed expanding cities and to adjust to liberalization was questioned. In West Africa at large, studies such as the FAO “Feeding the cities” revealed that the expansion of the demand had catalyzed an expansion of domestic food trade and local production (Hugon 1997). As a whole, trade arrangements could be seen as functional for consumers, in spite of high transport and transaction costs. Cities have been continuously supplied in times of crisis, and food habits have been modified by urban life but not towards a higher reliance on imported goods. Urban people consume more imported rice, canned tomatoes, and other industrially processed goods but they also consume new local products. Yam tubers and yam chips, for example, both entered the menus of an urban population for whom yam had not been a traditional staple food. Further new food products were processed as a response to expanding urban markets and new needs for easy to cook or no cook food. A decrease in bread and wheat consumption was even observed after devaluation due to changes in prices favorable to local cereals and tubers (LARES 2000). Food is also an important cultural link to the area of origin, and no traveler can come home without bringing specific items for the typical dishes. Trading networks develop specifically around such products, as in the case of the fufu described above, which is just an example among many others. Strong ties between urban and rural areas and the constant search for trading opportunities of a low- or no-income working population reduced extraversion in trade. In return, urban consumption patterns contributed to the nurturing of urban–rural ties. Such local food preferences could even be stronger if policies would create conditions for some of the raw products such as fish, poultry and milk to become more competitive in comparison to imports.

In spite of these achievements, informal trade networks do come with limits. First they cannot cope sufficiently with variation in supply (Hibon et al. 2011). Prices still fluctuate from year to year as well as within a year from season to season, in spite of the fact that wholesalers on main markets buffer these fluctuations through supply from diverse areas. Second there are major food products which still cannot compete with imports. Third, local value chains face new requirements in terms of processing, packaging, quality standards and traceability in order to compete with imported products and endure in spite of the expansion of new large scale distribution systems.

Conclusions - challenges for pro-poor development policies

Value chain promotion is now seen as a major strategy for growth and poverty alleviation. But policies still seem to be designed from the perspective of the State and of the raw commodities, which may or may not improve the trading balance, instead of considering the food products, which consumers are using on a daily base and that affect their nutrition and well-being. Urban petty traders and food processors have developed linkages with smallholders in the remotest areas and encouraged consumption of regional food. Food trade networks are assets that could be promoted and upgraded in order to achieve lower transaction costs and higher standards, allowing local food products to maintain and even enlarge their market shares at national and regional levels, and distribution systems to be improved (including markets and supermarkets). Trade networks are often overlooked or dismissed as “unorganized” or even illicit. In an ideal situation of trustworthy legal systems, informal trade networks might become unnecessary and therefore not worth being taken into account, but in a West African context, they are assets for pro-poor growth. Networks of petty traders are not only a source of income for people without access to the formal economy, but they also shape outlets for local products, provide consumers with local food, and prevent from changes in consumption and trade inducing a dependence on imports. Upgrading rather than impeding activities in the informal trade sector appears to be a wise strategy for pro-poor growth.
References

Migration and Transportation: 
A “North-South-Discussion”

Heiner Monheim

Migration und Verkehr: ein „Nord-Süd-Discussion”

Introduction

The following article has been written as a journalistic essay. That is the reason why footnotes, references, exact figures and scientific definitions are missing. The only definition needed is the understanding of “Global North” as synonymous for rich, wealthy, highly formalized, so-called developed countries (though some of them are located in the southern hemisphere) in contrast to the “Global South”, the group of less developed countries with poor economies, a high degree of informal working life and low political stability.

Current migration theories often emphasize the influence of life cycle development on migration processes. This understanding is based on the conditions which are dominant in wealthy regions in the northern hemisphere. The theories are culturally specific and should not be generalized and applied to migration in countries of poor socio-economic conditions.

Of course much of the development of migration is related to the transportation system. What are the infrastructural conditions for mobility over long distances? Does migration play a relevant role in the passenger ridership of the transport system? Does it produce specific transport and safety problems? How is migration and long-distance mobility concentrated in the capital region in comparison to other urban structures?

I. Migration Theories Need Modification

Sociological and geographical migration research is based upon the empirical experience of highly developed and wealthy societies of western cultures, and such theories are not applicable to poorer and less industrialized countries. Western theories assume a diminishing residency tied to only a few localities; a multi-local life and an increasing frequency of migration are understood as typical for a modern society.

In contrast to this assumption, earlier times saw massive migration flows that were relevant for greater parts of (Western) society at the time.

- Massive migration during the 18th and 19th centuries was driven less by economic progress and more by the European famines and the search for political and/or religious freedom.
- Following World War II, 13 million refugees were forced to migrate within and between regions. Initial provisional living in migrant camps was followed by waves of migration due to regional, working and housing opportunities, and these migrations had little to do with ordinary market conditions. The “Wirtschaftswunder” (economic growth miracle of Germany) started only in the 1950s.
- A more recent migration wave took place in Germany as a result of the reunification of East and West Germany. Currently an increasing number of these former East German ex-migrants are migrating back to eastern regions of Germany.

The above mentioned migration took place in a sort of mass movement and was very much related to important historical events. This has to be distinguished clearly from the regular year by year movement of individuals who migrate without being driven by special circumstances.

Life cycle models have become obsolete

Life cycle models of migration assume that the migration of individuals is driven by specific causes. A typical life proceeds in specific phases in which the probability of an intra- or inter-regional migration is enhanced. Significant life phases include: the professional or training phase or apprenticeship, the subsequent selection of a job, and the concurrent phase of founding a family. Also operational
are the phases of economic consolidation with increased opportunities to build one’s own house with the money earned. Finally, there are phases of a reduction in the family size due to children leaving home to start their own family, followed by the retirement phase and the process of assisted living during old age. Following a professional training phase it is assumed that the mobility of individuals is restricted to areas in which that person was born and grew up in, while those with highly specialized training will migrate farther away from place of origin. Likewise, those persons faced with finding work who have special skills will migrate further from their place of origin than those with ubiquitous skills. Other life cycle factors such as establishing a family or retirement are more relevant for local migration, though the “living apart together-model” with frequent long distance mobility between two homes has become more and more relevant for rich and highly educated people.

The societal differentiation of modern cultures has led to more varied life styles. Family relationships become less formalized: there are more frequent entries and exits in relationships and childless couples are more frequently found. Relationships in “patchwork families” with children from different relationships (and occasionally considerably differing ages) are becoming more frequent. In this context (informal same sex partnerships also need to be mentioned. In addition there are relationships which maintain households in different cities. Career paths and choices have become more flexible. One result is the shortening of the training period related to a particular workplace. Frequent occupational changes are becoming normal. Many individuals experience longer phases of unemployment or the intentional interruption of professional activity. Increasingly, individuals are engaged in parallel occupations at the same time such as self-employment carried out along with a salaried occupation. These socio-demographic and economic trends reduce the local and regional attachment to cities. They provide incentives to frequently change regional and inter-regional locations. They also promote ties to different cities and parallel lifestyles due to work or relationships.

**The life cycle model is inappropriate in less developed countries**

For developing countries the lifestyles mentioned above do not shape migration. The well organized biographies with clearly delineated phases are the exception rather than the rule. The social and regional biographies follow a completely different logic. The widespread practice of using children in the workforce alters the concept of a well paid career. The career paths observed in developed countries are restricted to the affluent elite. Among the lower classes informal career paths such as frequent changes in informal work coupled with periods of forced unemployment are much more common. The high percentage of illiteracy and lack of schooling shows that extended education and training phases have no major role to play in the migration trends. Only the economic elite have access to academic training, which involves nationwide or international migration.

In addition to this, the family and household structures are completely different in developing countries. For example, the number of children per woman is often much higher. Thus the necessity for children to become wage earners at an early age or to become completely self-employed is much greater in these counties.

The percentage of partially or completely orphaned children (due to early death of one or both parents or due to the absence of a child’s biological father) is very high. Thus orphans must fend for themselves at a very early age. Due to the reduced life expectancy of such groups, the classic retirement phase seen in developed countries is shorter or does not exist at all and associated migration in that phase is not observed.

**Population growth and productivity problems as driving factors in migration**

In the developing countries the exodus of the once agrarian population from the rural areas to the cities forms the largest part of migration. The desire to found and maintain large families is no longer as pronounced as in previous decades. This exodus to the cities has been accelerated by environmental factors such as drought, desertification, overgrazing, and deforestation as well as direct and indirect effects of climate change. Thus a portion of the population is forced to escape to urban areas.

In some countries, there are also forced migrations toward the periphery of rural areas, resulting in refugee camps for those escaping famine or military conflicts. Near the borders of these countries the population density is often minimal. Thus there are sufficient areas for camps and minimal competition for land use.

This situation is comparable with the refugee experience during and following the second World War when cities were intentionally bombed and migration to the periphery took place. Following the war and the resulting famine years, the rural areas took on temporary migrants. Thus the exodus from rural areas to urban areas (or vice versa) was context dependent.

The movement away from the rural areas is not limited to developing countries. In industrialized countries like Germany the exodus occurred during the 1960s up until 1980 during the “economic miracle” period. Initially the movement to escape from rural agricultural areas to urban areas was propelled by expanding employment opportunities in urban areas. Often the urban migration process started with workers commuting to the city during the week while maintaining a temporary residence near their workplace. This was later replaced by more permanent residencies in the urban areas as a solution for daily commuters with long commuting distances by car or train.

Here too one can find a reverse migration from the cities to rural areas. Due to limited availability of agrarian employment opportunities and due to the seasonal character of rural agrarian employment, the need for seasonal workers arose. At the same time a novel branch of tourism to rural areas arose. Both needs could be filled with a seasonal workforce. Initially these migrant workers came from countries around the Mediterranean, and later eastern European migrants joined this trend. After a period of seasonal employment, permanent residency of the workers often follows.
The role of advancing social and economic development

As a rule, normal migration is associated with social and economic development because:

- increased income leads to more inter-regional migration,
- modern transportation infrastructure allows for international migration,
- differentiated social structures and economic structures are prerequisites for migration as well as the consequences of migrations.

The antithesis for the economic maturity of highly industrialized societies assumes that:

- obstacles to migration can be reduced or eliminated by active regional planning and related policies, which pursue the goal of balanced regional development;
- such policies provide or guarantee sufficient development for all regions;
- highly developed societies are able to deal more adequately with changing external natural and economic catastrophes.

In any case this comparative analysis has shown that it is necessary to be very cautious with abstract theories when interpreting migration phenomena. The context of migration in specific countries must be taken into account: In historical migration research the key development phases of a country must be considered. The sociological migration research requires an analysis of social contexts, and the geographical migration research requires the thorough analysis of regional contexts.

One important factor in the regional context is the transportation system, which may provide better or less favorable opportunities for migration. The role of long distance transportation systems on migration mobility will be addressed in the following section.

II. The Interface Between Transport and Migration

A clear relationship between transport systems and migration behavior can be ascertained for the earlier migrations induced by famine or political-religious controversies between Europe and North America. The exodus of millions of refugees was facilitated by ocean going sailing vessels and sufficient harbors. Transporting the refugees was good business for the ship owners. Further distribution of the new arrivals in the New World was expedited by horses and oxen. Later, the “let’s go west-migration” was mainly supported by the establishment of rail services.

The expulsion of displaced persons in Europe following World War II took place on foot with handcarts or by horse drawn wagons or, where possible, via railways that were still in operation. The continuation of refugee migrations following the war was accomplished by provisional repair of the rail system.
The migration following the reunification of Germany took place primarily by rail or with automobiles. The first refugees who escaped from the German Embassy in Prague were transported by GDR trains to the West. Later, after opening the “Iron Curtain”, long queues of East German “Trabbi-Cars” went westward. After the crash of the East German economy, a constant migration flow went westward into the West German metropolitan areas with their strong economy.

For the following discussion it is important to define what is meant by long-distance migration mobility. Does it mean a trip between an abandoned former home area to a favored region, or does it refer to travel between a previous home area and a new home area? Which trips are to be accounted for: those of the migrant or the trips of relatives and friends of the person who has migrated?

In the arguments that follow a broad definition of migration-based mobility is proposed, which includes the induced trips by relatives of the out-migrant/ emigrant. The specific flows of migration are structured by the transport network and capacity and how it correlates with the economic and settlement structures of the regions.

- How centralized or decentralized is the settlement system organized?
- How dominant is the capital city region? Which transport systems are available?
- How well connected is the local transport system with the regional transport system?
- Which roles do the rail, bus and paratransit (informal collective transport) systems play?
- What is the relationship between the regional and the national transit systems?

Relevance of migrants in transportation systems of the “Global North”

In industrialized countries the percentage of migrants using long-distance transportation is relatively small irrespective of the type of transport examined. In these countries the percentage of occupational commuters, leisure and vacation travelers is very high in road, rail and bus transport.

And the relevance of long distance mobility is not very high. The percentage of long-distance trips among all trips is only about 20%.

But long-distance transportation is taken very seriously at the political level and the long distance networks are accorded the highest quality standards. Most transportation infrastructure investment is allocated to long-distance infrastructure (motorways, high speed train lines and major airports). This high priority is primarily given for the sake of business and commercial mobility rather than national or international migration.

The long range traffic infrastructure does not influence the volume and distribution of the mobility of migrants in Europe. Good access is viewed as ubiquitously available and inter-regional migration is determined much more by other factors such as employment opportunities or the availability of housing units.

Therefore the transportation systems of the “North” will not be discussed in more detail, because the direct or indirect migration mobility contributes little to the capacity of existing transportation systems. Migration does not lead to special transportation programmes and is not a relevant segment of the transportation system.

At best there are discussions to consider whether multiple residence and highly mobile households should be served with special fares, for example with a universal rail ticket.

Relevance of migrants in transportation systems of the “Global South”

In the countries of the Global South a major portion of all individual traffic is related to migration-imposed mobility (seasonal or permanent travel between home and workplace). The usual long-distance mobility due to business, commuter, shopping, and tourist trips is poorly developed and is much more dominated by regional transportation networks. The dominance of long-distance migration in the developing countries is apparent in the reports on the flow of millions of Chinese migrant workers travelling by train or bus to their home villages during the Chinese Spring Festival (the Lunar New Year).

Poor rail networks

Whether the rail systems play an important role in migration mobility depends to a large extent on the network structures. The railway infrastructure of most countries of the Global South is not well established yet. This is still due to colonial times when only small parts of railway networks had been established. Frontier regions and other peripheral regions had poor connections to the central areas of the respective country. After independence the new governments rarely established policies to improve rail networks. The only inter-regional and international networks are roads, which are often in a poor condition. This lack of long-range transportation networks is an important reason for the poor economic exchange.
between neighboring states. Even today limited state finances restrict the development of transport systems. This leads to insufficient maintenance and the degradation of transport infrastructures.

**China and India as exceptions**

Only China and India have established sufficient long-distance railway networks due to their continental magnitude, unique histories, and their economic influence. The Indian rail network, however, has been poorly managed. China is rapidly expanding its rail networks: every year 4000 km of new rails are added to the network. It now has the most dynamic rail network development worldwide. The relatively well-developed rail systems play a major role in the direct and indirect long distance migration of these countries. The trains permit the regular flow of migrants between areas of origin and areas of destination. Many migrants transport large voluminous cargo from their old homelands into their new residences and transport goods and funds from their new work and living areas back to their homelands. The trains are thus full of people with this type of migration-related luggage.

**Long range bus and paratransit services**

Instead of the poor rail services in many countries of the Global South, long-distance buses or paratransit services are a viable alternative. Inter-regional busses provide a differentiated system through private enterprise. These buses are used to transport people and cargo. Many migrants fix their cargo on the roofs of these buses. Express bus lines provide connections between large cities and the capital city. In contrast, the services to other regions and secondary cities are neglected. Inter-regional buses are often involved in spectacular accidents. These lines are primarily restricted to major thoroughfares. Often different bus companies compete without systematized networks in terms of schedules and fares, resulting in major gaps in the supply of services. The paratransit systems operate with minibuses. They offer mainly regional and occasionally inter-regional connections. Thus more often than not, trips have to be broken down into different legs of a journey, and this results in extended waiting times between connections. The paratransit systems work without schedules and fixed fares. They transport people as well as cargo. The technical condition of the vehicles is often in an appalling state. Often the vehicles are overloaded. The personnel are poorly trained and the prices are often individually negotiated. Thus the paratransit system offers a minimal level of transport security. Private automobile traffic in the developing countries plays a very limited role. It is often difficult to define private automobile traffic because private automobiles often carry third parties or third party cargo. Thus many cars cannot be counted as motorized individual traffic but rather as paratransit. The use of a car by only one individual or family is rather uncommon and is specific to the local and national elite.

**A better transportation and regional development model for the Global South**

In the light of the current climate and energy debate, the countries of the Global South must make a larger contribution to reducing climate change as well. Such a contribution can only be achieved through new strategies in transportation policy and regional development policy.

As far as transport policy is concerned, an improvement in rail and bus transportation systems is needed for the Global South. Less developed countries must limit their political orientation towards automobile dependent development, and hopefully diverge from following the example of the Global North. The rail system must be quickly and systematically expanded, reactivated and modernized. Regarding the rail policies, priorities must be revised. Over the last decades the World Bank, UNEP and other international organizations have placed a high priority on long-distance rail systems, for example to connect Cairo with Capetown. This was recommended from a globalized view on economic development that gives high priority to the international flow of goods. But the international cargo rail networks belong to the so-called “heavy rail services” that require massive and expensive infrastructure.
A better solution would be to concentrate on the expansion and modernization of regional train networks. This is the option of so-called “light rail” transportation. This would employ systems similar to trams, “S-Bahn” systems (suburban rail services), and regional trains. Such systems could greatly contribute to the elimination of the rapidly increasing urban automobile chaos. And they would help to find a better balance in regional development.

This leads to the perspective of planning concepts for regional development. The polycentric model with a system of many small and medium-sized towns provides many advantages compared with the monocentric model of a dominating capital region. As soon as a single region monopolizes most of its public funding, investment, and economic development, massive migration flows will start. A better regional balance can potentially keep long-distance migration to a minimum. Coming back to transport policies: high speed rail systems are mainly developed for the connection of capital regions. They monopolize rail investment and hinder investment to regional and local rail networks. They are inappropriate in developing countries independent of the distances to be covered. Regional development and regional transport infrastructure should have the highest priority; they could establish a fair regional balance and partly solve the migration problems.

In this regard, China and India could serve as a model. Though the German “Transrapid System” was implemented for the Shanghai airport connection, the high-speed rail system is no longer being emphasized. Greater emphasis is now being placed on conventional light rail technologies. New development strategies try to improve the economic development and the railway infrastructure in less developed western Provinces. In India a polycentric system of metropolitan areas and a decentralized railway system have contributed to parallel developments in many different parts of the country.

So my final conclusions are:

- High-speed rail transportation systems are inappropriate in the Global South, given the limited financial ability of developing countries. Such high investments always lead to a massive concentration in the capital regions. Migrants also do not benefit from the prohibitive prices of high-speed tickets. Priority is necessary for regional and local light rail developments in all regions.

- “Car mania” does not fit with the Global South at all. Intensive expansions of inter-state highways lead to chaotic traffic conditions and massive environmental problems. Any further priority given to automobile traffic and motorway expansion would be a bad decision. The Global South needs decentralized road networks in the interest of economic development and a reduction of the exodus from rural areas. The massive increase of fatal accidents in the Global South have been identified as a big problem by the WHO, and they can only be stopped if priority is given to local and regional improvements of road networks and public transport systems.

- In the interest of better regional development, the distribution of public investment, research, and education resources, as well as the subsidies for the location of private enterprises and the transport system need to be balanced between the regions. The traditional dominance of the capital regions has to be reversed. Their needs must not monopolize all investments and certainly not the transportation budget.
Urban Transition and Rural-urban Linkages – Some Topical Reflections about Doug Saunders’ “Arrival City”

Eva Dick

“What will be remembered about the twenty-first century, more than anything else except perhaps the effects of a changing climate, is the great, and final, shift of human populations out of rural, agricultural life and into cities.” (Saunders 2010: 1)

The first sentence in the preface of Doug Saunders’ book “Arrival City – How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world” (published in 2010) spells out its central message: the inevitability of the urban transition, independent of country- and region-specific differences in extent, timing, as well as political, economic and socio-cultural background factors of urbanization. Saunders then points to the specific places this transition is most likely to occur at, coining them “arrival cities”. These are neighbourhoods at the peripheries of metropolises and are all too often also at the margin of urban policy makers’ and planners’ attention. Rural-urban migrants use them as entry points to the city and stepping-stones for their own (and their children’s) socio-spatial mobility.

The book provides more than 300 pages of accounts on the urban growth of around 30 cities or neighbourhoods in about 20 countries all over the world that were visited by Saunders and his over a dozen assisting field researchers. Its ten chapters take the reader to the different facets of the arrival cities - from the edge, to the top, outside in - and each of them includes several sub-chapters on different cities or countries. The book also adopts a historical perspective confronting contemporary massive urbanisation processes in, for example, Dhaka and Mumbai, along with rural-urban migration waves in 18th and 19th century London and Paris, as well as European migrants’ paths to New York and Chicago up to the early 20th century. Almost each of these urbanisation accounts is exemplified by the life story of a person or a family many of whom the author and his co-operators have personally talked to and accompanied whilst conducting research for the book. These life stories and the way individuals and families struggle with gradually integrating themselves into urban lives lie at the heart of the book. The point is made very clear that the success and failure of people’s (and eventually also countries’) urban transition – even if occurring across generations – is directly contingent with the degree arrival cities and their inhabitants’ needs are politically acknowledged and supported.
To me, the book is as much about people’s arrival to the cities as it is about their linkages back to the rural areas. While its title at least implicitly suggests that rural-urban migration instantly turns into urban ‘arrival’ – a view largely upheld by both researchers and practitioners for years – the content of the book advises us otherwise. From the “first great migration” to the 19th and early 20th century European metropolises, up until the contemporary mega-urbanization processes in the South, migrants have never travelled to the cities and turned their back to the countryside at once. In Europe, according to Saunders, centuries of “circular, seasonal migration had built links between village and city, and those circular migrations (…) did not fully dwindle into permanent settlement until the First World War” (p. 133). With respect to contemporary migration processes, the story of the Solkar family in India exemplifies patterns of rural-urban movement and hybrid lifestyles true for many other countries in the South. Although the male household members have practised urban lives and employment for more than half a century and across generations, the family remains tied to subsistence peasant farming. Wages earned in Mumbai have allowed the family to modestly raise the productivity of their farming, yet none of the family members have considered moving to the city permanently. However, nowadays migration patterns and urbanization experiences are progressively changing. Sanjay, the youngest son, is the first in the family with intentions to permanently settle in the city while many of his peers make much larger distance moves to work as labourers on construction sites in overseas destinations such as Dubai.

The book further informs us about the importance of village-based networks and organisations for making rural-urban migration as well as urban transit and arrival possible. Beyond mere push and pull factors prompting rural to urban movements, social arrangements between individuals and families hailing from a common area of origin also determine flows and intensities of migration. Through mutual aid and information on, for example, jobs and housing, these networks assist migrants with accessing initial means of survival in the urban destination. The story of Sabri Köçyüg’s arrival in Harem, Istanbul, offers evidence on village-based networks providing the social, political and economic back-up of poor migrants’ way into the large cities. The yearlong seasonal migration habits of Sabri’s father had paved the way for his own movement to the city in the 1960s. Joint action with fellow East-Anatolian villagers at the edge of Istanbul then lead to a new type of (self-)organized and even professionally backed gecekondu development. However, the informal networks sustaining rural-urban linkages and facilitating migrants’ urban insertion need not necessarily be benign. The example of the Shiv Sena movement in India reveals the potentially gang-like and divisive effects of policies on behalf of the (chosen) disadvantaged completely at odds with notions of urban citizenship-related wellbeing and access.

More than anything the book draws evidence on the invariable influence of governmental and legal frameworks on rural-urban migration processes and outcomes. Several chapters provide insight into China’s massive urbanization and economic growth scenario of the last 20 years. The story of the young migrants Jiang Si Fei and Hua Chang Zhan in Shenzhen, the economic hub of the Pearl River Delta, shows how the household registration system hukou is effectively preventing any kind of effective, temporary or permanent, insertion into urban life. Instead, the system brings about a largely constraint-driven perpetuation of rural-urban circular migration and linkages at very low levels. The reason is that it prevents migrants, at least the ones without a certain level of skills provided through a post-secondary education, to access elements of the urban welfare system, for example, those that are related to housing. Against this background, migrant couples such as Fei and Zhan, after many years of being together, continue to live in separate worker accommodations. They seek to reap maximum benefit out of the city’s relatively high wages while at the same time postponing joint house holding and upbringing of children to a life elsewhere. Apart from the damage such a situation inflicts on individual and family planning prospects, at the aggregate level it may put the entire city’s and country’s economic and social future at risk. In 2008, in view of the absence of affordable housing opportunities, many Shenzhen workers had opted not to return from their New Year holiday but rather seek employment in other urban areas in closer proximity to their home villages, and the city ended up with a large surplus of entry-level jobs.

The book’s account of Tatary in rural Poland further illustrates the often adverse effects of national policies on spatial outcomes, as well as the intimate relationship between urban-bound migration and rural development. In the country’s transition era the government introduced the Farmers’ Social Security Fund (KRUS) as a support system to agriculture and to forestall massive migration to the country’s large cities “in a romantic attachment to the ideal of family farming and the aesthetics of the farm” (p. 104). Now Marek Storczynski, like many other farmers in the region, awaits his 60th birthday when the pension payments become available. Meanwhile he continues his low-productivity farm on a small family holding which produces below subsistence level. However he receives the larger share of his income from the part-time employment of his eldest daughter in Warsaw and expects his younger daughters to leave the countryside, even Poland, once they have finished school. The case of Storczynski’s rural living supported by urban income is exemplary in a country in which foreign remittances amount to 2.5 per-
cent of the country’s GDP. Together with the government pension these remittances from overseas urban areas constitute the main source of farm income.

Saunders’ conclusions with respect to rural development prospects in the light of urbanization dynamics are nevertheless at times stark. With respect to China and the increasingly permanent character of people’s migration to the city, he states that “the more successful arrival cities allow villages to die out” (p. 113). Referring to mass suicides in the poorest and most cut-off regions of India, he sheds a dramatic light on the hopelessness of rural life in the absence of urban connectivity. As a consequence, in his opinion, larger scale, commercial agriculture and a (second) Green Revolution remain as the only viable solutions for rural development – although in a chapter about Bangladesh he somewhat attenuates this position by calling for “investment not size” in agriculture (128). Saunders’ narrowness with regard to rural perspectives may partly stem from the almost complete absence of African examples in his book with the exception of a chapter on the Kibera neighbourhood in Nairobi, Kenya.

We may nevertheless want to keep in mind that the book is more concerned with urban rather than rural development dynamics. Judging it from this perspective, it makes a truly excellent case for the importance of foreseeing and transition-enabling strategies and structures in poor neighbourhoods worldwide. Based on positive examples from urban or quarter-based policies pursued in Brazil and Colombia, he sketches out directions for urban land reform interventions as well as for government support for enhanced access to employment, education and health as central opportunity structures. He shows the instrumental role of strengthened civil society organizations in sustaining bottom-up processes of neighbourhood upgrading and urban poverty alleviation. The Venezuelan model is presented as a negative example in which heavily and external-financed barrio development without job creation has not achieved anything beyond “hollow growth” (p. 216). By way of examples from Spain and Germany, Saunders demonstrates the degree to which national citizenship regulations may positively or negatively impact international migrants’ access to urban opportunity structures. Unfortunately, the (justified) description of decade-long integration failures in Germany turns into a drastic portrait of the Kreuzberg neighbourhood in Berlin echoing the very same black-painting media reports the book denounces.

In many of the selected stories from North and South, Saunders highlights the transit and linkage function of immigrant neighbourhoods. In his view, in the case of adequate support of the state these provide not only transitory pathways into the city but (by way of urban-rural remittances and household and community linkages) also potential solutions to rural poverty. In this way he foresees a growing middle class within the arrival city actively contributing to rural non-agricultural growth and a related rural upward mobility. His call towards the end of the book for reorienting foreign development assistance towards the “arrival city” seems thus suggestive, however also excessively optimistic and somewhat one-sided. At the very least we may conclude that more research is needed to systematically inquire into the longer-term relationships between household’s urban social mobility and their aspirations to develop or return back-rural, as well as about further pathways for comprehensively addressing the promotion of economic and other forms of rural-urban linkages.

Eva Dick
PhD, is a research fellow and lecturer at the Department of Spatial Planning in Developing Countries, Faculty of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund University. Her research focuses on different forms of migration and their influence on spatial development and planning. Presently she is involved in a research project about “non-permanent migration, translocality and governance in transit cities” in Ghana and South Africa. Contact: <eva.dick@tu-dortmund.de>


Das Wissen Minkes über Bauen mit Bambus scheint unerschöpflich, doch leider sind viele der Informationen im ersten Teil fast nur stichwortartig zusammengefasst – anscheinend zugunsten der zahlreichen und eher verkaufs förderlichen Architektur-Projekte im zweiten Teil. So müssen beispielsweise die 16 Varianten des Erntens, Trocknens, Konservierung und Lagerung (einschließlich 9 Fotos) auf nur 4 Seiten Platz finden, was viele Fragen offen lässt – wie z.B. über die Haltbarkeit der Konstruktion und des Insektenschutzes. Auch an anderen Stellen regt sich Bedauern, wenn anders natürliche und alternative Baustoffen und andere natürliche und alternative Baustoffe und alternative Einwirkungen der naturnahen Bauens, dargestellt an den Werken der Architekten Ken Yean und dem Büro Ng Seksan Design – beide in Malaysia ansässig – sowie der Green School in Bali eines nicht namentlich hervorgehobenen Baumeisters. Die abgebildeten Bauwerke vermitteln den Eindruck, dass sich der Architekt Ken Yean auf die Erschaffung baulicher Ungeheuer mit Geschossflächen zwischen 25.000 und 150.000 m² mit implantierten Grünlächen spezialisiert hat. Eine senkrechte Rasenfläche über 40 Geschosshöhe ist sicherlich imposant, wenn wahrscheinlich auch nicht sehr pflege freundlich. Ng Seksan plant auch senkrechte Grünlächen, versteht aber als Landschaftsplaner mehr von den Anforderungen der Instandhaltung dersel ben (was die Details zeigen) und ist im Übrigen eher Meister im Entwurf anspruchsvoller Villen in üppigen Tropengärten und Parks. Es macht Freude zu sehen, welch paradisi sche Wohnambiente entstehen können, wenn sich betuchte Bauherren oder –Frauen finden, die keine Angst von Schlangen, Spinnen, Affen und anderen (Mit-) Bewohnern des Tropenwaldes haben.

Die Grüne Schule (www.greenschool.org) liegt mit den Titeln Materialize, Mobilize, Stimulate und Transform überschrieben.


Dieser Band ist gleichzeitig Katalog zur gleichnämen Ausstellung am Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen in Stuttgart. Thema sind unterschiedliche Auffassungen des naturnahen Bauens, dargestellt an den Werken der Architekten Ken Yean und dem Büro Ng Seksan Design – beide in Malaysia ansässig – sowie der Green School in Bali eines nicht namentlich hervorgehobenen Baumeisters. Die abgebildeten Bauwerke vermitteln den Eindruck, dass sich der Architekt Ken Yean auf die Erschaffung baulicher Ungeheuer mit Geschossflächen zwischen 25.000 und 150.000 m² mit implantierten Grünlächen spezialisiert hat. Eine senkrechte Rasenfläche über 40 Geschosshöhe ist sicherlich imposant, wenn wahrscheinlich auch nicht sehr pflege freundlich. Ng Seksan plant auch senkrechte Grünlächen, versteht aber als Landschaftsplaner mehr von den Anforderungen der Instandhaltung derselben (was die Details zeigen) und ist im Übrigen eher Meister im Entwurf anspruchsvoller Villen in üppigen Tropengärten und Parks. Es macht Freude zu sehen, welch paradisi sche Wohnambiente entstehen können, wenn sich betuchte Bauherren oder –Frauen finden, die keine Angst von Schlangen, Spinnen, Affen und anderen (Mit-) Bewohnern des Tropenwaldes haben.


Kosta Mathéy


Unter der aktuellen Schwemme von Publikationen über ökologisches Bauen und Stadtplanung leistet dieses Buch einen beachtenswerten Beitrag, da es viele innovative Gedanken entwickelt anstatt zu wiederholen, was von anderer Stelle schon hundertfach vorgebetet wurde. Statt dessen wertet es systematisch aus, was bisher erreicht wurde und ergänzt es durch neue, gele gentlich auch futuristische Ideen.

Unter MATERIALIZE wird die stoffliche Umsetzung ökologischer Planungsprinzipien durch bewährte wie auch effizientere Composite Materialien verstanden; deren Optimierung durch Computergestützte Dimensionierung, das Weglassen übertriebener technischer Überzüchtungen am Bau und in der Infrastruktur, sowie durch die Berücksichtigung von bisher nicht messbaren Raumqualitäten und ein konsequente biotopische Nutzung der Dachflächen als Ersatz für die den davor stehenden Grund und Mutterboden. MOBILIZE bezieht sich nicht nur auf neue und intelligente Beförderungssysteme, sondern auch auf den Rückbau und die Umnutzung von Straßenfläche, vernetzungsfreundliche Stadtsstrukturen und neue symbiotische Stoffbeziehungen zwischen Städten und Umland.


Während die Sektor-Kapitel zu kurz sind, um mit der stärker spezialisierten Fachliteratur konkurrieren zu können, erweisen sich die zahlreichen Fallstudien und Stadtbeispiele wie bei den meisten jüngeren UN-Publikationen als ausgesprochen anschaulich und nützlich. Zudem verleiht der UN-Siegel den daraus entnommenen Argumenten und Daten höhere Autorität, was im Unterricht oder im politischen Rahmen hilfreich sein kann.

Kosta Mathéy

Stadtökologie


Während die Sektor-Kapitel zu kurz sind, um mit der stärker spezialisierten Fachliteratur konkurrieren zu können, erweisen sich die zahlreichen Fallstudien und Stadtbeispiele wie bei den meisten jüngeren UN-Publikationen als ausgesprochen anschaulich und nützlich. Zudem verleiht der UN-Siegel den daraus entnommenen Argumenten und Daten höhere Autorität, was im Unterricht oder im politischen Rahmen hilfreich sein kann.

Kosta Mathéy

In der Einleitung wird die Publikation als „Handbuch“ vorgestellt. Doch trotz der klaren Gliederung der Materie im Inhaltsverzeichnis erfordert die Struktur des Buches ein konsekutives Lesen des Textes von Anfang bis Ende wie bei einem Roman. Auch der Schreibstil kann in Übereinstimmung damit als eloquent bewertet werden, unbeschadet der der vielen und korrekten Quellenangaben. Aber viele Fachbegriffe und Verweise auf Referenzprojekte oder Städte setzen Vorkenntnisse voraus, die eigentlich nur jene haben dürften, die das Buch gar nicht mehr brauchen. Der Verzicht auf Diagramme und Tabellen erschwert die Verständlichkeit für fachfremde Leser oder Studierende; auch die wenigen Fotos sind eher als Stimmungsbilder denn fachliche Illustration zu bezeichnen. Es entsteht der Eindruck, dass sich der Autor mehr Gedanken über die beabsichtigte Zielgruppe hätte machen können und sollen.

Kosta Mathéy

Infrastruktur


Dieser Reader vereint 34 Aufsätze zum Thema Stadtform und (bei einigen) auch zum Thema Mobilität aus den Jahren 1929 bis 2011. Die meisten Beiträge wurden lediglich kopiert und nicht neu gesetzt, was ein Zitieren aus dem Originaltext möglich macht, aber weniger leserlich ist. Eine durchgängige Linie der Sammlung ist die Referenz zu Christaller’s ‘Central Place’ Theorie sowie Burgess Concentric Zone Aussagen. Genauso durchgängig sind die vielen komplizierten mathematischen Formeln, die nach heutiger Erkenntnis weniger zur Lösung städtischer Mobilitätsprobleme beitragen als innovative stadtplanerische Lösungen oder der politische Wille zur Verkehrsberuhigung und zum Ausbau nutzerfreundlicher öffentlicher Verkehrsalternativen mit einem städteplanerischen Implikationen. Bei dem Schnäppchenpreis von etwa €260,- werden
ohnehin nicht viele Privatkäufer in die Verlegen-heit kommen, sich diesen Reader anschaffen zu wollen und 650 Seiten akribisch durchzuarbeiten – was in einem Jahr gut zu schaffen sein sollte. Ich könnte alternative Vorschläge zur Verwen-
dung dieser Lebenszeit beisteuern. ‘If in doubt please do not hesitate to contact me’.

Kosta Mathéy

Technologie


Das Buch behandelt das Thema des Klimage-rechts Bauens International nach Parametern der Haustechnologie. Konsequenterweise steht zu Beginn eine Erläuterung der wichtigsten Klimafak-toren und Klimazonen – letztere werden auf kalt, moderat, subtropisch, tropisch und Wüstenklima reduziert. Exemplarisch für diese fünf Zonen werden in den folgenden Kapiteln klimatische Kennwerte, Anforderungen an die Fassade und an die innerräumliche Bausubstanz sowie technische Ausstattungsempfehlungen für die Städte Moskau, München, Shanghai, Bangladesch und Dubai durchde-
kliniert. Für weitere Städte befinden sich im Anhang jeweils 17 geografische wie klimatische Kennwerte, Anforderungen an die Fassade und an die innerräumliche Bausubstanz sowie technische Ausstattungsempfehlungen für die Städte Moskau, München, Shanghai, Bangladesch und Dubai durchde-
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kliniert. Für weitere Städte befinden sich im Anhang jeweils 17 geografische wie klimatische Wenn nicht man sich auf den Klimafaktor beschränken will, was ja ein legitimer wissenschaftlicher Ansatz ist, sollte sich das gleichzeitige Nebeneinander unterschiedlicher Klimaverhältnisse in einem Erdband, einem Land, einer Region und sogar innerhalb einer Stadt schon herumgesprochen haben.

Kosta Mathéy


Forthcoming Events / Veranstaltungen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2013 World Social Forum. Venue: El Manar University</td>
<td>March 26–30, 2013</td>
<td>Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Contact phone: +216 71240559, Email <a href="mailto:esmeral@isocarp.org">esmeral@isocarp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th International Conference on Urban Planning and Regional Development in the Information Society – REAL CORP 2013 – Planning Times: You better keep planning or you get in deep water, for the cities they are a-changin'. Organised by CEI ALANOVA</td>
<td>May 20–23, 2013</td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Further information: &lt;www.corp.at&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURA 2013: Cities as Seedbeds for Innovation. Contact / further information: University of Twente, School of Management and Governance / IGS, PO Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands. Email <a href="mailto:info@eurap2013.org">info@eurap2013.org</a>, further information: &lt;www.eura2013.org&gt;</td>
<td>June 4–7, 2013</td>
<td>Enschede, NL</td>
<td>Further information: &lt;www.eura2013.org&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th Annual World Congress of ISOCARP: Frontiers of Planning: Evolving and Declining Models of City Planning Practice. Organised by the international Society of City and Regional Planners (ISOCARP). Contact: ISOCARP P.O. Box 983 2501 CZ The Hague, The Netherlands. Phone: +3170-346 2654, Fax: +3170-361 7909, Email <a href="mailto:iscocarp@iscocarp.org">iscocarp@iscocarp.org</a>; further information: &lt;www.isocarp.org&gt;</td>
<td>October 1–4, 2013</td>
<td>Brisbane, Australia</td>
<td>Further information: &lt;www.isocarp.org&gt;</td>
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