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Transitions in Africa



# Editorial

African cities are experiencing rapid population growth and spatial expansion. This is paired with increasing economic and social inequalities of the urban population, trends that can be illustrated by the fact that land consumption is increasing per capita, that the cities are as expensive as expansive, and that urban growth is not sufficiently accompanied by positive impacts on social and economic development.

Urban transition is generally explained with the complexity of social and economic transitions, population growth, and migration. However, these are only the factors that make urban transition necessary and irreversible. Access to land, housing, and urban services are the key variables that deepen the divide between emerging middle classes and the urban poor. For a sound explanatory framework of urbanisation processes, the agents who are active in these processes must be looked at in order to explain “how” urban transitions are managed, steered, and/or (self-) organised. Emerging informal land markets, precarious settlements, and scarcity of urban services are prominent examples of the impacts of poorly managed urban growth with long-term consequences.

Spatial and institutional transitions and Africa’s urban transformation are the focus of this volume of TRIALOG. Our authors address power relations and imbalances between different actors, in/formal land-management processes, complex land markets, and spatial reconfigurations, among other aspects of these transition processes. The first nine articles of this TRIALOG volume are linked to papers presented during the first Mozambique Urban Research Forum, or *Fórum Urbano Nacional de Pesquisa* (FUN-P). The forum was envisioned and implemented by the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), Rotterdam, with the support of the *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (UEM), pursuing the objective to foster research on the ongoing urbanisation in Mozambique and Africa. The international event, held in Maputo in June 2016, brought together researchers and professionals from 11 different countries: Mozambique, Brazil, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Eighteen researchers presented their papers in four panels, along with urban experts and practitioners.

FUN-P is an outcome of the research project *Urban Expansion and Compactness Debate in the Context of Mozambique*. This project was executed by the IHS as part of the Future Cities Africa (FCA) initiative, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and implemented by the Cities Alliance. The IHS conducted in-depth research by collecting and analysing data on urban land expansion in secondary cities in Mozambique. The purpose of this research project was to fill crucial theoretical and corroborative gaps related to the comparative merits of planned expansion and compactness by collecting and analysing data on cities and urban land expansion, testing the relevant theories/models, and feeding the results into the current academic and policy debates at national and international levels.

*We, the editors of this TRIALOG volume, were deeply saddened to learn that the Mayor of Nampula, Mahamudo Amurane, was cowardly murdered on October 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017. He had provided his full support and enthusiasm to our research in his city, encouraging us to look further into the underlying reasons of badly steered urbanisation, i.e. the powers of complex land markets. This edition is dedicated to his memory. May his soul rest in peace.*

The contributions in this volume of TRIALOG shed light on the urban transitions in African countries resulting from the inherent effects of rapid urbanisation in terms of governance, spatial transformations, and socio-economic impacts. **Alexander Jachnow** analyses the benefits of different urban actors derived from the dysfunctionality of land-provision systems by assessing complex urban land markets in Mozambique, stressing the negative consequences of these short-term benefits. **Carolina Lunetta** and **Elis Keunen** assess the role of local governments and land-market transformations influencing the process of urban expansion and leading to sprawl and the commodification of land in Nampula, Mozambique. **Anna Mazzolini** and **Daniel Draper** revise land management and governance in Mozambique through the lenses of “inverse-planning” initiatives at the city outskirts of Maputo, which represent an opportunity to reshape the social contract between the citizens and local authorities. **Ogenis Brilhante** debates two opposing paradigms related to city sustainability “making room for future city expansion” and the “compact city”, identifying and measuring the sprawl and compact characteristics of the expansion process of the city of Nampula, Mozambique. **Paul Jenkins** presents the relevance of new forms of urbanism by “non-formal” initiatives of residents in Mozambique as a manner to guide and support urban development with significant qualitative impact. **Victor U. Onyebueke** and **Raphael I. Ndukwu** explore the impacts of recent neo-customary practices of rural communities in transforming, customary land-tenure systems in peri-urban areas, which are accelerating urban sprawl in the Enugu metropolitan area of Nigeria. **Eléusio Viegas Filipe** and **Simon Norfolk** expose the socio-economic transformation of peri-urban areas in Belo Horizonte, Mozambique, from subsistence agriculture to high-value residential plots, with the peasantry being dispossessed from their land by urban elite. **Eddy Chikuta**, **Wilma S. Nchito**, **Emma Wragg** and **Gilbert Siame** assess the nature and implications of settlement upgrading through the lens of gentrification in Kalingalinga, one of the fast-developing informal settlements in the city of Lusaka, Zambia. **Kerry Selvester** and **Caroline Wood** expose the tangible and intangible barriers that geographically confine young women to the *bairros* in Maputo, Mozambique, and emphasise the need for interventions that address these barriers in order to unlock the opportunities that cities present. Finally, referring to urban development pattern in the North of the continent, **Hans Harms** analyses the formation processes of two different types of informal settlements in the Greater Cairo area and discusses policies for their improvement. This last example shows how extremely high densities and compactness achieved through such informal processes lead to another set of challenges in the process of urban transition.

**Alexander Jachnow, Carolina Lunetta and Klaus Teschner**

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## Urban Transitions in Africa

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# The Benefits of Dysfunctionalities

## Complex Land Markets and the Rapid Urbanisation of Mozambique

Alexander Jachnow

**Vorteile des Nicht-Funktionierens - komplexe Landmärkte und schnelle Urbanisierung in Mozambique**  
*Dieser Artikel beschreibt, welche Vorteile die verschiedenen städtischen Akteure aus der Unwirksamkeit der Regelungsmechanismen zum urbanen Landnutzungsmanagement ziehen können. Während meist die geringen oder fehlenden Kapazitäten, Ressourcen und legalen Mandate der Kommunalverwaltungen für das nicht funktionierende Landnutzungsmanagement verantwortlich gemacht werden, argumentiert der Autor, dass hierbei das gesamte System des Baulandzugangs betrachtet werden muss, das auch die politischen Ökonomien mit einschließt. Die erhöhte Nachfrage nach Land im Prozess der Urbanisierung bringt Mechanismen hervor, die staatliche Regelungen zum Landzugang unwirksam werden lassen und in einem komplexen Zusammenspiel von Märkten und Verwaltung ein entsprechendes Angebot bereitstellen. In den urbanen Gebieten von Mosambik entstanden so komplexe städtische Landmärkte, welche die Beschränkungen im formalen Landerwerb umgehen und peripheres Land um die großen Städte verfügbar machen – mit erheblichen Vorteilen für eine Vielzahl von Akteuren, jedoch mit ebenso erheblichen negativen Auswirkungen auf die Morphologie und die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Gefüge der Städte.*

In this article, we want to first scrutinise the explanatory models generally used to justify the incapability to manage and control urban development; i.e., the low or completely lacking capacities, resources and mandates of local governments to provide a proper land-administration system. We argue here that in order to fully understand the possibilities to overcome dysfunctional land management, it is imperative to look into the overall system of the current organisation of the provision of land in Mozambique. It is noteworthy to learn that this big, complex system incorporates the formal system and manages to actually create sufficient supply for the demand, but also makes use of informal processes. As these are beneficial to a sufficient amount of stakeholders, an interest in preserving these dysfunctions is maintained and possible reforms are blocked, thus establishing a rather complex informal-formal system of land transactions.

Finally, to explain the rationalities of the different agents, we assess the benefits provided by these complex land markets where practically everyone can buy or sell their land-use rights or dwelling. As these benefits are for the most part short-term, they put the sustainable development of the city at stake.

### **The framework of land provision: transfer of land-use rights (DUAT)**

In Mozambique, different land-management systems coexist. Customary, tribal lands have a pre-colonial tradition, which was weakened during colonial times, when the Portuguese established priority land-ownership rights. This has been transferred into a post-colonial, particularly socialist understanding of land being in the domain of the state. That state socialism would

simultaneously allow for a neoliberal market orientation is not necessarily a contradiction, and has been analysed in other cases, such as Nicaragua (Rodgers 2011).

The transfer of land-use rights (DUAT) can be provided in Mozambique via four formal procedures:

- i. the allocation of land by the state, upon request and following an existing urban plan;
- ii. its allocation through customary systems;
- iii. a recognition of user's rights after good faith occupation of land for 10 or more years; and
- iv. the transfer of land-use rights in the course of relocation, e.g., when the public provides infrastructure that affects plots that are held by individuals or communities that need to be relocated.

All DUATs obtained by occupancy are perpetual and do not require plans for exploitation of the land. DUATs obtained by grant are rewarded for renewable periods of 50 years. Local communities have a right for obtaining DUATs to their traditional territory. However, plots that are only occupied because of customary rights are not included in urbanisation plans, with the consequence that these are not issued a DUAT as a formal title. This consequently makes the formal transaction impossible, and the customary land in highly demanded zones prone to informal allotments. Though legal frameworks allow – in theory – for strong protection of community-based land rights, both unregistered customary lands as well as real estate with DUATs are traded in the informal markets.

## Lack of policies


In Mozambique, as for a number of other African countries, the planning, legal and administrative apparatus at the local level is commonly described as dysfunctional, which is explained by the insufficient resources available. The logical conclusion, hence, is that with sufficient financial and capacitated human resources an efficient land-management system could be established. Sometimes the recommendations go beyond the mere technocratic approach and suggest that the shortcomings in the governance structure also would need to be addressed (e.g., Jenkins 2000).

To add on these deficiencies, a better national framework is also missing. Policy objectives that would consider the role of cities for economic and social development are not developed. The lack of resources, and the lack of a spatial perspective for development planning, is rooted in the negligence of urban development in the Mozambican national system.

Despite its impacts, Mozambique's rapid urbanisation [Figure 1] is not among the prioritised problems and, at best, is conceptualised as the need for allocating new urban populations. The population influx places an unusual stress on the existing institutions and on the built environment. The complex, dynamic process of urban transition impacts the organisation of space. Formal institutions have the role to regulate it, yet their influence is limited. Urban growth, therefore, is organised by other actors: private developers, self-organised individual households, real-estate agents, a growing middle-class demanding properties, entrepreneurs, floating populations with temporary needs for shelter, etc.

The absence of policies able to steer this growth in its different aspects leads to unsustainable urban patterns, such as sprawl, and also has social and economic impacts, such as urban fragmentation and the missed opportunity of agglomeration benefits. Eventually, the unsustainable growth transfers the bulk of the hidden costs of urbanisation to the future. Even with a better recognition of the future challenges, it is unlikely that in the current setting politics will be prepared to solve them, as it can be observed in all sectors that the main focus of local governments is on solving currently pressing problems. Notwithstanding, the existing national strategies picture the urban population as better-off than the rural; however, it is important to recognise that urban areas come with their own specific challenges, such as a strong socio-economic imbalance and impacts such as ground and water pollution, environmental degradation, and so forth.

Next to the mentioned lack of resources and mandates, another severe deficiency of the public sector – though less stated – is the lack of transparency regarding how land is allocated, transferred, or “purchased”. It is noteworthy that this deficiency is also grounded in systemic failures of better land management. The majority of the acquired DUATs are not recognised or registered in the cadastre and, hence, remain outside the system despite significant investment from the donor community into the national cadastre system. Given the weak legal framework, disputes related to land and property, in regard to owner-



ship, subdivision, taxation, or tenant problems, are inevitable (LANDAC 2014).

▲ **Figure 1:** Fast urbanisation in Nampula. Photo: C. Lunetta 2016

Most literature points out that conflicts between government, investors and communities are a common feature of the existing formal and informal land markets. It has been observed, however, that the majority of informal land transactions happen to the satisfaction of the “clients”. One particularity of the complexity of these land markets is the participation of a number of different stakeholders, which is mandatory for the efficient transaction and concession of all parties involved. Where formal markets require only three actors – i.e., a seller, a buyer, and a confirming authority for approval – complex land markets often involve informal and formal stakeholders and up to potential veto-players at the national level. Complex land markets, hence, include not only the seller and buyer, but also community leaders and other intermediators, which can be single individuals, professional real-estate agents, or local, regional and national governments and sectorial administrative units.



▲ **Figure 2:** Panoramic view over Nampula. Photo: C. Lunetta 2016

### **The consequence of the absence of planning, resources, and policies**

With the lack of city plans or urban land-use plans, the directions spatial expansion takes ultimately depend on infrastructure projects (i.e., the possibilities to finance roads or railways), which then trigger spatial developments. The bigger infrastructure projects are of regional or even national dimension, and the impacts on urban structures more arbitrary. The economic corridor that passes Nampula, for example, has changed the city's morphology significantly, especially in terms of the directions of urban growth, and has disturbed the originally centric shape of a previously more-compact city. [Figure 2]

This illustrates that there are consequences due to the deficient planning and land-allocation system: it does not necessarily mean that there is no planning or no land allocation, but that it happens outside of the formal system. The average increase of about 15,500 new inhabitants per annum implies that planning instruments not only have to steer the development of the existing urban areas but, to a significant proportion, also have to prepare new areas. Even in cases where a municipality has developed urban-extension plans and implemented them, there were no effective mechanisms whereby the activities of other actors were properly coordinated. Throughout the last years, land has been sold literally everywhere within the urban agglomeration. Limited cooperation between the levels of government has led to shortcomings in territorial planning, from miscommunication to the absence of administrative follow-up at various levels. For example, land might be provided and developed by the municipality, but the roads or electricity provided to the area by different authorities might not consider the municipal plans. [Figure 3]

Moreover, parts of the new urban population remains mobile; i.e., not everyone settles permanently within the urban area but keeps moving for a variety of reasons. Population statistics do not cover circular migration but record only the in- and out-flux of people, indicating an average annual immigration rate of 4% versus an emigration rate of 3.2% between 2002 and 2007 (INE 2013) for Nampula Municipality. Real-estate ownership is not the first priority of the arriving populations, and it is hard to obtain. Most newcomers look for interim access to land within their economic opportunities and social networks. This also impacts the mechanisms of land markets, e.g., in terms of temporary uses, oral contracts, joint property and so forth.

In addition to the described challenges, municipal governments have been entrusted with relative autonomy through the decentralisation process that started in 1998. This has gone hand in hand with the expectation that local governments should generate their own resources locally, as they ultimately will not be provided with sufficient resources from the national budget. The scarcity of resources is paired with the lack of clarity regarding available land for investments; there is neither a clear commitment to protect communal lands nor is there a legal definition for the status of land for investment.

### **Commodification of land**

The driving force for land markets is the demand for dwellings. Within the current scenario, an individual household often engages a number of times on the land market. Most of the premises the formal land laws are based on do not reflect that occupation had been historically regulated through oral norms and testified proceedings, without any documentation. Besides, the current legal status of a building, or the registration of a plot, generally has little impact on the social or economic situation of the owner. For example, even though it is possible to apply for a construction permit for houses made from local "non-durable" materials, most self-producers would not see this as a necessity. Notwithstanding, formal housing can also exist in more precarious areas. Consequentially, a situation has arisen in which the homeowners feel no obligation to formalise property, nor the municipality to acknowledge the right of the formalised homeowners by connecting their property to infrastructure. The formalisation process does not serve as a tool to steer or manage urban development and has little significance. As a consequence, a vast majority of buildings lack all or some of the required permits and the majority of the plots are "informally registered" or unregistered. Even businesses, workshops, and other commercial constructions do not always acquire all legal documents.

In the absence of incentives for a more formal development, it becomes evident that the commodification of land puts individual interests and desires above collective and public ones, with the consequence that long-term benefits are sacrificed for short-term ones. At the same time, the economic possibilities and political influence of the clients lead to a diversification of markets, especially in terms of unserved land, for the urban poor, but also in terms of investments in real estate by the middle and upper class. Though the participation of the urban poor is the main explanation for the existence of informal markets, there is ev-

idence of informal land transactions within all economic levels. While land and housing tenure is a major source of individual income, there are often no mechanisms to capture land-value increases. Markets do not trade all resulting costs, especially the costs for providing newly urbanised areas with the required infrastructure, which poses a major constraint for quickly growing cities.

### The subsidiary agency of dysfunctional administrations: complex land markets (CLM)

The described complex land markets determine the spatial configuration of cities and even possess regulatory faculties. We understand here that complex land markets (CLM) are an institution that has substituted to an important extent the formal, partially dysfunctional institutions.

In line with contemporary understandings of the city as a process, urbanisation processes are integrated within an open system in which linear and circular flows are mixed, i.e., in which aspects of the inputs come from outside, but the primary outputs are further processed and transformed. CLM are an essential feature of this system, which moreover includes aspects of land governance, regulatory frameworks for possession, and policies. Moreover, CLM constitute the heart of political economies, as they are interdependent aspects of both the political as well as the economic system of a city. CLM are understood as the socio-economic spaces of negotiation where real estate and tenure rights are traded. This includes informal markets, pluralistic tenure systems of statutory and customary laws, as well as corruptive practices, which is why these land markets are far more complex than formal – or merely informal – ones. What we label here as CLM is, hence, an institution that has established rules and functions, though these are continuously under negotiation.

The complexity of these markets is due to their social and legal system components. They are an institution of transition, as they establish “stable, valued, recurring patterns” (Goodin 1998: 21) of behaviour. The institutionalisation of formal as well as informal practices in urban transition presents an informal-formal continuum, an understanding that has been brought forward before by Jenkins (2004). We further develop the idea of a complex legal system into a complex market system with reciprocal benefits which explain why the claim and the costly attempts to formalise land markets in the past were not achievable.

### Stakeholders in complex land markets (CLM)

Officially, municipal governments play a central role in land management in urban areas, therefore their vision, legal framework, practices and behaviour towards the production of the city should potentially influence its shape. The research undertaken in 2016 observed that local governments are generally abstinent from a coherent spatial vision and from practices regarding planning, land allocation, and regularisation. However, public servants are actively involved in the established complex land markets. An essential part of the benefits deriving from the dysfunctional land administration is related to illegal land transactions and corruptive modalities, such as selling plots without DUATs or plots in unsafe zones, or the emission of DUATs




even in cases of non-compliance with the regulations. This also includes semi-public actors like the *Chefe do Quarteirão*, *Chefe do bairro*, etc. that are reinventing their role within this new regulatory framework (see Mazzolini and Draper in this issue of *TRIALOG*, p. 17-22).

Local leaders, which represent the communities, often overlap with traditional authorities. Though the communities rely and depend on their leaders, these also pursue their private interests. Local leaders often act as real-estate mediators, and expect monetary compensation when a private transaction occurs. This is particularly the case in informal settlements, where cultural habits interweave with new dynamics of land access (see the case of inverse planning in Costa do Sol, Maputo, presented by Mazzolini and Draper in this issue of *TRIALOG*, p. 17-22), or of peri-urban settlements where local authorities still play a crucial, traditional and post-colonial role in land allocation, subdivision, and administration by transmitting householder requests to the municipality. Both the urban dwellers and authorities rely on negotiation and finding agreeable alternatives to legal titles and the possession of construction permits. Com-

▲ **Figure 3:** Narrowing the pathways: constructions do not consider municipal plans. Photo: A. Jachnow 2016

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**Figure 4:** Affordability map of selected areas for the household survey in Nampula 2016, with a sample of 600 households, designed to cover the different urban typologies in the city, and with the purpose of understanding how the land and housing market works in these locations. Eight areas were selected, starting from the city centre to the peripheries, identifying old and new urban areas. Source: Jachnow et al. (2017: 81)

combined with corrupt practices and the bending of regulations, this has favoured the consumption of new land, resulting in a sprawling city.

The main new actor that has entered real estate, and that even substitutes the planning tasks of the local administration, is the private sector (Andersen et al. 2015). Land speculators and intermediators have helped to establish land markets despite the fact that they practise a profession which, in the narrow terms of the legislation, should actually not exist. Their tolerated existence is due to two factors: (i) the lack of a formal market within a context of (ii) increasing urban land demand.

A more-professional segment of the private sector has been established in form of developers, which not only capture changes in the land value via speculation but also actively contribute to its increase. The local private sector, through its technical expertise and the comprehensive knowledge of the local realpolitik, seems proactive in substituting the local planning authorities in regard to providing urbanisation and parcelling plans when and where the inhabitants require them, while the municipality is not able to implement this.

But not only the physical sprawl is a consequence of CLM – another negative impact is caused by the opposite ends of the markets that drive spatial segregation. The question of affordability establishes a strong spatial fragmentation of different social strata during the urbanisation process from the very beginning. [Figure 4]

The currently still-existing mix of different economic backgrounds in close proximity drive segregation, and even progressive urban dynamics driven by economic growth and social permeability might not change this trend but, rather, aggravate it.

Moreover, with the non-intensive spatial development, the economic progress is also hampered because agglomeration benefits cannot materialise. Eventually, as evidenced by research on urban sprawl, the environmental impacts,

above all the loss of natural and rural lands, are severe and often irreversible.

## Conclusions

Urbanisation processes are not universal, and the historic process of urban transition does not repeat itself regardless of time and location. Important factors that influence these processes have changed over time, including obvious ones, e.g., how technical innovations, such as transportation, have shortened distances and hence allow for more sprawl. The less visible factors, however, equally impact these processes and, hence, urban morphologies. The most influential of the invisible factors in the peculiar post-socialist market economy of Mozambique are the complex land markets. The influence of these markets becomes visible because the markets dictate how spaces are organised, purchased and used; and, eventually, how they contribute to the city's progress either as a driver or as a bottleneck for urban development.

It has to be acknowledged that land provision in urban areas somehow works for new dwellers. This justifies the existence of CLM as an interim solution – for an indefinite period. It is maintained by the fact that the incentives for the different stakeholders outdo the potential punishments. Citizens are able to access land, vendors to receive the payments, and informal real-estate agents to benefit from their role as intermediators even as local administrations and traditional authorities benefit from their role as regulators. These benefits of dysfunctional land allocation, administration and management are mainly monetary and immediate; the detriments of the resulting urban form and the impacts on society, however, are long-lasting and contribute to unsustainable urbanisation. The already-mentioned future costs for reformation and repair of urban areas are not considered, and will aggravate future negative impacts. Given the current depression and slow economic growth, the emergence of an increasingly segregated city is hardly surprising. This process can already be observed in the bigger cities and will ultimately dominate the urban patterns in the country until and unless a set of policies

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◀ **Figure 5:** Homogeneous densification of underserved peripheries in Nampula. Photo: A. Jachnow 2016

addresses these trends to turn them around. Otherwise, the current developments will continue to negatively impact the urban form.

The major costs of these urban dynamics are momentarily borne by the poor – as they have to settle at the underserved urban peripheries. [Figure 5] This results in aggravating the urban divide and further contributes to social and economic fragmentation. The benefits of dysfunctions tend to favour the more powerful, whereas efficient planning has the purpose of equilibrating the interests of differently equipped stakeholders. As the scarcity of available land increases, the competition will get more severe.

The vulnerability of the poor could then result in general disadvantages for the urban fabric in the long term. E.g., the inability of poorer landholders to invest at scale in their real property could be turned into a convenient argument to evict them from their plots in order to make room for investor-driven development. This will foster urban inequalities and gentrification and lead, as said before, to the appearance of a dual city in which private transactions will discriminate the poorer segments of society and, ultimately, also negatively impact the life of the middle and upper classes (i.e., burden the city as a whole with high social transaction costs).

As the new areas do not create revenue, the local administration will continue without resources, while the gains are shared among sellers and developers. New settlers will have to bear with the higher commuting costs and lack of infrastructure at the peripheries. At the same time, the environmental degradation, created by rapid, unsustainable urbanisation, will put another debit on the city's virtual balance sheet. To escape the vicious practice of

short-term individual benefits at the cost of long-term public debt, nothing less than a change of the current mind-set is required. This goes beyond acknowledging a general public interest in sustainable urban development. To ensure that cities can develop in sustainable ways, the "right of the city" needs to be recognized, similar to the right of nature, which essentially is the right of existence of the global eco-system. Instead of treating nature – or urban areas – as a commodity, it will be imperative to recognize that urban areas possess cycles of development while their areas need to be maintained for future generations regardless their monetary values (cf. Rühls et al. 2016).

Protecting in similar terms the right of the city could contribute to a different perception of our human habitat. This right would go beyond the present needs and wishes of the citizens, and also include future generations of urban communities. If the concept of sustainability is to be taken seriously, there is a need to assess present benefits against the context of potential future detriments.

Eventually, we have to recognise that the case of Mozambique's "uncontrolled sprawl" presents an extreme example of unsustainable urbanisation. However, the phenomenon itself is familiar to many contexts in the urbanising world. The unsustainability of urbanisation, as it occurs worldwide, is neither a necessary evil owed to the current flow towards a global urban society, nor a consequence of the absence of stakeholders and resources. Both arguments fall short of validity. There is sufficient knowledge available to organise urbanisation in sustainable ways, and the stakeholders and resources required are already there – the only problem is that this is not understood yet.

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# Analysing Urban Growth in Mozambique: The Influencing Factors of Urban Expansion and Their Impacts

Carolina Lunetta and Els Keunen

**Städtisches Wachstum in Mosambik: Einflussfaktoren städtischer Expansion und ihre Auswirkungen**  
*Sekundärstädte in Mosambik sind gegenwärtig einem beschleunigten städtischen Wachstum ausgesetzt, das zur Zersiedelung ihres Umlands führt. Am Beispiel der Stadt Nampula analysiert dieser Beitrag die Rolle der Lokalregierung und den Einfluss des Immobilienmarkts im Kontext städtischer Expansionsprozesse. Das Fehlen einer kohärenten räumlichen Vision seitens der Kommunalverwaltung trägt gepaart mit etablierten Praktiken in Bezug auf Planung, Landzuteilung und Regularisierung zum ausufernden Stadtwachstum bei. Hinzu kommen Probleme mit Steuererhebung und Korruption, die den Flächenverbrauch an den Peripherien zusätzlich begünstigen. Der Artikel beschreibt, wie die Immobilienmärkte insbesondere benachteiligten Gesellschaftsgruppen den Zugang zu Wohnraum und zur Stadt erschweren.*

1

IHS acknowledges the assistance of Universidade Lúrio during the research, specifically of the following professors: Aboo, Valdemiro; Amurane, António; Berti, Maurizio; Fernandes, João Miguel; Francisco, Micanaldo; Zacarias, Benilde.

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The maps in this article were prepared by Ogenis Brillhante, Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), who developed the methodology and Micanaldo Ernesto Francisco, a local GIS specialist at Universidade Lúrio in Nampula, using Google satellite images available from Google Earth / SAS Planet with a spatial resolution of 1.20 metres and a hexagonal form of 50 metres a side.

3

Quantitative methods were applied to measure the attributes of expansion and compactness in the periods of 1999 and 2015. Based on existing maps, satellite images, and secondary data from official documents, maps were produced using GIS to calculate several indicators and key spatial metrics to measure the process of expansion and compactness in Nampula and identify the spatial structure, trends, and respective impacts. The methods to calculate indicators and metrics were defined by Angel et al. (2011) and Abrantes (2013).

Mozambican cities have experienced rapid urban growth over the last decades, both in area occupied as well as in population. A major boom occurred during the civil war, as the primarily rural population fled to existing urban centres. Cities and villages have continued to grow since, through natural growth as well as rural-urban migration. In the resource-scarce environment that is Mozambique, with its limited financial means and human capacity, this growth has been largely informal and with limited infrastructural provision. As observed by Andersen et al. (2015), the populations of smaller secondary and tertiary urban areas are proportionally growing faster than in the larger urban areas.

As part of a research project commissioned by Cities Alliance through the Future Cities Africa Initiative, this paper presents the findings of research carried out by the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS)<sup>1</sup> concerning the urban expansion and compactness debate in Mozambique. The city of Nampula, located in the north of the country, served as a case study to identify the main factors that have influenced urban expansion in Mozambique since the creation of the current municipal structure in 1999 (Jachnow et al. 2017).

This paper presents some of the research findings in which actors, processes, and impacts on the city's spatial structure are analysed. The focus is on two main actors: the public sector or government, and the private sector through the land market. It is argued that these actors influence the urban morphology in their own way: the local government's actions promote expansion, whereas the change from social to market-oriented land allocation reduces housing affordability, bringing about sprawl.

## Nampula: a sprawling city

Even though some cities can expand without the presence of sprawl, and others even manage to concentrate

expansion and thus increase density and compactness, spatial expansion and sprawl are common outcomes of urban growth and urbanisation processes. In Angel's sample of 120 cities, 107 decreased in average built-up area density between 1990 and 2000 (Angel 2011: 21).

Nampula is no exception in this regard: while the occupied area in 2015 was 5.3 times bigger than in 1999 [Figure 1]<sup>2</sup>, population density went from 126 p/ha in 1999 to 50 p/ha in 2015.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the urban spatial structure became much more irregular during this period, with lots of non-contiguous expansion taking place. The declining density, the city's irregular, non-contiguous shape, and the increase of mainly mono-functional, often informal residential settlements with a predominance of single dwellings are all characteristics of sprawl (Neuman 2005).


Nampula has undergone and continues to undergo an accelerated urban growth, which constantly influences its urbanisation process, especially regarding its spatial structure. The next sections explore the role of the government as well as the land market in relation to this substantial urban expansion.

## Local government practices are promoting expansion

Municipal governments play a central role in land management in urban areas, therefore their vision, practices and behaviour towards the production of a city can greatly influence its shape. As observed during the research, the Nampula local government's general absence of a coherent spatial vision, their practices regarding planning, land allocation and regularisation, tax collection and enforcement along with corrupt tendencies generally favour the consumption of new land, resulting in a sprawling city. It can be argued that the city's government fails to deliver in each of the steps of the planning and management cy-



**Figure 3:** Formal and informal areas in Nampula in 2015 – the areas in grey are formal; in dark grey, informal. Source: O. Brilhante and M. Francisco 2016, in Jachnow et al. (2017: 93)



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mandatory, as stipulated in the spatial planning law. Municipal governments are under a lot of pressure to develop their PEUs, but municipalities that have complied with this requirement have often done so just to tick the box. Nampula's PEU was developed in 1998 and is therefore completely outdated. Further PPUs were developed later, but have not been influential in guiding urban development. Once approved, these plans become administrative regulations; generally, however, there is no strict observation of the implementation of the plans by the municipality, nor are there civil society organisations that hold the local government accountable for their implementation.

Apart from the spatial plans, municipal councils develop a socio-economic plan on a yearly basis. Including inputs from different departments, the plan is coordinated by the department of planning and finance. The given municipality is held accountable for these plans by its municipal assembly, and therefore the plans are closely monitored. Investments with a clear spatial component (such as schools, medical centres, roads, bridges, etc.) are part of the socio-economic plans; however, the plans do not have any spatial component, nor do they relate to the spatial plans. Infrastructure planning is done on the fly, without any vision, at locations where there is a perceived or an advocated need rather than an assessed need. This lack of an overall spatial vision, which also found in Nampula, contributes to scattered investments and haphazard urban growth.

## Planning for expansion is boosting sprawl

Instead of developing a time-consuming overall or even partial plan, the municipal council focuses mainly on the

development of detailed plans, especially those of the expansion areas. However, these detailed plans are generally very basic, consisting only of maps outlining the different plots and indicating state reserves.

Plots are usually designed in a rectangular grid, allocating the same size to all plots. Plot sizes are large, averaging between 600 and 900 m<sup>2</sup>. Chilundo (2009: 48) explains the rationale behind this as follows: "These dimensions were established considering that most of the areas were not yet provided with basic infrastructure (water, public sanitation, electricity) and with the assumption that future residents had to build by their own wells and pit latrines. And, to allow that those two elements have enough separation to avoid water contamination, it was considered that the plots with that dimension were suitable." This is in contrast with average plot sizes in unplanned areas and even in areas where regularisation has taken place. Often, plot sizes are much smaller in size than those in formal land developments in the expansion zones. Therefore, even after regularisation, these areas usually have higher building density than the expansion zones.

Expansion zones are designed in this way because this is how it is promoted by the former Ministry of Environmental Coordination (MICOA – now MITADER). Quite rigid guidelines are communicated regarding plot sizes, building regulations, number of plots per city block, etc. These guidelines also include detailed instructions on the amount of space for public services and the incorporation of state reserve areas to be developed into schools, hospitals, sports grounds, etc.; however, these state reserves




Figure 4: Extracts from the “Basic Techniques for Urban Planning Manual” developed by the Mozambican Ministry of Environmental Coordination. Source: MICOA (2006)

are not always included in the plans. An example of MICOA recommendations is shown in Figure 4.

Even when state reserves are included in the plan, years can pass without any development occurring on them since the municipal government’s default condition is one of resource scarcity. A local leader of one of Nampula’s neighbourhoods admitted that at one point he allowed people to settle on the land allocated for public services because he lost faith that the areas would ever be developed as intended. This resulted in a mono-functional residential neighbourhood void of any other land use – a key characteristic of sprawl – but with many informal, small-scale economic activities.

### Lack of municipal resources stimulates self-organised land occupation and land speculation

The implementation of any plan – for expansion, regularisation, infrastructure or other – requires funds, but due to the limited transfers from the national level and limited tax collection at the local level, municipal governments generally operate on a tight budget. With virtually no attempt for containment – since all land within the municipality is urban and hence can be developed – the municipality faces difficulties in providing services to its total inhabited area. Situations vary, but most of the time during the implementation of expansion plans, only the most basic infrastructure is provided, often limited to (indications of future) roads. Almost invariably, basic infrastructure such as water pipes, drainage and electricity only follow later, regularly with contributions from the residents. In this regard, there is no difference in access to basic services between the “formal” areas of the municipal expansion zones and the “informal” areas without development plans. Therefore, apart from the official property title, called DUAT – which can be obtained only after a long, costly and tedious process, possibly involving corruption – there is no incentive to request land through the formal process. Instead, people revert to occupying land informally, at a location of their choice – not necessarily in a contiguous or high-density manner.

A vacant-land tax could spur additional municipal resources while reducing the amount of vacant land in urban areas, but this is absent in Mozambique. This, in combina-

tion with a lack of control on the maximum amount of time for developing acquired land, contributes to the slow development of infrastructure on individual plots, sometimes leaving the land vacant for extended periods. As there is no control on whether or not the land is used, there is also no incentive to quickly develop it. This leads to many people starting the process to request land without the intent, ability, or resources to develop it. They hold on to the land until they are successful in finding the financial means to start their building, or, in the absence thereof, sell it to prospective buyers. In fact, some people use land for speculation by requesting access for the sole purpose of selling it at a higher price later. The presence of vacant plots – and other plots with a very slow pace of construction – has the result that other parties who are interested in accessing land have to acquire it at increasingly greater distances, leading to further expansion of the city.

### Deficient land management does not provide support to guide urban growth

There are currently eight expansion zones in Nampula, however this is not nearly enough to cover the demand for access to land. Various interviewees confirm that there is an extensive backlog of applications that have been approved by the municipal council but have not yet been allocated a plot. Although the number of people awaiting allocation, or the time between approval and allocation, could not be confirmed, one indication of the backlog is that in March, 2016, plots were being granted to citizens who had requested land during the previous legislative period of 2009-2014. Furthermore, the processes of requesting access to land are very bureaucratic, requiring many steps between the handing-in of the request and the final approval by the mayor. The fees charged and the licences covered within these processes, which are set at municipal level, are often rather opaque to citizens. The result of this long process is that people look for alternative ways of accessing land.

Expansion plans – drawn before implementation – are rarely updated to the actual situation after demarcation, even though significant differences usually exist. This results in a lack of transparency, as the plans cannot be relied on for conflict resolution. Furthermore, especially when changing mandates, there is often an active strate-

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Due to the scarce availability of data regarding land markets in Nampula, a household survey was chosen as a means to gather information on the impacts of the land markets on urbanisation. A non-probability sampling approach in eight distinctive areas identified in one neighbourhood (Namatequeliua) in Nampula was adopted in the survey of 600 households.

gy to make data disappear. A reason given to explain this phenomenon is resentment or fear that the next government will do better because of the work of the previous government. In order to avoid this, the old government takes away or hides information. Another possible explanation is that there are inconsistencies, irregularities, discrepancies or errors that were made intentionally or unintentionally during the government's term that are preferred to be kept hidden. For example, in Nampula, less than three years after the closing of the Millennium Challenge Corporation's multi-million dollar project, the software used for registering cadastral data is no longer in use. Without proper maintenance and updating, there is a palpable risk of losing this data.

Informally occupying land is facilitated by the municipal council's practice of approving applications for plot regularisation of all plots that have minimum accessibility, notwithstanding that the law only provides for regularisation of plots in areas covered by an urban development plan. Few requests are turned down, so that requesting for regularisation instead of requesting a plot of land has now become common practice.

Moreover, expropriations are neither considered nor used as a fundamental tool within the planning process. Municipalities have shown willingness not to remove families from their original places of residence, especially during slum upgrading programmes. Reallocation actions are more common after emergency situations such as floods, which in the past have led to the resettlement of hundreds of families. Even though there is proof that expropriations are increasing in the country, as documented in local and international press, and in many cases compensation is not guaranteed to the affected population, expropriation by the municipal council in Nampula appears to be minimal. For this reason there is a high sense of security of tenure, even for those without a DUAT, as people feel they will not be expelled from their land once they have occupied it and there is a high probability they will be granted a DUAT after requesting for regularisation. The sense of tenure security is further increased due to an overall lack of enforcement with regard to land occupation and use. The practice by the government to almost indiscriminately approve all regularisation requests therefore encourages the proliferation of informal land occupation.

### Corrupt practices further reduce effectiveness of the local planning and management

There are various circumstances in which malevolent local leaders can abuse the system, because of their key role in land attribution, and allegations of corruption have been made by various parties. Leaders can apparently be easily convinced to give out a declaration needed for requesting land access – de facto widely used as documentation of legal tenure. Furthermore, as they often organise the access to land in areas including but not limited to the informal settlements, they can organise a "good" space against payment, even on the state reserve land, an example of which is mentioned before.

Even though actual information is difficult to find, indications of widespread corruption are omnipresent, and not only in connection to the local leaders. For example, the municipal inspectors checking construction licences in

Nampula are regularly rotated so as to minimise corruption. Regular rotation of other staff, such as cadastral and finance officers, is also common in some municipalities. All in all, as per the 2011 Daily Lives Survey (Transparency International 2011), "35.3% of Mozambicans perceive public officials/civil servants to be extremely corrupt" (Martini 2012: 4). Corrupt practices can make people resort to other, less formal ways of accessing land, for example through the market. This is further explained below.

### Changing land: from social to market-oriented land allocation

Despite the fact that sale of land is prohibited, the most common form to access land is through the informal land markets outside of the formal process of land allocation within municipalities. Hence, the commercialisation of land has created a complex land market system where different "levels of legality range from full illegality through complex matrices of levels of legality" (Jenkins 2004: 221). Because the informal mechanisms are tolerated, socially legitimised, and formalised mostly by the local authorities, they cannot be considered illegal.

In the context of rapid urbanisation, the increased demand for housing has stimulated the real estate markets where land is becoming scarce and unaffordable – not only in the central areas, but also in the surrounding areas. Growth in demand, leading to monetary valuation, has diminished the effectiveness of the customary systems to access the land (Jenkins 2004). Even if the "use value" still preponderates over the "exchange value", the commoditisation of land, housing, and the forms to access it has led to social segregation (Jenkins 2004).

Informal land markets have become more active and complex not only in the capital Maputo, but also in secondary cities such as Nampula, and the transformations impact housing affordability and influence expansion and compactness of the city. Based on data from the household survey (Jachnow et al. 2017),<sup>4</sup> this section presents some indicators of the informal housing market transformation. These indicators are identified as: Increase in number of land transactions without infrastructure, valuation of land prices based on market factors, increase of the land prices, and emergence of new actors involved in the land transactions.

### Transformations of the land market


#### *Increase in number of land transactions without infrastructure*

In accordance to the Land Law N° 19/97, there are four recognised methods to access land in Mozambique: Allocation of land by the state via request and following a specific plan; allocation through customary systems; simple occupation after 10 years of "good faith"; and the transfer of infrastructure and buildings located in a plot including the transmission of the land-use rights.

Negrão (2011) identified that from the different land-access modalities, the most common form is not through customary route or good-faith occupation. In the urban areas studied in Manica and Nacala, his research showed that 62% of the land was accessed via market, only 13% was allocated by the state, and the rest by customary sys-

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tems and simple occupation. The same occurs in the city of Nampula, where 55% of people interviewed received access to land by purchasing the property or land from another owner, and 57% said they had bought the plot without the house. [Figure 5] These numbers show an active informal land market in the city, functioning by acquiring the land itself and not the infrastructure and buildings located on a plot as legally stated by the law.

### Increase of the land value

The price of land and properties on the market in urban areas varies greatly, depending on several market factors such as plot size, demand, improvements on the land and buildings, accessibility, public facilities and basic infrastructure of the area, proximity to the city centre, and title or other document stating right of transmission (Malauene et al. 2005). This can be seen in Figure 6. Plots located in central areas, next to public facilities, and where there is a higher percentage of DUAT holders (areas 1-3) have square-metre prices almost 6 times higher than the those located in the outskirts of the city (areas 7 and 8) or in areas considered as informal settlements (areas 5-8).

Additionally, land and property prices are influenced by a number of non-market factors, such as lack of transparency of information on land transactions, corruption in land sales, and influence of social reciprocity networks in the establishment of prices. The way that land is accessed also influences its valorisation. Negrão (2011) identified that those who had the land allocated through inheritance or simple occupation attributed less value to the land than those who had the land allocated through the market.

It is known that the land and property costs tend to be lower in cities with dispersed urban growth, where there is less pressure on the housing markets. But this doesn't mean that prices are not rising. In the survey conducted in Nampula, when questioned about the price paid for the property and the estimated value nowadays, the households identified a significant valorisation of the land. However, the value presented might not be the real price paid because there are extra payments involved for bribing or tax evasion.<sup>5</sup>

From all the received answers, 61% claimed to have paid up to 20,000 MT<sup>6</sup> for the property. When asked about the estimated value of the property nowadays, 35% of people stated the minimum value was from 100,000 MT to

5,000,000 MT. This can be partially explained by the investments in the land, where 36% answered to have spent from 10,000 to 150,000 MT on improvements. However, 51% declared there was an increase in land value due to the growth of demand in the market, while 35% answered due to investments in the house or plot.

Another aspect, previously presented, that also interferes in the land valuation is the increase in land speculation. From the dwellers interviewed, 26% answered that they own a second property, which 28% keep empty, 23% rent out, 12% use for food production [*machamba*], and 41% gave to another family member for housing or is building on it. Since prices are not regulated and controlled through any "top limit", the land value can be very high. Also, different plots in the same location and with similar area can have very different values. In an interview with a real estate agent in Nampula, a small plot of 600 m<sup>2</sup> at the city outskirts can cost between 35,000 MT and 50,000 MT. In an expansion area where basic infrastructure exists, such as in Muhala Expansão, a plot can cost 1 million MT.

According to Allen and Johnsen (2008), a vast majority of the urban households still own their house (78.6%), while 12.7% live in a rented home (including many higher-income renters). Nevertheless, as pointed out by Andersen et al. (2015b), renting out properties has become a common practice in all planned and unplanned areas in Maputo. Currently, even households of the emerging middle class compete with the urban poor for spaces in informal settlements.




Figure 5: Land Access Modality and Land Transacted. Source: C. Lunetta 2016, see Jachnow et al. (2017: 101)

**5** Tax evasion is a common practice when transferring DUATs, which can be easily done by reporting a different – significantly lower – price to the authorities that tax the transaction.

**6** Mozambique's currency, the metical (MT) has been subject to considerable devaluation during the time of the research. It went from 50 MT for 1 USD at the beginning of April 2016 to 78 MT for 1 USD in October 2016. In 2017, the metical gained back strength with a quite stable exchange rate of around 60 MT for 1 USD in the period between June and December 2017.

Figure 6: Average plot size/ estimated price per m<sup>2</sup> per researched area in Nampula. Source: C. Lunetta 2016, see Jachnow et al. (2017: 108)

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Some cities in Mozambique have been attracting international interest and investments due to the development of logistic corridors linking the mining districts and deep-water coastal ports with the neighbouring landlocked countries. These corridors, developed over strategic transport routes, stimulate industrial and commercial investments in related urban centres, resulting in an increasing demographic pressure on the cities.

8

Local authorities are represented by the *chefe do posto administrativo, secretário do bairro, chefe da unidade local* and *chefe do quarteirão*. The first two are official posts paid by the municipality, while the latter two are voluntary positions.



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The rental market in secondary cities has increased demand for real estate products and investments in the last years mainly due to high population growth, the increasing purchasing power of the middle class, and the expatriates coming for the implementation of infrastructure projects.<sup>7</sup> In Nampula, properties are being rented out primarily in the central locations, and the large demand for higher-standard housing promotes a hyper appreciation of the real-estate prices. There, it is possible to find high-level government officials renting out their official residences, which provides them with an income much higher than their salary. According to local real estate agents, the average rent of a two-bedroom apartment or house in a well-located area of Nampula can cost 60,000 MT.

### Emergence of new actors involved in the land transactions

The commercialisation of customary land in the existing market triggered the arrival of real estate agents (Jenkins 2004). The so-called *comissionistas* act as brokers who facilitate land transactions between landholders, buyers or investors, and local authorities.<sup>8</sup> These middlemen have a good knowledge of the available plots for sale and have a network of contacts with foreign and local investors. According to a local agent in Nampula, for each transaction they get a commission based on an extra margin of the sale price, varying between 7 and 10 percent. In Nampula, they work mainly in the urbanised areas of the city.

The informal subdivision of land and demarcation will result in a new spatial order with the involvement of local authorities. In the process of property acquisition, local authorities use their contacts to sell plots. Their involvement in allocation of demarcated land developed by the municipality, or allocation of "available" land in unplanned areas, usually involves a kind of payment for recognising property transactions. Many times, the land sale of these plots leads to multiple allocations resulting in land conflicts.

The formalisation of the informal land subdivisions is done mainly via a certificate issued by the *secretário de bairro*. Given the significant obstacles of the formal DUAT registration, this form of transaction has developed whereby the formal system is bypassed. A large number of households work with the certificate, as identified in the household survey conducted in Nampula in which 47% of the respondents indicated that they possess this certificate as the legal tenure of the land, while only 27% indicated they possess a DUAT.

This local authority also operates in non-official planning processes, which contribute to a commodification of land management (Andersen et al. 2015). In recent research conducted by Urban LandMark (2013) in the city of Tete, it was identified that the local authorities have a higher participation in the land-selling transactions that took place in the researched urban settlements than in all other land or property transactions (such as, for example, transfers as a result of inheritance).

### Impacts of the land market

Land is still available in most of the secondary cities, despite several shortcomings. However, the unregulated form of its trade has resulted in land becoming increasingly expensive.

The continuous increase of transactions on the market will, however, exclude the poor and decrease the customary system, resulting in a less-just system (Negrão 2011).

Where the very poor sell off their plots, sometimes as a result of market pressure by the middle-class and wealthy households, the result is gentrification processes and the poor being pushed to the peripheries. In peri-urban areas of Maputo, this process occurs through allocation of large plots to construct luxury condominiums.

The market pressure determining the access to housing for the urban poor in less suitable locations has also consequences on the spatial form of the cities. The peri-urban areas tend to grow radially, often occupying land that is neither demarcated nor in possession of any infrastructure. The informal land markets, though also stimulating sub-alotments and in-situ densification, mainly contribute to urban sprawl by enabling access to peripheral areas, but this will not provide a long-lasting solution. Even though there is a lot of vacant land in Nampula, the amount of available land is increasingly limited. As mentioned by the chief of Muhala Posto Administrativo in Nampula (2016, in an interview): "The land already has owners."

Many transactions in informal markets are transactions regarding mainly new land through subdivision. New land is generally supplied by owners holding the land through simple occupation, or through purchase, and then later made available to newcomers. Where holders/occupiers possess larger plots, obtained through inheritance or with the assistance of neighbourhood leaders and municipal employees, these owners will subdivide or rent parts of their plots of peri-urban land where there is no formal plot demarcation (Negrão 2011). As a result, consolidated areas are being densified precariously, and new settlements with very low density and no infrastructure are being established in the peripheral areas.

### Conclusion

It is evident that the main creators of urban Mozambique are the large numbers of the urban poor that do not take into account the comprehensive plans or policies of urban development. Rather, they respond to the availability of opportunities. People's purchasing power, in combination with preferences regarding location and housing conditions, further determine the shape, direction and extent of urban growth, and there is evidence of negative impacts due to the dispersed urban sprawl.

Because of the local government's practices, inadvertently or not, expansion and even sprawl are happening at a rapid pace in Nampula. Distances to employment and services – mainly situated in the city centre – are rising, thereby limiting people's opportunities to sustainable livelihoods. Furthermore, the decreasing affordability caused by the shift from land being used as a social good to an economic commodity is affecting especially the urban poor. However, since benefits derived from the dysfunctions of the current system are large and widespread, change is unlikely to happen any time soon, thereby maintaining the present status quo. It can thus be concluded that access to the city, especially for the most vulnerable groups of society, is being compromised.



# Experiences of Inverse Planning – Re-thinking Land Access and Urban Governance in Maputo, Mozambique

Anna Mazzolini and Daniel Draper

## Erfahrungen mit “Planung von unten” – neue Konzepte für Landzugang und lokale Regierungsführung in Maputo, Mosambik

*Maputo ist, wie viele Hauptstädte in Subsahara-Afrika, von schnellem Wachstum und sozio-ökonomischen Veränderungen geprägt. Jüngst beobachtete Dynamiken verdeutlichen die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen. Bei Planung und städtischem Management sehen sich die Kommunalverwaltungen insbesondere von der wachsenden Mittelschicht gefordert, die bessere Wohnmöglichkeiten und Infrastrukturanbindung verlangt. Während sich die Behörden überwiegend um Strategien zur Regulierung des Zugangs zu Bauland bemühen, um die rasche Urbanisierung zu bewältigen, finden Bewohnergruppen neue Wege, um ihre Landnutzungsrechte zu sichern. Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass diese Pioniere der städtischen Entwicklung das Potenzial haben, die zukünftigen städtebaulichen Strukturen am Stadtrand nachhaltig zu beeinflussen. Abgesehen von den räumlichen Folgen der Expansion, bietet sich hier auch die Möglichkeit, den Gesellschaftsvertrag zwischen Bürger\*innen und Kommunalverwaltung (insbesondere den Stadtplaner\*innen) neu zu gestalten sowie den Zusammenhalt zwischen den verschiedenen städtischen Akteuren zu stärken. Dieser Artikel liefert zunächst eine kritische Analyse der empirischen Erkenntnisse einer Feldforschung aus den Jahren 2015-2016. Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Wahrnehmungen, Befürchtungen und Sichtweisen der Bewohner\*innen gelegt, deren Quartiere im Kontext dynamischen Stadtwachstums einem hohen Druck des Immobilienmarkts ausgesetzt sind. Der Artikel erläutert die Prozesse, die aus städtebaulichen Entwicklungsstrategien “von unten” entstehen, mit dem Ziel, bestehende Landregulierungsmechanismen zu hinterfragen, die auch in anderen Kontexten in Afrika existieren. Die Erkenntnisse aus dieser realen Stadtentwicklung könnten dazu beitragen, die Vorgehensweisen entsprechend anzupassen.*

The processes of horizontal expansion and densification of cities in Mozambique are the result of mixed semi-formal and semi-legitimate proceedings of land subdivision and allocation. Several authors (Barros et al. 2013, Andersen et al. 2015, Melo and Viegas 2014) point out that “informal” settlements in Mozambique are shaped and reproduced through various factors not solely related with spatial access, extreme poverty, or educational level. The peripheral space is also produced through a widespread culture of imitating the formal urban grid (Nielsen 2009) in order to facilitate the land-regularisation processes.

Traditionally, as the registration process for both land-use registrations and construction permits is neither consistent nor systematic, the vast majority of housing is predominantly recognised as informal, despite the high level of residential security. This perception derives not only from the fact that the legal status of a building has always had limited impact on the social or economic situation of the owner within the city. It also derives from the intricacy of relationships and relational ties built up throughout the process of securing a plot or constructing a house, often lasting several years; a process imbued with socio-political and cultural meanings, inferring a certain level of confidence about their “home spaces” (Jenkins 2012, 2013; Kamete and Lindell 2010).

Recently, the city expansion has functioned as a private-led stimulus, which is raising concerns about urban equity (Lage 2013). Some authors analyse changes to informal perceptions of security in this new, liberal context (Melo and Viegas 2014). Recent land-development policy is increasingly influenced by a new wave of regularisation programmes through a willingness to formally register residents’ land-use rights (DUAT<sup>1</sup>) as the main solution to cope with urban expansion. An example is the ProMaputo programme still lying at the heart of De Soto’s approach. In the context of increasing land pressures, local planning entities feel the urgency to encourage all householders or land users to quickly obtain their DUAT.

This article debates on the current processes of “informal” and hybrid land management emerging from heterogeneous social groups, having the presence of a wealthier class influencing the perception of what is formal or informal within the city. The consequences in terms of urban governance that the changes within the culturally influenced continuum of land access (transactions, actions) could have will also be discussed. Given the high penetration of culturally influenced “informal” settling-down dynamics through self-production/subdivision of space in peripheral areas, Maputo is particularly suitable as a case study.

The two presented cases<sup>2</sup> of inverse planning are analysed through the lens of urban governance, aiming to specific-

**1**  
*Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra.*

**2**  
The cases analysed demonstrate the diverse methods employed by an emergent class in trying to spatially represent an achieved status. These “inverse-planning” actions illustrate the ways in which residents act following spatial and aesthetic norms “as if the state was able to construct for them”, thus in a continuous intricacy between the imitation of the state and the “materialisation” of the residents’ social position (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]), as realised through spaces of representation.

**Figure 1:** House under construction in Costa do Sol, Maputo. Photo: A. Mazzolini 2015



**3**  
The DUAT missive is strictly related to the inclusion of the plots in a formal urbanisation plan (e.g., “plano de parcelamento”, “plano de reordenamento” or “plano de pormenor”).

**4**  
The first three inverse-planning actions identified were detailed by Nielsen (2011), who defined them as “inverse governmentality” processes.

**5**  
This case is not the first one in the neighbourhood. An “inverse governmentality” process was documented in detail for the first time by Nielsen in 2008, regarding 4 *quaterões* (neighbourhood’s sub-units) in Costa do Sol. Anna Mazzolini, the main author of this article, is currently conducting a comparative research between the two cases.

ly envisage: (i) new processes of production of peri-urban space as a consequence of the proactive efforts of an emerging middle class, (ii) inverse planning as the reshaping of the “social contract” between citizens and the authority, and also among the residents themselves, (iii) how authorities and residents are changing attitudes and the resultant consequences in terms of urban land management and access, and (iv) the new roles in the game, given the presence of new actors such as local private firms.

### 1. “Inverse planning”, the residents, and the state

“Inverse-planning” practices are defined here as embryonic planning forms that are proposed, undertaken, and financed by the residents. These actions are the result of a collective of householders who need to obtain their land-use rights.<sup>3</sup> The lower-middle class in particular, trapped between the necessity to obtain positive formal responses and the traditional ways of gaining land rights, is proactive in promoting such processes.<sup>4</sup> This practice is carried out through the establishment of a direct agreement between the communities and architectural/planning firms for the topographical identification of the plots and urban design (roads, public spaces, etc.).

The processes have their basis in the cultural importance that, especially since 2000, has been given to the spatial “form” of a plot as an implicit declaration of self-regularisation. Householders imitating the formal grid, formally or informally, feel safer depending on which kind of “spatial output” they are able to achieve. As a consequence, efforts in terms of urban inclusion have gradually shifted from a policy perspective to a *physical/spatial* one.

The two cases detailed in this article could be considered the “middle class” continuation and adaptation of the very first inverse-planning action carried out by the Maguanine association in Costa do Sol in 2004, an association rooted in a poor community (Nielsen 2011). The association, in order to obtain DUATs and secure the plots, “informally” contracted a local architect to prepare a regularisation plan.

Even though it was an “illegal” action”, and although the plan was only shared with the local authority at the end of the process, it was approved.

The “innovative” factor was that an urbanisation scheme came directly from the residents themselves, convinced that they would be properly included in the city’s plan through the imitation of a formal grid and respecting the plot-size standards. The assertion that such a process works has also been influencing the new middle-class residents’ aspiration to urban land. Since the first cases, there has been a significant upsurge in social actors implementing such actions: nowadays, “inverse-planning” processes particularly seem to suit the new middle class’s urban needs as a safe, sometimes quick, way to obtain land-use rights. Despite being relatively recent, these actions are already differentiating themselves into several sub-niches of actions, depending on the internal composition of the residents’ groups implementing them.

### The Costa do Sol case<sup>5</sup>

The development of a community-led parcelling plan was the idea of Mr. Ibraimo, a middle-class householder and, now, residents’ committee coordinator. In 2013, Ibraimo was not a resident of Costa do Sol. He lived in a little apartment in Central neighbourhood, but had acquired a plot in Costa do Sol to construct a house. [Figure 1]

He managed to join about 200 families from four blocks (*quaterões*) interested in obtaining a DUAT. A special commission was organised and a formal DUAT request sent to the Municipality, which rejected it and suggested that the residents contract a private architect to establish a work and financial plan. In this first phase, the Municipality was extensively involved and appointed two technicians to monitor the process. The two technicians suggested a list of architecture firms suitable, in their opinion, to develop the plan. The residents’ committee decided upon the preferred firm and contacted the architect. From that moment on, the Municipality maintained only an observatory role.

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◀ **Figure 2:** Street in Costa do Sol, Maputo, area recently inhabited by middle-classes. Photo: A. Mazzolini 2015

The residents developed and signed a private agreement establishing the value of the parcelling process, stating that the individual costs would be proportional to the plot size. It was also decided that the overall value had to be paid to the architect in several tranches to facilitate the poorest families. A joint bank account was opened. At the time of the first field monitoring, two years after the establishment of the contract (November 2015), only 35 householders had put their agreed contributions in the account. About 165 payments were lacking, and the account balance was only 20% of the required amount.

In Ibraimo's opinion, the main reasons for this were the considerable time spent in organisational terms, the lack of trust of some householders, and sudden unforeseen economic constraints. Currently, the architect has approval from the Municipality to proceed with a small part of the parcelling plan, excluding the conflicting zones. However, the economic issues are not completely resolved and the architect is trying another strategy. Working on the empty

plots, the wealthier population could easily pay to speed up the process for the whole group.<sup>6</sup> [Figure 2] Meanwhile, some subjects belonging to a tiny elite are recurring to traditional, semi-legal (or also bribery) modalities in order to speed up their DUAT emission process.

### **The Polana Caniço case**

A similar process started in 2013 in Polana Caniço [Figure 3] due to a land conflict with the neighbourhood of Costa do Sol. The residents of 4 *quarterões* felt threatened by the planned construction of a *condomínio*,<sup>7</sup> and around 200 households collected signatures and made a claim to the Municipal Council. Although they received a positive response, the Municipality passed the responsibility to the Ministry of Central Administration (MAE). The MAE tried several negotiations between the residents and the private company, but the developer did not participate in the meetings. The MAE passed over the process to the Municipality, choosing two technicians to be in charge of the pro-



**6** Those subjects hold the plots of land farther away from the main infrastructures, and for this reason they feel less confident/safe about their right to stay or to construct there: Thus the interest in rapidly soliciting their land title. They seem proactive in paying a higher amount than required, and to subsidise poorer neighbours (that is to say, to also provide their DUATs) with the aim of definitively closing the process.


**7** A horizontal, fenced residential community.

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◀ **Figure 3:** Satellite image of Polana Caniço settlement in Maputo. Source: Google Earth image 2016

**Figure 4:** Low-income house in Polana Caniço, Maputo, involved in the “inverse planning” process. Photo: A. Mazzolini 2015



**8**  
A “plano de pormenor”.

**9**  
One of the private technicians in charge of the plan was in fact working for the Municipality, and provided a subdivision plan that in some parts was rejected by the local authority because some plot sizes did not fit the current normative.

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cess and field work. The technicians, having verified the neighbourhood’s boundaries, expressed in favour of the community. The community decided then to hire an architect to prepare a detailed plan.<sup>8</sup>

A small private enterprise did the fieldwork in 2014, and the community opened a joint bank account. A price per square metre was established. Some lower-middle-class householders also paid for poorest. The process of collecting the entire amount took one year. The detailed plan was thus elaborated and delivered to the Municipality. The DUAT missives were quickly approved in August of 2014. Since then, individual communications from the Municipality to the residents have commenced, including the value for the DUAT emission.

In November of 2015, nearly 90% of the families were in possession of the DUAT. This does not mean that the process was free of constraints. Some families with severe monetary problems had to go to the Municipality to negotiate the value. Ten percent of the families experienced problems, such as no response from the Municipality. The main reason was the lack of clarity by the private enterprise in charge of the plan, as well as the conflicting roles.<sup>9</sup> The Municipality later reassured the owners of these plots that they would receive their DUATs. The plot regularisation, the reallocation of some houses or courtyards, would happen after the middle-class newcomer residents had settled in. This agreement had not been respected in the first phase, leading to an increasing feeling of insecurity and of being “left alone” among the poorest residents.

Eventually, some municipal technicians advanced with the proposal of a “collective DUAT” for the remaining ten percent. The population rejected the proposal, considering that collective DUATs would put them in an unfavourable situation in the event that the residents wanted to

build on or sell their own plots. The situation is now resolved, and the Municipality dispatched all the DUAT missives by the beginning of 2016.

## 2. Spatial practices in transition – a new urban social contract?

the two cases studied are a perfect example of the ongoing reshaping of the urban social contract in two parallel ways: a “vertical” relationship between the planning authority and residents, and a “horizontal” one among various different socio-economic groups. The role of the local authority is caught between being regulatory and “culturally influenced”, the latter being characterised by a complex network of relations and intentions. Although this position is not new within the Maputo urban-planning system, it is gradually changing and evolving due to these more frequent inverse-planning actions. [Figure 4]

Moreover, it is worth reasoning whether there is a difference in the way the local authority chooses to deal with the processes of “inverse planning”, depending on which social segment initiates it. From a local perspective, in fact, if such an action were implemented by the urban poor it could be interpreted as a sort of “licit” continuum of space self-management. If carried out by the urban middle class, it could be misinterpreted as a gentrification process (interview with DPMUA, October 2015).

In terms of costs, the procedure relieved the Municipality of some technical actions as well as parcelling costs. Specific urbanisation costs, such as the collocation of the *marcos*, were transferred from the local government to the citizens themselves. The expenses charged to the residents for the *marcos* collocation and for the plan elaboration do not change the fact that, following the plan approval, they are also supposed to pay the normal fee of the issuance of the DUAT document.



◀ **Figure 5:** A lower middle-class house in Polana Caniço, Maputo. Photo: A. Mazzolini 2016

In terms of spatial equity/urban inclusion, the impasse of the final stage of the Polana Caniço case illustrates how these processes could lead to land transactions that are unequal, particularly regarding the poorest residents. Those still waiting for their DUAT may feel the urgency to sell their plot to the incoming wealthier class, even at a lower price, because of the “illegality” of any transaction without a DUAT.

The local architect interviewed for the case of Costa do Sol gave a contrasting perspective, repeatedly pointing out how inverse planning could be a valuable instrument to guarantee quick solutions in hotspot areas, avoiding illegal transactions and fostering urban inclusion. This would be due not only to the presence of an “external” actor mediating the planning process, but also because the whole process would be accelerated, which could help to avoid the overlapping of various actors/interests on the same plots, which often arises when an extremely slow bureaucratic process occurs.

Analysing the social implications, certain core components of the inverse-planning actions infer a possible reshaping of the set of relationships and/or undeclared social obligations between the urban poor and the emerging middle class. [Figure 5] Such actions could be viewed as the beginning of a new kind of integration between particular spatial interests and traditional land-achievement modalities, promoting collective actions capable of overcoming the lack of clear and qualitative land regulations and the cumbersome bureaucracy. However, it is obvious that this could weaken the local urban governance apparatus. The retreat of the planning authority from the process threatens some important fundamentals of urban inclusion, thus giving added importance to the land-title document. This aspect, in Maputo, challenges the urban “*realpolitik*” of widespread acceptance of “informal” settling-down actions as alternative but still valid ways of production of space.

### 3. Actors and responsibilities – a local perspective


The degree of the local authorities’ engagement with the inverse-planning process is a key factor to analyse forthcoming planning scenarios. That is to say: the way in which all these detailed plans will be included in the general city plan, a posteriori, could imply the introduction of completely new tools within the existing urban plans and planning processes. More than this, the roles and responsibilities among the triangle of actors is bound to be completely redefined.

In order to discuss these points, it is worth following a local perspective, in particular that of the third actor entering the process, the local firm. It is interesting that the definition that the architect in charge of the Costa do Sol parcelling plan uses to define the “inverse-planning” process is that of “social planning”.<sup>10</sup> With this term, he emphasises not only the fact that land allocation is carried out through a community-based action and a set of transversal agreements involving different actors, but also the fact that these actions hold the potential to provide a certain level of urban and social “protection”. The architect believes that a real social-planning action could be carried out uniquely with the superseding of the Municipality field actions, limiting its role to a regulation/normative/bureaucratic/fiscal one.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding the sustainability of the inverse-planning actions, there seems to be a wide consensus about the fact that “*it works*” (interview with Prof. Tique, CEDH, interview with Polana Caniço committee president, and interview with private topographer and architect, 2015). The consensus seems to be that once a plan appears, it will be approved if basic regulations have been respected.

**10**  
He pointed out how, before the year 2000, this private sector expertise was not present in the country. Nowadays, however, as the architect said in a personal communication in March 2016, “There are many qualified persons now in the city, they are persons who want to help.” As for community involvement, the architect reassures that during his mandate there was complete collaboration because of the participatory planning meetings. These meetings were fundamental for becoming aware of the residents’ needs and preferences, in particular regarding public spaces (green zones, leisure areas, spaces for vendors).

**11**  
“I consider the Municipality as an administrative subject solely. People think that the Municipality has to go on the field, to ‘see’, to ‘know’, but this does not work. They solely have to control, to check if the plan is adaptable to the structural city plan, to approve, to make money from the taxes, and do invest that money. And so on. The Municipality must hold a holistic vision, preparing terms of reference for the plans, but they are losing their time with all these little parcelling actions.” (Interview with the architect in charge of the Costa do Sol parcelling plan, done by Anna Mazzolini in March 2016.)



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▲ **Figure 6:** Socially mixed area in Polana Caniço, Maputo. Photo: A. Mazzolini 2015

## 12

The continuum follows the traditional recognition of the auto-production of space or housing as a real *co-production* mode within the city. This co-production, due to the lack of technical or administrative alternatives, quickly gains a certain level of legality. For this reason, in the two examples described, the “illegality” of the urban occupations is still to be considered as a “floating” category that is continuously changing and reversing.



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## Conclusions

In the Costa do Sol and Polana Caniço neighbourhoods, both lower- and middle-class residents and newcomers are progressively complementing Mozambique’s *realpolitik* in terms of land access with new, personal market-driven rationalities, and the “inverse-planning” actions analysed here are perfect proof of those interrelations. [Figure 6] These processes are likely to spread very quickly, as is proven by the fact that more and more (but also less qualified) topographers and local architects are now offering such services to the communities, fostering a brand new competitive niche in the market (interview with local architects and Costa do Sol committee representatives, October 2015).

It could be argued that this way of acting perpetrates a traditional attitude adapted to the new regularisation policies. In reality, such a peculiar way of obtaining land rights escapes strict definitions, and the consequences it might have are impossible to fully envision because it holds the potential to subvert so many aspects of conventional urban governance dynamics. What is relevant is that it is more and more the Municipality itself that, lacking other viable strategies, persuades the residents to resort to community-private contracts to produce their own parcelling or upgrading plan.

These processes could be seen as an instrument to manage new expansion zones (or land-conflict zones) and to limit the power of private interests on land. However, the fact that these processes seem to “work” uniquely through the presence of a wealthier class infers that these benefits might not be applicable to the whole community, thus holding the risk to become an “unclear” planning solution.

Inverse planning should be recognised as a continuum: the main reason for accepting the first “illegal” planning action being the lack of financial and technical means.<sup>12</sup> Inverse planning should be seen as a rupture as far as the relationships and the micro-politics are concerned. In this sense, we can define at least three main arguments following which the inverse planning breaks with this continuum:

- i. The local authority, the land-use planning, and the governance: the sense of the planning policies is clearly subverted in the cases documented. Principally, the collective interest makes space for a “generic” interest, which can be claimed (using the DUAT as the main instrument) in different situations by different actors. Profound changes are implied: a shift from the recognition of the land rights to the mere allocation of them through the verification of the adherence to the new planning framework, and an ex-post planning carried out by a local private sector rather than an ex-ante planning through a long-term state strategy. A consequence: a shift from a socially “collective” interest to a commoditised “generic” one.
- ii. The perception of the space, the middle class, and the urban poor: generally, a parcelled zone implicitly means a zone inhabited in the near future by a wealthier elite (Nielsen 2011). Moreover, in the last decade, the plot perimeters have proved to increase the land-tenure-security perception (Jenkins 2004). These two main embedded perceptions are increasingly intersecting with each other in the inverse-planning process. In the same manner, mechanisms culturally related with specific classes are interchanging (Simone et al, 2013). The middle class take inspiration from and reproduce a strategy rooted in poor communities to defend their land use. The poor class, seemingly proactive in engaging in market-led aspirations, do not always (after receiving the DUAT) move farther.
- iii. Inverse planning as a social action. There are many voices defining these actions as “social” actions. From a certain point of view, they could also be interpreted as a sort of local “resistance” towards private-led development. The real news is that such a resistance is cross-class and transversal to different income groups.

We can choose to define inverse planning as a logical strategy emerging from a different socio-economic scenario in a context of administrative and political weakness: in this sense, the effectiveness of the output achieved can be contested, as “where political will was weak and where the nature of the market is embryonic and highly distorted in favour of the economically powerful, the consequence of regularising the informal is likely to be the opposite of what some land reformers lobby for” (Jenkins 2001: 11). In this sense, the novelty of the phenomenon could be contested. Reversely, we could choose to define it as a new way for the lower classes to achieve the desired “urban premium” (Turok 2016), taking advantage of a wealthier class willing to speed up its construction process.

We can be sure of what the inverse planning is not. It is not an innovative form of participation in a general context of weak governance. The disappearing of the state and the increasingly imitative, and increasingly formalising, actions superseding the state planning are not bound to be a new instrument of participation. Nor is it an innovative technical solution. What is really new is the particular set of relationships (not only authority-citizen, but also the triangle private-public-community) deriving from such actions, and the subtle relationships between the visibility or invisibility of these new practices and orientations (Simone 2015) with the urban governance issue.

# The Compact City versus Making Room for Future City Expansion in the Context of Nampula, Mozambique

Ogenis Brillhante

## **“Kompakte Stadt” versus “Raum für Stadterweiterungen” im Kontext von Nampula, Mosambik**

*Die beiden gegensätzlichen Paradigmen stehen im Mittelpunkt der akademischen Debatte um urbane Nachhaltigkeit. Dieser Artikel versucht, anhand der Sekundärstadt Nampula ein diesen Gegensatz ausgleichendes Wachstumsmodell zu entwickeln, mit der Ausgangsthese, dass beide Paradigmen ins Gleichgewicht gebracht werden könnten, wenn Zersiedelung als Merkmal des Expansionsprozesses verstanden wird und Kompaktheit erst in einem späteren urbanen Entwicklungsstadium zu erwarten ist. Nampula ist weiterhin primär durch städtische Expansion und Zersiedelung geprägt. Interviews und kartographische Auswertungen lassen auch im jetzigen Stadium keinen Trend zu mehr Kompaktheit erkennen. Während sich die bebaute Fläche im untersuchten Zeitraum mehr als verfünffacht hat, verringerte sich die Dichte um das 2,5-fache, was die Annahmen des oben skizzierten ausgleichenden Wachstumsmodells nicht bestätigt. Daher wird abschließend ein alternatives Entwicklungskonzept vorgeschlagen und diskutiert.*

Concern regarding sustainable urban development and sustainability has given rise to a substantial number of academic work dealing with city growth, sustainability, and urban forms since the 1980s. Ever since climate change became a prominent issue in the 2000s, questions such as “Are certain urban forms and city designs more sustainable than others in terms of pollution, environmental impact and energy use?” and “How to manage the current urban expansion process in terms of sustainability?” have been studied without reaching a critical consensus. However, an important result of this discussion was the narrowing down of these questions to two seemingly opposing paradigms for urban development: i.e., the “compact city” versus “making room for future city expansion”.

The paradigm “making room for future city expansion” acknowledges the inevitability of the trend towards urban expansion and calls for a combination of a more generous designation of the city limits and a basic road grid, while the paradigm of “the compact city” seeks to optimise efficient use of infrastructure and to reduce the city’s environmental footprint through a more compact form.

In recent years, Angel et al. (2011) and Inostroza et al. (2013) published empirical studies that show the expansion processes that have happened and how they will continue in the coming decades. Angel et al. (2011) point out that the urban population in developing countries is expected to double between 2000 and 2030, while the built-up area of the countries’ cities can be expected to triple. The authors also show that an average of 6 out of 7 cities will experience a decline in density in these countries.

On the other side of the academic discussion stands the concept of the compact urban form, which is pro-

moted to oppose the trend of sprawling cities. Compact cities offer advantages such as the shortening of intra-urban travel distances, contributing to the reduction of carbon emissions from commuting, the reduction of automobile dependency by allowing mass-transit systems and encouraging walking and cycling, the emphasis of the efficient use of land through high population densities, and the economising of the per capita cost of infrastructure provision (Haase et al. 2012 and Matasumoto 2011).

Despite the potential benefits of a compact city, not all of these benefits have been supported by clear evidence. Matsumoto (2011) and Haase et al. (2012) mention some of the drawbacks of this concept, such as congestion, housing affordability, quality of life, urban heat islands, and high energy demands in built-up areas. Besides this, the authors argue that the compact city’s potential should not be neglected.

Mozambique has experienced an accelerated process of urbanisation and urban growth in the last two decades. This process is expected to continue in the coming decades, and according to Andersen et al. (2015), most of this expected urban growth will happen in secondary and tertiary urban areas.


This article is part of a research project that discusses the application of the two paradigms related to city sustainability in the context of a corridor city in Mozambique, namely Nampula. The research aimed to identify the factors affecting the urbanisation process of the city and its spatial structure between 1999 and 2015, as well as to investigate the present manifestation of sprawl and compact-city characteristics in the expansion process as well as the existence of a possible third model promoting a

**Figure 1:** City expansion in Nampula, Mozambique. Photo: C. Lunetta 2016




**Figure 2:** Nampula, Mozambique: formal and informal areas in 1999 and 2015. Source: O. Brilhante and M. Francisco 2016, in Jachnow et al. (2017: 92/93)

**NAMPULA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL AREAS IN 1999**



**NAMPULA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL AREAS IN 2015**



good balance among the key elements of these two opposing paradigms.

### Methodology

The research used a cross-section approach to collect data at two points in time (1999 and 2015), adopted a non-probability sampling approach as it was difficult to know (estimate) the research population, and used the administrative area as the main unit of analysis. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected using a survey. Eight semi-closed interviews were applied purposively to key Nampula municipal and private organisations in March 2016.

The following key characteristics (manifestations) drawn from the literature were used to define the presence of expanded urban sprawl in the city: intensive and dispersed urban growth at the fringes of the city (periphery), low dwelling and population densities, construction of single family/group of houses not contiguous to the city, linear construction of houses and commerce along the transportation axis, and the construction of shopping malls or commercial centres outside of the city. The compact-city characteristics selected were: existence of a public transportation system, policies and laws promoting mixed land use, diversity, the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency, the increasing of green areas, and the presence of green infrastructure approaches.

The population numbers used in the study was obtained from INE census (Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2007). For the year 1999, the population was equal to 303,346 inhabitants based on the INE census of 1997; and for the year 2015, the population was 622,423 as a projection of the INE census of 2007. The administrative area used in the calculation of the metrics and in the preparation of the maps was equal to 42,244.71 ha.

The spatial metrics and indicators selected to measure the attributes of expansion and compact city in the periods of 1999 and 2015 were: urban land coverage (urban extent), population density, and compact index defined and measured according to the approaches proposed by Angel et al. (2011). The contiguity (expansion) index was



measured following the approach proposed by Abrantes (2011). Green areas in the city were measured in square meters per habitant and defined according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2010).

The diverse maps related to the urban expansion and compact-city metrics were prepared by a local GIS specialist using Google photographs available on Google Earth SAS Planet with a spatial resolution of 1.20 meters and a hexagonal form of 50 meter of sides.

The choice to use a non-probability sampling approach in this study made it difficult to generalise the results. The sample collected did not take into account the whole population (stakeholders) involved with sustainable housing in the three chosen sites, but a small sample of them selected using the research criteria. Reliability in the study was assured by formulating the interview questions using the information obtained in the extensive literature review, and validated using a triangulation of semi-structured interviews with data from GIS and literature review.


### Factors affecting the urbanisation process and the spatial structure of the city between 1999 and 2015

Migration, high rate of economic growth, and local birth rates influenced and continue to heavily influence the urban expansion of Nampula. [Figure 1] The city expansion has predominantly occurred along the main linear axis of transportation. Seven out of the eight interviewees confirmed these results and added that the construction and pavement of two important road corridors, which divide the city into two parts, steered the city expansion along them.

Between 1999 and 2015, most of the urban growth of Nampula occurred in the periphery. The typology of this growth consists of informal single dwellings along and/or near the main axis roads linking the districts, as well as around important infrastructure such as the university Unilurio.

From the metrics applied to the built-up areas and non-occupied areas, it was found that the occupied area in 2015 was 5.3 times larger than in 1999. While in 1999 the occupied area represented only 5.7% of the administrative area, in 2015 it covered 30.52%. The growth of informal areas has contributed most to this fast expansion. [Figure 2] While in 1999 they covered only 4.31% of the administrative area, by 2015 they had increased to 24.71%, i.e., an increase of almost six times. The total urban population doubled in this period.

Three factors were mentioned to have influenced this fast expansion process at the periphery: (1) the preparation of a city plan by the municipality in 1999 in order to reduce the population congestion of the city centre. Although this plan has only been partially implemented, some of the "Planned Settlements" still lack basic infrastructure and good accessibility; (2) the substantial migration during the civil war; and (3) the city's economic development combined with the lack of available dwellings in the city centre. The high demand increased the housing prices, forcing new dwellers to look for housing outside of the city centre while simultane-




ously motivating the owners of apartments in the city centre to rent these out and move to the periphery.

This fast urban expansion increased the urban floor but decreased the population density. The population density in 2015 was 2.5 times less than in 1999 (50.38 p/ha and 125.82 p/ha respectively), which is in accordance to the literature findings that state that densities are decreasing in developing countries.

The city's spatial structure also became more irregular in 2015 than it was in 1999. The compact index in Figure 3 shows that this index increased from 4.09 in 1999 to 14.68 in 2015. The increase of this index can be seen as an indication that the city started becoming less compact once its urban form became less centric in terms of its circular form.

**Figure 3:** Compact index of Nampula in 1999 and 2015. Source: O. Brilhante and M. Francisco 2016, in Jachnow et al. (2017: 67)



▲ Figure 4: Nampula: contiguous and non-contiguous areas of growth from 1999 to 2015. Source: O. Brilhante and M. Francisco 2016

Most of the expansion (63.45%) occurred contiguous to the city centre, while 35.54% occurred in dispersed areas, i.e., not contiguously, as it is shown in Figure 4. The fact that the city has no significant sub-centres and remains mono-centric in structure may have contributed to the contiguous expansion, followed by the fact that the city core is located at the crossroad of the main routes and the railway, and is practically the place where most of the basic services are concentrated. In Figure 4 we can also see that several dispersed (i.e., isolated or semi-isolated) clusters of built areas have appeared within the administrative area, but far from the core. [Figure 5]



▶ Figure 5: Dispersed development at the outskirts of Nampula. Photo: C. Lunetta 2016

### Presence of characteristics (manifestations) of sprawl and compact city in the expansion process

The expansion process that occurred display sprawl characteristics such as declining density, irregular shape of the urban spatial structure in relation to a circular form, informal settlements with the predominance of single dwellings contiguous to the existing urban areas, and dispersed areas within the administrative area. Some compact-city characteristics were also found: the existence of a public transport system connecting the city centre with various district [Figure 6]; the existence of a municipal law promoting mixed land use (although some respondents said that it is poorly enforced); and, eventually, some isolated initiatives to increase green areas by, for example, retaking privatised land that had been the only municipal park of the city prior to being sold by the previous local government. This green area, today, is the only open green area in the city and is strongly frequented by the local population.

While trying to quantify the green areas, it was found that they have decreased in relation to 1999. In 1999, the spatial average was equal to 58.73 square meters per person (m<sup>2</sup>/p); in 2015, 29.12 m<sup>2</sup>/p. The fast urbanisation process together with the significant growth of informal areas can be seen as possible reasons for this reduction.

### The existence of a third model

From the interviews, a third model capable to promote a balance among the key elements of the two paradigms was not identified. With regard to the two paradigms discussed, the majority of the respondents agreed that it is possible to identify an area for future expansion of the city, but it would be very difficult to protect and keep this area free from informal occupation, political pressure,

and land market speculation. Some stated that the municipality does not have the financial means to implement a basic road grid into the new areas, a condition suggested by Angel et al., 2011, for planned expansion.

Five out of eight respondents said it would be possible and necessary to apply some of the concepts of a compact city to Nampula, such as increasing green areas, improving basic sanitation and public transportation, promoting energy efficiency, and accommodating more people within the existing area of the city by promoting the construction of vertical buildings (especially in the city centre, where there is a shortage of housing and commercial spaces).

## Conclusion


Nampula is still undergoing an accelerated urban growth process, which is shaping its urbanisation process and in particular its urban spatial structure. The city experienced a fast urban expansion during the studied period that occurred with the presence of sprawl, as confirmed by the interviews and the metrics, and also with the presence of a few compact characteristics.

A third model, which could promote a good balance among the key elements of the two paradigms, was not identified but the concept of “making land for future expansion” might not be the best solution to accommodate the future urban growth and promote the future sustainability of the city. This concept calls for a combination of a more generous designation of the city limits and a basic road grid as a solution to plan in advance and manage the future expansion. The application of this concept would mean that we accept the footprint of cities, resulting in a continuous increase of the environmental impacts of the existent natural and sensitive areas. In time of climate change impacts, this continued urban expansion would, for example, multiply the required investments that are necessary to build a resilient environment for the extended urban structures.

While a certain degree of urban expansion is inevitable, this process needs to be slowed down. The future urban spatial growth can somehow be planned and implemented following a green perspective. In line with this perspective, and under the pressure of the expected impacts of climate change, the use of compact-city approaches and designs can strongly contribute to a greener and more sustainable urban expansion of the city.

As a contribution to promote more compact and sustainable cities, at IHS I have developed and am currently applying for academic purposes a concept of a green city consisting of four main pillars that should be applied to all city sectors: 1) energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources, 2) extensive use of greenery, 3) planning for land compactness with mixed land use and social mix, and 4) promoting local economic development anchored on the green growth principles with equity.

As all cities have their own natural, social-economic and cultural features, the concept is very flexible and relies on the application of key urban design attributes together with socio-economic and environmental approaches and enablers, tailor-made to each city's conditions. Nampula can also adapt elements of this concept to its own conditions and implement them as part of an incremen-



tal process to support the city to become greener and more sustainable.

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▲ **Figure 6:** Public transport routes in Nampula. Source: O. Brillhante and M. Francisco 2016, in Jachnow et al. (2017: 121)



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# Working with Urban Expansion and Densification in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Land Access and Urban Development in Maputo

Paul Jenkins

## Städtische Expansion und Verdichtung in Afrika südlich der Sahara: Erkenntnisse zu Mechanismen des Landzugangs und zu Stadtentwicklungsprozessen in Maputo

*Der Artikel stellt lokale Stadtentwicklungsprozesse in den größeren Zusammenhang des demographischen Wandels, der von der Kolonialzeit geprägten politisch-ökonomischen Strukturen des Kontinents sowie seiner ausgeprägten soziokulturellen Diversität und diskutiert auf diesem Hintergrund empirische Ergebnisse aus zwei Feldstudien in Maputos peri-urbanen Gebieten. Am Ende stehen zwei Überlegungen: die eine betont die Beschränktheit typischer "urban management" Kontrollansätze, während die andere die Möglichkeiten alternativer Methoden betrachtet, um gewünschte Stadtentwicklungsprozesse zu unterstützen. In vielerlei Hinsicht ist eine solche Analyse nicht neu: bereits in den 1980er Jahren gab es eine Debatte um den sogenannten "Selbsthilfe-Wohnungsbau" und noch früher zu alternativen, sozial ausgerichteten Ansätzen der Intervention im städtischen Raum, wie sie z.B. von Patrick Geddes (und später von Nabeel Hamdi) vorgeschlagen wurden. Allerdings finden diese Positionen in der derzeit allein auf formale Prozesse ausgerichteten städtebaulichen Praxis wenig Beachtung, und selbst in der akademischen Literatur über die rasche Urbanisierung muss immer wieder daran erinnert werden. Was hier versucht wird, ist eine neue Inwertsetzung dieser Ansätze, basierend auf einer Kontextanalyse und empirischen Beobachtungen in Maputo im Kontext des Forschungsprogramms "Home Space in the Africa City" (siehe <[www.homespace.dk](http://www.homespace.dk)> und Jenkins 2013).*

1

This paper draws on the author's 45 plus years of engagement in urban spaces in Sub-Saharan Africa – more than 35 years of which have been on urban issues in Mozambique. This engagement has been as a professional architect and planner, an urban researcher, and a resident in peri-urban Maputo, where many of the author's extended family also reside. The different knowledge(s) to which this has exposed the author actually get validated in different spheres, but all are valid in themselves in those spheres and should not be discounted from one to the other. This paper draws on the author's published academic research on Maputo over the past 16 years, but also on prior professional experience as a Maputo city planner, and participatory engagement in peri-urban areas since the 1980s. The city, after all, is what we imagine it to be.

2

Relevant protagonists of this debate were Turner (1976), Ward (1982), and later Mathéy (1992); the debate is discussed in detail in Jenkins et al. 2007: 158-168.

The paper<sup>1</sup> is structured around three understandings of context, and follows two empirical descriptions of outcomes in Maputo peri-urban areas as well as two reflections: one on the constraints of typical "urban management" *control* approaches, and one on the opportunities for an alternative *support* function. In many ways such an analysis is not new, as evidenced in the 1980s in the so-called "self-help housing debate"<sup>2</sup> and, indeed, much earlier than that in alternative, socially oriented approaches to urban intervention as propounded by Patrick Geddes (1915) – and more recently by Nabeel Hamdi (2010, 2006, 2004), etc. However, the position still does not get much traction in formal urban-management praxis or, indeed, in much of the academic literature on rapid urbanisation, and needs to be continually restated. What is attempted here is a restatement of this approach that is based on contextual analysis and empirical observation in Maputo.<sup>3</sup>

The key message is: in a situation of rapid urbanisation, yet limited resources on which to base any effective public and/or "formal" private investment, the "non-formal" initiatives of residents' own forms of urban development can be proactively guided and supported to create significant, urban qualitative impact.


## PART 1 CONTEXT

### The context of demographic change

Africa is a massive land mass, but until recently it was relatively under-populated compared to other major

continental areas in temperate and/or tropical areas. The continent, and especially the area of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is going through a demographic revolution with rapid population growth and, in parallel, a process of rapid urbanisation, including a significant youth "bulge". In the period between 2010 and 2025, the demographic projection is 330 million more people in SSA – of whom two-thirds will live in urban areas (Jenkins 2013). Given the vast size and differential context of the 50 or so countries in the SSA macro-region, however, urbanisation rates will differ enormously [Figure 1]; likewise, there are problems regarding the definition of what is urban. Official statistics base this on national definitions and administrative divisions, although these often do not represent what can be seen as areas that are functionally urban (in social, economic, cultural and physical senses). That essentially means an undercount of the functional urban population in the macro-region.

Nevertheless, the official statistics are striking. In 2010, Mozambique was considered to have 38% of its population living in urban areas, and the projection for 2025 is 50%. Thus, 85% of the population increase nationwide will be living in urban areas in less than a decade – some 6.6 million new residents compared to about 9 million existing urban residents in 2010 (Jenkins 2013). The capital city conurbation of Maputo/Matola is among the top 15 largest urban areas in SSA. More so, UN-Habitat (2005) already considers a very high proportion of the existing urban population to be living in "slums" (80% in 2005).



**Figure 1:** Differential urbanisation across the continent. Source: UNEP/GRID: Population Density for Africa in 2000 (created by Andy Nelson, University of Leeds, 2004). Available at: <https://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/global-pop/africa/afpopd00.gif>

**3**  
In particular, backed up by the major research programme “Home Space in the Africa City”. (See: [www.homespace.dk](http://www.homespace.dk)) and Jenkins 2013.)

**4**  
See “Tribal Map of Africa” – a fold out map from the book “Africa: Its peoples and Their Culture History” by George Murdock, 1959. A digitised version (Prof. Nathan Nunn, Prof. Suzanne Blier, Julia Finkelstien, Harvard University) is available at: [http://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:murdock\\_ea\\_2010\\_3\\_3](http://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:murdock_ea_2010_3_3)

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While there are queries on how “urban” is defined, and how we actually assess the resident population in urban areas – given the significant fluidity of migration in spatial terms (rural to urban, urban to urban, within urban), as well as temporal terms (daily, seasonal, life cycle and permanent transitions) (Jenkins 2017) – there is no doubt that the urban areas of countries in SSA, including Mozambique, will see very large-scale and rapid urbanisation, but with limited political and economic capacities to manage this in any way through formal government and/or private-sector activity, as the next section argues.


#### The context of political economic structures

Sub-Saharan Africa is politically complex and, arguably, historically fragmented; a process not resolved by the colonial division into some 50 nation-states, the vast majority of which were created in a relatively short (70 to 90-year) period of colonial domination with state boundaries imposed over the existing socio-cultural boundaries.<sup>4</sup> This imposed political process, and its aftermath of rapid de-colonisation (and, indeed, continued subsequent neo-colonialism), has been a major (but not exclusive) factor in many nation-states still not being politically stable, although there is a slow spread of forms of representative democracy.

Not only were nascent pre-colonial polities destabilised and superseded in the colonisation process, even prior to this the mercantile period beginning in the 16<sup>th</sup> century drained the macro-region economically – including a massive demographic drain through slavery. Colonisation deepened these processes of economic exploitation and one-sided trade, and despite strong attempts to strengthen national economies after independence, forms of neo-colonisation are based on these processes of exploitation and unbalanced trade – which arguably still continue. Thus, although some economic gains were achieved during the worldwide economic growth of the post-War period, macro-regional economies generally have continued to decline – albeit there has been some resurgence in new millennium due to renewed foreign direct investment (FDI). This is focused, once again, on raw material and energy exploitation (as in the late colonial period and early neo-colonial period in many states). The outcome of this long-term economic subordination and exploitation is that, according to UN data, the macro-region contains the largest global grouping of poor nation-states with widespread structural poverty. This is quite different from other recently urbanising macro-regions worldwide such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and even South Asia.

Whereas there seems to be some opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa to now consolidate political stability and

This map shows many of the different languages spoken on the African continent. The diversity of the languages reflects the length of time Africa has been settled.



**Figure 2:** Languages of Africa. Source: Living Encyclopaedia of Global African Music, 2001. Available at: <[http://artsites.ucsc.edu/igama/2%20-%20Encyclopedia/e-LEGAM%20Content%20Files/C%20-%20FAAISJ/01\\_map-AfricaLanguages.html](http://artsites.ucsc.edu/igama/2%20-%20Encyclopedia/e-LEGAM%20Content%20Files/C%20-%20FAAISJ/01_map-AfricaLanguages.html)>

enhance economic development, this is as yet a fragile situation and one often subject to external dependence as much as to internal uncertainty.

Mozambique is fairly representative of the general political economic context of SSA, although its status as one of the so-called “least-developed countries” may well change with the exploitation of its significant gas deposits as well as other mineral and energy sources. The key issues here are, firstly, whether these can be economically beneficial to the producer nation (including assisting diversification of long-term economic growth), and secondly, how the ensuring wealth can be best distributed. Other Sub-Saharan African countries with rich mineral and/or energy deposits have not necessarily been successful in either regard.

### The context of socio-cultural agency

Sub-Saharan Africa, as a continent, has a very high degree of social and cultural diversity, despite colonisation. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated through the proxy of language – see Figure 2 – although in each language group there are many dialects and cultural differentiations and hence even more complexity than illustrated.

Apart from this socio-cultural complexity challenging political stabilisation in the creation and consolidation of nation-states as key polities in the “modern” post-independence world (as evidenced in the many political and continued military conflicts), this complexity is also reflected in the *realpolitik* of how governance works.

Given that nation-state governance is still only partially established, many non-state governance structures in fact have higher levels of social legitimacy than state entities – these include so-called “traditional” leaders, ethnic organisations, as well as specific interest groups. Underlying these non-state levels of governance – and constantly negotiating with these – are kinship, clan and ethnic structures that inevitably interact with the sub-state structures set up by governments, if usually non-formally (i.e., not through any public process). Across the macro-region, land management in urban areas is perhaps a key example of this.

Nevertheless, although there is vast socio-cultural diversity, there are also strong cultural affinities that underpin the actual functioning of, for instance, urban areas. In other words there often emerges a *de facto* set of processes for urban management at various levels, which has relatively strong socio-cultural legitimacy, if no “formal”, legal (*de jure*) status. Arguably it is this socio-cultural dynamism that provides the mechanisms by which rapidly growing urban areas actually function and have some form of management.<sup>5</sup>

This, however, is under-studied: both from the political-economic point of view as well as from the socio-cultural point of view. Hence, what these mechanisms are and how they work – and why – is little understood in “formal” knowledge sets (such as academic research, government policy, etc.). It is, however, part of the “non-formal” knowledge sets of urban residents, if often in embedded ways. More, and wider, understanding of such processes is critical to engaging with urban-management issues and collectively agreeing with urban residents on how these can be improved.

The paper now looks at two empirical situations where non-state and sub-state entities engage in urban development *de facto* (as they have no legal position to do this *de jure*) in Maputo’s peri-urban fabric over the past 16 years (possible through Google Earth historic imagery and long-term and varied engagement of the author in these areas). One case study looks at urban expansion and the other at urban densification; both cases are in the peri-urban areas north of the city centre.

## PART II CASE STUDIES

### Case study 1: peri-urban expansion

The two Google Earth images presented here are of an area in the northern part of the Maputo peri-urban city area – i.e., within the city boundaries. The road to the right in the first image from 2000 [Figure 3] separates what was a (much abandoned) market-garden area in the colonial period from an area with no specific urban plans – except (as can be seen in the centre top of the image) for a new, planned housing area built by the CMC company responsible for the new motorway from South Africa to Maputo (part of the Maputo Corridor project) – for re-housing residents affected by the motorway (which, in fact, is on the far side of Matola city, some 35-40 km away). At that time, another planned development had just been started south of this location. The other occupation to the top left of the image is a military installation.

<sup>5</sup> For example, there are strong similarities between how land is accessed and housing provided through ‘self-managed’ processes between Mozambique and Dakar-Pikine in Senegal, as compared in Pinard, Jenkins & Andersen (2017).



◀ **Figure 3:** Maputo: CMC neighbourhood 2000. Source: Google Earth; historic timeline for 11 July 2000

Most occupation outside of these developments was sparse.

The second image [Figure 4] shows the rapid urban expansion in this area in the 16-year interim period – with the completion of two more formally planned areas south of the original 2001 one, but also occupation of all the previously sparsely occupied areas – mostly unplanned, although to the left of the image some of these areas have continued the format of the neighbouring planned areas in “unofficial” plans. The military installation remains intact, with some internal development, but the market garden area has limited development – although one new school is evident (red roofs to right of image).

The expansion process documented above is fairly typical of many areas in the city – although perhaps the location around CMC *bairro* in fact has more planned areas than the majority of the Maputo peri-urban area – and the unofficially planned developments have con-

tinued to emerge in this area. This form of expansion has now gone quite far past the city boundaries and is approaching (and being approached by) the nearest small town to the north of the city (Marracuene). Outside of the city administrative area, most occupation is unplanned or unofficially planned. The majority of this unplanned occupation is undertaken with tacit acceptance of the sub-state level of governance (see below), with non-state entities also active (especially outside the city boundaries). Municipal officials are often also involved – albeit unofficially. Arguably, these groups, together with residents, plan the majority of city expansion.

### Case study 2: peri-urban densification

The other urban-development process underway is densification – mostly uncontrolled, even when taking place in officially planned areas. The two following images look in some detail at a residential area officially planned in 1984 and demarcated in 1985, with plots being allocated from that year (in the city council’s Basic Urbanisation



◀ **Figure 4:** Maputo: CMC neighbourhood 2016. Source: Google Earth; historic timeline for 28 April 2016

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**Figure 5:** Maputo: Bairro Laulane 2000. Source: Google Earth; historic timeline for 11 July 2000



Programme – see Anderson et al. 2015a / 2015b, Melo et al. 2017). The area in focus includes a neighbourhood centre in Bairro Laulane, planned for administrative, commercial and small-scale productive functions. The planning followed previous colonial cadastral lines for simplicity, but also implemented the guidelines for basic urban development as prepared by the (then) National Housing Directorate, with embedded ideas of urban quarters around communal open spaces. The plans were based on “modules” of 8 plot blocks to provide for good permeability (most traffic being pedestrian), as this also permitted the topographers to adjust the plan in practice to try to include permanent structures within new plots. [Figure 5]

Noticeable in the focus area is that by the year 2000, nearly all plots had been developed, and had largely followed guidelines provided locally by the city council, in the 1980s, of locating houses in relation to plot boundaries. Many houses had similar footprints (as identifiable from roof shapes), and most plots had trees in the back-

yard areas, planted by residents. Already, however, a redevelopment process was underway, with some occupants buying out neighbours and building larger houses – especially near the neighbourhood centre (bottom centre of the image). Infrastructure was still limited (e.g., sand roads), but electricity and water had by then been supplied.

The second image [Figure 6] again shows the occupation changes after 16 years, and clearly demonstrates a process of significant densification. Many plots now have multiple building footprints and, as a consequence, tree coverage is much reduced. The process of redevelopment through multiple plots with larger houses has continued, and the commercial/small industrial centre has developed significantly. In some cases (reading the construction shadows), 2<sup>nd</sup> floors have been added. The previous house and orchard of the local administration (bottom right of the image) has now also expanded, serving the whole urban district. A concrete-block paved road now reaches the neighbourhood centre, which has a minibus terminus.



**Figure 6:** Maputo: Bairro Laulane 2016. Source: Google Earth; historic timeline for 28 April 2016

**6**  
This is studied in another in-depth case study in Motelson, Andersen & Jenkins (2017).

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◀ **Figure 7 / Figure 8:** The future of Maputo's new urban areas? Self-managed vertical development in peri-urban Salvador de Bahia, Brazil. Photos: Author

The vast majority of this densification and redevelopment has taken place with no involvement of the official municipal authorities – although, again, neighbourhood heads and quarter “chiefs” were involved, as were to some extent the urban district authority, none of whom have this function legally.

This process of densification is happening all over the peri-urban area: in planned areas (both official and unofficial) as well as in predominantly unplanned areas, albeit with dif-

ferential development.<sup>6</sup> For instance, there seems to have been a greater incidence of redevelopment of plots (through buy out) and upper-storey construction in areas that are planned – although this is now happening more generally. Densification is firstly horizontal – the filling of open space within plots – and to date vertical densification is conducted mainly by middle-class occupants. In all likelihood, this will change and vertical densification will also become more common among lower-income groups – as has happened in Brazil, for example, through selling and renting upper floors [Figure 7 and Figure 8], or in Kenya through unofficial tenement developments (Huchzermeyer 2011). [Figure 9 and Figure 10]

What these case studies illustrate are two of the most important urban trends in Maputo, which are also typical of other larger Sub-Saharan African cities. The extremely limited ca-

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◀ **Figure 9 / Figure 10:** The future of Maputo's new urban areas? Tenement buildings in Mathare Valley, Nairobi. Photo: K. Teschner 2011



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capacity of the authorities to plan, then demarcate urban land, and also control development on this land (including building control) is manifest, as is the limited formal private-sector investment. On the contrary, individual investment is widespread, but not totally uncontrolled – although the formal, controlling authorities (municipal departments) cannot cope – as there is (as discussed here for Maputo) engagement between individual households and local sub-state entities such as urban-quarter heads and neighbourhood secretaries, who do not have official status for such control but have some sense of social legitimacy. In addition, there are socio-cultural legitimacies that people adhere to in relation to neighbours and aspirational goals in how they develop their land and houses. This is discussed below.

## PART III

### Constraints on state "control" of urban development

Urban areas have often been "ordered" by states – from pre-history, but especially since the Enlightenment and subsequent Industrial Revolution – something due as much to the desire for control as for any aesthetic/geometric reasons. However, some urban areas have been predominantly socio-culturally ordered rather than controlled by the state or ordered geometrically. Urban planning, as we understand it today, essentially evolved as a function of the state to control urban development in the industrialisation period, including through future "urban plans" which then guide the state's role of day-to-day "development control". This process was embedded in colonial domination, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, where it was used as a mechanism for urban exclusion. Since colonial governance capacity was generally weak (compared to the home countries), the nature of the control usually included dualistic governance systems, especially concerning land-use control (and to a lesser extent, building control). Thus, many indigenous Africans were excluded from urban areas (or parts of them) and relegated to certain ordered, planned and controlled areas (e.g., townships, 'indigenous' neighbourhoods, mining camps, etc.), or governed through colonial-created "traditional" authorities in "native areas" on the urban periphery – where socio-cultural mechanisms were the basis for resource allocation and control.

While the capacity to order, plan and control urban development in the colonial period varied enormously between colonial systems, in most post-independent African urban areas this was further weakened by the political and economic issues outlined earlier in this paper. This often included an implicit anti-urban bias in policy and development projects (if not in actual investment) (Jenkins 2006). With the growing trends in urban growth (natural and migratory), this policy vacuum has led on to socio-cultural dynamics becoming the dominant driver of urban change in SSA – albeit including negotiation with sub-state/non-state authorities, which include the so-called "traditional" authorities. These mechanisms are generally, however, bundled together as so-called "informal", even if they involve official authorities in various ways. Despite this reality, the four to six post-independence decades in the macro-region have also not led to changes in the political desire for state control of urban

development – despite (or because of) the fact the limited control that is possible usually benefits a small minority of the urban population.

### Opportunities of a "support" function

The vast majority of urban land access in Mozambique is through sub-state/non-state allocation and lower-level commercialisation processes – despite the Land Law and Law for Territorial Ordering, which establish the state's authority over land and the necessity for "planning" as the basis for secure urban land rights. The state's capacity to plan is very weak, and is even more so when it comes to development control of plans. In this context, these processes are seen as socially legitimate, and urban land access and self-managed house construction have high socio-cultural value, representing both the vast majority of private savings/investment, and closely allied to life transitions. As a result, a "laissez faire" position is taken de facto "on the ground" as a "pay-off" for political stability.

Rather than labelling this massive urban engagement – which will only increase manifoldly in the next decades, given the population projections noted earlier – as "informal" and even "illegal", this form of urban development needs to be seen as a solution and NOT a problem. It represents a significant portion of domestic investment, it embeds important social and cultural values, and it is an integral and very important part of the *realpolitik* of managing the fast-growing and changing cities in the macro-region. The key issue, thus, is how to **support** this and not **control** it according to some plan – plans often predicated on levels of administration and urban investment which is far from possible for their realisation, let alone the capacity to thereafter control development according to the given plan. However, to be able to support these non-formal mechanisms requires, firstly, a better understanding of the actual dynamics of urban land access and house development in praxis – something significantly researched now in Maputo (e.g. Jenkins 2013).

### Concluding remarks

Summarising, urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow phenomenally and rapidly in the next century, and for the foreseeable future the political, administrative, technical and economic resources will not be available to produce urban "order" such as envisioned in most post-Enlightenment views of the "good city" – and also envisioned by the government and formal private sector in SSA. This means that new forms of urbanism, and indeed understandings of urbanity, which are emerging from this contextually specific rapid urbanisation phenomenon need to be better understood – not to reactively control them, but to proactively support their evolution and dynamic change. Given that their major dynamics are embedded in social and cultural values, they need to be the main focus for this understanding. Nevertheless, we also need to better understand the mechanisms by which households interact with sub-state and non-state actors, and how these factors all influence the contextually distinct praxis of land access and development. Urban research, thus, needs to move from a normative to a reflective position in engaging with this opportunity.



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# Neo-customary Turn in Urban Land/Settlement Delivery and the Sprawl Question in Peri-urban Enugu, Nigeria

Victor U. Onyebueke and Raphael I. Ndukwu

## Rückkehr zu traditionellen Praktiken der Baulandausweisung und Siedlungsplanung sowie die Frage der Zersiedlung im Stadtumland von Enugu, Nigeria

*In Nigeria, wie in anderen Teilen Afrikas, führt der zunehmende Bevölkerungsdruck zu einer wachsenden Nachfrage nach Bauland an der städtischen Peripherie. In den betroffenen Städten ist das Stadtumland zum dynamischen Schauplatz wiederentstandener oder veränderter Formen von überlieferten Praktiken der Landvergabe geworden. Dies verschafft den angrenzenden ländlichen Gemeinden nicht nur eine neue Rolle als Lieferant parzellierter Grundstücke, sondern auch als Städtebauer. Der Artikel erforscht Natur und charakteristische Mechanismen des so geprägten Wachstums im Ballungsraum von Enugu, einem bedeutenden Verwaltungszentrum im südöstlichen Nigeria. Mit Hilfe von Landsat-Bildern und Eintragungen im Kataster zwischen 1985 und 2014 wurden Veränderungen der Landnutzung und die Ausweitung der Siedlungsfläche räumlich-zeitlich erfasst. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die in nigerianischen Städten zu beobachtende Renaissance von traditionellen Mustern bei Baulandausweisung und Landvergabe das Wachstum im Stadtumland verstärkt und eine neue Welle der Zersiedlung begünstigt.*

## Urbanising African cities and restless urban-rural peripheries

Peri-urban interfaces (PUIs) are part of the urban edge characterised by “often wide and persistent, if dynamic, transition zones that combine various rural and urban conditions” (Simon 2008: 170). In many rapidly growing African cities, PUIs remain in a state of flux with the development roles and realities of adjoining rural communities changing in dramatic ways to contain the increasing population pressure and search for cheaper land in the urban peripheries (Andersen et al. 2015). Durand-Lasserve (2004: 3) interpreted this evolving phenomenon as “neo-customary practices” – de facto land delivery systems and practices “rooted directly or indirectly in the custom”. Myriad interactions and conflicts inherent in these “zones of transition” are (re)shaping the changing power relations among planning agencies, politicians, urban and rural elites, and grassroots actors with consequent evolution of de facto “bottom-up” planning practices (Onyebueke and Ikejiofor 2014).

This article explores the changing trends in neo-customary and formal government land/settlement delivery in Enugu and their effects on the city’s PUI and its spatio-temporal transformation or growth over time. This fresh exploration is important not just to fill the yawning geospatial gap in the contemporary understanding of informal land-tenure systems, but also to highlight the often overlooked connection of land/settlement delivery processes and urban sprawl in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.

## Neo-customary turn in urban land/settlement delivery and sprawl

In Africa, like most other parts of the world, land rights have evolved over the years from the earliest stage marked by

“open-access commons” – typical of traditional hunting-and-gathering societies – to the more-established land-tenure systems of today that recognise both private and state properties (Krier 2009: 6). In the context of land-tenure evolution in most PUIs, both internal and external factors have combined to produce greater commodification of land (McGregor et al. 2006). The internal factors include social/institutional issues, land-use structures, and configurations of power relations in the place concerned; the external factors have to do with intervening local, national and global policies/programmes. To Kalabamu (2014: 480), such definitive transformations of customary tenure systems as seen in Greater Gaborone (Botswana) actually stem from “the intersection of historical, demographic, cultural, political and environmental factors”.

In many Nigerian cities, persistent failures of public-sector land and housing programmes amid skyrocketing prices of private-sector equivalents are prompting contiguous rural landowning communities to exploit the lucrative urban land markets through the initiation of own subdivision schemes (Onyebueke and Ikejiofor 2014). Durand-Lasserve (2004: 3) has likened such neo-customary practices as “a combination of reinterpreted customary practices with other informal and formal practices”. With such a characteristic and alternate model/procedure of urban land transfer, new networks involving diverse sets of stakeholders (such as land surveyors, urban planners, lawyers, community representatives and informal land agents, among others) are taking root across the urban-rural divide. Besides functioning as some sort of escape for local communities from “pre-empt arbitrary and under-compensated expropriation” by the government (Rakodi and Leduka 2004: 42), such community-initiated schemes have become hugely popular because they offer commodified land through flexible procurement processes at bargain-basement prices. Through commodifi-

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**Table 1:** Causes and impacts of sprawl. (Source: Adapted from Bhatta 2010: 28-36)

**1**  
Sprawl refers to the pattern of “spatial configuration of a metropolitan area at a point in time” and accounted for by the “change in the spatial structure of cities over time” (Angels et al. 2010: 3-4). Sprawls occur through the combined processes of infill, expansion and leapfrog, which correspondingly result in inward, outward, and discontinuous growths, yet the major impulses of urban expansion, or peri-urbanisation as it is sometimes called, are centred on PUIs of affected cities.

Causes of urban growth and sprawl	
Population growth, independence of decision on future expansion, economic growth and industrialisation, speculation (policy, land and infrastructure), expectations of land appreciation, land hunger, legal disputes, physical geography, lack of affordable housing, under-priced development and property taxes, lower living and property costs, new road construction, etc.	
Positive impact	Negative impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• higher economic production</li> <li>• opportunities for the underemployed and unemployed</li> <li>• opportunities for better services and lifestyles</li> <li>• potentials of extending urban infrastructure and services to a greater number of people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• proliferation of informal settlements</li> <li>• increased vehicular dependency</li> <li>• saps local resources and destroys open space</li> <li>• inflated infrastructure and public service costs</li> <li>• energy inefficiency due to extended travel and transmission distance</li> <li>• disparity in wealth</li> <li>• impacts on wildlife and ecosystem</li> <li>• loss of farmland</li> <li>• increase in temperature</li> <li>• poor air quality, impacts on water quality and quantity</li> <li>• impacts on public and social health</li> </ul>

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tion, some socio-cultural restrictions inherent in the traditional customary tenure system, like non-access to land by non-natives and women, are done away with.

In their analysis of Maputo (Mozambique), Andersen et al. (2015: 331) saw these neo-customary practices as a form of local planning/city-building impetus that interrogates who actually plans African cities. Incidentally, land and housing initiatives of this kind are becoming rife in Africa – and have also been identified in Accra (Ghana), Cotonou and Porto Novo (Bénin), Dakar (Senegal), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Durban (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Yaoundé (Cameroon), and Enugu (Nigeria) (see Durand-Lasserve 2004, Rakodi and Leduka 2004, Onyebueke and Ikejiofor 2014).

However, one key issue that is often overlooked in peri-urban studies and informal land delivery literature – with the possible exception of Durand-Lasserve (2004) – is the curious connection between neo-customary “urbanism” and sprawl.<sup>1</sup> Without elaboration, Durand-Lasserve (2004: 14) categorically stated that “...uncontrolled urban sprawling is clearly associated with neo-customary land developments”. Since the same very factors that cause urban growth are also responsible for sprawl (Bhatta 2010), planning and city governments need to be cognisant of the causes and positive/negative impacts of urban growth/sprawl (refer to Table 1). This is imperative, as the adoption of compact city development in Africa is indispensable for the achievement of efficiency and long-term sustainability (Arku 2009).



**Figure 1:** Enugu in sub-regional perspective. Source: V. Onyebueke and R. Ndukwu 2016



◀ **Figure 2:** The Awkunanaw end of the Enugu peri-urban interface. The Enugu-Port Harcourt Expressway—the only physical marker that demarcates Enugu city fringes (right-hand side) and *Amaechi-Awkunanaw* village (left-hand side). Photo: Authors

### Evaluating transformation and growth in peri-urban Enugu

Enugu, also known as “Coal City”, is the current capital of Enugu State and the most important administrative centre in Southeast Nigeria. [Figure 1] It developed with the discovery and mining of coal in the 1920s. Ever since, Enugu has grown steadily in population as the four succeeding census figures have confirmed: 62,800 (1952 Census), 122,600 (1963), 407,756 (1991) and 722,664 (2006). Currently, the city covers an area of about 7,161 km<sup>2</sup> and has a 2015 projected population of 930,792 people. Consistent with Angels et al.’s (2010: 78) rule of thumb that “when the population of a city doubles, its area triples”, the city’s progressive population growth has translated into continual expansion – i.e., deeper incursions into the customary lands of the adjoining rural communities of Awkunanaw, Nike and Ngwo. [Figure 2 and Figure 3] With the waning general acceptance and effectiveness of the Land Use Act of 1978, which provided for compulsory acquisition of land by the government for public interest, these land-owning communities, like others in the outskirts of many Nigerian cities, are capitalising on the cracks in the dualistic customary and planning regimes by

assuming the roles of land subdividers and city builders (Onyebueke and Ikejiofor 2014).

The spatio-temporal land-use dynamics of Enugu between 1985 and 2014 were analysed using temporal remote sensing data.<sup>2</sup> We buttress the analysis of remote sensing images by introducing data on land delivery (obtained from the official subdivisions register) as a ground validation gauge in order to account for the sequence and pattern of spatio-temporal transformation and growth in the peripheries of Enugu. The register is kept by the Enugu State Planning Department (ESPD), and it spans a 53-year period (from 1961 to 2014) with 403 entries of approved layouts<sup>3</sup> corresponding to either 149 entries from the government/formal schemes or 254 entries from informal/quasi-formal ones initiated by communities (see Table 2). Other attributes of the register include the plan reference number and date of plan registration.<sup>4</sup>

### Patterns of spatio-temporal transformation in peri-urban Enugu

Enugu has been growing progressively in all directions with exception of the north-eastern section, where the

2 Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper (28.5m) for 1985; Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper (28.5m) for 2000; and Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) for 2014. Land-use categories were classified using supervised Gaussian Maximum Likelihood Classifier (GMLC). Image data pertaining to different timeframes were analysed using signatures from training sites for the land-use types. Confusion matrices deployed to assess the accuracy of actual and predicted classifications yielded positive predictive values (PPV) of between 82% and 87%, and the kappa statistics of 0.93 to 0.87. Ajala and Olayiwola (2013) used an analogous approach to investigate urban land-coverage changes in another Nigerian city, Ile-Ife.

3 Informal settlements in Enugu such as Obiagu (‘Ogui urban jungle’), Ikilike, Iva Valley, Ugbo Alfred, etc., and other quasi-formal layouts developing incrementally, are mostly excluded.


4 For more treatises on community-mediated settlements and their development, refer to Onyebueke and Ikejiofor 2014.

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◀ **Figure 3:** Blocks of flats springing up at the Awkunanaw end of the Enugu peri-urban interface. Photo: Authors



**Figure 4:** Urban expansions: 1985 to 2015. Source: V. Onyebueke and R. Ndukwu 2016

Udi Hills constitute a tangible physical barrier (refer to Figure 4). Between 1986 and 2000, the proportion of the built-up area rose to 23.62% of the entire land coverage of the city. However, by 2015 the built-up area had risen significantly to 42.17% – an almost doubled increase in the built-up area between 2000 and 2015. Figures 4 and 5 correspondingly show aerial photo clips comparing the spatio-temporal changes in Enugu at three time intervals (1986, 2000 and 2015), and a stacked bar chart analysis of the significant transformations. It is interesting to observe that in the study ar-

ea, whereas population has increased about 32-fold from 1986 to 2015, the built-up area multiplied to nearly 45-fold.<sup>5</sup>

An analysis of the official subdivision register is presented in Table 2. This reveals at least three crucial points about settlement emergence and sprawl in Enugu. First, there has been an about 29% cumulative growth rate in the number of layouts from 1961 to 2014, which is indicative of mounting population pressure on peri-urban lands (see Table 2, Column 4 and

**5**  
The figures are percentage ratios obtained by dividing the population and built-up area of the base year by the projected year, and multiplying them by 100.

**Table 2:** Cumulative incidence of two major neighbourhood categories in the city of Enugu, Nigeria: 1961-2014. (Source: V. Onyebueke and R. Ikejiofor 2014)

Year of Establishment (Plan registration date)	Number and Mode of Layouts (Neighbourhood)		
	Formal Initiative (Government or Public Scheme)	Ouasi-formal Initiative (Community-mediated Scheme)	Cumulative Total
1961-1969	46	-	46
1970-1978	39	19	58
1979-1987	22	12	34
1988-1996	16	20	36
1997-2005	17	45	62
2006-2014	9	158	167
<b>Total</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>403</b>

Source: Authors' analysis of the official register of layouts or subdivision plans (20 August 2014)

Figure 6). Second, the noticeable slump in settlement registration in both schemes between 1979 and 1996 corresponds with the negative economic impact of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) introduced in 1986 by the International Monetary Fund to achieve economic diversification in Nigeria through fiscal policy reviews and privatisation (observe that the minimum point 'P' in Figure 6 falls between 1987 and 1988). Third, the post-SAP era in Nigeria is characterised by declining public settlement intervention and increasing community land/settlement development initiatives (notice the position of the intersection point 'T' in Figure 6).

Evidently, neo-customary land and settlement initiatives in peri-urban Enugu surpass government initiatives by nearly twofold. Besides having implications for community participation in planning and development, such remarkable shifts in the functional role of adjoining rural communities (and government) invariably lead to path-dependent sprawl.

### Conclusions

Africa's burgeoning urban population arises from natural increases, rural-urban migration, as well as conurbation of adjoining settlements. The inexorable outcome is massive urban expansion or sprawl. The attendant consequences are numerous – principal among which are poverty, food insecurity, unemployment and misemployment, housing shortage and slum growth, overcrowding and infrastructure overload, as well as sprawl and environmental threats (Blanco, et al. 2009). Curiously, the neo-customary practices of the adjoining rural communities are responding to the population pressure to self-organise PUIs of affected cities, as the city of Enugu case study has vividly demonstrated.

Rural communities whose lands adjoin city fringes are currently playing a more-dominant role in urban land/




Figure 5: A stacked bar chart analysis of land-use cover in Enugu 1985 to 2015. Source: V. Onyebueke and R. Ndukwu 2016

settlement delivery. These community-mediated city building practices account for the bulk of spatio-temporal land-use changes and, by implication, constitute the key instigators of sprawl in many Nigerian cities. Unlike conventional urban sprawls, which are impelled from inside the city (see Bhatta 2010), the emergent equivalent derives mostly from exurban decisions and actions typical of neo-customary practices. Consequently, the two sprawl typologies are not likely to respond to the same control measures, since the latter entails mainly activities and processes that often function in reverse order to formal planning processes, and also involve more stakeholders than the former. Clear-cut urban policies and intentional planning are necessary prerequisites for containing sprawl in Africa (Arku 2009). In Enugu, for instance, the modest handle the planning authority has on CMS initiatives could be harnessed to make ongoing rapid urban expansion more amenable to sustainable planning goals. Further studies are required to unravel the spatio-temporal changes involving diverse land uses (and not just housing development) in the PUI of Enugu and other Nigerian cities as they both planned and unplanned.



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


Figure 6: A graph showing frequency of public and community schemes in Enugu 1961 to 2014. Source: V. Onyebueke and R. Ndukwu 2016; Aerial photograph from the Enugu State Government 2014

# Urban Sprawl and Gentrification in Belo Horizonte, Mozambique: Informal Land Markets and Disappearing Peasantries<sup>1</sup>

Eléusio Viegas Filipe and Simon Norfolk

## Zersiedlung und Gentrifizierung in Belo Horizonte, Mosambik: Informelle Landmärkte und das Verschwinden der Landbevölkerung

*Obwohl die Regierung in Mosambik regulatorische Bestimmungen zur Sicherung bestehender Landbesitzansprüche erlassen hat, führen rasche Urbanisierung und industrielles Wachstum zur Enteignung vieler im Stadtumland lebender Bauern. Basierend auf umfangreichen Feldforschungen in den Jahren 2014 und 2015 untersucht dieser Artikel die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Veränderungen in Belo Horizonte, einem Stadtteil von Boane, in dem die Flächen der einstigen Subsistenzlandwirtschaft in den letzten 10 Jahren für hochwertige Wohnnutzung parzelliert wurden. Dieser Prozess war maßgeblich geprägt durch eine unlautere Übertragung der Landzugangsrechte der peri-urbanen Landbevölkerung an die städtischen Eliten Maputos. Der Artikel beschäftigt sich vor allem mit der kommunalen Politik in Bezug auf die peri-urbanen Gemeinden sowie mit Landkonflikten zwischen Bauern und privaten Investoren, da diese im Kontext von Bevölkerungszuwachs und Verstädterung für die Veränderung der peri-urbanen Landschaft in Belo Horizonte entscheidend waren.*

### 1

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### 2

Belo Horizonte is one of the neighbourhoods of today's Boane municipality. It lies very close to Matola city and less than 25 km from Maputo.

## Changes in land access and use in Mozambique

High urban expansion and internal migration (both economic- and climate-related displacement), surging international commodity prices, European subsidies for alternative energy, and the prospect of global carbon market incentives have created a large demand for land in Mozambique. This has been reflected in a shift in land use from peasant smallholdings to real-estate development and large commercial farms.

The lack of transparency over land values, minimal land taxation, and significant imbalances in information between market participants have promoted speculation and huge inequalities in wealth and power, both country-wide and within communities (Adams and Salomão 2011, Tanner 2010: 280, Chemonics 2006). Traditional and customary structures that were the mainstay of equitable, local land allocation and land administration are coming under increasing pressure from national and foreign investors seeking land to invest in housing, real-estate projects, agriculture, tourism, mining, and forestry plantations.

Despite a progressive regulatory framework in place since the late 1990s, powerful interests are taking advantage of poor communities, who have limited access to information about the opportunities and safeguards offered under the law. For many years, the economic and political elites in Mozambique have presented themselves as best qualified to bring about development, while in fact allowing vested economic interests to prevail in access to and control over resources at the expense of local communities and effective pro-poor policies (Aabo and Kring 2012, Chemonics 2006, De Wit, Tanner, and Norfolk 2009, Norfolk

and De Wit 2010). In some cases, as in Belo Horizonte,<sup>2</sup> this includes the manipulation of the poor by those who are supposed to protect their interests.

As a consequence of the high demand for land in many areas of the country, and particularly in the metropolitan areas of Maputo, Matola, Beira, and Nampula, and the peri-urban area of Boane, structural shifts are taking place that are manifested by:

- Vested interests using their political influence and economic resources to reinforce their negotiating power and push to gain access to land that historically or traditionally belonged to local communities.
- Rights to access and use of land are increasingly given to individuals and companies through market-based transactions often resorting to informal land deals or acquisitions.
- Land-value increases due to high demand especially in areas where high profits can be made through investments in real estate (e.g., in the Belo Horizonte area, along the main roads, Witbank corridor, etc.), tourism, commercial farming (e.g., in Chicumbane in the Lower Limpopo Valley), forestry, mining, industries, etc.
- Formation of new classes of relatively better-off peasants who are able to capitalise from informal land transactions while others become landless and destitute peasants who are forced to find new sources of livelihood. Moreover, the economic, political, and intellectual elites from urban centres solidify their class positions and expand their influence into the rural areas.





As a result of the increased demand for land and the resulting land transactions involving local communities and outsiders, “better-connected” and “better-informed” groups and individuals gain access to the best land, while the poor (or the “less-connected” and “less-informed”, who thus risk to become poor) are left with:

- Meagre or no compensation from the land transactions or the loss of their land.
- Reduced access to land and, often, to “worse” land (Mozambique is often depicted as land-abundant, but not all the land is the same or suitable for agriculture production).
- Reliance on smaller, fragmented plots that make it more difficult and expensive to produce food crops.
- No livelihood alternative (for instance, in the urban areas life is expensive and life conditions are harsh, especially if households cannot rely on self-production of food).

Local people’s rights to land are not being adequately protected, neither by customary nor state institutions, particularly in areas where there is high demand for land. This is partly due to the partial and poor implementation of relevant public policies and laws. This situation is aggravated by widespread corruption, and the entrenched attitudes and behaviour of those who have the mandates and responsibilities to implement the legal framework. This is made worse by the low access to information, the low educational levels and, in the end, the scarce participation and insufficient capacity to communicate and deal with formal institutions by the local population.

### Changing land access and use in peri-urban areas – the case of Belo Horizonte

Until the mid-1980s, Belo Horizonte attracted little scholarly attention in comparison to other relatively well-known



and more vibrant and prosperous areas of Boane, such as the banks of the Umbeluzi River, Mafuiane, Massaca I, and Massaca II (Sabino 2006). It was in these areas that a plethora of colonial and postcolonial enterprises had been established, including plantations, ranches, agricultural and consumer cooperatives, communal villages and state farms. By the late 1980s and 1990s, however, Belo Horizonte had become a household name in Matola and Maputo, suggesting a wealthy neighbourhood undergoing expansion that could rival the up-market Sommerschild bairro in Maputo. In fact, references to Belo Horizonte coincided with the increasing land demand in the peri-urban areas and the growing informal land markets. [Figure 1 and Figure 2]

In most of the major cities across the country, the peri-urban (and even the urban) poor continue to rely on access

▲ **Figures 1 and 2:** Belo Horizonte neighbourhood in Boane: transformation of peasant farmland into high value residential area. Photos: Eléusio Filipe

▶ **Figure 3:** The urbanisation of Belo Horizonte 2002. Source: Google Earth Imagery 2002



▶ **Figure 4:** The urbanisation of Belo Horizonte 2006. Source: Google Earth Imagery 2006



▶ **Figure 5:** The urbanisation of Belo Horizonte 2015. Source: Google Earth Imagery 2015





◀ **Figure 6:** High value residential area in Belo Horizonte with sign of Kape Kape peasant association representing the former owners. Photo: Eléusio Filipe

to agricultural land resources in order to survive. This access provides a buffer against the shocks of urban life for the poor; they are able to produce food for the family and market surpluses within the readily-available city market. This was the case in Belo Horizonte, where a substantial number of the female peasants who opened crop fields in the area were spouses of migrant workers who worked in South Africa. Many others were spouses of low-level civil servants, drawn from the peri-urban and urban poor of Maputo and Matola, who saw their living standards deteriorate after the introduction of the economic adjustment programme in 1987 (Hanlon 1990, Hall and Young 1997, Pitcher 1996). Moreover, the displacements during the “civil war” (1976-1992) and natural disasters (Geffray 1991, Christie and Hanlon 2001) forced thousands of people to occupy the grazing areas in Belo Horizonte that had belonged to bankrupt state farms, which had turned them into farmlands (machambas) where they produced a variety of food crops.<sup>3</sup> [Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5]

With the introduction of the structural adjustment programme in 1987 that set in motion a process of liberalisation and privatisation of underperforming and inefficient state farms, in the early 1990s the government granted the concession of lands previously owned by state farms to an agro-business company, Vetagro. Vetagro claimed that the protections offered to local people by the new Land Law of 1997 did not apply to former state farms. In the early 2000s, Vetagro diversified its business and helped establish Imobiliária de Umbeluzi SARL, a Mozambican property-development company, of which it owns 25 percent of the shares. This property developer, attracted by large profits, is driving the urbanisation of areas that Vetagro previously owned. This is leading to sharp increases in land values, which further exclude local people – especially the poor – from emerging markets.

In fact, a process of land dispossession followed, as members of Kape Kape (a peasant association) came under increasing pressure to sell their land to urban elites for real-estate development, reinforced by the Boane local authority, which implied that they would lose their land to future urban development anyway. Kape Kape members believed they were prepared to protect their land rights, but

they rapidly found that the association had itself become a vehicle for pressure from outside investors. [Figure 6] The Boane district administration initiated a process of land delimitation and demarcation, parcelling existing agricultural plots into plots for high-class residential development [Figure 7], while encouraging local peasant farmers to register their land via the association. Kape Kape helped the farmers register their new land parcels, but many found that the land they were allowed to register was often smaller than what they had previously farmed.

According to many peasants we interviewed, the parceling process was unfairly implemented. Many legitimate occupants were deprived of land that was subsequently registered by local officials, by association leaders of Kape Kape, and even by ORAM<sup>4</sup> staff. Local people, dependent on land to bolster their livelihoods, were forced to seek farmland elsewhere or abandon farming. With limited livelihood alternatives, most people expressed disillusionment after selling their land.

At present, the urban sprawl phenomenon appears to be displacing thousands of peasants who used to live and farm in the peri-urban areas. While a few actors are consolidating land, the poor must rely on smaller, less-productive and often fragmented plots. Fragmentation is evident also in peri-urban areas. Households in Boane are still heavily dependent on food production both for their own consumption and for the city market. As they have lost access to land in Belo Horizonte, many have started to farm elsewhere. The distance and cost of transport (up to US\$3/day) makes it difficult to care for these fields or produce enough food. This is especially challenging for the elderly and women. Alice Macuácuá’s account details the informal land market in Belo Horizonte, the tensions between Kape Kape’s leadership and the rest of peasant members, and her coping and survival strategies after she sold her land plots in the area:

“The peasant sells his/her land; the President Tembe was one of the people who were leading the land-delimitation process when one of my land plots was taken. In my case, I personally looked for a buyer and I paid fees in the association, besides those mandatory fees. I sold my land plot in 2008 for 100 thousand meticals, but I don’t know what

**3** Urban population growth, natural disasters, and war in the 1980s and 1990s led to rapid development of high-density neighbourhoods around Maputo, such as Magoanine, Laulane, Benfica, Malhazine, and Matendene. These neighbourhoods expanded following the resettlement of flood victims in 2000.

**4** Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua.

**Figure 7:** High class residential development in Belo Horizonte. Photo: Eléusio Filipe



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the prices are now. The 100 thousand meticaís were worthless because of the many children that I have; the association didn't give another plot; I had to take some of that money to buy another farm in Changalane. I don't know what the leaders of Kape Kape did or do with the fees because they don't help us peasants in anything. [...]. I always lived off land; my farm of Belo Horizonte ensured the livelihood of my children, but it is now difficult; although my farms in Changalane are bigger, they're more expensive to maintain because of transport (70MT – going and coming back) and the time of travel. In Belo Horizonte, the farms were closer; I didn't have to spend money on transport; I could go to farm early and it was good for me. [...]. There are not many foreigners building in this area that belonged to us. The only benefit that we poor peasants of Kape Kape see that came out of this is that we were able to replace reed huts with brick houses. People continue farming and none gave up farming just because his/her land was taken." (Interview: Alice Macuácuá. Cam-poane-Boane, 3 December 2014).

### Final Remarks

Consistent with similar processes of urbanisation taking place in other African cities and Mozambican ones in particular, where the construction of new homes is not followed by the provision of public and private services and utilities, Belo Horizonte still remains without paved roads, schools, hospitals, and/or recreational parks. In many of the peri-urban areas around Maputo and Matola in rapid expansion, there is no evidence of existing urbanisation plans. If they exist, local people know little about or do not have access to them. As a consequence, when there is need to build a road, government authorities at the municipal level (especially in Maputo, Matola, Beira and Nampula) give orders to demolish walls, houses, bars, shops, barber shops and other private properties found along the new planned road. This often happens without fair compensation of the victims. In the case of Belo Horizonte, the urbanisation plan exists, but it is not widely known by anyone apart from the authorities and

intermediaries involved in land transactions and the potential beneficiaries, thus creating an enabling environment for corruption and land speculation. Nevertheless, the rate of urbanisation in Belo Horizonte is growing very fast.

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# Implications of Informal Settlement Upgrading on Inclusive Urban Development in the City of Lusaka: The Case of Kalingalinga

Eddy Chikuta, Wilma S. Nchito, Emma Wragg and Gilbert Siame

## **Implikationen einer Aufwertung informeller Siedlungen für sozialstrukturelle Veränderungen in Lusaka, Sambia, am Beispiel von Kalingalinga**

*Bürgerbewegungen und Netzwerke sowie internationale Organisationen wie UN-Habitat haben in den vergangenen Jahren versucht, Regierungen im globalen Süden davon zu überzeugen, ihre Politik im Umgang mit informellen Siedlungen zu verändern. Ihr Argument war, dass Problemlagen in diesen Siedlungen nicht durch gewaltsame Vertreibungen angegangen werden können, sondern dass nur eine Aufwertung des Bestehenden nachhaltige Erfolge verspricht. Dies impliziert auch eine Veränderung der Wahrnehmung der dort Wohnenden als engagierte Akteure mit sozialem Kapital. Mit der neuen Politik zu informellen Siedlungen wird daher versucht, möglichst unter Vermeidung von Umsiedlungen den Bestand an Ort und Stelle umfassend zu verbessern, im Sinne größerer Bleibesicherheit, besserer Infrastrukturausstattung, einer Verbesserung der Wohnverhältnisse und einer Verbesserung der Einkommensmöglichkeiten. An Hand einer Fallstudie zur informellen Siedlung Kalingalinga in Lusaka untersucht der Artikel die Auswirkungen solcher Maßnahmen zur Siedlungsverbesserung auf urbane Transformationsprozesse. Mit qualitativen Methoden werden Erzählungen und Beobachtungen über Art und Umfang der in den Siedlungen erfahrbaren Veränderungen sowie deren Wirkungen auf den Kontext der Stadtentwicklung Lusakas festgehalten und neu entstehende sozialökonomische Differenzierungen erkennbar gemacht. Dabei werden deutliche sozialräumliche Transformationen einzelner Wohnviertel sichtbar mit wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Hinweisen auf eine Gentrifizierung, die jedoch durch im globalen Süden vorherrschende Bedingungen urbaner Informalität spezifisch geprägt ist.*

As cities expand, their demographic composition often changes. People from different backgrounds and social classes converge in cities in search of greener pastures. This further strains a city's capacity to provide decent shelter for all. As a result, some people settle in informal housing (UNCHS 2003). Nearly one billion people around the world do not have a permanent address and live in fear of losing their informal housing every day. The majority reside in some type of slum environment where there is usually a high population density, living conditions are poor, and the people subsist on a low income (UNCHS 2003). Abbott (2001) notes that these settlements form as a result of the overflow from urbanisation and migration to major cities combined with poverty and minimal government assistance in providing adequate housing. In order to alleviate these issues, Abbott (2002) suggests that informal settlements must be upgraded, meaning redeveloped and re-blocked, to create more space and permanent housing solutions for all of the residents. Conversely, upgrading processes have been accused of creating pre-conditions for the process of gentrification to ensue. As a policy for addressing urban poverty, upgrading has also come under scrutiny. One key criticism is that upgrading is a "band aid" – a piecemeal approach that benefits a lucky few, but does little to address the dynamics underlying informal settlement development such as inequitable land distribution, dysfunctional institutional frameworks, and structural poverty (Gilbert and Gugler 1992), which might present formidable challenges in the wake of SDGs, particularly SDG goal number 11, which endeavours to *make*

*cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable by 2030.*

Gentrification is an occurrence that emerges in poorer urban areas when residential shifts, urban planning, and other phenomena affect the make-up of that area. Gentrification can involve population migration as poorer residents of a neighbourhood are displaced. In communities undergoing gentrification, average incomes increase and average family sizes decrease (Kennedy and Leonard 2001). This is accompanied by an increase in rental and estate prices, which in turn often results in the displacement of poorer residents, who are unable to pay higher rentals or to afford buying real estate in the area. Gentrification is a global phenomenon with local particularities (Smith 2002). According to Lees (2012), although gentrification has some generalisable features both internationally and within individual cities, there is also much important specificity dependent upon the context in which the process takes place. Many local changes can have a great impact on a settlement and on the lives of its inhabitant's daily lives (Quercia and Glaster 2000).

The upgrading of informal settlements is a process. Thus, it is important to think of it not from a development perspective, but more in terms of urban renewal. The intent is to transform the settlement under conditions of minimum relocation. Within this paradigm, the World Bank has identified poverty alleviation as the most pressing issue facing developing cities (Pacione 1996). Abbott (2002) notes that

**Figure 1:** Satellite photo of Kalingalinga. Source: Google 2017 CNES/Airbus Digital-Globe



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the principal reason for upgrading informal settlements is to improve the living conditions by providing physical infrastructure and services that enhance holistic human development, especially for the low-income residents of the settlements.

Changes stimulated by upgrading of settlements lead to increased value of land and property, which raises the living standard of the affected people and improves the physical structure of the given settlement (Imparato and Ruster 2003). Such improved areas might open up opportunities for the outsiders who have capacity to move into these improved settlements and buy out the original residents. Inevitably, the potential toll of the process of gentrification might be the maintaining of the "cycle of urban informality" and increasing poverty. Levy et al. (2006) postulate that "positive settlement changes" are coupled with increasing housing and property rates, which result in lower income groups becoming volatile to displacement or prevented from moving into certain geographic areas because of the prohibitive and perceived discriminatory costs. It is this geographic component, along with restricted economic opportunities, that makes gentrifica-

tion-related displacements an area of concern for urban planners and managers.

## Reflections from the Kalingalinga informal settlement

The nature of change in Kalingalinga [Figure 1] presents a case of a new conceptualisation of gentrification that reflects the context and temporality of the process of change in the global South. This study was designed as a descriptive and interpretive case inquiry analysed using qualitative methods. The study examines the nature and implications of settlement change in Kalingalinga using the lens of gentrification. Primary data was collected mainly using semi-structured interviews, which were supplemented by field notes and observations. The study had a total of 30 respondents, who were drawn from the population of the Kalingalinga settlement. The respondents included: 15 old residents who have lived in the settlement for over 15 years, 10 new residents who had recently moved to the settlement, 3 business proprietors, and 2 local council personnel. The participants were selected in a purposive manner, while snowball-sampling procedures




**Figure 2:** Upcoming commercial infrastructure in Kalingalinga. Photo: authors

were also employed to identify some old and new residents.

### Conceptualising change in the Kalingalinga settlement

Kalingalinga is undoubtedly experiencing significant changes that share some hallmarks of traditional conceptualisations of gentrification, as described by Lees (2012) and others, in the context of cities of the North and stemming from revitalisation activities. Upgrading can result in significant settlement changes that see improvement of basic services (including water, road infrastructure, education and health facilities, among others), which in turn attracts people to settle in an area due to the improvements; Kalingalinga is no exception in this regard (Lees 2012). These changes also create opportunities for real-estate professionals and developers seeking new, profitable market opportunities and unrealised value in revitalising neighbourhoods; again, Kalingalinga is no exception in this regard.

Along with the new developments and infrastructure being put up, Kalingalinga is seeing an inflow of different people in search of business opportunities and accommodation. There is also a growing interest from the business community in the area, as evidenced by the number and complexity of businesses and commercial activities that are slowly engulfing and taking residence in the area. [Figure 2] The result is that most of the properties, particularly houses, are being converted into business and office complexes. Selling has become lucrative for some, while others are feeling the pressure from both the business community and wealthy private purchasers who are offering them competitive prices for their properties. This has resulted in most of the old, poor residents being displaced from the settlement, voluntarily and involuntarily. From the perspective of Kennedy and Leonard (2001), these types of development trends are clear indications that gentrification is in progress. But it is necessary to exercise caution in assuming that these changes amount to gentrification. Kennedy and Leonard (2001) also emphasise that gentrification does not automatically occur when higher-income residents move into a lower-income neighbourhood, for example, at a scale too small to displace existing residents or in the context of vacant land or buildings. Nor does economic development activity – revitalisation – necessarily imply gentrification. Tenants can leave their units for a range of reasons, so departures in a revitalising



neighbourhood do not necessarily mean gentrification is occurring.

### Morphological implications associated with upgrading activities in Kalingalinga

The physical dimension of places appears to be a relevant factor in allowing the process of gentrification to start and develop, over time, through a gradual progression that maintains a link between the socio-demographic profile, the economic capacity and the temporal transformation of an area whereby the original profile evolves rather than being replaced. The structural quality of the urban fabric appears to be a pre-requisite for gentrification to take place, allowing the existing population to benefit from a progressive process of socio, economic and environmental upgrades (Pacione 1996). Areas that have undergone gentrification display similar and recognisable morphological patterns in terms of urban type, as well as geographical locations of main and local roads and businesses. [Map 1]

Kalingalinga exhibits visible physical characteristics – for example, renovated/extended houses alongside new services and cultural amenities – that reflect changing class demographics. Shopping malls have appeared. [Figure 3] Some property owners in the settlement have realised how beneficial it has become to sell their property, which earlier was worth nothing but, with the on-going improvements, is appreciating over time. This has resulted in Kalin-

**Map 1:** Spatial configuration of the Kalingalinga settlement. Source: adapted from Google Earth 2015

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**Figure 3:** New shopping complex in Kalingalinga. Photo: authors 2015



▲ **Figure 4:** An un-renovated, low-income house in Kalingalinga. Photo: authors 2015



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galinga experiencing an influx of middle- and high-income people, while losing segments of the poor population accounting for about 70 per cent of the population over the last 20 years. There are a greater number of more-affluent individuals that have begun to inhabit the settlement – bringing with them higher incomes. As the income of the neighbourhood residents increases, so does the social fabric, cost of housing, and rental prices, which are slowly mirroring a consumption space for middle-income people concomitant with standard forms of gentrification.

A significant proportion of Kalingalinga's newly purchased properties are also being physically upgraded. New owners are extending and improving properties to better suit their middle-income status. [Figure 4] While specific houses have undergone improvements, the area as a whole remains low-income. The gradual transformation of the landscape, the revitalisation of local centres with retail shops, restaurants and boutique stores, and the development of an active sense of place and spirit or *genius loci* reflect the aspirations of the new middle class. Changes in Kalingalinga are slowly securing the image and desirability of the middle-class lifestyle in the settlement, creating what Ley (1996: 82) has called "a common structure of feeling", which in time will exhaust the stock of un-renovated housing available for redevelopment. [Figure 5]

Spatial analysis of processes of change as presented in Map 1 shows that most parts of the settlement are experiencing significant housing transformation and land-use changes, from residential to mixed use. The Alick Nkhata Road in Kalingalinga has been completely transformed into a commercial precinct, with few sections of the original rudimentary housing and businesses still existing. Roads, water, sanitation and reticulation systems are slowly being provided to service the needs of the settlement.

There is a gradual morphological shift that is seeing most dilapidated structures being upgraded, houses being improved, and the conversion of houses into commercial buildings; sections of the settlement have already been completely overhauled into business and commercial precincts. While housing is gentrifying into traditional, upgraded housing types or into converted industrial structures, the retail is generally gentrifying in either a piecemeal fashion or through larger-scale interventions such as shopping malls. Morphological change in Kalingalinga is seemingly welcome; the resulting effect is that most of the changes being made to the settlement appeal to the

newcomers or middle income. The new shopping malls and other commercial buildings reflect the needs and aspirations of the emerging middle- and high-income people, and are not accommodative of the needs of the poor.

### **Socio-economic implications associated with upgrading activities in Kalingalinga**

Higher property values bring great economic benefits to the local neighbourhood. Conversely, these economic benefits flow from taxation – this means that citizens pay an increased price in the cost of living for the improvement of an area. As property values rise, so do property taxes. And as conspicuous consumption increases, so do sales tax revenues. So as property taxes and sales tax revenues increase, the education provided in local public schools improves, the provision of public services becomes greater, and the overall quality of life is improved. Kalingalinga is experiencing socio-economic restructuring, which has seen security of tenure for most residents as well as a public school, a clinic, and road infrastructure development, among other things, and which is changing the socio-economic profile of the settlement. Analysing the processes of change resulting from continued upgrading activities in Kalingalinga suggests that the morphological and socio-economic restructuring of the settlement has boiled down to a matter of exclusion that is having great costs on low-income residents, especially the elderly and vulnerable settlement residents.

### **Displacement and loss of affordable housing**

Smith (2002) argues that housing-price inflation is arguably the most widely identifiable component of neighbourhood transition. Clearly, the most important of these components relates to the increased costs of housing and, in particular, a pressure on private renters as landlords to raise rents in alignment with the economic purchasing power of the more affluent buyers and tenants looking to move to the neighbourhood (Atkinson et al. 2011). Findings in Kalingalinga reveal that most people in the settlement are being displaced directly as a result of such pressures (though a handful are being evicted in order to rehabilitate the property and later sell or re-let it). Many of the landlords are seeking massive or significant increases in rent at regular periods during tenancies. In some cases, this occurs at the end of a leasing period, but more commonly such increases are being introduced into existing agreements and, in a few cases, conducted on an almost monthly basis. The general force of these changes in costs for lower- and moderate-income tenants in Kalingalinga are producing even more outward waves of migration and more of a general tendency to move further from the core of the city of Lusaka. Landlords feel able or are compelled to raise rents, thus making the settlement more difficult to survive in for lower-income residents. The resulting hardship for many tenants has raised problematic feelings of injustice and, in some cases, genuine anger (for example, over the phenomenon of advertised rents being raised by bidding). Hence, for some tenants these pressures inevitably mean being steered towards cheaper and often poorer-quality accommodation in the same or other localities, producing an unending the cycle of urban informality or moving away to suburbs further out of the city. These problems seem particularly acute for elderly tenants, who



are perhaps less able to afford or challenge rent increases through legal means.

### Loss of community

An important yet little understood aspect of upgrading is the extent to which it affects spatial relations between various social groups. The social fabric in Kalingalinga has become a decorative feature instead of a social ideal – a superficial label used to attract middle-class residents rather than a signal of equality for all residents. Low-income and minority residents have been relegated to the back of an “urban renewal bus” that is fuelled on a cultural diversity ethic and in which they were once “first in line”. At times, they are not even on it. Settlement changes have resulted in the disruption of the social fabric and/or social diversity of the settlement.

The disruption of the social fabric in Kalingalinga is occurring on three levels. First, there is a process of displacement whereby lower-income residents are being forced to relocate to other housing or other settlements. This is a result of the rise in property values and service charges that are deemed as discriminatory. Second, the demographics of the community are changing as higher-income residents replace the displaced residents. Third, cleavages are emerging between the different groups in the settlement. For example, cleavages are forming between renters and owners as renters face displacement and owners try to maximise their property values by increasing the rentals as a result of the changes and demand. Most notably, cleavages are forming between old and new residents in Kalingalinga.

As a result of the big building footprints characterising Kalingalinga, there is a loss of urban authenticity and the settlement is slowly becoming a boring monoculture with architecture that is uniform. There is also concern that large developments might dwarf any historic buildings left in the area. A major impact of possibly being displaced due to these reasons is the creation of significant levels of fear and worry about finding another place in such a hot market among old residents in Kalingalinga. Increasing levels of change is also generating a sense of fatalism among some of the people, who acknowledge that landlords have a right to raise rents or who feel that there is a kind of inevitability that rents must go up.

### Conclusion

The process of gentrification, like that found in the Kalingalinga settlement, can be an integral part of a successful revitalisation effort or the clearest sign of a changing neighbourhood in which the original residents feel they can no longer call their own. In some cases, a local government or developer will view the gentrification activities in a neighbourhood as the former, while existing resident leaders will characterise the same activities as the latter. Clearly, the pace of this change and the level of distress in the neighbourhood have much to do with how gentrification is perceived by residents, business owners, city officials, developers, and local leaders. So, too, do the political dynamics of the gentrification process.

Literature on gentrification-related displacement in the Zambian context is still in its infancy. Gentrification ap-



pears to be spotty, inconclusive, and often contradictory. Gentrification relates directly to settlement change, and settlements change in myriad ways and for myriad reasons. The literature is too often driven by ideology rather than by a focus on concrete strategies to minimise adverse impacts associated with gentrification. Kalingalinga is one of the fast-developing informal settlements in the city of Lusaka. In the light of creating an inclusive city, findings have shown that upgrading activities in Kalingalinga are not protecting the rights of low-income, working-class groups. Knowingly or unknowingly, informal settlement upgrading is being used as a tool to clean out low-income neighbourhoods and attract middle-income groups. This paper therefore argues that such trends are creating and perpetuating the cycle of urban informality, as displaced neighbourhoods or people will automatically move on to another area and settle without government approval. Socio-economic pressure is squeezing most poor, old residents out of the settlement to pave way for middle-income groups that can adapt to the rise in property values and costs of living. The explanation for these different processes rests in the context and temporality of the gentrification processes in Kalingalinga. The study, therefore, supports the notion of hybrid gentrification as a methodological approach to understanding processes of change in the Global South (Lemanski 2014). Hybrid gentrification as a concept demonstrates that theories rooted in certain empirical locations are enriched by analyses from elsewhere; more broadly, this example demonstrates a methodology for bridging the North-South theory divide (Lemanski 2014, Lees 2012).

By taking the time and consideration to understand the context in which gentrification may take place, a shared understanding of current conditions can be established. Issues include: current property conditions and property valuation trends; renter and homeowner assessment; employment statistics; relevant community organisations; affordable housing; proposed development; and current pertinent policies. Analyses of urbanisation trends, downward raiding (Lemanski 2014) and neoliberalism are key in understanding and conceptualising gentrification processes in the South. There is need to consider and work towards a pro-poor approach to upgrading that supports inclusive urban development at a citywide scale.

▲ **Figure 5:** Upcoming middle-income housing in Kalingalinga. Photo: authors 2015



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# Bairros – Barriers or Gateways for Mozambique’s Young Women?

Kerry Selvester and Caroline Wood

## Leben in armen Wohnvierteln – Barriere oder Sprungbrett für junge Frauen in Mozambique?

*Städte können Bedingungen schaffen, in denen sich der Wunsch nach sozialer und ökonomischer Mobilität verwirklichen lässt. Sie sind aber paradoxerweise gleichzeitig Orte, in denen sich Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung verstärken können. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall für junge Frauen in Mozambique. Um dieses Paradox zu verstehen, widmet sich der Artikel zunächst den Faktoren, welche die Mobilität von Frauen im Stadtgebiet determinieren. Die Analyse legt nahe, dass die städtische Umgebung aus zwei verschiedenen Perspektiven wahrgenommen werden muss: einerseits in Hinblick auf Zugang zur Transportinfrastruktur, andererseits aber auch auf die sozio-kulturelle Architektur der Stadt. Soziale und wirtschaftliche Barrieren halten junge Frauen in armen Nachbarschaften gefangen und verhindern ihre aktive Teilnahme am urbanen Leben und den sich hier bietenden Chancen, trotz räumlicher Nähe zu "besseren" Vierteln. Der Artikel legt nahe, dass ein dringender Bedarf besteht, durch verbesserte Stadtplanung die Isolation und Armut der Bairro-Bevölkerung, insbesondere der besonders benachteiligten Gruppen, zu überwinden.*

1

A "bairro" is an administrative sub-division of urban districts in Mozambique's cities. In this paper, we use the shorthand *bairro* to describe an inner city, densely populated residential area, in large part occupied by low-income households. *Bairros* have a legal and cultural identity but may contain informal houses and unregulated use of land.

2

MUVA is a programme funded by the DFID and managed by Oxford Policy Management (OPM). It is an innovative, adaptive programme working with young disadvantaged women living in urban areas in Mozambique. MUVA works with the private sector, public sector, and civil society to identify, test and support the adoption of solutions to reduce the barriers that exclude women from access to decent work.

3

This echoes a large body of wider evidence which suggests that change in location (e.g., refugee camps, migration, displacement) often disrupts traditional gender norms, opening a space for women to take advantage of this change and developing critical social networks faster and more effectively than men. (See: <[www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/go/bridge-publications/cutting-edge-packs/gender-and-migration/](http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/go/bridge-publications/cutting-edge-packs/gender-and-migration/)>)

## Introduction

This paper uses the term "infrastructure" to refer to the networks and connections that exist within the "*bairros*"<sup>1</sup> The tangible infrastructure refers to the things that can be seen: roads, lighting, institutions and policing, for example. This paper uses the term "socio-cultural architecture" to describe the unseen networks and connections within the *bairros*: identities, information flows, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions.

Most of the existing research on urbanisation and women's economic empowerment primarily focuses on the tangible infrastructure. Whilst these barriers are significant, we found little research exploring the social and cultural drivers of the relative isolation of Mozambique's young urban poor.

This paper illustrates, with findings from MUVA's<sup>2</sup> research, the importance of discussing, and taking action, to address these less-visible barriers and how the geographical confines of a *bairro* impact young people in general, and young women in particular. The paper explores why it is important to recognise and seek answers to the questions and challenges posed by the tangible infrastructure and socio-cultural architecture of *bairros*, and why this is critical as part of a thriving city approach to urban planning.

## Context

Cities offer a concentration of economic opportunities and access to a range of both public and private services. Living in a city can mean greater access to global media and international markets. Cities can potentially provide better connections via technology, thus providing a fertile environment for the exchange of new ideas and innovations, as well as opportunities to change or disrupt social norms

and values.<sup>3</sup> On this basis, urban environments are seen to offer answers. Yet in Mozambique, the reality is that many of these opportunities are unevenly experienced by city dwellers.

Urban unemployment, underemployment, and working poverty are three contributing factors to the stubbornly high poverty rates and growing inequality in Mozambique. Nationally, the unemployment rate hovers around 22%; however, unemployment is significantly higher amongst urban youth. In 2014, 61% of urban women between 15 and 24 years of age were unemployed, compared to 53% of urban men of the same age. However, it is of note that 59% of 15- to 24-year-old urban women have at least completed secondary education, compared with 50% of urban men of the same age (INE 2015). This means that women in this age group are slightly better educated than the men, but suffer more unemployment. This is echoed at the global level, where women's increased levels of education are not translating into higher numbers entering the labour force and accessing decent work (IFC 2013).

In research conducted by the MUVA programme, one aspect of urban life that was highlighted in a number of the studies was the importance of the geographical space – the *bairro* – in which these young people live. Time and again, the given *bairro* manifested as a source of identity but also as a restrictive and non-nurturing space. From focus group discussions, it became clear that *bairros* exist not only in terms of physical and tangible structures, services and locations, but also in terms of identity, cultural and social norms. It is within this socio-cultural architecture that gender inhibitors, and potentially enablers, are most acutely expressed. Thus, shifts in attitudes, perceptions and behaviours are not only influenced by physical infrastructure, they are also determined by cultural and social values and beliefs, psychological well-being, and access to information.

## Bairros – are they a barrier or springboard?

There is an assumption that if the tangible infrastructure within a city is in place, then this will greatly enhance mobility across the city and equitable access to the opportunities that the city presents. When considering the mobility of girls and women in the city, our research shows that this is not simply a matter of the tangible infrastructures and assets but also the socio-cultural architecture, which should adequately address the barriers that need to be broken down to unlock the potential of the city to thrive.

**Tangible barriers** to mobility in Mozambican cities can be illustrated by the limited viable transport options and the lack of affordable transport. The cost, availability and safety of these transport options are prohibitive for many, with the additional security risks for women of sexual harassment and violence. Only the cities of Maputo and Matola have public-sector bus companies that provide over-subscribed transport to and from the main arteries of the city. The rest of the transport needs are provided by largely under-regulated private-sector transport.

In addition, there are other highly visible constraints to mobility, including inadequate roads, poor lighting, poor zoning policies, and the absence of signage, maps or the numbering of houses. These factors conspire to increase the perceived bewildering and prohibitive nature of the *bairros*, deterring aspirations to venture beyond familiar territory. To a great extent, the existence or non-existence of infrastructure and services can be measured and quantified, and, with monetary resources and political will, addressed.

**Semi-visible or hybrid challenges** are often less-obvious constraints to urban mobility for young girls to and from the poorest urban areas, where the tangible and intangible interplay to create restrictions on movement. For example, a girl's domestic or childcare duties reduce the time available for her to study or travel outside of the neighbourhood. The *MUVA* studies show that the overwhelming burden of childcare, either of own children or younger brothers and sisters, falls on female family members – firmly tethering them to the geographical space of their *bairro*.

Given that domestic and childcare duties limit young women's ability to move beyond the immediate home environment, the availability and accessibility of childcare facilities is often seen as a tangible intervention to enable mobility for women. Tangible barriers such as cost, location and quality of childcare can act as barriers and make this type of intervention less effective. There are also intangible barriers such as mistrust, fear and/or strain of separation and of subverting gender roles (i.e., moving outside of the expected carer role in order to work) that negatively impact the uptake of childcare options. In this situation, many women exit the labour market and forego the pursuit of work opportunities outside the local environs.

Another key determinant of mobility is the perception of risk of experiencing violence. The risk, or perceived risk, exists due to the tangible infrastructure, for example, poor lighting, and the socio-cultural architecture of the *bairros* manifested in, for example, disapproval of women walking alone in the street (disapproval that may result in violence or retribution).



◀ **Figure 1:** Bairro Chamanulo, Maputo. “Many young people forget their dreams because of pregnancy. They become mothers, they don't go back to school or get a job, and become dependent on their partner. They lack self-esteem and lose their own value.” (Fernanda, 31.) Photo: MUVA 2016

**Figure 1 and Figure 2:** These photos are from a group of young people who worked with MUVA in study groups and, more recently, as a part of a “Photovoice” project to explore the barriers that prevent young people, especially young women, from accessing decent work.

Although more complex, it is possible to measure and address these hybrid constraints and an effective response can be tangible. For example, although gender norms largely determine the roles that women are expected to play, concrete interventions can reduce the time domestic chores take, thus freeing more time for the women. These include more-efficient services or better access to water-collection points. More time can be created through electrification or access to clean-energy products such as solar kits or mini-grids to increase the number of “daylight” hours or to enable the use of labour-saving household appliances. These are tangible solutions to hybrid constraints.

Similarly, although there are multiple drivers of violence, many tangible interventions such as improvements in services and physical infrastructure can have a meaningful impact on the attitudes and behaviours that propagate a fear of violence. Policing, lighting, the regulation of alcohol sale and consumption coupled with community work and communication campaigns to shift attitudes towards violence and the high levels of acceptability of violence against girls and women in Mozambique are well-evidenced, effective approaches to reduce violence against women and therefore facilitate mobility.<sup>4</sup>

**The socio-cultural architecture** is also an important factor and equally determining. The research identified clear and significant invisible constraints to young women's movement and exploration of the city. Perception and confidence, self-esteem, cultural norms and control present equally important barriers to young women's freedom of movement as, for example, the lack of public transport.

Unspoken rules about what is and is not acceptable behaviour for girls and boys are powerful determinants of choice and freedoms. Social norms that reinforce the perception that girls should remain at home where their movements are regulated by male members of the family (when present) were expressed time and again, resulting in restriction of movement of girls and women within and outside of the *bairros*.

The fear of violence and insecurity, of the unknown, beyond their own *bairro* is also difficult to see or measure, but equally restricting, preventing the girls from exploring beyond their known geographical space. Their perceptions of the world outside of their *bairro* are largely formed by the male family members who interact more frequently in the wider city, or by religious leaders who filter information to the youngsters.

**4** A 2008 Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Ministry of Health, and the National Statistics Institute revealed that 37 % of women with either no education or only a primary-school education thought it was justifiable to beat a woman under certain circumstances, and 25% of those with a secondary education or higher viewed beatings as sometimes justifiable.



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**Figure 2:** Bairro Chamanculo, Maputo. "In the neighbourhood, there aren't many men doing household tasks because they are macho and when they see a boy doing it they call him 'matreco', they say that he is 'engarrado' [subject to witchcraft]... This man is a married man, his wife is a domestic worker, he works at nights, so he is taking care of the house during the day and sharing the domestic tasks with his wife. It's positive." (Celeste, 19.) Photo: MUVA 2016



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The MUVA studies show that many young people do not feel at ease, or even entitled, to venture outside of their *bairro*, except for very specific tasks or activities; for example, going to night school or dealing with official papers. Through extended family contacts, some know of other parts of the city, but the city centres were rarely visited by the young people interviewed unless there was a specific reason. This makes the centre of the city, where the main training and job opportunities are, an unknown quantity for the majority of the youth interviewed, and somewhere they are not confident to tackle.

Poor communication and the lack of information also act as invisible barriers to young people who have very little guidance in terms of future opportunities with respect to education, skills training, or careers. The dearth of available information in the poorest *bairros* in the city is notable, and is a barrier to getting the most out of the city and venturing out of the *bairros*. Access to information and knowledge is more limited among girls, compared with boys. Many of the young women indicated that they had not, and would not, actively seek employment in the city and largely relied on hearsay from neighbours or family members in relation to study opportunities or jobs.

Breaking both the physical and aspirational boundaries around the girls and young women is a major challenge for urban planners. Although the intangible constraints to mobility are less easy to measure, they can be identified and acted upon. Concrete measures can be taken to address the various aspects mentioned above, including: demystifying both the *bairros* and the city through joint cultural and social ventures that bring people together in different urban spaces; providing attractive spaces in the *bairros* for both residents and non-residents; providing information in the *bairro* space that facilitates movement between the discrete areas of the city encouraging active seeking of job opportunities, higher or vocational education; improving internet access; and facilitating access to services that defend the rights of young people, and particularly women, to freedom from violence.

## Conclusion

In using mobility as an example, this paper has sought to illustrate that whilst investment in tangible infrastructure is critical to urban development, tackling the problems that arise due to the socio-cultural architecture is equally important. The paper has also sought to elucidate the ways in which both the tangible and intangible are intertwined.

The socio-cultural architecture, should it be ignored, will be at a cost to the city with the potential for isolation to turn to mistrust and violence. Addressing the constraints due to socio-cultural architecture does not require intangible interventions, but it does require additional effort to become informed. Interventions such as investment in shared, safe and healthy public spaces for young people, youth services and information services, expanded channels of communications (e.g., through expanding digital coverage) and communications campaigns to address harmful social norms and behaviour are each potentially critical, tangible interventions which could greatly impact self-esteem, self-confidence, access to information, violence and fear.

This paper has used mobility as an example of a freedom in which both the tangible and socio-cultural architecture of the *bairros* play a determining role, but there are many other critical freedoms for young women where the same model of analysis applies, including economic empowerment, educational attainment, women finding their voice, health and well-being. In all spheres of life there are tangible and intangible barriers and opportunities. The gender intersect is often in the intangible, yet the impact can be no less determining.

Apportioning the appropriate level of investment and urgency to interventions that can address these barriers and unlock opportunities requires that urban policy makers recognise the need for improvements in both the tangible and socio-cultural architecture of the *bairros*.

# Informal Settlements in Cairo – Formation Process and Options for Improvement

Hans Harms

## Informelle Siedlungen in Kairo – Entstehungsprozess und Optionen für eine Verbesserung

*Der hier vorliegende Artikel basiert auf einer ausführlicheren Buchveröffentlichung des Autors und versucht, nach einer Analyse der Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsprozesse informeller Siedlungen in Kairo verschiedene Ansätze für eine Verbesserung dieser Siedlungen zu diskutieren. Der spezifische Kontext des Stadtwachstums in Kairo brachte zwei Typen informeller Bebauung hervor: erstens durch Aufteilung von Agrarland entstandene, hochverdichtete Siedlungen auf dem engen Raster der ehemaligen Parzellen und Bewässerungskanäle, zweitens auf Wüstenland gewachsene Gebiete, deren Siedlungsmuster eher an traditionelle Strukturen erinnern. Internationale Entwicklungsorganisationen (darunter die GIZ) wollten mit verschiedenen Projekten die Situation der hier Lebenden verbessern und versuchten vergeblich, die jeweilige Regierung von partizipativen Ansätzen zu überzeugen. Die ägyptischen Regierungen nach 1974 zogen es jedoch vor, „Neue Städte“ in der Wüste zu bauen und die Informellen Siedlungen zu vernachlässigen, was hier als elitäre, autoritäre und nicht nachhaltige Politik kritisiert wird. Unter Präsident Mubarak entstand 2008 mit der „Informal Settlement Development Facility“ (ISDF) erstmals eine für informelle Siedlungen zuständige Institution, die eine „Nationale Karte“ informeller Gebiete erstellte und dabei zwischen „ungeplanten“ und in Risikozonen liegenden „unsicheren“ Siedlungen unterschied. Die ISDF ist selbst nur für das 1% der „unsicheren“ Siedlungen zuständig und soll die dort Lebenden in neu zu erstellende Wohnviertel umsiedeln. Für das Gros der „ungeplanten“ Siedlungen wechselten die ministeriellen Zuständigkeiten mehrfach, ohne dass konkrete Lösungen erarbeitet wurden. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer Diskussion der politischen Optionen für eine inklusive und nachhaltige Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen in den Informellen Wohngebieten Kairos und spielt dabei ein optimistisches und ein pessimistisches Szenario durch.*

The intention of this paper<sup>1</sup> is to present and analyse the formation processes of informal settlements in the Greater Cairo area and to explore policies for their improvement. In a relatively short paper like this, only an overview of the broad spectrum of the topic can be given.

The paper starts with a short history of the urban and political context in which the settlements emerged, followed by a presentation of the two types of informal settlements in Cairo, one on privately owned agricultural land and another on state-owned desert land. Attempts by international development agencies to improve the situation in informal settlements will be presented, and the problems and difficulties encountered to persuade the Egyptian government to a more open participatory policy for improvements will be analysed. Finally, perspectives for urgently required new policies towards the informal areas will be explored and some conclusions drawn.

The methodologies used for this paper were local visits to and inspections of a series of informal areas in the context of urban seminars and student projects in Cairo, and many local visits of additional areas on my own. My first in-depth encounter with the informal settlements in Cairo was made possible through the participation in the Summer School “The New Urban Revolution in Greater Cairo” from September 30<sup>th</sup> to October 9<sup>th</sup> 2011, on urban regeneration, supported by the Technical University Berlin, Habitat Unit, and the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service). This was followed by further stays in Egypt in the context of a joint master programme between one Ger-

man and two Egyptian universities (Cottbus University, Cairo University, and Alexandria University) from 2012 to 2015. Extensive literature research on Cairo and on Egyptian urban development was done. I would like to mention here especially David Sim’s publications on Cairo.


*Informal settlements* in Cairo are called *ashwa’iyyat*, and they are distinct from “slums”. In Cairo, no parts of the informal city have characteristics of the stereotypical Third World slums, i.e., shanty towns or *bidonvilles*. Only a small fraction of “deteriorated slum pockets” not exceeding a few percentage points can be called “slums”. Informal settlements are located contiguous to the formal urban areas and as extensions of villages in the peri-urban part of the Greater Cairo area. They have not been planned by experts and do not follow official planning regulations and building codes. But they emerge with an implicit rationality of their own. Informal settlements started to appear in the early 1960s when poor and middle class families could not find sufficient dwellings at “affordable” conditions and in appropriate proximity to services and jobs in either the private housing market or in government housing projects.

## The urban context

The Greater Cairo area (as defined by JICA – Japanese International Cooperation Agency) has, according to the census of 2006, approximately 17 million inhabitants. (Sims 2010: 6-7) It is made up of three distinct subareas: the urban part of Cairo proper with 11.7 million inhabitants, the peri-urban Greater Cairo (mostly villages within

**1**  
The basic ideas of this article have been previously published in a longer version and with some additional ideas and aspects (Harms 2017: *Challenges for Sustainable Development of Informal Settlements and of Desert New Towns in Cairo*) as an article in the book *Revitalizing City Districts* (Abouelfadl et al. 2017: 147-169). The maps and some of the figures from the following pages had been printed in that book and could be used here with the kind permission of David Sims and the editors.

**Map 1:** Built-up area of Cairo in 1950 compared to 2009. Data for 1950 from Maslahat al-Misaha (Egypt Survey Authority) map series 1:100,000, sheets 30/31 (1949) and 31/32 (1951). Source: Sims (2010: 47), elaboration Marion Séjourné and David Sims 2009



**Map 2:** Large informal areas in Cairo. Source: Sims (2010: 127), elaboration Marion Séjourné and David Sims 2009



the agricultural periphery) with 3.9 million inhabitants, and Greater Cairo's desert New Towns with 602,000 inhabitants. Up to the 1950s, Cairo consisted of two parts, the historical city built in the Islamic tradition and the "downtown" area, or the part of Cairo built in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century under the Khedive with European formal planning rules. Cairo's population (according to *mongabay.com*) increased from ca. 2.5 million inhabitants in 1950 (see the area marked in black in Map 1) to 12.5 million inhabitants in 2010.

After Nasser's takeover in 1952 and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the new post-colonial government in Egypt adopted a policy of centrally controlled rapid industrialisa-

tion and of state-subsidised public housing for industrial workers. By 1965, the Cairo governorate had constructed nearly 15,000 public housing units, most of which were very small (45 to 65 square metres). Later, also, larger public housing units were built which were predominantly allocated to government officials and army officers. During the war years with Israel, 1967 and 1975, all private and public development of formal Cairo stopped. But informal settlements continued to grow to accommodate some of the one-million people evacuated from the Suez Canal zone, and to provide housing for further urban in-migration. In 1974, under Sadat's "Open Door" policy, economic conditions in Egypt changed rapidly. Borders were opened for trade, travelling and foreign investment. Many poorer and unemployed Egyptians migrated for jobs into the Gulf States. Much of their earnings were sent back to Egypt and provided the main investment capital for an accelerated housing boom in the informal areas in Egypt and, especially, Cairo.

Within the formal city, considerable population shifts had occurred. This trend had already been noticed in the 1966 census, when the central districts lost population. In the period of 1986 to 1996, the exodus from central Cairo peaked. Affected were the areas of the historic city of Islamic tradition and the "downtown" area, as well as old low-income and working-class areas, like Bulaq (formerly the harbour area), and others northeast of it, like Shubra. Population losses in the historic and core formal areas were partly caused by "slum clearances" promoted by state agencies for prestige projects, like banks and hotels on the river front in Bulaq; partly by middle-class families moving out of the older central areas; and partly by increasing commercialisation of space in other relevant areas. Often, informal conversions of housing into small factories, warehouses and wholesale operations had occurred, coupled with slow deterioration and even collapse of much of the older housing stock. The rent controls introduced under Nasser were part of the reason for no investment into the older housing stock. Most of the displaced poorer families sought better accommodations, and now live in the largely expanded informal city.

Sadat's political decision in 1974 to build New Towns in the desert generated considerable excitement among urban planners, higher state officials, and Egypt's cultural elite, all of whom saw the existing city as chaotic and uncontrollable. A vision was promoted of a "modern New Cairo", away from the high density and mixed use of the existing city, where the planners could start with a "clean sheet". The decision was not based on studies or investigations into the reality of how most Cairenes make a living, or on a wider discussion of what the actual problems and assets of the metropolitan region and the dense Nile valley were. They seemed to be based, rather, on the professionals' and elites' own wishes and dreams, and were more related to other questionable "modern" realities, like those of California or Dubai, than to their own reality in Egypt. Of course, the visions were also based on investment possibilities (Harms 2017).

The ministry of housing envisioned, as a target, to settle many millions of inhabitants in the desert New Towns. After 30 years and a tremendous amount of public and private investment, the 2006 census revealed that the total population of all New Towns in Egypt had not reached 800,000 inhabitants. This came as a shock to Egyptian

planners and promoters. It was less than 4% of the Greater Cairo population and just over 1% of the nation's total population (Sims 2014: 141). The first New Town built in the late 1970s, El 'Asher Men Ramadan ("Tenth of Ramadan"), located 70 km to the northeast of Cairo, was designed for a population of 500,000 and, later, an intended one-million inhabitants. But after thirty years, only 124,000 people were living there. It had attracted many manufacturing enterprises, but no workers had moved into the government-built housing. There are many reasons for this, among them: arbitrary and lengthy bureaucratic allocation policies for flats, prohibition of opening retail shops, and high food prices. Payments for owning a dwelling unit were and are unaffordable for most low-income households. Most of the workers are bussed in from Cairo, the Eastern Delta, and the Suez Canal area. Due to economic problems, a considerable number of factories have closed by now, or are operating at a fracture of their capacities. In most New Towns, the already-constructed dwelling units have very high vacancy rates.

### Informal city

Informal settlements started to appear after the Second World War, when people migrated from the Delta and Upper Egypt to Cairo. The earliest migrants settled in the historical districts, where they rented or shared flats or rooms. They were attracted to the city by the hope for a better life and by Nasser's industrialisation policy. Public housing projects built predominantly for industrial workers absorbed some of the migrants. The first law for publicly subsidised housing was issued in 1951. After the 1952 revolution and into the 1960s, walk-up apartment blocks were built, initially with a maximum of four floors. By 1965, the Cairo governorate had constructed nearly 15,000 public housing units, most of which were very small (45 to 65 square metres). Later in the 1960s, larger units were built but mainly for government officials and army officers (Sims 2010: 51-52). Rigid management of selection-process rules and the strict exclusion of any commercial activities made many of them less attractive. Often, loss of social networks would have also resulted.


Many migrants who could not find affordable housing in the urban market turned to buying small parcels of agricultural land directly from the farmers, and building their houses in self-help and with local craftsmen in stages and outside the formal legal framework. Building types and production procedures changed over time.

According to David Sims (2010: 58), there is "no recorded history of the germination of the phenomenon and the actors involved". The then-marginal character did not generate academic or professional interest. From old maps and oral histories, one can surmise that privately owned agricultural land contiguous to the urbanised area was sold and built up informally. Early examples include Bulaq al-Dakrur, west of Dokki, and Mohandiseen, just across the railway tracks. "Informal occupancy of (desert) state land probably first appeared in Manshit Nasir, located in abandoned quarries just east of the northern Mamluk cemeteries. [...] The first residents there had been relocated from slum clearances in al-Darassa and al-Azhar" (Sims 2010: 61). [Map 2]

In Cairo, two types of informal areas developed: first, on privately owned agricultural land, where lower and middle

income families would buy plots, which gave them a relatively high level of security of tenure; and second, on state-owned desert land, where generally poorer settlers invaded unused land in a slow, incremental process. The two types show different urban morphologies and are based on two different development processes. The dynamics of informal development on agricultural land are based on the following factor: agricultural land in the flood plain of the Nile is generally held as private, free-hold property in very small holdings. This is the result of the agrarian reform under Nasser after 1952, when the land of large landowners was distributed to those who worked on it. Irrigated agricultural land around Cairo is highly productive, but turning it into building land increases its market value many times more. The geography of the land-ownership pattern of irrigated agriculture consists mostly of long, narrow plots, which are arranged in parallel strips with the narrow side connected to irrigation channels. When the agricultural land is turned into building plots, the irrigation channels are converted into access lanes to the plots. The individual building plots can be small, often about 175 square metres, which makes subdivision simple and doable by the owner. When development intensifies, the larger channels are eventually filled in and become the main streets in the area. Initial construction of the small buildings on the plots is guided by traditional rule-of-thumb standards for foundations and structural walls. For temporary water solutions, shallow tube wells are installed to tap the high groundwater and soak-away pits are constructed for domestic wastewater. [Figures 1a and 1b]

**Figures 1a and 1b:** Informal development on agricultural land in al-Munira al-Charbija. Above: plan of 1977. Below: Ikonos satellite image, 2000. Source: Sims (2010: 65)





▲ **Figure 2a and 2b:** Comparison of medieval and present urban morphology. Above: Bab al-Wasir, 11<sup>th</sup> century. Below: Fustat plateau, informal settlements on desert land, 1980s. Source: Sims (2010: 117)

In most cases, the sale of agricultural land parcels involves a direct transaction between the farmer-owner and the end-purchaser who wants to build a house. A simple sales contract is drawn up, possibly involving a local broker or lawyer. Personal acquaintanceship and community trust are the main guarantees for these sale transactions. In some areas, there are middlemen who buy up larger parcels from the farmers, subdivide them, and then sell them to individual family builders. Often, the construction process is carried out under the supervision of the individual or extended family: they decide on design, finance construction, purchase building materials, contract labour, and allocate dwelling units. They may employ a local contractor who is skilled in both the technical aspects of construction and, especially, the ways of bypassing or dealing with local authorities (which often includes bribes and is part of a system of patron/client relationships). These operations rely on personal trust and avoid written arrangements. This process reduces costs to a minimum, and ensures that the quality of construction is guaranteed by the owner-builders who have supervised it and whose families and relatives will, in most cases, be living there as end-users. Building in stages is the key, and unfinished skeletal buildings with concrete columns and re-bars sticking up show the progressive development.

The process of settlement development on desert land takes on a different form (since there is no preformed land-ownership pattern), as is shown, for instance, in Establ Antar on the Fustat Plateau. David Sims observed that "Streets, lanes, and building layouts are determined 'organically' over time through negotiations among settlers, the operation of informal land markets, and the common need for access and circulation. Obviously, the government has little or no say in the matter. The resulting local neighbourhood patterns are remarkably reminiscent of, and even indistinguishable from, medieval urban fabrics in Cairo (as well as other Middle Eastern cities)" (Sims 2010: 116). It shows a long tradition of urban development not planned by governments, but by local self-organised processes. [Figure 2a and 2b]

The building types in the informal areas have gone through a certain evolution. Older single-story buildings of the 1950s and 60s show village-style fieldstone walls with wooden beams holding up the roof. Later, typically, two to four floors were constructed in stages with load-bearing masonry walls and concrete-slab or wood floors. This type can often still be found at the edge of agricultural villages. Finally, there are the classic informal houses from the 1970s to the present, the reinforced concrete frame buildings that are now the norm. [Figures 3a and 3b] The floor-plan size is normally 75 to 125 square metres, with one or two small apartments from 40 to 80 square metres per floor. Many buildings on former agricultural land are blocked in on two or even three sides by neighbouring buildings, which means they require airshafts for ventilation. [Figures 4a and 4b]

Areas along major roads or in close proximity to mass transportation networks have been in use already for three generations, often rented to tenants. Most of the five, six or ten-storey buildings are equipped with elevators. A more recent phenomenon, since the 1990s, is the speculative high-rise towers in well-located and accessible parts of informal areas. The buildings have larger floor plans of 250 to 450 square metres, with larger and often several apartments per floor. Their height can reach fifteen floors. [Figure 5a and 5b]

In the new millennium, under the new law from 1996 that ended rent control in new constructions, a large part of the accommodations within Greater Cairo is let in the form of tenancy contracts. A majority of tenants in the informal areas pay a lump sum up front on arrival at the apartment. Often, they move into a flat with only a concrete slab and column structure and with brick partitions. All finishing touches, including doors, windows and plumbing, are then made according to their wishes and at their expense (Denis 2012: 237).

Agricultural land surrounds Cairo on three sides, and here is where the informal development has taken place. Different studies show that roughly 83% of the informal areas are located on agricultural land and about 10% on state-owned desert land. The remaining 7% are on agricultural land reclaimed from the desert.

All informal settlements started without any officially provided infrastructure or social services. But as the number of inhabitants grew and needs were articulated, utility companies slowly began to develop services. The needs



were often transmitted through respected elders or other connections to the dominant party or the municipality. Again, this is part of the informal client/patron system prevalent in Egypt. By 2008, informal areas extended over 205 square kilometres, which is nearly 40% of Cairo's built-up area (excluding desert Cairo). Here live over 60% of Cairo's population (Sims 2010: 97).

### How sustainable is the informal city?

In terms of **environmental sustainability**, it can be said the high density and continuous connection to existing built-up areas are very positive aspects. The major advantage is the proximity to existing infrastructure networks of electricity, water and sewers, which can be extended into the informal areas. There are a number of disadvantages. They include narrow streets with higher buildings that make it complicated to plan how infrastructure can be provided to the existing built-up area. In general, the sewer systems are very inadequate. Due to increasing density, the older sewer pipes are overloaded and often overflow. The many narrow and unpaved streets create accessibility problems for minibuses, ambulances and fire police to enter the areas. There are few public open spaces, hardly any street lighting, and few trees, especially in the older dense areas that are built on former agricultural land (like in Bulaq al Dakrur). In informal areas on desert land (like in Establ Antar), the situation is slightly different because there are more open spaces, trees, and public places for street cafes and public use. The reasons for this are the different development processes and the resulting area morphologies in the two types of informal areas.

In terms of **social and economic sustainability**, it can be said that for the mass of Cairenes who struggle daily for a livelihood, the advantages of living in the informal areas outweigh the disadvantages (Sims 2010: 120 ff.). The

most important advantages of housing in informal areas are that they are reasonably affordable and there is a very wide range of choice. A housing study (USAID, Housing Study for Greater Cairo, 2008) showed that over the previous five years, families had moved into units in informal areas under a variety of tenure arrangements: more than a third moved into rental units, another third acquired ownership (either they purchased a unit, or they constructed their own unit) and about a quarter inherited or were gifted a unit. Those who purchased an informal unit paid on average less than half of what a unit in the formal



◀ **Figures 3a and 3b:** Photos of streets and buildings on desert land in in Establ Antar, Fustat Plateau. Source: the author

n Ottoman Egypt, the indigenous town population had no formal share in political power or executive authority. Even the village headmen always represented the authorities to the villagers rather than the villagers to the authorities.

housing market would cost. The average square-metre price in the informal areas was, at that time, about half of the price (LE 666 compared to LE 1114) in formal areas. Another set of advantages can be called "social". The informal market functions mostly by word of mouth, which makes it easily possible for families to locate near other family members, friends, and/or those from the same parts of Egypt. Close neighbourhood ties have many advantages: many people know each other and families can find help, i.e., for child minding and in time of crisis. Information about jobs and business opportunities are often shared.

Informal areas that have been in existence for many years have many shopping opportunities and informal social services close by. The high density is favourable for business opportunities. For local residents, many jobs are available in the area in shops and workshops (i.e., for carpentry, metal work, repair shops and information technology). Often, half of the workforce can be employed in the larger informal areas due to the mixed-use development. Workshops in informal settlements are often small family-based enterprises with less than 10 workers. They are highly specialised and have little capital. Often, the chain of production, as in furniture making, is split into separate steps and distributed among many highly specialised small manufacturing units. This makes it possible for the individual workshop to work with very little capital, and the know-how needed is easily acquired by training on the job (Meyer 2009: 103-107). Most areas have easy access to central Cairo, with many informal minibus lines and tuk-tuks providing for the transport needs. Negative aspects and disadvantages of living in one of Cairo's informal areas are of two types: one results from the informal, uncontrolled urbanisation process itself with the narrow lanes and tall buildings that take up nearly the entire plot of land. This is worse in older, matured, and very dense areas. Here, a minimum control for public space and for sufficient light and ventilation in the buildings is lacking. The second type has to do with government neglect, incompetence, and a lack of government budgetary allocations. The most glaring problem is the insufficiency and poor

quality of basic services for the population in terms of infrastructure, schools, playgrounds and medical services, especially given the huge and growing population.

In terms of **political sustainability**, there is a complete lack of local representation and local democracy. The existing districts set up by the central government have centrally appointed district chiefs (mostly from the military or security forces) and extremely limited budgets. This unaccountability of local and central government is a fundamental trait of Egyptian social history.<sup>2</sup> The existing local district elections are a travesty, since 80% of the seats are reserved for the dominant party and many people are uninformed about them and don't vote.

The housing needs of two-thirds of the population are neglected, and a very small percentage of the well-to-do population benefits from government budget allocations in the desert New Towns and from private investment in luxury and speculative housing. The discrepancy between the over-supply for the higher strata of the population and the lack of opportunities for the lower ones has led to the paradoxical situation where, in the Greater Cairo region, between one million and two million housing units are vacant (Source: Conversations with several professionals).

**How can this unbalanced, unsustainable and unjust situation be explained?** Various authors have explored and commented on this situation. Eric Denis (2006: 49) sees the justification for the promotion of desert towns and gated communities in an elitist mentality and a perspective that stigmatises the people in the "streets". They are perceived as risks for middle and upper-class people, a view that is also promoted by the government and media. This social construction of risk provokes the exclusion of the "other and dangerous". In this elitist perspective, Cairo is presented as a complex of unsustainable nuisances against which nothing more can be done, except to escape or to protect yourself. "Suburban desert colonies" are seen as defensive bastions against the lost metropolis with its density and mixed uses. Denis goes further with his interpretation: "The values conveyed in their time by colonial

**Figures 4a and 4b:** Photos of streets and buildings on agricultural land with very high densities in Bulaq al-Dakrur. Source: the author



urbanism are reproduced, dissociating the people's city from the city of their masters" (Denis 2006: 67). Other authors have also investigated and tried to explain the government's reaction towards the informal production of urban areas in Cairo. W. J. Dorman explains the relative tolerance towards the production of informal housing on the one hand and their official non-recognition on the other with a "mix of disengagement, clientelism and fear" and labels it "the logic of neglectful rule" (Dorman 2011: 277). He shows that only under conditions of protest and riots does the government's policy seem to change from a policy of neglect into an apparently more-active approach to the issue of urban informality. After the political disturbances<sup>3</sup> in 1977 that challenged government control, the government and international donor organisations attempted to undertake urban development projects in Cairo.

### International development projects to improve the urban situation

After 1977, two projects were initiated. The one by the World Bank (1978-85) consisted of providing urban services in the old informal area of Manshiet Nasir (to improve roads, sewer systems, provide schools, clinics, community centres) and a Helwan housing upgrade project. The second project, by USAID (1978-88), also in Helwan, was much larger and included upgrading in existing informal communities. Critical observers saw these two projects as intended "to appease and pacify" potentially restive groups. About US\$100 million were earmarked for a Helwan new community (HNC) with "core units" with plumbing (i.e., a minimum house with shower and kitchen plumbing) that homebuyers would then be expected to expand themselves. Both projects, initially well perceived by the population, ran into trouble soon after contract approval. The reasons were in part personal changes in the Egyptian executive agency, and in part the different priorities of USAID and the World Bank compared to the Egyptian government negotiators. The outside agencies were interested in fostering a more efficient and competent state that would be better capable of managing the city's future growth. This included projects to increase the state's capacity to upgrade informal settlements and provide crucial services and legal titles to Manshiet Nasir and Helwan settlements.

Government officials were from the beginning not interested in upgrading informal areas. They preferred their demolition and the relocation of residents to either newly built housing estates or desert cities such as Tenth of Ramadan. They hoped the donors would fund this. But USAID and the World Bank rejected this agenda. Legalisation would have entitled the settlers to demand additional services from the Cairo governorate, and they would have acquired a however small autonomous social power. Government officials consistently sought to avoid official recognition and never initiated any provision of legal titles. In Helwan, the indifference of the Egyptian agency delayed much of the upgrading. The HNC project of mini houses and services was judged almost a complete failure by USAID when it departed in 1988 (Denis 2012: 280). All Egyptian agencies explicitly rejected the construction of owner-built housing in the HNC, claiming that it constituted state-sponsored slum building. Finally, conventionally built apartment blocks were constructed on the site. Neither of

the projects had any "demonstration effect" or were replicated anywhere in Cairo.

In the 1990s, international development agencies returned to the subject of upgrading and regularisation of informal areas because of two events that occurred in 1992: the earthquake in Cairo that had destroyed thousands of buildings and left a large number of families homeless, and the threat of subversive Islamic activists in Imbaba (Singerman 2011: 111-141). Both events required government action. Since 1998, the German GTZ (GIZ since 2011) has been involved in a programme to improve Cairo's informal areas (Kippers and Fischer 2009). Egypt and Germany signed a project agreement for a "Participatory Urban Management Programme" (PUMP) to be implemented in Cairo by the GTZ and the Ministry of Planning, and with the governorates of Cairo and Giza as the main counterparts. "The PUMP project was designed as a multi-component project with the aim of providing the Egyptian government with policy advice on how to deal effectively with informal areas using participatory methods developed in the pilot areas" (Piffero 2009a: 15). The project was committed to a "process-based approach that secures the participation of all stakeholders". It was the only donor programme in Egypt to deal with different levels of administration (districts, governorates, and ministries). In 2004 (after four years), the project was extended to the whole districts of Boulaq al Dakrur and Manshiet Nasir and changed its name to "Participatory Development Programme" (PDP). The intention of the participatory project was to help the neglected population of the informal areas to raise their voices and to actively express their concerns, as a basis for policy proposals.

The project has been evaluated by Elena Piffero (2009b). She was contracted as "associate researcher" to document the project with full support and access to meetings, data, and records. Her research focussed on the participatory approach adopted, and her aim was to find out what happened to the participation under the authoritarian conditions in Egypt. She put her research into the context of the critical debate about the dissonance between the "participatory wisdom" and its practical achievements, or between theory and practice in the development discussion. Her emphasis was to find out the dynamics at the local level, rather than on the national and international levels as Denis (2012) had done in his analysis of the previous US interventions. Especially since many international development organisations have focussed on the 'local' as the preferred area for their intervention, seeing there the potential for decentralised and participatory forms of development. Piffero tried to find answers to the questions: Did the initiative help the neglected population of informal areas to raise their voices and actively express their concerns? Who had benefited from the intended "empowerment"? Has the participatory approach as used in Cairo proven its efficacy in enhancing delivery services in informal areas and in policy formation? And, implicitly: Does the development initiative have a potential to trigger an incremental process of "democratisation" from below?

Her conclusions are that, for a start, there was a lack of clarity in terms of the meaning and aim of the participatory approach on the side of the GTZ. On the Egyptian side, the NGOs involved were less representative of "margin-

**3** Following the IMF-mandated removal of subsidies for certain consumer goods, riots, strongly supported by Helwan factory workers, started in Cairo.

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alised" groups than "well connected" to political personalities, and were more interested in increasing their own prestige than in promoting the development of their communities. "The 'natural leaders' were local political brokers whom the project empowered with more visibility and more (direct) contacts with the administration. They and the local politicians are probably the first beneficiaries of the patron-client networks permeating Egyptian socio-political life" (Piffero 2009<sup>a</sup>: 182). In a context where showing respect for the elders and the powerful, and avoiding open conflict, are common principles, these cultural attitudes can reinforce inequality. Concerning the question whether the GTZ project had improved the efficacy of providing services in informal areas, she found that this had not been reached because the initial assumptions regarding the potential of local NGOs and CDAs for being agents of change, and that at the same time the governmental counterpart would accept and support change, were over-optimistic. At the urban district level, the expected bottom-up pressure did not materialise and the local government personal lacked motivation and capacity to deal in a participatory way with the issue of upgrading.

A major problem was the chronic unavailability of funds. All decisions and budget allocations for urban management and development are dependent on the central government. Additionally, there is no coordinating structure among the many ministries and agencies involved. Any form of locally determined and locally implemented development is doomed to fail. At the national level, there is no intention to develop a policy towards the informal areas that is based on local concerns and the needs of the inhabitants. Piffero emphasises the importance of the political context when using participatory methods, and states that "international experience shows that the few cases of success of participation as empowerment have depended on the presence of a counter-elite political party or social movement promoting a radical transformative political project, such as in the case of Brazil or Kerala in India" (Piffero 2009<sup>a</sup>: 186). For Cairo, she concludes, the main imperative for the government seems to have been not managing or improved governing of the city but merely controlling it.

## Perspectives for more-sustainable and inclusive urban development policies

So far it has become clear that perspectives for more-sustainable and inclusive solutions to urban development, and especially to improve the informal areas, have hardly ever come from the initiatives of the Mubarak or previous governments. But in 2008, there was an initiative by the presidential decree of Mubarak to form the "Informal Settlement Development Facility" (ISDF). Its management board was established a year later. It was directly headed by the Egyptian cabinet, and its task was to produce a "national map of slums" in Egypt. Thus, it did a first-time-ever survey of all informal areas in the country. The ISDF distinguished two types of informal areas: the "unplanned" and the "unsafe" ones. The "unplanned" ones are defined by non-compliance to planning and building laws and regulations, the "unsafe" ones as being subject to life-threatening conditions (with the base conditions being defined by the ISDF). The unplanned areas constitute 60% of the total urban area, while unsafe ones constitute 1%. The general, broad line of ISDF policy emphasises that in-situ upgrading should be the norm (Khalifa 2011). The ISDF is wholly in charge of unsafe areas, while for unplanned areas it is only partner with other ministers. In 2014, a new ministry was formed, the Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements (MURIS), but it was dissolved again in 2015 and the responsibilities transferred to the Vice Minister of Urban Utilities for Informal Settlement Upgrading. The changing institutions and shifting responsibilities can be interpreted as that, at the top governmental level, the various personalities and interest groups are more concerned with themselves and their power games than with organising ways to solve the existing problems.

Another question is: What effect did the Spring Revolution and the departure of Mubarak in February 2011 have? Sims reports that throughout the first months, prominent businessmen and former ministers were named in the main newspapers and were prosecuted for illegal land deals, shady land reclamation projects, and other government fiascos in the desert that caused the government billions of losses. A year after the Egyptian Spring, in 2012, more-constructive criticism began to appear. The Ministry



▶▶  
**Figure 5a and 5b:** Speculative high-rise towers in well located and accessible parts of the informal area Bulaq-al-Dakrur. Source: the author

of Planning and International Cooperation published a "Proposal for Community Dialogue" under the title "Strategic Framework for an Economic and Social Development Plan until 2022". Although rather vague in many parts, it included as objectives "the general welfare of all classes of people" and to build a "society dominated by justice and equality" (Sims 2014: 277-279). But neither of the following governments took up the issue. Human rights organisations and other initiatives published a detailed report in November 2013 on "Social Justice and Urban Development". It took up a series of very important subjects on planning and participation, on rights to land and suitable housing, on decentralisation, and on the new idea (for Egypt) that a portion of any public land should be reserved for social needs such as workshop clusters, training centres, education and health services, youth clubs, etc. These two reports, and others, are steps in the right direction so that the social dimension becomes a focal point in upcoming discussions.

In the last chapter of his book, Sims (2014) offers an important contribution to the above discussions. He presents detailed proposals on land policy as well as a set of radical principles for a new public land management system (Sims 2014: 301-314). The main principle would be to set up a "National Land Bank" for all desert land, and that desert land, as the most important national asset, must be protected and must be used to benefit the nation's people in measurable ways. He proposes further to use long lease contracts rather than freehold sales, and an annual property tax for all desert land.

As another concern, he raises the issue of the relationship between development and the cost of energy. So far, all government plans have been "appallingly insensitive to dis-

tance/location and the inherent economic costs of such distance". Petrol, diesel fuel and natural gas for electricity are highly subsidised. It is estimated that they took 20% out of the 2012 national budget. Any reduction of the subsidy would be a huge problem for the dispersed desert towns.

### What options are there to improve the informal areas in Cairo?

The present and future governments will have the task of dealing with the existing informal areas. The authoritarian rule of neglect of the majority and favouring a small minority will have to stop. The initiatives of 2014 to set up central government agencies like the ISDF and MURIS revealed some concern at the central level of the government, but the dissolution of MURIS and no active projects on the ground are not positive signs.

An *optimistic view* could see a future government based on social justice, local democratic principles and, i.e., the establishment of a national land bank (as Sims proposed). It could be an opening for more initiatives to improve the living conditions for the majority of the Egyptian population and to foster a more-sustainable development. Under the present authoritarian and repressive regime, this seems unlikely to happen. El Barran and Arandel already suggested in 1988 that "these settlements should not be viewed as part of the housing crisis but rather as the urban poor's contribution to its solution" (El Barran and Arandel 1988: 231). The future of existing informal housing areas requires upgrading through the insertion and improvement of infrastructure and provision of social services. This is not an easy task. It requires, for each informal area, locally specific solutions to be worked out in local planning workshops with the local population and the support of government agencies specifically set up for this purpose and provided with funding from the national government and outside development donors. Empty land within and adjacent to the areas could be bought by the government in order to insert educational and health centres, training facilities for work, and youth clubs. Details would need to be decided cooperatively with the local population in each of the informal areas.

A *pessimistic view* is: instead of promoting or encouraging more "social justice" from above and democratic upgrading policies from below, the central government, including the present one, is continuing the top-down elitist approach. A proposal discussed some years ago as the "Strategic Urban Development Plan" (SUDP), initiated together with UN habitat, the World Bank and the Japanese organisation JICA, is being promoted again under the present government of President Sisi.

Among the proclaimed aims of this strategy are: to upgrade the informal areas through action plans, and to prevent their expansion by belting them in with new planned areas. "Upgrading" is seen as containment, demolition, and redevelopment.

Another proclaimed aim is: to transfer Cairo's centre to a newly built area in Cairo's outskirts, supposedly in order to alleviate infrastructure and investment pressure from the existing city centre. This would mean "changes, so that everything could stay the same" – especially the existing elitist and exclusionary power structure – until, hopefully, another more successful revolutionary situation occurs.

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# TRIALOG

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## Call for Papers

### Resilient Urban Development versus the Right to the City? Actors, Risks and Conflicts in the Light of International Agreements (SDG and NUA) – What can the academia contribute?

7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> June 2018 in Dortmund (Germany) – Annual Conference of TRIALOG 2018

The two-day international conference is focusing on a critical review of international agreements for urban development, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG, 2015) and the New Urban Agenda (NUA, 2016), and aims at highlighting potentially conflicting goals in their implementation and application. The concepts of Good Governance, the goal of a Resilient Urban Development and claims for the Right to the City serve as normative frameworks for the conference.

The conference is structured along two main foci: The first day is titled "Resilient Urban Development Versus the Right to the City? Risks and Conflicts" and will set the scene with an analytical and theoretical part based on results of empirical research and conceptual and theoretical work on the topics of Good Governance, Resilient Cities and the Right to the City. The second day focuses on a critical review of the action-oriented international agreements of the SDG and the NUA titled "Risks, Conflicts and Contradictions in the Implementation of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda in the Global South. What Can the Academia Contribute?"

The conference language is English. The target groups are researchers and practitioners on urban development both from the Global North and Global South from a wide range of disciplines.

The international agreements mentioned above will shape urban development and the discussion for the next 15 (SDG) resp. 20 years (NUA), and thus influence the international research agenda and planning education. However, little is known so far on the operationalisation and unintended outcomes. Therefore, the conference will contribute to the discussion on risks and positive elements of the agendas and define further research topics. The comprehensive critical review of the agreements based on the concepts of Good Governance, the goal of a Resilient Urban Development and claims for the Right to the City will provide a solid theoretical ground.

#### Background

Rapid urban growth and increasing damage from natural and technological hazards are affecting a growing number of urban dwellers in the Global South. The experience of disasters and post-disaster recovery has produced some hard lessons in recent years, which have underlined the importance of urban planning and urban development control. At the same time, the concept of resilience is increasingly being put into the spotlight. Resilience in this context means "the ability to adapt to natural hazards and recover quickly from their effects" (Henstra et al. 2004: 5).

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines resilience as "the ability of a system, community, or society exposed to natural hazards to resist, respond to, and recover from the negative effects of natural hazards - in a timely and efficient manner." (UNISDR 2009). Regarding cities, Godschalk characterizes the concept of resilience as follows: "Such [resilient] cities are capable of withstanding a strong shock event without the outbreak of chaos or permanent deformation or tearing. Resilient cities are based on principles derived from past catastrophic events in urban areas and are therefore designed to anticipate, endure and recover from the effects of natural or technological hazards in advance." (Godschalk 2003: 2).

That's why cities need to be "change proof", they must be flexible enough to withstand extreme events without total collapse, and robust enough to recover quickly from the negative effects (see Henstra et al. 2004: 8). In the Global South, however, even if there is an institutionalised planning system in place, the reality is usually different: most of the victims of extreme events can be found in the unplanned 'informal' settlements that have developed beyond formal plans and are often located in danger zones, e.g. on steep slopes or in river valleys. These are the locations of low-income urban dwellers who cannot find affordable housing elsewhere (Greiving 2016). Resettlement projects have mostly failed in the past, because the new settlements were too far away from the inhabitants' sources of income in the centre or the layout of the new buildings did not offer the opportunity for income-generating activities to sustain their livelihood.

Since a risk is the product of the probability of an event and the vulnerability of a site, it follows that cities as the most densely inhabited areas are the places where risks are the highest. Thus, spatial planning, being responsible for decisions whether and how space is used, can create but also mitigate risk. Urban risk management requires successful co-ordination between different actors. First, horizontal co-ordination between comprehensive urban planning and the various sectoral planning must be ensured in order to create the necessary knowledge base for risk-taking decisions. In addition, vertical co-ordination between central government, regional and local authorities is required to build effective disaster risk management (Young 2010, Greiving et al. 2012). Finally, non-governmental actors must also be involved in order to integrate the perception and assessment of the risks of the affected city dwellers into the decision-making process. A successful disaster risk management can be seen as part of Good Governance. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states: "The risk governance concept provides a systematic approach to classifying disaster management, risk reduction and risk transfer assessments into a broader context" (IPCC 2012: 56).

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## Structure of the conference

The background above reflects the dilemma of the first day of the conference: the goals and interventions to achieve resilient urban planning can be in conflict with other goals, e.g. contradict the "right to (participate and live in) the city" and can lead to evictions from areas which may be unsafe but also vital for settlers in order to sustain their livelihoods. Similarly, the goal of the NUA to achieve compact cities can lead to the demolition of affordable single-floor neighbourhoods and development of high-rise apartment blocks which are normally unaffordable for the urban poor. This intentional sharpening of arguments promises lively multidisciplinary discussions at the conference. These discussions will be introduced by keynotes on resilient urban planning and the right to the city (see draft programme).

The second day is dedicated to discussions on the goals and programmes of the SDG and the NUA. The conference explores how these international agreements can be put into practice, what unintended consequences the implementation can have and which contradictions do exist. While the SDG set clear targets which still have to be operationalized, the NUA sets goals and commitments without a clear way to achieve them. The conference will address the role academic research can play in solving the above-mentioned risks, conflicts and contradictions. In a first part, the agreements are critically examined and in a second part the role of the academia to achieve these goals is examined in terms of research agendas, adaption in the curricular and policy advice. What can the academia contribute to address the mentioned conflicting goals and to make the SDG and the NUA successful? Where is more research needed to avoid negative outcomes and to strengthen the implementation? Where are current blind spots? Both parts will be introduced by keynotes (see draft programme).

## Presentations

Participants are required to send an abstract of 150-250 words in .rtf or .doc by 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018 12:00 pm CET, to the conference e-mail address <trialog2018.rp@tu-dortmund.de>

Abstracts should:

- Indicate the topic for day 1 or day 2
- Indicate a title
- Explain the state of objectives, methods and results and the issue to be addressed, define the context, and highlight the main arguments.

## Important dates

- Abstract submission: 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018
- Abstract review and notification of selected abstracts for presentation: 30<sup>th</sup> April 2018
- Best presentations will be selected for publication in the TRIALOG journal.
- Conference: 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> June 2018 in Dortmund, Germany

## Draft programme

### Resilient Urban Development versus the Right to the City? Actors, Risks and Conflicts in the Light of International Agreements (SDG and NUA) – What can the academia contribute?

International conference organised by the Department of International Planning Studies at TU Dortmund University in collaboration with the partners of the BMBF LIPSINDAR project and TRIALOG e.V.

#### Thursday, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018

8:00 **Registration**

9:00 **Welcome addresses**

Dean of the Faculty of Spatial Planning  
Representative of the Rectorate, TU Dortmund University  
Representatives of the partners

#### Resilient Urban Development versus the Right to the City? Risks and Conflicts

Chair: Prof. Dr. Fred Krüger, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg (LIPSINDAR Project)

9:30 **Keynote speakers**

- Prof. Dr. Mario de Los Reyes, School of Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Philippines, Manila: *Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction into the Local Development Planning: Towards Sustainable and Resilient Communities*
- Prof. Dr. Sue Parnell, University of Cape Town, South Africa: *Planning – the crunch-point for implementing conflicting utopian urban visions of rights and resilience*

10:30 **Plenary Discussion**

11:00 **Parallel Sessions with five peer reviewed presentations of selected participants each**

13:00 *Lunch break*

14:30 **Parallel Sessions with five peer reviewed presentations of selected participants each**

16:30 *Coffee break*

17:00 **Plenary Discussion: Critical Discussion on the Framing Concepts**

18:30 *End of the first conference day*

19:00 **Get together**

#### Friday, June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2018

#### Risks, Conflicts and Contradictions in the Implementation of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda in the Global South. What can the academia contribute?

Chair: Dr. Wolfgang Scholz, TU Dortmund

9:00 **Keynote speakers**

- Prof. Dr. Marie Huchzermeyer, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa (tbc): *Keynote on a critical review of the New Urban Agenda in the light of the right to the city\**
- Prof. Dr. Wilbard Kombe, Ardhi University, Tanzania: *Keynote on the role of academia\**

10:00 **Plenary Discussion**

10:30 *Coffee break*

11:00 **Parallel Sessions with five peer reviewed presentations of selected participants each**

13:00 *Lunch break*

14:00 **Parallel Sessions with five peer reviewed presentations of selected participants each**

16:00 *Coffee break*

16:30 **Round table discussion** (keynote speakers, presenters) **What can the academia contribute?**  
Chair: NN (TRIALOG e.V.)

17:00 **Plenary Discussion: What can the academia contribute?**

18:00 **Conclusion**

18:30 *End of the second conference day*

20:00 **Dinner (optional)**

#### Saturday, June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2018

10:00 – ca 15:00 **TRIALOG e.V. Mitgliederversammlung 2018**  
(Annual General Assembly)

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