Controlling
Urban Space –
The Rise of New Actors

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⊞	street gate
⊤	barrier
▨	"dangerous neighbourhoods"
⠿	open spaces (planned parks)
⊟	church
�▨	neighbourhood / community centre

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Editorial

In a post-Fordist era, the modern metropolis has been experiencing major changes: increasing mobility, growing economic flexibility and widening social and economic disparities have significantly reshaped the internal spatial structure as well as the social order within the city. In a context of neo-liberal transformation, of particular significance is the intensification of social and spatial control by a wide range of new actors, as a response to the rise of uncertainties and multiplying points of tension and confrontation within unequal cities. Non-profit and voluntary organisations, private businesses and corporations are gaining more and more power and influence in terms of surveillance, policing and control over local spaces.

This issue of Trialog focuses on the reconfiguration and the rescaling of control of urban space, examining the political significance as well as the socio-spatial implications of the diversification of stakeholders with different and sometimes competing interests. The focus is here not primarily on security (which has been developed in the issue of Trialog 87), but on the control of urban space in a broader sense – in its production as well as in its management.

In his theoretical and conceptual paper on the privatisation of space and policing under neo-liberal conditions, Volker Eick introduces a new typology of policing and space that goes beyond the traditional division between public and private actors. He especially points out the trend towards private, competing entrepreneurial, profit-seeking entities that are now guiding policing entities and strongly influence the way in which the new urban elites redefine cities. This trend is discussed within the article on City Improvement Districts in Johannesburg in which Elisabeth Peyroux examines the growing empowerment of private actors, in particular local business and property owners in the field of policing, urban management and local economic development through the implementation of private-led urban regeneration. She shows the alliances between public actors and business interests and draws attention to the consequences this developments might have on the intra-urban spatial structure and the trend towards an elite-driven urban redevelopment.

The reconfiguration of the relationships between public and private actors in the field of policing lies at the heart of the two following articles. Marianne Morange and Sophie Didier investigate how well-off suburban residential communities in Cape Town attempt to regain control over their environment by implementing a residential City Improvement District. This original form of control is highly contested by the city as a form of secession particularly unacceptable in a post apartheid context. The debate, eventually won by the city, shows the still tremendous power of public authorities, who decide, sometimes arbitrarily and in authoritarian ways, on the rules of the game. In her analysis conducted in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg, Claire Bénit-Gbaffou also tackles the question of the state's regulation of community as well as business initiatives as far as policing is concerned. The "community security initiatives" implemented through an original partnership between residents, police and for profit security companies illustrate Volker

Eick's new typology. However, she concludes that the multiplication of security stakeholders, far from leading to a security "network" that could be regulated and coordinated, enhances fragmentation and inequality.

This perspective is also adopted in the context of the south-western Nigerian cities by Laurent Fourchard who analyses the plurality of actors and non state policing solutions from a historical perspective. He shows how state powers failed to control and monitor the multiplication of private security initiatives leading to a spatial and institutional fragmentation of security provisions and increased gaps between rich and poor neighbourhoods. In his study of the spreading of fortified enclaves in Lima, Jörg Plöger also addresses the issue of spatial differentiation resulting from residents' initiatives. By exploring how residential spaces are being appropriated and controlled through the implementation of different socio-spatial measures, he shows how the nature of community control over space is highly dependant on community resources (financial, social, political), and how this growing reliance on communities to protect their own environment questions the fabric of the city.

The following two articles consider the control of urban space at a wider, metropolitan scale, interrogating the nature of actors in the production of urban space. Michael Waibel analyses Vietnam's transitional urban development since the introduction of market-economy reforms and the role of private and public stakeholders in producing urban space and (re)shaping urban spatial forms. While in the process of commodification of urban development, the state gave up its unique control over urban space and allowed for the rise of new actors, the public authority is increasingly becoming engaged in the production of "new urban areas" in joint ventures and speculation operations that also seem detrimental to the poor. Adopting a different angle, Jérôme Tadié provides an original insight into the way fire and arson become tools of urban transformation and urban control in Jakarta in the hands of various actors (government, inhabitants, intermediaries and representatives bodies, criminals). By showing how they are instrumentalised for urban renewal and business development through the eviction of the poor from strategic locations, he addresses the shadow actions of the state, which can sometimes resort to criminal elements in order to achieve its vision of the city.

Diese Trialog-Ausgabe konzentriert sich auf die Neuordnung der Kontrolle über den städtischen Raum. Als Reaktion auf wachsende Unsicherheit in sozial ungleicher gewordenen Städten erhalten Freiwilligenorganisationen und private Dienste mehr und mehr Macht über lokale Räume. Hier werden sowohl die politische Bedeutung als auch die sozialräumlichen Beziehungen untersucht, die bei der Vervielfachung und Ausdifferenzierung der Akteure auftreten, die manchmal gar gegensätzliche Interessen haben. Der Schwerpunkt liegt deshalb nicht primär auf dem Aspekt der Sicherheit (der in Trialog 87 behandelt wurde), sondern in der Kontrolle städtischen Raums in einem weiteren Sinn – in seiner „Produktion" und im Management.

Elisabeth Peyroux, Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, Wolfram Schneider

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Controlling Urban Space –
The Rise of New Actors

Volume Editors: Elisabeth Peyroux, Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, Wolfram Schneider

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"Problematic Territories..."

Controlling Urban Spaces – New Actors in New Places

Volker Eick

Schon immer war es die Sphäre des Politischen, wo sozialräumliche Widersprüche ausgefochten, ausgeglichen, verhandelt und umgesetzt wurden, die dann jeweils zu neuen Formen der räumlichen Organisation, aber auch zu sich wandelnden Governance-Formen führten. Privatisierte Räume und private Akteure, öffentlicher Raum und (para)staatliches Regieren, halböffentliche Räume und private public partnerships sind Ausdruck dieser politischen Auseinandersetzungen. Die zu beobachtende Privatisierung öffentlicher Räume lässt sich in sozioökonomische Veränderungen der vergangenen drei Dekaden einordnen, die ich unter dem Begriff der neoliberalen Glokalisierung fasse und in den Kontext sozialräumlicher Restrukturierungen stelle. Nachfolgend skizziere ich einige privatisierte Raumtypen und ordne sie in den Kontext eines neoliberalen Stadtumbaus. Zweitens mache ich in Anlehnung an das Vera Institute of Justice deutlich, dass Privatisierung öffentlicher Räume nicht zwingend die alleinige privatpolizeiliche Bearbeitung dieser Räume hervorbringt und vice versa die Privatisierung von bisher staatlich oder kommunal erbrachten Sicherheitsdienstleistungen nicht zwingend deren Beschränkung auf private Räume bedeuten muss; dieser Nexus zwischen Raum und „Polizei" wird daran anschließend skizziert und der Versuch einer Typologisierung unternommen. Das Papier schließt mit der These, dass es die (neuen) urbanen Eliten sind, die diese Prozesse wesentlich vorangetrieben haben und vorantreiben und insoweit statt von Neoliberalismus von einer Neoliberalisierung (des Raums) gesprochen werden sollte.

During the last decades a plethora of literature has been produced with the aim of widening our understanding of privatization of public space and its (criminological) implications for the city in general and its residents in particular. Urban planners,[1] sociologists,[2] geographers,[3] and political scientists,[4] additionally, and particularly referring to the privatization of security, criminologists,[5] last but not least feminists[6] among others discuss the world wide phenomenon of privatization of space.[7] In doing so, (public) space has been analyzed from different angles – with regard to property rights whether state-owned, communal or private space; with regard to (equal) access rights, thus, with regard to „the right to the city"; finally, with regard to the (political) public debate as a „public sphere". These different starting points, given limited space, cannot be discussed here in detail. However, what is central at this point is the public-private construction in relation to sectoral and spatial boundaries.

The relation of „state versus market" (sectoral) overlaps with, but is analytically different from the predominant construction characterized by „open versus closed" (spatial). Both of these boundaries are used in relation to policing: the first to describe who provides policing services; the second to describe where policing takes place. In this paper I will focus on access to space and its control through „policing" entities under neoliberal conditions. In doing so, I will argue that during the last three decades the privatization of public space has been embedded in socio-economic developments commonly characterized as „neoliberal globalization".[8] I will start with theoretical approaches of neoliberal globalization and then show how current trends are reflected in the privatization of space and policing. I will describe some types of privatized space and contextualizing them with the neoliberal restructuring of the contemporary city in the North American and European context by providing at least some empirical evidence like the ensuing papers will do in greater detail.

Neoliberal Globalization and the Privatization of Public Space

The privatization of public space is an international trend with incidences in Eastern Europe and Asia as well as in Western Europe and South America. However, its beginnings date back to the mid 1970s in the US. The mushrooming of Shopping Malls and gated communities, the emergence of BIDs, and the (re)privatization of policing around the world lead to the assertion of new models of urban space. How can one understand such processes that some scholars are connecting with neoliberalism and globalization?

Brenner and Theodore (2002) among others[9] proposed to understand neoliberalization dialectically as a process consisting of destructive and creative modes of regulation and the respective destruction and creation of institutions. Neoliberal destruction in this view can be described as the abolition of Keynesian artifacts (public housing, public space etc.), related policies (redistributive welfare state etc.), institutions (unions, public services etc.), and agreements (Fordist labor compromise, redistribution of Federal money etc.). On the other hand, the creative side of neoliberalism can be seen in establishing new or reorganizing already existing institutions and practices, which serve the (future) reproduction of neoliberalism (public private partnerships, workfare policies etc.).

Neoliberalism should be understood, as Jessop (2002) has mentioned, as the strengthening of free market

1
Sorkin, 1992; Madanipour, 2003.

2
Bourdieu, 1991; Lofland, 1998.

3
Mitchell, 2003; Glasze, 2003.

4
McKenzie, 1994; Beste, 2000.

5
Sack et al., 1995; Jones and Newburn, 1998.

6
Hauser, 1987; Massey, 1994.

7
It can be taken for granted that this discussion has been and still is based on the Habermasian concept of „the public" (Habermas, 1962/1990; Calhoun, 1992; Marx, 2001).

8
Brenner et al., 2003.

9
Larner, 2003; Tickell and Peck, 2003.

competition, the selling of the public infrastructure, the proliferation of the market logic in the residing public sector and „free" trade (inward and outward flows of capital, goods, and – to a limited extend – workforce.[10] Depending on the respective national context, historic traditions, developments paths and changing economic and political conjunctures less „pure" strategies to accomplish global neoliberalism can be identified; strategies Jessop characterizes as neostatism, neocorporatism, and neocommunitarism (Table 1).[11]

Peck and Tickell (2002) in an analogous attempt offered us a conceptualization of urban neoliberalization that differentiates between an initial phase of proto-neoliberalism, when cities became flashpoints for major economic dislocations and struggles particularly in the sphere of social reproduction, and phases of roll back and roll out neoliberalism. Following this argument, Keynesian politics and artifacts are, in a first stage, destroyed (rolled back) to give space for a second phase – a roll out of more pro-active neoliberal practices and elements on all spatial levels (scales).[12] While the nation state is loosing power the local as well as the supra-national level are becoming more important in the provision of the necessary „ingredients" for the successful development of a neoliberal globalism. It was Swyngedouw (1997) who introduced the term glocalization to describe the simultaneous shifting of regulation tasks (and the creation of respective institutions) to the scale above (supra-national) and below (local) the national level.

The vanishing of national interventions – be it in social housing, local infrastructure, welfare provision etc.

▶ *Table 1: Strategies to promote or adjust to global neoliberalism*

Neoliberalism
1. Liberalization – promote free competition
2. Deregulation – reduce role of law and state
3. Privatization – sell off public sector
4. Market proxies in residual public sector
5. Internationalization – free inward and outward flows
6. Lower direct taxes – increase consumer choice
Neostatism
1. From state control to regulated competition
2. Guide national strategy rather than plan top-down
3. Auditing performance of private and public sectors
4. Public-private partnerships under state guidance
5. Neomercantilist protection of core economy
6. Expanding role for new collective resources
Neocorporatism
1. Rebalance competition and cooperation
2. Decentralized „regulated self-regulation"
3. Widen range of private, public, and other „stakeholders"
4. Expand role of public-private partnerships
5. Protect core economic sectors in open economy
6. High taxation to finance social investment
Neocommunitarianism
1. Deliberalization – limit free competition
2. Empowerment – enhance role of third sector
3. Socialization – expand social economy
4. Emphasis on social use-value and social cohesion
5. fair trade not free trade; Think global, Act Local
6. Redirect taxes – citizens' wage, carers' allowances
Source: adopted Jessop 2002: 114

– at the same time forces the local state to take over such responsibilities; to cooperate with the private sector (commercial or „civil society"); or to leave such sectors. The privatization of public space and the respective privatization, or pluralization of policing – as pluralization might be a better term to describe the plethora of state-run, rent-a-cop, and „civil society"-policing entities – are reflecting these developments.

Space as Contested Terrain

As a starting point I refer to Bourdieu's observation that „domination of space [...] is one of the most privileged forms of executing power [...], manipulation of the spatial distribution of groups has always been used to manipulate these very groups";[13] therefore, the spatial distribution of social classes and the use of space can be seen as a result of social confrontations for „space profits".[14] One might read „space profits" as space/social control capacities for domination over space allowing for the keeping of people or environs at a (physical) distance that are said to disturb or bring discredit upon the ruling classes, for example. I am referring here to a concept of space as social relation – producing and being reproduced by the built environment.[15] Therefore, space is always contested terrain.

Adopting results from a research paper published by the Vera Institute for Justice (2000) I will focus on the nexus between space and policing. The argument is simple but has some more complex implications: Private space is not solely policed by private police and public space is no longer the exclusive realm of state police. Moreover, the term „private" does not catch the diversity of policing entities presently active within the urban environment given the existence of rent-a-cops, neighborhood watch groups, nonprofits, let alone militias or vigilantes. In addition, as different actors bring in different logics into different spaces they (re)define functions, social relations, power structures etc. of the respective spaces. Even more, the line between crime and acts of war has been erased,[16] as has that between criminal offences and minor order disturbances.[17] It is the purpose of this essay to tackle this complexity.

▶ *Julien Michel (2000): "Les Policiers"(State Policing of Public Space)*

10
See also Harvey, 2005.

11
Jessop, 2002: 113-117.

12
Such scales can be described as national, regional, city, or local level as well as a supra-national or transnational level.

13
Bourdieu, 1991: 30, translation ve.

14
Ibid.: 31.

15
Thus, space is not a simple „container".

16
Bigo, 2001.

17
Garland, 2001.

18
Eick and Sambale, 2005.

19
Knöbl, 1998.

20
Lehne, 1992.

21
Elsbergen, 2004.

22
Eick, 2003a.

23
Eick, 1998.

24
Hoogenboom, 1992.

25
Alvarado and Davis, 2000.

26
Löhr, 2003.

27
Eick, 2003b.

28
Helms, 2005.

29
Eick, 2004.

Policing Space – Spacing Police

On the one hand, we identify the intensified commercial exploitation of inner-city spaces which transforms these spaces into archipelagos of consumption fenced in by domestic authority (Hausrecht). On the other side, we identify similar processes in residential areas most frequently in the outskirts where the (former) social housing estates are located. Here, the sanctity of the home follows particular norms and (profit) interests of the new owners – and not necessarily the norm of the common interest (Gemeinwohl), even though we know that Gemeinwohl is not per se a guarantee for egalitarian management, at least in praxis.[18] Moreover, the privatization of the city and the urban society is followed by privatization of security and at the same time by a re-definition and restructuring of state and local police and their duties.

Table 2 shows the interplay between type of space and type of policing. Commercial police (rent-a-cops) and policing „civil society" style (nonprofits, militias, neighborhood watch etc.) are subcategories of private policing. At the same token, state policing in Table 2 includes Federal police and communal police (such as district officers, Municipal Public Affairs Offices etc.). Additionally, one should keep in mind that the terms „semi-private" or „semi-public" have been introduced into scientific und political debate to describe the fact that spaces of private ownership are used by (parts of) the public – in German legal terms „öffentlich gewidmet" (devoted to the public).

In the following I will briefly describe some of these interrelations and draw a few conclusions for the following essays in this edition of Trialog. Even though state policing emerged out of private initiatives[19] today the most well known form of policing is the state-run police; therefore, the discussion will start with the first column.

		type of policing		
		state (police)	„civil society" (nonprofits, militias)	private (rent-a-cop)
type of space	public	A	D	G
	semi-public	B	E	H
	private	C	F	I
Source: revised from Vera Institute of Justice 2000: 3				

▶ *Table 2: State and non-state policing*

In general, my understanding of state police's duty is the protection of citizens' property and life using repressive and preventive measures against whatever is currently defined as „crime". It is not my understanding that we can take it for granted that those duties are carried out in a socially just manner. As the principal role of policing in capitalist states is to sustain capitalist development, those who lack power are those who suffer most under these circumstances. The social sorting of „undesirable" individuals, for example, has become an important part of state police's responsibilities while focusing on disorder- and incivility-based activities, thus, serving the competitive needs of (inner-city) urban elites (as a „to-the-point" illustration see Julian Michel's (2000) picture „Les Policiers" in this essay).

Given this, *Model A* (state/public) includes all practices viewed as „traditional" police work, often referred to as crime fighting – even though literature shows that only a small portion of police officers' work is related to fighting crime.[20] It is the state-run police that recently came under pressure in discussions regarding the possibility of outsourcing of duties in order to reduce public expenditures. Due to the renaissance of Municipal Law (Ordnungsrecht) the diverse field services of the Municipal Public Affairs Offices and those voluntary police forces equipped with the state monopoly of force have to been taken into consideration as well.[21] Finally, the socio-spatial specialization of police forces which only allow special „undesirables" to access selected public spaces should also be mentioned here.[22] *Model B* (state/semi-public) refers to the German Federal police as railway stations (unlike railroads) are semi-public space and patrolling such spaces is one of their main tasks. Shopping Malls, football stadiums, and other sport facilities are also policed by state police. *Model C* (state/private) includes police forces who intervene in an emergency on privately owned land or in apartments, flats etc.; or, as previously mentioned, are involved in the protection of railroads (privatized in Germany).[23] In the US context (and beyond) one might think of „grey policing" (use of private detectives) and „moonlighting" – police officers who while working for private companies after their shift's end are able to keep their same rights, uniforms and weapons;[24] in México City's inner city police officers protect private banks.[25]

Model D („civil society"/public) describes the work carried out by nonprofits within several neighborhoods identified by the German government (among others) as so-called disadvantaged areas. The identification of such areas goes with the implementation of Federal programs like the „Socially Integrative City" program („Soziale Stadt")[26] introduced in 1998 (similar programs are well known all over Europe and in the US, like the „New Deal for Communities" in the UK). In these areas (and beyond) former unemployed and welfare recipients are working as security and safety guards overseen by nonprofit organizations active in the state-subsidized labor market (re)integration programs.[27] Subsidized labor market (re)integration also functions as the frame for similar programs in other countries such as the UK.[28] Former unemployed and welfare recipients are a cheap labor force due to these subsidies; about 1.000 people work as security forces in this type of labor market integration scheme in Berlin alone.[29] In referring to „civil society" policing at least two more groups should be mentioned here: First militias (which I do not have the space to go into detail) and self-organized groups like the even more frightening vigilante organizations such as neo-fascists who, for example, police „their" territories in parts of East Germany in order to keep them „migrant-free". Even parts of Berlin are confronted with such a style of „civil society" policing. *Model E* („civil society"/semi-public) refers to practices of nonprofits in areas that are private property but open to the public such as railway and subway stations. Again, highly subsidized and, therefore, cheap labor force as well as labor market integration are key to understanding the growth of these policing strategies. Finally, *Model*

F ("civil society"/private) summarizes those projects where Neighborhood Watch programs patrol private residential areas or, as on Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, nonprofits take over the responsibility for policing and patrolling privatized areas, including parking lots or infrastructure facilities.

Model G (private/public) is currently one of the most contested terrains as for-profit policing comes in direct competition with state police or – to a growing extent – as a police private partnership. It entails for-profit policing in pedestrian zones, in Business Improvement Districts (BIDs)[30] and in public housing estates and parks.[31] It sometimes takes the form of a total hand-over to private police as was the case in Toronto, Canada.[32] *Model H* (private/semi-public) refers to another highly contested terrain, as it is here where rent-a-cops work in warehouses, Shopping Malls etc., are on duty as patrols or guards in pedestrian zones, at fairs as well as in airports and railway stations or schools (sometimes summarized is mass private property). It is in these publicly accessible spaces where rent-a-cops allow or deny particular groups access, enforce particular norms (instead of common rights), and implement standards of behavior (fighting „disorder" and „incivilities" on an everyday basis). Finally, in this section, *Model I* (private/private) is the most common form of commercialized security services and includes the classic indoor services. Well known examples include the protection of industrial sites and other private properties involving the prevention of public access (harbors, back offices etc.). Also included are access-denying gated residential areas, often referred to as gated communities.[33]

But the accessibility of space should, along with Jones and Newburn (1998), be seen as a continuum of access rights to space – ranging from no-go-areas to public space that offers access to „all". While searching for reasons for the ongoing growth of private security companies Shearing and Stenning (1983) have shown for North America that under the command of big national companies (and bureaucracies) huge private and semi-public spaces like Shopping Malls, gated communities, high-rise buildings, sports center etc. emerged (mass private property) which – along with other (spatial) reconfigurations –[34] contributed to the rise of the private security industry. Current empirical research and debate have shown that mass private property or communal space „is an umbrella concept that encompasses" a „range – or continuum – of property forms that are, to a greater or lesser degree, open to the public and under state and/or non-state control".[35] In these areas diverge prosecution practices below criminal law and „appropriate" specific controlling and disciplining social orders are enforced by a plethora of policing entities as, among others, Crawford and Lister (2004) have shown. They can be characterized as „government pockets", „governance bubbles", „containment management", „poor policing the poor", or „(neo)feudal (semi)private (dis)order worlds".[36]

To conclude: We identify a pluralization of policing strategies, and no type of space is solely policed by one type of policing entity. Nevertheless, the most

general trends are the growth of private police on duty in public spaces and a stable – if not declining – number of police officers. Additionally, an increasing cooperation – if not merging – between state and private police can be identified as a global phenomenon since the early 1990s. Consequently, all three policing entities are affected by the privatization of public space. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that positive reference to (the ideal of) public space is also the „business" of the urban elites (see, for example, Mike Davis' (2000) illustration in this essay). They are taking advantage of the positive connotations that the notion of public space embodies while trying to define, who is desirable to use it.

The city as a contested terrain is increasingly be guided by market logic, thus creating spaces organized around contractual rules and orders that are structured by a plethora of policing entities aiming at an urban cleansing for the purposes of the urban elites, at least in North America and Europe. As cities are to-

► *Mike Davis (1998): "Ecology of Fear"(LA's Gulag-style Geography of Policing)*

day confronting a more competitive (global) environment, local governments have taken to place-marketing, enterprise zones, tax abatements, public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism – but also reached out for new strategies of social control and workfare policies. Urban forms of governance under neoliberalization have become entrepreneurialized, emphasizing economic efficiency, low taxes, individual responsibility and user fees; the most important goal of urban policy has become to mobilize city space as an arena for market-oriented economic growth. As mentioned above, Brenner and Theodore (2002) have identified a phase of roll out neoliberalism, which has responded, since the 1990s, to the contradictions of the earlier zero-sum kind of entrepreneurialism (roll back). While the basic neoliberal imperative of mobilizing city space as arena for growth and market discipline remains the dominant municipal project, roll out neoliberalism has established some flanking mechanisms and modes of crisis displacement – including new policing strategies and institutions to sustain neoliberalism. It is under such conditions that not only state police and rent-a-cops but, additionally, „both regulated civil policing initiatives

30
Eick, 2006b.

31
Eick and Sambale, 2005.

32
Rigakos, 2002.

33
Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Glasze et al., 2005.

34
Kempa et al., 2004.

35
Kempa et al., 2004: 570.

36
Shearing, 1997; Rigakos, 2002; Eick, 2003b.

and vigilante activity often work against the interests of the weakest members of the community"[37] – and are integrated into if not established by the neoliberal project. Those (new) urban elites redefine cities as competing entrepreneurial, profit-seeking entities governed by a for-profit logic that in turn guides policing entities. It is under such conditions that market orientation achieves hegemony in the cities deciding what kind of social behavior and which whereabouts and what degree of visibility especially for the „undesirables" remains „tolerable". It might well be, as the abstracts of this volume suggest, that ethnic/social identities, social homogeneity, or community cohesion are also at stake. I am wondering, though, if such objectives can be achieved or even discussed without mentioning the global neoliberalization process and its effects on even the tender nerves of the residents and their urban environment in both the Global North and South.

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City Improvement Districts (CIDs) in Johannesburg
Assessing the Political and Socio-spatial Implications of Private-led Urban Regeneration

Elisabeth Peyroux

City Improvement Districts (CIDs) veranschaulichen den wachsenden Einfluss lokaler Geschäftsleute und Grundbesitzer in der Stadtentwicklung. Diese Public Private Partnerships werden in Selbsthilfe organisiert und finanziert. Klar definierte öffentliche Räume sollen so vor allem durch die Verbesserung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen bewirtschaftet und entwickelt werden. In Johannesburg wurde das von mächtigen Geschäftsinteressen eingeführte nordamerikanische CID-Modell ein inzwischen häufig angewandtes Mittel für die Aufwertung der verfallenden Innenstadt sowie der reichen Vorortzentren. Der Artikel analysiert das Aufkommen der CIDs und beschreibt die Zusammenhänge dieser Entwicklung im Kontext des südafrikanischen Übergangs zur Demokratie und der Veränderungen nach dem Ende der Apartheid. Über die Wirkung der CIDs für die Innenstadtentwicklung hinaus wird erklärt, wie sich die Balance von den öffentlichen Interessen zur wachsenden Macht privater Akteure verschiebt und welche Konsequenzen das für die Veränderung der innerstädtische Raumstrukturen hat. Darüber hinaus lenkt der Artikel die Aufmerksamkeit auf die neuen Formen lokaler Partizipation, die durch die Organisation von CIDs unterstützt wird. Das führt zu der Frage, wie und in welchem Ausmaß dadurch der Weg für eine städtische Umstrukturierung im Sinne der Eliten frei wird.

Introduction

Private-led urban regeneration has been promoted in many cities worldwide in a context of growing scarcity of public funds, increasing devolution of responsibilities and functions to the local level and rising public private partnerships in Local Economic Development (LED). Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) or City Improvement Districts (CIDs) in particular have developed as an international model for revitalising commercial areas in declining downtown as well as in higher to lower-income neighbourhoods in both southern and northern cities.[1] Whilst there is no standard definition of CIDs, these organisations are mostly defined as self-taxing, self-help public private partnership organisations set up by business and property owners to maintain, promote and develop public areas within a perimeter, specifically through the enhancement of public services.[2] Their spreading has been linked to the upcoming of an "urban entrepreneurialism" and the rise of neo-liberal forms of governance as competition between cities in the global economy becomes greater than ever.[3]

CIDs illustrate the trends towards public infrastructure and urban streets being handed over to commercial and profit-seeking organisations.[4] However, research on CIDs has mainly considered them as a tool of LED and urban revitalisation, emphasising their form, functions and operating practices. They have primarily been analysed as a new mechanism for municipal services delivery thus missing implications such as the leadership many of these private organisations exercise in shaping public policy and their emerging role in the management and governing of the city.[5] Following the discussion on the trends towards "private cities"[6] (of which gated communities, shopping malls and entertainment centres represent major expressions), this paper argues that CIDs are part of the

significant shifts we observe today in the ways public urban space is being regulated and controlled. These publicly sanctioned yet privately directed organisations have much farther reaching political and socio-spatial implications. By combining local economic development tools, urban management instruments and policing strategies, not only do they reshape urban forms and redefine the decision-making structure of the city but also challenge the conceptions of public interest. This paper analyses the emergence of CIDs in Johannesburg and highlights some of the key issues that they pose in the particular context of post-apartheid South Africa.[7]

## City Improvement Districts: Pulling out private resources to upgrade public areas

Urban regeneration in Johannesburg rests on economic and social problems which share similarities with both northern and southern cities: a declining inner city affected by deindustrialisation, the development of suburban shopping malls, the decentralisation of office parks, and the "white flight" out of the inner residential areas linked to rising rates of crime; high levels of unemployment and poverty; and the growth of economic informality.[8] But Johannesburg, a highly unequal city, shaped by the legacy of apartheid, has to steer and manage complex and specific social and political change. Inter-racial patterns of inequality and strong spatial disparities have been driven by decades of "racial Fordism" while the transition to post-Fordism suggests increasing intra-racial inequalities and growing urban social polarisation.[9] One of the main challenges of LED is to enhance the economic basis of the city while overcoming spatial biases, social exclusion and new forms of class-based inequalities. The redistribution of revenue and expenditure after years of colonial and segregation models of urban finance

▶ Photo 1: Street seats in Ghandi Square, Johannesburg CBD. Picture by Lucille Davie, www.joburg.org.za, 2006.

▶ Photo 2: The pedestrianisation of Main Street, Johannesburg CBD. Picture by Lucille Davie, www.joburg.org.za, 2006.

▶ Figure 1: The triangle diagram

CREATING A DOWNTOWN EXPERIENCE

10
Tomlinson et al. 2003.

11
See Didier and Morange in this issue.

12
Interview with the former director of the CJP, March 2005.

13
Improvement Districts are constituted as non-profit (Section 21) companies with a Board of Directors elected among the contributors. It comprises property owners, business owners, and representatives of residents' organizations (if relevant) and a representative of the local authority. The levy is based on the calculations on ratable property values (costs are borne in proportion to the value of the property). Through legislation, the cost of provision of CID services

remains a highly debated issue. It was at the heart of the structural reform of the government introduced after the 1994 transition. The relationships between public and private stakeholders and communities are being renegotiated in light of the political expectation - and frustration - with regard to the promotion of democratic and grass-roots participation.[10]

CIDs have been implemented as a promising tool of urban regeneration inspired by the successful North American examples as was the case in Cape Town.[11] The forerunner of South African CIDs was established in the inner city of Johannesburg by business and property owners as soon as 1993 on a voluntary and pilot basis and it is said to have been very successful in its impact on crime levels.[12] Following this experiment, these private organisations[13] have spread to the CBD, the adjacent mixed areas and to the decentralised nodes located in the northern suburbs over the past decade. In 2006, there were 10 legislated CIDs, 6 "informal" voluntary improvement districts and 4 precinct projects also falling under the category.[14]

The services provided by the CIDs are supplementary to those provided by the local authority and op-

erate exclusively within the boundaries of each of the CID. They usually include security, cleaning and maintenance of public spaces, marketing, physical improvements and special programmes to address aspects such as transportation, access and parking. Some CIDs also include social programmes such as in Rosebank (creation of a Homeless Association, development of income-generating activities and a car guard scheme employing the homeless). The provision of services is based on a hierarchy of needs established after a specific approach devised by the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP)[15] known as the triangle diagram "creating the urban experience" or "creating a downtown experience"(Figure 1).

The inner city CIDs' services are more confined to crime and grime. Security and cleanliness, marketing and development of business are meant to change negative perceptions of the downtown area and reverse business decay. Public spaces have received specific attention through landscaping and refurbishing: creation of new or upgrading of existing public open space (Gandhi Square, Mary Fitzgerald Square), interconnection between them through walkways (between Gandhi Square and the Carlton Centre), pedestrianisation (Main Street) (Photos 1 and 2).

The northern suburbs (Rosebank, Sandton, Illovo, Randburg) are less affected by serious crime and urban degradation. Branding, landscaping and promoting cultural entertainment are among the main complementary services provided by the CIDs along with security and maintenance as suburban nodes seek to become prominent business, service or tourism centres and compete between each other.[16] Their territorial strategies are intimately connected to the various ways of 'place-making' and 'place-promoting' that features in the urban policy discourses in Europe today.[17] Strategies have been developed to turn a satellite city business district into a cosmopolitan 'village' (the Rosebank Management District) (Photos 3 and 4); rezoning has been implemented in a residential area to develop a predominantly high profile corporate business node (Illovo Boulevard) (Figure 2, Photo

5); an edge city and a secluded sub-urban node is the object of efforts to turn it into a sophisticated and open "Enterprising Global Hub" (Sandton Central)[18]. (Photo 6)

Urban regeneration and the neo-liberal turn in Johannesburg

CIDs embody and even anticipated the neo-liberal turn of the African National Congress' (ANC) politics that occurred in the mid-1990s. As indicated, the transposition of the CID model in Johannesburg is the result of an efficient lobbying by business and property owners of the inner city belonging to the CJP that started before the 1994 transition. These powerful economic elite took the lead in initiating voluntary CIDs, encouraging public authorities to engage in partnerships for regeneration and set up legislation for CID. The study tour conducted by the CJP in the UK and USA in 1996 with seniors officials of the city and of the provincial government, business and community representatives brought up international experience. The legislation on CID was drafted using CJP legal resources and went through a process of revision at the legal department of Provincial Government. It was approved by provincial legislature at the end of 1997 (City Improvement District Act n°12 of 1997) and became effective in November 1999.

CIDs have found a supportive political context driven by the major constraints facing the central state with regard to post-apartheid restructuring. The continuous fiscal crisis of the local government - which became acute in 1997 - and the need to reform the racially based administrative fragmentation inherited from the apartheid regime prompted the political reorientation of the ANC. The budgetary crisis was the inheritance of the long-term unpaid debts deriving from the rents and services boycotts during the apartheid struggle. It was also the result of rates boycotts in the former "white only" suburb of Sandton whose residents resisted the decision made by the newly elected local councillors to standardise the rates across the metropolitan area during the 1995-2001 interim phase where the design of local government was being negotiated.[19] The controversial "iGoli 2002", a policy and planning process drawing on cost-recovery and business principles, was said to symbolise the rise of neo-liberal tendencies within the council.[20] It laid the foundation for the adoption of the single unitary metropolitan structure and the shift towards the privatisation and the outsourcing of public services.[21] At the national scale, the crisis is also said to have been used as a pretext for a shift away from the ambitious state-centred and equity-driven Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) towards the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR), a more efficiency-driven process of development based on public private partnership, the role of the state being reduced to that of a facilitator.[22] This shift was later reflected in the Joburg 2030 strategy initiated by the City of Johannesburg whose aim is to transform Johannesburg into a "world-class city" with a strongly outward-oriented economy, specialised in the service sector.[23]

The alliances between business and property owners and the metropolitan council can be explained by a convergence of interests as far as the maintenance, improvement and control of urban space are concerned. CIDs contribute to enhancing the city's economic value through the strengthening of the property market: the appreciation of property values and business activities in the nodes generates more tax revenues for the local government.[24] The regulation of informal street trade represents an additional area of agreement. The council, in cooperation with business, had the by-laws changed in 2001 in order to prevent unregulated street-vending or remove street vendors in circumscribed markets. This was also the case in

is spread on an equitable, pre-agreed basis among all property owners within the geographical area.

14
Kagiso Urban Management 2006: http://www. kum.co.za/managed_kum. php.

15
The CJP is a private, nonprofit Section 21 company which manages the inner city CIDs.

16
CIDs in the suburbs are managed by the blackowned, equal opportunity Kagiso Group through Kagiso Urban Management (KUM). The CJP operates within the framework of KUM.

17
Jensen 1997.

18
Peyroux 2005.

19
At that time, the former boundaries dividing "black" and "white" local authorities were erased and the government of Johannesburg was divided between Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan council and four municipal sub-structures. The council and the sub-municipalities were merged into a single metropolitan area in 2000.

20
Beall et al. 2003: 87.

21
Mabin 2006.

22
Beall et al. 2002: 94.

23
Rogerson 2005.

24
Spiropoulos and Fraser 2003: 9.

► Photo 3: Street life in Rosebank Management District, Johannesburg. Source: KUM, 2006.

► Photo 4: Rosebank Mall, Rosebank City Improvement District, Johannesburg. Source : KUM, 2006.

▶ Figure 2: Map of Illovo
Boulevard Management
District. Source:
www.illovoboulevard.co.za.

▶ Photo 5: Overview of
the Illovo Boulevard Man-
agement District. Source:
www.illovoboulevard.co.za.

25
Beall et al. 2002: 116.

26
Graham 2001.

27
Peyroux 2005.

28
Personal correspondence,
July 2005.

29
Zukin 1995.

30
Dinges and Sack 2000,
Eick 2006.

31
Gulik 1998, Eick 2006.

32
Shearing and Kempa
2001, Landman 2002.

CIDs in the CBD and Rosebank where an African craft market has been financed by business as a way of controlling street trade and formalising the respective relationships. This illustrates the "porous boundaries" between the local authority and formal business while demonstrating the exclusionary tendencies of financial, retail and property interests who do not tolerate competition[25] or attempt to regulate it and the local state which agrees upon such measures. Surveillance and control of crime also involve the cooperation of the police and private security forces within CIDs with weekly meetings being organised between the South African Police Service (SAPS), the managing bodies of the CIDs and the security organisations operating in the district (Photo 7). The growing role of private actors in controlling and regulating public spaces raises a certain number of controversial issues that have a particular resonance in the context of South Africa.

Risks and implication of CIDs in the context of Johannesburg

The risks and implications of CIDs as pointed out in the northern cities in terms of "fiscal exclusivity" and "splintering" management and privatisation of streets[26] have a highly political signification in South

Africa. By creating distinctive fiscal and service enclaves, CIDs give birth to concerns about the risk of reinforcing spatial inequalities like those between the wealthy suburbs where businesses and property owners have the ability to pay for additional taxes and the low-income townships whose commercial and economic basis remains poor. The fact that a transposition of the CID concept in low-income areas is currently being explored by the City of Johannesburg shows that this potential shortcoming has already been taken into consideration.[27] On the other hand, proponents of CIDs see them as a way to provide opportunities for upgrading and enhancing public spaces without burdening the state. By doing so, they also see a benefit for the public authority. As stated by the former CJP director, in an urban context characterised by strong structural inequalities, "CID areas should maximise the income that a city council produces in that area in order to provide the excess to be spent in previously disadvantaged areas".[28] Whether this form of cross-subsidising will become effective remains to be researched.

The risk of "protection for profit" and "sanitarisation" of public places[29] within CIDs – highlighted in the northern cities[30] - also raise concerns in South Africa.

While the crime prevention component of CIDs might work towards a safer environment more conducive to social life, enforcing more control and surveillance of public space according to profit-driven strategies is seen as a potential source of discrimination and exclusion for certain segments of the population, in particular marginal social groups – street vendors, sex workers, the homeless - who rely on public space for their material maintenance.[31] The issue of access to public space is highly sensitive in Johannesburg where social and racial mixing within public spaces is one of the main challenges. Scholars working on private policing and gated communities already pointed out the risk of a new urban apartheid based on socio-economic lines.[32]

Finally, as CIDs are implemented to defend the interests of property owners and corporate businesses, the main question revolves around the way private and public interests are balanced in the issues raised and dealt with by these organisations.[33] As pointed out in the analysis of Urban Development Projects in Europe, one might question how and to what extent these new forms of private governance are characterised by "less democratic and more elite-driven priorities".[34] This can be linked to the debate on the decline of the public sphere raised in the current American system which suggests that issues are invented and defined by organised interest groups and that the role of ordinary citizens is reduced.[35] In South Africa, CIDs foster new forms of local participation and community empowerment - two major issues in the political agenda associated with community development. But this form of "shareholders democracy"[36] might not be the best option to fulfil these political expectations. Scholars have suggested that CIDs might lead to a perversion of the concept of community development as interests of owners, tenants and users are not identical, and property owners and businessmen who detain vote powers might not be from the community themselves.[37]

Conclusion

CIDs illustrate the increasing involvement of local business and property owners in the management of the city. By doing so, they redefine the boundaries between public and private interventions. These private organisations have been proven to gain leadership in shaping public policy and setting up standards for the rest of the city. Examples of BIDs in the USA show that some of them are now taking on challenges such as revising outdated regulations and costs in the field of housing, managing downtown development as an administrator for the city's tax increment financing programme while some mayors encourage outsourcing of services to BIDs.[38] Corporate BIDs may also directly shape commercial growth by directly investing in capital improvements.[39] The use of private police forces within the district, which refers to the growth of citizen-led policing, also questions to what extent the state monopoly of policing has been broken.[40] Analyses of policy issues raised by CIDs question the capacity of elected municipal officials to watch over them and the effectiveness with which cities monitor the CIDs within their jurisdiction.[41] With the implemen-

tation of CIDs, the ability to define and control public places along with profit-oriented decision-making has become the critical process through which the balance of power between public and corporate interests is being played.

In Johannesburg, the North American CID model brought up by a powerful coalition of business interests has been well acknowledged and has become a widespread tool of urban regeneration in the declining inner city and in the high income decentralised nodes. In that regard, Johannesburg follows the trend towards neo-liberal forms of governance and the "entrepreneurial city" which has been widely analysed and debated in the context of Western neo-liberal urbanisation. However, with regard to the political support enjoyed by CIDs, it appears that little attention has been paid to their potential negative outcomes in terms of growing spatial inequalities and the risk of political and fiscal fragmentation which have a particular resonance in a post-apartheid context. But one of the key neglected issues revolves around how and to what extent the question of the possibility of a public interest is being challenged by these new organisations,[42] in particular through promoting corporate interests to the detriment of addressing social issues. The form of local democracy that is fostered by BIDs is also put into question,[43] in particular the trends towards an elite-driven urban redevelopment.

33
Briffault 1999.

34
Swyngedouw et al. 2002: 542.

35
Light and Smith 1998.

36
Glazse 2003.

37
Gross 2005.

38
Levy 2001.

39
Gross 2005.

40
Newburn 2001.

41
Briffault 1999.

42
Ward undated: 18.

43
Briffaut 1999.

▶ *Photo 6: Sandton Central Business District. Photo: Walter Knirr, www.joburg.org.za, 2006*

▶ *Photo 7: A private security guard employed by the Illovo Boulevard Management District. Source: www.illovoboulevard.co.za.*

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mics and new forms of
governance (Cape Town,
Johannesburg, Durban,
Lagos, Ibadan, Kano, Nai-
robi, Maputo, Windhoek)"
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"City" Improvement Districts vs. "Community" Improvement Districts:

Urban Scales and the Control of Space in Post-Apartheid Cape Town

Marianne Morange, Sophie Didier

Im Jahr 2000 unterstützte die Stadtverwaltung von Kapstadt im Zentrum die Einrichtung eines City Improvement Districts (CID), der vom nordamerikanischen Modell der Business Improvement Districts beeinflusst ist. Der CID hatte raschen Erfolg bei der „Säuberung" der Innenstadt und der Reduzierung der Kriminalität durch ihre Verlagerung. Verführt durch die Idee, die institutionelle Kontrolle über ihre direkte Umgebung wiederzuerlangen, ergriff sehr bald ein wohlhabender und überwiegend weißer Vorort die Gelegenheit, einen eigenen CID im reinen Wohngebiet zu gründen. Der CID wurde in „Community" Improvement District umbenannt. Auf Grundlage dieses kurzlebigen Experiments, dokumentiert dieser Artikel die Bedeutung, die die Maßstabsbildung bei der Beschreibung räumlicher Kontrolle hat. Zuerst beschreiben wir den Erfolg der CID-Formel und ihre veränderte Bedeutung in der Stadt. Es wird die Schwierigkeit der Stadtverwaltung deutlich, bewohnergetragene Initiativen zu kontrollieren, die vorher von den politischen Behörden auf nationaler Ebene ermutigt worden waren. Aber dieses Experiment illustriert ebenso die Widersprüche, die zwischen den Akteuren bei der Auswahl des passenden, zu kontrollieren Gebietsrahmens bestehen, als auch ihre Fähigkeit, mit diesen Maßstäben zu jonglieren. Und schließlich wird offenbar, wie die Stadtverwaltung, die auf CID mit Anpassungsfähigkeit reagiert hat, zu einem „autoritären" öffentlichen Sektor beigetragen hat.

The worldwide debate on BIDs as management tools designed for decaying inner cities is well documented, ranging from the nature of partnerships, the privatisation of service delivery and the inequalities in access to services, to the privatisation of control over the urban space, as well as the emergence of shadow governments, or the mere efficiency of the formula[1]. The South African city of Cape Town has been implementing a similar policy since November 2000: as we have previously documented elsewhere[2], the Cape Town municipality[3] set up a public-private partnership inspired by the well-known North American model of BIDs[4] in order to fight urban decay and revitalise the CBD. Our focus is different here: the Cape Town CCID's (Central CID) "success story" (it rapidly reduced crime by displacing it towards neighbouring areas[5]) inspired a "Community CID" experiment. It took place in two suburban areas of Cape Town between 2000 and 2004, and was then halted abruptly by the municipality. Based on the chronicle of a short-lived "Community CID", we wish more specifically to elaborate on the importance of taking scale into account when examining such forms of control over space in the city. The CID episode indeed reflects a contradiction when it comes to the scale chosen to control the urban space, for the municipality, while encouraging community participation, generally supports control at the metropolitan scale, as opposed to the logics of the local scale supported by communities. These scales, far from being complementary, prove in the end to be contradictory. However, stakeholders are not restricted to a single scale of action: they play with them, rescaling or downscaling their analytical framework and arguments according to their needs and interests. With this short chronicle, we therefore wish to contribute to the South African debate on the nature of urban governance in post-apartheid cities[6] as well as to the broader debate on the changing scales of governance in globalising cities[7].

Burgeoning community initiatives and the emergence of locally-based security schemes

In Cape Town, the decay process of the inner city occurred in the mid-1990s, after the flight of businesses to suburban nodes (malls and "edge cities" such as Claremont, the Waterfront, Tygervalley or Century City – Doc 1). This classic trend took place in a specific context: in the late 1980s and in the post apartheid era, there was an influx of Blacks, Coloureds, and foreign Black migrants into the city centre who tended to replace White residents; moreover, the landscape changed while the municipality became more tolerant (or powerless) and let poor people regain control over this area; at the same time, police forces encountered a crisis. All of these elements fuelled a feeling of growing insecurity and sometimes of fear amongst the Whites[8], accelerating their suburbanisation. In the global context of competition between cities, it became a necessity for Cape Town to reverse urban decay so as to remain an attractive destination for tourists and to reach a world class city level by attracting foreign investors: this necessitated the restoration of security and safety. Business property owners claimed a right to control their environment and the CCID's main purpose was precisely to allow them to regain control over "their" part of the city, along with public authorities (Doc 1). Two suburban communities of Cape Town were seduced by this general idea: these mainly White and well-off suburbs[9] seized the opportunity offered by the municipal by-law to launch their own CIDs. The Durbanville Afrikaner community (13,237 residents[10]) set up the first strictly residential CID which was not located in or next to the city centre (Doc 1). This CID tooled for residential suburbs was thus called "Community" Improvement District, and the English community of Pineland (11,662 residents[11]) also applied for a CID under the by-law.

1
Briffault, 1999; Mitchell, 2001.

2
Bénit et al., 2004.

3
The Cape Town municipality is referred to as the Unicity (the term is used in South Africa to refer to the unified metropolitan structures and centralised local political powers that run major metropolitan areas since 2001 – see doc 3).

4
Zukin, 1995. For technical details about the Capetonian scheme itself, see Doc 2.

5
Whether the displacement of crime is real or not, the CCID "success story" is largely advertised (and measured) in the community newspapers by the CCID managing agent and it is now perceived as a reality.

6
Beall et al., 2002.

7
Swyngedouw, 1997, 2005.

8
Nahnsen, 2003.

Doc 1: Nature and localization of the Cape town CIDs

	existing CIDs	projected CIDs
mixed-use	◉ Fishoek	○ Athlone
industrial	▲ Parow	
residential	▣ Durbanville	☐ Pinelands
residential, with no influence of the CTP*	▣ Durbanville	▣ Pinelands

* *Cape Town Partnership*

◇ UniCity of Cape Town perimeter

Mitchell's Plain Urbanized areas and major townships

Main roads ✱ Main suburban nodes (offices, malls....)

9
They are in the upper quintile in terms of annual household income, i.e. over 72,000 Rand (around 11,000 €) , while the lower quintile encountered in the townships ranges between 0 and 18,000 Rand (around 2,800 €).

10
1996 population census.

11
1996 population census.

12
For more details about the ways and means of this circulation, see Didier & Morange, 2005.

13
A National Crime Prevention Strategy, the People Participation Process, Community Police Forums, platforms of dialogue between the police and the residents and the Bambanani program (see Bénit et al., 2005; Didier & Morange, 2005).

Community initiatives are indeed stimulated by the rapid changes in the institutional post-apartheid context that tends to legitimate locally-based forms of control. It lead to the spreading of the CID formula through the metropolitan area of Cape Town (Doc 1)[12] due to a need for efficiency, particularly acute in terms of security, which local authorities, politicians and businessmen share with communities. The post-apartheid context allows communities to emerge as legitimate stakeholders and to claim a right to a direct control over their environment at the local scale: the need for dialogue between the state and the civil society after the abolition of apartheid (in 1991) ended up in calls for their involvement in the security field so as to avoid vigilantism and supplement police forces when funding became scarce. Using a number of tools

defined at the national level[13], public authorities solicit communities to participate in and to imagine creative solutions: "Residential CIDs" are one amongst many other controversial initiatives which have been emerging thanks to this "D.I.Y." ideology. In Durbanville, the idea of a "Community CID" emerged through the Community Police Forum (platforms of dialogue that the national police forces have to set up at the local level): the CID leaders used the forum as a stepping stone to start collecting signatures and approvals from property owners (Doc 2 and 3).

This drift from the CPF also shows that the Unicity gave communities the opportunity to use the inconsistencies of a hastily written and vague local legislation. Initially, the municipal by-law ignored "Commu-

nity CIDs". It did not make provisions for them, but it did not forbid them either. This lack of concern seems surprising when one considers the context of its writing: three different pieces of legislation that existed in the seven substructures, prior to the creation of the Unicity, were merged. The Durbanville community had used the Tygerbeg by-law that made provisions for "community CIDs" (Doc 3), therefore, such confusions were predictable and could have been avoided. It also shows that the municipality was focused on its restructuring, whereas the community was capable of seizing a once-off opportunity, and, whether consciously or not, playing with the difficulties of those restructurings and updates. Finally, community participation is difficult to implement without the public sector being outrun by initiatives with locally-based goals, whereas the Unicity's focus is supposedly placed on integrative and metropolitan policies[14].

The Unicity and the metropolis vs. the community and the local scale

The residential adaptation seemed to have been accepted by the municipality but the wind changed when a new mayor was appointed (Doc 3) who put a halt to what she dubbed "Residential CIDs" in the white suburbs. She and the ANC councillors denounced a hijack of the CID concept. An internal campaign was launched to debunk them as dangerous attempts to recreate white *laagers*[15] and to reactivate former identities or apartheid municipalities[16]. The Durbanville CID was fought back and terminated by the municipality and the application of Pineland was rejected in 2004 on the same grounds.

The Unicity's reaction against "Community Improvement Districts" reflects a contradiction in terms of the scale chosen to control the urban space. Communities control specific perimeters, which clearly contradicts the Unicity's metropolitan apprehension of the city (or at least, the policy it officially supports). From that point of view, the debate around the acronym CID itself is crucial and was highly controversial in Cape Town: should the C stand for city only or for both city and/or communities, depending on the nature of the scheme? The second option was rejected: CIDs were ultimately deemed applicable in the city only (meaning the inner city, or in a perimeter that is not strictly residential). This echoes a scale related debate: the inner city is considered a specific area which plays a role in terms of job opportunities and investment attraction that impacts the entire metropolis; in this sense, the City CID is a metropolitan tool of action, while the Community CID applies at the neighbourhood scale only and for this reason was rejected.

Obviously, the principle of a "community CID" is not compatible with the idea of equal access to security at the metropolitan scale: it privileges rich areas which can afford to set up a CID, while in poor areas, the residents cannot pay an extra levy. The well-off communities deny these charges and put forward another argument that sounds perfectly logical, but works at the local scale only: the principle of a levy is fair since every property owner contributes to the costs and the scheme allows for certain levels of adaptability (for in-

stance poor pensioners are exempted from the fees) or affordability (the Durbanville CID board applied a flat -although illegal - monthly rate of 40 Rand, presented as affordable to all).

Does it mean that community members reject the principle of redistribution of wealth between poor and rich neighbourhoods? Indeed, "community CIDs" are accused of giving the rich the opportunity to ring-fence their resources and to limit metropolitan redistribution to the townships. It contradicts the dream of a post-

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Definition

A CID is a perimeter within which the property owners (whether residential or commercial) fund a top-up of services such as security or refuse collection with the blessing of the municipality by paying an extra levy that can be seen as a form of additional tax except that the money is ring-fenced within the CID perimeter. The levies are raised at the level of the CID by the Unicity itself and appear in the municipal budget although they can only be spent within the perimeter of the CID and cannot be redistributed to other areas by means of the general budget.

A CID is set up for three years and must be renewed (after a process of approval by the municipality) every 3 years. The property owners of the CID must elect a managing board. The main interest of a CID for the property owners is the principle of ring-fencing the resources (the levies cannot be used in other areas of the city even though they transit through the municipal budget; they are redirected straight away to the CID board (see doc. 5). A municipal by-law sets and defines the rules to set up and run a CID in Cape Town.

Application procedure

1/ A minimum of 25% of the ratepayers have to support the creation of a CID in that area. They must decide on boundaries.

2/ The application is advertised, and a public meeting is organised to ensure a minimum of 50% support among property owners in that area (75% when the proposed area has less than 60% of business property -since 2003).

3/ The newly established CID and the local council enter into a service level agreement whereby the local council would undertake certain services and the CID would perform certain functions. Ratepayers in the CID would pay additional levies to provide additional or top-up services on the services already in existence.

After Berg J. (2004), "Private policing in South Africa: the Cape Town city improvement districts - pluralisation in practice", Society in Transition, 35(2).

▶ Doc 2: What is a CID ?

14
Watson, 2002, 2003.

15
The *laager*, a circle of chariots, was a defence technique used by the Boers when protecting themselves from the attacks of Black tribes.

16
Pineland, one of the oldest suburbs of Cape Town, had been standing separately for a long time, while the remote Durbanville, located on the outskirts of the city, used to be a fully-fledged municipality under the apartheid.

17
We have previously written more specifically on discourses and the stakeholders' rhetoric of justification (Didier & Morange, forthcoming in Urban Forum, 2006)

18
The Pineland community did try to approach Langa community members and a special meeting was organised. It was not very fruitful since in the meantime, Community CIDs had been strictly banned, which discouraged the Pineland community to continue to defend its scheme.

19
Landman 2004; Baker 2002.

20
Tomlinson, 1999.

21
Bénit & Gervais-Lambony, 2005.

A confused local political game

	Durbanville community applications	Changes of the legal municipal framework	Who is running the Unicity?
2000	First application under the Tygerberg by-law: « Community » I.D.	A fragmented Cape Town: 7 separate substructures	Tygerberg is ruled by the NNP / NNP supports CIDs
2001		Merging of the substructures, unified by-law	The DA (DP-NNP alliance) / the NNP supports the application
2002			NNP-ANC coalition takes over the Unicity / ANC against CIDs
2003	Application for renewal under the unified by-law	By-law rewritten overnight	
2004	Reapplication rejected		

In the early 2000s, there were three main political parties in South Africa: the Democratic Alliance (DA) was the main opposition party. It used to be an alliance of the NNP (the heir of the apartheid National Party) and of the ex-DP (Democratic Party, White English liberals) "against" the dominant ANC. In June 2002, after a hot controversy, the national parliament voted for the "floor crossing" legislation: it allowed NNP members of the DA to move back to their "party of origin" (the NNP) so as to join an ANC-NNP coalition without having to be re-elected under a new banner. This sounded like treason to many NNP voters.

At the local level in particular, the "trick" allowed the ANC-NNP to take over the DA-ruled Cape Town Unicity (a symbolic target that was one of the stakes of the war) and to come back into power (it had ruled Cape Town from 1996 to 2001). With over 100 councillors, the coalition had the majority and could appoint an ANC mayor. All of a sudden, this new "super mayor" saw her powers increased by growing centralisation (implemented by a provincial law). She appointed executive committees that run the city almost without having to consult the local councils. Suddenly, the NNP that had supported Durbanville, its electoral stronghold, in the "residential CID" battle proved incapable of continuing to do so (actually the NNP went down in the summer of 2004).

In the 1990s, the old apartheid municipalities had merged into seven substructures so as to prepare for the creation of a single unified Unicity, which happened in 2001. In the old Tygerberg substructure, a local by-law existed that allowed for the creation of "Community CIDs". It was amended and merged into a single unified by-law on "City CIDs" that was vague enough so as not to forbid "Community CIDs" as such. These were banned only after the rewriting of the unified by-law by the ANC-NNP coalition in 2003 when the NNP could no longer support its traditional stronghold. When Durbanville applied for the renewal of its CID, it was thus rejected.

This demonstrates that the balance of power between the various stakeholders is changing quickly, and that local authorities are able to react so as to regain control over the city when the national political context and time are favourable.

▶ *Doc 3*

apartheid city based on solidarity between neighbourhoods at the metropolitan scale and the motto "one city one tax base" used during the fight against apartheid. Confronted with this criticism, communities reply again, at the local scale, but along different lines: Pineland's residents argue on the contrary that their self-sufficiency would allow the municipality to concentrate its financial resources on the townships. The municipality could object that a CID only consists of top-up services (it does not allow the municipality to withdraw from the delivery of basic services[17]) and therefore only allows rich areas to be better serviced thanks to local resources that they do not wish to share (Doc 3).

A scalar-adjusted basis for action and justification

However, giving them tit-for-tat, the Unicity promptly advised the Pineland CID to include the poor neighbouring township of Langa in its perimeter[18]. This reveals that the principle of an old locally-based charity system of redistribution (a rich area helping "its own" poor) is accepted and is far from being overcome by that of social redistribution at the metropolitan scale. Indeed, Community Improvement Districts tend to reinforce this principle more than they contribute to a mere rejection of the poor. Of course, the reliance on communities to implement their own local social order can certainly encourage social discrimination and spatial exclusion. Security can be used as a pretext for groups to exclude the 'undesirables'[19]. The Durbanville CID was seen as a way to identify undesirable job-seekers (perceived as "outsiders") asking for a job on a door-to-door canvassing basis, by taking their fingerprints while in the local job bureau funded by the CID scheme. However, communities object that they do not wish to exclude job seekers and outsiders but try to identify "their" poor, the ones they are ready to tolerate in the area. In the White suburbs, this charity conception is indeed combined with larger processes of discrimination and exclusion. Here again, the community addresses the issue of security at a local scale with the blessing of the Unicity as long as the constitutional right that guarantees equal access to security is not challenged. The Unicity metropolitan vision is thus far more complicated than one could expect.

Moreover, the Unicity criticises the Durbanville CID along lines that could also apply to the CCID: a tool that disturbs a certain number of political principles when used in the suburbs is presented by the municipality as a tolerable and valuable option in the city centre. The "social" cleansing of the streets, the control of space and of behaviours (who is on the street and doing what) are tolerated in the city centre. The CID, primarily conceived to serve business interests in CBDs, commercial and industrial areas, is even used to fight the decaying residential areas in the "City Bowl" which remains a relatively prestigious location for upper and middle class residents. Its decay was not as strong as in Johannesburg or as in North American cities and the property values never decreased as much[20]. The residential side of these CIDs is sometimes higher than the 40% legal ceiling defined in the by-law for what is now called "mixed-

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▶ Doc 4

use CIDs" (Doc 1) but they are tolerated because of the "window-dressing" oriented municipal agenda[21]. In other words, the intolerable becomes acceptable in the inner city because it has an impact on the whole city (in terms of employment, image etc.). That is why, strangely enough, the CCID was implemented in the first place by an ANC municipality (elected in 1996), as part of its "new urban management" strategy.

The "interlocking" of two scales of control that took place in the city centre reflects a convergence of interests between the Unicity and some inner city communities (at the expense of poorer ones deemed undesirable in the city bowl). On the contrary, in the suburbs, the nature of the area does not seem to justify such forms of control and in the Unicity's eyes, the CID option cannot be extended to the entire metropolitan area although the Unicity itself opened the way for the idea of a control of space at the local level by tolerating exceptions to the "metropolitan rule" officially defended by the ANC (the principle of solidarity and redistribution between the different parts of the metropolis as well as the equality of citizens before the law in terms of rights and duties)! To what point can a local authority make an exception and "bend the rules" in the name of a territorial specificity? This is one of the many questions raised by the Durbanville case (Doc 3 and 4).

22
Hibou, 2004.

23
Swyngedouw, 1996.

Conclusion: centralisation of power and flexibility in public practices

Finally, the CID experience reveals that the Unicity, when delegating part of its powers to the communities, has adopted the principle of flexible management and a case by case approach as a new norm of public practice and this involves playing with urban scales. This was possible due to a recentralisation process happening at all levels of government thanks to a political context that strengthens the ANC. This creates frustration and questions the legitimacy and accountability of public action, two bases of the democratisation process at stake in South African cities. Communities who felt they had been asked to contribute to their own security and are blamed for promoting locally-based interests, interpret this as a form of political violence and arbitrariness especially when they witness other communities taking control of their neighbourhood because they live near the city centre. To imagine a process of delegation to communities that remains entirely under control without leading to the reassertion of public authorities' monopolies would imply legislating around community initiatives. In Cape Town, this was postponed so as to avoid the controversial debate on the legacy of apartheid and the need for redistribution to poor areas. When the ANC came back to power in 2003, it eventually defined a legal framework, but in a quite arbitrary way: the by-law was rewritten overnight and the municipality was wise enough to include a provision stating that it can terminate a CID whenever it wants and whatever the reason may be. By applying the principle of flexibility to public affairs management, the ANC demonstrated that the best proof of political strength might not be the capacity to legislate, but the ability to change the rules in the middle of the game without facing contestation[22]. By choosing flexibility instead of a precise scale of control of the urban space, it may contribute to the emergence of an "authoritarian" state, leading to an "unstable form of governance that re-enforces fragmentation and tension in civil society"[23].

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Policing Johannesburg's Wealthy Neighbourhoods:

The Uncertain 'Partnerships' between Police, Communities and Private Security Companies

Claire Bénit-Gbaffou

Der Artikel untersucht die Herausforderungen, die durch "Partnerschaften" zwischen staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Sicherheitsanbietern entstehen. Grundlage sind 2 Fallstudien für Sicherheitskonzepte , die in wohlhabenden Gebieten in Johannesburg entwickelt wurden. Der Artikel fragt nach dem Monitoring durch die Polizei, verstanden als Koordinierung der verschiedenen nichtstaatlichen Initiativen in einem „Sicherheits-Netzwerk". Die Formalisierung von Partnerschaften zwischen Polizei und nachbarschaftlichen Diensten ist generell gescheitert, da die Beteiligung der Gemeinde nicht langfristig verlässlich ist und sie für Korruption und persönliche Konflikte anfällig sind. Außerdem können Privatdienste leichter die wohlhabenden Gebiete sichern, da für die Polizei ihr Einsatz in den reichen Vierteln als „Dienst für die Elite" schwieriger zu rechtfertigen ist. Die Aufgabe dieser Partnerschaften könnte eine weitere Privatisierung der Sicherheitsdienstleistungen ermutigen. Es werden einfache Regelungen mit dem Privatsektor abgeschlossen, die weder zu einer tatsächlichen Partnerschaft noch zu einer Überwachung durch die Polizei führen.

In the context of the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which witnessed both the spread of crime into areas that were previously protected through the apartheid containment strategy, and the necessary restructuring of the police service[1], the South African state massively appealed to non-state actors to help the police fight crime, describing civil society (defined as both business and community organisations, private security companies and police reservists) as important "partners" for the state in the fight against crime[2].

These public partnerships with residents' associations on the one hand and the private sector on the other, are in line with worldwide trends to promote security governance and to reform the police in order to make it more accountable to the residents and more efficient in its crime prevention strategy[3]. However, behind the term "partnership" lays a plurality of agreements: roles, functions and responsibilities regarding crime prevention are unevenly shared, depending on the local contexts and the stakeholders involved.

Some authors rather speak of "security networks" to describe the pluralisation of policing agents at the local level[4]. The notion of networks is looser than that of partnerships. Newburn defines it as an "increasingly complex and differentiated patchwork of security providers"; he stresses the importance, "when thinking of the idea of a 'network of security', not to overemphasise the degree of integration". The term 'network' might describe the reality experienced on the ground – lack of real coordination, prevalence of ad hoc and flexible agreements, etc. – better than the term 'partnership'. On the contrary, partnership implies an agreement between several parts, legally or morally binding, and in the case of public-private partnerships indicates some control implemented by the public authority. However, in the security field, little empirical evidence or theoretical analysis has been devoted to the monitoring or regulating capacity of

the police over non-state security initiatives; and this is what this paper wishes to address, since we follow Shaw[5] in arguing that the central issue in security governance is not so much how to eradicate "these security instruments that compete with the state", but how to manage them.

There are of course forms of partnership that involve minimal public control, such as sub-contracting or outsourcing of police functions and duties[6] – where control is reduced to the legal regulation of non-state activity (with little resources to actually check its application[7]), and to a possible (but difficult) assessment of the outcomes of such activity. In this paper we look for a little bit more than that: we consider joint security operations where the police can try and make use of the supplementary technical, financial and personnel resources offered by the non-state actors. In this sense, we assume[8] that the state is more than just "one (albeit important) player in a network of governing agencies"[9], and, especially in South Africa where the state has some administrative capacity as well as a strong political legitimacy, it ought to play a monitoring role over non-state security initiatives. Therefore, even if the boundaries between public and private policing stakeholders, practices and strategies are increasingly blurred[10], we insist, on the contrary, on the remaining, major distinction between the two types of actors – that has to do with the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

The paper draws on two case studies[11]: Parkview and Atholl, two middle to upper-class areas located in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, where the residents have chosen not to erect gates and barriers to protect themselves[12], but have preferred to rely on community policing as formally encouraged by the state. In both cases, they have created non-profit, "community" security companies, a kind of "third way" between full reliance on public policing and the hiring of a private security company. These

1
Leggett 2005.

2
White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998.

3
Shearing and Stenning 1983.

4
Newburn 2001, Johnston 2001.

5
Shaw 2000.

6
Schönteich et al 2004.

7
Berg 2003.

8
In line with Loader and Walker 2001.

9
Johnston 2001.

10
Baker 2002, Carrier 1999.

11
Field research was conducted in 2004 and 2005, as part of the programme on « Privatisation of Security in African Cities : urban dynamics and new forms of governance », funded by the French Institute of South Africa.

12
We have elaborated elsewhere on the road closure issue in Johannesburg (Bénit 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou forthcoming). See also Peyroux 2005.

experiments have been – or are currently being – dis-
carded by the police, after having operated in informal
ways for several years. They highlight, both by their
successes and their failures, not only the technical
complexities but also the political challenges inherent
in the construction of security partnerships between
state and non-state actors. The first part of the paper
tracks down the specificity of this "third way", and the
blurred line distinguishing community and business
security initiatives; the second part discusses the op-
tions available to the police for monitoring non-state
security initiatives.

How different are community security initiatives from private security companies?

Residents' groups in Atholl and Parkview, two sub-
urban areas in northern Johannesburg, have decided
to set up their own "community" security companies,
deemed not for profit and dedicated to the neighbour-
hood. Many residents had indeed aired their dissatis-
faction with private security companies, judged not
"dedicated" enough to the area and becoming com-
placent after a while. The development of Community

**The privatisation of security in and around Atholl,
Johannesburg, 2005**

1. An defensible urban layout?

	Street
	Highway
	Golf, parc, recreation area
	Business and commercial center
Atholl	Name of suburb

**3. A fragmented pattern of
private control over urban spaces**

▬ ▬ ▬	Controlled access road
┄┄┄┄	Semi-controlled access road
➔	Direction of security initiative expansion

2. Multiple security stakeholders

⬮	Boom or barrier
◉	Permanent security guard
✦	Private control room
✦	Police Station
☐	Perimeter of City Improvement District

Illovo Improvement District Name of main security projects

▶ *Map 1: Securing Atholl
without closing off the
suburb*

Policing Forums[13] (CPFs) and the public encouragement for community policing constituted a favourable context, the police often enhancing locally what was seen as a supplementary manpower more akin than the private sector to work with the police.

In Atholl, a high-income suburb not far from Alexandra township, a residents' association launched what they call the Atholl Security Project. Residents contribute about R400[14] a month to the project on a voluntary basis, which pays for the seven private security guards (3 shifts) permanently standing at the entrances of the suburb, and also for a few agents employed by Atholl Project, repairing pavement and lighting, trimming the trees, collecting garbage etc.

In Parkview (a police precinct including several middle-income to wealthy suburbs), unlike in Atholl, the community security project was initiated and monitored by the Community Policing Forum (CPF). Parkview police have indeed largely supported the initiative, enhancing what they considered a real partnership with the "community", under the name *CPF on the Beat*. *CPF on the Beat* is a non-profit organisation set up by the Community Policing Forum in order to employ reservists (security guards, after it has been declared illegal to pay reservists –supposed to be mere "volunteers" helping the police) to patrol the area. The police would train and monitor the guards, and they would be in control of its operational use; whilst the community was in charge of the finance (collection of money[15] and payment of the guards) through *CPF on the Beat*. The creation of *CPF on the Beat* was rendered necessary because the Community Policing Forum itself, being a police statutory body, could not legally directly raise funds to employ security agents...

Both projects have been tempted over time to expand beyond the neighbourhoods' boundaries – their success in terms of crime reduction being an incentive for growth (Figure 1, Map 1).

Competition between security companies to access a local market is fierce, especially in wealthier suburbs where a demand for expensive security policies is likely to develop. In Atholl for instance, the ward councillor had to intervene to stop a physical battle between agents of competing private security companies: one of them was blocking the road to prevent the others from entering the suburb, even throwing stones against the houses of people contracting with its competitors!

In such a competitive context, attempts to create integrated security networks, or real partnerships not only with the police but amongst different private security companies, are doomed. Bramley police (to which Atholl belongs) for instance proposed to set up a room within the police station to be used jointly by a police officer and a security agent (from a different company each day) – which meant each private security agent would have had to work for the whole area (and not only for his company's customers). The initiative failed spectacularly.


Portraits of community leaders – and security businessmen

The operational manager of the Atholl Security Project is a former employee of a security company. He was the local representative for the security company in Atholl, and got to know the customers. He then decided to do his security project on his own, sidelining the security company, and approached the chair of the residents' association, who was seduced by his project. He is now busy expanding the project to neighbouring Illovo, and "upgrading" the project by making use of CCTV and polygraph technology – as one of his friends owns such a company.

In Parkview, the manager of *CPF on the Beat* owns two restaurants, and he started uniting businesses, encouraging them to join a common security scheme. Then he was given the opportunity (by the CPF and the police) to create *CPF on the Beat*: a statutory non-profit organisation, collecting funds from voluntary donations (for which the acronym CPF is a good marketing device). The manager was also nominated deputy-chair of the CPF, but due to increasing conflicts with the other members of the CPF (accusing him of hiding *CPF on the Beat's* benefits, supposedly to be transferred to the CPF account), he had to resign. The success of his security scheme contributed to this suspicion: having been approached by several other CPFs in Johannesburg, he was about to expand his scheme to other suburbs, more in a business than in a community-like manner.

In this context also, "community security companies" (set up as non-profit organisations) are very clearly identified by private security companies as competitors, and even as "unfair competition" since the community security companies obviously do not comply with the private security regulations – and have pretensions to a local monopoly. This was one of the reasons why the Parkview initiative was eventually declared illegal by the Provincial Commissioner, lobbied by a big private security company[16].

The competition is even more direct in Atholl, where the private security company originally hired by Atholl Security Project to guard the entrances of the suburb is progressively being ejected from the area, Atholl Security Project attempting to replace the private company's staff with its own contract workers. The manager of the project indeed argues that it would allow for a better crime prevention strategy, avoiding "outsourcing" and the unnecessary spreading of information to "outsiders". For the private security company, however, the increasing replacement of its agents by people employed by the Atholl Security Project is only a business strategy. Dumping the prices on the pretext of being a non-profit project, failing to regularly pay the private company it hired for the 7 permanent security posts, the chairman of the residents' association is accused of trying to push the security company out of the area[17]. The security company is currently busy denouncing these illegal (deemed "criminal") practices to the police authorities – illegal and "criminal" not only business-wise, but also for using employees as street patrollers, who are not legally registered as security agents, and therefore less controllable if they use illegitimate violence.

▶ *Photo 1: Never too careful! Multiple layers of security companies Atholl, 2006, © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou*

▶ *Figure 1*

15
From R100 to R200 depending on the nature of the contributor (resident, small or big business): 12 to 25 Euros.

16
The other reasons being: a community initiative becoming a business; the growing visibility of the initiative, becoming a model (with other suburbs asking for its extension to their area); the political accusation of representing "elitist policing"; a personal conflict between the chair of the CPF and the manager of *CPF on the Beat*.

17
The Atholl Project proposes to patrol the street at night for R250 per household (R400 for the current private security company). Its failure to pay the security company led the latter (running at R30.000 a loss per month for its guarding operations) to cross-subsidise it by using the profit made by its armed response unit (about 300 customers in the area).

18
As was stated by Didier and Morange (2005) in the case of Cape Town.

19
The main difference to "community" security companies being the nature of the link with public authorities (the police in particular). This is the main point developed infra.

20
See Angot 2006.

21
As stated by several residents, they would rather 'help the police' than 'make the security companies millionaires'...

22
This point is developed in Bénit, 2005.

23
Olivier de Sardan 2004.

24
See Steinberg 2005, showing the contradiction between white rural communities' expectations, developed through a participation process (that the police and/or the residents target stock theft) and the national priorities leading to focus the local police resources on personal assaults, dominant in the townships.

25
Hornberger 2004.

26
The legitimacy of which is not discussed in detail here (see note 20).

The distinction between community and business-driven security projects is obviously extremely blurred. In such wealthy neighbourhoods, the households' contributions are potentially high and security issues are a major political concern, giving local leaders much scope for political advancement as well as personal enrichment[18]. Non-profit, "community" security companies seldom remain such, since temptations are numerous to transform them into a thriving business and to make huge profits.

"Community" security companies are located in a specific niche of the private security market, promoting their small scale, flexibility and accountability to the residents and to the police. But it is also a niche developed by some small private security companies, operating in a few suburbs only, who compete with the major ones by underlining their flexibility, their responsiveness to local demands and their closeness to the "community"[19]. The term "community" is indeed a very powerful marketing instrument, with or without the police support[20]. In Parkview, the confusion about the name CPF on the Beat allowed the organisation to raise funds in the name of the Community Policing Forum (CPF) – and there was a fierce legal battle led by the CPF and the police (after the project had been discarded) in order to forbid the use of such a misleading name.

Moreover, in the name of the "community", security projects are able to put increased social pressure on residents who do not contribute financially, for instance in Atholl through the creation of a database pinpointing those residents not contributing. (cf. Figure 2)

However, community security projects are also being criticised by some residents for their lack of efficiency, in spite of their supposed local commitment. Small is not always beautiful, as smaller security companies (whether community or business) lack the "back-up" system – an efficient radio system, good training, backing cars, etc., allowing for quick and efficient re-

sponse. This criticism is extended by residents to the police service itself, whose lack of resources is understood as the root of its inefficiency.

How can the police monitor non-state security initiatives?

However, non-state security stakeholders wishing to help the police[21] in addressing its lack of resources or personnel shortage encounter important technical as well as structural difficulties. We are not even mentioning here the political issue[22]: the overall equity question raised by the creation of an "elitist" police – obvious in these types of initiatives in the wealthy areas (where residents are able to pay for a better service), but also contained in a way in the very principle of "community policing", a factor of inequality since it is drawing on whichever resources are locally available.

The direct, personal contacts between police officers and residents or security companies, especially when involving money, are likely to slip into basic corruption practices. The Weberian notion of an anonymous and therefore efficient and just bureaucracy is still entrenched in the very centralised South African Police Service, unlike in many other African countries[23]. However, a trend towards decentralisation, an increasing accountability to the residents at the station level and the enhancement of local partnerships have certainly created expectations difficult to fulfil[24], as well as opened a scope for the personalisation of relationships with the police[25].

In a system of locally unequal policing resources[26], what were the options for the residents of wealthy areas willing to help the police with what they have to offer: their money, while trying to avoid setting up mechanisms for corruption? Money handling, or hiring of supplementary policing personnel, requires mediation, either through a change of scale within the police (national police), or through an intermedi-

ary non-state body, in both cases providing a form of control by creating a distance between contributors and beneficiaries.

The first solution – involving for instance donations to the national police budget that will eventually be allocated to the ad hoc police station – was not adopted for very long neither in Parkview nor in Atholl. In a post-apartheid context of high social and spatial inequalities where the political principle of redistribution is prevalent, donations to the national budget coming from a wealthy neighbourhood are to be redistributed to deprived areas[27]. There are some informal agreements between donating communities and the police hierarchy (at the metropolitan and provincial level) to allocate the donated funds to the area it originated from – so as not to discourage donations; however these agreements remain informal and their formalisation would be politically difficult.

The second solution was attempted in Parkview, through the creation of *CPF on the Beat* – a non-profit organisation which could, unlike the Community Policing Forum (a police statutory body) collect funds and hire private security agents. However, the financial monitoring of this mediating agency by the Community Policing Forum failed[28], as *CPF on the Beat* acted less and less as a "community" body and more and more like a business.

An alternative and more common mediating agent would be a private security company hired by residents, and which would be expected by its collective customer (the "community") to work with the police. Establishing partnerships between the police and private security companies is indeed easier when there is one dominant, if not monopolistic, security company (be it private or community) in an area. Berg[29], in her case study of Cape Town, showed that the most efficient public-private security partnerships emerged in the City Improvement Districts[30], where a single security company is usually in charge of patrolling the delimited area. The same could be said about enclosures (restriction of access to public streets in a suburb), or in the security villages (private and walled neighbourhoods) – also manned and patrolled by one dominant security company.

However, these partnerships remain very fragile and probably quite limited. The marketing strategy of private security companies necessarily puts forward a competitive agenda – and their crime priorities and logic of action significantly differ from that of the police[31].

Such competition did not exist in Parkview residential area, where a strong relationship existed between the police and the 'community' security company through an empowered Community Policing Forum, whose representatives were significantly attending police management meetings, and were not pushed by any marketing concerns to take over the monitoring of the supplementary security force they were paying for. These difficulties are highlighted a contrario by the enthusiasm Parkview police expressed when talking about the community security initiative:

"They [CPF on the Beat] had the support of the police: they had the same radio channel, a direct link with the police. It was in a way the police's own private company. I could dictate them where to go: 'there is crime in that street, deploy ten guys over there...' It is the way we should actually work with private companies! But I can't just say to ADT [a big private security company]: 'go there, there is crime'!" (Parkview police officer)

Conclusion

The difficulty in setting up 'real' partnerships lies in the complexity of the public monitoring of supplementary funds or personnel devoted to street policing. While donations to the police are acceptable, the direct payment of regular sums into police operational budgets by business or community stakeholders is very problematic, leading to a loss of independence and possible corruption of the police service. If mediating

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The "community", a marketing device?

NON-contributors. We are currently trying to appeal to all residents of Atholl to assist us in some way, and we acknowledge those who really cannot afford the extra burden [...]. The map of our suburb has really assisted us in the following up of residents, and one family has also really contributed in assisting us with the computerization of Atholl map and database! This is near completion, and we will be able to detail residents and all contributors, as well as those regrettably still "unknown" to the project.

Atholl newsletter, November 2003

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organisations can deal with the supplementary funds (be it community non-profit or business organisations), the question of monitoring the supplementary security personnel remains. The community initiatives seem easier to integrate within the local police strategies – since the private security sector has got its own, market-driven logic. However the formalisation

27
Legislation allows police authorities to redistribute donations if they wish to do so.

28
The manager of *CPF on the Beat* refused to submit its financial accounts to the Community Policing Forum (CPF), as had been agreed, very informally, between him and the CPF chair when they were still friends.

29
Berg 2004b.

30
A City Improvement District is a perimeter within which property owners and businesses agree to pay a supplementary levy that will be used within the perimeter to enhance urban services, in particular security and cleanliness. The board of owners will usually hire a managing agency, which will employ a team of cleaners and security agents servicing the area. See also Didier and Morange, Peyroux in this issue.

31
Shearing and Stenning 1983 ; Irish 1999.

▶ *Figure 2*

▶ *Photo 3: CPF on the Beat: community, a good marketing device Parkview, 2004, © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou*

► Photo 4: You enter a zone patrolled by Stallion, Cyrilldene, 2003, © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou

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of partnerships between police and communities has generally failed, due to their technical fragility (flexibility of community involvement, personalisation of relationships leading to possible corruption and conflict, blurred boundaries between community and personal –financial and political – interests) as well as their political difficulties (if the private sector can easily target high income areas, it is considered less legitimate for police to set up "elitist policing" thanks to the involvement of wealthy communities).

Very aware of these complexities, the South African government is busy refining its monitoring of non-state security initiatives by drafting new legislation on private security companies as well as on Community Policing Forums (the 1995 legislation being considered too broad, having led to too big a variety of community security initiatives). However, the latter (in its provincial version) seems to forbid – as a likely consequence of the Parkview experiment – the Community Policing Forums to have a close link with, or to set up and monitor any non-profit association. Initiatives like the Atholl Security Project, much less genuine in terms of community involvement and not monitored by any public authority, are given preference and therefore are likely to develop, as are communities' collective contracts with private security companies – also leaving the police aside. It is as if the complexity of a formal agreement with the police was too dangerous, possibly associating a public authority with dubious (business and political) practices, which are tolerated as long as no public authority puts its name on it. Making money out of security, financing an "elite" police service, are accepted as long as they remain non-state initiatives, endorsed by non-state agents. Would this mean the abandonment of any attempt to monitor security networks – leaving vast areas to be policed by the private sector, giving up too complex partnerships with communities?

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Privatisation and Fragmentation of Policing in South-Western Nigeria

Laurent Fourchard

Thema des Artikels ist die Privatisierung der Polizeiarbeit, die nach und nach die Städte insgesamt betrifft. Als Fallstudie dienen dazu die Städte der Yoruba in Südwest-Nigeria. Während in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren vermutlich nur einige schlecht versorgte Quartiere Nachbarschaftswachleute einstellten, hat die steigende Kriminalität und der Wandel der Polizeiarbeit seit den 1960ern zunehmend zu einer Privatisierung der Sicherheitsfunktionen bis zur gesamtstädtischen Ebene geführt. Der Artikel analysiert die Verschiedenartigkeit der von den Bewohnern entwickelten Lösungen und konzentriert sich auf die historische und räumliche Dynamik dieses Phänomens. Die Vielschichtigkeit der Lösungen macht den hohen Grad an institutioneller und räumlicher Fragmentierung deutlich. Der Mangel an Koordination zwischen den Organisationen ist offensichtlich. Die Lösungen verdeutlichen die wachsende Kluft zwischen reichen und armen Gebieten sowie zwischen den neuen Wohngebieten und dem heruntergekommenen Zentrum.

A large body of literature within the last ten years has insisted on the privatisation of state functions in Africa but very few have focused on the changes that took place within the police itself, with arguably the South African exception. For some researchers, the political liberalisation of the 1990s has had limited impact on the everyday routine of the police which remains largely enshrined in post-colonial practices (Hill, 2000: 17-24) whereas the recent introduction of community policing in English speaking countries has not been considered a radical change in police culture in Africa (Brogden, 2004; Rutere and Pommerolle, 2003). Simultaneously, many researches have emphasised the rise of private security companies, the development of non-state armies and various militia and vigilante groups in the 1980s and the 1990s (Banégas, 1999, Anderson, 2002). According to Béatrice Hibou, the privatisation of state functions does not necessarily mean the decline of the state, nor the victory of the private over the public but rather a permanent process of state formation (Hibou, 1999: 12-13). Following Max Weber's analysis, she argues that the 'discharge' of state functions to different bodies has been historically important in the construction of many states including European ones. This has been the case in Nigeria, where the state has been delegating police power to community organisations since the 1930s (Fourchard, 2005). It seems, however, that the current government is no longer able to control non-state policing if we only look at the rising growth of illegal vigilante or militia groups since the 1990s (Agbu, 2004).[1] At first glance, Nigeria looks like other African countries in which the monopole of state violence has recently been challenged by the rise of new collective actors. However, in this article we want to argue that the privatisation of policing[2] in Nigeria has been a longer historical process which has led to a fragmentation of policing solutions. Time and space are thus two major dimensions for analysing such phenomena, firstly to understand the historical origin of what is generally considered a contemporary phenomenon and secondly to analyse how non-state policing, initially limited to a few neighbourhoods, has now extended to the whole city without any coordination. The various solutions implemented by neighbourhoods over time led to a spatial and institutional fragmentation of security provisions. We focus our discussion on south-western Nigeria, one of the most ancient urbanised areas on the continent, which today has some of the most populated cities (Lagos with 12-15 million, Ibadan with 3-5 million inhabitants) and where crime and policing problems arose very early.

Crime and policing: a national challenge in Nigeria

Violent crime is often considered to have grown as a consequence of the Civil War (1967-1969), but more recent research has indicated that armed robberies and banditry were common in the 19th and 20th century Yoruba cities (Fourchard, 2005, 2006). However, the crime landscape has changed dramatically over the last decades. During the colonial period (end of the 19th century – 1960), especially since the 1930s, armed robbers operated by night and in a few under-policed neighbourhoods of large cities before they extended their operations to commercial centres, residential areas and main country roads in the 1960s and 1970s. This expansion is the result of a major change in police and criminal practice over the last forty years, with a more common use of cars and fire arms and with the rise of more violent armed robber gangs targeting the main beneficiaries of oil revenues (middle and upper class). Simultaneously, the police has become an instrument in the hands of political parties, especially during electoral campaigns, their members gradually being more affected by corruption practices whereas the little tradition of crime investigation that had been established in the 1930s rapidly collapsed.

British indirect rule gave large power of coercion to Native Authorities (NA), especially in the north and in former Yoruba city states, which used NA Police to implement law and order in the country and large 'indig-

1
In this article, I use 'non state policing' to designate organisations of private actors and movements involved in policing operations rather than 'community policing', a notion popularised since the 1980s and which, in academic literature, generally refers to a better cooperation between the police and the policed

2
By privatisation of policing we are referring to all forms of non-state policing – private security companies, community policing and less orderly forms of residents' involvement in the production of security.

enous' cities. The adoption of a federal formula in the 1950s was supposed to give guarantees for the autonomy of the regions but the multiplication of states (three regions at independence (1st October 1960), 36 weak states nowadays) has mainly reinforced the federal state. In this framework, the disbanding of local police forces and their progressive amalgamation to the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in 1966-1970 deprived local elites and traditional rulers of one of the major sources of power and support (Marenin, 1985). Local governments set up in the 1950s have no vested power of police and cannot implement coordinated public policies at the city level while chiefs and 'traditional' rulers are today only one political actor among many, even if in the west, some of them still perform a policing role. However, the claim for a local police has strongly been advocated by elected state governors especially those in opposition to the federal government during civilian rule[3]. Crime and policing thus represents a larger political issue for most local and national actors. The federal government and the NPF want to limit the number of non-authorised movements but simultaneously they have in the past authorised non-state policing. Some state governors, following their own agenda, actively support non-state policing movements. Finally, local communities set up neighbourhood watches, most of the time without any authorisation, but some of these movements may have been involved in local politics.

Today, three main types of organisations involved in security matters can be identified: associations, vigilantes and militia. Initially, vigilante groups (the term first appeared in Nigeria in the mid 1980s) were created mainly to ensure the security of lives and property

while civil associations (hometown, migrant, market, landlord, neighbourhood) were more concerned with social security functions. Militia groups are also different from vigilantes because they are formed primarily to defend ethno-regional interests (Fourchard, 2003: 41). But these distinctions are not all that clear and most of these organisations generally combine various agendas and perform very different roles (anti-criminal activities, strong mobilisation against other ethnic groups during urban riots, involvement in local and national politics during electoral campaigns). A historical approach is thus necessary to understand the roots of these movements, their change over time as well as their unequal impact at the city level.

A dual policing system and the spatial fragmentation of security provisions

Under colonial rule and during the 1st Republic (1960-1966), the European city (commercial centre, administrative and European reservation areas) was under the surveillance of the NPF, whereas NA Police was given the task to implement law and order in the 'indigenous' city. This double policing system was unequal, the African city being much more under-policed than the European one. The amalgamation of NA Police and NPF in the late 1960s should have brought all the cities under the control of the NPF but Marenin considers that police forces were still concentrated on government residential areas in the early 1980s (Marenin, 1985: 80). Consequently, violent crime and insecurity feelings first hit the 'indigenous city' (large pre-colonial centre and new colonial layouts for African migrants), before concerning more protected residential and commercial areas in the 1970s.

In the 'indigenous' city, the pre-colonial institution of night guards, suppressed by the British at the beginning of the 20th century, was progressively re-introduced in most Yoruba cities in the 1930s. The colonial administration authorised native authorities to supervise the organisation of this policing system. In Ibadan, for instance, two systems were set up 1) community street patrols or neighbourhood watches composed of volunteer adult males under the supervision of elders (baale). They were formed into small groups by areas used for night patrol duties; 2) and recruitment of night guards (ode) paid by members of the neighbourhood, generally Yoruba hunters who were known to detain powerful anti-criminal charms. The first formula was the main one in the 1940s whereas the second formula has become increasingly dominant today but the two systems have been widespread in most Yoruba cities and villages since the middle of the 20th century. Authorised or legalised in the south-western region in the 1940s or 1950s, they were no longer supervised by local authorities nor by the police in the following decades. Today, neighbourhood watches are operational in the poorest areas of south-western cities even if they are not the only form of non-state policing (see below).

In the European part of the city, the NPF was responsible for law and order whereas individual night guards were recruited by European and Lebanese companies, by institutions (schools and churches) or by rich landowners: this practice was rather different from African neighbourhoods where these guards were collectively recruited, paid by the 'community' and as such were acting as neighbourhood watches. This combination of a better trained police and night guards devoted to the protection of single units of habitations was enough to ensure the safety of these areas until the

1960s. However, the change of criminal practices (more mobile, more violent and targeting richer areas) forced upper class and middle class neighbourhoods to develop more coordinated responses in the 1970s. But unlike the night guards of the 1940s and 1950s, residents mainly promoted 'gated neighbourhoods', enclosed by physical obstacles in order to prevent automobile assisted crime. In Ibadan, this policing pattern started in the 1970s before becoming prevalent in the 1980s (Fabiyi, 2004 : 47). In an exhaustive study of 'gated neighbourhoods' in Ibadan, Fabiyi found that rich areas have the larger number of gates (and also the most costly) whereas medium density areas have the larger number of crossbars (cheaper than gates) (Fabiyi, 2004 : 31-43). Photos (1, 2, 3 and 4) of Ibadan indicate that slum inhabitants and residents in the inner city do not use this policing system, which is widespread in residential areas especially in Bodija which is one of the first government residential area (GRA) of Ibadan. Consequently, rich neighbourhoods cumulate three layers of security provisions: private guards recruited by individuals, landlords and neighbourhood associations which organise restriction of movements at the ward level and an 'architecture of fear' (fenced houses, spikes and wires on fences, burglary proof windows and so on) which have been developing in the upper class areas of Lagos and other southern cities since the 1980s (Agbola, 1997). In those areas, privatisation of security has gradually led to privatisation of public space. In the poorer areas, the second and the third layers do not exist, costly physical obstacles are rare, while anti-criminal charms used by guards and inhabitants alike are considered to be one of the most efficient protections. Since the 1990s, neighbourhood watches and night guards have sometimes been replaced by Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) members considered to be more ef-

▶ Photo 2: Active cross bar in Old Bodija. August 2004. Photo: Seyi Fabiyi. Courtesy of Seyi Fabiyi.

ficient in many poor neighbourhoods of Ibadan and Lagos[4]. Today, the provision of security at the local level thus depends on the wealth of the inhabitants even if this variable alone cannot explain the multiplication of policing solutions.

Institutional fragmentation of security provisions

The incapacity of the state to coordinate and control the multiplication of security responses to crime has led to an institutional fragmentation of policing practices. First, the state failed to control the historical development of neighbourhood watches at the local level. In the mid 1980s, Babangida's government tried to regain control over the multiple forms of non-state policing by modifying the appalling image of the police. He promoted a Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) all over Nigeria and subsequently set up vigilante groups in order to develop cooperation between the police and community neighbourhood watches. But this policy did not change former police practices (intense corruption, large use of torture, little interest for crime prevention) and neighbourhood watches continued to perform their role as they did before. More importantly, the successive governments failed to control the rise of movements (either 'ethnic', 'religious' or commercial) which claim to perform vigilante activities without having any authorisation. This is documented by the well known case of the so-called 'ethnic militia groups', which became very powerful in many parts of Nigeria in the 1990s (such as the Bakassi Boys and the Egbusu Boys in Eastern Nigeria and OPC in Western Nigeria) (Agbu, 2004). In 2002, the federal state forbade these groups in order to avoid their political use during the 2003 electoral campaign (Fourchard, 2003). But banning these organisations did not suppress them. While OPC remains the major vigilante group in south-western Nigeria today, the 'Bakassi Boys' were changed by the Anambra state governor into Anambra Vigilante Services. Unlike the neighbourhood watches or-

ganised at the local level, these groups are organised at the regional level with a strong hierarchy and an embryonic administrative structure.

Moreover, many different organisations have also gained parcels of police power. Two examples among others can be given. Policing public motor parks in Lagos and Ibadan, often considered to be crime hot spots, is implemented today by the main road transport unions in Nigeria (Nigerian Road Transport Union Workers, NURTW). Unofficial agreements between police officers and local NURTW chairmen authorise the latter to check crime and to levy taxes in their own motor parks in exchange for a monthly sum given to the police (Albert 2006). Old policing actors such as 'traditional authorities' may also have been promoted in certain occasions. For instance, in the city of Ijebu Ode, in 1996 the idea of introducing a 'vigilante system' monitored by 'traditional' authorities came from the highest authority (the Awujale of Ijebuland), who decided to resuscitate the night guard institutions based on wards (Itun). An inter-Itun committee supervised by a council meets with the police once a month (Agbola and Sobanjo, 2003). If this last example indicates a will from the police to associate closely with chieftaincy hierarchy, this example has not been replicated in bigger cities.

Thus the fragmentation of policing responses at the local and the national level is today very high. In most of the cities in the west, a large number of uncoordinated bodies have official, unofficial or illegal police power such as the Federal Police, the OPC, neighbourhood watches, landlord and tenants' associations, transporters' unions, 'traditional authorities'. This represents a real challenge to the stability of Nigeria because each of these groups can be used and financed during electoral campaigns as armed movements or as 'political thugs' as has happened several times in the past (during the 1964, 1999 and 2003 general elections).

Finally, this shift of power from public to non-state agents in policing urban space represents a delegation of power without sustainable control. Is this particular trajectory unique in Africa? Studies on non-state policing are rare in Africa and mainly focused on the last two decades, except in South Africa. Like in south-western Nigerian cities, community-based organisations in Johannesburg did function irregularly in black townships since the 1930s while the white city was well protected by the police (Goodhew, 1993; Kynoch, 2001). Like in Nigerian cities, when richer areas more frequently became targets of criminals, these later generally built either 'gated neighbourhoods' (Lagos Ibadan since the 1970s), road closures, gated communities or other specific arrangements such as a City Improvement District (Johannesburg and Cape Town in the 1990s) (see Mariane Morange, Sophie Didier Claire Bénit and Elisabeth Peyroux in this issue). Moreover in the two countries, community responses to crime were sometimes authorised: night guards in the 1940s and 1950s and vigilante groups in the mid 1980s in Nigeria, Civilian Protection Service during Word War II and Magkotla in the late 1970s and the 1980s in Johannesburg. Beyond these resemblances,

two central differences between the two countries should be mentioned. First, the Nigerian Police has no legitimacy and no popularity and is still strongly embedded in post-colonial practices whereas the South African Police has regained some popularity since its radical changes from the Apartheid period. Second, the South African Police has had some success in controlling vigilante groups whereas the Nigerian Police has never had sustainable means to enforce the interdiction of illegal groups.

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Practices of Socio-spatial Control in the Marginal Neighbourhoods of Lima, Peru

Jörg Plöger

Die gegenwärtige Überformung Limas resultiert aus der tiefgreifenden ökonomischen Krise während der 1980er Jahre und dem daraufhin eingeleiteten wirtschaftspolitischen Strukturwandel. Während die sozialen Ungleichheiten auf hohem Niveau stagnieren, ist der Staat nicht in der Lage, eine ausreichende und gleichmäßige Leistungsversorgung zu gewährleisten. So wird die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung durch die zunehmende Instabilität ihrer Lebensbedingungen bedroht. Direkte und indirekte Unsicherheiten führen zur Herausbildung einer uneinheitlichen Stadtlandschaft. In den Nachbarschaften äußert sich das in der Vermehrung nachträglich und informell abgeschlossener Wohnenklaven. Im Gegensatz zu anderen lateinamerikanischen Großstädten handelt es sich dabei um einen sozialschichtenübergreifenden Prozess. Über die Anwendung verschiedener Maßnahmen und Strategien sozialräumlicher Kontrolle eignen sich die Bewohner ihre Wohnumgebung kontinuierlich an. Einerseits werden dadurch bestimmten Gruppen und Nutzungen vom Zugang ausgeschlossen. Andererseits kann es über den Sicherheitsdiskurs aber auch zu einer Wiederbelebung lokaler Gemeinschaften kommen, wie am Beispiel einiger Nachbarschaften marginalen Ursprungs verdeutlicht wird.

Rising insecurities in the context of recent transformation processes

In Peru, the severe economic crisis aggravated during the "lost decade" of the 1980s and the consequent politics of structural adjustment since 1990 have had a considerable impact on the society.[1] While the high levels of existing socio-economic inequalities are maintained, the population is confronted with a wide range of uncertainties regarding all aspects of their life.[2] According to Figueroa et al. (1996), three quarters of the population belong neither to the small group of entirely integrated upper income groups nor to the group of those structurally excluded. This means that the majority of households are potentially threatened by exclusion and social downgrading. Correspondingly, Herrera (1999) observed the fluctuation of poverty, showing that in addition to the 40 percent below the poverty line, another 20 percent of households were at least once affected by poverty during the 1990s. As employment conditions are characterised by growing informalisation and instability, a majority of households find it increasingly difficult to generate sufficient income. This results in deteriorating standards of living, status degradation and social disintegration. On the other hand, the downsizing and privatisation of the state has continuously weakened the capability of its institutions to provide sufficient services. The overall insecurities deriving from this situation are expressed most apparently in the fear of crime and the fear of others.

Since the 1990s, Lima's urban landscape has been transformed significantly. The unsustainable urban sprawl of the previous decades, mostly through the spread of informal settlements on the periphery, was slowed down.[3] This was principally due to the deceleration of the population growth through migration from rural areas, the increasing scarcity of available land and the congested traffic infrastructure. The central areas of the so-called "cones", Lima's predominantly marginal annexes extending to the north, east and south of the metropolitan area, have experienced processes of densification and the emergence of new nodes of activity.[4] In the context of a neo-liberal transformation and unchanged social inequalities, the exposure to direct and indirect insecurities translates spatially into a more complex and heterogeneous urban landscape, which in the residential sector is exemplified by the proliferation of fortified enclaves.

Exposure to insecurity and social inequalities

In Lima, public safety is one of the most contested urban issues. Since the official data on the development of crime rates is very unreliable, estimates do not provide sufficient proof that they have risen. However, the perception of insecurity steadily grows, as surveys show.[5] This is accompanied by a prevalent lack of trust in the efficiency of public authorities to improve the situation. As a consequence, individuals and groups adapt their spatial movements and daily encounters to their personal tolerance towards risk.

The lower social sectors are especially exposed to insecurity. Lima's security landscape reflects the reproduction of social inequalities. The ability to protect oneself from a more complex and unpredictable urban environment and a society perceived as increasingly heterogeneous and disintegrated is distributed unevenly. Lower class neighbourhoods are underserviced not only regarding the equipment with basic infrastructure, but also regarding the provision with other public services or goods, for example public safety. Public police forces, such as the national police (PNP) or the municipal security forces (serenazgo)[6], are distributed unequally. In addition, poorer neighbourhoods are not able to collect sufficient funds

1
Gonzáles 1998

2
Ugarteche 1998, Grompone 1999, Joseph 2004

3
Kroß 1992

4
Ludeña 1998, Chion 2002

5
INEI 1998b, Basombrío 2003

6
These public security forces are paid for with local taxes and are now employed by most municipalities in Lima. Without disposing of the legal authority, they often carry out duties restricted to the police.

for employing a similar number of security guards or for installing the same amount and quality of physical devices as more affluent areas. Security provision becomes a more local, communal and private matter.[7] The residents compensate the protection gap by forming self-organised vigilante groups (rondas vecinales) or by employing security personnel. More than 700 reported cases of "vigilante justice" in 2004 symbolise the degree of perceived insecurity, especially in marginal areas.[8]

The most effective approach towards crime prevention by the state has been the inauguration of a national programme for public safety in 2003. It created the legal framework for an improved collaboration between the PNP, the municipalities and the residents. In Lima, hundreds of neighbourhood groups have been founded especially in the poorer districts to serve as local partners for the police.

Residential enclave building in Lima

The spread of enclosed residential complexes or neighbourhoods is a phenomenon observed throughout Latin America.[9] However, in Lima, the process of residential enclave building differs from the development in other Latin American metropolises in several aspects. In the Peruvian capital, subsequently and informally enclosed neighbourhoods are by far the most dominant type. Although informal road closures appear in many Latin American cities, existing studies have focussed on gated communities. Instead of the real-estate sector offering a product, the residents themselves, mostly organised through some form of local association, initiate the fortification process. Residential spaces are being appropriated, controlled and fortified through the implementation of different socio-spatial measures and strategies. Street gates are the most prominent, though not the only, physical feature of spatial intervention (see fig. 1 and 2).

Most of Lima has been urbanised using variations of the gridlock street pattern, characteristic for Latin American cities. For that reason, many neighbourhoods, if not located close to topographic boundaries, possess a high degree of accessibility. The consequence is that neighbourhoods can be penetrated easily by through-traffic and trespassing strangers. The imposition of socio-spatial control can be regarded as an attempt to re-establish a feeling of spatial comfort. Due to its ex-post nature, the spatial reality created by the enclave building process is not static, but subject to continuous changes over time. The actual security geography of an area is determined by the degree of local community cohesion, the available financial resources and the importance of security-related discourses.

The process is characterised by its almost complete informality. Very few of the installed street barriers are authorised by the responsible authorities, although they constrain access to public spaces and the right to free movement. In an attempt to regulate the often-chaotic security landscape, the metropolitan authority of Lima passed a law in 2004 that was designed

ALTO
ORDEN DE DISPARAR
¡ VIVIENDA
VIGILADA !

to formalise existing and future street closures. The impact appears to have been rather minimal, though. This is mainly due to the fact that the municipalities are made responsible for the application and local enforcement of the law. These often have no real interest in confronting their residents with unpopular measures such as dismantling the erected devices. As recent newspaper articles suggest, the regulation only seems to induce the legalisation of the informal status quo (El Comercio 26.07.2005).

The fortification of residential areas has only appeared as a widespread feature since the end of the 1990s. It is estimated that the number of residential enclaves has reached approximately 300.[10] Apart from some denser, central areas, they are now spread all over the Lima metropolitan area. Nevertheless, concentrations can be distinguished in districts such as La Molina, Los Olivos, San Luis or the western part of Ate. In contrast to the situation in other Latin American metropolises, the enclave building process crosses socio-economic boundaries to a greater extent. While fortified enclaves are still over-represented in wealthier areas, more than half are located either in neighbourhoods of the lower middle (30 percent) or lower-class (24 percent).

Reactions to insecurity: examples from marginal settlements

The foundation of informal, marginal neighbourhoods requires a high degree of community organisation to initiate the process of legalisation and consolidation.

▶ *Figure 1: Subsequently installed street gate and informally employed security guard. District of San Juan de Lurigancho*
Photo: Jörg Plöger

▶ *Figure 2: "Warning: this home is protected by armed response". District of Comas*
Photo: Jörg Plöger

7
Pereyra 2003

8
La República 04.11.2004

9
e.g. Caldeira 2000, Cabrales 2002, Geographica Helvetica 2002

10
Plöger 2005

It can be observed that the strong social ties and the will to participate in the achievement of common goals declines with growing consolidation. Many marginal settlements are now spatially and functionally integrated into the urban texture and find themselves confronted with problems typically associated with more urbanised areas, e.g. crime, social disintegration, traffic congestion or ecological problems. As results from several areas studied in Lima demonstrate, it is in this context that community organisations are re-articulated, with insecurity being one central driving force.

Community cohesion and social control

Corsac is a marginal settlement of about 1,000 inhabitants located in a small valley in the district of Puente Piedra on the northern fringe of the metropolitan area. The name is an abbreviation for "Comunidad de Residentes de San Agustín de Canin", which refers to the Andean highland village from where almost all heads of household migrated. The community was founded in order to gather migrants from the same regional and cultural background already living in different parts of Lima. According to census estimates, the majority of households belong to the lowest social group and disposes of an income of approximately US$ 100.[11]

After purchasing the land and assigning the lots to community members, the association, with help from an NGO, worked out a development plan that included future facilities and open spaces. The equipment with infrastructure is still very basic, though. Only a few households have managed to improve the quality of their homes, while the majority still use basic construction materials, such as bast, wood, cardboard or corrugated iron (see Fig. 3).

The strong community cohesion facilitates the exertion of social and spatial control even with lower financial resources, but is also based upon the rejec-

tion of behaviour considered as deviating from the norm. Residents not obeying the agreed-upon rules can be punished with the denial of their membership. The neighbourhood representative emphasised the need for a high degree of identification with the objectives and ideals of the community for the protection against the interests of outsiders. The residents feel less threatened by crime and violence, although local youth gangs occasionally roam the area. The biggest concern stems from the recent emergence of informal marginal settlements on the surrounding hills. Due to the fear that these might extend on land belonging to the neighbourhood, the boundary has been demarcated by stones, fences and other physical devices. Additionally, the only official entrance has been equipped with a gate. Each household pays for a security guard, who is also a resident, by making a small monthly contribution. While the police is virtually absent in the area, the neighbours rely on the service of the municipal serenazgo. With a walkie-talkie handed over by the district authorities, the security guard is now able to call the serenazgo in case of an emergency.

Dangerous places and groups

Further features of the process of residential enclave building in marginal areas are illustrated by Barrio 2, a neighbourhood located in the Pachacámac area of Villa El Salvador. This semi-consolidated neighbourhood was developed since the mid-1980s partly through a programme of public housing assistance and partly by illegal land invasions. About half of the approximately 13,000 inhabitants each belong to the lower and the lowest social sectors.

The neighbourhood now faces various problems, most importantly the persistence of poverty and the increase of social disintegration and crime. According to the representatives of the neighbourhood association, the police, despite the serious situation, do

not properly attend to the area. As a consequence, several neighbours have collected funds in order to close-off streets since 2001. A total of 31 gates and two barriers have been installed so far (see map, fig. 4). Although the perception of security has improved in the enclosed sections, insecurity remains a problem elsewhere, especially in the informal market areas and other public spaces. At the moment, no security guards are employed in the neighbourhood because earlier experiences showed that they were too expensive in the long run and there have been allegations about them being connected to robberies. Instead, the association has re-organised neighbourhood watch groups (rondas vecinales) founded during the 1980s as a response to the insecurity during the years of terrorism. In spite of the fact that crime is usually associated with "dangerous groups" from the outside, in Pachacámac persons from inside the neighbourhood are claimed to be responsible. The residents of two areas that were invaded illegally are stigmatised as "people with bad lifestyles", or more specifically as gang-members, petty-thieves or drug consumers.

They are referred to as a threat to the well being of the "decent majority". As a member of the neighbourhood association mentioned cynically, these areas are not equipped with gates because the delinquents would not tend to rob themselves.

More comprehensive approaches

Clorinda Málaga de Prado in the district of Comas, with a population of approximately 2,500, has reached an advanced level of consolidation. The largest proportion of households belongs to the upper strata of the lower social sector. The neighbourhood is located in a topographical niche surrounded by hills and was illegally invaded in the mid-1950s by a group of migrants from the same province in the Andean highland. Nowadays, their children and grandchildren predominantly lead the households. After the satisfaction of primary needs such as consolidation, connection to basic infrastructure and the legal recognition of the property titles, the original neighbourhood association had ceased to exist.

▶ Map: Security geography. Barrio 2, district of Villa El Salvador. Cartography: P. Engler

▶ Figure 4: Informal street
gate. Barrio 2, district of
Villa El Salvador
Photo: Jörg Plöger

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Harvey 1996:294

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Since 2001, some residents decided to organise themselves again. The main reason was to find an appropriate way to react to the increase in crime. In contrast to uncoordinated, small-scale spatial inter-ventions, as e.g. in the Pachacámac case, they elabo-rated a comprehensive neighbourhood development plan, including the improvement of public and com-munal spaces and the application of design features that are intended to provide a higher degree of secu-rity. The plan also includes the installation of an en-trance gate and the employment of private security personnel. The aim was to clearly indicate the neigh-bourhood boundaries to outsiders, hence helping to establish a sense of territoriality. Apart from the pro-tection against crime these means were also intended to prevent land invasions in the vicinity, albeit its own informal origin.

Conclusion

As the three case studies presented above demon-strate, in Lima, the process of residential enclave building extends to marginal neighbourhoods. Nev-ertheless, depending on factors such as degree of community cohesion, socio-economic structure, geographical location and development history, the security landscapes are very diverse. Corsac serves as an example for less consolidated marginal neigh-bourhoods with low financial possibilities but strong community ties. In some semi-consolidated neigh-bourhoods, weakened neighbourhood cohesion and an increase in urban insecurity are manifested by a heterogeneous security landscape (Barrio 2). More comprehensive approaches to security provision as adopted in Clorinda Málaga de Prado are still very sel-dom in areas of marginal origin, though.

Residents are important actors in the transformation of the metropolises of the south, especially those with a high degree of informality, high levels of social in-equality and deteriorating public services. In Lima, a process of spatial "small-scaling" accompanies the increasing social differentiation and complexity. While the city as a whole is perceived as less predictable and coherent, subsequently enclosed neighbourhoods are an attempt to re-establish controllable spatial units on

the local level. In the context of greater instability due to the exposure to rising overall insecurities, this can be interpreted as a strategy to secure the permanence of places.[12] While city life seems to be continuously less predictable and the interaction with others is in-creasingly characterised by distrust, residential areas are increasingly appropriated and equipped with dif-ferent layers of socio-spatial control. As a by-product of sharing specific common interests that derive from inhabiting the same area, and based upon the exclu-sion of unwanted social groups and spatial uses, local communities are being re-articulated.

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The Production of Urban Space in Vietnam's Metropolis in the Course of Transition:
Internationalization, Polarization and Newly Emerging Lifestyles in Vietnamese Society

Michael Waibel

Die Entwicklung Vietnams nach der Einführung marktwirtschaftlicher Reformen seit den späten 1980er Jahren kann sicher als Erfolgsgeschichte gewertet werden. Exportorientiertes Wachstum und zunehmende Integration in die Weltwirtschaft hat den Weg zu einer modernen Konsumgesellschaft geöffnet. Die Metropolen Ho Chi Minh City und Hanoi haben erwartungsgemäß am stärksten von dieser Entwicklung profitiert. Mit dem höchsten Lebensstandard sind hier aber auch die stärksten Einkommensunterschiede anzutreffen. Außerdem leiden die städtischen Agglomerationen unter extremem Zuwanderungsdruck aus ländlichen Gebieten, Umweltproblemen, steigender Kriminalität, großer Wohnungsnot und zunehmender sozialräumlicher Fragmentierung. Der Artikel thematisiert die im Zuge der Transformation gewandelte Rolle des Staates und die privater Akteure bei der Veränderung der Städte. So werden etwa neue Akteurskonstellationen bei der Implementierung von Großwohngebieten in der städtischen Peripherie untersucht. Oftmals überlassen dabei staatliche Institutionen die Kontrolle über räumliche Entwicklung Kapitalgesellschaften, die ausschließlich die Wohnbedürfnisse der oberen Mittel- oder Oberschichten befriedigen und so Arme am Wohnungsmarkt nur unzureichend teilhaben lassen.

Vietnam's transitional development since the introduction of market-economy reforms in the late 1980s can certainly be described as a success story. The adoption of export-orientated growth and integration into economic globalization has opened the way for a modern consumer society.

In accordance with most regional transition theories, the metropoles of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi have derived the most benefit from the successive opening-up of the economy to global capital. These urban agglomerations are Vietnam's most outstanding motor of innovation, growth, and globalisation and represent main target regions for flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Here, the urban population can enjoy the highest overall living standard. However, it is also here that the most extreme income disparities are to be found. Furthermore, the metropoles suffer from increasing migration pressure, environmental problems such as air pollution, and rising crime rates. Moreover, the transition of Vietnamese urban society has also led to increasing social differentiation in terms of income, education, family size, consumption patterns, etc. to produce hitherto unknown class divisions.

In terms of urban spaces, the commodification of urban development through several land use reforms allowing land use rights to be traded led to a transfer of state resources to private hands and consequently to a marketization of housing and land. Similar as in China, the state gave up its unique control on urban space and allowed the new actors, such as trans-national corporations, household enterprises or individuals.

As a result, Vietnam's metropoles have been witnessing the production of new urban spatial forms and elements driven by multiple forces.

Overview: New Urban Spaces

The production of *globally orientated spaces* in the inner city cores can be seen in the massive and continuing construction of office and hotel space mostly by trans-national corporations. This contributes to the fast-track development of an internationalized Central Business District (CBD) (see Photo 1).

In the urban periphery, export processing and industrial zones have been established to channel foreign direct investments, which initially also served as demarcated laboratory spaces for market economy conditions. In this context, the most important actors are companies from Japan and from the tiger economies of Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, which in some cases have even taken over the operation of these zones. In Ho Chi Minh City alone, there are three export processing zones and ten industrial zones that have a total size of 2,354 ha and have attracted a cumulative of US$1.54 billion in FDI capital.

► *Photo 1: Central Business District of Ho Chi Minh City*

► *Photo 2: Marginal Settlements along a Canal in Ho Chi Minh City*

The production of *consumption spaces* can be observed by the immense conversion of living space into commercial space in the city cores. In Hanoi, the epicentre for this development has been the famous Ancient Quarter, the country's oldest existing trade, market, and retail estate, which has witnessed an enormous economic revitalization in the course of transition, mainly driven by local individuals (WAIBEL 2002). In general, the city cores of Vietnam's metropoles are increasingly developing into a place of consumption, with modern supermarkets, fancy restaurants, and posh coffee and retail shops belonging to international as well as, increasingly, domestic chains and household enterprises. Consequently, a decrease of population density can be observed there.

In the urban periphery, large shopping complexes have been established. Among the more prominent examples are the superstores of Metro Cash & Carry (Vietnam), a subsidiary of the German retail and wholesale chain. So far, Metro has successfully launched five huge superstores in Ho Chi Minh City (2 sites), Hanoi, Can Tho in the Mekong Delta, and Danang in Central Vietnam.

► *Photo 3: The Ben Nghe Canal before and after the clearance of marginal settlements along its borders (IKONOS-Image 2001 left, Quickbird-Image 2005 right)*

The transitional urban development in Vietnam has given rise to the creation of *informal spaces*, as well. Marginal settlements have emerged that are characterized by massive inflows of rural-urban migrants and by displaced urban poor. About one third of the total population of Ho Chi Minh City is made up of migrants who in most cases cannot afford to buy living space in formal housing markets. Like in other Southeast Asian metropoles, many squatters have spontaneously settled on flood plains along canals and rivers (see Photo 2). In recent time, the municipal government of Ho Chi Minh City increasingly tries to demolish the marginal settlements along the canals, at least in the core city. In the course of the production of new traffic spaces like the Saigon East-West Highway, funded by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, for example, all marginal settlements along Ben Nghe Canal (separating District 1 and District 4) have been torn down and the inhabitants evicted (see Photo 3).

Besides, *informal spaces* have also been created by individuals through the extension of business activities to *public spaces* such as pavements and streets. This strategy could be well observed in the Ancient Quarter of Hanoi, for example, and was a reaction to the limited availability of space. The sidewalks of the Ancient Quarter were also increasingly occupied by the motorbikes of the customers, which made them inaccessible to pedestrians, until the municipal authorities forbade this practice. Also, market stalls or retail outlets have been established around the dilapidated socialist housing complexes through the illegal occupation of public spaces.

Furthermore, the daily flooding of the city cores by street hawkers from the suburban countryside may contribute to the production of informal spaces. The latter development has been labelled the 'pavement economy' (see FORBES 1996: 62) or the 'ruralisation of urban landscape'. Because the state authorities regard the country's metropoles as showcases displaying a modern Vietnam to a globalising world, they increasingly try to ban rural traders and thus informality from the inner city (WAIBEL 2004A: 38).

In addition, the production *of recreational and leisure spaces* could be observed. In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City for example, several large water parks, theme parks, bowling centres, and many tennis courts have been erected (see Photo 9). At the urban-rural fringe of the metropoles international joint-venture companies established spacious golf courses, which are of

course reserved for the newly-emerged upper classes and Asian businessmen. Maybe the most prominent example for the production of leisure spaces is the new national stadium in Hanoi which was the main venue for the 2003 South East Asian games. This new national symbol with a capacity of 40,000 all seated is the biggest stadium in the country and was built at the cost of US$53 million (see Photo 4). Also, the *public spaces* of the metropoles like pavements and streets are increasingly reclaimed as (mostly temporarily) *leisure spaces* by individuals. THOMAS (2002: 1611) gives the examples of roadside celebrations after football matches, pavement commercial ventures and the funerals of popular local heroes.

Last but not least, new *residential spaces* have been produced. The socialist state had never been able to provide its urban population with sufficient living space. Along with the marketization of land and housing in the late 1980s, the growing availability of construction materials, and the abolition of the heavily-subsidized public housing programmes in the early 1990s, the initial public reaction to the severe housing shortages consisted mostly of spontaneous and unregulated urban building activities. A huge construction boom set in, which on the one hand lead to the densification of the existing building structures. On the other hand, delayed and uncontrolled suburbanisation processes set in that are typical for transitional urban development. This contributed to the enormous expansion of the surface area of the metropoles. Due to the high land prices, new houses were mostly built on very small plots of land, whereas the height and standard of the houses depended on the specific financial resources.

Since about the beginning of the new millennium, large companies have begun to get involved into the property market and erected new, mostly up-scale residential living quarters with high-rise buildings, mostly in the periphery of the metropoles. This lead to socially highly selective suburbanization processes. Today, the spatial structure of residential spaces can be described as highly fragmented. Often, modern high-rise buildings are erected in the immediate vicinity of marginal settlements, as seen in District 4 of Ho Chi Minh City. Residential segregation is a consequence of the increase in social polarization of the urban population and is reflected in the residential spaces of Vietnam's metropoles.

In the following, the author will analyse the development of so-called 'new urban areas' as a vivid example of this phenomenon.

Regain of State Control and the Development of New Urban Areas

The precondition for the recent increase of the state's share in urban construction activities has been the continuing restructuring process of the former socialist planning apparatus. This restructuring process became necessary, as the socialist planning institutions turned out to be completely incapable of coping with spontaneous developments typical of a market economy.

Since the mid-1990s, international donors like the UNDP or the World Bank have massively supported the Vietnamese government in the time-consuming restructuring of its public institutions at all levels. Similar as in other transitional societies like in the East-European countries, institutional changes have been much slower than real changes. Consequently, time lags have led to a phase of mostly unregulated (urban) development processes. In the past years, the so-called 'institutional gaps' could be more and more closed.

Along with the general tendency towards the development of an 'entrepreneurial state', the prospect of enormous profits, given the heated property market until 2003 and the availability of large estate properties in the possession of the national or local institutions, the state increasingly became engaged in the production of new residential spaces again.

▶ *Photo 4: My Dinh National Stadium in Hanoi as new national symbol*

▶ *Photo 5: Map of the new urban areas of Hanoi*

Interestingly, the percentage of state-controlled public housing activities is much higher in Hanoi than in Ho Chi Minh City or other South East Asian metropoles. Certainly, the role of Hanoi as the country's capital and as the home of political decision-makers, who may not wish to leave all potential profits to private companies and who may want to serve their clientele, seems to be important in this context.

The state was able to raise its share in housing production in Hanoi from 3.9% in 1995 to 36% in 2002 (HANOI STATISTICAL OFFICE 2003: 108). There, over 50 new urban areas, carefully planned new sites, including a well-equipped infrastructure and mixed residential housing units, are to be built in the periphery of the city core (WAIBEL & SCHNEPF-ORTH 2004: 6) (see Photo 5). In Hanoi, the main implementing actors are state enterprises like the 'Housing and Urban Development Corporation' (HUD) under the Ministry of Construction, and Vietnam's largest construction corporation, the state-owned company VINACONEX with 26,000 employees. As local-state actor, the Hanoi Housing Development and Investment Co-operation (Hadinco) under the Hanoi People's Committee[1] is playing an important role. It is projected that state-controlled companies will develop 7.9 million square meters of new living space in Hanoi alone by 2010. This production volume seems reasonable as the per capita floor space in urban areas still is only at about 10.8 square metres. By the end of 2005, preparations or actual construction projects were underway in about 30 of over 50 new urban areas; five new urban areas have already been completed.

The most prominent new urban areas are the 'Saigon South New Urban Area' in Ho Chi Minh City and 'Ciputra International City' in Hanoi.

Saigon South represents a huge city extension project, just 4 km south of the central District No. 1 of Ho Chi Minh City. Saigon South is a mixed residential and commercial urban development covering 3,300 hectares of former wetlands. Its projected population in the year 2020 will be between 500,000 and 1,000,000 residents (WAIBEL 2004B). This project is being realized by a joint-venture company established by the Taiwanese corporation Central Trading & Development Group (CT&D) and the Vietnamese Tan Thuan Industrial Promotion Corporation (IPC) under the control of the Peoples' Committee of Ho Chi Minh City. CT&D holds a 70% stake in the joint venture's legal capital. Within this area, residential and commercial quarters alternate with educational centres (e.g., the first completely foreign-owned university in Vietnam, the Australian RMIT International University), health facilities, and leisure facilities, such as a golf course. Several gated communities have been established there (see Photo 6).

Another example of this process is the US$2.1 billion urban development project 'Ciputra Hanoi International City' near the West Lake of Hanoi. This project is being realized by a joint-venture company made up of an affiliate of the Indonesian property developers Ciputra Group and the Urban Development and Infrastructure Construction Company under the control of the Department of Construction of the Peoples' Committee of Hanoi. Similar as in the Saigon South Project, the corporate partner – in this case, Ciputra – holds a 70% stake in the joint venture. The Ciputra group is the largest investor in the Hanoi property market and currently one of Indonesia's biggest developers, having planned and developed 14 satellite cities in Indonesia. Ciputra Hanoi International City has an area of nearly 405 hectares with high-rise apartment blocks of 20 and 17 floors, villas, office buildings, medical and sports centres, and parks, and is expected to host the country's biggest shopping mall in the near future (see Photo 7). This new urban area will have up to 200,000 inhabitants after completion in 2010. A 120-square metre apartment can currently be resold for about US$100,000 at market price.

The conceptual design and implementation of these prestigious new urban areas can be interpreted as a visual symbol for the political as well as the individual wish to be part of a globalising modern community, as well as representations of internationally standardized town planning, driven by market forces (GOTSCH 2002). Although the planning authorities originally intended to provide a mixed social structure in the new urban areas, at least in the state-controlled projects, an enormous speculation bubble in the real-estate and property market, as well the huge demand for living space, have led to sky-rocketing prices. Consequently, access to the new urban areas is becoming socially highly selective in the course of residential suburbanisation processes. These exclusively serve the needs of the beneficiaries of transition, Vietnam's Nouveaux Riches, who follow an upscale Western lifestyle and value security, orderly neighbourhoods, and comfort (WAIBEL 2004B).

In this way, the development of the new urban areas helps to intensify the process of physical, functional, and social segregation within Vietnam's metropoles.

▶ *Photo 6: Gated Community within Saigon South New Urban Area*

New Lifestyles

Another factor that is accelerating the polarization of the urban space of Vietnam's metropoles is the increasing segmentation of the urban society through various lifestyles. Newly emerging upper and middle classes – mainly the commercial and administrative bourgeoisie –, who have benefited from an exorbitant increase in disposable incomes, are consciously individualising their lifestyles in the aim of distinguishing themselves from the others.

In this context, the development of the new urban areas makes manifest two ambivalent needs of the urban population: On the one hand, it favours the exclusion of large parts of urban society. In the case of Ciputra Hanoi International City, this is clearly demonstrated in the erection of an impressive and massive triumphal arch, an outstanding urban symbol at the main entrance of this new urban area (see Photo 8). It is evident that the developers are playing to resident's desire for differentiation. This landmark also communicates the success of the local residents, and hence deflects competing claims to power from other social strata. At the same time, the triumphal arch serves as a symbol of security in addition to its function as a gate, since the area is only accessible to an exclusive section of the population. It symbolically delimits this new urban area from the rest of the urban space.

On the other hand, the new urban areas also promote inclusion. These areas display a great degree of in-

ner homogeneity, because its inhabitants consistently have medium and higher incomes at their disposal and presumably have similar aesthetic preferences. The latter are communicated through the architectural homogeneity of the new urban areas of Ciputra Hanoi International City and Saigon South New Urban Area. In this way, urban areas have emerged that are relatively homogeneous in economic terms as well as in terms of taste. The ambivalent wishes of simultaneous distinction from other societal groups and integration into a specific lifestyle or peer group are served by the new urban areas, which are developing into selective vanishing spaces within the city.

Within this clearly delimited urban residential space, the inhabitants are able to exert control over their own territory and in some way they are even able to shape their surrounding living space. All this may be interpreted as another privatisation of the production of space.

Despite the described edificial, aesthetic, and economic homogeneity, it is safe to assume that the residents of the new urban areas strive for further differentiation among themselves into various lifestyle groups, in accordance with Pierre Bourdieu's theory. An explorative empirical survey of 50 households in two new urban areas in Hanoi in 2004 (DÖRNTE 2005) first confirmed this trend with respect to constitutive elements of lifestyle like specific consumer patterns, leisure behaviour, and values and attitudes, as well as the individual furnishing of the interior of the apartments or the decoration of the houses. Al-

▶ Photo 8: Triumphal Arch of Ciputra Hanoi International City

▶ Photo 9: Tennis court within the New Urban Area of Dinh Cong/Hanoi

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together, four relatively homogenous lifestyle groups were identified by means of a cluster analysis. This proves that at least parts of the urban society in Vietnam's metropoles can already be characterized as "post-modern". The most globalised lifestyle group identified is characterized by transition-based economic success, exclusive travel, and leisure activities like tennis or golf, an interest in modern art, and by status symbols like expensive cars and modern-westernized decoration of their houses (see Photo 9). Also, members of this group show a significant loss of Vietnamese tradition, widely ignoring the performance of rituals, for example.

Conclusion

The cumulative result of the described tendencies is that the transitional development of Vietnam's metropoles is characterized by commercialisation, internationalisation, and tertiarisation processes as well as by the rise of spatial polarisation and fragmentation through a growing polarization of incomes and the development of new lifestyles. This development is driven by multiple forces and actors whereby social, economic and spatial aspects of transition are interrelated.

Due to institutional gaps typical for transition, individuals initially became the most important actors in the production of new residential, consumption, and informal spaces. Since about the start of the new millennium and along with institutional restructuring measures, the state has increasingly regained control over urban spaces. Often, state actors co-operate with trans-national corporations that supply them with capital and know-how. The regain in state control and the cooperation with international actors can not only be observed at the production of new residential spaces but also at the demolition of informal spaces like marginal settlements and the consequent production of formal spaces as indicated with the example of the Saigon East-West highway construction project.

As a general result, Vietnam is moving away from being one of the most egalitarian towards becoming one of the most unequal societies in the world. The development of the new urban areas appears to have aggravated housing inequality, for example. The latter

developments, at least, are in sharp contrast to the still existing egalitarian ideology of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In some way, this dilemma can be interpreted as the price of the successful opening towards a globalizing economy in the course of transition.

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Fire, Arson and Control of Urban Space in Contemporary Jakarta

Jérôme Tadié

Feuer ist in Jakarta alltäglich. Über 800 mal bricht es jährlich aus, am häufigsten in den ärmeren, dichter bewohnten Gebieten. Daraus ergibt sich die Frage nach der unzureichenden Infrastruktur, die von gefährlichen Stromleitungen und brennbaren Materialien bis zum problematischen Grundstückszugang für die Feuerwehrleute reicht. Da Feuerschäden dem Bereich von Ordnung und fehlender Ordnung angehören, kann ihr Zustandekommen auch als Reflektion von Struktur und Politik der Stadt angesehen werden. In Jakarta wird Feuer oft als Schicksal angesehen, gegenüber dem die Bewohner machtlos sind. Aber Feuer ist auch ein Mittel der Stadtplanung und Vertreibung und das machen die Konflikte zwischen den verschiedenen Akteuren bei der Kontrolle und Nutzung der Stadt deutlich. Schwerpunkt des Artikels sind Feuer in Wohngebieten und es wird dessen Rolle bei der Veränderung einer asiatischen Großstadt abgeschätzt. Einbezogen werden die Regierung, die Bewohner und verschiedene andere Gruppen. Der Artikel stellt die Fälle von Feuer und Brandstiftung in Jakarta räumlich dar sowie unter welchen politischen Bedingungen sie stehen. Die Steuerung der Stadt erscheint als das Resultat einer wechselhaften Übereinkunft, die nicht nur zwischen den offiziellen Institutionen und der Bevölkerung, sondern auch zwischen formalrechtlichen Praktiken und den mehr informellen ausgehandelt wird..

Usually presented as disasters to which it is difficult to respond, fires are seen as calamities, resulting from negligence or from various kinds of random accidents. They belong to the realms of hazards, catastrophes, crime (in the case of arson), and violence, not only of the environment, but also as a part of urban practices. Fires are thus a witness of urban transformations in a traumatic way. They point to environmental hazards in densely built and populated settings and therefore testify to urban practices, to the way in which a city is built, managed and controlled. They involve visible actors – the population, the city government and its agencies – and more invisible ones, who participate in shaping the city.

Fires as sources of urban transformation and innovation have been studied in the United States, regarding major fires, especially in Chicago, Boston and Baltimore (C. Rosen, 1986; R. Miller, 2000). They have also been considered in the process of urban dereliction in American city centres, the process of the creation of urban dead zones and gentrification (M. Davis, 2002, p.386; J. Betencur, 2002). In Jakarta, it is a totally different context that is studied, as the areas that burn are dense, rarely insured and cannot be considered as ghettos[1].

Focusing on the bigger fires in Jakarta, those that hit and displace most people in residential areas, usually in popular neighbourhoods or *kampungs*[2], this article aims to examine not only the transformations of poorer areas, but also the management and control of city space[3]. Fires point to different realms of control in the city. I will therefore analyse how they can first be studied as signs of powerlessness over the built environment and the city. They raise the questions of risk mitigation and of the agencies responsible for it. Then, I will consider the way in which burnt areas have been used since the 1990s, showing how fires

are an important element in tracing the evolution of the city and of its actors. In a third part, I will study the mechanisms of control over urban areas: how burnt land is an issue not only in city planning, but also in the constitution of new territories and in the political life of a metropolis. From the lack of maintenance, to the management of the city and its regulation by the government and the resistance and the use of neighbourhoods by the inhabitants in defending their interests against other stakeholders (even by violent means), fires thus show different types of control over urban space.

1. The city on fire: major fires in Jakarta since the 1990s

Since 1990, fires have been striking Jakarta an average of 800 times a year, displacing an average of 20,000 people a year[4]. Apart from 1997, which was a dry El Niño year when more than 1,100 fires were registered, there has been no significant evolution in the number of fires occurring in the city. The houses destroyed are mostly situated in the poorer neighbourhoods. Usually provoked by electrical shortcuts (almost half of the fires) or by the explosion of oil stoves (12%), fires can turn a whole neighbourhood into ashes. They break

► *Photo 1: Manggarai, 29/11/2005, one week after the fire: After the firemen, the police are amongst the first to come into the neighbourhood and to close it for investigation.*

1
For studies from an urban planning point of view, see also J.Dubois-Maury, 1988 and S.Yerasimos & F. Fries (ed.), 1993.

2
Kampungs are social and spatial units often considered as villages, thus underlining the community bonds present in such neighbourhoods, although they are not rural at all in the context of Jakarta. Nowadays, they retain a retrograde image of areas of poverty. (P. Guiness, 1986, p. 7; J. Sullivan, 1992, p. 20).

3
This article is based on field work in Jakarta in 1999 and 2000 in the neighbourhood of Tanah Tinggi in Central Jakarta and further field work in 2005-2006. In this article, only fires in residential areas are considered. They usually do not involve insurance problems unlike market fires, which are a sensitive topic.

▶ Photo 2: Penjaringan, 16/08/2005, day after the fire: Recycling activity on the main road of a neighbourhood that burnt on the eve, due to arson.

▶ Photo 3: Penjaringan 10/01/2006: 5 months after the previous photos, the burnt neighbourhood is being rebuilt in a similar pattern as it used to be before. Here, two storey houses face each other on a side of a tiny alley.

▶ Photo 4: Manggarai, 29/11/2005: Reconstruction and precarity: in this picture, the contrast between the former and the new land occupation can be seen. The warehouses close to the main road are being rebuilt one week after the fire took place whereas the inhabitants who used to live in semi-permanent and temporary housing now dwell in a tent.

4
I only consider here the fires that took place in the limits of the Special Region of the capital (DKI Jakarta) which, according to the 2000 census, counts approximately 8.5 million inhabitants.

5
Ayi Bunyamin and Kartini, 1998, p. 68

6
In Los Angeles, Mike Davis (1998, p. 42 and p. 96 sqq.) shows how those insufficient means are linked to urban policies.

7
The aim of this article is not to determine if the fires were criminal or accidental, which can rarely be proven (as the scientific police statistics also show), nor to provide an exhaustive list of fires that occurred since 1990, but to show the major tendencies taking place in the metropolis.

8
Pelita, 5/11/1990.

9
Sri Budi Eko Wardani, 1995, p. 72.

10
Media Indonesia, 24/5/1994.

out in environments with a high level of risk: small wooden houses, sometimes shacks, crowded on both sides of tiny alleys, thus helping the fire to propagate and preventing access to the firemen's vehicles. Lacking the appropriate equipment for extinguishing the fires in those kampungs, the fire brigade can only try and prevent them from extending to neighbouring blocks, but not from completely destroying the block where they broke out.

Fires thus reflect the condition of dwellings in a Third World metropolis. They point to a geography of poverty, occurring in Jakarta mostly in the densest and slum-like areas. Fires are thus linked to population and housing densities in Jakarta. But when taking a closer look at the figures, the map of the number of fires recurring in the same sub-districts throughout 2004 (map 1) gives a different picture of the types of neighbourhoods subject to such calamities. It shows that not only the densest neighbourhoods are fire prone. It points to other types of areas, those where most of the construction takes place: on the fringes of the Special Region of the capital city (DKI), as well as in the more central parts, near the Golden Triangle or the CBD. It also shows zones where industries and houses are intertwined, pointing to industrial risks in the city.

Fires provide an understanding of the city's composition. They show the areas most at risk, those over which the city agencies have least control, either because of their poverty, defects in city planning (or lack of application of its rules), or because of ongoing change. The city government itself assesses those areas of risk through its fire fighting agency (Dinas Pe-

madam Kebakaran). They are identified by five main criteria:

- narrow roads, many turns and parked cars;
- little space between houses;
- easily inflammable materials (wood, ...);
- scarce water supply;
- dangerous behaviour of inhabitants.

Fifty three subdistricts correspond to these conditions. They are not always those where most fires take place, nor are they located in the poorer zones on a systematic base. As seen by the criteria, it is not only the built environment that is considered, but the human factor too. Social behaviour and lack of control take part in the definition of risk and control by the city government. In those zones, the population is usually perceived as confronting the firemen by throwing stones, sometimes mugging them so that they would sprinkle the right house, etc. Environmental risks and social practices are thus closely linked in the official management of these hazards. The fire fighting agency, on the opposite, is usually criticised by the population for its lack of efficiency (it is poorly funded and slow in its response to fires) and, as rumours have it, for not always wanting to extinguish the fires, or for asking money to spray the neighbourhood[5].

In these cases, fires point to poverty and ill development, resulting in the auto destruction of "slums". But such destructions do not only result from the structure of the neighbourhood, as often deplored, but also from insufficient means or concern given to the disaster. What appears as a lack of maintenance is a lack of control. Fires thus point to urban policies, to relationships between inhabitants and city developers, may they be private or public[6]. They underline the absence of control over urban space. They point to two different kinds of actors involved: the inhabitants (and their way of managing their neighbourhoods) and the city government, through its agencies like the fire brigade.

2. Fires and city development

Because of their location, fires reveal city structures. The use of burnt land testifies to a wish to control urban space. If a lot of areas are rebuilt by their inhabitants – usually without much change regarding

risk mitigation (see photo 3 & 4), even when the land does not belong to them – others are transformed, as shown on map 2.

Infrastructure

Several fires have proved to be an opportunity to transform the use of land, and to impose the development of new infrastructures[7]. In 1991-1992, for instance, fires took place in the vicinity of the planned motorway route. In Duri Kepa (West Jakarta), in September 1991, 960 houses were burnt down, displacing 6,798 people. This fire came in the context of a land dispute: a developer had proposed land compensations, which the inhabitants found too low, in a context of evictions already approved by the city government. In 1992, Kemanggisan, situated at a few kilometres to the east, met the same fate (500 houses burnt down and 2,000 people displaced). It was the fourth fire in the same area in 10 years (the others occurred in 1982, 1987 and 1988). Similar events also happened to the north in the Kalijodo area, as well as in the Jelambar Baru and Tamansari subdistricts, where they provided an excuse for road widening.

The Tanjung Priok harbour has also been an area of transformation. Whereas some neighbourhoods, like Koja, have been cleared without resorting to fires, other poor, densely populated neighbourhoods have been subject to such catastrophes, as in Kalibaru, to the north-east of the city, where the wood port is situated. The "season of fires" as some inhabitants put it, can be traced back to 1980 and lasted until 2002, with almost 10 major fires occurring during that period. Although none of these fires were proven to be of criminal origin, rumours to the contrary circulated in the neighbourhood, as there was a land dispute between the port agency and the inhabitants. During the November 1990 fire, the inhabitants attacked "individuals" who were carrying weapons and pouring oil on houses[8]. During that incident, fire broke out in three different places, forcing 1,772 people to flee to the streets. Nowadays, those areas are occupied by infrastructures related to the harbour: wood warehouses, container parks and a truck terminal.

Private investment and building a modern city

Burnt land has also been used for private investment to develop commercial and business zones. For instance, in Karet Tengsin, near the Golden Triangle (Jakarta's CBD), several fires took place since the 1990s[9]. There were also fires in North Jakarta, in Pinangsia for example, where offices and shops were developed and even more, since the 1980s, in the Mangga Dua area, which went through tremendous change with the building of malls. Initially, some of the land where the row of malls are built was cleared by fires, but now it is towards the railways lying on the northern side of those malls that fires occur, on land belonging to the railway company, as in Kampung Lodan for instance (see photo 8). Another type of private investment consists in developing new housing areas, aimed at wealthy classes, as in the Simpruk area near Senayan, as well as in Kelapa Gading or Pulogadung in the 1990s.

Inhabitants / km² (average : 18 413)
| 77 000 |
| 30 000 |
| 20 000 |
| 15 000 |
| 11 750 |
| 7 800 |
| 690 |

Fires by *kelurahan*
10 and more
9
8
7
6
5

0   2 km

Source : "Laporan Kebakaran Tahun 2004", Dinas Pemadam Kebakaran Propinsi DKI Jakarta, and 2000 Census for the densities.

▶ *Map 1: Subdistricts (kelurahan) with more than 5 fires in 2004*

Public and social developments

Fires have also been taking place on protected land, reserved for urban greenery or for the preservation of canal banks. In Tebet, for instance, 230 houses were burnt in 1994. They were located next to a green corridor, on what, according to the city plan, should be a low occupation area. The inhabitants resisting against the city agencies were relocated to public housing next to the Tebet park[10]. In the Teluk Gong area, several fires took place on the banks of the flood canal: 700 houses were destroyed in October 2001; it was the second fire in 3 months. This latter fire occurred during a conflict between the inhabitants and the city police who were trying to evict them[11].

In such contexts, public housing (flat units) is usually seen as a solution to fire-prone areas. It is a means of rationalising urban space where they are built. They are also intended as a solution to poverty and as a way of amending the bad image of the city "slums"[12]. They are convenient in that fire fighters' vehicles can easily access them. Moreover, especially when built on public land, they are a means of economically integrating these areas into the city. They require state funding to be built, but in return the inhabitants either buy their units or rent them, thus generating profit for the agencies managing them.

In Jakarta, several public housing units have been built on burnt land: in the Penjaringan subdistrict since the 1984 fire[13], which harbours the largest complex (see map 3), but also in such areas as Karet Tengsin, Tanah Tinggi, or Bendungan Hilir (Benhil) (photo 5). This poli-

11
Similar types of fires were also documented in the Teluk Gong area. They were usually linked with efforts of the city government to clear the banks of the canals (see the reports of Urban Poor Consortium and Fakta NGOs pointing at the civil police as being responsible for setting fires to informal settlements. See also P.Hendrati, 2002.

12
Such points of view on urban kampungs can be traced back to the Dutch colonial period, even if the building of flats only began in the 1980s (A. Kusno, 2000, p. 128).

13
A. Murray, 1991, p. 95.

Map 2: Types of use of the major kampung fires in Jakarta (1990-2004)

▶ Map 2: *Types of use of the major kampung fires in Jakarta (1990-2004)*

▶ Photo 5: *Public housing in Tanah Tinggi, built after the 1993 fire, using simple materials to avoid huge costs. However most of the inhabitants are not the ones that used to live in former kampung.*

▶ Photo 6: *Karang Anyar, May 2005: 3 days after the fire Communal kitchen subsidised by the Indonesian Red Cross. The burnt houses are to the rear. Volunteers as well as women from the neighbourhood operate it.*

14
Merdeka, 5/07/1993.

15
Kompas, 23/08/1993.

16
The New Order refers to the Suharto Regime from 1966 to 1998, in opposition to the Old Order (President Sukarno, 1949-1966). Since its fall, decentralisation laws have

cy started at the end of the 1980s, with the building of the first Penjaringan units.

This typology highlights the different types of major developments and transformations that took place in Jakarta: from the transport network, to the expansion of business districts and new housing developments (private and public). It testifies to the importance of the plans made by city managers and to the way they leave their mark on city landscapes. Fires thus show how urban space is controlled and effectively transformed. In some instances, as in the Manggarai area, where fires are not always sufficient to clear the areas because of strong community ties, they also show the forces which continue to oppose the managers' plans. Those conflicts between different visions of the city, and the processes going on when a fire takes place, can be illustrated by the Tanah Tinggi example.

3. Who controls the evolution of a city? Rumours and actors

Tanah Tinggi is amongst the most densely-populated subdistricts of Jakarta, with an official density of almost 59,000 inhabitants per km², according to the 2000 census. The northern part of the neighbourhood, called Mohammad Ali, is composed of tiny alleys, surrounded by small houses, sometimes shacks. This area is well known for its high rate of criminality, its gangs and its drug problems. In July 1991, a fire struck the neighbourhood: 736 houses were destroyed, leading to the eviction of 5,800 people. The inhabitants were residing mostly on state land assigned by the city plan to residence purposes. Four days later, the Minister for Public Housing proposed that flats should be constructed in the burnt areas. The inhabitants opposed that decision at the local parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). At that stage, the project was postponed and the inhabitants rebuilt their homes.

During that whole process, rumours were profuse: the origin of the fire appeared to be criminal. According to the inhabitants I interviewed, a person had rented a room in the area and had set fire to it, thus burning the whole area on purpose. They suspected the firemen of coming late, with no water. They were also blamed for not coming into the neighbourhood through the small alleys, and instead sprinkling water only from the major roads surrounding the kampung. With the announcement that social housing was going to be built in the area, it became clear to the local population that their homes had been burnt down in order to build public housing. Even if those were the rumours still going on several years later, such a decision could easily be understood: it is a means of regaining uncontrolled areas, especially crime-prone ones, of pacifying and integrating them into an urban economy and a new urban modernity.

Two years later, in July 1993, another fire broke out in the same neighbourhood. Officially, it was due to a cigarette that set fire to a mattress. This time, the Governor denied that there was arson[14], but it was eventually decided that the new flats would be built on the site of the fire. The inhabitants tried to oppose

such a decision by going to the Central Jakarta Mayor's Office, with no success. Then, in August, when city officials tried to visit the area, they were met with stones thrown by the local population. At the end of the month, riots broke out when the government tried to pull down the houses: some policemen were hurt, soldiers too. Eventually, the army, the police, the city police and civil guards had to surround the area so that the clearing could go on. Some houses that had not been burnt during the fire were also pulled down[15]. As this was going on, the inhabitants were obliged to pay for the food of the soldiers guarding the area. Eventually, the public housing was realised, with parts of the former population moving to other neighbourhoods in the city or living in shacks next to the new public housing. This construction was seen as "God's will because of the immorality of the Mohammad Ali area" (interview).

The instance of Tanah Tinggi highlights mechanisms relevant to the functioning of the whole city. In its daily management, rumours take a great part. As up to nowadays, city plans have not been really publicised in a detailed manner, rumours spread and play a peculiar role. They are a means of control of urban space and of understanding the evolution of land uses and lobbies. When a fire takes place on disputed land, they are omnipresent. Rumours were used by the city newspapers, when freedom of speech was not guaranteed, during the New Order[16]. They were a tool to give non-official news or to hint at ongoing events. On the other hand, city officials often refute accusations of arson, and deny the validity of information or testimonies provided by the inhabitants, by stating that they are mere rumours.

Rumours thus often disclose a hidden management, revealing sensitive information that only a select few have access to. They raise the question of who is supposed to have the knowledge of and the control over what is happening in the city. They refer to a hidden functioning of the metropolis, which is not the official one – and the intervention of local thugs in land clearance is part of that parallel process. Thus, during the New Order, the groups suspected of being involved in land clearance and of setting fire to the neighbourhoods were "social" organisations such as Pemuda Pancasila[17]. Other rumours held army soldiers and drop-outs from the military academy responsible for arson. Since 1998, the picture has become more blurred and other thug groups are also suspected. In several cases, the fires are not just a calamity anymore, but they take part in a system of urban management in which paralegal and hidden processes are omnipresent.

Among more formal elements, law enforcement agencies take an important part in the management of the burnt areas: the army, especially under the Suharto regime, the police and the city police[18]. City agencies (the Social Service, the Peace and Order Service as well as the Population Agency), as well as the Indonesian Red Cross (photo 6), which open public kitchens and lend tents, NGOs and private investment and political parties are also present in the aid given to the victims.

▶ Map 3: Fires in the Penjaringan subdistrict between 1990 and 2002

This map of this north-western subdistrict shows the different kinds of neighbourhoods that were burnt and how they were transformed. In the RW 017, for instance, it is mostly in the so called illegal settlements on the shores of the reservoir that fire took place, although some of them were used to develop the fishing complex represented by the larger buildings. In the other RWs it can be seen how some of the fires were used to build new public housing (flats), whereas other neighbourhoods were rebuilt according to the same dense pattern.

Number of fires

🔥 4
🔥 3
🔥 2
🔥 1

RW.012 Neighbourhood unit (Rukun Warga)

Neighbourhood unit where at least one fire took place

Sources: Map of the built environment by DPPT DKI Jakarta 2000 (1994 air photo); fire statistics from the press articles and the DPK DKI.

In such a process, Tanah Tinggi also showed ambivalent relationships between the city government and the population. Fires point to the level of political power of the inhabitants[19]. In the case of Jakarta, they sent representatives to the local parliament or to the mayor's office, in order to have access to higher realms of city power (in the person of high-ranking officials)[20], and resorting to violent means of contestation when their voice would not be heard. In these attempts, they were often helped by NGOs such as the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (LBH), who could only assist them in trying to demand better compensations or delay their evictions.

Nowadays, NGOs are still present. But some political parties use these catastrophes and the same kinds of networks to get access to the population, thus getting a wider audience or showing that they are imple-

been implemented, giving greater power to the local governments.

[17]
During the end of the New Order, this political "youth organisation" – recruiting strong men and thugs – was also taking charge of territorial control. (see L. Ryter, 1998)

[18]
W. Hafidz, 1998, p .66.

[19]
See M. Davis, 1998, p. 96 sqq.

[20]
Sri Budi Eko Wardani, 1995.

► *Photo 7: Penjaringan, 16/08/2005: In this burnt down neighbourhood, one can see firemen with their large trucks and political parties on the following day: here the Islamic PKS that publicises its help by fixing banners at the entrance of the burnt area*

► *Photo 8: Kampung Lodan (behind Mangga Dua) 7/12/2005: one month after the fire Flags of two political parties (the PDI-P and the PKS) are used as tent material on these refugee dwellings. Kampung Lodan burnt twice in 2005*

21
Partai-Partai ..., 2004, p. 324-325.

22
In its plans for the construction of public housing, for instance, the city government justifies the construction of flats not only by reference to the land scarcity but also regarding the international image of Jakarta which has to be "equivalent to other capital cities in the world" (DKI Jakarta, Dinas Perumahan, 1995, p.45).

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menting their programmes. This was the case at the end of the Suharto regime, with the Partai Demokrat Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), who was most active in helping the victims, thus creating a local basis for its popularity. Nowadays, several parties attempt to exploit those situations in order to expand their political basis, but also to give consistency to their political programmes. The Muslim party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), appears to be one of the most visible ones: it displays its flag and publicises its presence with loudspeakers immediately after a fire. In its programme, it stands against land clearance and helps victims of catastrophes[21]. During the local elections of 1999, it was the fifth political party in Jakarta, but jumped to the first position in 2004 with 24% of the votes. Other parties like the former government party, the Golkar, would only subsidise the relief by giving out funds or food to the coordination post, without marking its territory (photos 7 & 8).

Fires thus raise the question of how a city is to be controlled and managed. They show how certain types of international models and forms of modernity are applied to Jakarta. From infrastructures (freeways, malls, etc.) to the rebuilding of whole areas following international patterns (public housing for instance[22]), these evolutions are supposed to integrate Jakarta not only into a modern environment, but also into an economically competitive system. In such a process, when there is conflict, fires are a means of solving it at the expense of the inhabitants.

The importance of rumours in such a context underlines these peculiar practices, as well as the use of thug-like groups, either by the city agencies or by promoters. They stress the importance of several types of actors and practices, which are not new in Indonesia. But they also point to the mechanisms by which

Jakarta is controlled and transformed: not always in an official and clear-cut manner, but with actors interacting in the twilight zone where formal planning practices merge with informal ones, thus often blurring the limits between the public and private spheres and between legality and illegality.

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Neue Bücher / Book reviews

Architektur

Franziska Ullmann. Basics: Architektonische Grundelemente und ihre Dynamik. 206 S. ISBN 3-211-83800-7. 2005, € 40,-. Springer Verlag, Wien.

Die Autorin, ehemals Lehrbeauftragte in der Meisterklasse Hans Hollein in Wien, ist seit 1996 Professorin für Räumliches Gestalten an der TU Stuttgart. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die Motivation naheliegend, ein Lehrbuch über Grundelemente räumlicher Gestaltung zu verfassen. Das Werk gliedert sich – gut nachvollziehbar – in vier Abschnitte: Punkt, Linie, Fläche und Raum. Zu jeder dieser Grundelemente sind jeweils an die 200 Stichworte aufgelistet (z.B. Fläche: flach, horizontal, betreten, übertreten / Umrandung, Spannung Begrenzungsdynamik / Füllung, Platz und Fläche, Dynamik und Figur etc.) und dazu jeweils eine kurze Erläuterung zu deren Definition, Variationen und Auswirkung auf die räumliche Wahrnehmung sowie – auf der jeweils gegenüber liegenden Seite – sorgsam ausgewählte Abbildungspaare (meist S/W Photos dritter Quellen). Kurz: eine vorbildlich zusammengestellte Klassifizierung von Raumelementen.

Überfordert fühlt sich der Rezensent bei dem Versuch, sich diese deduktiv erarbeitete Kenntnis als operative Hilfestellung bei der räumlichen Gestaltung vorzustellen. Niemand wird in der Lage sein, sich die rund 800 Grundformen zu merken und mitsamt aller Kombinationsmöglichkeiten gezielt im Entwurf einzusetzen. Hinzu kommt noch die Variable zeitgeschichtlich mutierender Formempfindungen bzw. Moden, die das Buch nicht erwähnt. Damit wachsen leise Zweifel an dem praktischen Nutzen des Katalogs. Wahrscheinlich ist es sinnvoll, es bei der deduktiven Betrachtungsweise zu belassen und anhand einer Auswahl aus den gezeigten Beispielen jungen Architekturstudenten das Gefühl über unterschiedliche Wirkungen von Raumelementen näher zu bringen. In ihrer späteren Praxis mögen diese sich dann an das eine oder andere Schlüsselbeispiel erinnern.

Kosta Mathéy

Paul Segal. Professional Practice. A Guide to Turning Designs into Building. 144 S. ISBN 0-393-73180-4, 2006. £ 13,-. W.W: Norton (www.wwnorton.com).

In den wenigsten deutschen Architekturschulen können Studierende lernen, was sie alles wissen müssen, um einen Entwurf in ein Gebäude zu verwandeln. In England gibt es zu diesem Zweck nach dem Diplom eine dritte Prüfung mit vorgelagertem Unterricht, um die Eintragung in die Architektenliste zu erlangen. An der Columbia University in New York ist dieses Wissen sogar Teil des Lehrplans in der Graduate School, und der Autor des vorliegenden Bandes hat das Fach dort über 20 Jahre unterrichtet. In guter amerikanischer Manier kommt er gleich zur Sache und vermittelt praktisch, kurz und prägnant das Wesentliche für die Praxis. So erfahren wir, mit welchen anderen Berufen wir kooperieren müssen, wie man überhaupt erst an einen Auftrag kommt, was die Rechte und Pflichten im Verhältnis zu den Auftraggebern sind und wie hoch realistischerweise das Honorar ist, wie man sein eigenes Büro geschickterweise organisiert, was die bau- und versicherungsrechtlichen Bestimmungen sind und, last but not least, mit welchen Zukunftsaussichten der Beruf rechnen muss bzw. kann.

Natürlich gilt nicht alles, was über die Berufsausübung in den USA gesagt wird, auch für den Rest der Welt. Doch die Grundaussagen sind universell gültig – und wenn ein deutscher Leser frühzeitig feststellt, dass es erheblich nationale Unterschiede gibt – besser so. Ein nützliches und leicht zu verdauendes Buch für angehende Architekten.

Kosta Mathéy

Wüstenrot Stiftung (Hrsg.). Bauen für Kinder. 336 S: ISBN 3-7838-1521-1. 2006, € 28,50. Karl Krämer Verlag, Stuttgart.

Das Kompendium entstand im Nachgang an den 2004 von der Wüstenrot-Stiftung ausgeschriebenen Gestaltungspreis ‚Bauen für Kinder' – deren preisgekrönten Projekte im hinteren Teil der Publikation ausführlich vorgestellt werden. Der Titel des Buches ist im Grunde nicht sehr präzise, besser hieße es ‚Bauen für die Kinderbetreuung' – Gegenstand des Buches sind in der Hauptsache Kindergärten, Spielplätze und Kindertagesstätten. Prinzipielle Fragen der Raumansprüche und Raumwahrnehmung von Kindern – die ja auch im Familien oder Gruppenwohnen von Bedeutung sind, kommen nur am Rande zur Sprache. Auch der außereuropäische Kontext wird, mit Ausnahme eines japanischen Beispiels, ausgeklammert.

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Der Band gliedert sich in vier Teile. Unter der Überschrift ‚Bauen für Kinder in Deutschland' steht zu Anfang ein theoretischer Rückblick auf Kindheit – bzw. das Verschwinden dieses Begriffs – in den vergangen Jahrzehnten; ein Aufsatz über die Entstehung von Kindergärten und vorbildliche Beispiele des Kindergartenbaus aus Deutschland. Teil II ‚Funktion und Nutzung beim Bauen für Kinder' betrifft psychologische Aspekte beim Kindergartenbau, ein Beitrag zu Kindertagesstätten (Walter Stamm-Teske), kindergerechte Freiraumplanung (Hille von Seggern) und ein weiterer, nicht leicht einzuordnender Aufsatz über den Bezug Alt-Jung in unserer Gesellschaft. Teil Drei gilt den Erfahrungen aus Finnland, Frankreich und Italien, jeweils mit einem historischen Teil und einer nachfolgenden Architekturübersicht. Dabei wird deutlich, dass das Ausland gegenüber experimentellen Ansätzen aufgeschlossener ist als Deutschland. Der vierte Teil ist, wie schon gesagt, der Dokumentation des Wüstenrot Wettbewerbs gewidmet.
In dem voluminösen Band stecken viele Informationen, Anregungen und Architekturbeispiele (die sich in der Formensprache wenig von anderen zeitgenössischen Bauten unterscheiden). Bei dem subventionierten Verkaufspreis ist die Anschaffung des Buches ohne Zweifel eine anzuratende Investition.

Kosta Mathéy

Stadtentwicklung

Niels Gutschow. Benares. The Sacred Landscape of Varanasi. 498 S. ISBN 3-936681-04-X. 2006. € 128,-, Edition Axel Menges (AxelMenges@aol.com).

Benares – oder Varanasi, wie es heute heißt – ist der wichtigste Pilgerort für indische Hindus und eine der ältesten Städte Asiens. Ein solcher Ort übt auf jeden Besucher eine starke Faszination aus und gibt seine vielen Geheimnisse nur zögernd preis. Der Architekturhistoriker Niels Gutschow besuchte diese Stadt das erste Mal 1962 und kehrte nach und zwischen seinen Forschungen in Japan und Nepal oft zurück in diese Stadt, wo er im Laufe der Jahre (und 2000-2002 unterstützt durch die DFG) wertvolles Material und Wissen über den Ort sammeln konnte, wie es bislang kaum einem anderen Forscher möglich war. Aus den Arbeiten resultiert u.a. das vorliegende Buch über Benares, über 3 kg. schwer, das als absolutes Unikum gelten kann.

Der Autor nähert sich der Materie mittels der Allegorie von (Land-) Karten, die ja die konventionelle Aufgabe haben, den Fremden und unwissenden eine Orientierung an die Hand zu geben. Solche Karten existieren und existierten immer schon über Varanasi, doch ihre Sprache war den Nutzergruppen angepasst und z.T. nicht notwendigerweise kompatibel mit dem Verständnis einer Karte nach Dudenwissen. So überschreibt Gutschow sein erstes Kapitel ‚Bildkarten', das zweite ‚gebaute Karten', das dritte ‚Wallfahrten', das vierte ‚Opfergaben', dann Panorama-Karten und schließlich ‚topographische Karten, wie wir sie gemeinhin kennen. Selbstverständlich sind die – auch abgebildeten - Karten nur der Schlüssel zu dem Schrein Benares. Text und Abbildungen versuchen jeweils die komplexen Bedeutungen des Lebens und Agierens in der heiligen Stadt zu erfassen. Hervorgehoben werden müssen in diesem Zusammenhang auch die technisch wie künstlerisch perfekten Farbfotos (des Autors und von Stanislaw Klimek), die das Buch üppig durchziehen. Der Text klärt auf über Geschichte, Stadtanlage, Denkmäler, Religion und Rituale und tausend Dinge mehr, die die Einzigartigkeit dieses Ortes ausmachen. Sicher bleiben Lücken, aber eine umfassendere und in vieler Hinsicht kompetentere Publikation über das Thema wird sich mit Sicherheit nicht finden lassen.
Wie schon angedeutet, handelt es sich bei der Publikation um ein in jeder Hinsicht einmaliges und perfektes Gesamtwerk, von denen auf dem internationalen Buchmarkt jährlich kein Dutzend herauskommen.

Kosta Mathéy

Arnold Klotz et al. (Hrsg.). Stadtplanung und Stakeholder: Managing the Flow. 87 S. ISBN 3-211-31076-2. 2006, € 15,-.
Springer Verlag Wien.

Das schmale Bändchen, das aus einer gleichnamigen Tagung in Wien 2005 zurückgeht, lässt eine Sammlung nichtssagender Sonntagsreden der eingeladenen Honoratioren vermuten. Man kann sich irren. In diesem Fall finden wir eine sorgfältige Analyse aktueller Aufgaben in der Stadtentwicklungsplanung, die auf die nachfol-

genden und ebenso aussagekräftigen Fallstudien zu den Städten Rotterdam, Zürich, Hamburg, Leipzig und Wien Bezug nimmt. Der ebenfalls abgedruckte Eröffnungsvortrag von Karl Fingerhut mit einer Auswahl von Szenarien der Stadt von morgen bestimmt den Ton der Auseinandersetzung. Die Fragestellung der Herausgeber macht sich einerseits an dem Rollenverständnis der Stadt als Körperschaft in der Lenkung der künftigen Entwicklung fest, und zum Anderen an den für den gegenwärtigen Stand der Gesellschaft gemessenen Instrumentarien der Stadtentwicklungsplanung.

Rotterdam zum Beispiel setzt auf die unternehmerische Risikobereitschaft einer unabhängigen ,Development Corporation' für die erfolgreiche Planung des Entwicklungsgebietes Kop van Zuid auf dem ehemaligen Hafenareal. Zürich dagegen verfolgt die Strategie der kleinen Schritte unter betonter Einbeziehung der vorhandenen Bevölkerung und derer Interessen. Hamburg, ähnlich wie Rotterdam, setzt auf marktwirtschaftliche Effizienz und offensives Marketing bei dem Ausbau der Hafencity, wobei die Investorengewinnung zur Hauptaufgabe der Planungsgruppe mutierte. Leipzig etikettiert die stadtplanerische Ratlosigkeit um in ,Stadtplanung als Lernfeld': Trial and Error als Strategie vor dem Hintergrund einer nicht vorhersehbaren künftigen Entwicklung von Rahmenbedingungen. Wien schließlich stützt sich auf das klassische Instrument der Masterplanerstellung für die neue Stadt auf dem Flugfeld Aspern und ist als Gemeinde reich genug, die Implementierung durch eigene Mittel kräftig zu unterstützen. Das Resumée aus den Erfahrungen lautet, dass die Zeiten bequemer Lehrbuchweisheiten vorbei sind, und die Stadtplanung sich sehr differenziert und mit viel Phantasie der verantwortlichen Aufgabe stellen kann, die künftige Funktionsfähigkeit der Stadt sicher zu stellen.

Kosta Mathéy

Wohnungsversorgung

Vestbro, D.U., Hürol, Y., Wilkinson, N. (Hrsg.): Methodologies for Housing Research, The Urban International Press, Gateshead, Tyne & Wear 2005, 354 S., € 30,- (carol.nicholsen@theNBS.com).

Forschungen zum Thema Wohnungsbau gibt es reichlich, und so verwundert es auch nicht, dass zu den gebräuchlichen Forschungsmethoden immer noch Seminare und Diskussionen abgehalten werden, und zusätzliche Publikationen darüber erscheinen. Die Herausgeber, assoziiert mit verschiedenen europäischen Universitäten und dem Open House International Magazin, versuchen hier ihren Teil zu einer permanenten Methodendebatte beizutragen. Das Buch enthält 21 Beiträge zu verschiedenen Methoden und einen kritischen Überblick als Einleitungsbeitrag. Hauptsächlich aus West-Europa, Polen, Australien und Kuwait stammende Berichte zur Anwendung von bestimmten Forschungsmethoden belegen, dass der Vielfalt von Methoden scheinbar keine Grenzen gesetzt sind. Es gibt verschiedene Methoden, die alle als partizipativ gelten, andere sind auf der Besonderheit eines einzelnen, oft außergewöhnlichen Falles aufgebaut, z.B. Eva-

luierung von realisierten Projekten, Einzel- oder Vergleichsstudien, eher konventionelle landesweite Vergleiche, architektonisch-graphische Methoden, erweitert durch die Einbeziehung von Dimensionen des Umweltschutzes, der Innenraumqualitäten und der sozioökonomischen Determinanten runden die empirischen Ansätze ab. Darüber hinaus gibt es Versuche der sozialen Modellbildung, die Besonderheiten der Forschung übers Internet, die Problematik von wenig strukturierten und schlecht vergleichbaren Daten, und die Unterschiede von subjektiven und objektiven Messungen. Das alles wirft dann sehr richtig, wie im letzten Beitrag hinterfragt, die Frage nach dem Wert von Generalisierungen auf. Und wie schon im einführenden Artikel vermerkt: es gibt wohl für so jede Situation die Möglichkeit einer methodischen Variation; das wesentliche ist nur, dass sie es versteht, sich dem Fall anzunähern, und dass alle Möglichkeiten interdisziplinärer Forschung ausgeschöpft werden. Falls da noch jemand weiterforschen will, so sollte man in Erinnerung bringen, dass heute so ziemlich alles geht, was einen sinnvollen Weg hin zu den erwarteten Ergebnissen bietet... Wie weit das doch weg ist von dem vor Jahren debattierten dialektischen Materialismus und der Gesellschaftsanalyse, deren Ziel es war, Interessenskonflikte bloßzulegen.

Florian Steinberg

Gesellschaft und Politik

Manfred Liebel, Gabriele Rohmann. Entre Fronteras. Grenzgänge / Jugendkulturen in Mexiko. 136 S. ISBN. 3-936068-67-4. 2006, € 20,-. Archiv der Jugendkulturen, Berlin (www.jungendkulturen.de)

Die in Europa anzutreffende Kenntnis über Lebensgewohnheiten lateinamerikanischer Jugendlicher aus Unterschichtsfamilien ist lückenhaft und bestenfalls von tendenziöser bzw. sensationslüsterner Berichterstattung gefärbt. Die Existenz von Jugendbanden wird pauschalisiert und in schwarz-weiß Sicht als Konkurs humaner Kultur gewertet. In Lateinamerika selbst haben sich Sozialwissenschaftler differenzierter mit dem Phänomen beschäftigt. Mit diesem Band ist jetzt eine Auswahl dieser Arbeiten aus Mexiko auch in deutscher Übersetzung zugänglich: Rossana Reguillo verfolgt die Theoriebildung über Entstehen und Zusammenhalt von Jugendbanden und die gleichzeitig entstandene kulturelle Identität der Jugendlichen. José Manuel Valenzuela berichtet über die Jugendlichen in der Grenzregion zu den USA, Manfred Liebel schreibt komplementär dazu über die Latino-Gangs in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika; Antonio Guerrera analysiert unterschiedliche Jugendkulturen in städtischen und ländlichen Regionen, Rossana Reguillo untersucht internationale Jugend-Kulturströmungen zwischen so verschiedenen Regionen wie beispielsweise Chiapas und New York und Maritza Urteaga widmet sich der Frage nach der Rolle von Frauen und Mädchen in der Macho Welt der Banden. Ein ausführliches Glossar und Bibliographie vervollständigen die Dokumentation. Eine seriöse Informationsquelle über die Thematik lateinamerikanischer Jugendkultur.

Kosta Mathéy

Veranstaltungen / Forthcoming Events

July 2 -5, 2006 in Ljubljana, Slovenia
ENHR Conference 2006 - Housing in an expanding Europe: theory, policy, implementation and participation - inter-state migration, pressure on housing capacities in the destination areas and vacancy rates in the places of origin. Contacts: Urban Planning Institute of the Republic of Slovenia, Trnovski pristan 2, 1127 Ljubljana p.p. 4717, SLOVENIA. Phone: (+386 1) 420 1300, Fax: 420 1330, <enhr2006@uirs.si>; Igor Bizjak, ENHR, Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 785, SE-801 29 GÄVLE, Sweden. Phone: (+46 26) 420 6500, Fax: (+46 26) 420 6501, <sysop@uirs.si> http:// enhr2006-ljubljana.uirs.si or www.uirs.si/

July 2 - 5, 2006 in Ljubljana, Slovenia
New Researchers Conference in the context of ENHR Conference 2006. Contact: Maša Filipovi , Institute of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploš ad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Phone: (+386 1) 580 5203, Fax: (+386 1) 580 5213, <masa.filipovic@fdv.uni-lj.si>, www.fdv.uni-lj.si/

July 6 - 8, 2006 in Amsterdam, NL
International Conference Urban Conditions and Life Chances. Organised by Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt). Contact: AMIDSt office, Roeterseiland, building G, reception: room G1.45, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, NL-1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Phone: (+31 20) 525 4062/ 525 4063, Fax: 525 4051, www.fmg.uva.nl/amidst/conference.cfm <amidst-fmg@uva.nl>

July 23 - 29, 2006 in Durban, South Africa
16th ISA World Congress of Sociology: The Quality of Social Existence in a Globalising World. Organised by The International Sociological Association (ISA) - Research Committee 21 on Sociology of Urban and Regional Development / Research Committee on Housing and Built Environment. Congress Secretariat: InterAction Conferencing, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Office 332, Graduate School Building, Francois Road, Durban 4041. Phone: (+27 31) 260 1607, Fax (+27 31) 260 1606, Contacts: <sociology2006@ukzn.ac.za> Wim Blauw, <wim.blauw@planet.nl> / Favio de Souza <fdesouza@ctec.ufal.br> www.shakti.uniurb.it/rc21 or www.sociology2006.org.za

Sept. 10 - 14, 2006 in Geneva, Switzerland
50th IFHP World Congress: „Urban Life, Boundaries and Transformations". Organised by the International Federation of Housing and Planning (IFHP). Contact: IFHP Congress department, Joke Bierhuys, 43, Wassenaarseweg, 2596 CG Den Haag, The Netherlands, Phone: (+31 70) 328 1504, Fax: (+31 70) 328 2085, <congress@ifhp.org>; local organiser: equiterre, 22 rue des Asters, CH-1202 Geneve. Phone: (+41 22) 329 9929, Fax: (+41 22) 320 3977, <ifhp@equiterre.ch>, www.ifhp.org or www.ifhp2006geneve.ch

September 20 -23, in Naples, Italy
34th IAHS World Housing Congress: Sustainable Housing Design: Emphasizing Urban Housing. Organised by IAHS, co-hosted by the Department of Building Engineering DINE - University of Naples „Federico II" and the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering - Univ. of Trento. Contact: <lpe@ing.unitn.it>; Prof. Renato Iovino, Naples <reiovino@unina. it>; Prof. Antonio Frattari, Univ. of Trento <Antonio.frattari@ing.unitn.it> www.housingscience.org/html/conferences/2006.htm or www.dine.unina.it/iahs/XXXIV.htm

Sept. 7 - 9, 2006 in Darmstadt, Germany
7th N-AERUS Conference: "International Aid Ideologies and Policies in the Urban Sector". Organised by the Network Association of European Researchers on Urbanisation in the South (N-AERUS). Hosted by Technical Univ. of Darmstadt, Planning and Building overseas (PAR) and by TRIALOG. Programme / conference registration: www.urban-studies.de/naerus/ or Prof. Dr. Kosta Mathéy <mathey@par..tu-darmstadt.de> and Daphne Frank <daphnefrank@gmx.de>. Scientific co-ordination: Marcello Balbo, N-AERUS coordinator, www.naerus.net

October 2 - 4, 2006 in Birmingham, UK
World Conference: Accelerating Excellence in the Built Environment. Related to „Cities Without Slums" campaign (MDG Target 11). Hosted by the West Midlands Centre for Constructing Excellence. It is anticipated that the United Nations and the World Bank will participate. Contact: West Midlands Centre for Constructing Excellence, Shifnal Road, Priorslee, Telford TF2 9NT Shropshire, UK. Phone / Fax: (+44 1902) 321 703, <info@acceleratingexcellence.com> www.acceleratingexcellence.com

October 20, 2006 in Vienna, Austria
Planung in Not / Need for Planning. 23. Jahrestagung von TRIALOG und der Vereinigung zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Planens und Bauens in Entwicklungsländern e.V. / 23rd Annual Workshop of the Association for Scientific Research on Planning and Building in Developing Countries. Schwerpunkt: Prävention und Wiederaufbau nach Katastrophen und anderen unerwünschten Situationen. Veranstaltet von TRIALOG (Koordination: Kosta Mathéy) und der TU Wien (Andreas Hofer). Abstracts sowie Anmeldung an: <redaktion@trialog-journal.de>. Das genaue Programm ist kurzfristig abrufbar unter www.trialog-journal.de

October 21, 2006 in Vienna, Austria
TRIALOG Mitgliederversammlung 2006 Contact: Peter Gotsch, TRIALOG c/o ORL, Englerstraße 11, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany. Phone (+49-721) 608 7154, Fax: (+49-721) 608-9107, <pg@glora.org>, www.trialog-journal.de

November 6 - 8, 2006 in New Delhi, India
SAHC'2006: 5th Conference on Structural Analysis of Historical Constructions. Preservation of the architectural heritage - from an approach based on the use of modern technologies - is considered a fundamental issue in the cultural life of modern societies. Contact: DEC, Univ. of Minho, 4800-058 Guimarães, Portugal. www.sahc2006.org/docs/SAHC2006.pdf <secretariat@sahc06.org>

January 24 - 29, 2007 in Nairobi, Kenya
7th World Social Forum. Contact: www. forumsocialmundial.org.br/eng/index.asp

June 25 - 28, 2007 in Rotterdam, NL
ENHR International Research Conference on Sustainable Urban Areas. Organised by ENHR and the Delft Centre for Sustainable Urban Areas / OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies. Contact: ENHR, Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala Univ., PO Box 785, SE-801 29 GÄVLE, Sweden. Phone: (+46 26) 420 6500, Fax: (+46 26) 420 6501, www.enhr.ibf.uu.se/ or : Drs. Esther Philipsen. Phone: (+31 15) 278 7951, Fax: (+31 15) 278 4422, www.sua.tudelft.nl <E.Philipsen@otb.tudelft.nl>