

TRIALOG 101

A Journal for
Planning and Building
in the Third World

2 / 2009

Borders and Migration

Editorial

Migration means the forced or voluntary long-term or temporary relocation of people from rural to urban environments, within or beyond national borders. This issue of TRIALOG presents an interdisciplinary perspective on borders and the phenomenon of migration. It addresses the treatment of boundaries within the urban context, as well as the entailing social, economic, spatial and political consequences: exile communities, new hybrid identities, phenomena of cultural, ethnical and socio-economic differentiation, felt needs for greater security and isolation leading to increased fortification – if not the physical walling.

Daniela Vicherat Mattar points out the varied types of meanings of inner-city and international walls. Common to both walls is that they do not pursue just security interests, but rather symbolically denote affiliation and/or belonging. *Giovanna Marconi* emphasizes the importance of "transit cities" as physical nodes of transnational migration. She uses Tijuana, Mexico, and Istanbul, Turkey, as examples to illustrate the challenges innate to the urban inclusion of the often long-time "stranded" immigrants. The Kosovo town of Mitrovice, which is divided between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, is used by *Rossana Poblet* and *Natalie Mitchell* to illustrate both the lines of conflict along the ethnic borders as well as the attempt to overcome this division with expropriation and land distribution. A different kind of challenge is highlighted by *Heidrun Friese*: with the example of the Italian Mediterranean island of Lampedusa, she reveals the ambiguous understanding of hospitality and the conflict arising from positioning refugees as strangers that are both friend and foe. *Philippe Rekacewicz* portrays Africa as a territory of inner-migration and movement to "sanctioned territories" which, in turn, react with insulation and deportation. A wider view of the visible and invisible borders of the world is supplied by maps, which reveal these interrelationships or show the escape routes of two Africans. *Cecilia Giusti* and *Suk-Kyung Kim* use the informal settlements of Mexican immigrants on the Texas border to Mexico to describe how local small businesses contribute to local economic growth and create jobs; as a result of this, they got importance in the planning of the nearby Texas neighbourhoods. *Michael Waibel* and *Andreas Gravert* show how the development of industrial zones on the urban peripheries of Vietnam creates a link to western markets but leaves the informal migrant workers that live there disenfranchised from the urban social system. Taking a look at the Ho Chi Minh City metropolitan area, the authors question the motives behind the exclusionary policies of the state in conjunction with interests of transnational companies. *Enkeleda Kadriu* discusses the new challenges faced by governmental and non-governmental actors as a result of the migratory movement in Albania during the period of political transformation.

This look at the numerous border territories in conflict and the population groups concerned should clarify the extent of the social and territorial issues. At the same time, the opportunities and possibilities of overcoming borders and territorial reorganisation, integration strategies and the emergence of new identities become visible. The hope is that this perspective may help to foster a more open and tolerant urban future.

Migration bedeutet die – erzwungene oder freiwillige, langfristige oder temporäre – Umsiedlung von Menschen: vom Land in die Stadt, innerhalb nationaler Grenzen oder über diese hinaus. Diese Ausgabe von TRIALOG lädt ein zu einer interdisziplinären Sicht auf bestehende Grenzen und zunehmende Migrationsbewegungen. Aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven wird diskutiert, wie Migration und Grenzen sich im städtischen Kontext ausprägen, wie sie gestaltet werden können, und welche sozialen, ökonomischen, räumlichen und politischen Folgen damit verbunden sind: Exilgemeinschaften und neue hybride Identitäten, kulturelle, ethnische und soziale Abgrenzungsphänomene, Sicherheits- und Abschottungsbedürfnisse, Ummauerungen etc.

Daniela Vicherat Mattar verweist auf verschiedene Bedeutungen innerstädtischer und zwischenstaatlicher Mauern sowie auf deren Gemeinsamkeiten. Beide dienen nicht nur einer Abgrenzung oder einer Kontrolle der Mobilität, sondern markieren symbolhaft Zugehörigkeit. *Giovanna Marconi* betont die Bedeutung von „Transitstädten" als Knotenpunkte transnationaler Wanderungsbewegungen und zeigt am Beispiel Tijuana/ Mexiko und Istanbul/ Türkei die Herausforderungen städtischer Inklusion für langfristig „gestrandete" Einwanderer. Am Beispiel der zwischen Serben und Kosovoalbanern geteilten Stadt Mitrovice im Kosovo zeigen *Rossana Poblet* und *Natalie Mitchell* die Konfliktlinien entlang ethnischer Grenzen auf sowie Versuche zur Überwindung dieser physisch-räumlichen Spaltung durch Enteignung und Landverteilung. *Heidrun Friese* beleuchtet am Beispiel der italienischen Mittelmeerinselinsel Lampedusa widersprüchliche Verständnisse von Gastfreundschaft im Konflikt um eine Positionierung von Flüchtlingen als Fremde zwischen Freund und Feind. *Philippe Rekacewicz* porträtiert Afrika als Territorium innerer Migrationen und Abwanderungsbewegungen in die „sanktuarisierten Territorien". Diese reagieren mit Abschottung und Abschiebung, während die Gründe für die Emigration nicht zuletzt in den globalen Wirtschaftsstrukturen liegen. Karten dieser Wechselbeziehungen und der Fluchtrouten zweier Afrikaner eröffnen einen Blick auf sichtbare und unsichtbare Grenzen der Welt. *Cecilia Giusti* und *Suk-Kyung Kim* beschreiben am Beispiel der informellen Siedlungen mexikanischer Zuwanderer an der texanischen Grenze zu Mexiko, wie dortige Kleinunternehmen zum lokalen Wirtschaftswachstum beitragen und Arbeitsplätze schaffen und wie sie dadurch bedeutsam für die Planung grenznaher Nachbarschaften in Texas werden. *Michael Waibel* und *Andreas Gravert* zeigen auf, wie Industriezonen in den städtischen Peripherien Vietnams eine Anbindung an westliche Märkte herstellen, die dort informell lebenden Arbeitsmigranten jedoch vom städtischen Sozialsystem ausgeschlossen bleiben. Mit Blick auf den Großraum von Ho Chi Minh-City hinterfragen die Autoren die Motive der staatlichen Ausgrenzungspolitik im Zusammenspiel mit Interessen transnationaler Unternehmen. *Enkeleda Kadriu* verweist am Beispiel der Migrationsbewegungen während der politischen Transformation in Albanien auf daraus erwachsende neue Aufgaben für staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure.

Beim Blick auf diese Vielzahl konfliktiver Grenzterritorien und betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen werden auch Chancen zur Grenzüberwindung und territorialen Neuordnung, zur Integration und zur Entstehung neuer Identitäten sichtbar. An dieser Perspektive in eine offenere und tolerantere urbane Zukunft ist uns gelegen.

Kathrin Golda-Pongratz and Astrid Ley

TRIALOG 101

A Journal for
Planning and Building
in the Third World

2 / 2009

Borders and Migration

Volume Editors: Kathrin Golda-Pongratz and Astrid Ley

Inhalt / Table of Contents

Walling Borders: an Achievement or Sign of Failure?

Daniela Vicherat Mattar

Mauern sind wieder en vogue. Sie erfüllen dabei einen zweifachen Zweck: Als Versuch intra-urbane Konflikte zu beschwichtigen sowie als Mittel zur nationalen Abschottung und als Schlichtungsversuch zwischenstaatlicher Auseinandersetzung. In beiden Fällen dienen Mauern dazu, Unterschiedlichkeit baulich Rechnung zu tragen mittels der Integration und Exklusion bestimmter Bevölkerungsteile. Als innerstädtische Abgrenzung dienen Mauern zur Abschottung von ethnischen und/oder religiösen Gruppen wie beispielsweise in Belfast zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten oder in Bagdad zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten. Sie werden aber auch zur sozioökonomischen Segregation eingesetzt wie zum Beispiel bei den ummauerten Favelas in Rio de Janeiro oder bei der Ummauerung eines Migrantenviertels in Padua. Als zwischenstaatliche Grenze dienen Mauern der Kontrolle von Mobilität und Einwanderung. Prominente Beispiele der letzten Jahre sind die Grenzen zwischen USA und Mexiko, Nord und Süd Korea oder die spanischen Enklaven Ceuta und Melilla in Marokko. Sowohl innerstädtischen wie zwischenstaatlichen Mauern sind gemeinsam, dass sie nicht nur Sicherheitsinteressen verfolgen, sondern Mitgliedschaft symbolhaft markieren. Mauern können aber auch fallen wie Berlin beweist. Oftmals bedeutet die Aufhebung der physischen Barriere jedoch nicht, dass es seelisch und mentalitätsmäßig eine Annäherung gibt. Ihre Präsenz lebt in der geistigen Abgrenzung und der Konstituierung des „Anderen" fort – die vielbenannte „Mauer in den Köpfen" ist noch nicht überwunden. Dennoch verstärkt eine bauliche Ummauerung bestehende Ungleichheit und Diskriminierung und unterbindet von vornherein jegliche Möglichkeit zur Überbrückung von ethnischen, religiösen, politischen oder sozioökonomischen Differenzen.

Even the strongest defenders of the globalised world and network society would agree in a simple statement: borders create order.[1] The existence and enforcement of borders defines the belonging and identification feelings and narratives attached to a given spatiality. As a result, the polity this given spatiality encompasses is able to articulate institutional and social mechanisms to translate the affiliations and memberships of the individuals – all mechanisms that underpin and validate the (re)production of inclusion and exclusion dynamics (Newman 2006). To physically attain these purposes, it seems that walls are in vogue again. In various forms and sizes, and also in response to different justifications, old and new walls are being erected to control and contain populations and their mobility, access capacities and possible interactions. To achieve sought-after security and shelter, or to exclude those who are signified as a threat (depending on which side of the wall-line one stands), walls keep on being used to produce the social and physical order that borders embed.

Walls are man-made borders often either built in order to solve and contain existing conflicts or as an actual reflection and reinforcement of such conflicts. As a divisive line, walls serve to keep people in as much as to keep people out. Walls are a brutal exhibition and display of power, concrete as well as symbolic: whereas for some they might signify security and regularity, freedom and protection, for others they bluntly represent exclusion, marginalisation and stigmatisation.

Even if throughout history the construction of walls has proven to be a less than efficient means of containing conflicts, the inclination to solve problems following strategies that separate and divide the confronting parts – both at micro and macro levels – prevails. The most evident physical form of such strategies is reflected in the contemporary prevalence of walls; the examples in Belfast, Jerusalem and Baghdad, or the walls built on the US-Mexican border or between North and South Korea, are among the most conspicuous ones. When walling, in these examples and others the pursuit for order operates on a twofold, non-exclusive scale: on the one hand, as devices to pacify intra-urban conflicts, and on the other as instruments to set ownership claims over land when used to mediate at inter-state relations. Indeed, in what follows I sketch how, at both levels, walls are implemented as a concrete measure to accommodate existing differences through integration and segregation dynamics embedded in the contingent justification used for building a wall.

Inter-state walls and the fortification of the "borderless world"

When erected in order to mediate the existing conflicts between states, walls serve to control the mobility of the populations, particularly in relation to undesired migration (in terms of both illegal immigration and population drain). The construction of a wall allows the state behind its promotion to set a sovereignty claim over the land that may well be

1
For debates regarding the questions of borders as reflection of national identities and their accurate or not representation through state formations, see Donnan and Wilson (1999). For debates about globalisation and the (ir)relevance of borders, see Balibar (2003), Nicol and Townsend-Gault (2005).

under dispute – examples in this regard are numerous, and include the border walls that are being built between Mexico and the USA, between Morocco and Spain, and between Morocco and the Western Sahara. Further examples include the wall Israel is building along the occupied territories in Palestine (well beyond the limits set by the Green Line), the wall separating India and Pakistan in the disputed Kashmir region, the wall dividing North and South Korea, and the wall that used to divide the Greek and Turkish populations in Cyprus. What all the examples have in common, in spite of the divergent histories that led to their construction, is the extent to which these walls are still used as valid, material security devices and symbolic mechanisms to demarcate a national territory and its legitimate members. Thus, as a device to set a membership criterion, the walls situate the individuals inhabiting these lands within a hierarchy of membership that exists by virtue of the limit set by the walls.

The erected walls physically reflect a membership criterion that projects two different national-state narratives over a common territory. The presence of the given wall clarifies the match between a logic of territorial belonging and land ownership. In this way it situates two collective social narratives in order to legitimise the existing divisions and distinctions embedded in the wall, which emerge in order to respond to the categorisation of one or the other side as being threatened or victimised by the other.

Much has been said about the fortification of the developed and wealthy north-west in order to stop the flow of migrants from less developed countries from the south-east (Andreas and Snyder 2000, Neill and Schwedled 2007). Clearly, there has been an increased securitisation in terms of performance and border-control devices displayed in border regions in order to restrain civilians' mobility, to stop illegal immigration, to maintain the power of an often authoritarian political regime, or to secure (illegal) territorial expansion. The examples are numerous and are normally accompanied by the display of excessive material and human resources invested in order to maintain the practice of spatial/human segmentation produced by walling: since 1953, more than 1,114,000 soldiers have been employed to patrol the 241 km wall that divides the conflict zone between North and South Korea; since 1994, a wall has been being built across some segments of the 1,200 km Mexico–USA border in order to control illegal immigration with an estimated display of 12,000 effectives assigned just to patrol the border; between 1980 and 1986, a wall called the Berm was built along 2,000 km of the Western Sahara to keep the Polisario Front under control; and in 1998 and 2001 respectively, with financial support from the EU Spain encircled its enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla so as to keep illegal immigration from northern Africa under control (Novosseloff and Neisse 2007). These and other examples are not only numerous, but also surprisingly current.

Whatever the argument behind the construction of a wall – be it nationalist, socio-cultural, political, economic or security based – the final aim of such a wall is to (re)create purified spaces as envisioned by those who trace the divide and make it concrete. This purification of territory works in a twofold way: it clearly states the qualities of those who are accepted inside the wall perimeter, but also stigmatises those who are kept outside. Much aligned with the



▲ Figure 1: Fence around Melilla (Source: Dutzi, A., in Novosseloff and Neisse 2007:157)

Schimttian understanding of politics (Schmidt 1996, Mouffe 2000, 2005) a bipolar logic – friend/enemy – is reproduced by the presence of a wall which tends to reify the presence of "the other" in the walled territory as illegitimate or as an expected threat. This logic not only fosters isolation and the understanding of the own territory – symbolically and physically – as pure, but it necessarily rests on the continuous and apparently inevitable vilification of otherness.

The remarkable potential of this deployment of territorial segmentation that goes along with the walling processes also masks another two territorial realities that grow in parallel to the aim of population control and security as displayed by the walls. The presence of walls veils the vivid forms of interaction, cooperation and exchange that exist between civil populations on the two sides of the borders on the one hand, and nurtures the escalation of criminal forms of organisation to resist the wall and control traffic across them, on the other.

Intra-urban walls: walling good or evil, wealth or poverty?

Paradoxically, the globalisation and urbanisation of the planet have made evident the extent to which walls are an intrinsic device to the foundation of cities. Indeed, there are big discrepancies among classical urban theorists about the role walls have played in the urban landscape. For instance, for Max Weber (1958) walls were central in defining the city-space, whereas for Lewis Mumford (1961) the city was the result of a series of communication systems (Weber 1958, Mumford 1961). Nevertheless, both authors recognised that the presence of walls is essential to define the scope of the city and the ways in which the urban life is organised; the ways in which urbanity is defined. This is because walls, in their materiality, have not only delineated the urban landscape but have also symbolised the nature of the urban order.

In his works, Peter Marcuse has identified the various functions intra-urban walls have: they are used to fortify and protect the city or parts of it, to trace the limitations between the private/public domains, and to express the existence of conflicts and the impossibility of solving them on a discursive consensual basis. Walls are used as a means to divide, to categorise and to keep urban populations

under control. Thereby they define the scope of the daily activities of the residents and their adjustment (or lack of adjustment) to existing institutional segregation patterns (Marcuse 1989, 1993, 1994, Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, 2002). In sum, walls demarcate, they chart the city fabric, they shape people's civic spirit and engagements, they draw the frontier between friends/enemies, and they define the terms and conditions of any possibility and form of social (inter) actions and civil collaboration.

When operating as intra-urban devices, walls are erected to separate conflicting populations. The conflicts are of course context-driven, and more often than not echo a divergent narrative on each side of the wall line: in Belfast, for example, inhabitants of Loyalist quarters claim the peace-lines, built since the end of the 1960s, serve to keep two ethnic and religious populations aside, while the view of the Nationalists tends rather to stress the presence of the wall as a reflection of the political struggle that keeps populations confronted even today. Another aspect that is recurrently walled within cities is wealth and poverty, as is demonstrated by the guarded and walled wealthy gated communities or the recent walls projected to encircle parts of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires or Padua. Either as instrument to state ethnic, religious, national or socio-economic differences, what such walls de facto do when erected is to create and reproduce ghettoes, with the consequent stigmatisation of its populations, within the unity given by one city-space.

Against the Aristotelian claim that no city can exist without diversity, walls are built to separate people who are "alike" from those who are not. The walls reinforce a hostile attitude and predisposition towards "the other" – "the other" being understood as a specific human other whose national, religious, socio-economic, ethnic characteristics are seen as a threat or whose "world views" or "ways of life" as inappropriate. In the case of Belfast, this inadequacy is based on ethnic and religious discourses that confront Republicans and Nationalists, Catholics and Protestants, all of whom are mostly located in the north-western working class areas (Bew 2007, Boal 2002, Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). In other cases, walls are erected under a broad public discourse of urban security and development. Examples here include the wall that is now being built to encircle parts of the Santa Marta favela in Rio de Janeiro (which is called an "eco-barrier" by the government since it is being justified as preventing the expansion of the favela into the adjacent Atlantic Rainforest), and the wall that was built by the city council of Padua in 2006 to encircle parts of the Via Agnelli social housing blocks, now inhabited mostly by immigrants, under the justification of preventing illegal activities such as drug trafficking and prostitution. The promotion of a safe environment for the legitimate city residents and the prevention and control of illegal activities shows clearly how the rational to build walls in intra-urban areas reproduces a hierarchy of membership within the city fabric, underpinned by a political strategy that reproduces the friend/enemy logic.

Under this light, walls are far from being an anachronistic form; instead, they intrinsically modern in giving shape and helping city residents to make sense of and to organise their daily life. Unfortunately, though, "walls permit the populations behind them to grow horns. They foster a curious disengagement with reality… [that] 'allow[s] people to see what they want to see on the other side, the image of their enemy'" (Pullan 2004:82). Walls existing in divided cities such as Belfast, Baghdad or Jerusalem are clear examples of this vilification based on national, ethnic or religious bases; whereas walls built under blunt premises

Figure 2: Belfast Falls/ Shankill "Peace Line" from the Loyalist (Shankhill) side (Source: Vicherat Mattar 2009)

of order and security control, as in the cases of Padua or Rio de Janeiro, show the extent to which the "friend/enemy" mentality also underpins the preservation of a socio-economic hierarchy that organises – segregating but unifying the city fabric – the entitlements residents have according to the place where they live.

Walls within cities reify a friend/enemy politico-economic logic based on the protection of individual rights over collective entitlements to the city-space. The presence of different forms of walling (as in the cases mentioned above) shows how difficult it is for planners and urban designers to promote the "making together of difference" that is at the core of the potentialities cities have for human development (Fainstein 2004).

Can all walls be torn down?

The celebrations of the 20 years of the fall of the Berlin Wall demonstrate that concrete walls can indeed be torn down. The problem is thus not as much the concreteness of the erected walls as it is the mental boundaries their presence embeds. Increasing inequalities and discriminatory practices are enforced by the presence of walls. Often, material walls correspond to a more general mode of mental walling that is enforced by access (or its denial) to the privileges membership entitles. The limits for possible inter-community collaborations or bridge-building across ethnic, religious, political and socio-economic divisions do not then rest only on the presence of the walls, but on the reproduction and defence of an existing system of social hierarchies. Hence, for the walls to be torn down we first need to put these hierarchies under question.

Walls certainly reflect common expectations of what is good and desirable for society's development: they provide a stage from where to think, to project and to act either in inclusionary or exclusionary terms. The presence of walls in border regions as well as within cities makes concrete something that should remain porous. As is stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, peoples' mobility, circulation and exchange is meant to be exercised as a right and not a crime. Thus, it is pertinent to question, together with Wallerstein (Wallerstein 2006), the moral justifications under which walls keep on being built, in particular when the defence of liberal democratic principles and neoliberal economic doctrines, based on free interaction and exchange, has become the driving forces of societies across the world.

The presence of both inter-state and intra-urban walls reflects the desire of the respective communities to remain physically, culturally and politically apart. The pervasive existence of walls reflects the failure of the state to provide alternative mechanisms of social integration or to set patterns and conditions for integration beyond the bipolar logic of inclusion and exclusion as imposed by a wall. If there is an achievement at all attained by the presence of walls, it is not the explicit security and control they deploy over the given territory, but the constant awareness of otherness they imply. An awareness of that might at some point reject the bipolar and antagonistic logic of friends and enemies for the sake of a "constitutive outsider";[2] it is in the awareness of this necessary constitution of I by an outsider that the potential to transform a dividing wall into a bridging wall exists.

References

ANDREAS, P., SNYDER, T. (Eds.) 2000, *The Wall around the West.* Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

BALIBAR, E. 2003, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

BANSKY 2006, *Wall and Piece.* London: Century.

BEW, P. 2007, Ireland. *The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BOAL, F. 2002, "Belfast: Walls within", in *Political Geography* 21, pp. 687-694.

DERRIDA, J. 1988, *Limited, Inc.* Translated by S Weber. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

DONNAN, H., WILSON T.M. 1999, *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State.* Oxford: Berg.

FAINSTEIN, S. 2004, "Cities and Diversity. Should we want it? Can we plan for it?", in *Urban Affairs Review*, 41, 1, pp. 3-19.

MARCUSE, P. 1989, "'Dual city': A muddy metaphor for a quartered city", in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 13, 4, pp. 697-708.

MARCUSE, P. 1993, "What's so new about divided cities?", in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 17, 3, pp. 355-365.

MARCUSE, P. 1994, "Not chaos, but walls: Post-modernism and the partitioned city", in Watson, S., Gibson, K. 1994, *Postmodern Cities and Spaces.* Cambridge: Blackwell.

MARCUSE, P., VAN KEMPEN, R. (Eds.) 2000, *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* Oxford: Blackwell.

MARCUSE, P., VAN KEMPEN, R. (Eds.) 2002, Of States and Cities. *The Partitioning of Urban Space.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MOUFFE, C. 2000,: *The Democratic Paradox* New York: Verso.

MOUFFE, C. 2005, *On the Political.* Abingdon: Routledge.

MUMFORD, L. 1961, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations and Its Prospects.* London: Secker and Warburg.

NEWMAN, D. 2006, "The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world", in *Progress in Human Geography*, 30, 2, pp. 143-161.

NICOL, H.N., TOWNSEND-GAULT, I. 2005, *Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World.* Washington: University of Washington Press.

NEILL, W.J.V., SCHWEDLED, H.U. (Eds.) 2007, *Migration and Cultural Inclusion in the European City.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

NOVOSSELOFF, A., NEISSE, F. 2007, *Des Murs entre les Hommes.* Paris: La Documentation Française.

PULLAN, W. 2004, "A one-sided wall", in *Writing in Walls*, Index on Censorship, 3, p.82.

SCHMIDT, C. 1996, *The Concept of the Political.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

SHIRLOW, P., MURTAGH, B. 2006, Belfast. *Segregation, Violence and the City.* London: Pluto.

WALLERSTEIN, I. 2006, *Walls and the World,* Comentary No. 185, Fernand Braudel Center, Binghampton University. May 15th, 2006.

WEBER, M. 1958, *The City.* New York: Free Press.

2
For developing the concept of "constitutive outsider" based on the distinction I/other, see Derrida (1988).

Daniela Vicherat Mattar
Sociologist, Marie-Curie postdoctoral fellow at the School of History, Classics and Archaeology, University of Edinburgh. Her research focus is on the prevalence of walls in contemporary European cities.

d.vicheratmattar@ed.ac.uk

Migrants Stranded at the Border of their Dream:

Learning from transit cities in Mexico and Turkey[1]

Giovanna Marconi

Transitmigration stellt heutzutage eine geopolitische Herausforderung dar. Eine Politik der Zugangsbeschränkung - die derzeitige Migrationspolitik von Westeuropa und den Vereinigten Staaten - wirkt sich auf die Einwanderungssituation in Anrainerstaaten aus. Während der politische und wissenschaftliche Diskurs zu Transitmigration einen Schwerpunkt auf die Herausforderungen für und die Verantwortlichkeiten durch die sogenannten „Transitländer" legt, wird wenig Bezug genommen auf die Bedeutung für „Transitstädte" als physische Knotenpunkte der transnationalen Wanderungsbewegungen. Diese Städte werden von Zuwandernden als Orte genutzt, um soziale Unterstützung und nützliche Informationen zu erhalten, anonyme Unterkunft und Einkommensmöglichkeiten zu finden und ihre Weiterreise zu organisieren. Allerdings ist der kurze Zwischenaufenthalt häufig länger als gedacht. Gestrandet an den Grenzen der Festung Europa oder des Amerikanischen Traums werden viele Transitmigranten zu ständigen Bewohnern. Dies wirkt sich auf die wirtschaftliche, soziale und räumliche Situation der betroffenen Städte aus. Die meisten Migranten sind mittellos und haben einen kulturellen, sozialen und religiösen Hintergrund, der sich stark von dem der lokalen Gesellschaft unterscheidet. Daher stellt sich ihre städtische Inklusion als schwierig dar und ist durch Konflikte gekennzeichnet. Hinzu kommt, dass ihre Lebensumstände durch ein alarmierendes Ausmaß an Marginalisierung und Vulnerabilität geprägt sind. Mit besonderem Bezug auf die Situation von Transitstädten wie Tijuana in Mexiko und Istanbul in der Türkei, weist dieser Beitrag die Herausforderungen durch die zunehmenden Migrationsströme nach mit denen sich viele Transitstädte konfrontiert sehen.

Transit migration is a key geopolitical issue today. The closed-door policies pursued in Western Europe and the United States impact the migration situation in neighbouring countries of the global South. While political and academic discourse on transit migration mainly focuses on the challenges for, and responsibilities of, those labelled as "transit countries", very little reference is made to the "transit cities" as physical nodes of transit routes. These urban areas are indeed the principal loci of international migration systems, used by migrants as antechambers and switching points where they can get useful information and organise their onward journey, and find anonymous accommodation, income opportunities, and the social support needed to recover from their previous migration. However, their stopover is frequently longer than expected. Stranded at the borders of the "Fortress Europe" or of their "American Dream", many end up becoming permanent residents by default, with tangible impacts on the economic, social and spatial settings of supposed "transit" cities. These migrants often have scarce economic resources and their cultural, social and religious backgrounds quite differ from those of local residents. Therefore, their urban inclusion is difficult and marked by conflict, while their living conditions are increasingly characterised by alarming levels of marginalisation and vulnerability. With particular reference to the situation of Tijuana in Mexico and Istanbul in Turkey, this paper aims at exploring the challenges faced by the many transit cities that are confronted with growing migration inflows prompted by exogenous factors.

Transit migration a blurred and politicised issue

The concept of transit migration has been in the policy discourse only since the early 90s, when the term "transit country" emerged in the migration lexicon as an intermediate category alongside the migrants' country of origin and destination.

Despite being increasingly used by politicians, academics and international agencies, no commonly agreed definitions for terms such as "transit migration", "transit country" and "transit migrant" are available yet, nor does there exist a category or classification for them in international policy or law (DÜVELL, 2006:5). Such terminology seems to have entered into the political discourse simply by force of habit, but is indeed highly politicised. The transit migration debate has two dimensions: a theoretical one, i.e. the scientific effort to describe an existing reality; and a political one, i.e. the discursive construction of that same reality (IÇDUYGU, 2008:8).

From the conceptual point of view, the subject is extremely blurred, since the "condition" under study (i.e. being in transit) refers to migrants' "personal intentions" of using a certain country as a gateway towards another. To the authorities of the so-called "transit country" there is no such thing as a transit migrant status. Instead, a "transit migrant" can be classified as a tourist, a student, a visitor or an immigrant. A transit migrant status simply does not exist.

Legally speaking, transit should be temporary and limited. However, in practice it may end up being long term and semi-permanent. Mainly economic and/or political obstacles block migrants at some point of their trip, without immediate possibilities to reach their target destination or to go back home.

The boundary between transit and immigration is thus impossible to pinpoint, unless migrants themselves voice a desire to move into the territory of a different state (DE TAPIA, 2004:111). Target destinations such as an EU country or the US have extremely limited legal entry channels. Thus any intention to immigrate there coincides with finding an illegal way to cross borders. When migrants express their intention to move on, it would be difficult to state if their project is really feasible or just a dream, and thus whether they can be classified as transit migrants or as immigrants by default.

For these reasons, exact information on transit "experiences" can be obtained only a posteriori, i.e. when the transit through a certain country has already happened.

Nevertheless, transit migration has not only become a growing concern for the European Union and the United States, but it is also increasingly central in their migration policy making. Both the phenomenon itself and its political construct are strongly related to the increasing securitisation of their migration regimes[2]. On the one hand, the restrictive policies and enhanced border controls of the EU and US cause migrant flows through countries such as Turkey and Mexico[3]; on the other, the EU and US governments' main reaction to this process has been to exert strong political pressures on transit countries to take over responsibility for preventing the passage of migrants. This so-called "externalisation of migration controls" consists mainly in readmission agreements[4], joint border patrols, and financial transfers for building detention centres and reinforcing security in the so-called transit countries.

In this context, transit-country governments have realised the importance of migration control as a means for "parallel diplomacy" (COSLOVI, 2007:234). Mexico drastically increased its efforts to curb transit migration in order to enter the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by militarising its southern border. It embraced the gatekeeper role with the ultimate goal of free movement of labour within North America as well as of regularisation of its irregular migrants living in the US. Similarly, migration management serves as a trump card for Turkey's EU accession negotiations.

This seemingly creates a win-win situation for the EU and US by externalising migration controls, and for transit countries by achieving strategic objectives in exchange for acting as buffer zones. But this collaboration significantly affects the personal security of migrants. The increased controls are forcing growing numbers of migrants to take dangerous roundabout routes and to rely on smugglers and criminal networks to overcome the new obstacles, thus exposing them to high risks. Moreover, the devolution of migration controls to countries where the institutional framework is still weak and human rights protection not always guaranteed often leads to undemocratic policies and practices against migrants.

Transit routes and cities in Turkey and Mexico

Transit has transformed into an insecure type of long-term settlement, with growing numbers of migrants stranded at some point of their trip. Current academic and political discourse on transit migration largely focuses on the implications for, and responsibilities of, "transit countries", but very little reference is made to the physical nodes of transit routes where migrants stop-over; namely "transit cities".

Transit cities are places where a multitude of networks converge and intersect, creating a wealth of opportunities for migrants. As principal loci of international migration systems, these cities are used as antechambers and switching points to obtain useful information on how to migrate further, find anonymous accommodation, income opportunities and the social support needed to recover from the previous travel, and to organise the onward journey (PEROUSE, 2004:71).

The largest proportion of migrants in transit through Turkey enters across its eastern borders. They principally arrive by land (by trucks, bus or even on foot) via Urva, next to the Syrian border, or via Van and Hakkari, respectively next to the Iranian and Iraqi frontiers. From there, transit migrants travel to Ankara with the aim of reaching the great harbours in the west and south-west coastal cities: Istanbul in primis, but also Smirne, Bodrum and Izmir. Here they stay until they can gather money to pay an (illegal) passage to Europe, principally Greece or Italy (KOPPA, 2007:1). Many migrants enter Turkey directly through the Istanbul airport, since the country still maintains a quite liberal visa regime to promote tourism. Some others arrive in this city after being cheated by smugglers who they believe will take them from Libya to Italy or Greece, but instead leave them on Turkish shores.

Figure 1: Map of transit cities and routes in Turkey (Source: The author, adapted from google maps)

1
Most of the information used for this paper was collected by the author during field research in Tijuana (February-May 2008) and Istanbul (April-May 2009). The visiting period in Istanbul was carried out within the framework of MIUM-TIE (Managing International Urban Migration – Türkiye, Italia, España), an EC-funded project involving Università Iuav di Venezia, Koç University in Istanbul and Universidad de Cadiz.

2
Migration regime (like i.e. „prison regime" or „child-care regime") is the bulk of policies adopted by a certain state for managing/governing a certain issue.

3
Unlike Mexico to the US, Turkey is not the only "transit country" crossed by migrant flows heading towards Europe: the Western Balkans, former CIS (Community of Independent States) and Northern Africa make up the so-called "transit belt" used by migrants as a gateway since the introduction of increasingly restrictive policies by the EU and its Member States.

4
I.e., to return third-country nationals intercepted migrants to transit countries. Unlike "repatriation" (for international-law states are obliged to accept back their own nationals when expelled by whatever state) "readmission" needs to be regulated by specific agreements since states are sovereign to decide whether or not to accept back in their territory third-country nationals.



▲ Figure 2: Map of transit cities and routes in Mexico (Source: The author, adapted from google maps)

5
For Mexico-US, data were provided during an interview with Scalabrinian Missionaries of Tijuana's "House of Migrants" on 21st of March 2008, in occasion of the procession they organise each Good Friday along Tijuana's streets to publicly denounce how many migrants have died during the crossing attempt.

6
Data from US Border Patrol. A total of 12,199 OTMs were intercepted in San Diego Sector from the year 2000 to 2007.

7
In 2005 a total of 16,784 foreigners (excluding US citizens) were estimated to live in the city, out of a total population of nearly 1.5 million (Alegria, 2005). This number is in reality much higher, but any assessment of how many transit migrants leave or stay in the city is impossible.

In Mexico there are several transit routes from the southern border with Guatemala and Belize. Most of them lead to Mexico City before taking different directions towards the north. Since motorways and other roads are highly patrolled, cargo trains are the most popular (and dangerous) means of transport. The main migration corridor starts in Tapachula, a city on the border with Guatemala, and passes through Arriaga, 270 kilometres further north. From there, the route branches out and leads to the most important cities on the Mexico-US border: Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez, Mexicali and Tijuana.

During their journeys, migrants spend considerable amounts of money for a variety of services, including assistance in evading controls at borders, clandestine transport and provision of false documents. Furthermore, they have to pay bribes and are exposed to a high risk of being robbed or defrauded. The last leg of the trip is usually the most expensive one. In the northern border cities of Mexico, coyotes [smugglers] charge between 1,500 and 3,500 US$ for "crossing to the other side". A passage from Turkey to Greece costs between 1,000 and 3,000 US$. In both cases, migrants with the "good contacts" might pay less than half of those without for the same trip. Moreover, smugglers' fares are proportional to the danger (in terms of risk of life) of the crossing. A passage to Greece by land, or to the US with forged documents, is much more expensive than going by rusty boats or walking through the desert. More than 5,000 migrants have died while crossing since the construction of the wall on the US-Mexican border started pushing crossing routes into dangerous places outside urban areas. During the same period (1995-2008), more than 1,000 migrants have drowned in the Aegean Sea in the attempt to reach Greek islands[5].

Istanbul and Tijuana are two of the last stops on migration routes crossing Turkey and Mexico. Points of interface between economic, political and geopolitical worlds, these cities are staging posts for stays of varying length, hubs for international mobility.

Although local policymakers and the media stress the temporary, transitory character of transit migration, and despite migrants themselves intending to use these cities just as transit points, a sort of funnel effect for migration flows is observable. Due to the tremendous difficulties in moving on, an increasing proportion of migrants become permanent settlers. They form additional vulnerable groups in contexts where urban poverty, as well as social and spatial exclusion and marginalisation, is spreading among the local population.

There is an absolute lack of data on the urban dimension of transit migration. Together with tens of thousands of Mexicans heading towards the US, an average of 10,000 international migrants is believed to arrive in Tijuana each year. They are mainly Central Americans from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, but they also come from South America (mostly Argentina, Colombia and Peru), the Caribbean and, to a lesser extent, Asia (principally China and Korea) and Africa. The San Diego Sector of the US Border Patrol apprehends on average 1,350 "Other Than Mexican" (OTMs) a year.[6]

Around 15 to 25 percent of all apprehended irregular migrants in Turkey are caught in Istanbul. Migration flows heading toward this city are mixed, comprising asylum seekers, economic migrants and people in transit. These categories are hardly separable. Since Turkey still lacks immigration policies, looking for asylum is almost the only option for obtaining some kind of document legitimising a temporary stay. Economic migrants are principally from the former Soviet Republics, who use tourist visas to work periodically in Istanbul. Among asylum seekers and transit migrants, Iraqis and Afghans appear to be top of the list, followed by Iranians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (IÇDUYGU, 2003:18). Other origins include Asia (in particular India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines), West Africa (especially Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone), and East Africa (Somalia, Eritrea). Interestingly, the number of Maghrebians using Turkey as transit country has also increased in recent years, indicating that many migrants are forced to take long roundabout routes to "Fortress Europe".

The living conditions and survival mechanisms of migrants in transit cities

Despite the growing number of foreigners living in Tijuana, making up 1.1 percent of the total population,[7] their presence is nearly invisible. For instance, the Chinese community of 9 thousand people prefers to keep a low profile to the point that in the 2000 census no Chinese were registered among Tijuana's residents. Their presence is visible only by the 250 Chinese restaurants in the city (ALEGRÍA, 2005:236). Instead, pretending to be Mexican is the most adopted strategy of Latin American migrants, both for crossing the US border and when settling in the Mexican city. Since Mexico did not sign a readmission agreement with the US, being apprehended by a US border patrol would mean being repatriated to their country of origin while, pretending to be Mexican, migrants might just be sent back to Tijuana where they stay until they can organise another attempt at crossing. For those who end up settling in Tijuana irregularly, the easiest ways to avoid migration controls is to get a forged Mexican ID and smoothly mix in with the local population or to simply vanish by living in the widespread squats and working in the informal market.

Stranded migrants are fewer in Istanbul in relation to the huge population of the Turkish metropolis (up to 13 million). However, they are much more visible since their racial,

linguistic and religious background is quite different from that of Turkish people. Xenophobia, racism and fear spread among natives, especially the low-income population, because these newcomers are "different" and perceived as undesirable competitors for scarce resources.

Migrants in Istanbul tend to concentrate in few degraded neighbourhoods in central districts, contributing to the existing urban fragmentation. For instance, up to 2,000 Africans are estimated to live in Kumkapi, a neighbourhood within the historical peninsula mainly inhabited by Kurds, who constitute themselves a highly excluded minority. Many other Africans settled in Tarlabaş and Kurtuluş two neighbourhoods within the central Beyoğlu district where Iraqi refugees also cluster. The building stock of these areas is in a state of decay. Miserable lodgings in narrow basements are rented to migrants for a far higher price than Turkish people would pay. As a result migrants live in very unhealthy and overcrowded conditions in order to share costs.

These neighbourhoods are strategic places not just for finding anonymous accommodation, but also for the opportunities they offer to get into contact with both providers of employment as well as with the smuggling networks. However, due to their undocumented status and lack of knowledge of the Turkish language, most migrants just find sporadic underpaid occupation in the construction or textile sectors. In many cases middlemen take up to 20 percent from their already poor wages, and frequently migrants are not paid at all for their work. For many these earnings are barely sufficient to pay for their daily necessities. Hence it is highly improbable that they will be able to save up the amount required to pay the passage to their target destination.

Those with family or friends in Europe, or those whose relatives at home still have some savings, might rely on regular or forfeit sums they collect from money transfer agencies, a type of service that is booming in transit cities. All the others get stranded in a limbo in which they barely manage to survive.

Immigration by default, prompted by exogenous factors rather than by a real potential of transit cities to absorb migrant workers, confronts local governments with an entirely new set of complex social and legal issues for which they are unprepared, and often unwilling, to cope. Both in Istanbul and Tijuana international migration takes place in the total absence of explicit public policies addressing migrant needs. Their access to housing and employment is essentially based on social networks, while access to fundamental rights such as health and educational services usually depends on the goodwill of public officers. The only formal support for transit migrants comes from civil society organisations and international NGOs.

In the Mexican city the main service provided is temporary shelter. There are several hostels for migrants next to "the wall", the principal ones run by Catholic organisations. On average, 15 to 20 percent of migrants hosted in these structures are of foreign origin. Some of these organisations are associated into the Coalición pro defensa del migrante (Coalition for Migrant Protection), which advocates migrant rights and often coordinates with international NGOs to address migrant needs.[8]



◀ Figure 3: Kumkapi neighbourhood in Istanbul (Source: Marconi)

In Istanbul the situation is different. Since the government prefers to avoid interference from outsiders in domestic affairs, local offices of international organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have restricted autonomy. Also, Turkish NGOs still have a low profile (PEROUSE, 2004:80). The most active stakeholders on the ground are those linked to Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches participating in the Istanbul Interparish Migrant Program (IIMP). Although not legally recognised as a proper association, local authorities turn a blind eye to the IIMP's activities, since it provides essential services for which the government is not intentioned to take responsibility. IIMP offers migrants help in terms of health assistance, material resources (food and clothes), information and legal aid. It also runs a course for migrant mothers and their children and organises computer or language classes.

The side effects of externalisation policies

As a result of US and EU pressures for filtering unwanted migration, local authorities in transit countries have been compelled to introduce new prohibitions, restrictions and controls, often with no other relevant result than to exacerbate the vulnerability of migrants and worsen their living conditions.

The role of Tijuana as US gatekeeper is palpable: migration controls are strict at all the main points of entry to the city from the south, namely the motorway tollbooth, the central bus station and the airport. Since a "migratory station" for detaining irregular migrants was built in 2003, more than 10 thousand foreigners have been jailed there before being deported.

In Turkey, apprehension of migrants is irregular and varies according to the advances and setbacks in negotiations for accessing the EU. Also, in Istanbul there is a detention centre for migrants called a "guest house".

8
For instance, from 2005 to 2008 the French NGO Medicins du Monde (MdM, Doctors of the World) ran a project promoting the right of migrants to health. They provided medical assistance to migrants hosted in hostels in both Tijuana and Mexicali (the two border cities in Baja California State), as well as in a health centre placed in San Ysidro international crossing point, where more than 200,000 irregular migrants are deported from the US each year (data released by researchers of El Colegio de la Frointera Norte, Tijuana, based on the Survey on Migration along the Northern Mexican Border – EMIF – they produce). From May 2006 to May 2007 MdM assisted 1,164 migrants, 17% of them foreigners (data provided by Stéphane Vinhas, Migrants' Health Project Coordinator, during an interview in Tijuana on 26 March 2008).

Figure 4: Tijuana. Crosses on the "wall" (Source: Marconi)

In 2007, 9,250 irregular migrants were apprehended in the city (ERDER, KAŞKA, 2003:23; AAVV 2008:57).

In these contexts it is difficult to limit corruption, abuse of power and extortion against migrants by authorities. Within a globalised attitude of criminalising undocumented migration, local police in transit cities feel almost legitimised to take excessive action. Victims fear deportation if they defend themselves. Given the ensured impunity, the exploitation of the irregular situation of migrants is a common practice. For instance in Istanbul, African migrants living in the Tarlabaşi neighbourhood have self-imposed a sort of curfew: they generally remain in their shanty lodgings after 8 p.m. in order to avoid police harassment. In Tijuana the situation is similar. Nearly every day police comb the streets in front of migrant hostels threatening those found without documents with arrest.

Nevertheless, Tijuana is also an outstanding example of advocacy for migrant rights. It has been widely documented that corrupt police officials perpetuate an alarming number of abuses on transit migrants. As a consequence, a special corps was created in 1990 with the explicit mandate of protecting migrants. This pioneer practice, consisting of a migrant-aid and rescue group known as "grupo beta" which patrols risky areas of the city along the border, has been replicated in several other transit cities in Mexico. Furthermore, Tijuana hosts an office of the National Commission on Human Rights, which has filed several complaints against the municipality. Also, the Coalición pro defensa de migrantes monitors abuses against migrants and keeps record of, and gives visibility to, the hundreds of migrants who have lost their lives while attempting to cross the US border. A never-ending line of white crosses — personalised with the name, age, and place of origin of the people who have died — is hung along the border fence between Tijuana and San Diego, a visual silent indictment bearing witness to the side effects of zero-immigration policies.

Conclusions

Two antithetical, highly symbolic, physical marks strongly distinguish the urban space of Tijuana and Istanbul: the entire northern border of Tijuana is a wall where the vast, unplanned, dispersed urban area comes to an abrupt and artificial end. In contrast, the bridges across the Bosporus, which connect Istanbul's Asian and European sides, link de facto two continents and are broadly used as metaphor for bridging civilisations. For migrants in transit, these cities often become their last stop.

Forced by circumstances to spend longer and longer periods in would-be transit cities, migrants live and work in precarious situations, vulnerable to being deprived of even the most fundamental rights such as adequate housing, freedom to meet in public spaces, access to healthcare services, or safe and respectable working conditions.

Local governments are still not fully aware of this increasing presence. Policy makers need evidence of the potential of international migration as an important contribution to the social and economic dynamism of their cities. And they also need to understand the costs of failing to manage increasingly diverse urban societies, especially in terms of the decay in civic values and social cohesion. The arrival of new groups of migrants might have strong impacts on the behaviour of the urban population, fluctuating between solidarity and rejection, which may sometimes be violent.

Due to their limited legal, financial and institutional capacities, transit cities are generally unprepared to deal with these issues and need help to address the situation. However, national rather than human security has been, up to now, the main concern of the EU and the US, while transit countries have exploited the situation in order to promote other political objectives. On both sides, the actions taken have not been directed at assisting local stakeholders in making informed choices, but rather at influencing their policies with the aim of curbing irregular flows. The cost of all this is ultimately paid mainly by migrants and by the societies "hosting" them.

References

AAVV 2004, *Proceedings of the Regional Conference on Migration "Migrants in the transit countries: sharing responsibilities in management and protection"*, Istanbul, 30 September – 1st October 2004, Council of Europe.

AAVV 2008, *Stuck in a Revolving Door. Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union.* Human Rights Watch, New York.

ALEGRÍA, T. 2005, *Tijuana, Mexico: Integration, Growth, Social Structuring and Governance.* In BALBO, M. (ed) 2005, International Migrants and the City. UN-HABITAT and Università Iuav di Venezia, Venice.

COSLOVI L. 2007, *Spagna e Italia nel Tragico dominio degli sbarchi*, Limes, rivista italiana di geopolitica, Vol. 4/2007 "Il Mondo in Casa", gruppo editoriale l'Espresso, Milano.

DE TAPIA, S. 2004, *Presentation of the General Rapporteur's conclusions.* in AAVV, 2004.

DÜVELL, F. 2006, *Crossing the fringes of Europe: Transit migration in EU's neighbourhood,* Working Paper No.33, COMPAS, University of Oxford.

ERDER, S. KASKA, S. 2003. *Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Women: The Case of Turkey.* IOM Report, Geneva.

IÇDUYGU A. 2003, *Irregular Migration in Turkey*, IOM Migration Research Series No.12, Geneva.

IÇDUYGU, A. 2008, *Rethinking irregular migration in Turkey: some demo-economic reflections, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes* 2008/72, Irregular Migration Series, Demographic and Economic Module, Florence.

KAŞKA, 2003

KOPPA M. 2007, *Migration and Security Issues in Southeast Europe: The Greek Perspective.* Remarks prepared for the "Forum for the Southeast Europe Project", March 8, 2007, Washington DC.

PEROUSE, J.F. 2004, *At the cross-roads between Europe and Asia - complexity of transit migration in Istanbul*, in AAVV, 2004.d

Giovanna Marconi
PhD candidate, architect and researcher at the planning department and SSIIM UNESCO Chair on "Social and Spatial Inclusion of International Migrants" of Università Iuav di Venezia. The focus of her research is South-to-South international migrations and transit migration.

marconi@iuav.it

The Challenges of Spatial Planning in a Divided City: Mitrovica

Rossana Poblet and Natalie Mitchell

Die Stadt Mitrovice im Kosovo ist in vielfältiger Weise von Migrationsprozessen und ethnischen Grenzen geprägt, die mit dem gewaltsamen Konflikt von 1999 in Verbindung stehen. Seither ist die Stadt entlang des Flusses Iber geteilt und die Brücke über den Fluss ist zum Symbol für die Spaltung des Kosovo geworden. Im südlichen Teil leben überwiegend Kosovoalbaner, während im Norden überwiegend Serben leben, von denen 5000 bis 7000 als intern Vertriebene gelten. Auch eine Volksgruppe von 8000 Roma ist zersplittert und vertrieben worden. Der folgende Beitrag zeichnet ein Bild von den unterschiedlichen Konflikten in Mitrovica und von deren physisch-räumlichen Auswirkungen und beschreibt, in welcher Weise örtliche Behörden diesen Konflikten begegnen. Am Umgang mit Enteignungsprozessen und Anstrengungen zur Landverteilung und –rückgabe werden die Probleme dieser geteilten Stadt besonders deutlich sichtbar.

"…There were times when the peninsula seemed truly large, with enough space for everyone: for different languages and faiths, for a dozen peoples, states, kingdoms and principalities… but times changed" *- Ismael Kadare, Elegy for Kosovo*

Could those times come back?

Introduction

Throughout history, Kosovo[1] has been part of different cultures and territories which allowed diverse communities to live under common systems; nevertheless this strength also produced conflicts and disputes affecting the development of the region and the relationships between those communities. The latest conflict, caused by economical[2], political and ethnic tensions between the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, ended after NATO intervention in 1999 when the territory came under the interim administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Under that legal umbrella, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has taken a leading role since December 2008. Nevertheless, even under these international efforts, Kosovo is still a very sensitive place where any tension can originate a new conflict, especially in regions with multiethnic compositions and different interests.

The city of Mitrovica is an emblematic example of a rich place that was born around mining exploitation but that has lost its core since the end of the conflict. The city is now a place with economical, physical, environmental and social problems that is divided by the Mitrovica Bridge, an iconic symbol of the Kosovo division. Many organisations and authorities have tried to create common projects to develop it, but Mitrovica is still under two different views: the northern one dominated by Kosovo Serbs, and the southern one dominated by Kosovo Albanians. Both of them are trying to live and survive under very difficult conditions. This document will review

1
Kosovo is located in the Balkans and has the city of Pristina as capital. It is bordered by Macedonia to the south, Albania to the west, the region of Central Serbia to the north and east, and Montenegro to the northwest (see figure 1).

2
Kosovo has one of the most under-developed economies in Europe and was the poorest province of former Yugoslavia. The average annual per capita income is $2,300. One out of every four people who live in extreme poverty in Kosovo lives in the city of Mitrovica. Unemployment levels in the city have been estimated as high as 70%.

Figure 1: Map of Kosovo, Source: UN 1999

▲
Figure 2: Picture new Born (Rossana Poblet)



Figure 3: Industrial sites in kosovo (Source: Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center 2002)

the challenges faced to develop a city under post-conflict effects affected by new compositions of population.

Mitrovica, located approximately 40 km north of Pristina, covers a total area of 350 square kilometres, and consists of the major town and 49 villages inhabited by different communities[3]. The Ibar River, which originates in Montenegro and passes through Mitrovica on its way from the mountains to the Black Sea, divides the town and, since the Kosovo conflict, the people too. The Mitrovica Bridge, in the background of the different tensions between north and south Mitrovica, has become a symbol of the disputes between Serbia and Kosovo[4] (see Figure 2). No other place in Europe combines the consequences of deindustrialisation, pollution and ethnic tension quite like this area. For years, the Mitrovica region (formed by Zubin Potok, Zvecan, Mitrovica, and other municipalities) generated wealth both for the state and region thanks to its deposits of gold, silver, lead and zinc. The valuable mineral reserves exploited in this region contributed to the different empires and regimes posted in this region (Warrander/Knaus, 2007; see Figure 3).

A total population in Mitrovica is difficult to ascertain due to the lack of a census and the displacement of people; however it is estimated that Mitrovica south, predominantly Kosovo Albanian, has an overall population of approximately 110,000, including the presence of the Bosniak, Turkish, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian and Gorani communities. Mitrovica north, predominantly Kosovo Serb, has approximately 20,000 inhabitants, made up of 17,000 Kosovo Serbs (5,000 to 7,000 of whom are internally displaced persons [IDPs]) and 3,000 members of other communities (Kosovo Albanians, Bosniak, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian). Several Turkish and Bosniak families live on both sides of the river, while the pre-1999 Roma population (approximately 8,000) of south Mitrovica has been displaced to the northern municipalities, Montenegro, Serbia proper and several countries in Europe[5]. All these communities have been affected dramatically by the conflict and have had to create new employment and income-earning activities to survive since the prior main economic activity of the town has disappeared (see Figure 3).

3
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Profile, April 2008

4
On February 17 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia. Currently, there are more than 60 UN member states recognising Kosovo as independent. However, there is staunch opposition to the declaration from other countries such as Russia and Serbia itself. Serbia intends to seek international validation and support for its stance that the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence is „illegal" at the International Court of Justice.

5
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Profile, April 2008

6
Mining and metallurgic economic activities have a long history in the municipalities of Mitrovica and Zvecan. Since 1926, the Trepca mining company significantly contributed to the development of Mitrovica town, which grew up around the factory. In 1999, the factory employed approximately 15,000 workers.

Living conditions and development in Mitrovica

Until a few years ago, there were checkpoints and fences controlling the access to north Mitrovica and across the Ibar River. In north Mitrovica, the few Kosovo Albanians lived in enclaves and the Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians (RAE) communities lived in potentially polluted former barracks or in informal settlements. No Kosovo Serbs were living in the south of the city. During the last few years the situation has improved, however freedom of movement is still limited.

This current picture of Mitrovica is in contrast to the way this area was conceived. The Mitrovica region was modernised and developed on the back of the Trepca Company[6], which directly or indirectly provided most of the region's employment. Trepca was an industrial complex built up around the local lead and zinc mines and processing facilities. It provided Mitrovica with a proud industrial identity shared by Serbs and Albanians and other ethnicities alike. By 2000, however, poor management and a continuous history of over-employment combined with the effects of the Kosovo conflict led the company to almost entirely cease production. With mountains of debt and unresolved property disputes, the future of Trepca is now extremely uncertain. The result is a one-company town without its company[7].

Today, living standards in Mitrovica are sustained by salaries and transfers from different sources such as the Kosovo consolidated budget, the budget of the Republic of Serbia, the international community, and remittances from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora. These external sources of income are the only life support for the post-industrial community.

Land administration and property related issues

Kosovo's history has had several different stages of land administration. During Ottoman rule from 1389, there was a legal system of land ownership under the Sharia and specific state laws. These were recorded on instruments called "tapias" (titles), but there was no cadastre as such. Under Turkish rule in the 17th century, Albanians became the major ethnic group; there was a system of common law based upon institutions such as clan ownership in addition to the Ottoman institutions. Gradually state institutions replaced this common law. Serbian, and then Yugoslav,

ruled from 1913, and provided the basis for the current cultural and ethnic landscape. In 1930, a land-book system became law but it was never implemented in southern Yugoslavia, including Kosovo (the land book tried to define ownership and introduced systematic recording of land rights) (ANDERSON/ONKALO, 2004). In 1945, as a result of nationalisation, property was declared socially owned and much private land and property was transferred to Socially Owned Enterprises (SOE). In 1999, 43% of the property was either socially owned enterprise (SOE) or publicly owned enterprise (POE). Residential property fell into two primary categories: private single-family homes, which were located mainly on the outskirts of towns and in rural areas, and socially owned apartments, which up to the early 1990s constituted the primary source of residential housing. These apartments were built and administered by either SOEs or POEs and were allocated to employees of these enterprises to meet their housing needs. They were subsidised by obligatory contributions from employee salaries. Employees were allocated permanent rights of use over these apartments, known as "occupancy rights", which were statutory rights that derived from the Law on Housing Relations. This regime by and large accommodated the housing needs of different ethnic groups in urban areas until the loss of autonomy in 1989. Then a state of emergency was declared and legislation in Kosovo was replaced by new Serbian legislation. Many Kosovo Albanians were dismissed from their positions in public companies and lost their property rights to their socially owned apartments, which were reallocated to Kosovo Serbs. As a result of these developments, it was primarily the Serb occupancy-right holders who were in a position to convert their occupancy rights into ownership rights. They could do this by purchasing the apartment from the allocation-right holder under the privatisation process introduced by the Law on Housing in 1992. Also, legislation designed to limit real-estate transaction was enacted, namely the Law on Changes and Supplements on the Limitations of Real-Estate Transactions. The object and effect of the law was to restrict the sale of properties from Kosovo Serbs to Kosovo Albanians as a means of ensuring that the Serb population did not decline. Some 98% of the transactions presented to the Ministry of Finance were reported to have been rejected on this ground. Many citizens sought to circumvent these legislative measures and concluded informal unregistered property transactions which were not recorded in the cadastre or property records. This practice continued up to 1999, and gradually rendered the cadastre and property registration system unreliable (HPCC, 2007). During the 1999 conflict, many of the court books, cadastral records and maps were removed to Serbia proper. After the conflict, over 2.2 million parcels needed to be identified and recorded, and a high number of changes dating from the previous 10 years had to be registered. Many institutions that had existed from 1989 to 1999, but had been based in Belgrade, ceased to exist (this included the cadastre and land administration functions). Migration and displacement of people started to cause changes of ethnicity in different areas, and the right to occupy and use land was uncertain. The United Nations became responsible for the Kosovo administration in 1999, and no property transactions were recorded between February and October as the court systems were not functioning. In November 1999 an ad-hoc independent body was established to resolve residential property disputes. It was composed of the Housing and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) and the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD), both of which were mandated to achieve an efficient and effective resolution of claims concerning residential property[8]. The claims were divided into three categories: (A) individuals who lost property as a result of discriminatory laws, (B) individuals who entered into informal transactions on the basis of free will of the parties from 1989 until October 1999, and (C) refugees and IDPs



7
People or Territory? A proposal for Mitrovica, European Stability Initiative, 2004 (http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=50)

8
KPA ended its mandate in 2005, but in 2006 the Kosovo Property Agency was established with the aim to receive, register and resolve conflict-related claims (through the HPCC) including agricultural and commercial property.

◀
Figure 4: Mitrovica town 2000 (Source Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center 2000)

Table 1: Property claims registerd by the Housing and Property Directorate in the Mitrovica region by 2004, Source: European Stability Initiative, 2004

who lost possession of their property after 24 March 1999. In Mitrovica, by 2004 the following claims had been registered:

Location	Claims registered by HPD	Out of which identified as destroyed property
Mitrovica		
South	1,266	600
North	1,287	260
Total	2,585	863

By 2007, the majority of claims (93.2%) were category C; 4.2% were category A claims, while 2.6% were category B claims. Pristina region presented most of the claims, followed by Pec/Peje, Prizren, Mitrovica and Gjilan.

Challenges of spatial planning in the city

Different efforts have been made to improve the city conditions and to develop spatial planning in Mitrovica, but more than 9 years of uncertainty have resulted in low levels of investment and lack of ideals regarding the future of the city. In northern Mitrovica, there is the overwhelming sense of a lack of community ownership or care for the city. Uncertainty about the future, in this, the only urban area with a substantial Serbian population, has stunted economic growth, hampered community development, and affected spatial planning to the city's detriment. Over the past few years, Kosovo's economy has shown significant progress in transitioning to a market-based system and maintaining macroeconomic stability, but it is still highly dependent on the international community and the diaspora for financial and technical assistance. Remittances from the diaspora – located mainly in Germany and Switzerland – are estimated to account for about 15% of GDP, and donor-financed activities and aid for another 15%. Unemployment, affecting around 40% of the population, is a significant problem that encourages outward migration and black-market activity.

As you drive through the main thoroughfares, you encounter a jumble of ramshackle kiosks and illegal developments, the increasingly clogged streets being full of double-parked cars and abandoned wrecks. Pedestrians are forced to walk on the street as the corrugated iron kiosks and parked cars take up any spare space along the city's once wide and open footpaths (picture 5). These kiosks are, however, an economic necessity, a required response to the need for shopping outlets in the formerly residentially-focused north. A small section of a former booming mining town in the centre of the Balkans that became isolated from the rest of the city and offers essential services and shopping opportunities. The state of the kiosks speaks to a level of confidence that traders have in the long-term prospects as well as the lack of capital available for anything more substantial. Some of these kiosks are even owned by third persons with influence, thus making it difficult to remove them since there is no real will (picture 6).

Illegal constructions which sometimes occupy areas reserved for public facilities, services, and infrastructure are also affecting the urban development, creating new physical conflicts in the city (picture 7). The lack of urban control and original documents regarding property facilitate the consolidation of these constructions.

Much of the substantial investment that has been seen in northern Mitrovica has come from either the international organisations with donor government funds or from the Serbian government. This includes the construction of new buildings for a Serbian-language university, student housing and the grand Orthodox Church on a prominent position on the hillside overlooking the city (see picture 5). At the same time, Serbia has bought small houses from Albanians in the Bosniak Mahalla, replacing them with big blocks for Serbs. This helps part of the society, but it could also be seen as a geopolitical strategy to change the ethnic composition. Independence may bring a level of certainty to the region, but the economic situation will take many years and lots of international assistance to improve[9].

9
Pending Independence Declaration Causes Tension in Kosovo's Second Largest City

By Barry Wood, Mitrovica, Kosovo 29 January 2008 http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-01-29-voa76.cfm?rss=politics "Even if there is no violence here after independence, the city's economy is destitute"

10
This being said, however, walking is still the mode used for the majority of trips in Kosovo and there is a challenge to avoid losing this pedestrian tradition.

11
Many great projects have been stymied due to local political pressure and barely disguised threats. This is partly due to the fact that these projects have generally been financed and pushed forward by international organisations or the UNMIK administration, and these organisations are generally not in favour with 'Belgrade' as they are seen to support the Albanian majority and its move to independence – whether this is true or not.

Figure 5+6: Photo by Natalie Mitchell



Figure 7: Photo by Natalie Mitchell

Figure 8: Rebuilt Church (Photo by Natalie Mitchell)

Figure 9: Survey 2004 (Source UNMIK)



Informality and lack of public identification

A major issue affecting development in northern Mitrovica is the lack of civic pride or ownership of the city. There is a lack of connection or feeling of community between residents, and a widespread disbelief in the power of community action to make change for the better. People tend to be out for themselves and look after their own interests. As before, this is partly due to the lack of security and certainty surrounding life here. It is not that people stay completely silent on issues of spatial planning, city development and mobility though. Many in the north complain about the traffic, pedestrian and parking situation. Many of these are the same people who park their cars on footpaths or on gardens, block pedestrian ramps, double park on the street blocking the traffic lane, and who drive when it would likely be easier, quicker and less stressful to walk to their destination[10].

Many inhabitants of Mitrovice blame the kiosks mentioned above for taking up parking spaces and generally making the city look bad. To their credit, several plans and projects have been initiated by the UNMIK administration to remove or relocate the kiosks, but these have failed in the past under pressure from certain 'political' figures that wield their influence over various matters of public policy in the city[11].

Community is hard to create, especially when the constituents have been thrown together in the way they have been here. It is a city that once boasted of being something of a melting pot of cultures, with people coming from around the region to work in the mines and factories and to share and create music, theatre and art. There was pride in the city and a vibrant lifestyle, which is now largely missing.

Now, again, there are people from around Kosovo in the north, but to a large extent they are internally displaced people (IDPs) who felt no option but to flee from their home towns and find shelter in the north where the majority is of Serbian ethnicity. The 'original' residents are somewhat reluctant to see the IDPs as locals or residents of the city, and some have complained that the IDPs don't care about the city as much as they do, that they don't respect the city. "If there is no public interest you cannot have spatial planning," a colleague declared recently. While perhaps a little simplistic, it can be seen here in the lack of correct implementation of planning projects or the lack of respect for the proper functioning of the city.

▲
Figure 10: Envisioning workshop 2007 (Source Natalie Mitchell)

12
The Municipal Spatial Planning Support Programme implemented by UN-HABITAT is funded by Sida and supported by the Provisional Institutions of Self Government in Kosovo.

13
According to the Council of Europe, "Roma" means "man of the Roma ethnic group" or "husband", depending on the variant of Romani or the author. The Roma are – with the Sinti and Kale – one of the three main branches of the Roma (generic term), a people originally from northern India. The first written traces of their arrival in Europe date from the XIVth century. Kosovo's Roma can be classified into three groups: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. The so-called „ethnic Roma" identify themselves as Roma and use Romani as their mother tongue, and also speak Albanian and Serbian. The Ashkali are Albanian-speaking and live close to the Kosovo Albanians with whom they have always been identified. The Egyptians, whom many consider to be Ashkali, speak Albanian but claim to have originally come from Egypt. These two groups speak Albanian language.

14
History of Roma Mahala, Danish Refugee Council, http://www.drc-kosovo.org/history.html

Proposals of civic education

In 2004, the UN conducted a survey with the aim to identify the main problems of the city and to propose actions to improve urban conditions (see Figure 9). Later in 2005, UN-Habitat implemented the Municipal Spatial Planning Support Programme[12] with the aim to assist the preparation of the Municipal and Urban Development Plans in five municipalities in Kosovo. However, the difficult political situation in Mitrovica effectively ruled this out. After that, UN-Habitat concentrated on the more 'neutral' issues, such as on empowering civil society to get more involved in the planning process. The civil society was encouraged through NGOs to propose projects and lobby for official funding and to work closely with the planners and donor agencies.

Other initiatives in Mitrovica were to create a 'Mobility and Transport' working group with local and international professionals and civil-society representatives, including an expert from Novi Sad University who was in charge of preparing project proposals with community representatives regarding a new railway station, public transport provision, and urban design/public space in neighbourhoods.

Aside from these experiences, appropriate inclusion of both sides of the city has proven problematic. Nevertheless, a visioning workshop for the city of Mitrovica was organised in Skopje, Macedonia, in 2007, creating a space of dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. The aim of the visioning workshop was to bring together civil-society representatives and professionals from both ethnic groups in an effort to develop a vision for one city and one municipality, even if two different administrative bodies would manage it. The event served the double purpose of empowering the civil society and media within the field of spatial planning and improving their dialogue with professional planners, whilst strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the north and the south.

The participants worked in groups focusing on crosscutting issues such as the economy, the environment and mobility, analyzing the current situation and developing strategies within each separate field of interest. It was determined that the topics of priority were: new economic development; environmental quality; infrastructure and mobility; public services and facilities; urban quality and sense of identity. A common motto was adopted by the whole team that sums up the most important elements of their vision: "Mitrovica – Treasure of Kosovo. Where Crystals and Rivers Meet Tradition and Culture". After this event, it was not possible to continue a joint work (see Figure 10).

On May 4th, 2009, the Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica adopted the Municipal Development Plan-MDP (see map Figure 11) and the Urban Development Plan-UDP (see Figure 12) prepared by the consultants of Kosovo-based Lin-Project and "Metron" from Switzerland. According to the leading projects, both plans took into consideration the results of the visioning workshop held with both communities.

A forgotten minority community: The Roma Mahala

The word "Mahala" means settlement in Turkish language, and the "Roma Mahala" is an area of Mitrovica town that was mainly inhabited by the around 8,000 members of the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian[13] (RAE) community. Before the war, Kosovo was the home to 120,000 to 150,000 Roma. A first Roma presence in Kosovo has been traced back to the 14th century (1394) in the town of Prizren. Roma in Kosovo enjoyed a comparatively high living standard. They had their own institutions, newspapers and theatres. The Roma Mahala in Mitrovica was one of the oldest and largest Roma settlements in the region, located over approximately 17 ha, and included around 700 houses, some small and makeshift, but many large and solid, and several mansions (see map 6). This scenery changed in June 1999 (ODHIR/OSCE, 1999:102), just after the end of the conflict, when the RAE community was forcibly expelled and their homes looted and burned by Kosovo Albanians (see picture 13).

The residents fled from the south of Mitrovica to the north, others to Serbia proper, to the regional countries of the Balkans, and to Western Europe.[14] Under these circumstances the United Nations and NATO housed around 600 persons in temporary makeshift camps in north Mitrovica; in 1999 the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established the IDP camps Cesmin Lug (in the Mitrovica municipality) and Zitkovac (in the Zvecan municipality), and in 2001 the Kablare Barracks. These three camps were located within 3 km of the Trepca smelter and within 300 meters of two mine-tailing sites. A fourth camp was built at Leposavic, approximately 45 km from Trepca, and then a fifth camp, Osterode, used by the French Kosovo Force (KFOR) from 1999 until 2006, was converted into an IDP camp. The Kablare and Zitkovac camps were closed and the RAE community was relocated there.

Although the camps were built as temporary measures, they consolidated as permanent informal settlements due to the lack of rehabilitation of the former homes and lack of political decisions and financial means. All these factors extended the life of the IDP camps, which are mainly polluted informal settlements poisoned by the lead leftover by the smelter that used to work in Mitrovica. There has been irreversible damage to the population and especially to the children living there. In addition, the lack of water and sanitation facilities, electricity, heating and healthcare and access to food inside the camps has contributed to a humanitarian crisis that has lasted over the last ten years now[15].

MDP - Development concept

Balanced development

Existing situation

- Forest
- Pastures
- Defoliated forests
- Agricultural land
- Settlement areas
- Tailings
- Village
- Centers (cities) near Mitrovica
- River
- Road
- Railway
- Mine
- Waste dumpsite

Development concept

- Natural Park Shala of Bajgora
- Center for leisure, sport and recreation
- Park for leisure and recreation on the Ibar riverbank
- settlement development
- Sub – center
- Centers for free time, leisure and recreation
- Planned road
- UDP road
- Green corridors
- Protection of the riverbeds
- UDP boundary

Figure 11: Municipal Development Plan, Source: UN-Habitat/ Municipality of Mitrovica

Figure 12: Urban Development Plan Proposal for Mitrovica (Source: UN-Habitat/Mitrovica Municipality)

UDP – Development concept

COMPACT CITY

EXISTING SITUATION

- Residential area connected to infrastructure
- Residential area not connected to infrastructure
- Trade and craft Area
- Central area
- Military area (Potential)
- Schools/Universities/ Health institutions
- Tailings
- Main roads
- Secondary roads
- Railway

DEVELOPMENT

- Densification of the Central area / Development of the secondary centers
- Verification of the connected area for densification
- Densification / Connection to infrastructure
- Densification / Construction of the Trade and craft area
- Area reserved for infrastructure
- Free areas
- Construction / Replenishment of road network
- Optional replenishment of the circle
- Leisure/Culture links
- Free area links

Figure 13: Roma mahala 1999 (Source: Danish Refugee Council)

15
In April 2008, at the request of the camps leaders the local office of the Serbian Institute for Public Health and Protection performed a blood analysis on 53 children in Cesmin Lug and on 51 children in Osterode. The blood test was done on 104 children between the age of one and sixteen years. The final results show that only two children have a blood lead level below the level of concern (10 µg/dL), while 102 children were contaminated or in a risky health condition. Furthermore, out of these 102 children, the samples reveals that 22 children have such a high concentration of lead in the blood (over 60 µg/dL) that the testing instruments were not able to measure it.

16
Multisectorial Return Project to Roma Mahala, Danish Refugee Council, http://www.drc-kosovo.org/project.html

Rossana Poblet Alegre
is an architect with a degree from Ricardo Palma University and masters studies on urban renewal at Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería, Lima/ Peru. Between 2004 and 2008 she worked as a technical advisor for the Kosovo Cadastral Agency and as a monitoring officer for the Ministry of Public Services within the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Currently, she is a masters student at TU Darmstadt within the International Cooperation and Urban Development masters program.

r_poblet@yahoo.com

Natalie Mitchell
is an urban planner. She holds a masters degree of social science from RMIT University. Between 2006 and 2008, she was an International Municipal Spatial Planning Advisor (UNV) for UN HABITAT Kosovo within the Municipal Spatial Planning Support Program of Mitrovica. Currently, she works as a Senior Planner in the Department of Planning of NSW Government, Sydney/ Australia.

Mitchell.Natalie@gmail.com

The Roma Mahala Return Project

In April 2005 the Municipality of Mitrovica, together with UNMIK, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and United Nations Human Centre for Refugees (UNHCR), signed the agreement for the allocation of municipal land in order to prevent further poisoning of the displaced RAE population residing in the camps. It was the formal act for the beginning of the Roma Mahala Return Project.

According to the Danish Refugee Council, out of the 13.5 hectares of land in the Roma Mahala, 4.1 hectares was privately owned, divided into 355 parcels of land on which there were 368 buildings. The other 9.4 hectares were socially owned land, subsequently given to the municipality, on which there were 280 houses. The municipality argued that one section of the municipal land where RAE were living (a 1.9 hectare "triangle" on the riverbank) should remain a green area both to protect the riverbank and to serve as park for of the citizens of Mitrovica. It has therefore been agreed to compensate the former inhabitants with an additional 3.24 hectares of former agricultural land adjacent to the Mahala. This brings the total area of the current Roma Mahala to approximately 17 hectares[16].

As a result of the combined effort of the Steering Group for the Roma Mahala Return Project composed by OSCE, UNMIK, Mitrovica Municipality, UNHCR, Ministry of Community and Returns (MCR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) the first phase of the return project was completed in March 2007. On 30 March 2007, 162 individuals returned to the 24 flats in the two newly built apartment blocks and 185 individuals returned to their private properties. In October 2007, the first phase of the Roma Mahala Return Project was finalised with the return of 115 individuals to two new apartment blocks. Totally, 102 families and 462 individuals returned to the reconstructed Roma Mahala. The second phase of the return project was taken over by the United Nations Kosovo Team (an umbrella of 13 UN Agencies led by UNDP) with the aim to continue the return project in co-operation with Mitrovica Municipality.

However, due to the continued lack of political will in Mitrovica and financial means, little could be made to evacuate the remaining camps and provide proper accommodation and standard living conditions to the RAE community. Due to disputes between north and south Mitrovica, a possible decision of the Kosovo institutions to close the camps in the north would most probably not be accepted as valid and/ or implemented by the authorities in the north. Considering the origin of the problem, an important concern delaying the return process is related to the security and economic viability of returning to the southern part of Mitrovica.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that the future political developments related with the Kosovo status will decide the further changes and actions in Mitrovica. A still-affected, post-conflict region faces the challenge to rebuild and to once again become the core of the economical growth of the region, and to regenerate the very active art and student life existing before the war. Mitrovica is still the area where conflict and tension concentrates. There are different interpretations to the future political configuration of Mitrovica: while the south wants a joint Mitrovica, the north wants to split from the south. We cannot predict the future, but it is important to find a proper solution to all the different communities living there in order to have peace in the region. A secure future for Mitrovica could give Kosovo's Serbs a sense of a long-term future in Kosovo. Mitrovica is the only urban cen-

tre where the Serbs live. At the same time, the concerns of Kosovo Albanian's about the partitioning of Kosovo also have to be addressed. An important way to provide stability and justice is to continue implementing mechanisms to solve the pending property-related issues and assuring sustainable return processes that not only provide formal accommodation but also allow the economical independence of the returnee, including freedom of movements and health care.

Mitrovica is maybe one of the most important regions in Kosovo and everyone has been affected by the conflict: Minorities living in enclaves, majorities living without freedom of movement, and return processes programs without warranties of economical sustainability, employments or security to start a new life. It is difficult to give technical proposals when so many interests are still under discussion. Kosovo has now declared independence and while this has increased uncertainty in the interim, particularly in regards to the status of the northern (mostly Serbian) municipalities, there is hope that this decision will lead to a more stable and certain development environment in the future. Civil society empowerment and community strengthening will be key to ensuring an improved economic and spatial outlook for this damaged city.

References

ANDERSON, B./ONKALO P, 2004, Towards Sustainable Land Administration in Kosovo - Final Report of the Kosovo Cadastral Support Programme, Project leaded by UN-HABITAT and funded by different donors.

EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, 2004, People or Territory? A Proposal for Mitrovica, Viena.

EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, 2004, A Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvecan, Viena.

HOUSING AND PROPERTY CLAIMS COMMISSION, 2007, Final Report of the Housing and Property Claims Commission, Priština (HPCC).

KOSOVO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, UNDP, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/FS_Eng.pdf

MDPL, OSCE, PISG, 2007, You are displaced, your rights are not, Sustainable Property Restitution and Solutions to Displacement in Kosovo During Transition, Final Conference Document and Recommendations, Priština.

Multisectoral Roma Returns Project to Roma Mahala, http://www.drc-kosovo.org/project.html

ODHIR/OSCE, 1999, "Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, Part II".

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe MISSION IN KOSOVO - Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 2003, Property Rights in Kosovo 2002-2003, Priština.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe MISSION IN KOSOVO - Department of Human Rights, Decentralisation and Communities, 2007, Eight years after minority returns and housing and property restitution in Kosovo, Priština.

PALAIRET, MICHAEL, ESI-LLA (Lessons Learnt and Analysis-Unit of the EU Pillar of UNMIK in Kosovo), 2002, Trepşa 1965-2000, UK .

UN-HABITAT Kosovo, 2006-2008, Making Better Cities Together – Newsletter, Municipal Spatial Planning Support Programme

UNMIK CIVIL ADMINISTRATION MITROVICA, 2004, Mitrovica Agenda for Local Economic Development, Priština.

WARRANDER, G./KNAUS V., 2007, Kosovo, the Bradt Travel Guide, UK.

WORLD BANK COUNTRY BRIEF, 2007 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KOSOVOEXTN/0,contentMDK:20629286~menuPK:297777~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:297770,00.html

The Limits of Hospitality:

Lampedusa and European Borderlands

Heidrun Friese

Zu den wichtigsten und politisch umstrittensten Herausforderungen unserer Zeit gehört die Frage, wie wir Migranten und Flüchtlinge aufnehmen, die täglich an den Grenzen Europas ankommen. Historisch gesehen war Gastfreundschaft eine religiöse Pflicht und es galt als heiliges Gebot der Nächstenliebe gegenüber dem Fremden, ihm einen –wenn auch ambivalenten- Platz in der Gemeinschaft einzuräumen. Mit der Herausbildung des modernen Nationalstaats wurden diese Verpflichtungen in ein Procedere politischer Willkür, in gesetzliche und Verwaltungsabläufe eingebunden, die die Zweideutigkeit von Gastfreundschaft deutlich machen und den Fremden zwischen Freund und Feind positionieren. Die zunehmende transnationale Mobilität unserer Zeit hat zur Reformulierung von Grenzen geführt und eine komplexe Geographie der „Borderlands" hervorgebracht, die diese Grenzen der Gastfreundschaft abbilden. Der folgende Text zeichnet diesen Konflikt und seine Herausforderungen für die Zukunft am Beispiel der italienischen Mittelmeerinsel Lampedusa nach.

Dans les civilisations sans bateaux les rêves se tarissent - Michel Foucault

One of the most vital and politically contested questions of our time is how to hospitably welcome migrants and refugees arriving at European borders. Historically, hospitality was a religious duty, a sacred commandment of charity to assign strangers an – albeit ambivalent – place in the community. With the development of the modern nation-state, these obligations have been inscribed into the procedures of political deliberation, legal procedures and administration that articulate the ambivalences of hospitality and position foreigners between friend and enemy. Increasing transnational mobility in our times led to re-articulations of borders and to a complex map of borderlands that shape the limits of hospitality.

Figure 1: Dumped boats on Lampedusa shore (Heidrun Friese, 2007)

Since the late 1990s, the island of Lampedusa has become one of Europe's frontiers and a site of transit for undocumented migrants and refugees.[1] Despite the fact that most undocumented migrants in Italy are 'overstayers' arriving by overland routes and/or at European airports, the tiny island close to the Tunesian mainland became – together with the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla – the powerful symbol of restrictive European migration policies, border management and the limits of hospitality.

Defining the boundaries of Europe has always been a contested endeavor. Paradoxically, while freedom of movement has been widened with the Schengen treaty, external borders become increasingly affirmed and practices of hospitality restricted. At the same time, the extension, the exterritorialization of European borders across the Mediterranean and to Northern Africa - and thus, the ex-colonies - affirms European 'borderlands' (Balibar, 2004) that articulate the highly ambivalent relations to strangers and non-members of the European (political) community. Whereas the right to mobility is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[2] the various articulations of a mobile, transnational world become rather troubled and emphasize the ambiguities of hospitality as well:

> *'… most attempts at restricting the "right" to mobility have been associated with forms of state intervention that stigmatize certain groups on the basis of colour, religion, ethnicity or cultural practice. States routinely hold that there are good movers and bad movers and that the latter should be limited, penalized, extradicted or thrown into prison. Often such distinctions between friend and fo stem from and enhance the fear of the mobile, which harks back to the fear of the "mob".' (Urry, 2007:205; emphasis HF)*

On one hand, it has been emphasized that 'humanity on the move' (Bauman, 2007), the transnational movement

of people weaken borders and the sovereignty of modern nation-states. The border becomes a constantly negotiated and contested site, it is a site of porosity allowing for multiple transfers, translation and various Grenzgänger that belong neither to here nor there. A strand of thought suggests that nation-states are becoming obsolete and advocate a cosmopolitan order and the free movement of people. On the other hand, borders and the 'reinscription of space' (Gupta, 1992) constituted an increasing apprehension and lead to overdetermination and their 'ubiquity' (Balibar, 2004). Despite the emphasis on deterritorialization, the importance of space and place, the re-territorialization of local communities is forcefully being reasserted.

'… Borderlands, borders, and their crossings, illustrate the contradiction, paradox, difference, and conflict of power and domination in contemporary global capitalism and the nation-state, especially as manifested in local-level practices' (Alvarez, 1995:447). The proliferation of multiple and shifting borders thus, constitutes the other side of globalization. The increasing movement of goods, commodities, capital and media is by no means the end of borders. Rather, they the result of the crisis of the classical relation between the nation-state and its territory.

> *'The constitution of the modern Nation-State – through the "invention" of borders which replaced the ancient forms of "marches" or "limes", combining on the same "line" administrative, juridical, fiscal, military, even linguistic functions – was in particular a transformation of the (more or less indefinite, heterogeneous) space into territories controlled by a "monopolistic" State-power.' (Balibar, 2004:3)*

The very notion of border – the practices of its government as much as its localization – have significantly changed during globalization. Whereas on the one hand, borders are projected to the outside and stretch their shadow hundreds of miles further from the geographical lines that delineate an area such as Europe, multiple borders, check-points and sophisticated devices for surveillance and "security" are being employed in the "inside" of nation-states on the other. The univocality of the geopolitical definition of borders and membership therefore, is questioned as well as symbolical and cultural aspects gain relevance in the political reworking of borders (Mezzadra, 2001). Boundaries do not only confine the space of the polis, they do not fence the political community from its alleged "outside", but they are as well reproduced within. Borderlands therefore, are not marginal to the constitution of the political, the common and the public arena but rather constitute its very core. What happens at borders is far from being of "marginal" importance.[3]

Routes and Grenzgänger

Borders are both means of exclusion and division and zones of contact, encounter and commerce (be it legal or 'illegal') providing a livelihood for many inhabitants of these regions. Over centuries, multiple und complex encounters, travel and trade has made up the Mediterranean world, connecting the desert and the sea. With reference to Arjun Appadurai (1990), the Mediterranean can be considered as a 'seascape' allowing for multiple connections.[4] Trading and the fishing industry brought people from Lampedusa in busy relations with other regions of the Mediterranean (Tunesia, Libya, Algeria, Greece, Malta, the Adratic) and the island – which historically has been a safe harbor for escaped slaves and a mythical meeting place of religions - is still connected to the wider region.

The passages of the arriving undocumented migrants are mostly 'extraordinarily long and complex, involving multiple relationships often of an exploitative character, various transit points especially in major cities…' (Urry, 2007:36). These border-crossing journeys alternate mobility and dwelling by relying on extended networks of solidarity and hospitality of family members, friends and diasporic communities. At the same time, migrants have to face xenophobia, brute exploitation and semi-slavery in transit countries – involving not least descendents of local tribes and traders that were historically engaged in the slave trade.

Current routes have a quite uncanny historical background which recalls what Gilroy (1993) calls the 'Black Atlantic' shaping colonial and post-colonial relations.

'Tripoli was always a main Mediterranean outlet of black slaves traded across the Sahara. For well over a thousand years, it was the terminus of the main caravan trails of the central desert, being supplied with slaves from the South through Fezzan and from the south-west through Ghadames. The abolition of slavery and the slave trade in Tunis and Algiers in the 1840s only confirmed this predominance' (Wright, 2007:114).

Even if Britain (1807), France (1818), Greece (1841) and Tunisia (1841) had declared slave trade illegal, between 1846 and 1856 there were shipped around 12.048 black slaves – foremost women – out of Tripoli (Wright, 2007:114, 120). Next to Tripoli, the eastern Misurata and the close by oasis Zliten, were important trading points. Connected to the arrival of the caravans in spring and early summer, the human freight had a seasonal rhythm – April and October – serving between the Mediterranean 'middle passage' and the slave markets of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the ships used in this trade were small and slaves 'were simply loaded (sometimes as last-minute make-weights) into the holds of ordinary merchant ships

1
These remarks are part of first insights of an ongoing and multi-sited project on The Limits of Hospitality at the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/O. which is generously funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. (http://web.mac.com/hfriese).

Between 2002 and 2008, approximately 105.000 boatpeople approached Lampedusa on their way to Europe. Source: UNHCR

2
Art. 13 divides the freedom of movement into three separate rights – namely to leave a country, to return to one's own country and to have freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Similarly, EU objectives are expressed in art. 8a, 1 of the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced by the Amsterdam treaty (1997). There is however, a radical disjuncture between the freedom of exit and the freedom of entry.

3
IOM estimates that '10-15%' of migrants are undocumented and UNHCR estimates around 42 million refugees and displaced persons worldwide (http://www.unhcr.ch/news/538 access, 23.8.2009)

4
For a history of Lampedusa, see Friese, 1996.

Figure 2: Coastal landscape of abandoned boats (Heidrun Friese, 2007)

5
http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/470658fe4.html (access 3.11.2007) UNHCR estimates that more than 500 people died during crossings in the Mediterranean in 2007. Fortress Europe estimates that between 1988 and 2007 in the Channel of Sicily 2.486 people lost their lives (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/nel-canale-di-sicilia.html, access 23.8.09). This was already true for the slave trade of the Mediterranean 'middle passage'. The new steamships were more easily to control and thus were hardly used for the transport of slaves (Wright, 2007:134-5).

6
Ministero dell'Interno, Notizie, 29.12.2007, http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sal... Tripoli_accordo_per_il_pattugliamento_congiunto.html_1562036151.html (access 24.1.2008)

7
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ (access 2.11.2007). On 18.6.2008 'Working Arrangements establishing a framework for cooperation between Frontex' and UNHCR) were signed. http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art39.html (access 15.7. 2008).

8
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/illegal/doc/sec_2006_1010_en.pdf (access 4.7.2009).

alongside or on top of their usual cargo'. Boots usually were overloaded – the 'ratio' of 4 slaves per ton of ship' was even higher than in the infamous Atlantic trade. Thus, the 'central Mediterranean islands were essential ports of call for small ships carrying large numbers of slaves but limited stores of food and water' (Wright, 2007:128-32).

Current overland routes undertaken by undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan countries basically converge with the old caravan routes that bifurcate in Agadez and lead to Libya or Algeria. Whereas in the last years boat-people continued their journey from the Tunisian coast to reach Lampedusa, currently – and in spite of recent bilateral agreements – Libya is a major site for the embarquement of the flimsy boats. Against the quite common assumption (so dear to European politicians concerned with questions of "security"), organized human trafficking is not regularly involved when people decide to depart. 'Migrants do have agency' (de Haas, 2007:25), they are not passive victims of modern slave traders. The passeurs – often former fisherman or returned migrants – are mostly connected through dynamic networks rather than through a rigid criminal organization, they respond to an increasing demand, offer a service and the 'market' makes the prices for transborder transport allowing local communities prosperous incomes (current prices for transport across the Mediterranean range between 1.000 and 2.000$). However, just like in the 19th century, such service relies on bribery, corrupt police and border officials in transit countries. And: the itineraries and routes – an uncanny 'longue durée' – haven't changed that much. 'The exact death toll' of people choosing this dangerous route 'will probably never be known as some flimsy vessels disappear without trace.'[5] It is assumed that the death toll is rising, since boats are increasingly smaller and unsafe and odysseys become longer.

Many migrants originate in zones of economical crisis and political instability that are subject of asymmetrical in/exclusion in global processes. Additionally, especially young and educated men find themselves in a double bind, as they feel stuck in their home countries and group pressures on 'manliness' enrich unrealistic expectations to make a good life in Europe and to return with the symbols of affluent consumer society. Once these men (and still to a lesser extend women) decide to move on their journey, they encounter the European legal systems that set up a variety of limits to the freedom of movement and upon their capacity to stay. These legal maps shape the day-to-day relations between the ones who arrive and the residents of transit communities, they order the spaces assigned to (irregular) 'aliens', they open or disclose possibilities of action.

Border-regimes

Current political designs are drawing adjacent border zones and borders beyond borders, a (juridical) no man's land blocking 'exit' and 'entry' (Bauman, 2007:45) that maps the modalities of hospitality as well. They promote twofold action in containing movement and undocumented migration: the shifting of borders beyond European borders and at the same time, the increasing control of borders. In order to dissuade unwanted migration, cooperation and efforts in controlling the Mediterranean have been strengthened. The Western Mediterranean Dialogue on Migration unites representatives from Algeria, France, Italy, Malta, Mauretania, Morocco, Portugal and Spain. Proposals of transit processing centers suggest the exterritorialization of the border 'management'. In August 2004 the bilateral relations between Italy and Libya have been improved and in October the EU embargo of weapons was leaved allowing Libya to buy up to date systems of surveillance, speedboats and to train police forces. Recently, another agreement between Italy and Libya became operative[6] and joint patrols should shut down these routes. There is, however good reason to believe that routes will simply change and Tunisia and Egypt will again, become countries of departure and transit.

Additionally, in 2004 the Warsaw based EU agency 'for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union' (Frontex) has been established. The agency is 'intelligence driven' and is to provide cooperation in the surveillance of frontiers and additional 'border management systems' to member States.[7] Frontex is mentioned in the recent

Italian-Libyan protocol and its representatives have been carrying out a mission in Libya and visited some detention camps for undocumented migrants (the conditions of which they considered 'poor'). In 2005, a 'Return Directive' was adopted by the Commission providing for 'common rules concerning return, removal, use of coercive measures, temporary custody and re-entry'.[8] In 2008, the European Commission presented a Communication on the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), with the main purpose of preventing unauthorized border crossings.[9]

These norms display various (legal and ethical) tensions. The tension between the universal right of freedom of movement, the right to asylum on one hand and restrictions to movement on the other; tensions between humanitarian aid, rescue from distress and surveillance and policing on the other. Connected to that, there are various legal impasses, inconsistencies and legal fictions. In principle, boatpeople have the right to non-*refoulement* as stated in the Geneva Convention, people on the high sea enjoy freedom of movement and yet are intercepted, detained and eventually repatriated.[10] At the same time, (the limits to) hospitality are not just designed by legal fictions, but are as well articulated by complex and ambivalent situations made up by local practice, ethos and political and social circumstances. The border-regimes thus, encompass a highly complex institutional structure with various legal references and different (local) actors that have various (corporate) traditions and values that respond to different demands and belong to different (supra)national frames of reference that cross-cut day-to-day action and routines.

Borderlands

According to the ethos shared by fishermen, unconditional aid and hospitality has to be offered to those who are endangered and shipwrecking. Without asking for name, nationality or color of the skin, the first boatpeople arriving on Lampedusa have been taking care of by local volunteers. Later on, this local hospitality became – due to increasing numbers as well – institutionalized and, with the institution of Reception Centers, a matter of political clientelism and economic interests (the current coop running the center gets 33$/day for every 'guest'). 'Professionalization' did change the relation to those who arrived and local solidarity, the multiple gestures of hospitality converted into institutional 'reception' and 'good practice'. Whereas the first boatpeople had been hosted by local families and volunteers and thus, had been visible as singular individuals for locals, they have been turned into invisibles in a doubled sense of the term: with the institution of the center, the 'clandestines' have a fantasmatic presence on the island, an absent presence. After having been intercepted and brought to the shores, they are being immediately taken to the facility of first reception which they are not allowed to leave until they are flown out. They are a assigned to invisibility, an 'extraterritorial' and segregated place, a space of 'inclusive exclusion' (Agamben, 1995), a 'heterotopic' space of transition (Foucault, 1994), a site of 'rite de passage' and 'incorporation' into the sovereignty of the state power that mark the ambivalences of hospitality. Italian immigration law that instituted 'reception centers' articulates the language of hospitality and the ambivalences of the stranger between 'friend' and 'enemy': the alien

▲ Figure 3: Left Life Jacket found on Lampedusa shore (Heidrun Friese, 2007)

is considered a 'guest' (ospite) to be 'received', 'accommodated' and to be taken care of and as a potential enemy, has to be controlled and kept under surveillance.

'Before the newcomers who apply for admission to another social site are given access (if access is given) to a new wardrobe where the dresses appropriate to the new site and for that site reserved are stocked, they need to be bared (metaphorically as well as literally) of all and any trappings of their previous belonging; a quarantine is needed in the space-not-space of 'betwixt and between', where no socially forged and approved weapons are on offer and none is permitted. In the purgatory of the intermediate 'nowhere space' that separates the plots in the world sliced into plots and conceived as aggregation of spatially separate plots, the site is cleaned for the construction of a new belonging.' (Bauman, 2002)

Whereas the camp was originally an exceptional, entrenched site creating invisibility and surrounded by secrecy, it is extended beyond its fences making the old distinctions between inside and outside obsolete. Lampedusians complain the increasing 'militarization', surveillance and the conversion of the island into a prison, that indeed, creates the zone of indistinction.

Additionally, the local arena is made up of several economical conflicts. Historically, the local economy was based on the sponge and fishing industry. Whereas the sector's past was characterized by a surplus on the market, today fish became a scarce resource and the local fishing industry has to face an alarming crisis. In 2007, 91 boats were licensed for local fishing and around 500 families made at least part of their living from this activity. In order to reduce the fleet, the scrapping of boats is financed by the EU. The remaining local fleet is basically devoted to inshore fishing within the six miles zone and has to face national (Mazara del Vallo) and international (Korea) concurrence. These fleets are considerably bigger and technically better equipped than the relatively small boats in Lampedusa which cannot expand their radius of action to Greece or Turkey, since they are not licensed for the Mediterranean fishing.

The local fishing industry is no longer competitive on a globalized market. Structural handicaps, such as higher

9
The aim being 'to build a space of free and secure travel through collective responsibility and solidarity. The objective should be to ensure a Schengen space which will continue to allow secure border-free-travel for citizens and travellers to 24 countries in Europe while improving border security.' (Press Release, 13.2.2008. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/215&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (access 4.6.2009)

10
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) orders actions regarding boatpeople and establishes various borders. It distinguishes between territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf and finally international waters and is in vigor in Italy since 1995. Accordingly, the different tasks are assigned to the various military and civil corps: the naval forces are to acting in international waters, the Guardia di Finanza within the 24 miles zone, whereas the Coast Guard is basically engaged in Search and Rescue missions (SAS Convention, 1979). Competent authorities have to engage if a ship is obviously not adequate for 'the international transport of humans'. Recently, Malta and Italy delivered contrasting interpretations about these norms and who has to accommodate migrants rescued from distress.

Figure 4: Stranded goods found on Lampedusa shore (Heidrun Friese, 2007)

prices for diesel and the lack of efficient transport aggravate the situation. The main reason of this crisis however, is the dramatic over-fishing of the Mediterranean that opened another arena of conflict. Whereas Lampedusians once fished next to the Tunisian shores, in recent years Tunisians started to approach Italian national waters and thus, the traditional fishing grounds around the island - the (own) past it seems, is 'returning'. The structural crisis of the sector leads increasingly to quarrels because of the violation of national borders and local fishing grounds that lead to classical conflicts over scarce resources. Local fishermen feel assaulted by Tunisian fishers – irregular border commuters – and complain to be left alone by politicians and public authorities.

Next to this, another arena of conflict has been established. In the 1980s the boom in the tourist sector commences and became one of the main economical pillars for the small community. The apprehension that media coverage and visibility of the clandestine (i.e. the invisibles) could harm tourism is used in populist rhetoric not just in times of (local) elections. Media attention leads to astonishing dialectics of visibility and invisibility. Beyond populist rhetoric that seeks to represent those who feel not represented in the (local) political sphere: boatpeople and their reception are an integral part of a powerful political arena, they became part of the highly clientelistic networks that connect Lampedusa to the wider social and political context.

The first volunteers have been replaced and for the most part were not considered for the upcoming paid jobs. Additionally, locals feel largely excluded from decisions, from participation and representation. As part of decisions taken elsewhere, hospitality is no longer a practice from below that involves the local community but a contested matter of exclusion, negated participation and conflicting notions of justice. In January 2009, boatpeople broke out of the overcrowded facility to protest against their treatment there and against deportation (at the end of which part of the facility was burnt). About 600 people forced the gates and chanting 'Freedom! Freedom!' joined a demonstration by residents of Lampedusa, who were rejecting governmental plans to convert the center of first reception and aid (CPA) into a center of 'identification and expulsion' (CIE). The protest united both residents and migrants in their demands to participate in decisions and to the adoption of rights and (legal) norms. Current protest contests lacking political participation and disputes conflicting notions of (distributive) justice: the borderlands and the limits of hospitality become a site of engagement and an antagonistic political practice.

References

AGAMBEN, G. 1995, Homo sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita. Torino: Einaudi.

AGAMBEN, G. 1996, Mezzi senza fine. Note sulla politica. Torino, Boringhieri.

ALVAREZ, R. R. 1995, 'The Mexican-US border: the making of an anthropology of borderlands'. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, pp. 447-470.

APPADURAI, A. 1990, 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy'. In: Mike Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. London: Sage, pp. 295-309.

BALIBAR, É. 2004, 'Europe as Borderland'. The Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in Human Geography. University of Nijmegen, November 18, 2004.

BAUMAN, Z. 2002, 'The fate of humanity in the post-Trinitarian world'. Journal of Human Rights, 1(3), pp. 283-303.

DE GENOVA, N. P. 2002, 'Migrant "illegality" and deportability in everyday life'. Annual Review of Anthropology, 31, pp. 419-447.

DE HAAS, H. 2007, The Myth of Invasion: Irregular Migration From West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union. IMI Research Report, University of Oxford.

FOUCAULT, M. 1994 [1984], 'Des espaces autres'. In: Dits et écrits, Vol. IV. Paris: Gallimard, pp. 752-762.

FRIESE, H. 1996, Lampedusa. Historische Anthropologie einer Insel. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

GUPTA, A. 1992, 'The song of the nonaligned worlds: Transnational identities and the reinscription of space in late capitalism'. Current Anthropology, 7 (1), pp. 6-23.

MEZZADRA, S. 2001, Diritto di fuga. Migrazioni, cittadinanza, globalizzazione. Verona: Ombre corte.

URRY, J. 2007, Mobilities. Cambridge: Polity.

WRIGHT, J. 2007, The Trans-Saharian Slave Trade. London: Routledge.

Heidrun Friese
is private lecturer for ethnology with a focus on Mediterranean studies, European integration and transnationalism. Her research on Lampedusa is part of a project funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the Europa-Universität in Frankfurt/ Oder.

hfriese@gmx.net

Frontiers, Migrants and Refugees

Cartographic Studies

Philippe Rekacewicz

Der Beitrag von Philippe Rekacewicz, in Kreide gezeichnete Kartenskizzen und begleitende Texte, gehen auf besondere Weise dem ambivalenten und paradoxen Charakter von Grenzen nach und eröffnen einen anderen Blick auf deren sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Charakter und auf die Geografie der Welt.

Afrika steht im Mittelpunkt. Gezeigt werden dessen interne Migrationsbewegungen, seine Beziehung zu Europa und der Zusammenhang zwischen globalen Finanz- und Handelsbeziehungen und dem Schicksal des Subkontinents: Es ergibt sich ein Kreislauf der Ausbeutung und eine Geografie der Abschottung. Zwei Fallbeispiele, die Geschichten von Djewe aus Kamerun und Gabriel aus Togo, zeichnen deren Fluchtwege, Schwierigkeiten und Hoffnungen als Afrikaner in Europa nach.

Thousands die at Europe's gates:
A continent of many borders

We first drew this map in 2003. We update it every year and unfortunately each time we must add more black spots and change the red figures, replacing them with even larger numbers.

But in the last 15 years this stock of human misery has attracted little media attention, largely escaping the notice of the general public, particularly in comparison to other events such as the death of Lady Diana Spencer in Paris or the trial of OJ Simpson in California.

On 1 January 1993 the body of Gerry Johnson, a citizen of Liberia, then the prey of a devastating civil war, was found in a railway truck at Feldkirch, Austria. He had suffocated. On 16 February 2007 Greek coastguards recorded the death of 24 people, including a woman. They were all from Somalia, currently racked by civil war. Their boat capsized near the island of Samos. Between these two dates and places some 9,000 other migrants, and probably more, lost their lives trying to reach Europe, land of freedom and human rights. Nor do people only die getting here. They also lose their lives on the way home, much as Marcus Omofuma from Nigeria. On 1 May 1999 three sadistic policemen killed him (his face was almost completely covered by bandages) on a Balkan Air flight. They were escorting him home after his application for asylum had been refused. He was brutally murdered in the air in full view of the other terrified passengers.

The fearful figures we quote are provided by the United NGO, which draws on reports in the press and information from local organisations. Only corroborated deaths appear on the map. It is consequently an indication of the lower limit of a massacre that no one notices.

The death toll is the result of decisions taken in Europe. It is Europe that has deliberately raised protective barriers well away from its borders, from Nouakchott to Tripoli, passing through Niamey and Agadir. In the middle of the desert the police carry out checks and turn people back. There are unofficial collection areas and the first camps. Anyone who slips through the first net and manages to reach the real border is in grave danger for it is much more deadly. Anyone who gets across the red line is likely to end up at one of the black spots, where there are yet more camps.

Figure 1: Europe's borders (Source: Rekacewicz, 2007)





▲ Figure 2: Cross-migrations in Africa (Source: Rekacewicz, 2008)

Cross-Migrations in Africa

On the African exile routes, people and populations cross and crisscross in every sense. Refugees and people displaced by war mix with economic migrants to the extent that nowadays it is no longer possible to differentiate between them. Still, the international institutions try at all costs to convince us that differentiating between a migrant and a refugee is primordial... Nonetheless, they are all in the same boat, are all vulnerable in the same way, and all deserve the same international protection and respect of their basic rights. Those who come from West Africa, most of whom are economic migrants, or those who come from the war-torn countries as refugees – what they sometimes are since a very long time – are all confronted and often broken in body and spirit by the barriers constructed by the governments of the "sanctuarized" territories of the world: Europe and, to a minor extent, South Africa as well. Barriers, walls, police control, military action – all of this is done to make the protective fences as insurmountable as possible.

As a result thousands of migrants die, forced to take on the greatest of dangers in order to surpass the metal fences and obstacles. And if they happen to make it, they are immediately confronted with the "post-frontier" world – with prisons, police stations, retention centres – and are then sent back, sometimes trapped between two policemen, by train or airplane, to the country where the authorities think they came from...



▶ Figure 3: Djewe's one-way ticket (Source: Rekacewicz, 2007)

Djewe

Djewe took a relatively direct route, from Africa to Europe, but what is remarkable is the succession of events that prevented him from going home to Cameroon.

It all started in 1995 when Djewe was invited to take part in an international congress of Catholic journalists in Graz. He was asked to give a talk on the plight of journalists in his country, explaining how it was virtually impossible to work freely under the regime of Paul Biya.

Equipped with a Schengen visa issued by the honorary Austrian consul in Yaoundé, he took a regular Air France flight to Paris Charles de Gaulle, where he was supposed to catch another plane to Vienna. But he was manhandled when he arrived in Paris and detained by customs officers, as often happens to African nationals in transit. He finally managed to catch another flight to Vienna, travelling on to Graz by train. At the week-long congress everything went as planned.

Djewe reached Vienna airport, on his way back, in good time. But suddenly a message on the public address system asked him to go to the information desk. A hostess handed him a message, with a phone number he must call immediately. It was from the International Catholic Union of the Press (UCIP). When he called back they begged him not to take the plane home. A tip-off had been received from Cameroon suggesting that he would be picked up on arrival and thrown into prison. The secret police suspected he had made "inappropriate comments" during his talk at Graz. He later found out that his mother had been arrested.

It was the start of a nightmare. His plane was due to leave in half an hour, and he had not been through the security checks yet. Djewe had three minutes to decide his future. He had the option of not seeing family and friends for years, losing his job, but being sure of staying alive, or he could go home and risk death behind bars.

He decided to miss his plane and went back into the city to find the centre for asylum seekers. It took him a year to prove to the Austrian authorities, with their endless trick questions, that in Cameroon his life would be in danger. Though he was helped by the Catholic seminary, his first application was turned down. He appealed and finally was granted asylum. Djewe, who is married with children, now lives and works in Vienna. He has an open residence permit.

Gabriel

In the late 1990s Gabriel was finishing his medical studies in Lomé, the capital of Togo. Born in Guinea-Bissau, he was an active member of the UFC, the party opposing General Eyadema, Togo's brutal dictator. One night, during a raid, Gabriel was forced to bundle up his belongings and escape to neighbouring Benin by car, disguised as a woman. By bush taxi he travelled on to Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, via Parakou in northern Benin and Niamey in Niger.

In Burkina he worked on the markets in Koudougou and the capital for six months, before taking to the road again. This time he stopped in Bamako, Mali, where he did odd jobs for a year. He finally reached Conakry in Guinea and opened a private clinic with a partner. He stayed there for several years, working a while as a volunteer doctor in refugee camps. War was raging in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and Guinea was attracting countless refugees.

He had to leave Conakry in a hurry, driven out by racketeers, moving to Guinea-Bissau and working for Brazilian missionaries for a year. He led the youth wing of President Kumba Iala's Social Renovation Party until the military coup in September 2003. He was arrested and held in an army prison for a month. One day the prisoners were taken out to the bush and Gabriel realised that, by some extraordinary coincidence, he was close to his native village. Knowing the area very well he was able to give his guards the slip. He swam across an estuary and walked 40 kilometres back to Bissau.

There he took refuge with the missionaries. They helped him cross over to Zinguinchor in neighbouring Casamance by boat. He carried on to Dakar by bush taxi, and thence to Cap Verde, for four months, before returning to Senegal for a month with some other missionaries. At this point he obtained a Schengen visa for his Guinea-Bissau passport. Why Austria, we asked? "I had vague memories of lessons about the first world war and Austro-Hungary" he said.

Gabriel flew Alitalia to Rome, then on to Vienna. He even booked another flight in his name to confuse his pursuers. His entry into Austria was therefore entirely legitimate. Here he met "his little angel", a kind soul who helped him, gave him lodging and guided him through the maze of formalities to obtain asylum. Things are going well for Gabriel, but he still experiences daily brutality at the hands of the Viennese police. All in all he has been on the go for 10 years.

The Big Wheel

Exchanges between Africa and the world: ...Africa saves Europe, which impoverishes Africa, which feeds Europe, which enslaves Africa, which pays Europe, which continues pillaging Africa...

In early 2006 a radio station in Mali staged a trial of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A few months later the director Abderrahmane Sissako turned it into a hilarious film. In this farcical imaginary trial, full of subtle irony, he ridiculed the international financial bodies. It would be funnier if the consequences of their policies – always implemented with brutality and arrogance – were less disastrous for the African continent.



▲ Figure 4: Gabriel's West African Odyssey (Source: Rekacewicz, 2007)

Stabilisation of the economy by structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF has caused unaccountable damage over the last 30 years.

Fortunately, at the beginning of the 2000s, the World Bank acknowledged that it had been mistaken and published a press release about 10 lines long announcing that it was shelving its plans. It stressed their negative effects, acknowledging that human development was deteriorating in Africa and apologising for any inconvenience caused to the population of the countries that had suffered from its mistakes. They may see it as an inconvenience, others might think devastation a more accurate description. Either way structural adjustment has caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, uprooted and reduced to absolute poverty millions of people, destroyed national economies and handed over whole swathes of the public sector to multinational corporations. Then came the strategic framework for poverty reduction, an initiative invented by the same wizards which has done no more good than structural adjustment.

The United States gives Africa the marvellous policies of the World Bank and the IMF. In exchange Africa supplies oil and ore. The US recently supported the New Partnership for Africa's Development, an organisation promoted by four large African countries. It is a sort of local version of the IMF, with a giant structural adjustment plan in the continuing service of lenders and their financial interests.

Europe is no better. The European Commission's development aid policies are much the same, as the Swiss sociologist Jean Ziegler explained in the French daily Libération on 16 October 2007. "Europe encourages famine in Africa", he concluded. In response Peter Mandelson and Louis Michel, the European commissioners for trade, and development and humanitarian aid respectively, maintained that growth



▲
Figure 5: The Big Wheel (Source: Rekacewicz, 2007)

Philippe Rekacewicz
is a geographer, journalist and cartographer. He works for the international French monthly paper Le Monde Diplomatique, creates regularly maps that deal with important geopolitical and environmental questions and has published several Atlases related to these topics (most recently „L'Atlas. Un monde à l'envers", Paris 2009). He has a special interest in the role of the map as a means of political manipulation.

reka@monde-diplomatique.fr

and development in Africa can only be achieved through economic partnership agreements – the name given to an initiative that enables European multinationals to get their hands on everything of value there, a process rightly condemned by Ziegler as an instrument of relentless western domination of Africa. In exchange Africa supplies oil and ore.

China is also tightening its grip on Africa. To prove the point it is even outdoing the IMF. It has just granted a $5bn loan to the Democratic Republic of Congo to develop transport and mining infrastructures, severely compromising the IMF's own projects. In exchange Africa supplies oil and ore.

But is that all Africa has to offer?
No.

It is a little known fact but Africa can also offer culture, music and theatre. Diplomats, teachers and experts. Students, qualified technicians and thinkers. Writers, too. Many other human beings that Europe sends back, often tied up like parcels or sometimes even dead. Despite having been pillaged for centuries Africa continues to offer up all the riches it possesses. Africa has already paid back many times the massive debt the rich world has thrust upon it in the last 30 years. But international organisations are asking for more.

We shall leave the last word to Eva Joly, a former Franco-Norwegian magistrate, whose latest book (La force qui nous manque, 2007) contains a chapter entitled "Justice for Africa". She writes: "Who will dispute the contracts passed by Areva for uranium in Niger or by Sadiola for the gold mines of Mali, by Elf-Total in Nigeria or Gabon for oil? These countries are among the poorest in the world and yet they only receive a tiny share of the riches extracted from their land. The [French] Republic has contracted a debt that it must pay back. Our prosperity depends on riches that we steal. To some of the illegal migrants who risk their lives to reach Europe we should pay a dividend, rather than issuing a deportation order. I dream of the day when we will finally wake up."

Micro-businesses and Economic Development in Texas Border Colonias

Cecilia Giusti and Suk-Kyung Kim

Das Forschungspapier von Cecilia Giusti und Suk-Kyung Kim basiert auf Feldstudien, die in den sogenannten Colonias an der texanischen Grenze zu Mexiko durchgeführt wurden. Diese informellen Siedlungen zugewanderter Mexikaner, denen es an grundlegender Infrastruktur fehlt und wo Migranten der unteren Einkommensschichten in „substandard housing" leben, entwickeln sich in den letzten Jahren trotz ihrer physischen Isolation und den hohen Armutsraten durch die Entstehung von Kleinunternehmen zu zunehmend an Einfluss gewinnenden Märkten. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie diese „microbusinesses" funktionieren, inwieweit sie zum lokalen Wirtschaftswachstum beitragen und Arbeitsplätze schaffen können und inwieweit deren aktive Förderung relevant ist für die Planung nachhaltiger und lebenswerter grenznaher Nachbarschaften in Texas.

Introduction

The Texas-Mexico border region is one of the fastest growing areas in the United States in terms of economic activity, trade, and population growth. As trade between the United States and Mexico has increased dramatically, border areas have become extreme examples of the benefits and problems of such economic activity. At the same time as border cities are growing, low-income neighbourhoods called colonias have proliferated along the border, being clusters of poverty and isolation. Several problems are evident in these poor communities: lack of water, untreated sewage, unpaved roads, improper land tenure, and unsanitary conditions.

This study focuses on colonias on the Texan side of the border region. We argue that these communities, mainly isolated from urban areas, show a relatively stable population. Regardless of the many difficulties they face, colonias are showing signs of transforming into liveable communities. As dynamic communities, they are in constant need of necessities like shopping facilities and basic service establishments. A variety of businesses are emerging to serve these requirements, as has been observed in this research.

Ethnic clusters within cities have already been identified as environments that allow local businesses to thrive (ROCHIN et al., 1998). Colonias are not clusters within cities, however. Rather, they are separate entities where Hispanics are the majority population. This study aims to understand how micro-businesses function in the context of colonias and to explore their potential contributions to local economic development. Specifically, this research looks first at the main characteristics of these businesses, and secondly at their potential contributions to local economic development.

Conceptual and Research Frame

Much of the current knowledge about micro-businesses in the United States is based on studies done in metropolitan areas, and little is known about micro-businesses in the context of semi-urban and/or semi-rural communities such as colonias. This section starts by defining colonias and micro-businesses in the Texas border region, followed by a discussion of the capacity of micro-businesses to foster local economic development.

Colonias

Colonia is a Spanish term for "neighbourhood" or "community". In Texas, according to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG 2006), a colonia is a residential area along the Mexican border that may lack basic water and wastewater systems, electricity, paved roads, and safe and sanitary housing. Colonias can be found in other areas in the United States, such as New Mexico, Arizona, and California, but Texas has both the largest number of colonias and the largest colonia population.

Colonias are populated mainly by Hispanics, most of whom are of Mexican heritage. Large immigration flows from both the rest of the U.S. mainland as well as neighbouring Mexico, in a context of little or no affordable housing in border cities, resulted in the rise of these types of developments outside metropolitan areas. Colonias grew in response to market forces, with demand coming from low-income households and supply coming from relatively cheap land not useful for agricultural purposes (LARSON 1995).

Some colonias are in "extra-territorial jurisdictions", whereas others have their own categories and are considered "census places". Very few, only the largest and oldest, have attained the status of "city", including two in our study area: Rio Bravo and El Cenizo, both in Webb County.

Median housing value is low in colonias. In El Cenizo, one established colonia has the current category of "city" and a median housing value of $28,200, which is less than one-fourth the national median housing value of $119,600. About 60 percent of the colonia population is

defined as living below the poverty level. There is a large gap in income between residents of colonias and the national standard. Census data show that the median annual household income in colonias is about one-third of the median household income in the United States, and about one-fourth of that in Texas. The average family size is larger in colonias than in the United States as a whole, resulting in per-capita incomes of about one-fourth the national average (U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2006).

Construction in small steps is commonly observed in colonias. Residents often work on their houses as employment schedules and finances permit (FERGUSON and HAIDER 2002; TEMKIN and FERGUSON 2004). Houses are constantly being improved and, as families grow, houses expand accordingly. This practice, commonly known as incremental construction, characterises the housing supply in these neighbourhoods. While such practice is common in Latin America (GREENE & ROJAS 2008; WARD et al. 2004), it does not represent mainstream U.S. construction patterns. One of the home improvements observed in colonias is the adaptation of houses into businesses. As mentioned later, several house improvements involve the adaptation of some rooms in homes for micro-businesses to generate extra income for the family.

Micro-businesses and Their Contribution to Local Economic Development

There is no consensus on the threshold that separates small from micro businesses. Such a distinction may be based on the number of employees, the start-up costs, or the assets and/or revenues (U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 2007; AEO 2007; BAKER 2004; EDGCOMB & KLEIN 2005; ICIC 2005). The threshold defining micro-businesses is somewhat arbitrary, the extreme being a "single personal business", which is in theory the smallest possible size of any business (SBA 2008).

For the purpose of this study, a micro-business is defined as one with ten or fewer employees, including single personal businesses. All businesses under study in colonias match the SBA definition of "underprivileged" or "disadvantaged": businesses whose owners are identified as being low income, having limited wealth, belonging to social groups that have been historically discriminated against, and/or having problems in accessing the financial system (SBA 2008).

Previous research has suggested that ethnic minorities within metropolitan areas are inclined to engage in self-employment or to create businesses serving their own markets. Ethnic "enclaves" have been identified in large metropolitan areas where informal micro-businesses operate (ROCHIN et al. 2002; EDGCOMB & THETFORD 2004; LOSBY et al. 2002).

Colonias are a different phenomenon, however, as they are communities where both the population and local authorities are considered "minorities" and are located in semi-urban peripheral areas. Disadvantaged micro-businesses located outside of metropolitan areas in the context of the United States are the focus of this study. Unlike ethnic enclaves in cities (where Latinos are considered minorities), colonias are communities where Latinos are the majority, both as residents and as community leaders. Colonias are embedded in a developed country with both legal and financial frameworks that are definitely different than those found in developing countries.

This study addresses two overall inquiries. First, what are the characteristics of colonia businesses and their owners? Second, do these businesses contribute to local economic development, and if so, how? The first inquiry focuses on three areas: first, who starts businesses in colonias, second, the main characteristics of such businesses and their owners; and third, the physical characteristics of businesses and their location within the colonia. The second inquiry is approached from four perspectives: first, the capacity of these businesses to absorb employment; second, whether businesses are registered and pay local fees and/or taxes (a discussion that will also relate to their levels of "formality"); third, the type of linkages they establish with providers and customers within the local economy; and fourth, how they are rooted in colonias, and how business owners perceive their future, as both business owners and residents in colonias.

Research Study Area

Given the almost non-existent information on micro-businesses in colonias, this study gathered new empirical data.

The colonias studied were chosen based on the following three criteria: first, they had to be located on the Texas side of the United States-Mexico border region, the geographical focus of this study; second, the sample needed to embody the characteristics of most colonias in terms of income level, housing and infrastructure conditions, education, gender, family structure, and ethnicity; third, colonias were to be randomly chosen within the areas where the Center for Housing and Urban Development (CHUD)[1] had established community centres. This technique was used to take advantage of contacts that the researchers had within the communities being studied.

A total of 20 colonias located in Webb, Hildalgo, and Cameron counties, Texas, were selected[2]. Every business within the colonias was expected to be included, although that effort was not as straightforward as it might appear. Some businesses were obvious and visible, but others, such as those operating out of homes, had to be sought out and discovered. A total of 200 responses were collected. After applying Cronbach's alpha test[3] for verifying consistency and reliability, 155 responses were determined to be valid for the analysis: 55 responses from Webb County, 50 from Hidalgo County, and 50 from Cameron County.

Data Collection and Analysis Methods[4]

A survey questionnaire was developed based on the 2002 Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (USCB 2007). Those questions relating to the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of business owners were included in our questionnaire without modification. Other questions were modified considering the particular characteristics of colonias; some were added to investigate the financial resources used to initiate and operate micro-businesses in colonias, the familial support for the businesses,

1
CHUD is a research and outreach centre established in colonias by the College of Architecture of Texas A&M University in 1991. It has three regional offices in the border area, in El Paso, Laredo, and Weslaco.

2
Various official sources delimit the geographical boundaries of the Lower and Central Rio Grande Valley differently. Contact the authors for a complete list of colonias included.

3
According to REYNALDO & SANTOS (1999), the Cronbach alpha value of 0.7 is an acceptable reliability coefficient. In this study it was found that the alpha value for business owners' opinions on their communities was 0.674 with 200 responses and 0.774 with 155 responses. To acquire higher reliability of the survey results, 155 responses were used for the analysis.

4
The questionnaire was submitted and approved according to the Federal Regulations of the Institutional Review Board of Texas A&M University. Participation in the survey was voluntary, and respondents were informed about the purpose of the study and the identity of the researchers. Participants' identities have been kept confidential.

and the business owners' perceptions of and attitudes toward their micro-businesses and their communities.

The complete questionnaire included four sections: 1) general characteristics of micro-businesses and their owners; 2) operation and financing status of the micro-businesses; 3) economic and social contributions of micro-businesses to local development in the colonias; and 4) business owners' opinions and expectations of their businesses for the future.

The survey was originally created in English, translated into Spanish, and then translated back to English to ensure that the original version was upheld. A pre-test of the survey was conducted with selected business owners to verify the content and format of the instrument. Actual surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews using the standardised questionnaire. Four promotoras (colonia residents trained by CHUD to do outreach activities) contacted and interviewed survey participants.

Only business owners participated in these surveys. The representativeness of the respondent sample was verified by comparing the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the owners with data from the census, allowing us to validate our sample selection.

General Characteristics of Micro-business Owners in Colonias

A total of 155 business owners' responses was used for the analysis: 111 owners were female (71.6 percent), and 44 were male (28.4 percent). The proportion between men and women business owners is in agreement with the literature, which affirms that among the low-income population, women are more inclined to open micro-businesses than are men. These businesses allow an increase in family income while allowing women to continue caring for family members.

All business owners surveyed were Hispanic. This outcome is consistent with census information (USCB 2007) and with the general characteristics of colonias, which have a high concentration of Hispanics. While participants were given the choice to respond to the surveys in English or Spanish, all surveys were conducted in Spanish, a fact that also reflects the ethnic character of colonias.

In terms of country of origin, 70.30 percent (109 respondents) of business owners interviewed were born in Mexico. Among them, 82 percent (90 respondents) declared that they had been living in the United States for more than six years. While the question of citizenship or visa status was not part of the survey, most of the respondents were well-established in the country. This information is relevant, as it seems that these individuals have been part of the labour market before and when established, have ventured to open a business locally.

Micro-business owners are more educated than their peer residents in colonias. Among 155 respondents, 40 percent of the owners had completed high school and 15 percent held degrees from a community college or a four-year college. As a reference, in Rio Bravo, one of the most developed and higher-income colonias in the region, only 10 percent of the population older than 25 years of age are high-school graduates or the equivalent, and just 1.4 percent have bachelor's degrees (USCB 2007). These micro-business owners are thus above local educational attainment, despite being below national standards.

Characteristics of Micro-businesses in Colonias

1) Financing

Most respondents started their businesses with their own savings or family support, sources outside the financial system (Table 1). Of the 155 respondents, only 20 had received bank loans (12.9 percent), most of which were personal — not business — loans with strict conditions. These results are consistent with the argument that most low-income immigrants are "unbanked". Personal and family sources used in these businesses in colonias are not channelled through financial institutions. Further, many business owners did not even apply for loans due to the expectation that they would not qualify.

Source of Financing*	Number	Percentage
Bank	20	13
Personal savings	122	79
Family loans	50	32
Friend's loan	3	2
Spouse	9	6
ACCION	2	1
RDFC	1	1
Other	5	3
Total*	212	137
Applied for loan?		
Yes, more than once	5	3
Yes, once	23	15
No, never	126	82
Total	154	100

Table 1: Source of financing and loan applications

*Total is greater than 100% because respondents cited multiple sources.

Figure 1: Grocery store, Rio Bravo, Texas (Source: Giusti and Kim)

2) Economic sectors

Micro-businesses in colonias are concentrated on low-skilled, easy-to-enter economic activities requiring a small initial investment. Table 2 shows that the most frequent category of business was "Miscellaneous Store Retailers", which represents 17.5 percent of all businesses surveyed. The second most frequent category of business was "Food and Beverage Stores" (15.6 percent), followed by "Food Services and Drinking Places" (15.6 percent), and then "Repair and Maintenance" (13.6 percent).

Table 2: Types of businesses and Loan applications

Type of business	Male owners		Female owners		Total owners	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Miscellaneous store retailers	1	2,3	26	23,6	27	17,5
Food & beverage stores	8	18,2	16	14,5	24	15,6
Foodservices & drinking places	2	4,5	22	20,0	24	15,6
Repair & maintenance	19	43,2	2	1,8	21	13,6
Apparel manufacturing	0	0,0	11	10,0	11	7,1
Special trade contractors	6	13,6	1	0,9	7	4,5
Health & personal care stores	0	0,0	7	6,4	7	4,5
Clothing & clthg accessories stores	0	0,0	7	6,4	7	4,5
Furniture & home furnishing stores	1	2,3	4	3,6	5	3,2
Personal & laundry services	0	0,0	5	4,5	5	3,2
Motor vehicle and parts dealers, Gasolin Station	2	4,6	2	1,8	4	2,6
Others	5	11,4	7	6,4	12	7,8
Total	44	100,0	110	100,0	154	100,0

3) Spatial role and appearance

While most U.S. cities establish land control and/or zoning regulations, it is not what was found. Colonias, like most developing countries, have no restrictions on where and what to build (GIUSTI et al. 2007). Even in the few cases in which colonias have attained city status (El Cenizo and Rio Bravo), regulations are minimal and a variety of land-use patterns prevail.

Three interrelated elements are described next: first, the physical characteristics of the businesses; second, their location within the colonia; and third the type of visual promotions observed. In terms of their physical appearance, businesses can be freestanding structures located in one room of the home or as an addition to the home built especially for the business. Figure 1 shows a relatively large, freestanding business situated along the highway. Its customers are not only from colonias but also drivers passing by on the highway. Figure 2 shows a bakery located in a separate structure next to the owner's home. Its customer base is the local community. Figure 3 shows a business attached to the owner's home, with customers also coming from the colonia.

In terms of their location within the colonia, three different types of businesses were found. First, there are businesses located on the edge of the colonia, easily approached by outside customers. These businesses are relatively

Figure 2: Bakery, Rio Bravo, Texas (Source: Giusti and Kim)



◀ Figure 3: Business attached to a house, Rio Bravo, Texas (Source: Giusti and Kim)

larger and more established (Figure 1). Second, there are businesses located within the colonia, and the majority of customers are local residents (Figures 2 and 3). Most of these businesses — if not all — are located in the business owner's house, in additions made especially for the enterprise, or are using part of the garage or a section of the house. The division between living and business areas is not always evident in this second type. Third, there are businesses that exist only within the houses, which serve local customers and are not visible from the outside.

Finally, it was observed that these local businesses have physical advertisements for their services. A wide range of creative alternatives is found, from rudimentary signs to flyers or posters. There are no regulations in terms of the size or type of devices used to promote businesses, and they vary according to the given financial capacity. For example, the three businesses in Figures 1, 2, and 3 show advertising in front of their entrances, which is always a common feature. The other common observation is the number of advertisements when entering the colonia, as is observed in Figure 4.

Contribution to Economic Development

1) Job creation

Table 3 shows that among the 44 owners who responded that they hired labour, 21 (48 percent) had more than one full-time paid employee and 39 (88 percent) had more than one part-time paid employee. Considering that business owners themselves are full-time or part-time self-employed, these data show additional labour demands. Further, respondents have both full-time and part-time labour, paid and non-paid, consisting of a spouse, parents, parents-in-law, children, and other relatives.

We simulated two different hypothetical scenarios to estimate to what extent greater access to financial sources could result in the creation of more employment. Because the survey did not ask exact numbers of jobs but rather intervals (see Table 3), the objective of this simulation was to estimate the "real" number of jobs (including part-time, full-time, and paid and unpaid jobs) that the 155 micro-businesses surveyed could create. We simulated the most pessimistic (least number) and the most optimistic (highest number) scenarios for each of the intervals. Both scenarios were based on paid workers as reported in the surveys.

In the worst-case scenario, the 155 micro-businesses could generate more than 179 full-time and 88 part-time

Table 3: Types of employment generated by colonia businesses

* a According to number of employees ▼

Types of employment		Size of business*	Number of businesses	Percentage of businesses
Employement	Paid-employees			
	Full-time	1-2	19	12,3
		3	2	1,3
	Part-time	1-2	13	8,4
		3-5	3	1,9
		6-10	11	7,1
	Both		4	2,6
	Sub-total of paid employees		44	28,4
	Non-paid employees			
	One of family member	2	35	22,6
	Two of family members	3	36	23,2
	Three of family members	4	1	0,6
	Sub-total of non-paid employess		72	46,5
	Paid+ Non-paid employees		36	23,2
No employment	Single-person business		75	48,4
	Total		155	100

▲ Figure 4: Business advertisements, entrance to Rio Bravo, Texas (Source: Giusti and Kim)

jobs, including those of the owners. This number was calculated based on 155 jobs (from self-employment) plus 24 hired full-time jobs and 88 hired part-time jobs. In the best-case scenario, these micro-businesses could generate 203 full-time jobs: 155 self-employment jobs plus 48 full-time and 151 part-time hires. Micro-businesses also generated unpaid labour. Table 3 shows that nearly half of the business owners had unpaid labour.

While these are not remarkably high numbers, they should not be overlooked. Under exceptionally difficult socio-economic conditions and without access to financial backing, these business owners were ultimately capable of creating some jobs. Additionally, by working at these local businesses, workers build experience for future employment (s. Table 3).

2) Fees and Business Registration

Because the majority of the 155 businesses surveyed are very small businesses, as described earlier, they are very likely part of what is termed "informal" businesses. "Absolute informality" is not exactly what this study found, however. Among all respondents, 75 (48 percent) reported paying taxes and 80 respondents (52 percent) declared that they did not pay taxes. All food-related businesses surveyed actually had the permit required to operate, and business owners renewed it periodically, even when the business was very small. The penalty for not registering these food businesses is too high and the registration process is simple enough that most owners comply. These numbers are higher than those reported in other studies (ILO 2002) of developing countries or ethnic enclaves (EDGCOMB & ARMINGTON 2003). The threshold between formality and informality is not that clear in colonias.

3) Economic Linkages between Customers and Supplier

This study found that more than 70 percent of customers live in colonias, mostly in the same colonia where they shop. As colonias are definitively located out of urban areas, these businesses represent the only nearby supplier of basic necessities, so they are definitely serving the needs of the community. Further, these businesses serve local customers who have similar income levels and cultural backgrounds, including language, as the owners. The customers and owners are part of the communities and need each other.

In terms of suppliers, the survey found that more than 77 percent of the owners indicated that their primary suppliers come from the nearby large city. Only 12 business owners (8.1 percent) have their primary suppliers within their communities. Local customers and non-local suppliers result in limited but nevertheless relevant economic linkages. The presence of these businesses is almost the sole source of money circulating in the local economies.

4) Businesses Owners' Attitudes and Perceptions

The involvement of the businesses in their communities was investigated — not only if they invested in their businesses but, more importantly, if they expected to stay both as business owners and as residents in colonias. All of the 155 business owners showed positive opinions about their businesses and planned to continue operating them in colonias.

Table 4 presents statistically significant correlation coefficients for almost all of these questions. Owners' positive opinions about the markets in colonias (Opinion 3) were correlated with their intentions to stay in colonias (Opinion

2) and to educate their children in colonias (Opinion 4). The intention to educate their children in colonias (Opinion 4) was correlated with the intention to pass their colonia business on to their children (Opinion 5). These results support the idea that micro-businesses in colonias can enable owners to stay in the local communities with their families and thus encourage owners to contribute toward local community development. Additionally, business success in colonias could encourage the next generation to stay and contribute to increasing the quality of life there.

Making improvements to a business is an indicator that the owner perceives a certain level of success, because an owner who has a positive attitude toward the future tends to invest more. Among the 155 business owners, more than 58 percent had investment plans for their businesses. The most common improvements are adding office space or an extra room, purchasing equipment, or opening an additional store in the colonia. Such willingness to make further improvements is an indication of the owners' optimism about their businesses and their communities.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Colonias in the Texas-Mexico border region are low-income communities where Latinos are the majority. Latinos make up the greater part of residents, local leaders, and business owners, making colonias unique. This study explored micro-businesses in colonias and their potential to foster local economic development.

The first observed fact is that all business owners surveyed were Hispanic. While this piece of information may be interpreted as a bias in the sample, following census data and field observations, it seems to be representative. Businesses in colonias are actually owned by Hispanics and the language used is predominantly Spanish.

A high level of female owners was observed, and the location of the businesses within the house reinforced this finding. It was also found that those who ventured to open local businesses were relatively more experienced and better educated than were the median levels in colonias.

It was also found that businesses in colonias are concentrated in economic sectors that are easy to access and require low initial capital. Very few business owners had access to financial institutions to start their businesses. Owners were found to have insufficient knowledge about available credit or financial programmes, and their access to such programmes appeared to be limited.

Several businesses are located within residential units in colonias. The incremental construction pattern found in these communities is clearly applied in the adaptation of houses to incorporate micro-businesses. Because many businesses are located in the owner's place of living, within walking distance of their customers, they provide an opportunity for more social interaction among residents, suggesting the potential for these local businesses to create urban synergy.

After identifying the main characteristics of businesses, this research focused on their capacity to foster local economic development. In terms of employment, this study found that these micro-businesses generate both paid and nonpaid, as well as full- and part-time, employment, in addition to the business owner's job. This finding is especially relevant to local economic development, since these businesses primarily employ individuals who, historically, have had more difficulty entering the labour market.

	Opinion 1	Opinion 2	Opinion 3	Opinion 4	Opinion 5
Opinion 1: The future of my business here in the colonia is very secure.	1	0.43**	0.37**	0,14	0.39**
Opinion 2: My family and I want to keep our business here in the colonias.	0.43**	1	0.61**	0.32**	0.54**
Opinion 3: The colonia's inhabitants support local business.	0.37**	0.61**	1	0.39**	0.52**
Opinion 4: I want my children to grow up and live here in the colonias.	0,14	0.32**	0.39**	1	0.45**
Opinion 5: My business is my legacy for my children.	0.39**	0.54**	0.52**	0.45**	1

▲ Table 4: Correlation coefficients between the opinions

** p<.01

About half of the micro-business owners in this study pay some form of local fee or tax. The "informality" that characterises micro-businesses found in ethnic enclaves in urban areas of developed countries is not the overwhelming trend found in colonias. The division between formality and informality is not that clear.

This study found a mainly local consumer base and an external supplier network. The majority of customers came from the same colonia where the business was located, a situation that allows income to circulate within the local economy.

Micro-business owners show positive attitudes toward their businesses and express their willingness to stay in the colonias. They are investing in their communities and have plans to expand their businesses. Moreover, they express a positive attitude toward raising their children in colonias and investing locally.

Colonias, as border settlements, may exemplify the trajectory of other immigrant groups moving from developing into developed countries. They do not settle as "ethnic enclaves" in urban areas but rather in semi-rural or semi-urban communities along border regions. From this exploratory study, we find that colonias are growing as well as becoming more integrated communities. It is critical to search for ways to support these emerging private entrepreneurial initiatives, as it seems that they have the capacity to contribute to the goal of attaining more liveable and sustainable communities.

Finally, as this was an exploratory research, several questions remain. It is not clear how colonias will be incorporated into bordering cities, or even if they will be. Linkages with both U.S. and neighbouring Mexican providers should also be explored. Further, improvements made in local infrastructure should also be considered when analysing the capacity of colonias to grow and provide a higher quality of life for their residents — local business owners.

References

ALWITT, L., and DONLEY, T. 1997, Retail Stores in Poor Urban Neighborhoods, *The Journal of Consumer Affairs* 31 (1): 139-164.

ASSOCIATION FOR ENTERPRISE OPPORTUNITY (AEO), 2007, Policy and Advocacy, Microenterprise Statistics. http://www.microenterpriseworks.org/index.asp?bid=69

BAKER, D., 2004, The Entrepreneurial Economy: A White Paper, *The MicroEnterprise Journal*, October.

BIRCH, D. L. 1987, *Job Creation in America: How Our Smallest Companies Put the Most People to Work.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

BLAKELY, E. and BRADSHAW, T. 2002, *Economic Development: Theory and Practice*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

BORJAS, G. 1986, The Self-Employment Experience of Immigrants, *The Journal of Human Resources* 21 (4): 485-506.

EDGCOMB, E. and ARMINGTON, M. 2003, *The Informal Economy: Latino Enterprises at the Margins*, Washington, DC: FIELD, The Aspen Institute Publications Office.

EDGCOMB, E., and KLEIN, J. 2005, *Opening Opportunities, Building Ownership: Fulfilling the Promise of Microenterprise in the United States*, The Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning and Dissemination (FIELD), Queenstown, Maryland: The Aspen Institute Publications Office. http://fieldus.org/publications/FulfillingthePromise.pdf.

EDGCOMB, E. and THETFORD, T. 2004, *The Informal Economy 2004: Making It in Rural America.* Washington, DC: FIELD. The Aspen Institute Publications Office.

EGBERT, H. 2006, Cross-Border Small-Scale Trading In South-Eastern Europe: Do Embeddedness and Social Capital Explain Enough? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30 (2): 346-361.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS - COMMUNITY AFFAIRS OFFICE, 2008, *Texas Colonias: A Thumbnail Sketch of the Conditions, Issues, Challenges and Opportunities*, http://www.dallasfed.org/ca/pubs/colonias.pdf.

Flota, C., and M. Mora. 2001, The Earnings of Self-Employed Mexican Americans along the U.S.-Mexico Border, *The Annals of Regional Science 35*: 483-499.

FOWLER, F. 2002, *Survey Research Methods*, 3rd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

GIUSTI, C. 2003, *Policies Promoting Microenterprises in Colonias: What Works? What Does Not Work? And Why?* Proceedings of Seeds of Growth: Sustainable Community Development — What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, Washington, DC: A Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference. http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2003_conf_paper_session6_giusti.pdf

GIUSTI, C., LARSON, J., WARD, P., DE SOUZA, F., and MAY, M. 2007, *Land Titling in Starr County Colonias along the Texas-Mexico Border: Planning and Stability Issues*, Projections 6: 36-55.

HART, K. 1973, The Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, *Journal of Development Studies 6*: 104-120.

HEADD, B. 2000, The Characteristics of Small-Business Employees, *Monthly Labor Review* 123 (4): 13-18.

INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY (ICIC), 2005, *State of the Inner City Economies: Small Businesses in the Inner City*, Washington, DC: SBA, Office of Advocacy.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE. 2002, *Decent Work and the Informal Economy*, Sixth Item on the Agenda, Report VI, ILO Conference, 90th Session, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/dgreports/dcomm/webdev/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_069040.pdf

KLOOSTERMAN, R. C. 2003, Creating Opportunities: Policies Aimed at Increasing Openings for Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 15 (2): 167-181.

KONTOS, M. 2003, Self-Employment Policies and Migrants' Entrepreneurship in Germany, *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 15 (2): 119-135.

LARSON, J. 1995, Free Markets in the Heart of Texas, *Georgetown Law Journal* 84 (2): 179-260.

LIGHT, I. 2002, Immigrant Place Entrepreneurs in Los Angeles 1970-99, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26 (2): 215-228.

LOSBY, J., Else, J., Kingslow, M., Edgcomb, E., Malm, E., and Kao, V. 2002, *Informal Economy Literature Review*, Newark, NY: ISED, Field.

MORA, M. T., and DAVILA, A. 2005, Ethnic Group Size, Linguistic Isolation, and Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the USA, *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 17 (5): 389-404.

MUSTERD, S. and ANDERSON, R. 2006, Employment, Social Mobility, and Neighbourhood Effects: The Case of Sweden. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30 (1): 130-140.

O'HARA, S. 1999, Community-Based Urban Development: A Strategy for Improving Social Sustainability, *International Journal of Social Economics* 26 (10/11): 1327-1343.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS (OAG). 2006, *Glossary of Terms & Abbreviations related to Colonias-Prevention Laws*. http://www.oag.state.tx.us/border/glossary.shtml.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). 2003, *Entrepreneurship and Local Economic Development: Programme and Policy Recommendations*, Paris, France: OECD.

RAM, M., and SMALLBONE, D. 2003, Policies to Support Ethnic Minority Enterprise: The English Experience, *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 15 (2): 151-166.

REYNALDO, J., and SANTOS, A. 1999, Cronbach's Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the Reliability of Scales. *Journal of Extension*, 37(2). http://www.joe.org/joe/1999april/tt3.php

REYNOLDS, P. D., and WHITE, S. B. 1997, *The Entrepreneurial Process: Economic Growth, Men, Women, and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Quorum Books.

ROBLES, B. 2002, Latina Microenterprises and the U.S.-Mexico Border Economy, *Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy* 3 (2): 307-327.

ROCHÍN, R., SAENZ, R., HAMPTON, B., and CALO, B. 1998, *Colonias and Chicano/a Entrepreneurs in Rural California*, JSRI Research Report #16, The Julian Samora Research Institute, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

SCHNELL, I., and SOFER, M. 2003, Embedding Entrepreneurship in Social Structure: Israel-Arab Entrepreneurship. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27 (2): 300-318.

SERVON, L. 1998, *Microenterprise Development as an Economic Adjustment Strategy.* Study commissioned by the Economic Development Administration of the United States Department of Commerce. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, Center for Urban Policy Research. http://policy.rutgers.edu/cupr/eda/fullrep.pdf.

SERVON, L., and BATES, T. 1998, Microenterprise as an Exit Route from Poverty: Recommendations for Programs and Policy Makers. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20 (4): 419-441.

U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA) 1998, Characteristics of Small Business Employees and Owners, 1997 (January), Washington, DC: SBA Office of Advocacy, http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/ch_em97.pdf

U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA) 2008, *Human Capital and Women's Business Ownership*, Washington, DC: SBA Office of Advocacy, http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/wib01.pdf.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (USCB) 2007, 2005 *American Community Survey Data Profile Highlights*. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (USCB) 2007, *Survey of Business Owners 2002*, http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/women2002.htm.

WARD, P., DE SOUZA, F., and GIUSTI, C. 2004, Colonia Land and Housing Market Performance and the Impact of Lot Title Regularization in Texas, *Journal of Urban Studies 41* (13): 2621-2646.

WILLIAMS, C., and WINDEBANK, J. 2000, Beyond Employment: An

Examination of Modes of Service Provision in a Deprived Neighborhood. *The Service Industries Journal* 20 (4): 33-48.

Cecilia Giusti
is an economist and assistant professor of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning at Texas A&M University, College Station/ Texas. She also teaches in George Bush School of Government and Public Service. Her research focuses on economic development planning in developing countries, especially in Latin America.

cgiusti@archone.tamu.edu

Suk-Kyung Kim
holds a masters degree in Housing and Interior Design from Yonsei University, Seoul/ Korea and a PhD in Architecture from Texas A&M University. Currently, she is assistant professor of Interior Design at the School of Planning, Design and Construction at Michigan State University, East Lansing/ Michigan.

kimsk@msu.edu

B/ordered Spaces and Social Exclusion in Vietnam:

Housing Conditions of Labour Migrants in the Face of Global Economic Integration

Michael Waibel and Andreas Gravert

Die erfolgreiche Politik der exportorientierten Industrialisierung hat in Vietnam zu einer weitflächigen Ausweisung von Industriezonen in der städtischen Peripherie geführt. Diese Zonen stellen Ankerpunkte für die zumeist informelle Besiedlung durch Arbeitsmigranten aus ländlichen Gebieten dar. Während innerhalb der Industriezonen rechtliche und steuerliche Vorteile sowie optimale infrastrukturelle Vorraussetzungen und eine gute Anbindung an westliche Märkte gegeben sind, gelten außerhalb der umzäunten und bewachten Zonen in jeder Hinsicht gegenteilige Bedingungen. Arbeitsmigranten sehen sich nicht nur mit prekären Arbeitsverhältnissen, sondern aufgrund ihres „temporären" Aufenthaltsstatus auch mit dem weitgehenden Ausschluss aus dem städtischen Sozialsystem konfrontiert. All dies führt zu prekären Wohnbedingungen in so genannten Boarding House Agglomerationen, die sich aufgrund fehlender öffentlicher Verkehrsinfrastruktur zumeist direkt an den Mauern der Industriezonen befinden.

Zwar sind die Arbeitsmigranten für die Integration Vietnams in die Weltwirtschaft unverzichtbar, an ihrer Integration in den urbanen Kontext werden sie jedoch gehindert und stattdessen in informelle Wohn- und oft auch informelle Arbeitsverhältnisse gezwungen. Die Migranten weisen daher eine hohe Vulnerabilität auf. So mussten im Zuge der globalen Finanzkrise seit Beginn 2009 bereits ein Viertel der Migranten in ihre Heimatprovinzen zurückkehren.

Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt anhand umfassender eigener empirischer Erhebungen die Wohn- und Sozialsituation der Arbeitsmigranten im Großraum der Metropole Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) dar und hinterfragt die Motive der staatlichen Ausgrenzungspolitik im Zusammenspiel mit den Interessen transnationaler Unternehmen.

Introduction

Since the mid-1980s, Vietnam has been successfully introducing the "Doi Moi" (renovation) policy, thereby gradually turning the centrally planned system into a more decentralised market economy. The opening up towards global capital finally led to the recent entry into the WTO, which can be regarded as a significant milestone in the economic transition. Following the development model of the so-called Tiger economies, Vietnam has implemented the strategy of export-led industrialisation. The cornerstone of this policy has been the erection of numerous export processing and industrial zones in the sub- and peri-urban areas of Vietnam's metropolis. These clearly demarcated bordered zones are equipped with exceptional technical infrastructure and preferential tax regimes. In ultimate proximity to these globally integrated economic spaces, however, agglomerations of rather spontaneously evolved highly-dense informal settlements of migrant labourers with often precarious

◀ Figure 1: Bordered Space within Quang Minh Industrial Park, Hanoi (Photo: Waibel and Gravert, 2004)

▲
Figure 2: Entrance Gate of the first export processing zone in Vietnam: Tan Thuan EPZ in HCMC (Photo: Waibel and Gravert, 2004)

living conditions have developed. In spatial terms, this contributes to a high degree of urban fragmentation. In social terms, this contributes to the local disintegration of the population. In addition, the existing household registration system creates severe legal barriers for migrants, which lead to further discrimination and social exclusion.

In the following chapters, the authors analyse the reasons for this development and question the motivations of the stakeholders involved.

Industrial zones as ordered economic spaces

In Vietnam, the development of export processing and industrial zones has been a crucial move in implementing the strategy of export-led industrialization and channelling foreign direct investments (WAIBEL 2009). The most important foreign investors come from Japan and the four first-generation Tiger economies of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Following the "flying geese regional economic development model" (Akamatsu, 1962), the latter countries have outsourced labour-intensive industrial production to economically less developed countries in Southeast and East Asia. The main incentives for foreign companies to invest in Vietnam are low wages and a stable political environment. Furthermore, Vietnam benefits from the China-plus-one strategy of many trans-national companies that seek to achieve spatial diversification of their investments and to establish secondary manufacturing operations in the country (Bradsher, 2008). Labour-intensive production such as apparel, footwear and garments still accounts for the majority of exports. As in many other developing countries, this production is spatially concentrated to a large extent inside industrial zones. Within these large walled and guarded compounds, trade barriers are eliminated, bureaucratic requirements and taxes are lowered and outstanding infrastructure is provided. The demarcated mono-functional economic spaces emerged at a very early stage of transition and served as testing grounds and catalysts for liberal market-economy principles (Waibel/Jordan, 2005). As a result, the overall value of exports now accounts for over 70 per cent of the national GDP. Even if only the value-added component is included, this contribution amounts to a substantial 15-20% of Vietnamese exports to GDP (Ha/Phuong, 2009). So far, the number of export processing and industrial zones in Vietnam has risen to over 90, with about 26 more currently under construction (VEA, 2007: 60). Additionally, there are about 90 industrial parks that feature a comparable infrastructure. Export processing zones, industrial zones and industrial parks – henceforth summarized under the term "industrial zones" – employ a total of about 2 million workers in Vietnam (Le Cam, 2009: 54).

The Southern Key Economic Region, including Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and the surrounding provinces, has been especially successful in the operation of industrial zones. It includes about half of all industrial zones of Vietnam,

▶
Figure 3: Boarding House Complex close to Song Than Industrial Park in Binh Duong Province (Photo: Waibel and Gravert, 2008)

◀ Figure 4: Female migrants sharing a boarding house unit (Photo: Waibel and Gravert, 2007)

which channel about 80% of the country's foreign direct investments (Waibel, 2009: 33). The surrounding provinces now increasingly serve as the industrial backyard of the metropolis of HCMC. In the extensive peri-urban industrial belt around HCMC, more than 500,000 workers are employed in industrial zones alone. Most of them are from 15 to 29 years old and predominantly female (65%) (AAI, 2005: 7ff; WAIBEL/GRAVERT, 2007: 14). The overwhelming majority of the labourers are migrants from all over Vietnam.

Vulnerability of labour migrants

In HCMC, a significant part of the urban population is considered to be migrant population. Immigration already started during the US military engagement in Vietnam, when people fled from the countryside to the city to avoid frequent bombings. Subsequent to a short period of de-urbanisation after reunification in 1976, rural-urban migration accelerated considerably after the start of the reform process. Today, migrants represent about one third of the urban population of HCMC (Le Cam, 2009: 55), which amounts to approximately 8 million people. In contrast to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s, when many migrants from the countryside moved to inner-city locations to find work in the informal sector, rural-urban migration flows now concentrate in the suburban areas and the surrounding provinces of HCMC, where new employment opportunities for unskilled labour have emerged in the industrial zones (WAIBEL et al., 2007: 61).

In socio-economic terms, the 2004 Vietnam migration survey (GSO/UNPF, 2005: 5f.) revealed many aspects that are comparable to rural-urban migration patterns in other developing countries: The mean earnings of migrants are much lower than those of non-migrants. The differential of income between migrants and non-migrants is greatest in HCMC and the surrounding provinces. Nevertheless, 80% of migrants reported that their current earnings are higher than the income they had before migration. Often, migrant households maintain close trans-local networks to share and pool their incomes in order to increase resilience towards external stresses (GSO/UNFPA, 2006: 40). Also, migrants face difficulties in joining mass organisations like the "Workers' Union" or the "Vietnam's Women Union", which usually serve as important social security nets. Often, informal networks of relatives and compatriots from their home towns and regions substitute for this handicap (GSO/UNFPA, 2005: 3).

As commonly noted, the working conditions in Asian industrial zones are rather challenging. Employees suffer from long working hours of 50-60 hours per week. Their monthly earnings only amount to 1-1.5 million Vietnamese Dong (US$ 60-90) on average. Asked about their living difficulties in general, migrants list low incomes as the main problem, followed by high rents, little leisure time and harsh working conditions (Noltze, 2008: 116). Migrant workers often do not have formal labour contracts or enjoy social security. They generally assess their employment situation as insecure (Klaus, 2009: 67).

Also, migrants face severe legal restrictions due to the household registration system ("Ho Khau"), a relic of the Socialist period. According to the Ho Khau system, people can only access public services at their place of residential registration. As a result, it is very difficult for migrants to send their children to schools or to receive medical care. It is also impossible for them to buy real estate and land. So far, banks and micro-credit organisations – even if run by international NGOs – in most cases do not provide credit or saving schemes for migrants (Noltze, 2008; GRAVERT, 2008: 74). To apply for permanent residency, migrants have to show a long-term labour contract and prove at least one continuous year of local residence, e.g. evidenced by a formal rental agreement. Usually, migrants do not meet these requirements (GRAVERT, 2008: 98f.). All in all, the household registration system results in the discrimination of large parts of urban society. The manifold legal restrictions give migrants an insecure status.

Unstable working conditions on the one hand and the legal discrimination through the household registration system on the other hand mean that labour migrants are highly vulnerable. All this forces them into informal living arrangements, especially in the field of housing. In this way, migrants, who are indispensable for the success of Vietnam's export economy, are degraded to second-class citizens (VET 2005).

Figure 5: Water supply station: Basic technical infrastructure within a boarding house complex (Photo: Waibel and Gravert, 2008)

Boarding houses:
new slums in the urban periphery

In the course of the transitional process, the Vietnamese state has almost completely withdrawn from the role of supplying housing and has left this matter to the private sector. While the industrial zones and industrial parks usually offer an exceptional infrastructure, they were designed without a coherent effort to provide housing opportunities for factory workers. Therefore, labour migrants moved to spontaneously erected tenant house agglomerations in close proximity to their workplace. In Vietnam, such accommodations are called "boarding houses". Some officials regard this kind of housing as "new slums" in reference to "old slums" – the squatter settlements along canals and railway tracks of the inner city. Boarding houses are rented and multi-shared small housing units. The dominant boarding house typology consists of long row houses with small one-room units. Such units usually feature one room of 9-15 square metres that is shared by 2-5 migrants in order to lower the individual costs (~25% of the income). Usually, a mezzanine allows for more living space, amounting to 5-6 sqm per capita on average (Klaus, 2009: 76). Sanitation and cooking facilities are often situated outside and shared by several households. A lack of public transportation limits the mobility of workers and has led to the boarding house agglomerations being erected directly at the borders of the industrial compounds. Public infrastructure is generally insufficient, as housing for migrant workers was usually designed without provisions for medical care, power and water supply, or waste management (Bose, 2007). A survey undertaken by the authors among boarding house inhabitants in 2006 revealed that the highest individual priorities for improvement of the current housing situation have been better provision of technical infrastructure, in particular toilets, sanitation and water supply (Waibel/Gravert, 2007). The provision of the latter comes under the responsibility of the state, which has neglected to meet its obligations.

Boarding houses emerged when local families near industrial compounds, realising the demand for low-prized rental housing, began to rent out their backyards. In the recent past, more and more large compounds of up to 1000 housing units have emerged, usually constructed by local landowners. As the demand for workers in industrial zones continuously kept growing in the past, the demand for housing commonly exceeded supply, leading to overpriced rents. Parts of the local population benefited from the legal exclusion of migrants, because they have been able to generate large amounts of money with relatively small investments (Waibel/Gravert, 2007).

Recent attempts of the local government to provide adequate housing for workers have proven generally ineffective. For example, some management authorities erected housing compounds for labour migrants inside the industrial compounds. However, it has been reported to the authors that this has not proven to be an efficient solution, since prices there were higher than at the boarding house agglomerations outside and because the migrant workers were afraid of overly tight social control within the zones.

Migrants' perspectives:
self-imposed and systemically enforced exclusion

Interviews with boarding house dwellers have shown that the migrant workers – although they do not really have a choice – mostly accept the precarious housing conditions. When selecting their accommodation, they tend to focus on low rents, flexibility and close proximity to their place of employment. They regard their living situation only as a temporary solution allowing them to save as much money as possible and transfer money home to their relatives, with whom they usually keep close ties. Workers complain about low wages and insecure labour conditions, and in recent times, this has even resulted in demonstrations and wildcat strikes. The low minimum salaries lead to a situation in which most migrants even agree to work extra hours in order to maximize their income (KLAUS, 2009).

The self-conception of being temporary residents is reinforced by the legal discrimination through the household registration system. The latter constitutes a severe barrier for the integration of migrants into urban society. In addition, the migrants are even further isolated due to underdeveloped public transport connections. The majority

of them – although living only a few kilometres away from the 'Central Business District' (CBD) of HCMC – report that they have never visited the inner city (Noltze, 2008: 116). After work, they engage in the usual social activities such as dinner with friends and sometimes karaoke, but they mostly stay among themselves. Interaction with local (permanent) residents is reduced to a minimum. As civil society is still rather weak in Vietnam, there are only very few small initiatives trying to promote community-building efforts (Klaus, 2009). Community-building is further hindered by the heterogeneous origins of the labour migrants, who come from all over Vietnam.

Social exclusion as a consequence is therefore both self-imposed and systemically enforced.

As a result of all these obstacles, HCMC is surrounded by spatial enclaves of migrant workers that are apparently not at all rooted in the urban environment. Boarding house dwellers comprise a rather homogenous social group of mostly young, low-income migrant workers with long working hours, who exhibit a different way of life than the adjacent local population. In contrast to the walled compounds of the industrial zones, there are no physical borders separating the boarding house agglomerations from the rest of the city, but very strong socio-economic and legal borders are in place. This immense urban fragmentation may be typical for a neo-developmental state such as Vietnam. However, it indisputably contributes to high levels of petty crime, drug abuse, and prostitution in these areas (AAI, 2005; Waibel/Gravert, 2007).

The State's perspective: The dilemma of simultaneity and conceded informality

The state's perspective may be explained by a multi-level view. On the macro-level, the national government has put economic growth on the agenda as its primary goal. In consequence, the creation of favourable economic conditions for foreign investors was prioritised from the very beginning of the transitional process. Mono-functional economic spaces, such as export processing zones, were planned and erected in sharp contrast to other – less ordered – parts of the urban environment at that time. Notwithstanding, the provision of accommodation for the labourers of these zones was neglected. The reason for this can be traced back to, among other factors, a typical transitional phenomenon that is labelled the "Dilemma of Simultaneity" (Offe, 1991). This refers to the challenge that governments experience in promoting the reform process equally across all policy and sectoral fields. Due to budget constraints and aspects of opportunity costs, however, the state usually has to prioritise its fields of action. Against the background of the "dilemma of simultaneity", the provision of housing for millions of migrant workers was not tackled with the same degree of intensity as the provision of economic spaces for international investors. In this respect, the perpetuation of the household registration system from the Socialist period turned out to be very useful. It had originally been introduced to restrain and control urbanization in the Socialist era. The advantage of keeping this system was that it relieved authorities from providing costly infrastructural facilities for migrants and thus saved financial resources. In this way, the national state benefited from the legally induced informalization of the migrant population. This might also be described as a policy of "Conceded Informality". Furthermore, as formal housing was unattainable for the migrant population, informal housing was the only possibility to accommodate enough workers in proximity to industrial zones. The conceding of informality may therefore have been an inevitable necessity to attract international investors in the global competition for foreign direct investments in the labour-intensive industry, particularly in the first phase of transition.

Furthermore, the lack of capacity at the level of the city administration played a substantial role. Socialist planning bureaucracy was not sufficiently experienced or capable to deal with market-economy conditions at the beginning of transition. Therefore, urban development control over economic spaces was usually handed over to special-purpose associations. The latter focussed on the erection of mono-functional economic spaces and generally did not implement coherent urban development projects that might have integrated other functions such as housing, commerce or leisure.

Although the boarding house agglomerations do not even come close to meeting legal requirements of building regulations, this deficiency has been pragmatically tolerated by local administrations. One reason might be that some local authorities are unable to prevent informal developments. Another even more important factor might be that the informal status of the boarding houses leaves much room for corrupt officials to absorb some of the profits gained by local landlords. Here again, a policy of "Conceded Informality" appears to be in place, in this case at the micro-level.

Meanwhile, the media as well as politicians are increasingly acknowledging and reflecting the precariousness of these housing conditions. However, as long as local officials in cooperation with local landlords stand to gain from such developments, it seems likely that boarding houses will continue to be conceded.

This may only change once Vietnam's export economy ceases to depend on the provision of a cheap labour force. In fact, the global economic crisis will accelerate the restructuring and upgrading of the Vietnamese economy, which might imply tremendous consequences on the handling of migrants and their living situation.

Impacts of the global financial crisis

The strategy of export-led industrialisation brings with it a high degree of exposure to developments in the global economy. The export sector, and especially the electronics, apparel and footwear industries in Vietnam have been severely disrupted by the global financial crisis (Waibel/Gravert, 2009). Massive lay-offs of migrant workers have been the consequence. Many strikes took place, not least because some companies stopped paying their workers (PHAM, 2009). About one quarter of all migrant workers had to move back to their places of origin, at least temporarily, according to media reports (VNS, 05 June 2009).

However, the labour-intensive industry in Vietnam had already been under pressure before the global economic crisis set in. This is due to external and internal reasons:

Global competition in this low wage segment is extremely fierce, and less developed countries such as Cambodia or Bangladesh have been increasingly able to outpace Vietnam in the global race for foreign direct investments. Salary levels in Vietnam have increased significantly in the past due to the overall economic progress of the country. Therefore, it became more and more difficult to attract a labour force willing to work in the textile industry, where wages cannot exceed a certain level due to global competition. As a consequence, there have been labour shortages, especially in the HCMC metropolitan region.

To reach further economic growth, Vietnam's industry has to manage the shift from a labour-intensive to a more capital-intensive industry. In order to advance along the value chain, Vietnam needs to provide for a more skilled and better educated labour force, for example. In this context, it would be an important step to give migrants better access to education and gradually abolish the household registration system.

Conclusion and outlook

The policy of export-led industrialisation resulted in Vietnam's successful integration into the global economy. The main factors for this rapid economic development were low wages, political stability and the prioritisation of economic growth. Other sectors, such as social affairs or housing, were neglected – a typical phenomenon for transitional countries that is often referred to as the "dilemma of simultaneity". One result is an increase in urban fragmentation. The latter is spatially manifested by the contrast between clearly demarcated bordered industrial zones and unordered boarding house agglomerations. Inside the walls that separate industrial zones from their surroundings, massive public investments are made, exceptional infrastructure is provided, trans-national companies are given legal privileges, and trade barriers are reduced. Outside, technical infrastructure is lacking, and the migrant population faces social exclusion, legal discrimination, and insecure and precarious conditions in labour and housing. In an approach that might be labelled "conceded informality", the state largely tolerates the vulnerability of migrants. It can be assumed that the high degree of informality in the periphery of industrial zones is conceded, because this guarantees the provision of cheap and flexible labour force without stressing state budgets. Accordingly, the local disintegration of migrant workers can be interpreted as part of a strategy to foster the country's global economic integration. Industrial zones seem to be better integrated into the global economy than into their local settings. Boarding house agglomerations are not well integrated into their local settings either, although this is due to other factors. Dwellers of boarding house agglomerations are not separated by physical barriers, but with legal and socio-economic borders that relegate them to the status of second-class citizens.

The global economic crisis will reinforce the implementation of industrial upgrading strategies. Therefore, education and training have to be improved. As part of this development, barriers for migrants must be abolished, as they not only cause social exclusion and the discrimination of a large part of society. They also lead to the underutilization of labour force and the structural reproduction of poverty.

Michael Waibel
PhD in Geography, is Senior lecturer at the Department of Geography, University of Hamburg. He has been doing research on urbanism in Vietnam since 1996.

mwaibel@gwdg.de

Andreas Gravert
graduated in Geography. He is research assistant at the Department of Regional Planning, BTU Cottbus, concerned with the ‚Megacity Research Project Ho Chi Minh City'.

gravert@tu-cottbus.de

References

AAI, Action Aid International, 2005, *Migrant Workers in Vietnam – A Summary Research Report.* Vietnam.

AKAMATSU, K. 1962, A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. *Journal of Developing Economies*, 1(1), pp. 3-25

BOSE, M. 2007, Regionale Strategien für eine nachhaltige Wohnungspolitik in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. In: *Pacific News* 27, pp. 11-13.

BRADSHER, K. 2008, Investors Seek Asian Options to Costly China. In: *New York Times*, 18 June 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/business/worldbusiness/18invest.html.

GSO, General Statistical Office of Vietnam/UNPFA, United Nations Population Fund (ed.) 2005, *The 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi.

GSO, General Statistical Office of Vietnam/UNPFA, United Nations Population Fund (ed.) 2006, *The 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey: Internal Migration and Related Life Course Events.* Hanoi.

GRAVERT, A. 2008, *Das Bedürfnisfeld Wohnen in der Entwicklungspolitik – Eine Analyse von Strategien zur Wohnraumversorgung Einkommensschwacher am Beispiel Ho Chi Minh City.* Unveröff. Diplomarbeit, Göttingen.

HA, N. T./PHUONG, H. V. 2009, *Testing economic evolution.* In: Vietnam Investment Review, no. 915 (30 March – 5 April 2009). http://www.vir.com.vn/Client/VIR/index.asp?url=content.asp&doc=18465 (last accessed: 12 August 2009)

KLAUS, A. 2009, *Eine Exploration im Gemeinwesen von Boarding House Siedlungen.* Unpublished Master's thesis. Zurich.

LE CAM, L. 2009, *Heading Home.* In: *Vietnam Economic Times* no. 180, pp. 54f.

NOLTZE, M. 2008, *Mikrofinanzierung von Wohnraum – am Beispiel von Arbeitsmigranten in Großraum Ho Chi Minh City,* Vietnam. Unpublished Master's thesis, Göttingen.

OFFE, C. 1991, *Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa.* In: Merkur, no. 45 (4), pp. 279-91.

PHAM, N. Q. 2009, *Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on Viet Nam – A Rapid Assessment.* Paper prepared for the ILO, Hanoi, February 2009. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_103550.pdf (last accessed: 8 August 2009)

VEA, *Vietnam Economic Association (ed.) 2007, Industrial Zones and Export Processing Zones.* In: Vietnam Economic Times, 161, July 2007, pp. 60f.

VET, *Villes en Transition Viet Nam 2005, Impacts of Existing Residence Registration Policy on Urban Poverty Alleviation. Two Case Studies in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.* Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

VNS 5 June 2009, *Global crisis hits farmers hard, says new research.* In: Vietnam News, Hanoi.

WAIBEL, M. 2009, *Ho Chi Minh City – a Mega-Urban Region in the Making.* In: Geographische Rundschau International Edition, 5 (1), pp. 30-38.

WAIBEL, M./ GRAVERT, A. 2009, *Globale Integration versus lokale Exklusion? Die Auswirkungen der weltweiten Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise auf Arbeitsmigranten in Vietnam.* In: Südostasien 3/2009 (25). Forthcoming.

WAIBEL, M./GRAVERT, A. 2007, *Wohnst Du schon? Boarding Houses im Großraum Ho Chi Minh City – Eine Antwort auf die Wohnbedürfnisse von Arbeitsmigranten.* In: Südostasien, 23 (1), pp. 12-15.

WAIBEL, M./ ECKERT, R./ BOSE, M., 2007, *Housing for Low-income Groups in Ho Chi Minh City between Re-Integration and Fragmentation – Approaches to Adequate Urban Typologies and Spatial Strategies.* In: German Journal on Contemporary Asia – ASIEN 103 – April 2007, pp. 59-78.

WAIBEL, M./ JORDAN, R. 2005, *Exportorientierte Produktionszonen in Malaysia und Vietnam – Regionale Disparitäten und Widersprüche im Planungsprozess.* In: Internationales Asienforum (International Quarterly for Asian Studies), no. 36 (3–4), pp. 337–60.

Migration in Times of Transformation:

New Challenges for Urban Governance in Albania

Enkeleda Kadriu

Der Beitrag betrachtet die Migrationstendenzen in Albanien zwischen 1945 und 1990 sowie seit den 1990er Jahren. Vor dem Hintergrund werden Push- und Pull-Faktoren für die Wanderungsbewegungen sowie deren Folgen für städtische Entwicklung aufgezeigt. Kommunale Entscheidungsträger in sowohl schrumpfenden als auch wachsenden Städten Albaniens sehen sich der Bewältigung neuer Aufgaben gegenüber. Aufzuzeigen wie staatliche Behörden und verschiedene Interessensgruppen mit den sozialen und räumlichen Folgen von Migration umgehen bzw. welche Ansätze ratsam erscheinen, ist Kernanliegen des Beitrags.

Introduction

Although the free movement of people is considered one of the fundamental rights of citizens, unfortunately in many underdeveloped and developing countries in the world movement is not always a positive choice based simply on one's right.

"Every day across the world people make the difficult decision to leave their homes. War, persecution, environmental disaster and poverty are just some of the reasons why a person might feel that they have to leave their family, community or country."[1]

Albania, a small country in the south-eastern part of Europe has had a rough experience with migration. With almost 25% of its population and 35% of its working force living abroad, Albania is one of the countries with the highest rates of migration (both internally and externally) in the region. According to a study done by the British Council in several cities of 8 European countries, including the city of Tirana (the capital of Albania), 38% of the population aged 18-40 years that have not previously migrated want to migrate. In a situation in which the migration statistics are this disheartening, (35% of the work force is in migration; 60% of graduates in foreign countries don't work in their profession; 38% of the population wants to migrate; 46.8% of migrants returning to the country live off their savings; 37.85% invest their savings in different businesses; 60% chose to be self-employed)[2], local governments and stakeholders, among others, should come together to discuss what can be done by analysing the situation and trying to understand the factors that lie behind the figures.

In this study we give a brief overview of the migration trends in Albania during the periods 1945-1990, the 1990s, and thereafter, concentrating first on the factors that lead to these movements and then on the impacts and repercussions that migration has had on urban development both in shrinking and growing cities within Albania. We try to highlight some of the main challenges faced by the local governments that were most affected by the demographic movements of people resulting from the political transformation (i.e. the decentralisation and privatisation processes in the cities) and analyse how they address the issue of migration. Because migration in Albania has been more of a spontaneous and independent phenomenon, attracting little attention for research and study, our findings and suggestions leave ground for further work on the issue by other scholars.

Trends of migration in Albania

Migration in Albania is characterised by three main periods[3], all of which are associated with major changes in the economic condition of the country or, in other words, with different crises that the country experienced on the way to democracy and capitalism: i) the migration fluxes before 1944, mainly due to economic reasons; ii) a flux in smaller numbers during the 1945-1990 period, mainly due to political reasons; and iii) the massive fluxes after the 1990s, immediately following the fall of the communist regime in the country (Barjaba, 2004). The last two fluxes are the periods that fall within the scope of our analysis since they concern the period of transition from the collapse of the communist regime to democracy.

The transition period in Albania is defined and characterised by the change of the regime and from a strictly controlled and closed, centrally planned economy to an open market economy. This period is further characterised by political, economic and social changes, as well as turmoil that the country has experienced to date since the collapse of the regime in 1990. The political upheavals prevailing from 1989-1993 resulted in the Democratic Party winning the elections and of thousands of people fleeing, first through Western embassies and then through the ports to Italy and the borders to Greece, and were later followed with protests and demonstrations on the streets. The year 1999 brought 550,000 Kosovo refugees to Albania, which was a burden to the already weak economy trying to recover from the relics of communism and a fraudulent financial system. The year 2000 and onwards would be the "healing" and recovery period, although the political rivalry between the major parties continues to date.

1
Refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons, Amnesty International, Retrieved 09 July 2009 from http://www.amnesty.org/en/refugees-and-migrants

2
Study, 38% of Albanians want to migrate, 16 December 2009, Retrieved on 10 July 2009 from http://lajme.shqiperia.com/media/artikull/iden/158794/titulli/Studimi-38-e-shqiptareve-duan-te-emigrojne

3
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Retrieved on 08 July 2009 from http://www.mpcs.gov.al/migracioni/historik/69-tri-periudhat-e-emigrimit-modern-shqiptar



▲ Figure 1: Internal migration in Albania between 1990 and 2008, Source: IOM 2008:21

In the following, the two later periods of transition are looked at in terms of migration in Albania.

Migration from 1945 to 1990

Urban growth and development in this period took a special path. With a closed and planned economy, a strong ideological commitment and homogeneity, and an inherited backwardness — the country was still in many respects a medieval society up to 1945 — after high initial growth during the 50s and 60s, the development of the Albanian economy slowed down during the 70s and 80s (Aliaj, 2004: 43). Enduringly slow industrial development and agricultural accumulation impeded a fast urban development. The urbanisation process developed very slowly and was controlled, especially after the 50s, as a result of the natural growth and migration regulated through the job and housing guarantees (Aliaj, 2004: 43). Control of the demographic movement was obtained through the social housing system and employment, which were directly organised and followed by the party mechanisms. Only people registered at the civil registry office of their origin were entitled to housing and employment; therefore, changing location would not be beneficial in terms of both matters. Internal migration was not encouraged. People could move only during voluntary work periods[4], in cases of marriage, or for educational purposes. There was no free movement of people, and migration, with its contemporary economic, employment or socio-cultural factors, did not exist. Officially, emigration was prohibited and severely punished (Carletto et al, 2004:2), and the movement of people in or out of the country was allowed only for reasons and duties specified by the government. The cases in which people refused to return to the country were considered a crime and had several impacts on the remaining family and relatives in Albania, including persecution or imprisonment.

Migration during the 1990s and at present

In 1989, when the government and the politicians were busy keeping the country together, building a new regime (it was the first time that political parties other than the communist ones were formed and free elections were hold) and opening the economy to the world, the absence of controls gave way to full-speed international and internal migration immediately after the fall of the regime in 1990. With a new and weak government coming to power, and a lack of capacity to control and monitor the borders, it became more and more difficult to prevent the movement of people. The economic situation of the time — with inflation at around 350%, an annual 50% drop in the GDP, and rapidly increasing unemployment nationwide — favoured the emigration of well-educated people and internal demographic movements (Barjaba, 2004).

Barjaba breaks down the phase of post-1990 migration further: into the uncontrolled stream of 1991-1992, when approximately 300,000 Albanians left the country; the 1992-1996 stream, when a similar number migrated, most illegally, despite the temporary improvement of the economy and better border controls; and the 1996-1997 stream immediately after the collapse of various pyramid schemes which wiped out the savings of hundreds of thousands of people. Finally, the Parliament imposed a ban on speedboats in coastal waters to crackdown on people and drug smuggling. Since 1998, a gradual improvement in economic, political, and social conditions and favourable immigration policies in two key receiving countries, Greece and Italy, have increased legal migration and reduced illegal flows (Barjaba, 2004). With political and economic stability coming to the country, although slow and sometimes with reversals, migration in general has decreased, although a considerable number of people (especially the young generations) say they would still migrate if they had the chance (IOM, 2008).

Regarding the internal migration of Albanians, we can see an increase in the movement of people to the capital and the coastal and central regions of the country during the period 1993-1996 (Çaro et al., 2007:88), which led to a shrinkage in the population of the north-eastern and southern cities. In Graph 1 we can see the internal migration of Albanians during the period 1990-2008.

Factors of migration in Albania

Migration in Albania after 1990 was not shaped by governmental policies or regulations. Being developed as a spontaneous phenomenon[5], migration includes people from different backgrounds. Even though each individual or group have different motivations and reasons for migrating, there are some common factors that influence the decision-making process behind their migration.

Push factors

The most common push factors for migrants, both international and internal, are unemployment and poverty. According to Barjaba (2004), at a 13% ratio of unemployment and around 30% of the population living below the poverty line, the motivation for moving to regions which offer more opportunities for a better life becomes very strong. Poor health conditions, lack of education, and bad economic conditions, as well as poor access to basic services and lack of infrastructure, especially in rural areas, pushes people to migrate.

"Because migration is a policy of free movement of people, unfortunately it is impossible to stop or revert," says the director of civil office in Fier, Mrs. Mocka. The main reason for this movement, she continues, is economic. Because of the low potential for development in the rural areas, people move to the urban areas with the hope to find a job,

4 The voluntary work periods were planned and organised activities arranged by the party authorities according to the necessities of the party. Every citizen had to contribute voluntarily. These activities involved helping in building schools, hospitals, factories or roads, working in the fields, or the irrigation projects of the party, etc.

5 Migration of Albanians in and out of the country was initially done based on momentary impulses that resulted from the right to move freely and no longer fearing the controls of the party. As Barjaba expresses it, people „identified the freedom and liberty of the Western world with free movement" (2004b:232), which led to spontaneous demographic movements.





◀◀ Figure 2: Expelling index, internal and international migration, 1989-2001 , Source: Carletto et al, 2004: 38-40

◀ Figure 3: Absorbing index, 1989-2001, Source: Carletto et al. 2004: 38-40

earn higher incomes, live a better life, and/or educate their children. Located in south-west Albania, Fier is the fifth most populated city in the country, and it constitutes to be one of the most important cities in Albania in terms of production, especially oil and agriculture. According to the journalist A. Damini, currently in Fier immigration is increasing and emigration is decreasing. In 2008, the number of people leaving the rural areas to move to urban areas in the prefecture of Fier was 5,650 out of the total population of 78,559.[6]

According to Carletto et al., an additional push factor is the decrease in public sector jobs due to decentralisation and privatisation processes in Albania. Since 1992, the high levels of "underemployment in rural areas have kept unemployment rates in double digits, and real wages[7] only in 2001 recovered their pre-crisis level of 1995" (2004:4).

Pull factors

On the other side, the better economic development of some regions, with greater employment opportunities and higher wages, constitutes the pull factors. Tirana and several coastal cities offer a greater range of opportunities in terms of labour market and higher wages, and are thus some of the most attractive regions for internal migrants in the country (Çaro et al. 2007:95). Some other pull factors that encourage people to emigrate or migrate are family reunions, education, new job opportunities, higher incomes, cultural motivations and so forth.

Urban growth and development reconsidered

International and internal migrations have changed the demographic landscape of Albania. While on one hand we have cities with shrinking populations, on the other hand we have cities with increasing migrant populations. But the consequences go beyond the total population estimate and affect other domains as well, such as the overall economical and infrastructural changes in the country, the labour market, and the gender and age ratios (IOM, 2008).

In rural-urban migration as well as in migration from a small urban centre to a bigger or more developed one, people move according to their capacities, aspirations and expectations. Usually the first destination is the nearest urban centre, where many people may decide to permanently reside or stay temporarily until they find new opportunities to move to another better destination. In both cases, people rarely decide to return to their villages or cities.

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT, 2004) of Albania, four main trends can be identified regarding the demographic movement from 1990 onwards:

- Movement from north and north-eastern regions (prefectures of Kukes and Dibra) to central regions (Tirana, Durres, Vlora).
- Movement from various parts of the country (prefectures of Berat, Korce, Elbasan, Gjirokaster, Shkoder) towards the centre of the country (Tirana, Durres, Vlora).
- Movement from secondary coast regions (prefectures of Fier, Vlore, Lezhe) towards the central regions (Tirana, Durres).
- Movement from various central parts of the country to secondary coastal regions (prefectures of Fier, Vlore, Lezhe).[8] (IOM, 2008:14)

The maps (figure 2 and 3) show the expelling index including internal and international migration and the absorbing index for the period 1989-2001 (for more information on how to calculate migration movements at district level refer to Carletto et al. 2004:7).

Shrinking cities

The main concerns in small Albanian cities[9] are, among others, loss of vitality, decrease in population due to migration of people to bigger cities or abroad (22-25% of the Albanian population has migrated out of the country since 1990) (Barjaba, 2004), decrease of purchasing power and commercial life, deteriorating infrastructure, and lack of productivity and trade. Demographically speaking, shrinking cities are becoming older. The youth is moving to cities offering more opportunities.

The sectors highly affected by migration in the shrinking cities are the healthcare system, education, and employment sectors. Especially the high rates of unemployment in Albania in recent years, although improvement is seen, are a push factor for people to migrate. According to Çaro et al. (2007:92) the situation is critical in some districts, such as Has, Kurbin and Pukë, where the unemployment rate reaches more than 40 percent.

6
Population in towns and cities: January 1st, 2008, Retrieved on 4 August 2009 from: www.instat.gov.al

7
According to OECD, real wages are defined as "the goods and services which can be purchased with wages or are provided as wages." (Glossary on statistical terms: Real Wages, retrieved on August 4, 2009 from http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4824)

8
Please see the Administrative divisions of Albania map for a better visualisation of movements and locations of regions in Annex I.

9
Defined as cities with a population of less than 15,000 people, which is the case for 19 out of 42 cities in Albania.

Figure 4: City centre of Tirana, Source: Adelina Greca, 2004

10
The private ownership was banned in Albania during the communist period, and every property, movable or immovable was collectivised or state-owned. People's means to travel were limited; the houses were distributed to the people by the state according to an equal distribution policy of the party.

Growing cities

The main concern in growing cities such as Tirana and other big cities is how to allocate, afford and manage the increasing costs and expenditures within the already existing limited capacities of municipalities and local governments. Thus, migration is increasingly contributing to social dislocation, agricultural labour shortages, and rapid deterioration in the provision of social services in urban areas. Furthermore, the original identity of urban areas has often changed considerably due to the different socio-cultural norms and values of migrants to those of urban residents, which may provoke discrimination and aggression between residents and migrants (Çaro et al., 2007; Carletto et al. 2004).

Given the great increase of internal migration to the urban areas on the coast as well as local rural-urban migration, creating economic opportunities in urban areas beyond Tirana and the other big cities could help in re-establishing a more sustainable internal flow, as Tirana alone is struggling to accommodate and service the increasing number of migrants flocking to its poorest neighbourhoods (Çaro et al., 2007). The existing willingness and consensus of the public authorities and government to draw and design more appropriate, sustainable strategies to lift households out of poverty and promote the country's growth can be considered as a positive step of the public authorities towards the issue of internal migration.

Challenges for urban government and governance

After 1990, with the switch to free enterprise, private ownership[10] and an open market economy, people seized the opportunity to occupy and use public and empty space as they desired. This can be seen in the illegal settlements built mainly by internal migrants on state-owned or private land in the peripheries of growing cities such as Tirana and the corridor of Durres-Fushekruje. The new settlements, generally nice houses and villas built mostly with remittance money, became a big problem for the local authorities. First of all, they put forward the demands for infrastructure, public services and other facilities. Secondly, they brought about the problematic issue of title deed rights of the occupied land. Conflicts of interests arose between the landowners and the migrants, who asked for permits from the government. Caught in the middle, the government, who could not evict the migrants, had to compensate the old owners, who in many cases were not satisfied. To date, the migrants still live in the areas they first occupied, improving and upgrading their living conditions according to their incomes and capacities.

In addition to the above, a new sensitive and serious issue emerged concerning the socio-cultural aspect of migration. The potential of exclusion of the communities in these peripheric areas from the rest of the city poses a serious threat in terms of the disparities that have started to appear in the city such as: the unequal distribution of infrastructure and services, the emergence of ghetto society where people interact with and support people from the same place of origin, the alienation of people (especially the youth) from the cultural values of the society, etc.

While the issue of title deeds goes on in several cases, infrastructure is still very weak, in many cases upgraded or built by the community itself. The national decentralisation processes may give local governments more authority in dealing with many problems regarding the improvement of living conditions, but they still lack the financial means and budget necessary to cover all problematic areas. The brain drain of qualified human capital, the lack of vision for a promising future in the cities, and the lack of expertise in dealing with several issues, including migration, are some other obstacles which prevent local governments from providing proper public services, drawing coherent strategies and action plans, or implementing, following up and monitoring the progress of the projects launched.

Conclusion

Albania cannot afford another decade of migration, i.e. brain and work drain. Furthermore, the depopulation of the countryside and the unsustainable demographic pressure on cities like Tirana are likely to create additional impediments to a balanced and equitable growth process. Therefore, return migration is vital. However, migrants would opt to return permanently only in cases where secure employment, acceptable living conditions, safety,

favourable economic situation, acceptable education and medical systems are provided, or for family reasons.

Recognising migration as a socio-economic issue should be the first step towards building a migration strategy. Following the concept of the right to the city, "everybody has the right to enjoy the benefits, services and social and spatial space that the city provides" (Brown, 2009). Action plans for the creation of jobs not only in the big cities but also in other prefectures and less developed areas should be drawn, and means for their successful implementation should be also secured. Central and local governments should strive to create new investment opportunities in rural areas, thus revitalising the agricultural activities and production that was once vivid and discouraging migration to urban areas.

The constraints that the public authorities and institutions experience with migration and migrants, such as lack of inclusive policies, good governance and political willingness, can be overcome by transferring best-case examples and scenarios from countries with long prior experience and practice. Some observations and suggestions for governance within urban areas: local governments should receive bigger budgets, which is not possible given the economic conditions of the country and the fiscal difficulties of the government. The result is that the public services provided with limited resources by local governments do not satisfy all the population, which may lead to gentrification in the cities, further deterioration of the existing infrastructure, increase in illegal activities etc. Furthermore, the government could call for different partnerships with the private sector in providing the public services, being still in control of developments in the city, and protecting the interests of the citizens. A third option would be that communities take over and provide the services they need in a regulated or unregulated way depending on the possibilities they have (Kadriu, 2008).

Updated information and data on migration, as well as interpretation of the data, are among the objectives to be achieved in order to analyse the current situation especially in the urban areas with the most number of migrants. Unfortunately, there are no direct studies or undertakings that address the problems of migrants and local population at the local level. The main reasons for this are lack of capital and human resources, lack in legislation, and lack of cooperation between different public institutions. A positive step towards migration policies, proper registration, monitoring and following up is the National Strategy for Migration undertaken by the Albanian Government, which will hopefully exert pressure on respective institutions and organisations at both central and local level. Continuous exchange of information, expertise, and resources between key entities is a must in understanding and facilitating the processes of smooth integration of migrants.

We should learn to look at migration and migrants not as a problem but rather as a source of solutions and choices for the individuals and families involved. Such an approach would bring positive outcomes and win-win solutions for the whole community, local government, and all the other public/private entities concerned.

References

ALIAJ, B., eds. 2004, "Making Cities Work, The International Conference of ENHR (European Network of Housing Research)", The series of CO-PLAN publications, OMBRA GVG Tirana 2004

BARJABA, K. 2004a, Albania: Looking beyond Borders, Retrieved from Migration Information Source, 12 July 2009, from: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=239

BARJABA, K. 2004b, Migration and Ethnicity in Albania: Synergies and Interdependencies, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Summer/Fall 2004, Volume XI, Issue I, 231:239, Retrieved on 4 August 2009 from: http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/11.1/Essays/Barjarba.pdf

BROWN, A. 2009, The 'Right to the City' şa Model for Inclusion, Feature Publication – Inclusive cities, Retrieved on 10 July 2009 from: http://www.inclusivecities.org/feature_publication.html

CARLETTO, G., Davis, B., Stampini, M., & Zezza, A. 2004, Internal Mobility and International Migration in Albania, Rome: FAO, ESA, Working Paper 04-13.

ÇARO, E., van Wissen, L.J.G. 2007, Migration in the Albania of the post-1990s: triggered by post-communist transformations and facilitator of socio-demographic changes, SEER Southeast Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs (SEER Southeast Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs), issue: 03 / 2007, pages: 87-105, on www.ceeol.com.

INSTAT, 2004 People and Work in Albania, Tirana: INSTAT

IOM, 2008, Identification of the areas most affected by emigration and return migration in Albania: Profiling of returning migrants, International Organization on Migration (IOM), Retrieved on 20 June 2009, from: http://www.migrantinfo.gov.al/images/stories/files/publikime/anglisht/most_affected_areas-profile.pdf

KADRIU, E. 2008, Revitalization of Albanian Cities through Business Improvement Districts Case Study: Marketplace at District No. 2 in the City of Tirana, Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, TU-Berlin, Berlin. Germany

Taylor, P. and Colin, B. 2008, UNESCO/UN HABITAT Joint Project: Urban Policies and the Right to the City, UNESCO 2008: 19-24

Other online sources

Albania, Retrieved on 06 August 2009 from: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/albania.pdf

Emigrimi: si ndryshoi popullsia shqiptare, Retrieved on 10 July 2009 from: http://www.shqip.dk/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=6089

Executive Summary: Economy of Albania, Retrieved on 06 August 2009 from http://web.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/publications/Exec_Economy_Albania

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Retrieved on 08 July 2009, from: http://www.mpcs.gov.al/migracioni/historik/69-tri-periudhat-e-emigrimit-modern-shqiptar

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Retrieved on 08 July 2009, from: http://www.mpcs.gov.al/migracioni/historik/68-migrimi-ne-kuadrin-historik

Population in towns and cities: January 1st, 2008, Retrieved on 4 August 2009 from: www.instat.gov.al

Refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons, Amnesty International, Retrieved 09 July 2009 from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/refugees-and-migrants

Rritet migrimi, ulet emigracioni ne Fier, Retrieved on 10 July.2009, from: http://www.fieri.com/news/126/ARTICLE/4601/2008-12-21.html

Study, 38% of Albanians want to migrate, Retrieved on 10 July 2009 from: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/media/artikull/iden/158794/titulli/Studimi-38-e-shqiptareve-duan-te-emigrojne

Timeline: Albania, Retrieved on 06 August 2009 from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1004984.stm

Translations from Albanian to English – by author

Enkeleda Kadriu
holds a bachelor degree in Political Sciences and Public Administration from Middle East Technical University in Ankara Turkey, and a Master of Science degree in Urban Management from TU-Berlin. At the moment she is a PhD candidate at the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (ISR), TU-Berlin.

eda_kadriu@yahoo.com

TRIALOG

A Journal for Planning and Building in the Third World

- A journal for architects, planners, sociologists, geographers, economists and development planners
- A journal for the exchange of professional experience in the field of urban development in the Third World
- A journal for the presentation and discussion of new research results and for the discussion of recent concepts of development policies for urban change
- A journal of free discussions, of work reports and of documentation of alternative approaches

The thematic range of TRIALOG includes among other related topics: urbanization and housing policy / architecture and regional cultures / ecology, technological transfer and appropriate technologies / rural development strategies.

Contributions in TRIALOG are written in German or English, with a summary in the respective other language.

Available TRIALOG-numbers in English:

99 (1/09)	**East Africa**
98 (3/08)	**Vertreibungen / Forced Evictions**
97 (2/08)	**Es wandelt sich!**
95/96 (1/08)	**think future**
94 (3/07)	**Housing Policies**
93 (2/07)	**Imposing European Urban Structures**
92 (1/07)	**Megacities**
91 (4/06)	**Building on Disasters**
90 (3/06)	**Urban Coalitions**
89 (2/06)	**Controlling Urban Space**
88 (1/06)	**Afghanistan**
87 (4/05)	**Violence and Insecurity in Cities**
86 (3/05)	**Lehre und Forschung 2**
85 (2/05)	**Regionalkultur - Cultural Diversity**
84 (1/05)	**Orte Bauen**
83 (4/04)	**Entlang der Seidenstraße**
82 (3/04)	**Urban Mobility**
81 (2/04)	**Micro Governance**
80 (1/04)	**Neo-liberal Urbanity**
79 (4/03)	**Tourism and Development**
78 (3/03)	**Social Production of Habitat in Latin America**
77 (2/03)	**Infrastruktur und Entsorgung**
76 (1/03)	**Stadt und Wüste**
75 (4/02)	**New Settlements**
74 (3/02)	**Urban Land Managements**
73 (2/02)	**Disaster Relief - Katastrophenhilfe**
72 (1/02)	**Eco-community**

Single issue € 10 (plus postage)
Previous issues (till No.79) € 6 (plus postage)

Membership/ orders for previous issues:
TRIALOG - Peter Gotsch, Gluckstr. 85
D- 76185 Karlsruhe, Email: <pg@glora.org>

Subscription of TRIALOG (4 issues/year):
€ 35 for personal orders (plus postage)
€ 45 for institutions (plus postage)
€ 20 for students (plus postage)

Membership in the association: € 65,–
(Annual fee, incl. the subscription of TRIALOG)

Orders for subscription / single issues:
Astrid Ley, Habitat Unit, TU Berlin,
Straße des 17. Juni 135, D- 10623 Berlin,
Email: <astrid.ley@tu-berlin.de>

For more information: **www.trialog-journal.de**

Aktuelles / News

"Local Challenges, Global Opportunities – An Urban Dialog" hosted by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in Berlin, 14 July 2009

On 14 July 2009, leading urban academics, politicians and practitioners met to discuss how to address pressing challenges and capitalize on arising opportunities in the field of urban development. Faced with global issues such as climate change, the financial crisis and shifts in the international aid architecture, the participants identified impacts on the local level and debated strategies on how to support development partners in a challenging context.

The discussion took place alongside an expert forum, which was hosted by the Cities Alliance as the first of a number of events, commemorating its launch in Berlin 10 years ago. In this context the Cities Alliance had been able to attract a number of high-ranking urban specialists to Berlin. These were joined by German urban experts. Thus the discussants included: Annette Bähring, head of the GTZ Unit "Decentralization, Regionalization, Municipal and Urban Development"; Soomsook Boonyabancha, founding director of ACHR; Harald Fuhr, Chair of International Politics at University Potsdam; Peter Herrle, head of the Habitat Unit at Berlin University of Technology; Mark Hildebrand, founding manager of the Cities Alliance; Stephen Karam, senior urban economist at the World Bank; Walter Leitermann, manager of the European Office of the German Association of Cities and Towns; the Nigerian scholar and presidential advisor Akin Mabogunje; Franz Marré, head of the BMZ division "Water, Energy, Urban Development"; Gordon McGranahan, head of the urban settlements group at the IIED; Eduardo Moreno, Chief of the Global Urban Observatory at UN Habitat; Konrad Otto-Zimmermann, Secretary General of ICLEI; Sheela Patel, founding director of SPARC; and Clare Short, British

Local Challenges, Global Opportunities – An Urban Dialog, Photo: Bender, 2009

Member of Parliament and ex-Secretary of State for International Development.

The dialog forum was opened by Joerg-Werner Haas, director of the division "State and Democracy" at GTZ, who welcomed the participants. William Cobbett, manager of the Cities Alliance, then started off the discussion with a brief account of the key findings of the preceding expert forum: According to Mr. Cobbett, the three major barriers to the successful integration of the poor into the urban fabric remain informality, illegality and invisibility.

An Integrated Multi-Level Approach

In the course of the event it was recognized that while the speed and scale of urbanization is a huge challenge, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, this process also holds enormous economic potential. Accordingly, a multi-level governance approach was considered necessary to effectively address the challenges and opportunities of urbanization. It was also stressed, that the inclusion of civil society and the urban poor themselves in the policy and decision making processes should be regarded as equally important.

Since urban development is a highly complex and intertwined process, an integrated approach was deemed essential, to coordinate the work in different sectors which are traditionally treated separately. However, considering that there are immense differences between cities, and even between different areas within the same city, it is important that the integrated solutions are adapted to the individual context.

Changing International Aid Architecture

Furthermore, it was stated that international donors should assess the effectiveness of the current aid architecture. An institutional shift in the international aid architecture has been identified as developing countries are becoming increasingly interested in the horizontal sharing of knowledge and experiences. As new development partners such as civil society platforms, NGOs, foundations and universities are becoming more and more important and new forms of development such as South-South exchanges or triangular cooperation are on the rise, donors have to reconsider their role.

Disaster Mitigation

It was emphasized, that the urban poor are particularly vulnerable to environmental risks since they are often forced to settle on floodplains, mountain slopes and other hazardous areas due to a lack of alternatives. While it is the responsibility of governments to provide safe areas for poor people to live in, public authorities often fail to do so as key questions concerning land rights and security of tenure remain unresolved. In this case, education regarding disaster prevention and mitigation are particularly important to strengthen the resilience of the urban poor.

For development partners, the increase in natural disasters due to climate change calls for the design of practice-oriented strategies. These should include, amongst others, studies on alternative settlement structures in coastal areas to respond to rising sea levels. Also new development projects should be assessed in terms of being adaptable to changing conditions under climate change.

The Urban Agenda in the International Development Discourse

Finally, reflecting on the social, cultural and economic significance of urbanization, it was commonly felt that urban development should be much more prominently featured in the international development debate. Further, recognizing the sheer size of the urban challenge, the scaling up of solutions was deemed absolutely essential. Working strategies and good practices cannot be developed city by city. There is a need to make solutions available, adaptable and replicable to different contexts – that is to say: following a wholesaling knowledge management approach.

Conclusion

Summing up, the discussion presented a unique opportunity for exchange and new networks as it brought together key actors from different organizations in order to facilitate the dialog between urban academics, politicians and development practitioners. This opportunity was seized by the participants as they debated new trends and concepts as for instance local adaptation strategies to climate change and the changing international aid architecture.

At the same time, the participants expressed their frustration at the low support to urban development by the international donor community, especially considering the urgent need for action in this field. It was stressed that innovative concepts and solutions would not be able to effectively address the rising challenges, as long as genuine support by policymakers was lacking. While a British Parliamentary Committee on International Development1 has recently recognized the immense importance of urban development for poverty reduction, there is still a long way to go for the urban agenda to be mainstreamed into the general policy discourse.

Carolin Bender
GTZ Advisor for Urban Development at the unit "Water; Energy; Urban Development" at the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development; carolin.bender@bmz.bund.de

Chris Schmelzer
Project Officer at the GTZ sector project "Policy Advisory Services in Municipal and Urban Development"; chris.schmelzer@gtz.de

Fusion Cities - Two Border Cities growing together

Jula-Kim Sieber



Fusion is found everywhere in the globalized world – in urbanism as well. A seminar at PAR, an urban design institute at TU Darmstadt particularly focused on fusion passing borders. Four different types of borders were to be analysed: the natural, the artificial, the social, and the political border.

Four groups of students focused on the fusion cities BRAKIN (made of Brazzaville and Kinshasa) characterized by a natural border of the river Kongo; SAN JUANA (combining San Diego and Tijuana) with the artificial border between Mexico and the United States of America; JERUSALEM known for its political border, and FAVEMINIO (a combination of favela and condominio) with a social border in Rio de Janeiro between favelas and condominios. The students had to fulfill three analytical steps: borders, cities and movements. The conceptual idea was to finally distill the fusion in one freeze image called "consolidation of movement". The three steps are expressed in a visual language applying graphics and maps and only short explanatory texts, in order to provide comparable results. Through this abstraction, key notes of the cities become visible.

A typical example for this approach is illustrated by the work of the students Marion Bouchard and Humberto Sarabia. They found out that BRAKIN, Brazzaville and Kinshasa - the two closest capitals of the world – are only divided by the river Kongo.Downtown BRAKIN is located on the ferry linking the two cities. Besides trade the fusion is mainly based on music, a fusion of black and white, of colonized people and locals, but also of Brazzaville and Kinshasa, since the local conditions of musical expression are changing locations: Brazzaville had the first night bars, Kinshasa the music publishers (see map below). This movement has cultural and intellectual characteristics.

In summary all four groups identified that the specific characteristics of borders impact the fusion and interaction process. People find various ways to penetrate a border. Against this background cultural movements are of central importance. They open ways for integration which is indispensable for a global working habitat.

The whole analysis in form of PDFs and MP3 is available at http://www.fusion-cities.par-darmstadt.de.

Jula-Kim Sieber
is assistant professor at PAR, TU Darmstadt. She is researching on the relationship between architecture (+urbansim) and communications (=film, music, dance, art, community spirit, etc.). published on www.blog.ar2com.de translating it into architecture.ar2com.de

participating students
Anne Touchet, Eleni Sougaris, Humberto Sarabia, Julio Obregon Zepeda, Marion Bouchard, Slobodan Subotić and Petko Gogov

Figure 1: Cultural Exchange in BRAKIN (Marion Bouchard and Humberto Sarabia)



Neue Bücher / Book Reviews

Architektur

Wu, R./ Canham, S.: Portraits from Above – Hong Kong's Informal Rooftop Communities, Peperoni Books, Bad Münder 2008, ca. 300 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-9809677-7-8, € 45,-.

Mit dieser Dokumentation informeller Dachsiedlungen in Hong Kong haben die kanadische Architektin Rufina Wu und der deutsche Fotograf Stefan Canham den dritten Preis beim Bauhaus Award 2008 gewonnen. Das Projekt wurde darüber hinaus von der Kulturbehörde Hamburg und von Art and Culture Outreach in Hong Kong unterstützt.

In Ihrem Buch dokumentieren die Autoren informelle Siedlungen auf den Dächern von fünf Gebäuden, die auf Hong Kongs Halbinsel Kowloon liegen. Die „Rooftop Communities" sind durch staatliche Sanierungspläne gefährdet. Allein weil es diese Siedlungsform vielleicht bald nicht mehr geben wird, ist dieses Buch ein wichtiges Zeitdokument. Die fünf Gebäude werden als Isometrien dargestellt; sowohl in ihrem ursprünglichen, als auch in ihrem jetzigen „informellen" Zustand mit parasitären Siedlungen auf den Dächern.

Jedes Beispiel wird mit einem kurzen Porträt über das Gebäude und dessen Dach-Bewohner eingeleitet. Der Aufsatz „Siedlungen auf den Dächern Hong Kongs: Eine Einführung" von Dr. Ernest Chui (Hong Kong Universität) erläutert die Entstehungsgeschichte der Siedlungen und den Migrationshintergrund vieler ihrer Bewohner.

Ästhetisch anspruchsvolle und informative Fotografien ergänzen die etwas nüchternen Isometrien und schaffen ein ausgewogenes Gesamtbild von Hong Kongs informellen Dachsiedlungen.

Das Buch ist durch das sehr eindrucksvolle Bildermaterial Canhams geprägt. Der Text ist eher knapp gehalten, dennoch lohnt es sich hineinzulesen.

Josefine Fokdal

Wohnungsversorgung

Daphne Frank: Sustainable Housing Finance for Low-Income Groups. A Comparative Study, Reihe „Weltwirtschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit" Bd. 2, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2008, 284 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-8329-3677-8, € 44,-.

Die vorliegende Publikation, die auf einer Dissertation an der Universität Kassel basiert, untersucht und vergleicht – auf der Grundlage von sechs Fallstudien in vier Ländern – unterschiedliche Programme staatlicher Wohnbaufinanzierung, die in den vergangenen Jahren für einkommensschwache Bevölkerungsschichten durchgeführt wurden. Dabei stellt sie sich insbesondere die Frage der Nachhaltigkeit, also ob die jeweiligen Programme ihre Zielgruppen erreicht und in den Entwicklungsprozess eingebunden bzw. dazu beitragen haben, die Wohn- und Lebensverhältnisse der betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen dauerhaft zu verbessern.

Die Arbeit ist in fünf Teile gegliedert. Nach einer Einleitung, welche zunächst Begriffsdefinitionen, etwa der Nachhaltigkeit, sowie Methoden und Untersuchungskriterien klärt, wird im zweiten Teil der Rahmen abgesteckt, innerhalb dessen sich formelle und informelle Wohnbauprozesse unterer Einkommensschichten in den Ballungsräumen des Südens vollziehen. Im dritten Teil, der mit knapp 100 Seiten den Schwerpunkt der Veröffentlichung darstellt, werden in einer systematischen Aufarbeitung sechs beispielhafte Finanzierungsprogramme aus vier Ländern und drei Kontinenten (Lateinamerika, Afrika, Asien) erläutert und evaluiert, wobei die Programme in Chile und Ecuador bereits abgeschlossen, in Südafrika und Thailand hingegen noch andauernd sind. Der Aufbau aller Teilstudien erfolgt in gleicher und damit gut vergleichbarer Form: Zunächst wird der jeweilige politische und ökonomische Kontext kurz vorgestellt, dann folgt eine Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Merkmale des jeweiligen Programms, danach eine ausführliche Beschreibung der Rolle der verschiedenen Akteure (Nutzer, öffentliche Hand, private Bauwirtschaft, Finanzinstitutionen, internationale Geldgeber und Nichtregierungsorganisationen) sowie schließlich eine Darstellung der Programmergebnisse in Bezug auf die in der Einleitung formulierten Nachhaltigkeitskriterien.

Auch wenn die Auswahl der Fallbeispiele immer nur eine exemplarische sein kann, versucht die Verfasserin dennoch in ihrer Gesamtschau ein möglichst breites Abbild unterschiedlicher Typen von Wohnbaufinanzierungsprogrammen zu untersuchen: So werden etwa aus Chile („Basic Housing Programm") und aus Südafrika („Project-Linked Subsidy Programm") jeweils ein eindeutig marktorientieres und mit großen Stückzahlen auf die private Bauwirtschaft abzielendes, „produkt-orientiertes" Finanzierungsprogramm einerseits sowie ein eher auf Beteiligungs- und Entwicklungsprozesse, sozusagen „prozessorientiertes" Programm (Chile: „Progressive Housing Programm", Südafrika: „People's Housing Process") andererseits vorgestellt. In dem Programm in Ecuador („Housing Incentive System Program") steht eine technisch unterstützte Selbsthilfe für Reparaturen und Verbesserungen in bestehenden Quartieren im Vordergrund; und in Thailand (CODI Program) geht es insbesondere um die Unterstützung von basisorientierten Netzwerkbildungen durch Sparer-Gruppen, welche subventionierte Kredite für selbstbestimmte Investitionen erhalten.

Im vierten Teil erfolgt – die Fallstudien übergreifend - eine Modellbildung in drei Hauptkategorien: die „marktorientierten", die „gemeinschaftsorientierten" und die so genannten „hybriden" Programme, wobei Schwächen und Stärken der jeweiligen Typen herausgearbeitet werden. Dabei wird auch deutlich gemacht, welche zusätzlichen Hemmnisse, unabhängig vom Programmtyp, in vielen Fällen durch makroökonomische Rahmenbedingungen, politischen Zentralismus, bürokratische Strukturen, aber auch hohe Bodenpreise, periphere Standortzuweisungen und unzureichende Infrastrukturversorgung auferlegt werden. Auch Fragen unzureichender Ausführungsqualität, nicht zielgruppengerechter Auswahl der



Betroffenen und mangelhafter Zugangsmöglichkeiten zu formalen Kreditsystemen sind zunächst nicht unmittelbar vom jeweiligen Programmtyp abhängig. Hingegen ist die massive Beteiligung des privaten Bausektors und eine eher geringe Beteiligung der Betroffenen ein typisches Merkmal aller marktorientierten Programme, die vor allem auf hohe Produktionsziffern abzielen. Bei gemeinschaftsorientierten Programmen stehen demgegenüber die Einbindung der Betroffenen, die Fortführung sozialer Netzwerke, Prozesshaftigkeit, Beratung durch Nichtregierungsorganisationen, aber dadurch vielfach auch Abhängigkeit von externen (internationalen) Geldgebern im Vordergrund. Tendenziell greifen marktorientierte Programme eher in die Lebensweisen und sozialen Lebenswelten der Bewohner ein, mit der Gefahr, diese zu zerstören, während gemeinschaftsorientierte Programm diese eher bewahren.

Im abschließenden fünften Teil werden noch einmal zentrale „Eckpunkte" für eine Nachhaltigkeit der Förderprogramme rekapituliert (insbesondere in Hinblick auf den Erhalt sozialer Netzwerke und bestehender informeller Lebenswelten der Betroffenen) sowie Empfehlungen und „Bausteine" für die Weiterentwicklung künftiger Programme formuliert. Damit leistet die vorliegende Publikation – über den Vergleich der Fallstudien hinaus – eine wichtige Grundlagenarbeit für künftige Entscheidungsträger in Planung, Politik und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, aber auch Praktiker und Wissenschaftler auf dem Gebiet der Wohnbaufinanzierung und -förderung für einkommensschwache Bevölkerungsschichten.

Michael Peterek

Huchzermeyer, M. /Karam, A. (Hrsg.): Informal Settlements: A Perpetual Challenge?, Juta/UCT Press, Cape Town 2006, 336 Seiten, ISBN 978-1-919713-94-6, € 31,99.

Dieser Band, herausgegeben von Marie Huchzermeyer und Aly Karam, beide Wissenschaftler an der School of Architecuture and Planning der University of the Witwatersrand, reflektiert und beurteilt die Wirkung von Politikansätzen im Umgang mit informellen Siedlungen. Fokus ist das südliche Afrika. Bemerkenswert ist die Bandbreite von 18 Autoren – junge bis prominente, südafrikanische bis internationale Wissenschaftler, Vertreter von NGOs bis hin zu Politikberatern sowie staatlichen Entscheidungsträgern. Dies verschafft vielschichtige Perspektiven.

In einer umfassenden Einleitung wird als wesentliches Argument angeführt, dass Upgrading keinen technischen, sondern einen politischen Eingriff darstellt. Dieses Hauptargument zieht sich als roter Faden durch alle Beiträge. Die 15 Kapitel des Bandes basieren auf einem zweijährigen Forschungsprojekt und dem damit verbundenen Abschlussworkshop im November 2004. Leider beziehen sie deshalb nur ansatzweise die 2004 erst verabschiedete südafrikanische Wohnungsbaureform „Breaking New Ground



(BNG)" mit ein. BNG wird in Südafrika als Paradigmenwechsel verstanden: u.a. wegen der Einführung von insitu upgrading und der Entwicklung innerstädtischer Flächen für sozialen Wohnungsbau. Diesbezüglich ist Kapitel 3 bemerkenswert, denn hier wird auf das Programm für „Informal Settlement Upgrading (ISU)" als Teil von BNG eingegangen und ein Einblick in den Politikformulierungsprozess gegeben.

Teil 1 bietet einen Rückblick auf Politikinstrumente in Südafrika, Angola und Brasilien. Sehr hilfreich ist die entwickelte Typologie von Politikreaktionen auf informelle Siedlungen. Die Autoren selbst plädieren für „transformative policies" – einen Ansatz, der einen behutsamen Umgang mit informellen Siedlungen fördert - und bemängeln zugleich, dass die südafrikanische Regierung einer solchen Vorgehensweise skeptisch gegenüber steht, aus Angst damit Landbesetzungen zu motivieren.

Teil 2 ist den Rahmenbedingungen gewidmet: der Komplexität und Heterogenität von informellen Siedlungen. Detailliert schildert Warren Smit die Unzulänglichkeiten bestehender Politikinstrumente und Umsetzungspraktiken, die die sozio-ökonomische Vulnerabilität von armen Bewohnern eher noch verstärken. Dies ist laut Cecile Ambert insbesondere der Fall für Haushalte, die von HIV/AIDS betroffen sind.

Teil 3 konzentriert sich auf das Thema Bodensicherheit. Lauren Roysten und Alan Durand-Lasserve, Herausgeber des weitverbreiteten Bandes „Holding their Ground", führen gegen Hernando De Soto's Argument an, dass eine Formalisierung von Bodentiteln nicht im Interesse der Armen sei. Besonderes Augenmerk gilt den „market-driven evictions", die zunehmend dazu beitragen, dass informelle Siedlungen an der Peripherie entstehen. Hintergrundinformationen zu den neueren Trends zur Umsiedlungspolitik in Südafrika können TRIALOG Leser auch im Heft 98 3/2008 (Huchzermeyer) nachlesen.

Teil 4 zeigt, dass trotz progressiver Politik, die lokale Praxis in Südafrika anders aussieht: In situ upgrading ist ein loses Versprechen wie es Nick Graham für Kapstadt besonders verdeutlicht. Catherine Cross zeigt ebenfalls am Beispiel Kapstadt eindrücklich, welchen Einfluss unterschiedliche Akteurskonstellationen auf die Politikimplementierung nehmen.

Insgesamt bietet der Band einen gut strukturierten Überblick und wichtige Fallbeispiele, um die Problemstellung informeller Siedlungen aufzuzeigen. Illustrationen sind leider sehr sparsam eingesetzt. Dafür lebt die Publikation von ihrer wissenschaftlichen Qualität und guten Zugänglichkeit, die noch durch einen umfassenden Index mit allen wichtigen Schlagwörtern ergänzt wird. Es ist eine Grundlagenliteratur für alle, die sich mit Wohnungsbaupolitik und informellen Siedlungen in Südafrika beschäftigen; ist aber auch darüber hinaus für andere Kontexte von Relevanz. Die Veröffentlichung manifestiert die Bedeutung von multi-Ebenen und kontextspezifischen Ansätzen. Sehr zu empfehlen für Wissenschaftler, politische Entscheidungsträger und Berater, die sich mit Wohnungsversorgung im Kontext informeller Siedlungen beschäftigen.

Astrid Ley

Ökologie

Hartmut Leser: Stadtökologie in Stichworten, 2. neu bearbeitete Ausgabe, Hirt's Stichwortbücher, Gebr. Borntraeger Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin und Stuttgart 2008, 320 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-443-03119-0, € 29,80.



Stadtökologie beinhaltet ein weites, disziplinübergreifendes Themenfeld, zu dem in den vergangenen Jahren bereits zahlreiche Publikationen erschienen sind. Das vorliegende Buch im handlichen DIN A5-Format behandelt vorrangig die naturwissenschaftlichen Sachverhalte des Stadtökosystems. In seinen Hauptkapiteln werden die abiotischen und die biotischen Teilsysteme und Funktionsbereiche der Stadt dargestellt: Relief, Boden, Wasserhaushalt; Stadtklima; Pflanzen und Tiere im Lebensraum Stadt. Die Abhandlung erfolgt dabei in einer, auch für den naturwissenschaftlichen Laien, gut verständlichen Form, mit knapp gehaltenen Erläuterungen zu den jeweils wichtigsten Themen und Begriffen, zahlreichen Tabellen und Übersichten sowie hervorragenden graphischen Darstellungen, die eigens für diesen Band entwickelt wurden. Dabei werden auch immer wieder Querbezüge und Exkurse zu Mensch und Gesellschaft, Technik, Planung und Politik hergestellt, unter anderem in Teilkapiteln zum Lärm in der Stadt, zu den funktional-räumlichen Stadtstrukturtypen sowie zu den Grundsätzen und Werkzeugen einer ökologischen Stadtplanung und eines ökologischen Stadtumbaus. Der lexikon-ähnliche Gesamtaufbau des Werkes und die Abgeschlossenheit der einzelnen Kapitel (mit jeweils eigenen kurzen Zusammenfassungen) regen den Leser dazu an, sich immer wieder einzelne Teilthemen, unabhängig von deren Reihenfolge im Buch, zu erschließen, wozu auch ein umfassendes Stichwortregister dienlich ist. Ausführliche Literaturhinweise sowohl auf Grundlagenwerke der Stadtökologie als auch auf zentrale Sekundärliteratur zu den einzelnen Fachkapiteln erlauben dem interessierten Leser bei Bedarf eine weitergehende Vertiefung. Insgesamt ist dieses Buch allen, die sich in Studium, Planung, Verwaltung und Politik mit stadtökologischen Themen beschäftigen, als konzentrierter Überblick über die naturwissenschaftlichen Aspekte zu empfehlen.

Michael Peterek

Stadtentwicklung

Gather, M./ Kagermeier, A./ Lanzendorf, M.: Geographische Mobilitäts- und Verkehrsforschung, Studienbücher der Geographie, Gebr. Borntraeger Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin und Stuttgart 2008, 303 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-443-07143-1, € 29,-.

Der vorliegende Band – in der Reihe der „Studienbücher der Geographie" erschienen – ist als Lehrbuch zu den aktuellen Herausforderungen von Verkehr und Mobilität für Studierende nicht nur der Geographie, sondern auch verwandter raumbezogener Disziplinen wie Raumplanung, Städtebau, Stadtbauwesen oder Infrastrukturplanung konzipiert. Es zielt dabei bewusst auf thematische Breite und einen grundlegenden Überblick über gesellschaftliche und politische, technische, ökologische und ökonomische Anforderungen an zukunftsfähige Verkehrssysteme und eine nachhaltige Mobilitätssicherung.

Nach einem Einstieg in die grundlegenden Begriffe der Verkehrsforschung werden inhaltlich zunächst die gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen aktueller und zukünftiger Verkehrsentwicklung sowie Gründe, Ziele und Instrumente einer auf Nachhaltigkeit angelegten Verkehrspolitik dargelegt. In weiteren Kapiteln werden soziale, ökonomische und umweltbezogene Aspekte des Verkehrs (Mobilität für alle; Verkehr als Teil der Volkswirtschaft; Umweltauswirkungen des Verkehrs), aber auch die Wechselwirkungen von Raumstrukturen und Verkehrsentwicklung beschrieben. Es folgten Teilabschnitte zum Personen- und zum Güterverkehr, bevor dann abschließend konkrete Maßnahmen und Konzepte der Verkehrsgestaltung in urbanen Räumen, im ländlichen Raum und in den schnell wachsenden Metropolen des Südens thematisiert werden.

Zahlreiche Abbildungen, Diagramme und Tabellen, weiterführende Literaturangaben am Ende eines jedes Kapitels sowie ein abschließendes umfassendes Gesamtliteraturverzeichnis ergänzen die konzentriert und verständlich geschriebenen Texte dieses Lehrbuch, das Studierenden wie Praktikern als ein guter Einstieg in die zeitgenössische Verkehrs- und Mobilitätsthematik dienen kann.

Michael Peterek

Gesellschaft und Politik

Mexatlas - http://mexatlas.com

Mexatlas is an interactive webpage created by Patricia Perez Salem as part of her master thesis project (Master of Architecture and Urban Culture Metropolis) at the CCCB (Centre de Cultura Contemporania de Barcelona) in Barcelona.

The webpage is a proposal for a new tool of understanding the hybrid cultures of Northern Mexico. Mexatlas provides an insight into emerging cultures and subcultures in the border cities Tijuana, Juárez and Monterrey. Examples of music, architecture, graphic arts and cinema are presented, through which the fusions and interrelations with North American influences on one side, but also with immigrants cultures or leading cultural references such as Columbia or Jamaica are analyzed. The Mexatlas creates a vivid portrait of this hybrid, globalized and continuously changing cultural landscape of the North of Mexico, its author being convinced that it is "relevant", "beautiful" and "extremely powerful".

An initial map leads the visitor into a network of graphical relations and acts as very good tool for entering different cultural worlds. Clicks bring the visitor to interviews, photographs, videos and audios - short documentaries of visually and linguistically hybrid worlds like the work of the band "El gran silencio" in Monterrey, the architecture and urban life in Avenida Revolución in Tijuana, the religious graphics and graffiti or the wall that divides Mexico from the US ("el muro") itself.

Hopefully the Mexatlas will be interactive in the future, to provoke even more hybridity, cross cultural relations and interconnections through the world wide web. Still, being non-participative for the moment, an explorative visit is highly recommended.

Kathrin Golda-Pongratz

Impressum

Herausgeber von TRIALOG ist der Verein zur Erforschung des Planens und Bauens in Entwicklungsländern – TRIALOG e.V.
Postadresse für Redaktion und Verein:
TRIALOG e.V. c/o PAR - Planen und Bauen in außereuropäischen Regionen, TU Darmstadt
El Lissitzky-Straße 1, 64287 Darmstadt
e-mail: <Redaktion@trialog-journal.de>

Vertrieb: Südost-Verlag Service (SVS) GmbH
ISSN Nr.: 0724-6234
V.i.S.d.P.: Astrid Ley

Redaktion: Kathrin Golda-Pongratz, Astrid Ley
Redaktionelle Mitarbeit: Josefine Fokdal, Bettina Hamann
Satz / Layout: Jula Kim-Sieber
Proof-Reading: Bryin Abraham
Druck: E & B printware Karlsruhe
Buchrezensionen: Josefine Fokdal, Kathrin Golda-Pongratz, Astrid Ley, Michael Peterek
Veranstaltungen: Astrid Ley
Titelbild: The Big Wheel, Philippe Rekacewicz, 2007

Die in TRIALOG veröffentlichten Artikel repräsentieren nicht zwingend die Meinung der HerausgeberInnen und der Redaktion. Nachdruck ist mit Angabe der Quelle und Zusendung eines Belegexemplars gestattet. Artikel, Ankündigungen und Informationen bitten wir an die Adresse des Vereins oder an die regionalen Kontaktpersonen zu richten.

Vorstand:

- Antje Wemhöner (Experten)
  Zwingli-Str. 4, 10555 Berlin, Tel 030-39101525
  e-mail: A.Wemhoener@gmx.de
- Astrid Ley (Abonnements, Aktuelles)
  Habitat Unit, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin,
  Tel. 030 – 314 21833,
  e-mail: astrid.ley@tu-berlin.de
- Klaus Teschner (Finanzen)
  Lochnerstr. 26, 52064 Aachen, Tel. 0179-2395619
  e-mail: teschner@habitants.de
- Kosta Mathéy (Buchrezensionen, Austauschabos)
  c/o PAR , El-Lissitzky-Straße 1, 64287 Darmstadt,
  Tel. 06151-163637, e-mail: KMathey@aol.com
- Peter Gotsch (Mitglieder)
  Gluckstr. 5, 76185 Karlsruhe
  Tel. 0721-9150277, e-mail: pg@glora.org

Korrespondenten:

- Wolfgang Scholz (Aktuelles)
  Ardhi University, School of Urban and Regional Planning; PO Box 35176 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
  scholz.wolfgang skype in: 0231 1772 470
  e-mail: scholz.wolfgang@web.de
- Kathrin Golda-Pongratz
  Carrer de la Princesa 15, 1-2, 08003 Barcelona, E
  Tel. +34–93 269 1226, e-mail: kathrin@pongratz.org
- Jürgen Oestereich (internationale Zusammenarbeit)
  Am Dickelsbach 10, 40883 Ratingen
  Tel/Fax: 02102 – 60740, e-mail: JOestereich@aol.com
- Michael Peterek
  Eleonore-Sterling-Str. 8, 60433 Frankfurt a.M.
  Tel. 069 – 53098328, e-mail: Michael@peterek-ffm.de
- Hassan Ghaemi
  Carl-Ulrich-Str. 1, 64297 Darmstadt,
  Tel. 06151 – 963707, Fax: 06151 – 963709
  e-mail: hassan.ghaemi@ghaemi-architekten.de
- Gislind Budnick
  Heslacher Wand 35a, 701101 Stuttgart
  Tel. 0711 – 6071965, Fax: 0711 – 6400354
  e-mail: gb@gislind-budnick.de
- Hans Harms
  29 South Hill Park, London NW3 2ST, UK
  Tel. +44-207 435 3953953,
  e-mail: hharms02@aol.com
- Florian Steinberg
  c/o Asian Development Bank, 06 ADB Avenue
  Mandaluyong City, Manila, Philippines
  Tel. +632 6325581, e-mail: fsteinberg@adb.org

TRIALOG 101 kostet 10,- € zzgl. Versand.
Stand: Oktober 2009

Veranstaltungen / Forthcoming Events

September 25, 2009 – January 10, 2010 in Rotterdam, Netherlands

4th International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam on "Open Cities: Designing Coexistence", curated by Kees Christiaanse (ETH Zurich), Contact: <info@iabr.nl>, Phone: (+ 31 10) 4364335, www.iabr.nl/EN/open_city/index.php

December 2 – 4, 2009 in Rotterdam, Netherlands

Global Urban Summit 2009, organised by the City of Rotterdam in cooperation with the Rotterdam Climate Initiative a.o., Contact: <judith.van.der.heijden@reedbusiness.nl>, Phone: (+31 78)6253856, www.urbansummit.rotterdam.nl/en

December 3 – 4, 2009 in Birmingham, UK

Conference on "Urban Design Research: Method and Application", organised by the Birmingham City University, Contact: <andreas.wesener@bcu.ac.uk>, www.biad.bcu.ac.uk/schools/architecture/urbandesignresearch.htm

December 3 – 5, 2009 in Frankfurt/Oder, Germany

International conference on "The Transnationality of Cities", organised by the graduate program "Transnational Spaces", European University Viadrina, Contact: <wisogeo@euv-frankfurt-o.de>, www.euv-frankfurt-o.de/en/index.html

December, 7 – 8, 2009 in Belgrade, Serbia

Conference on "Regional Development, Spatial Planning and Strategic Governance", organised by IAUS, Contact: <iaus@iaus.ac.rs>, Phone: (381 11) 3370 09, www.iaus.ac.rs

December 13 – 15, 2009 in Istanbul, Turkey

8th International Ecocity Conference on "Global Environmental Balances and Cities", organised by Ecocity Builders, Contact: <kirstin@ecocitybuilders.org>, www.ecocity2009.com

January 15 -16, 2010 in Darmstadt, Germany

TRIALOG Jubiläumstagung – Conference of the Society for Scientific Research on Planning and Building in Developing Countries (TRIALOG), organised by TRIALOG and PAR, TU Darmstadt, Contact: <KMathey@aol.com>, <pg@glora.org>, Phone: +49 (0)6151 163637

February 10 – 12, 2010 in Dortmund, Germany

4th conference on Planning, Law, and Property Rights, organised by The International Academic Association on Planning, Law, and Property Rights and the School of Spatial Planning, Contact: <plpr2010@tu-dortmund.de>, Phone: +49(0)231 755 2428, www.plpr2010.tu-dortmund.de

March 3 – 4, 2010 in Penang, Malaysia

International Conference on Sustainable Architecture & Urban Design (ICSAUD) on "Issues on Global Energy Crisis and Its Impact on Design", organised by University Sains Malaysia and Nusantra Urban Regional Institution, Contact: <icsaud2010@ymail.com>, www.hbp.usm.my/icsaud2010

March 22 – 26, 2010 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

5th World Urban Forum: The Right to the City-Bridging the Urban Divide, organised by UN-Habitat, Contact: <wuf@unhabitat.org>, Phone: (+254 20) 7623334/ 7623903, www.unhabitat.org/wuf

March 24 - 25, 2010 in Delft, Netherlands

Conference on "Comparative Housing Research: Approaches and Policy Challenges in a New International Era", organised by the Delft University of Technology in collaboration with the ENHR a.o., Contact: <e.m.vogels@tudelft.nl>, www.otb.tudelft.nl/comparativehousing2010

April 7 - 9, 2010 in Chelmsford, Essex, UK

Planning Research Conference (PRC 2010) on "Diversity and Convergence: Planning in a World of Change", organised by Anglia Ruskin University, Contact: <ann.hockey@anglia.ac.uk>

April 14 - 18, 2010 in Washington DC, USA

Association of American Geographers (AAG) Annual Meeting 2010 with a paper session on "Borders and cities: perspectives from North America and Europe", organized by School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning, Arizona State University, USA and Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies (CEPS), Luxembourg, Contact: <meeting@aag.org>, www.aag.org/annualmeetings/2010/registration.htm